Politics

[CJW]

I just read a report of a Chechen general killed in a fight for an airport in Ukraine. If it's true, I guess they aren't invincible.

 

[SaintPanzer]

Trying to understand the "why" so that we do not need to go through the "what" repeatedly...

I have abstained from engaging in this thread so far, because my analysis will likely surprise, but let me preface by saying that Russian military aggression cannot be condoned, period, and that I do not aim to offend.

My point here is NOT to justify what is happening, I condemn it, it is to propose that we try to understand what is happening.

If you allow me, Joe, I will use one of your posts as a starting board

The Monroe Doctrine



I agree. This is THE reason. Period.

And not only do the United States have the military and economic power to prevent it, but we also actually have a political doctrine to support it.

It is called the Monroe Doctrine. Going clear back to 1823 this doctrine articulates the fact that the United States will not tolerate interference of any other world power in the Western Hemisphere. The doctrine held that any intervention in the political affairs of the Americas by foreign powers was a potentially hostile act against the U.S.

For example (and I am surprised to have not seen this mentioned already - unless I missed it, in which case I apologize), the United States could not tolerate the deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba, 1,000 miles from Washington DC in 1962, and JFK was likely ready to go to full nuclear WW III over it.

A few bottom line points here can be:

1- The Monroe Doctrine is not based on notions of freedom or democracy. As Red Leg correctly surmised, it is based on sheer power. The US did not invite the world to agree to the Monroe Doctrine, we dictate it, because we unilaterally deem it in our national interest, and we have enforced, it because we indeed had the power to do it.​

​

2- When the sovereign nation of Cuba decided to exercise their freedom to allow the Soviet Union to install military bases on their soil, the United States deemed their national interest threatened, and we engaged air and sea military action to prevent it, including the threat of nuclear WW III. Thankfully, Khrushchev who knew what war was (he was engaged throughout the entire Great Patriotic War (a.k.a. WW II for us) and he was Political Commissar at Stalingrad) understood that he had gone too far and he withdrew the Soviet missiles from Cuba (and we, discreetly, our missiles from Turkey).​

​

3- Is the Monroe Doctrine obsolete? Mercifully for our security, and indeed thanks to our military and economic power, as correctly outlined by Red Leg, no one has tested it in recent history. Good! But for the sake of discussion, let us take an hypothetical. Imagine Canada was to invite or allow China to establish military bases, likely including anti ICBM capability and hypersonic missiles capability in Quebec, Ontario and Alberta. What do you think the United States reaction would be? Accept the freedom of the Canadian people to ally with China?​

​

Realpolitik

It was Prussian Chancellor Otto von Bismarck's statecraft in unifying Germany in the 1800’s that brought the concept of Realpolitik to the world. Real here is to be understood in its German meaning: realistic, practical. Realpolitik is diplomatic or political action based primarily on pragmatic considerations rather than moral or ethical premises.

A few examples here can be:

1- One can likely credit Realpolitik for the fact that neither Russia (since Cuba) nor China (so far) have tried to install military bases in Canada or Mexico. Nobody in their right mind would think about trying it, because everybody in their right mind would know that it is pragmatically a non-starter.​

​

2- NATO control by the US is a given because the US is the overwhelming military power in NATO. Sure, the Bundeswehr was likely the core of ground forces in Western Europe during the Cold War, and, to be objective, French forces are today the core of military power in Europe, but the bottom line is that NATO does what the US say, because, until Western European Defense becomes a reality, if ever in the near term, NATO for all practical purposes IS the US. Which explains why there is a mutually defeating contradiction at play: most of Europe does not dare to challenge NATO/US because they do not dare step away from under the American defense umbrella; and as long as they do not, they are not motivated to construct a European Defense.​

Note that I am not arguing a side or another here, nor do I loose myself in the usual conspiration theories about the US domination of the world, but this discussion is itself a great example of Realpolitik. Realpolitik IS, it is not about what would/should/could it is about what IS.

Which leads us to quoting Red Leg's post again (Thank You Joe):



Under the wonderful principles dear to American foreign policy, of democracy, freedom of the people to choose their own destiny, etc., the concept of allowing Ukraine in NATO and the EU sounds great; it is the right thing to do; and Russia indeed has no say in it.

However, Russia happens to disagree with that notion, and, right, wrong, or indifferent, this is a fact.

Ukraine

The Realpolitik questions here are not:
--- whether Russia is right or wrong in its assertion that Ukraine is part of their cultural and historical heritage (although there are indeed reams of historical evidence to this point...);
--- whether Russia is right or wrong in its assertion that Ukraine joining NATO will lead to the creation of American military bases on its soil, likely deploying anti ICBM capability and short to mid range nuclear-capable cruise missiles - Tomahawk currently, hypersonic vehicles soon (although the examples of Estonia, Poland, Romania, etc. are difficult to ignore...);
--- etc.

The Realpolitik questions here are whether Russia - again: right, wrong, or indifferent - perceives it this way - the same way the US perceived Soviet missiles in Cuba as a threat - and whether they can do something about it. The clear answers are yes and yes. Period.

Arguing that NATO is only taking defensive steps in Estonia, Poland and Romania, and if they could in Ukraine and Belarus, and is not a threat to Russia, is as irrelevant as arguing that the Soviet Union was only taking defensive steps in Cuba and was not a threat to the US. This is not the way the US perceived it then, and it was our reality; and it is not the way Russia perceives it now, and it is their reality. Period. This is why Russia has been raising their "security demands."

The fact that Russia did nothing about the NATO expansions of 1999 (Poland) and 2004 (Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania, Slovenia) was also Realpolitik, they were too weak then, and it explains why they did nothing, but this should not hide the fact that they were deeply angered about it. But they could only talk about it, so, of course, nobody listened.

