Politics

[Scott CWO]

So you

Dear Red Leg, I sincerely respect you and the other participants, but let's not turn the discussion into a moral area, especially since, as a rule, it turns into a discussion on which of the participants is more immoral and who is less.
This war is not being waged out of the "whim of a mad dictator", it is a war for national interests, whether someone likes it or not. Perhaps it could have been prevented if the request for security guarantees had not been rejected from the doorstep.

Therefore, it may be interesting to you, such an episode from the past:
Recently, I accidentally stumbled upon a story relating to the summer of 1945, when the United States was deciding whether to inform the USSR (an ally) about the appearance of an atomic bomb. And at the final meeting, General Marshall spoke, and this is what he said in particular: "Marshall supported the disgraced concept of a "proactive initiative", primarily referring to personal experience. He stated that the history of claims and counter-claims, typical of Soviet-American relations, was based on accusations that, as a rule, turned out to be unfounded. What appeared to be a lack of Russian cooperation in purely military matters stemmed from their (Russian) understanding of the need to ensure their security. He, Marshall, always accepted this as a kind of reality and acted accordingly. ".

In general, Marshall suggested inviting the Russians to test the bomb, but the Truman government did not agree with this. This decision had many consequences. But I will only note that General Marshall was, it turns out, an astute and realistic person. I saw a monument to him near the base in Garmisch (I was passing by on a bicycle) and I hope that he will not suffer in the future, as monuments in different places of the world are suffering now.

So you are implying that the nuclear arms race started because the Truman administration didn’t invite the Russians to the bomb test? How convenient.

 

[Ray B]

So you

So you are implying that the nuclear arms race started because the Truman administration didn’t invite the Russians to the bomb test? How convenient.

I suppose Truman could have invited Stalin & his crew to a demonstration of the bomb - Ground level front row seats at Hiroshima.

 

[Wheels]

 

[Pondoro]

SITREP March 7, 2002

As we start a new week of war in Ukraine, it may be interesting to look at what outcomes the conflict has already produced

At the geostrategic level, some remarkable outcomes have been produced so far:

• resurrection of NATO from its “cerebral death”;
• interest of Sweden and Finland in joining NATO;
• reversal of German policy on weapons sales to belligerents;
• doubling of German defense budget to $112.7 billion/year and 2%+ of GDP;
• re-engagement of Turkey in NATO community and distantiation from Russia;
• emergence of EU as a foreign politic player;
• strengthening of the desire for an autonomous European Defense in Western Europe;
• strengthening of the desire for the American/NATO defense umbrella in Eastern Europe;
• European Parliament resolution to work towards granting EU candidate status to Ukraine;
• unprecedented economic sanctions on Russia;
• uneasy positioning of China and India;
• failure of Russia to decapitate the Ukrainian government by a rapid action;
• failure of Russia to receive a "liberators welcome" in Ukraine;
• failure of Russia to dominate decisively the battlefield;
• massive victory of Ukraine, so far, in the communication war;
• massive loss of credibility of Vladimir Putin on the international scene;

At the military level, some puzzling outcomes have emerged:

• incomprehensible Russian non-engagement in force of its air power in Ukraine;
• incomprehensible failure of Russia to secure complete air dominance rather than partial air superiority;
• incomprehensible Russian non-engagement of its modern armor in mass (T90MS) and reliance on less protected armor (T-72B3 and T-72B3M);
• repeated failure of S300 air defense system to intercept basic drones (Turkish Bayraktar TB2);
• failure of S400 air defense system to intercept conventional ballistic missiles fired at Russian Millerovo Airbase;
• lack of Russian air force guided munitions resulting in gen 4.5 aircrafts using WWII technology free-fall bomb, hence necessity for low level bombing and vulnerability to MANPAD (man-portable air-defense systems (e.g. stinger), inaccurate delivery, and collateral damages;
• incapability of Russian logistics to support offensive action further than 90 miles from its railhead depots;
• incompetence of conscript soldiery and, apparently, many junior officers;
• out-of-proportion effectiveness of basic drone technology (e.g. ~$1 million Turkish Bayraktar TB2 flying at 137 mph and carrying 330 lbs. total payload);
• unexpected effectiveness of the Ukraine military defense;
• high Ukrainian morale at individual level among volunteers;
• low Russian morale at individual level among conscripts;

Things to watch for this week at the geopolitical level:

• Do the negotiations start to produce progress?
• Do the EU/US take the risk of providing offensive equipment to Ukraine (e.g. Polish Mig-29 aircrafts)?
• How does Russia react if EU/US take the risk of providing offensive equipment to Ukraine?

