Politics

[WAB]

Biden's "State of the Union" speech is tonight. Just wondering, given the heightened state of alert, will VP Harris not be in attendance and safely viewing from an undisclosed location.

Yeah, hopefully in a straight jacket from a padded room.

 

[Hogpatrol]

If Volod would have only shared that ransomware sting money with Vlad, like he said he would, none of this would have happened. My money's on the Russian Mafia knee deep in this mess.

 

[Randy F]

If Volod would have only shared that ransomware sting money with Vlad, like he said he would, none of this would have happened. My money's on the Russian Mafia knee deep in this mess.

They also could be the one to putin a bullet to fix the problem...speaking hypothetically of course.

 

[Hogpatrol]

They also could be the one to putin a bullet to fix the problem...speaking hypothetically of course.

From what I know and seen over the years, they're running the show. All this NATO bullshit is just a smokescreen. Someone didn't get paid off or their crypto got stolen.

Anyone up to chip in on a MiG 29? Cheap considering their production cost. Hmm. Wonder how it made it's way over to the U.S.

1975 MIKOYAN MIG 21 UM Jets for sale - 2387792

1975 MIKOYAN MIG 21 UM Jets for sale located in Kaduna from 2387792. Search 1000's of Aircraft listings updated daily from 100's of dealers & private sellers.

www.trade-a-plane.com

 

[sgt_zim]

There is little of value worth or need produced by the USA so no big one for me ....PPU or Knoch for ammo rifles well can't think of any American rifle I would desire to own ....Cars nothing much there either ....food .....yeah ...I really cannot think of anything I desire from the USA .......

As long as the US remains the world's hegemon, the world will enjoy relative peace and prosperity. A modicum of gratitude for that would be in order.

In any case, that's a curious thing to say for someone who lives in an economically unimportant and irrelevant country. I mean, there are 50 or 60 cities in the US with bigger population than Iceland, and even the least populated state (Wyoming, where they have more cattle than people) has greater economic output.

 

[spike.t]

‘The damage is done’: Russians face economic point of no return

Shoppers and business people express despair and disillusion as sanctions cause run on rouble

www.theguardian.com

 

[spike.t]

Seems there were warnings in the past about what has happened

Many predicted Nato expansion would lead to war. Those warnings were ignored | Ted Galen Carpenter

It has long been clear that Nato expansion would lead to tragedy. We are now paying the price for the US’s arrogance

www.theguardian.com

 

[Randy F]

Seems there were warnings in the past about what has happened

Many predicted Nato expansion would lead to war. Those warnings were ignored | Ted Galen Carpenter

It has long been clear that Nato expansion would lead to tragedy. We are now paying the price for the US’s arrogance

www.theguardian.com

Maybe, probably, sure. But if the crazy autocrat wants to reunite the motherland, he's going to make his move eventually, one way or another. I'm sure we can pile up all kinds of reasons and excuses to take the blame off this lunatic, but to what end? US arrogance? Maybe, call it what they may, but there have been a whole lot of asses saved because of it.

 

[spike.t]

Maybe, probably, sure. But if the crazy autocrat wants to reunite the motherland, he's going to make his move eventually, one way or another. I'm sure we can pile up all kinds of reasons and excuses to take the blame off this lunatic, but to what end? US arrogance? Maybe, call it what they may, but there have been a whole lot of asses saved because of it.

Yeah...just putting it there to see if anyone puts some inside knowledge about it...and yeah been able to do whst he wants without any checks for so long now...reality is most likely seriously lacking....watched a short clip of putin sitting with presumably his advisors/cabinet types....and the one who was speaking kept talking not much sense...and putin kept chiding him....till he told him this is what I am asking you...are you voting yes or no to recognise the 2 breakaway areas in Ukraine...the person standing talking you could see was very very nervous and shitting himself....and of course his reply was yes....putin smirked and as if talking to a school kid told him he could go sit down now

 

[DieJager]

Ukraine’s Deadly Gamble

By tying itself to a reckless and dangerous America, the Ukrainians made a blunder that client states will study for years to come

www.tabletmag.com

Interesting read with a somehow different view.

 

[Pheroze]

I don't think I like this cancel culture crap. But, maybe I am missing something.

 

[sgt_zim]

Seems there were warnings in the past about what has happened

Many predicted Nato expansion would lead to war. Those warnings were ignored | Ted Galen Carpenter

It has long been clear that Nato expansion would lead to tragedy. We are now paying the price for the US’s arrogance

www.theguardian.com

the author is an r-tard.