The fact that Russia went to war in 2008 over the attempted inclusion of Georgia in NATO likewise was Realpolitik, but this time Russia could do something about it and did. But Georgia was too far, and not really in Europe, so everybody soon forgot about it.

The fact that Russia is, again, going to war over the attempted inclusion of, this time, Ukraine in NATO, continues to be Realpolitik, and nobody should be surprised about it. It is not like they have not been telling us for 10 years that this is their (hemi)sphere, and that they too have their own version of our Monroe Doctrine, and their own red lines.

The gain and the pain

Therefore, the question in 1962 for Cuba for the Soviets became: is it important enough for us to have bases in Cuba to risk WW III?

And the question in 2022 for US/NATO is exactly the same: is it important enough for us to have bases in Ukraine and Belarus to risk WW III?

In so many words, is the gain worth the pain?

I know, I know, nowhere in the above are the values of democracy and freedom considered. We are purely in the realm of Realpolitik.

Clearly, the unambiguous - and completely logical and with which I wholeheartedly agree - statements by the US, NATO, France, Germany, that under no circumstance whatsoever would a single American, French, German, etc. soldier be deployed in Ukraine, and that military response options are not on the table - which again, I totally agree with – make it somewhat obvious that the gain is not worth the pain.

But it also makes it somewhat untenable for the West to refuse to consider diplomatically Putin’s security demands.

And it also raises incredibly pertinent questions about NATO's expansion in Eastern Europe.

Everyone will of course understand, agree and sympathize with the almost panic desire of former Eastern Block countries to shelter under the American defense umbrella. One would be a monster to not understand these people.

But the Realpolitik question is unnerving: if these countries are apparently NOT of vital interest to the US (which is precisely the reason why we are not intervening militarily in Ukraine), why did we give them an Article 5 guarantee that we will come defend them and die for them?

Will we honor Article 5? Many folks believe we will, just as we went to war over Poland in 1939 after the Munich appeasement proved to be just what it was: a ruse.

But these were the days before the Atom. Will the USA go to global nuclear WW III to protect itself? Assuredly. Will we do it to protect Ukraine, or Romania, or Slovakia, or Slovenia, or Latvia, or Lithuania, or Croatia, etc. Tough call...........................

What appears clear, it that we are not doing it over Ukraine, which is patently much larger and much more important than all these other recent NATO members (aside from Poland)..........................

Sure, Ukraine is not part of NATO, we have not signed a piece of paper with them, but will such a piece of paper commit New York, Chicago, Dallas, etc. to be on the nuclear front line, push comes to shove, over Slovenia? Again, tough call..........................

The Kurds made the mistake to heed the American encouragement to overthrow their Iraqi master in 1988. They failed to analyze that despite all good human rights principles they were not of vital national interest to the US. They now boast the terrible claim of being the sole population attacked with nerve agents sarin and tabun. America did not react.......................

Georgian President Saakashvili too felt emboldened after the NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008, where the Membership Action Plan (MAP) to integrate Georgia and Ukraine was discussed, even though Germany and France warned that offering a MAP to Ukraine and Georgia would be "an unnecessary offence" for Russia. But then again, Germany and France have been practicing Realpolitik a few centuries, and have paid a heavy price when they ignored it. The Russia-Georgian was ensued. America did not react.......................

Are we misleading Eastern Europe? Are we encouraging democracy and freedom principles that we back only by words (and diplomatic condemnations, and economic sanctions, and equipment deliveries, etc.) but not by blood, because we too, obviously, and logically, and rightly, abide by the principles of Realpolitik?

Should Realpolitik prevail?

In the name of the great principles of democracy, freedom of the people to choose their government and destiny, etc. America recently involved itself in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, etc. We even did with Kosovo exactly what we blame Russia for doing in the Donbass with the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic!

The fundamental issue is that the Western Christian Democracy principles do not seem to work very well with peoples of other cultural heritages, and that despite our laudable intents, our interventions often create pandemonium. Is life for Iraqis better today than it was under Saddam? Is life today in Syria better than what it was before we attempted to remove Bashar al-Assad? Is Libya today better than it was under Gaddafi? Is Afghanistan returned to the Taliban better than it was under Hamid Karzai? Etc. etc.

This is another application of Realpolitik, the ability to accept some evil, as clearly existed under Saddam, Bashar al-Assad, Gaddafi, etc., to continue to use the above example, in order to prevent greater evil: the disintegration of entire States - dictatorships indeed - into utter chaos, and the Butcher's Bill climbing from tens of thousands into multiple hundreds of thousands, if not millions.

And if indeed the principles of freedom and democracy are so sacred that Russia considering Ukraine its buffer toward the West is so unacceptable, what are we waiting for to bestow them on Bahrein, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, China, etc.?

Ah, I get it: we cannot touch Bahrein, Qatar, Saudi Arabia because their oil keep our economy alive; and we cannot touch China because they likely can touch us back. We ARE applying Realpolitik.

This is a complete "two ships passing each other in the dark". Putin is probably laughing at Biden's lecturing him on not attempting to effect regime change or resolve political situations by force, in view of the our recent track record in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, etc. (thanks God we dodged the bullet – barely! – in Egypt). This is the eternal American weakness in foreign politics: do as we say, not as we do...

And both the blessing and the drama is that the US, splendidly geographically isolated in our Western hemisphere, really do not have to pay the heaviest price for ignoring Realpolitik, this is a privilege left to those we leave in place after we retreat.

Is Putin crazy?