Things to watch for this week at the theater level:

• Do the Russian & Belarus forces attempt to shut down the influx of military equipment from the West by running an operation along the Polish border, starting from the Western end of Belarus and driving south?
• Do the Russians initiate the battle of Kyiv?
• Do the Russians continue to progress South and East?
• Do the Russians link Crimea to Russia along the Sea of Azov coastline through Mariupol?
• Do the Russians escalate the war by starting to use massive and indiscriminate artillery fire on cities?

Unlikely developments this week:

• Entry of NATO in the military conflict at theater or strategic level;
• Attack of a NATO country by Russia;
• Escalation of the conflict at the nuclear level;

Possible outcome this week:

One of the possible outcomes that may emerge this week is an answer to the central question whether Russia's so far limited commitment of its forces, and non-engagement in a battle for Kyiv was caused by:

• a political choice to preserve as long as possible the city (cradle of Eastern-Slavic-Russian civilization) from destruction while ramping up by progressive soviet-style, brutal force and naked aggression coercive diplomacy toward a negotiated settlement; or
• a military incapability (incompetent projection of force and insufficient logistics).

Potential resolution scenario:

A potential resolution scenario is a negotiated settlement based on:

• Ukraine/EU/US/NATO/the West have already accepted - even if not in public statements for internal politics consumption - the foreign politic inevitability of Crimea being Russian due to its 90%+ Russophone population and - most importantly - Sevastopol;
• EU/US/NATO/the West have long accepted that the entry of Ukraine (we can add Georgia and Belarus) into NATO is not a realistic prospect at this stage, and that even if the US accepted it, France and Germany would veto it, as they already did in 2008;
• the Donbass is likely more a liability to Ukraine/EU/US/NATO/the West than an asset, and ending the ethnic disintegration cancer in Ukraine is well worth the cost of letting it re-attach itself to Russia;

The settlement could include:

• Immediate cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of Russian forces;
• International recognition that Crimea belongs to Russia;
• Neutralization/Finlandization of Ukraine and non-entry in NATO;
• Independence of the Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic on the Kosovo model;
• Potentially: entry of Ukraine in the European Union;
• Potentially: Russian reparations to Ukraine.

This essentially would meet the "security demands" made by Putin prior to initiating the war (hence it raises the psychological issue of rewarding aggression), but from a pragmatic foreign politic perspective (Realpolitik) the Crimean and NATO membership have never really been in play; and exchanging the Donbas for an entry in the EU would be a win for Ukraine because the Donbas coal-based economy is not free-market competitive, and consumes more State subsidies than it produces revenues, even thought it produces 20% of GDP, not to mention the invaluable closure on ethnic divisions and 8 years of war.

As an ex-tanker and commander of tank platoons what you say make a lot of sense..

Me neither cannot for the life of me get why they did not commense elite units like the 1.guard tank division and more paratroopers to aquire Kyiv..

 

[spike.t]

I have been sent some of these...and sure others on here have....some were obviously bullshit but here is info behind these ones....

BBC News - Ukraine invasion: False claims the war is a hoax go viral

Ukraine invasion: False claims the war is a hoax go viral

False claims have been spreading that the Ukraine war is a hoax and that actors have been involved in staging events.

www.bbc.co.uk

 

[One Day...]

SITREP (Situation Report) March 7, 2002
Update March 8, 2022 early am

As we start a new week of war in Ukraine, it may be interesting to look at what outcomes the conflict has already produced.

There already are new outcomes and a few answers, as well as analyses about some of the questions.

At the geostrategic level, some remarkable outcomes have been produced so far:

• resurrection of NATO from its “cerebral death”;
• interest of Sweden and Finland in joining NATO;
• reversal of German policy on weapons sales to belligerents;
• doubling of German defense budget to $112.7 billion/year and 2%+ of GDP;
• re-engagement of Turkey in NATO community and distantiation from Russia;
• emergence of EU as a foreign politic player;
• strengthening of the desire for an autonomous European Defense in Western Europe;
• strengthening of the desire for the American/NATO defense umbrella in Eastern Europe;
• European Parliament resolution to work towards granting EU candidate status to Ukraine;
• unprecedented economic sanctions on Russia;
• uneasy positioning of China and India;
• failure of Russia to decapitate the Ukrainian government by a rapid action;
• failure of Russia to receive a "liberators welcome" in Ukraine;
• failure of Russia to dominate decisively the battlefield;
• massive victory of Ukraine, so far, in the communication war;
• massive loss of credibility of Vladimir Putin on the international scene;
• announcement by Austria - that is self-declared neutral in Europe (like Switzerland) - that it will increase its defense budget to 1% of GDP;
• announcement by Denmark that it will increase its defense budget from 1.35% to 2% of GDP;