Strobe Talbott, deputy secretary of state, similarly described the Russian attitude. “Many Russians see Nato as a vestige of the cold war, inherently directed against their country. They point out that they have disbanded the Warsaw Pact, their military alliance, and ask why the west should not do the same.” It was an excellent question, and neither the Clinton administration nor its successors provided even a remotely convincing answer.

one has to have on some thick blinders, or black hole stupid, to not understand why the west wouldn't do the same. for some of the former warsaw pact nations, notably Poland and Czech Republic, it was a giant FU to Russia. I was in Prague a couple years ago. The folks my age and older STILL hate the Russians. So do the Poles. And for very good reason.

The USSR may have dissolved, but the psychopathology which was at its heart has never gone anywhere - I'd say it has been festering in Putin for 30 years. Witness Ukraine in the last week.

 

[Pheroze]

Maybe, probably, sure. But if the crazy autocrat wants to reunite the motherland, he's going to make his move eventually, one way or another. I'm sure we can pile up all kinds of reasons and excuses to take the blame off this lunatic, but to what end? US arrogance? Maybe, call it what they may, but there have been a whole lot of asses saved because of it.

I agree, looking to blame USA for the failure of the Russin government to make itself relevant is BS. If Russia has developed its own negotiated trading and security environment we probably would be here.

 

[SaintPanzer]

Thank you for your attentive read

In fact, I generally agree with what you wrote, but we are not processing information at the same level. Your attention is on technical/tactical aspects, my attention is on strategic concepts. These are not mutually exclusive

Re. Monroe Doctrine: you are correct in what you point out, but the point I am making is not to compare 1823 America with 2022 Russia, it is to illustrate the concept that great powers all have their (hemi)sphere of influence construct, and enforce it.​

​

Re. Cuba: indeed this is not about mere bases and troops, this is about the hardware deployed. In Cuba these were the first generation of nuclear ballistic missiles, what we would call today medium range missiles. In NATO in Eastern Europe these are nuclear-capable Tomahawk, plus anti ICBM capabilities. To summarize, in both cases: strategic weapons. This is the parallel I make.​

​

Re. Canada and Mexico hosting Chinese bases: as I said, tis was an "hypothetical". What this means is that the narrative of the presumed threat is not what should be analyzed, it is only designed to create a potential scenario. The point of interest there is, regardless of the scenario narrative, how would the US react? I can change the scenario if you want and imagine another hypothetical: Russia returns to Cuba with mid range hypersonic nuclear-capable vectors. The question remains the same: how does the US react?​

​

Re. Freedom of the People to Choose, Right to Self Determination, Democracy principles etc. : of course these principles are embodied in the United Nation, but the United Nation is itself a creation of the US and enshrines the same Western/Occidental/Christian principles. For the strategic purpose of this discussion, US principles, UN principles, EU principles are mostly one and the same set.​

​

Re. Poland: of course the US did not go to war over Poland, but the western democracies did, very much in the name of the same principles now embodied in NATO. Here again, you are technically accurate, but this does not really modify the strategic concept I was discussing.​

​

Re. Georgia: details set aside, it was one of the two countries designated in the Bucharest 2008 NATO Summit Membership Action Plan (MAP). The point I make is that Georgia, as well as Ukraine (or Belarus, if it came to that) are buffers that Russia has made clear it considers vital for its security and is ready to go to war over. My point was that Russia went to war over Georgia, just as they are doing over Ukraine.​

​

Re. NATO bases in Belarus: you may have read too fast, I did not say there are NATO bases in Belarus, I said NATO would likely want to have bases in Belarus and Ukraine (we can add Georgia) if these countries were integrated into NATO.​

​

Re. war in Ukraine: I did not say that this was not a war, and I am well aware of Clausewitz's writings. What I was saying is that my personal interpretation of the ground war in Ukraine is not that Ukrainians are stopping or slowing the Russians, it is that the Russians were not committed to a full blown, all-out armored thrust. It is my assertion that had the Russian army been tasked to overwhelm Eastern Ukraine and take Kiev in "blitzkrieg" mode, they would have done it a matter of 2 or 3 days (Kiev is only ~150 kilometers/~90 miles from the Belarus border...) and there is not much that the Ukrainian army could have done to stop them, so is the disproportion of forces, with or without a few hundred Javelin etc. trickling in. We can certainly agree to disagree on this, because these are matters of conjunctures - nobody knows what mission Putin assigned. Let us just say that if Russia was indeed not capable of eliminating the Ukrainian forces around Kiev in 2 days, we really do not have much to worry about Russia conventional forces...​

​

Re. Sevastopol: we are on the same path as with all other points above. My point was not to discuss the mechanism by which the US retains Guantanamo and Russia retains Sevastopol; my point is that they both do.​

A strategic mistake...