Regarding the military developments, I will abstain from prognosticating, but I note that the world opinion seems driven by completely ignorant (from a military perspective) journalists. I personally doubt very, very much that had Russia decided on a complete rapid invasion of Northern and Eastern Ukraine, to Kiev, this would not have been accomplished in three days, such is the disproportion of forces. Maybe someone should provide the definition of invasion to the press. It is patently different from the definition of attack. As Red Leg and I who trained in similar times, in similar positions, in similar places to face the Fulda Gap onslaught, this is NOT was is taking place in Ukraine right now.

Without being callous, and in all respect to the casualties, the very fact that Ukraine report only between 200 and 300 casualties after 4 days of war, tells me that the Russians have not rolled out the Armored Steamroller. I do not interpret Kiev as not haven "fallen" as the Ukrainians preventing the Russians from doing it. Kiev was not taken (yet?) because the Russians have not decided to take it (yet?). Ukraine has not been overrun because Russia likely does not intend to overrun Ukraine.

What is clear to me at this stage, is that Putin is achieving militarily what he could not do diplomatically: the non entry of Ukraine in NATO, and the non deployment of US strategic weapons on his border, what he calls "demilitarization of Ukraine".

I always thought that cornering him too tightly was a mistake, but I am surprised that he chose to attack on a large geographic scale now, although not yet on a large military scale – and this distinction is important. Is he exploiting a combined external/internal perceived American weakness after the withdrawal of Afghanistan and the complete unravelling of the Russian hoax?

So, a question deserves to be asked: are the limited air and ground attacks, Putin’s ultimate raising of the diplomatic stakes? Or is he really committed to full scale ground invasion? But to do what? Occupy Ukraine long term? I doubt it…

Another question that deserves to be genuinely asked is whether Putin is crazy, cunning (e.g. the NATO expansion East is just a pretext and his true aim is to rebuild the Iron Curtain in Eastern Europe – as so many pundits are saying…….. ), or is he genuinely desperate after his constant warnings about Russia security needs being ignored for 10 years?

I lean on desperate, because Russia does not have the beginning of the military power anymore to rebuild the Soviet Union or something like it, and any action against a NATO member (e.g. Poland) would immediately trigger NATO Article 5 with the entire alliance being automatically at war with Russia, a risk that even Putin cannot take. Let us not forget that we are not responding militarily in Ukraine, precisely because Ukraine is NOT part of NATO.

In any case, desperate or not, what Putin did cannot be condoned, and this is what makes the game so easy for the West: it will not be hard to condemn Putin and continue to ignore his rational demands, which will of course extend indefinitely the problem.

As to Crimea...

As to Crimea, the historic reality is that it was never Ukrainian. It was captured from the Turks by the Tsars in the 1700’s and “given” by Khrushchev to Ukraine as recently as 1954 to commemorate the 300th anniversary of the unification of Ukraine with Russia in 1654, which was a purely symbolic gesture within the boundaries of the Soviet Union, especially considering that 90%+ of its population have been ethic Russians for centuries, and up to now.

In Crimea, Russia has built and operated for over 300 years Sevastopol, the only major warm waters Russian naval base, from which they exert control over the Black Sea, and from which they get passage to the Mediterranean. It is as vital to Russia as San Diego, Norfolk, or Pearl Harbor are to the US. It is as irreplaceable to the Russians sea power in the Mediterranean as Naval Station Guantanamo Bay is irreplaceable to the US sea power in the Caribbean.

Notwithstanding the fact that Crimea is likely genuinely historically Russian, from a Realpolitik perspective, would we really expect the Russians to give up Sevastopol? After all the US kept Guantanamo in Cuba...

Is this analysis crazy?

Over the last two weeks, I thought it might be, because it seems so distant from what must obviously be a common sense analysis of the situation (e.g. Ukraine is right, Putin is just a megalomaniac thug), because that analysis is so common.

Then, yesterday while looking for data on the 2014 beginnings of the Donbass movements, I found this fascinating University of Chicago's R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor in Political Science, John J. Mearsheimer's conference: UnCommon Core: The Causes and Consequences of the Ukraine Crisis.

As incredible as it sounds, this is an 8-year-old conference. You would think it was given yesterday.

This reassured me, for I apparently stand in good, although meager, company as my analysis is apparently akin to that of the great Henry Kissinger.

View attachment 454739

Another great piece worth reading, this one referring George Kennan, the architect of America’s successful containment of the Soviet Union, is the editorial of Thomas L. Friedman in the Washington Times:

Opinion | This Is Putin’s War. But America and NATO Aren’t Innocent Bystanders. (Published 2022)

Russia’s president is trying to hide his poor leadership by becoming a nationalist avenger.

www.nytimes.com

View attachment 454740

I will finish the way I started: the Russian military aggression cannot be condoned. Period. My point here is NOT to justify what is happening, I condemn it, it is to propose that we try to understand what is happening.

In summary, from a Realpolitik perspective, Russia is as entitled to its own Monroe Doctrine - we could call it Greater Russia, or as the Tsars once said "Tsars of all the Russias", as the United States of America are, and it is my understanding that they are asserting it.

I hope this was of interest...

So much to unpack here.

I'm not sure analogies to the Monroe Doctrine are quite accurate. In 1823, Mr. Monroe may have asserted an idea, but he in no way had the ability to enforce it. He was lucky in that he was only 8 years away from the end of the Napoleonic wars, and there wasn't a great deal of appetite to question it. Then you had all the troubles in France, and the Wars of German Unification... and Mr. Monroe did not force the Spanish to give up their colonies.

Similarly, the Cuban Missile crisis was exactly that, a crisis over missiles. Mr. Kennedy did not force the Russians to leave Cuba, the issue was completely over the presence of Nuclear missiles within range of the continental US. Coming on the heels (no pun intended) of man banging his shoe on the table at the UN, shouting "We will bury you.", probably had something to do with it. Either way, US response was limited to a "quarantine"... they dare not even call it a blockade, with that specific meaning. The USSR could probably have stationed many troops, to little response. But put a missile in that could make it to DC in 9 minutes or so? That will get your attention.