At the military level, some puzzling outcomes have emerged:

• incomprehensible Russian non-engagement in force of its air power in Ukraine;
• incomprehensible failure of Russia to secure complete air dominance rather than partial air superiority;
• incomprehensible Russian non-engagement of its modern armor in mass (T90MS) and reliance on less protected armor (T-72B3 and T-72B3M);
• repeated failure of S300 air defense system to intercept basic drones (Turkish Bayraktar TB2);
• failure of S400 air defense system to intercept conventional ballistic missiles fired at Russian Millerovo Airbase;
• lack of Russian air force guided munitions resulting in gen 4.5 aircrafts using WWII technology free-fall bomb, hence necessity for low level bombing and vulnerability to MANPAD (man-portable air-defense systems (e.g. stinger), inaccurate delivery, and collateral damages;
• lack of precision of Russian guided cruise missiles (inability to hit runways and inability to avoid collision with high-rise buildings);
• incapability of Russian logistics to support offensive action further than 90 miles from its railhead depots;
• incompetence of Russian conscript soldiery and, apparently, many junior officers;
• out-of-proportion effectiveness of basic drone technology (e.g. ~$1 million Turkish Bayraktar TB2 flying at 137 mph and carrying 330 lbs. total payload);
• unexpected effectiveness of the Ukraine military defense;
• high Ukrainian morale at individual level among volunteers;
• low Russian morale at individual level among conscripts;
• lack of Russian secure voice communication systems at small units level and reliance on non encrypted radio and even civilian cell phone network to conduct military operations;
• loss of 845 Russian vehicles of all types as of March 7, including 218 vehicles seized by Ukrainian forces and pressed back into combat on Ukrainian side among which 85 tanks and 6 Pantsir and Tor-M2 air defense missile systems;

Things to watch for this week at the geopolitical level:

• Do the negotiations start to produce progress?
• Do the EU/US take the risk of providing offensive equipment to Ukraine (e.g. Polish Mig-29 aircrafts)?

White House, DoD lower expectations of Polish warplanes for Ukraine

The White House and Pentagon on Monday downplayed the likelihood of a three-way deal for Poland to give MiG-29 aircraft to Ukraine and for the U.S. to backfill the Polish fleet with American F-16 fighters.

www.defensenews.com

Just today Secretary Blinken made the statement that any decision by Poland to supply Mig 29's to Ukraine would be a "sovereign decision by Poland." I assume that was an attempt to defuse an appearance of NATO/US direct involvement, but it could also be seen as greenlighting a Russian retaliation against Poland that wouldn't trigger Article 5. One of the most potentially irresponsible statements I have ever heard (since Biden's press conference several weeks ago expressing understanding of a "minor" Russian incursion).

• How does Russia react if EU/US take the risk of providing offensive equipment to Ukraine?
• Do the EU/US ramp up sanctions to highest level, stop purchasing gas and oil from Russia, and prohibit energy transactions on SWIFT system?

Things to watch for this week at the theater level:

• Do the Russian & Belarus forces attempt to shut down the influx of military equipment from the West by running an operation along the Polish border, starting from the Western end of Belarus and driving south?

Belarusian forces will not take part in Ukraine war, Lukashenko says

Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko said on Friday that the Belarusian armed forces were not taking part and would not take part in Russia's military operation in Ukraine.

www.reuters.com

• Do the Russians initiate the battle of Kyiv?

Note: to give an idea of the potential nightmare than a full battle for Kyiv would be, American and British forces with full logistics support and massive precision air support advanced in average 1 kilometer (0.6 miles) per day during the second battle of Fallujah. The battle lasted almost 2 months (November 7 – December 23, 2004) to take the approximately 17 square mile city. By comparison, Kyiv is 324 square miles...​

• Do the Russians continue to progress South and East?
• Do the Russians link Crimea to Russia along the Sea of Azov coastline through Mariupol?
• Do the Russians escalate the war by starting to use massive and indiscriminate artillery fire on cities?