Look, if this can help, let me say that I believe that Putin was morally wrong - for whatever this may mean in the context of Realpolitik - and that - much more importantly - he likely committed the most egregious strategic mistake in modern Russian history (since WW II) by resorting to force now, at the time when precisely he was about - thanks to the efforts of the French President and German Chancellor - to be able to likely restart a global discussion about security in Europe with the US.

Had the Biden/Putin global summit Macron and Scholz were working on been allowed to convene, it is my belief that Putin would have obtained what he wanted, because France and Germany would have continued to oppose the entry of Ukraine (and Georgia, and Belarus should the prospect have emerged - which is unlikely currently) in NATO, just as they did in Bucharest in 2008, because France and Germany - not withstanding the great Occidental principles and not withstanding the US inconsiderate pressure - understand that Russia will not accept NATO/US bases - and the associated strategic hardware - on its borders.

But maybe not a terminal mistake (?)

Why Putin made the decision he made is a mystery to me. I agree with Red Leg that he has de facto written himself out of international goodwill for a while, or maybe permanently.

However, I would point out - another Realpolitik fact - that even at the darkest hours of the Cold War, when we really did not like Khrushchev or Brezhnev either, the US were in constant - and often successful - negotiation with the USSR (e.g. various arms treaties), so, liking the other guy is not a prerequisite to conduct the nation's business, as also illustrated by our on again and off again negotiations with Kim Jong-un or Ebrahim Raisi.................

I think that it is not that I am thinking tactically and you strategically, rather I am using examples to show why I disagree with your strategic assessment.

You've stated: "great powers all have their (hemi)sphere of influence construct, and enforce it." I am arguing that the Monroe Doctrine was never really enforced, until possibly when Theodore Rex was trying to defend his canal, and if he'd hadn't, we probably would not discuss it. Either way, I think Russia may believe it is a "Great Power", but I think we are learning that they are not.

Yes, you stated you were dealing with hypotheticals, but I think I was poorly pointing out that the US and Canada figured out a long time ago that they are better off supporting each other than they are trying to force their attitude on each other. They do share the longest undefended border in the world. I stand by my assessment that Russia, on the other hand is the "wife beater" compared to the neighbors it married. No one should be surprised those countries went to the "battered wife shelter" that is NATO. And let us be absolutely clear: there are no TLAM bases in Europe. TLAM is meant to be sea launched or air launched, and to suggest that Aegis Ashore is TLAM capable is to repeat Russian propaganda. The bases you are discussing simply do not exist. And I can get a lot closer with an SSGN anyway.

The UN is a "better" League of Nations. I am not a fan of Mr. Wilson for many reasons, but the US never joined the League... The UN I can blame on Mr. Truman and Ms. Roosevelt, but the bottom line is that what is in the Charter is the way we all agreed we would work in the future. If the right of self determination could be used to roadmap the decolonization of Africa in the Soviet's favor, the same charter should be used for the breakup of another empire. It's not "whataboutism", it's consistency. Russia is on the Security Council. They were allowed to stay there when the USSR ceased to exist. They agreed to it as well, if we want to re-litigate how things should work, start there.

I think strategically, instead of focusing on the fig leaf of NATO expansion (which to me is as obvious a piece of propaganda as the excuse that the Berlin Wall was to protect the east from western decadence), there's another way to look at Georgia and Ukraine (and Belarus):

In Belarus, a Russian-leaning government has obviated more "kinetic" requirements. My analogy there remains "battered wife syndrome". Militarily, Georgia is an easier nut to crack than is Ukraine. The MAP was in April, but by memory, Russian planning was going on well before that. My recollection of the summer of 2008 was that there was a highly contested election going on in the US, the incumbent was not able to run, and there was great discontent over his policies. As a strategic planner, that was a really good time to act: the odds that the US would be able to muster a military or diplomatic response was low. In other words, strategically it was a good time to strike. There's your realpolitik: Strategic goals are Operationally grasped when the risk appears to be low.