What certainly was relevant, and can be compared to today is that Mr. Khrushchev met with Mr. Kennedy in Vienna, and made the assessment that he could get away with it. He was incorrect. Today, Mr. Putin also met with Mr. Biden in Vienna.... made a similar assessment, and I believe had Ukraine not done as well, he would be receiving no repercussions. It is only because Ukraine seems to be doing better than expected is the world reacting in this way.

Analogies to a Canada/China alliance would turn on its head over 100 years of policy. It's not really that realistic. it also assumes that Canada would not see it as letting in a Trojan Horse, and there is enough experience in the rest of the world to make it doubtful. My studies at the Canadian Forces Staff College in Toronto would give no indication that there would be any interest, but then again, after the events of last week, everything I knew in Canada is now in doubt. Of course, China has other methods, but the reality is it takes a lot to project power like that. I'm not saying they never will be capable, just that other things are needed.

The "Freedom of the People to Choose" mentioned above is not solely a US idea. It is actually enshrined in the United Nations. See: Right to Self Determination" in the UN Charter. With this in mind, the right of Soverign powers to decide their own alliances was agreed to all back in the '40s. This "but historically..." kind of goes back on that.

We went to war in Poland in 1939? I'm unclear who the "we" is in that statement, but it was not the US. It wasn't until December of '41 (and after Germany declared war on the US) that the US got formally involved in the European effort (and Lend Lease was of questionable legal authority), and it remains to his discredit that FDR sold out the Polish Government in Exile at Yalta. Of course, the South Vietnamese would have understood the issue perfectly. Then again, so would the Sioux.

Georgia provided troops to both Iraq and Afghanistan. Hell, I was involved in the training process for Afghanistan. Georgia was an "easier reach" at the time, and never forget it was Stalin's birthplace. Other things were happening in Ukraine at the time that made Georgia more likely (see Revolution, Orange). But clearly there is something about "Former Soviet Republics". And by that I do not mean "Warsaw Pact".

NATO bases in Belarus?

To say this is not really a "war", because Russia has not used a "steamroller" to me means that a review of Clausewitz is in order. No, this is not "total war". For that matter, neither was the Falklands. But if war is policy by other means... this is exactly that. The policy of moving west had been clear. The policy alone was not enough. So we have other means. That wonderful trinity is clear in this case.

My final point relates to Sevastopol. Yes, huge Russian naval base. Home of the Black Sea Fleet. Different from Guantanamo? Well, there was that agreement as part of pulling Cuba from the Spanish Empire. There was a similar agreement when the USSR broke up. Somehow, the agreement wasn't enough. There's a point to ponder there, somewhere.

 

[375 Ruger Fan]

 

[375 Ruger Fan]

Toyota suspends all Japan factory operations after suspected cyberattack

Toyota suspends all Japan factory operations after suspected cyberattack

No information was immediately available about who was behind the attack or the motive.

www.cnbc.com

Toyota said it will suspend Japan factory operations on Tuesday, losing around 13,000 cars of output, after a supplier of plastic parts and electronic components was hit by a suspected cyberattack.

No information was immediately available about who was behind the possible attack or the motive. The attack comes just after Japan joined Western allies in clamping down on Russia after it invaded Ukraine, although it was not clear if the attack was at all related.


Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida said his government would investigate the incident and whether Russia was involved.

“It is difficult to say whether this has anything to do with Russia before making thorough checks,” he told reporters.

Kishida on Sunday announced that Japan would join the United States and other countries in blocking some Russian banks from accessing the SWIFT international payment system. He also said Japan would give Ukraine $100 million in emergency aid.

A spokesperson at the supplier, Kojima Industries, said it appeared to have been the victim of some kind of cyberattack.

 

[Corey0372]

OK, so I'm an 0303, and was the S-4 for a Tank Bn, so I have a little bit of knowledge on this:

They are not using Tanks as scouts.

They are not properly employing combined arms.

Shock and Awe is over-rated.

The intel on this is interesting. They are not doing well.

I agree... 100% not properly employing combined arms, or air......but why? They know how to

Internet still on, Cell networks still working, not employing EW in any real capacity (seems anyway).

There's a lot going on there that makes zero sense. Seems way more political and economic than tactical. Like Putin wanted a reason to be kicked off Swift.

Thanks for your input and I'll keep an eye out for your posts.

Pray for Peace gents.

 

[CoElkHunter]

The problem is that the clock can’t be turned back in time. A rapprochement with Russia may, even should, eventually be possible, but not with Putin. And at this point, the worst thing we can do is to appease his ambitions. Even Europe seems to have independently concluded the same. This is an extremely dangerous period, but living under constant Russian threat would make it permanently so.

To return to the current operational situation, the Galeev blog/article posted by @DieJager is worth reading. He is an intellectual dissident living in Moscow (amazing he hasn’t died of food poisoning). His explanation, if true, goes a long way to explaining to professional military observers the strange tactics the Russians seem to be employing.

I had concluded that the force was brittle, with a well equipped first echelon, and little depth. Galeev indicates there was no attempt or capability for depth at all. The invasion was an attempt to pull off a coup de main that has collapsed under a people unwilling to be surprised or cowed.

We and history are left with the question of what Putin or someone else will do to try and salvage the situatio.

EXTREMELY dangerous time indeed. Especially now with Belarus upping the ante with sending troops into Ukraine to support Putin and cancelling its non nuclear policy, possibly allowing Putin to place nuclear missiles there. There may come a time soon when NATO will use some form of aircraft assets at least in Belarus?

 

[Tanks]

...