My sense is that the Russian attack is culminating across the battlespace. With each passing day, the inertia will grow. They run the risk of consuming their logistics as fast as they can be pushed to the line of contact. From their current locations, they can inflict enormous damage on their primary objectives, but that is very different from seizing them. They have only to look at their own history to see the eventual folly of such a campaign - Leningrad comes to mind. They still hold the initiative, but I am beginning to wonder for how long.

Unlikely developments this week:

• Entry of NATO in the military conflict at theater or strategic level;
• Attack of a NATO country by Russia;
• Escalation of the conflict at the nuclear level;

Possible outcome this week:

One of the possible outcomes that may emerge this week is an answer to the central question whether Russia's so far limited commitment of its forces, and non-engagement in a battle for Kyiv was caused by:

• a political choice to preserve as long as possible the city (cradle of Eastern-Slavic-Russian civilization) from destruction while ramping up by progressive soviet-style, brutal force and naked aggression coercive diplomacy toward a negotiated settlement; or
• a military incapability (incompetent projection of force and insufficient logistics).

See above comment by Red Leg.​

Potential resolution scenario:

A potential resolution scenario is a negotiated settlement based on:

• Ukraine/EU/US/NATO/the West have already accepted - even if not in public statements for internal politics consumption - the foreign politic inevitability of Crimea being Russian due to its 90%+ Russophone population and - most importantly - Sevastopol;
• EU/US/NATO/the West have long accepted that the entry of Ukraine (we can add Georgia and Belarus) into NATO is not a realistic prospect at this stage, and that even if the US accepted it, France and Germany would veto it, as they already did in 2008;
• the Donbass is likely more a liability to Ukraine/EU/US/NATO/the West than an asset, and ending the ethnic disintegration cancer in Ukraine is well worth the cost of letting it re-attach itself to Russia;

The settlement could include:

• Immediate cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of Russian forces;
• International recognition that Crimea belongs to Russia;
• Neutralization/Finlandization of Ukraine and non-entry in NATO;
• Independence of the Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic on the Kosovo model;
• Potentially: entry of Ukraine in the European Union;
• Potentially: Russian reparations to Ukraine.

This essentially would meet the "security demands" made by Putin prior to initiating the war (hence it raises the psychological issue of rewarding aggression)...

Ukraine will now never agree to neutralization. Ukraine would see this as granting Russia victory, and the current government will never survive such a capitulation. This has become a war of self determination and Ukraine is on the cusp of forcing Russian forces onto the defensive.

...but from a pragmatic foreign politic perspective (Realpolitik) the Crimean and NATO membership have never really been in play; and exchanging the Donbas for an entry in the EU would be a win for Ukraine because the Donbas coal-based economy is not free-market competitive, and consumes more State subsidies than it produces revenues, even thought it produces 20% of GDP, not to mention the invaluable closure on ethnic divisions and 8 years of war.

I think they could agree to some sort of third party mediation with respect to Donetsk and Luhansk and reluctantly concur with an international recognition solution of Crimea.

 

[CoElkHunter]

SITREP (Situation Report) March 7, 2002
Update March 8, 2022 early am

As we start a new week of war in Ukraine, it may be interesting to look at what outcomes the conflict has already produced.

There already are new outcomes and a few answers, as well as analyses about some of the questions.

At the geostrategic level, some remarkable outcomes have been produced so far:

• resurrection of NATO from its “cerebral death”;
• interest of Sweden and Finland in joining NATO;
• reversal of German policy on weapons sales to belligerents;
• doubling of German defense budget to $112.7 billion/year and 2%+ of GDP;
• re-engagement of Turkey in NATO community and distantiation from Russia;
• emergence of EU as a foreign politic player;
• strengthening of the desire for an autonomous European Defense in Western Europe;
• strengthening of the desire for the American/NATO defense umbrella in Eastern Europe;
• European Parliament resolution to work towards granting EU candidate status to Ukraine;
• unprecedented economic sanctions on Russia;
• uneasy positioning of China and India;
• failure of Russia to decapitate the Ukrainian government by a rapid action;
• failure of Russia to receive a "liberators welcome" in Ukraine;
• failure of Russia to dominate decisively the battlefield;
• massive victory of Ukraine, so far, in the communication war;
• massive loss of credibility of Vladimir Putin on the international scene;
• announcement by Austria - that is self-declared neutral in Europe (like Switzerland) - that it will increase its defense budget to 1% of GDP;
• announcement by Denmark that it will increase its defense budget from 1.35% to 2% of GDP;