Similarly, in 2014, while US diplomatic "efforts" supported a change in government in Ukraine (as if there were no other diplomatic "efforts" to place that government there in the first place), a similar assessment was made: The second Libyan Civil War (and the first) showed that there was little appetite for the US administration to lead NATO efforts ("leading from behind"), Syrian "red lines" were shown to be more threat than an ultimatum, Russia had funds from high oil prices, and they determined the risk was low. The use of "little green men" mitigated the risk further. The situation today is similar. Russia expected a lack of resistance, and I think are strategically surprised by the backlash. Heck, I am surprised! Germany buying F-35s? Japan considering development of nuclear weapons? Swiss bankers (you know the guys who had no issues providing banking services to the NSDAP?) are supporting sanctions? The world just changed.

I think that based on Soviet experience in Hungary in '56, Prague in '68, et al, they honestly believed they could shock their way in. They learned otherwise, and are now reacting. They do not integrate air with ground, they did not expect to need to fight at night, they did not expect they would need to sustain (and did not move the resources to support), and, on the air side, they are prey to the same tactical air doctrine mistake that the US is married to: They expected air supremacy, and without it, they are not sure how to react. The concept of air superiority hasn't yet entered into their operations. Why haven't they simply flattened everything? Well, they are starting to, but I believe the initial idea was they didn't want to break something they thought they would use. If there original idea was the conquest would lead to economic benefits, breaking things provides no benefits, and high cost. There's a lesson for Taiwan in there. I'm sure they're watching. An armored Blitzkrieg? What resources to spend? Are the resources enough? Primordial Violence, but subordination, subject to reason. And then the play of chance came in, and in this case, the military leadership was not up to it.

Why he made the decision he made is simple to me: He thought he could intimidate his way in, and the West would accept it. There were some obvious signs there wouldn't be resistance ("minor incursions", anyone?) and honestly, if the Ukrainians had not put up a solid resistance, would anyone have really sanctioned? The fact that it took several days to figure out some banks (and by no means all) should be removed from SWIFT is a clue: On day one it looked like the game was worth the candle.

What concerns me (and I think the better discussion) is "what's next?" Is there a face saving way for Russia to back out? If not, do they ramp up destruction?

 

[SaintPanzer]

Seems there were warnings in the past about what has happened

Many predicted Nato expansion would lead to war. Those warnings were ignored | Ted Galen Carpenter

It has long been clear that Nato expansion would lead to tragedy. We are now paying the price for the US’s arrogance

www.theguardian.com

Yes, and as I've said, the Berlin Wall was put up to protect East Berlin from western decadence.

 

[Red Leg]

I think that it is not that I am thinking tactically and you strategically, rather I am using examples to show why I disagree with your strategic assessment.

You've stated: "great powers all have their (hemi)sphere of influence construct, and enforce it." I am arguing that the Monroe Doctrine was never really enforced, until possibly when Theodore Rex was trying to defend his canal, and if he'd hadn't, we probably would not discuss it. Either way, I think Russia may believe it is a "Great Power", but I think we are learning that they are not.

Yes, you stated you were dealing with hypotheticals, but I think I was poorly pointing out that the US and Canada figured out a long time ago that they are better off supporting each other than they are trying to force their attitude on each other. They do share the longest undefended border in the world. I stand by my assessment that Russia, on the other hand is the "wife beater" compared to the neighbors it married. No one should be surprised those countries went to the "battered wife shelter" that is NATO. And let us be absolutely clear: there are no TLAM bases in Europe. TLAM is meant to be sea launched or air launched, and to suggest that Aegis Ashore is TLAM capable is to repeat Russian propaganda. The bases you are discussing simply do not exist. And I can get a lot closer with an SSGN anyway.

The UN is a "better" League of Nations. I am not a fan of Mr. Wilson for many reasons, but the US never joined the League... The UN I can blame on Mr. Truman and Ms. Roosevelt, but the bottom line is that what is in the Charter is the way we all agreed we would work in the future. If the right of self determination could be used to roadmap the decolonization of Africa in the Soviet's favor, the same charter should be used for the breakup of another empire. It's not "whataboutism", it's consistency. Russia is on the Security Council. They were allowed to stay there when the USSR ceased to exist. They agreed to it as well, if we want to re-litigate how things should work, start there.