The S-4 is the Logistics section of a Battalion or Squadron. Supply is a vital part of the S-4.
A young officer with much promise will often be assigned as the S-4 to gain experience.
Most Marine Corps commanding officers have served as their unit S-4.

Young officers debate tactics, Generals discuss logistics.

“An army marches on its stomach.”​

― Napoleon Bonaparte

 

[Sabattiboy]

@One Day... @Red Leg
It seems prospective falls differently from where a person stands.
Reading the information posted it appears negotiations behind closed doors are not over points the average Joe assumes.
The average citizen likely wants to live their life free of war but from the top throwing a few hundred or thousand citizens under the bus to make a statement or relieve a little frustration is a minor thing.
The media makes points over this or that and we get riled up because it seems senseless but from "Realpolitik" it seems the obvious has nothing to do with it.
I did get the idea that Russia AKA Putin does not want NATO countries building a wall around the motherland anymore then America wanted missile noses resting off Florida. If it is a part of Russia, then it can't be NATO.
As far as doctrine goes it seems American leaders would like to dispense with rules and standards that have existed and recognized for over 200 years. That says to me that something like the Monroe doctrine doesn't necessarily stand for any nation. Statements to the affect that we all should have open borders and be one big happy family dislodges many things.

From my grade school days until my now late 60's I have come to see that the bullies are never stopped. The authority(s) responsible for keeping order will trounce the victims that finally fight the bullies because that fight is not keeping the peace. In other words, bullying is supported.
I don't recall Pol Pot drawing any international ire for killing millions. Maybe it would turn into another Viet Nam if they did. Was that RealPolitik? Americans were happy we were out of that war so letting a few millions get killed was okay.
I guess this comes down to global thinking about how a country handles its citizens. Let it fly according to the current leaders? Various leaders have had no trouble killing those that were not of their brand. A few decades or hundred or thousand years later the other group comes into power and they remember the previous play book and it is their turn.
The UN will write up a letter threatening to write a meaner letter if they don't stop. Maybe send a few trucks with UN on the side called peacekeepers to watch. All of which means what? Nothing to those being killed.
How about collecting all the war money and use it to send people to Mars or Venus or feed all the starving peoples on earth? Some might say, "Why should I help feed people I think should be killed?"
How about selecting a section of vast desert and designate it the war zone. Any country that wants to fight can send their army there and whoever wants to fight them can send their army. Boys will be boys you know.
Maybe a nuclear scorched earth would buy a hundred years of peace while recovering. Somewhere after everybody felt at peace it would start over again; That city used to be mine, you stepped on my grass. ........ and so it would go with a new generation.

 

[spike.t]

I just read a report of a Chechen general killed in a fight for an airport in Ukraine. If it's true, I guess they aren't invincible.

Read the Ukrainians were lubricating their bullets with pork fat for use on the chechens

 

[spike.t]

 

[Kevin Peacocke]

The problem is that the clock can’t be turned back in time. A rapprochement with Russia may, even should, eventually be possible, but not with Putin. And at this point, the worst thing we can do is to appease his ambitions. Even Europe seems to have independently concluded the same. This is an extremely dangerous period, but living under constant Russian threat would make it permanently so.

To return to the current operational situation, the Galeev blog/article posted by @DieJager is worth reading. He is an intellectual dissident living in Moscow (amazing he hasn’t died of food poisoning). His explanation, if true, goes a long way to explaining to professional military observers the strange tactics the Russians seem to be employing.

I had concluded that the force was brittle, with a well equipped first echelon, and little depth. Galeev indicates there was no attempt or capability for depth at all. The invasion was an attempt to pull off a coup de main that has collapsed under a people unwilling to be surprised or cowed.

We and history are left with the question of what Putin or someone else will do to try and salvage the situatio.

Agreed, settling the world's really big issues takes time, time to project consistency, time to win trust, time to formulate and cement agreements. Four years of a presidency, the correct presidency, is way too short. Eight years may be ok without the pathetic ankle biting by the short sighted opposition to win noddy points. From out here in my context and looking at your's I conclude that democracy is way too problematic to be entrusted to people.

 

[hyipl]

Daily Mail

Se Daily Mail på Snapchat

story.snapchat.com

 

[One Day...]

So much to unpack here.

I'm not sure analogies to the Monroe Doctrine are quite accurate. In 1823, Mr. Monroe may have asserted an idea, but he in no way had the ability to enforce it. He was lucky in that he was only 8 years away from the end of the Napoleonic wars, and there wasn't a great deal of appetite to question it. Then you had all the troubles in France, and the Wars of German Unification... and Mr. Monroe did not force the Spanish to give up their colonies.

Similarly, the Cuban Missile crisis was exactly that, a crisis over missiles. Mr. Kennedy did not force the Russians to leave Cuba, the issue was completely over the presence of Nuclear missiles within range of the continental US. Coming on the heels (no pun intended) of man banging his shoe on the table at the UN, shouting "We will bury you.", probably had something to do with it. Either way, US response was limited to a "quarantine"... they dare not even call it a blockade, with that specific meaning. The USSR could probably have stationed many troops, to little response. But put a missile in that could make it to DC in 9 minutes or so? That will get your attention.

What certainly was relevant, and can be compared to today is that Mr. Khrushchev met with Mr. Kennedy in Vienna, and made the assessment that he could get away with it. He was incorrect. Today, Mr. Putin also met with Mr. Biden in Vienna.... made a similar assessment, and I believe had Ukraine not done as well, he would be receiving no repercussions. It is only because Ukraine seems to be doing better than expected is the world reacting in this way.