At the military level, some puzzling outcomes have emerged:

• incomprehensible Russian non-engagement in force of its air power in Ukraine;
• incomprehensible failure of Russia to secure complete air dominance rather than partial air superiority;
• incomprehensible Russian non-engagement of its modern armor in mass (T90MS) and reliance on less protected armor (T-72B3 and T-72B3M);
• repeated failure of S300 air defense system to intercept basic drones (Turkish Bayraktar TB2);
• failure of S400 air defense system to intercept conventional ballistic missiles fired at Russian Millerovo Airbase;
• lack of Russian air force guided munitions resulting in gen 4.5 aircrafts using WWII technology free-fall bomb, hence necessity for low level bombing and vulnerability to MANPAD (man-portable air-defense systems (e.g. stinger), inaccurate delivery, and collateral damages;
• lack of precision of Russian guided cruise missiles (inability to hit runways and inability to avoid collision with high-rise buildings);
• incapability of Russian logistics to support offensive action further than 90 miles from its railhead depots;
• incompetence of Russian conscript soldiery and, apparently, many junior officers;
• out-of-proportion effectiveness of basic drone technology (e.g. ~$1 million Turkish Bayraktar TB2 flying at 137 mph and carrying 330 lbs. total payload);
• unexpected effectiveness of the Ukraine military defense;
• high Ukrainian morale at individual level among volunteers;
• low Russian morale at individual level among conscripts;
• lack of Russian secure voice communication systems at small units level and reliance on non encrypted radio and even civilian cell phone network to conduct military operations;
• loss of 845 Russian vehicles of all types as of March 7, including 218 vehicles seized by Ukrainian forces and pressed back into combat on Ukrainian side among which 85 tanks and 6 Pantsir and Tor-M2 air defense missile systems;

Things to watch for this week at the geopolitical level:

• Do the negotiations start to produce progress?
• Do the EU/US take the risk of providing offensive equipment to Ukraine (e.g. Polish Mig-29 aircrafts)?

White House, DoD lower expectations of Polish warplanes for Ukraine

The White House and Pentagon on Monday downplayed the likelihood of a three-way deal for Poland to give MiG-29 aircraft to Ukraine and for the U.S. to backfill the Polish fleet with American F-16 fighters.

www.defensenews.com

• How does Russia react if EU/US take the risk of providing offensive equipment to Ukraine?
• Do the EU/US ramp up sanctions to highest level, stop purchasing gas and oil from Russia, and prohibit energy transactions on SWIFT system?

Things to watch for this week at the theater level:

• Do the Russian & Belarus forces attempt to shut down the influx of military equipment from the West by running an operation along the Polish border, starting from the Western end of Belarus and driving south?

Belarusian forces will not take part in Ukraine war, Lukashenko says

Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko said on Friday that the Belarusian armed forces were not taking part and would not take part in Russia's military operation in Ukraine.

www.reuters.com

• Do the Russians initiate the battle of Kyiv?

Note: to give an idea of the potential nightmare than a full battle for Kyiv would be, American and British forces with full logistics support and massive precision air support advanced in average 1 kilometer (0.6 miles) per day during the second battle of Fallujah. The battle lasted almost 2 months (November 7 – December 23, 2004) to take the approximately 17 square mile city. By comparison, Kyiv is 324 square miles...​

• Do the Russians continue to progress South and East?
• Do the Russians link Crimea to Russia along the Sea of Azov coastline through Mariupol?
• Do the Russians escalate the war by starting to use massive and indiscriminate artillery fire on cities?

Unlikely developments this week:

• Entry of NATO in the military conflict at theater or strategic level;
• Attack of a NATO country by Russia;
• Escalation of the conflict at the nuclear level;

Possible outcome this week:

One of the possible outcomes that may emerge this week is an answer to the central question whether Russia's so far limited commitment of its forces, and non-engagement in a battle for Kyiv was caused by:

• a political choice to preserve as long as possible the city (cradle of Eastern-Slavic-Russian civilization) from destruction while ramping up by progressive soviet-style, brutal force and naked aggression coercive diplomacy toward a negotiated settlement; or
• a military incapability (incompetent projection of force and insufficient logistics).