I think strategically, instead of focusing on the fig leaf of NATO expansion (which to me is as obvious a piece of propaganda as the excuse that the Berlin Wall was to protect the east from western decadence), there's another way to look at Georgia and Ukraine (and Belarus):

In Belarus, a Russian-leaning government has obviated more "kinetic" requirements. My analogy there remains "battered wife syndrome". Militarily, Georgia is an easier nut to crack than is Ukraine. The MAP was in April, but by memory, Russian planning was going on well before that. My recollection of the summer of 2008 was that there was a highly contested election going on in the US, the incumbent was not able to run, and there was great discontent over his policies. As a strategic planner, that was a really good time to act: the odds that the US would be able to muster a military or diplomatic response was low. In other words, strategically it was a good time to strike. There's your realpolitik: Strategic goals are Operationally grasped when the risk appears to be low.

Similarly, in 2014, while US diplomatic "efforts" supported a change in government in Ukraine (as if there were no other diplomatic "efforts" to place that government there in the first place), a similar assessment was made: The second Libyan Civil War (and the first) showed that there was little appetite for the US administration to lead NATO efforts ("leading from behind"), Syrian "red lines" were shown to be more threat than an ultimatum, Russia had funds from high oil prices, and they determined the risk was low. The use of "little green men" mitigated the risk further. The situation today is similar. Russia expected a lack of resistance, and I think are strategically surprised by the backlash. Heck, I am surprised! Germany buying F-35s? Japan considering development of nuclear weapons? Swiss bankers (you know the guys who had no issues providing banking services to the NSDAP?) are supporting sanctions? The world just changed.

I think that based on Soviet experience in Hungary in '56, Prague in '68, et al, they honestly believed they could shock their way in. They learned otherwise, and are now reacting. They do not integrate air with ground, they did not expect to need to fight at night, they did not expect they would need to sustain (and did not move the resources to support), and, on the air side, they are prey to the same tactical air doctrine mistake that the US is married to: They expected air supremacy, and without it, they are not sure how to react. The concept of air superiority hasn't yet entered into their operations. Why haven't they simply flattened everything? Well, they are starting to, but I believe the initial idea was they didn't want to break something they thought they would use. If there original idea was the conquest would lead to economic benefits, breaking things provides no benefits, and high cost. There's a lesson for Taiwan in there. I'm sure they're watching. An armored Blitzkrieg? What resources to spend? Are the resources enough? Primordial Violence, but subordination, subject to reason. And then the play of chance came in, and in this case, the military leadership was not up to it.

Why he made the decision he made is simple to me: He thought he could intimidate his way in, and the West would accept it. There were some obvious signs there wouldn't be resistance ("minor incursions", anyone?) and honestly, if the Ukrainians had not put up a solid resistance, would anyone have really sanctioned? The fact that it took several days to figure out some banks (and by no means all) should be removed from SWIFT is a clue: On day one it looked like the game was worth the candle.

What concerns me (and I think the better discussion) is "what's next?" Is there a face saving way for Russia to back out? If not, do they ramp up destruction?

Very well reasoned.

 

[Kevin Peacocke]

So at five minutes past midnight the EU decides to admit Ukraine, what a useless bunch they are.

 

[Sabattiboy]

I think that it is not that I am thinking tactically and you strategically, rather I am using examples to show why I disagree with your strategic assessment.

You've stated: "great powers all have their (hemi)sphere of influence construct, and enforce it." I am arguing that the Monroe Doctrine was never really enforced, until possibly when Theodore Rex was trying to defend his canal, and if he'd hadn't, we probably would not discuss it. Either way, I think Russia may believe it is a "Great Power", but I think we are learning that they are not.

Yes, you stated you were dealing with hypotheticals, but I think I was poorly pointing out that the US and Canada figured out a long time ago that they are better off supporting each other than they are trying to force their attitude on each other. They do share the longest undefended border in the world. I stand by my assessment that Russia, on the other hand is the "wife beater" compared to the neighbors it married. No one should be surprised those countries went to the "battered wife shelter" that is NATO. And let us be absolutely clear: there are no TLAM bases in Europe. TLAM is meant to be sea launched or air launched, and to suggest that Aegis Ashore is TLAM capable is to repeat Russian propaganda. The bases you are discussing simply do not exist. And I can get a lot closer with an SSGN anyway.