Analogies to a Canada/China alliance would turn on its head over 100 years of policy. It's not really that realistic. it also assumes that Canada would not see it as letting in a Trojan Horse, and there is enough experience in the rest of the world to make it doubtful. My studies at the Canadian Forces Staff College in Toronto would give no indication that there would be any interest, but then again, after the events of last week, everything I knew in Canada is now in doubt. Of course, China has other methods, but the reality is it takes a lot to project power like that. I'm not saying they never will be capable, just that other things are needed.

The "Freedom of the People to Choose" mentioned above is not solely a US idea. It is actually enshrined in the United Nations. See: Right to Self Determination" in the UN Charter. With this in mind, the right of Soverign powers to decide their own alliances was agreed to all back in the '40s. This "but historically..." kind of goes back on that.

We went to war in Poland in 1939? I'm unclear who the "we" is in that statement, but it was not the US. It wasn't until December of '41 (and after Germany declared war on the US) that the US got formally involved in the European effort (and Lend Lease was of questionable legal authority), and it remains to his discredit that FDR sold out the Polish Government in Exile at Yalta. Of course, the South Vietnamese would have understood the issue perfectly. Then again, so would the Sioux.

Georgia provided troops to both Iraq and Afghanistan. Hell, I was involved in the training process for Afghanistan. Georgia was an "easier reach" at the time, and never forget it was Stalin's birthplace. Other things were happening in Ukraine at the time that made Georgia more likely (see Revolution, Orange). But clearly there is something about "Former Soviet Republics". And by that I do not mean "Warsaw Pact".

NATO bases in Belarus?

To say this is not really a "war", because Russia has not used a "steamroller" to me means that a review of Clausewitz is in order. No, this is not "total war". For that matter, neither was the Falklands. But if war is policy by other means... this is exactly that. The policy of moving west had been clear. The policy alone was not enough. So we have other means. That wonderful trinity is clear in this case.

My final point relates to Sevastopol. Yes, huge Russian naval base. Home of the Black Sea Fleet. Different from Guantanamo? Well, there was that agreement as part of pulling Cuba from the Spanish Empire. There was a similar agreement when the USSR broke up. Somehow, the agreement wasn't enough. There's a point to ponder there, somewhere.

Thank you for your attentive read

In fact, I generally agree with what you wrote, but we are not processing information at the same level. Your attention is on technical/tactical aspects, my attention is on strategic concepts. These are not mutually exclusive

Re. Monroe Doctrine: you are correct in what you point out, but the point I am making is not to compare 1823 America with 2022 Russia, it is to illustrate the concept that great powers all have their (hemi)sphere of influence construct, and enforce it.​

​

Re. Cuba: indeed this is not about mere bases and troops, this is about the hardware deployed. In Cuba these were the first generation of nuclear ballistic missiles, what we would call today medium range missiles. In NATO in Eastern Europe these are nuclear-capable Tomahawk, plus anti ICBM capabilities. To summarize, in both cases: strategic weapons. This is the parallel I make.​

​

Re. Canada and Mexico hosting Chinese bases: as I said, tis was an "hypothetical". What this means is that the narrative of the presumed threat is not what should be analyzed, it is only designed to create a potential scenario. The point of interest there is, regardless of the scenario narrative, how would the US react? I can change the scenario if you want and imagine another hypothetical: Russia returns to Cuba with mid range hypersonic nuclear-capable vectors. The question remains the same: how does the US react?​

​

Re. Freedom of the People to Choose, Right to Self Determination, Democracy principles etc. : of course these principles are embodied in the United Nation, but the United Nation is itself a creation of the US and enshrines the same Western/Occidental/Christian principles. For the strategic purpose of this discussion, US principles, UN principles, EU principles are mostly one and the same set.​

​

Re. Poland: of course the US did not go to war over Poland, but the western democracies did, very much in the name of the same principles now embodied in NATO. Here again, you are technically accurate, but this does not really modify the strategic concept I was discussing.​

​

Re. Georgia: details set aside, it was one of the two countries designated in the Bucharest 2008 NATO Summit Membership Action Plan (MAP). The point I make is that Georgia, as well as Ukraine (or Belarus, if it came to that) are buffers that Russia has made clear it considers vital for its security and is ready to go to war over. My point was that Russia went to war over Georgia, just as they are doing over Ukraine.​

​

Re. NATO bases in Belarus: you may have read too fast, I did not say there are NATO bases in Belarus, I said NATO would likely want to have bases in Belarus and Ukraine (we can add Georgia) if these countries were integrated into NATO.​

​

Re. war in Ukraine: I did not say that this was not a war, and I am well aware of Clausewitz's writings. What I was saying is that my personal interpretation of the ground war in Ukraine is not that Ukrainians are stopping or slowing the Russians, it is that the Russians were not committed to a full blown, all-out armored thrust. It is my assertion that had the Russian army been tasked to overwhelm Eastern Ukraine and take Kiev in "blitzkrieg" mode, they would have done it a matter of 2 or 3 days (Kiev is only ~150 kilometers/~90 miles from the Belarus border...) and there is not much that the Ukrainian army could have done to stop them, so is the disproportion of forces, with or without a few hundred Javelin etc. trickling in. We can certainly agree to disagree on this, because these are matters of conjunctures - nobody knows what mission Putin assigned. Let us just say that if Russia was indeed not capable of eliminating the Ukrainian forces around Kiev in 2 days, we really do not have much to worry about Russia conventional forces...​

​

Re. Sevastopol: we are on the same path as with all other points above. My point was not to discuss the mechanism by which the US retains Guantanamo and Russia retains Sevastopol; my point is that they both do.​

A strategic mistake...

Look, if this can help, let me say that I believe that Putin was morally wrong - for whatever this may mean in the context of Realpolitik - and that - much more importantly - he likely committed the most egregious strategic mistake in modern Russian history (since WW II) by resorting to force now, at the time when precisely he was about - thanks to the efforts of the French President and German Chancellor - to be able to likely restart a global discussion about security in Europe with the US.