See above comment by Red Leg.​

Potential resolution scenario:

A potential resolution scenario is a negotiated settlement based on:

• Ukraine/EU/US/NATO/the West have already accepted - even if not in public statements for internal politics consumption - the foreign politic inevitability of Crimea being Russian due to its 90%+ Russophone population and - most importantly - Sevastopol;
• EU/US/NATO/the West have long accepted that the entry of Ukraine (we can add Georgia and Belarus) into NATO is not a realistic prospect at this stage, and that even if the US accepted it, France and Germany would veto it, as they already did in 2008;
• the Donbass is likely more a liability to Ukraine/EU/US/NATO/the West than an asset, and ending the ethnic disintegration cancer in Ukraine is well worth the cost of letting it re-attach itself to Russia;

The settlement could include:

• Immediate cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of Russian forces;
• International recognition that Crimea belongs to Russia;
• Neutralization/Finlandization of Ukraine and non-entry in NATO;
• Independence of the Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic on the Kosovo model;
• Potentially: entry of Ukraine in the European Union;
• Potentially: Russian reparations to Ukraine.

This essentially would meet the "security demands" made by Putin prior to initiating the war (hence it raises the psychological issue of rewarding aggression)...



...but from a pragmatic foreign politic perspective (Realpolitik) the Crimean and NATO membership have never really been in play; and exchanging the Donbas for an entry in the EU would be a win for Ukraine because the Donbas coal-based economy is not free-market competitive, and consumes more State subsidies than it produces revenues, even thought it produces 20% of GDP, not to mention the invaluable closure on ethnic divisions and 8 years of war.

Thanks so much for the current updates (nice touch in green!) and keeping us all informed!

 

[One Day...]

...
My biggest fear is that the Biden administration's reactive weak handling of this crisis ... and fear that Russia will walk out of the Iran nuclear negotiations ...

Well, this is getting complicated...

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/07/russia-demands-iran-nuclear-deal-/

 

[spike.t]

Just to let the vodka drinkers know its safe

Stoli vodka announces rebrand

The maker of Stolichnaya vodka announced a major rebrand Friday, in direct response to its founder's "vehement position" against the Putin regime and the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

edition.cnn.com

 

[BourbonTrail]

Just to let the vodka drinkers know its safe

Stoli vodka announces rebrand

The maker of Stolichnaya vodka announced a major rebrand Friday, in direct response to its founder's "vehement position" against the Putin regime and the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

edition.cnn.com

I’m still drinking Tito’s…God Bless Texas.

 

[375 Ruger Fan]

Hackers Targeted U.S. LNG Producers in Run-Up to Ukraine War

(Bloomberg) -- In mid-February, hackers gained access to computers belonging to current and former employees at nearly two dozen major natural gas suppliers and exporters, including Chevron Corp., Cheniere Energy Inc. and Kinder Morgan Inc., according to research shared exclusively with...

finance.yahoo.com

https://finance.yahoo.com/research/stock-forecast/KMI?symbols=KMI&ncid=mbr_yfnacqlnk00000011
(Bloomberg) -- In mid-February, hackers gained access to computers belonging to current and former employees at nearly two dozen major natural gas suppliers and exporters, including Chevron Corp., Cheniere Energy Inc. and Kinder Morgan Inc., according to research shared exclusively with Bloomberg News.

The attacks targeted companies involved with the production of liquefied natural gas, or LNG, and they were the first stage in an effort to infiltrate an increasingly critical sector of the energy industry, according to Gene Yoo, chief executive officer of Los Angeles-based Resecurity Inc., which discovered the operation. They occurred on the eve of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, when energy markets were already roiled by tight supplies.

Resecurity’s investigation began last month when the firm’s researchers spotted a small number of hackers, including one linked to a wave of attacks in 2018 against European organizations that Microsoft Corp. attributed to Strontium, the company’s nickname for a hacking group associated with Russia’s GRU military intelligence service.

 

[375 Ruger Fan]

Opinion: I’m a Former Moscow Correspondent. Don’t Let Vladimir Putin Fool You—Russia’s War in Ukraine Is Only About One Thing.

"As towering skyscrapers rose in Moscow atop a pile of oil cash, Putin’s government became more backward-looking and more isolated," Lukas I. Alpert writes...

www.marketwatch.com

If you walk the streets of Moscow, you will eventually smell the faint odor of gasoline.
It’s as ever-present in the air around Russia’s capital as it is central to the country’s economy, infrastructure and geopolitical posture.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has spelled out a nationalist rationale for his country’s military incursion into two restive provinces in eastern Ukraine largely controlled by Kremlin-backed separatists, but it is primarily about protecting Moscow’s energy interests.
That was true in 2014, when Russia seized Crimea and I was a Moscow correspondent for the Wall Street Journal, for which I wrote dozens of stories about the insurgency in Donetsk and Luhansk that Russia helped foment. And it remains true now.

