We should separate technical development from tactical and operational deployment of armored forces.
I believe it is correct to say that the USSR provided a training environment for officers like Guderian to fully mature their concepts of combined arms maneuver. The Germans all acknowledged Captain Liddell Hart (British) as the theorist upon whose concepts of mobile warfare were most important to the creation and employment of Wehrmacht armored formations in WWII. I don't believe they would credit any operational or tactical revelations to the Soviet Union.
Technically however, they should have studied Russian tank development far more closely. The extremely fast, robust, and heavily gunned (relative to the time) Soviet designs of the 20's and 30's were a harbinger of the eventual superiority of Russian armor during the war. When in the fall of '41 the T-34 appeared on the battlefield it was superior to anything the Germans were then using. The improved PZ IV, Panther series, and Tiger redressed that balance to some extent, but the 34 remained far more robust and battle serviceable than its German counterparts. Once equipped with the 85mm gun it was a match for anything on the German side and superior to anything on tracks in the West. We shouldn't forget that a relatively small number of them manned by hastily trained North Koreans nearly ran us off the peninsula in 1950.
But as you note, I can't think of anything about combined arms armored warfare that the Russians would have taught the Germans in the thirties. The Soviets, on the other hand, attended a very demanding school in the art of mobile warfare conducted by the Germans in 41 and 42.
I believe it is correct to say that the USSR provided a training environment for officers like Guderian to fully mature their concepts of combined arms maneuver. The Germans all acknowledged Captain Liddell Hart (British) as the theorist upon whose concepts of mobile warfare were most important to the creation and employment of Wehrmacht armored formations in WWII. I don't believe they would credit any operational or tactical revelations to the Soviet Union.
Technically however, they should have studied Russian tank development far more closely. The extremely fast, robust, and heavily gunned (relative to the time) Soviet designs of the 20's and 30's were a harbinger of the eventual superiority of Russian armor during the war. When in the fall of '41 the T-34 appeared on the battlefield it was superior to anything the Germans were then using. The improved PZ IV, Panther series, and Tiger redressed that balance to some extent, but the 34 remained far more robust and battle serviceable than its German counterparts. Once equipped with the 85mm gun it was a match for anything on the German side and superior to anything on tracks in the West. We shouldn't forget that a relatively small number of them manned by hastily trained North Koreans nearly ran us off the peninsula in 1950.
But as you note, I can't think of anything about combined arms armored warfare that the Russians would have taught the Germans in the thirties. The Soviets, on the other hand, attended a very demanding school in the art of mobile warfare conducted by the Germans in 41 and 42.