Had the Biden/Putin global summit Macron and Scholz were working on been allowed to convene, it is my belief that Putin would have obtained what he wanted, because France and Germany would have continued to oppose the entry of Ukraine (and Georgia, and Belarus should the prospect have emerged - which is unlikely currently) in NATO, just as they did in Bucharest in 2008, because France and Germany - not withstanding the great Occidental principles and not withstanding the US inconsiderate pressure - understand that Russia will not accept NATO/US bases - and the associated strategic hardware - on its borders.

But maybe not a terminal mistake (?)

Why Putin made the decision he made is a mystery to me. I agree with Red Leg that he has de facto written himself out of international goodwill for a while, or maybe permanently.

However, I would point out - another Realpolitik fact - that even at the darkest hours of the Cold War, when we really did not like Khrushchev or Brezhnev either, the US were in constant - and often successful - negotiation with the USSR (e.g. various arms treaties), so, liking the other guy is not a prerequisite to conduct the nation's business, as also illustrated by our on again and off again negotiations with Kim Jong-un or Ebrahim Raisi.................

 

[wesheltonj]

So the UK is cutting off Russia's access to Pounds Sterling and the Swiss have restricted Russia too. As long as Cyprus and China keeps their Banking system open to Russia, they have way around the sanctions.

 

[Pheroze]

Ok friends. How does this play out - Belarus has now indicated they will host Russian nuclear weapons. They agree to get a couple on their soil at the same time they launch a military offensive into Ukraine. What does the West do to:
1. Stop the movement of nuclear weapons into Belarus;
2. Prevent Belarus from joining the fray.

From where I sit that referendum seems timed to give Belarus a nuclear cover under which it can join the war. Hopefully this crisis will play out before this happens.

The chess pieces are moving dynamically around this board.

 

[Pheroze]

What a weird and interesting war

 

[One Day...]

So the UK is cutting off Russia's access to Pounds Sterling and the Swiss have restricted Russia too. As long as Cyprus and China keeps their Banking system open to Russia, they have way around the sanctions.

This is much more cynical than that.

A careful reader - notwithstanding the pundits' usual verbal diarrhea and fantasy world elucubrations - will notice that the Russian gas transactions are excluded from the removal of the Russian financial system from SWIFT.

In so many words, the only thing that truly matter financially to Russia: continuing to sell gas to Western Europe, remains possible and SWIFT will conduct the transactions.

One could say this is laughable, I will say that this is Realpolitik because the simple fact is the Europe cannot live without the Russian gas.

I will also use this example to further illustrate my assertion that we are not watching an all-out conflict - which explains why Kiev has not fallen (because it has not been genuinely attacked) - we are watching armed diplomacy at the highest level (re. my above discussion with SaintPanzer and Red Leg about military operations).

If EITHER Russia or US/EU/NATO were deadly serious about an all-out conflict, you might well imagine that not a molecule of gas would be flowing to Western Europe, and not a cent to Russia in return, right now or any time in the near future.

The Nord Stream 2 closure is just a political/media stunt. In fact, it is not ready to open for another 6 to 8 months. Again, the fact that apparently no "journalist" is capable of analyze this and report it is laughable.

 

[Fred Gunner]

Foreign Fighters Are Rushing to Join Ukraine’s New International Battalion

The head of a volunteer unit told VICE World News hundreds of foreign fighters had signed up following a direct appeal by Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

www.vice.com

Want to go fight for Ukraine? Here’s what to do.

Here are the six steps you need to take if you want to help Ukraine fight.

www.militarytimes.com

 

[One Day...]

Ok friends. How does this play out - Belarus has now indicated they will host Russian nuclear weapons. They agree to get a couple on their soil at the same time they launch a military offensive into Ukraine. What does the West do to:
1. Stop the movement of nuclear weapons into Belarus;
2. Prevent Belarus from joining the fray.

From where I sit that referendum seems timed to give Belarus a nuclear cover under which it can join the war. Hopefully this crisis will play out before this happens.

The chess pieces are moving dynamically around this board.

Belarus announcement is just more blah blah in the wind and more posturing for the benefit of consumers of Western "news" (should I say disinformation? or propaganda? or unadulterated incompetence of the press? who fashion public opinion with interviews of perfectly uninformed and irrelevant "experts" or local civilians).

 

[Red Leg]

Thank you for your attentive read

In fact, I generally agree with what you wrote, but we are not processing information at the same level. Your attention is on technical/tactical aspects, my attention is on strategic concepts. These are not mutually exclusive

Re. Monroe Doctrine: you are correct in what you point, but the point I am making is not to compare 1823 America with 2022 Russia, it is to illustrate the concept that great powers all have their (hemi)sphere of influence concept, and enforce it.​

​

Re. Cuba: indeed this is not about mere bases and troops, this is about the hardware deployed. In Cuba these were the first generation of nuclear ballistic missiles, what we would call today medium range missiles. In NATO in Eastern Country these are nuclear-capable Tomahawk, plus anti ICBM capabilities. To summarize, in both cases: strategic weapons. This is the parallel I draw.​

​

Re. Canada and Mexico hosting Chinese bases. As I said, it is an hypothetical. What this means is that the narrative of the presumed threat is not what should be considered, it is only designed to illustrate a potential situation. The point of interest there was, regardless of the narrative, how would the US react. I can change the narrative if you want and imagine another hypothetical: Russia returns to Cuba with mid range hypersonic vectors. The question remains the same, and the point of interest: how does the US react?​