To understand the Kremlin’s motivations in regard to its smaller, and relatively impoverished, neighbor, the key fact to know is that Russia supplies 40% of Europe’s heating-fuel supplies—namely, natural gas. To get it there, Russia relies mostly on two aging pipeline networks, one of which runs through Belarus and the other through Ukraine. For this, Russia pays Ukraine around $2 billion a year in transit fees.

Russia is a petrostate and relies on oil and natural-gas sales for about 60% of its export revenue and 40% of its total budget expenditures. Any crimp on Russia’s ability to access the European market is a threat to its economic security.
In the Kremlin’s view, a switch of allegiance by Kiev, or Kyiv by Ukrainian preference, to the West—be it an economic association agreement with the European Union like Ukraine was on the verge of signing in 2014, or even the hint of joining NATO—is close to an act of war.
In my three years covering Russia, I watched as the country slowly withdrew into itself after Putin returned to office for what was then his third term as president.

Gone were prior efforts to intertwine Russia’s economy and the global system and encourage foreign investment. As towering skyscrapers rose in Moscow atop a pile of oil cash, Putin’s government became more backward-looking and more isolated.
In Ukraine, meanwhile, many were growing increasingly ill at ease with the impoverished state of their country and highly corrupt political system as it languished, locked in a kind of Soviet-era limbo under Russian domination.

As Ukrainians looked to rising living standards in places like Poland and Latvia that had joined NATO and the European Union, many wondered why they couldn’t have the same for themselves.
This is where Putin’s nationalistic impulses kick in. He views the fall of the Soviet Union as the “greatest geopolitical tragedy” of the past century and the rush of former Eastern bloc countries into the embrace of the European Union, and even NATO, as a great humiliation.
He has drawn a line in the sand with countries that border Russia, invading Georgia in 2008 when it hinted at joining NATO, and moving to destabilize Ukraine when it moved to establish closer economic ties with Europe.

Domestically, Putin has sold the incursions into Ukraine on purely nationalistic grounds—even going so far this weekend as to dismiss Ukraine’s history as an independent country as a falsehood.
While Ukrainians and Russians share religions and ethnicities, they speak different, albeit similar, languages, even as there are pockets of native Russian speakers in some Ukrainian regions, as there are in other former Soviet republics. And while Russians have seen their quality of life improve awash in petro-rubles in the decades under Putin’s rule, Ukrainians have been mired in poverty and bogged down by misrule.

While it is no wonder many Ukrainians yearn to be unmoored from their bigger, imperialist neighbor, for Putin and his cohort of oligarchs Ukrainian self-determination is not really on the table.
Not when it puts at risk the flow of money that has kept them in power.

​

​

 

[Tanks]

@375Fox That article omits one fact. NordStream 2 which Biden already had green lighted prior to invasion. That would have eliminated dependence on the pipeline going through Ukraine and the yearly payments.

The invasion of Ukraine, at this point, was actually counterproductive in regard to gas transport.

 

[Red Leg]

@375Fox That article omits one fact. NordStream 2 which Biden already had green lighted prior to invasion. That would have eliminated dependence on the pipeline going through Ukraine and the yearly payments.

The invasion of Ukraine, at this point, was actually counterproductive in regard to gas transport.

Beat me to it. I don't think this was a petroleum/gas based decision.

 

[Red Leg]

This is well worth reading. The first is an article in "The Hill" reporting on retired Colonel General Leonid Ivashov's criticism of Putin with respect to Ukraine. Below it is a translation of an actual interview he gave before the invasion. It makes one wonder how long Putin can keep his iron grip on the home front.

A retired Russian general’s criticism may signal a larger problem for Putin

Retired Russian Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov, the head of the All-Russian Officers Assembly, has gone public with a statement that calls for Russian President Vladimir Putin to resign o…

thehill.com

https://www.reddit.com/r/ukraine/comments/t9g2j3

 

[375 Ruger Fan]

Nord Stream 1 is a twin pipeline that has been in service for about 10 years or so and has a capacity of 1.9 trillion cubic feet per day (that's huge!).

Nord Stream 2 is a project to lay two more lines and to double the capacity to a total of 3.8 TCF/D.

