SITREP March 7, 2002
As we start a new week of war in Ukraine, it may be interesting to look at what outcomes the conflict has already produced
At the geostrategic level, some remarkable outcomes have been produced so far:
- resurrection of NATO from its “cerebral death”;
- interest of Sweden and Finland in joining NATO;
- reversal of German policy on weapons sales to belligerents;
- doubling of German defense budget to $112.7 billion/year and 2%+ of GDP;
- re-engagement of Turkey in NATO community and distantiation from Russia;
- emergence of EU as a foreign politic player;
- strengthening of the desire for an autonomous European Defense in Western Europe;
- strengthening of the desire for the American/NATO defense umbrella in Eastern Europe;
- European Parliament resolution to work towards granting EU candidate status to Ukraine;
- unprecedented economic sanctions on Russia;
- uneasy positioning of China and India;
- failure of Russia to decapitate the Ukrainian government by a rapid action;
- failure of Russia to receive a "liberators welcome" in Ukraine;
- failure of Russia to dominate decisively the battlefield;
- massive victory of Ukraine, so far, in the communication war;
- massive loss of credibility of Vladimir Putin on the international scene;
At the military level, some puzzling outcomes have emerged:
- incomprehensible Russian non-engagement in force of its air power in Ukraine;
- incomprehensible failure of Russia to secure complete air dominance rather than partial air superiority;
- incomprehensible Russian non-engagement of its modern armor in mass (T90MS) and reliance on less protected armor (T-72B3 and T-72B3M);
- repeated failure of S300 air defense system to intercept basic drones (Turkish Bayraktar TB2);
- failure of S400 air defense system to intercept conventional ballistic missiles fired at Russian Millerovo Airbase;
- lack of Russian air force guided munitions resulting in gen 4.5 aircrafts using WWII technology free-fall bomb, hence necessity for low level bombing and vulnerability to MANPAD (man-portable air-defense systems (e.g. stinger), inaccurate delivery, and collateral damages;
- incapability of Russian logistics to support offensive action further than 90 miles from its railhead depots;
- incompetence of conscript soldiery and, apparently, many junior officers;
- out-of-proportion effectiveness of basic drone technology (e.g. ~$1 million Turkish Bayraktar TB2 flying at 137 mph and carrying 330 lbs. total payload);
- unexpected effectiveness of the Ukraine military defense;
- high Ukrainian morale at individual level among volunteers;
- low Russian morale at individual level among conscripts;
Things to watch for this week at the geopolitical level:
- Do the negotiations start to produce progress?
- Do the EU/US take the risk of providing offensive equipment to Ukraine (e.g. Polish Mig-29 aircrafts)?
- How does Russia react if EU/US take the risk of providing offensive equipment to Ukraine?
Things to watch for this week at the theater level:
- Do the Russian & Belarus forces attempt to shut down the influx of military equipment from the West by running an operation along the Polish border, starting from the Western end of Belarus and driving south?
- Do the Russians initiate the battle of Kyiv?
- Do the Russians continue to progress South and East?
- Do the Russians link Crimea to Russia along the Sea of Azov coastline through Mariupol?
- Do the Russians escalate the war by starting to use massive and indiscriminate artillery fire on cities?
Unlikely developments this week:
- Entry of NATO in the military conflict at theater or strategic level;
- Attack of a NATO country by Russia;
- Escalation of the conflict at the nuclear level;
Possible outcome this week:
One of the possible outcomes that may emerge this week is an answer to the central question whether Russia's so far limited commitment of its forces, and non-engagement in a battle for Kyiv was caused by:
- a political choice to preserve as long as possible the city (cradle of Eastern-Slavic-Russian civilization) from destruction while ramping up by progressive soviet-style, brutal force and naked aggression coercive diplomacy toward a negotiated settlement; or
- a military incapability (incompetent projection of force and insufficient logistics).
Potential resolution scenario:
A potential resolution scenario is a negotiated settlement based on:
- Ukraine/EU/US/NATO/the West have already accepted - even if not in public statements for internal politics consumption - the foreign politic inevitability of Crimea being Russian due to its 90%+ Russophone population and - most importantly - Sevastopol;
- EU/US/NATO/the West have long accepted that the entry of Ukraine (we can add Georgia and Belarus) into NATO is not a realistic prospect at this stage, and that even if the US accepted it, France and Germany would veto it, as they already did in 2008;
- the Donbass is likely more a liability to Ukraine/EU/US/NATO/the West than an asset, and ending the ethnic disintegration cancer in Ukraine is well worth the cost of letting it re-attach itself to Russia;
The settlement could include:
- Immediate cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of Russian forces;
- International recognition that Crimea belongs to Russia;
- Neutralization/Finlandization of Ukraine and non-entry in NATO;
- Independence of the Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic on the Kosovo model;
- Potentially: entry of Ukraine in the European Union;
- Potentially: Russian reparations to Ukraine.
This essentially would meet the "security demands" made by Putin prior to initiating the war (hence it raises the psychological issue of rewarding aggression), but from a pragmatic foreign politic perspective (Realpolitik) the Crimean and NATO membership have never really been in play; and exchanging the Donbas for an entry in the EU would be a win for Ukraine because the Donbas coal-based economy is not free-market competitive, and consumes more State subsidies than it produces revenues, even thought it produces 20% of GDP, not to mention the invaluable closure on ethnic divisions and 8 years of war.