​

Re. Freedom of the People to Choose, Right to Self Determination, Democracy principles etc. Of course these are embodied in the United Nation, but the United Nation is itself a creation of the US and enshrines the same Western/Occidental/Christian principles. For the purpose of this discussion, US principles, UN principles, EU principles are mostly one and the same.​

​

Re. Poland, of course the US did not go to war over Poland, but the western democracies did, very much in the name of the same principle now embodied in NATO. Here again, you are technically accurate, but this does not really modify the concept I was discussing.​

​

Re. Georgia, details set aside, it was one of the two countries designated in the Bucharest 2008 NATO Summit Membership Action Plan (MAP). The point I make is that Georgia, as well as Ukraine, or Belarus, if it came to that are buffers that Russia has made clear it considers vital for its security. My point was that Russia went to war over Georgia attempts to join NATO just as they are doing in Ukraine.​

​

Re. NATO bases in Belarus. You may have read too fast, I did not say there were NATO bases in Belarus, I said NATO would likely want to have bases in Belarus and Ukraine (we can add Georgia) if these countries were integrated into NATO.​

​

Re. war in Ukraine, I did not say that this was not a war, and I am well aware of Clausewitz's writings. What I was saying is that my personal interpretation of the ground war in Ukraine is not that Ukrainians are stopping or slowing the Russians, it is that the Russians were not committed to a full blown, all-out armored thrust. It is my assertion that had the Russian army been tasked to overwhelm Eastern Ukraine and take Kiev in "blitzkrieg" mode, they would have done it a matter of 2 or 3 days (Kiev is only ~150 kilometers/~90 miles from the Belarus border...) and there is not much that the Ukrainian army could have done to stop them, so is the disproportion of forces, with or without a few hundred Javelin etc. trickling in.​

​

Re. Sevastopol, we are on the same lines as all other points above. My point was not to discuss the mechanism by which the US retains Guantanamo and Russia retains Sevastopol. my point was that they both do.​

Look, if this can help, let me say that I believe that Putin was morally wrong - for whatever it may mean in the context of Realpolitik - and that - much more importantly - he likely committed the most egregious strategic mistake in modern Russian history (since WW II) by resorting to force now, at a time when he was about - thanks to the efforts of the French President and German Chancellor - to be able to likely restart a global discussion about security in Europe with the US. Had the Biden/Putin global summit Macron and Scholz were working on been allowed to convene, it is my belief that Putin would have obtained what he wanted, because France and Germany would have continued to oppose the entry of Ukraine (and Georgia, and Belarus should the prospect have emerged - which is unlikely currently) in NATO just as they did in Bucharest in 2008.

Why Putin made the decision he made is a mystery to me, I repeat, I think that it was a mistake. I agree with Red Leg that he has de facto written himself out of international relations for a while, although I would point out - another Realpolitik fact - that even at the darkest hours of the Cold War, when we really did not like Khrushchev or Brezhnev either, the US were in constant negotiation with the USSR (e.g. various arms treaties), so liking the other guy is not a prerequisite to conduct the nation's business, as also illustrated by our on again and off again negotiations with Kim Jong-un or Ebrahim Raisi.................

I think our primary difference is with regard to Russia's actual place in the world and Putin's perception of its place in the world. That too is realpolitik. That doesn't make the situation any less dangerous, in fact, likely more so.

Russia may demand that nations on its borders not exercise self-determination, but that is very different than Russia compelling nations on its border to behave in something other than their own perceived national interests; rather like the Monroe doctrine through at least the Spanish American War.

I think most leadership in the West understood Crimea's importance to traditional Russian interests in the Black Sea. However, Ukraine as a whole, particularly since 2014 has made great strides in Westernizing, or probably more correctly, in de-Russification of much of its culture and bureaucracy. Equally bold steps seem to have been taken with respect to changing its military culture.

Russia is a little more than a third world country with a superpower's nuclear arsenal. It does not have a superpower's Army or Navy, and with a GDP the same as Texas, it is unlikely to ever have one. It deploys relatively small numbers of fairly sophisticated first line equipment, but has not made near the investment necessary to maintain such equipment in extended forward deployed operations. Its nuclear arsenal makes it dangerous - like a childish bully that has access to a loaded firearm. But that does not make him or Russia powerful - merely dangerous. Neither has the right to threaten other independent states.

I disagree with your conclusions about the restraint being displayed by Russian ground forces. Yes, there have not yet been neighborhood leveling conventional strikes against Ukrainian civilians as their air force employed in Syria, but I am ever more convinced that the Russians have not yet seized Kiev and Kharkov because they can't. Projecting power is difficult. It requires a high level of planning skill, vast resources, and the means to deliver those resources. The Russians have had no experience with that sort of warfare on this scale since the Second World War, and I see little evidence that they have made training for such operations a priority since the collapse of the USSR.

That lack of experience also likely failed to properly inform the logistics demands of modern sustained combat operations. Unlike the T-34 and the Mig-21, modern combat aircraft and combat vehicles devour spares, fuel, and manhours at incredible rates. The US Army's "tooth to tail" ratio is roughly 28% - 72%. Though that seems unwieldy, it also allows that 28% to operate with enormous flexibility and lethality in force projection operations.

If the cross border deployment numbers are remotely accurate, they have the equivalent of three or four Russian-sized mechanized divisions, with supporting forces, in the attack. That is a corps-sized force, but no doubt divided among three different commands all of which are apparently in contact with the enemy and demanding resupply. I am more certain every day that they have fought themselves to a standstill.

Complicating the "exercise" is the apparent defeat in detail of the Russian airborne force which seems to have had a key objective of establishing two or three different FOBs. The failure to achieve those objectives further exacerbates the supply effort.

No, I believe that Putin convinced himself that Ukraine, and specifically the government, would submit to a lethal show of force. It seems to have become very lethal indeed.