 

[Red Leg]

The Strategy That Can Defeat Putin

The U.S.-led coalition of liberal-democratic states should pursue three objectives.

www.theatlantic.com

Like everything in The Atlantic it is a long read. However, it is a very thoughtful one and captures where many of us are at this point in the conflict both with respect to observations and the way forward.

 

[Major Bonkers]

Russian casualties in the Ukraine are estimated at between 5,000 - 12,000 to date, and obviously increasing every day.

Russian fatalities in the decade-long Afghan war (1979 - 1989) were 15,000.

In the Ukraine, the Russians have, so far, lost a documented 145 tanks, which is almost certainly under the true figure. In Afghanistan, over 10 years, they lost 147.

I am not a military man - I never got past the medical - but it seems likely to me, as a matter of common sense alone, that Putin has failed. What he hoped to achieve has failed and cannot now be rescued. The longer that the war goes on, the better his opponent forces will be supplied and he will face them with increasingly degraded troops. To continue as he has been is just to create a meat-grinder.

He is in the same quandary as Macbeth: I am in blood stepped in so far, that, should I wade no more, returning were as tedious as go o'er. His unpalatable choices are either to go for broke, levelling cities, relying on the usual unpleasant Russian ruthlessness, and facing a guerrilla insurgency even should he 'win'; or to lose face and call a halt, having accomplished nothing.

No-one seems inclined to help Putin out of the trap of his own making and, frankly, he deserves to stew in it. This, however, ignores the plight of the Ukrainian civilians (and shortly the Russian civilians, as their economy implodes) caught up in the mess. What is needed is an honest broker to get Putin out of the Ukraine, and leave him in charge in Russia. Perhaps some second-rate politician from the EU can be found to take on this role: Herman Van Rompuy and Jean-Claude Juncker, your time has come!

 

[Tanks]

The Strategy That Can Defeat Putin

The U.S.-led coalition of liberal-democratic states should pursue three objectives.

www.theatlantic.com

Like everything in The Atlantic it is a long read. However, it is a very thoughtful one and captures where many of us are at this point in the conflict both with respect to observations and the way forward.

One thing from the article quoted below. Call me a sceptic, but I do not think USA is capable of a change in a mindset at this point. We have people from the right already calling what's happening a misinformation campaign from "a corrupt Ukraine government that is the West's puppet" and of course the left saying the only reason people care about Ukraine is because they are White.

We are way too polarized to make any sensible decisions long term.

Heck, Biden administration going to Venezuela, Iran etc. to beg for oil rather than removing the road blocks that were thrown on our own energy industry shows the ideological blindness.

For the United States, the decade ahead will require not merely the initial moves made by the Biden administration but a more profound readjustment of strategy. A new defense-strategy document has been in the works for months now; it should be set aside and rewritten for a very different world. There will be no overwhelming shift to focus on China. Rather, the United States will have to be, as it was for most of the 20th century, an ambidextrous power, asserting its strength and managing coalitions in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific. That will, in turn, require larger defense budgets and, no less important, a change in mindset.

 

[Sabattiboy]

I agree that it is going to happen. For a few reasons:

Blinken is the weakest sec of state I can ever remember, I have never seen anyone project weakness the way he does.

Russia has entered a meat grinder situation, the losses they are taking is surprising, I keep waiting for Russia to just level Ukraine indiscriminately. It is coming pretty clear they dont have the resources to perform a long term ground battle.

Sanctions are going to take their toll on the Russian people, and at somepoint they are going to rise up. The fact 3000 protestors have been arrested already means their isnt the appetite for it in Russia and as conditions worsen the people will grow restless. The narrative will need to switch that this isnt about liberating Ukraine but an all out attack on Russia.

My biggest fear is that Putin will do a tactical nuclear strike on an Eastern European NATO country. How does the US/Euro respond?

In the same token, it seems the US is not taking the threat seriously, using Russia to help negotiate with Iran, meeting with Venezuela, buying Russian oil and keeping that part of the Russian economy open to SWIFT.

There is a lot more questions than there is answers.

As @Red Leg and @One Day... and some others, wrote in several lengthy commentary, what actually lies behind the activity and the closed door talks with tit for tat on the table we are left out of the real reasons since we live off the media BS that only reports the what and not the real why.
I have zero doubt Russia or China or the good ole USA all would like to run the entire world offering security and a wonderful life for all. Some are not fooled by the wonderful life that really would be provided. Under Saddam Hussein life was grand for some and a Bleep bowl for the rest.