The UN is a "better" League of Nations. I am not a fan of Mr. Wilson for many reasons, but the US never joined the League... The UN I can blame on Mr. Truman and Ms. Roosevelt, but the bottom line is that what is in the Charter is the way we all agreed we would work in the future. If the right of self determination could be used to roadmap the decolonization of Africa in the Soviet's favor, the same charter should be used for the breakup of another empire. It's not "whataboutism", it's consistency. Russia is on the Security Council. They were allowed to stay there when the USSR ceased to exist. They agreed to it as well, if we want to re-litigate how things should work, start there.

I think strategically, instead of focusing on the fig leaf of NATO expansion (which to me is as obvious a piece of propaganda as the excuse that the Berlin Wall was to protect the east from western decadence), there's another way to look at Georgia and Ukraine (and Belarus):

In Belarus, a Russian-leaning government has obviated more "kinetic" requirements. My analogy there remains "battered wife syndrome". Militarily, Georgia is an easier nut to crack than is Ukraine. The MAP was in April, but by memory, Russian planning was going on well before that. My recollection of the summer of 2008 was that there was a highly contested election going on in the US, the incumbent was not able to run, and there was great discontent over his policies. As a strategic planner, that was a really good time to act: the odds that the US would be able to muster a military or diplomatic response was low. In other words, strategically it was a good time to strike. There's your realpolitik: Strategic goals are Operationally grasped when the risk appears to be low.

Similarly, in 2014, while US diplomatic "efforts" supported a change in government in Ukraine (as if there were no other diplomatic "efforts" to place that government there in the first place), a similar assessment was made: The second Libyan Civil War (and the first) showed that there was little appetite for the US administration to lead NATO efforts ("leading from behind"), Syrian "red lines" were shown to be more threat than an ultimatum, Russia had funds from high oil prices, and they determined the risk was low. The use of "little green men" mitigated the risk further. The situation today is similar. Russia expected a lack of resistance, and I think are strategically surprised by the backlash. Heck, I am surprised! Germany buying F-35s? Japan considering development of nuclear weapons? Swiss bankers (you know the guys who had no issues providing banking services to the NSDAP?) are supporting sanctions? The world just changed.

I think that based on Soviet experience in Hungary in '56, Prague in '68, et al, they honestly believed they could shock their way in. They learned otherwise, and are now reacting. They do not integrate air with ground, they did not expect to need to fight at night, they did not expect they would need to sustain (and did not move the resources to support), and, on the air side, they are prey to the same tactical air doctrine mistake that the US is married to: They expected air supremacy, and without it, they are not sure how to react. The concept of air superiority hasn't yet entered into their operations. Why haven't they simply flattened everything? Well, they are starting to, but I believe the initial idea was they didn't want to break something they thought they would use. If there original idea was the conquest would lead to economic benefits, breaking things provides no benefits, and high cost. There's a lesson for Taiwan in there. I'm sure they're watching. An armored Blitzkrieg? What resources to spend? Are the resources enough? Primordial Violence, but subordination, subject to reason. And then the play of chance came in, and in this case, the military leadership was not up to it.

Why he made the decision he made is simple to me: He thought he could intimidate his way in, and the West would accept it. There were some obvious signs there wouldn't be resistance ("minor incursions", anyone?) and honestly, if the Ukrainians had not put up a solid resistance, would anyone have really sanctioned? The fact that it took several days to figure out some banks (and by no means all) should be removed from SWIFT is a clue: On day one it looked like the game was worth the candle.

What concerns me (and I think the better discussion) is "what's next?" Is there a face saving way for Russia to back out? If not, do they ramp up destruction?

And sometimes the fine print means absolutely nothing.
In this case Puttin is doing what he wants and doesn't need to give a reason for it. Just toss out some BS about maps from ancient times or security border and let it rip.
The Cartels own Mexico and nobody sends their army to free them.
The small fish countries on Earth would passes back and forth as they did in the old earth days if it weren't for NATO or the USA. One king grabbed them then sometime down the road another king grabbed them and sometimes they took themselves back. They allied with Egypt when they were strong to keep King X or Y or Z from grabbing them.
Same stuff different day or year or millennium. One king had a huge number of chariots, modern day tanks, another had bow and arrows. They still fought for the spoils. Modern day oil and other raw materials.
Here's a question to ponder.
Would the world leaders give Ukraine to Putin if that would keep him from pushing a nuclear button?
If so, would that be his go to button to get what he wanted next?

Read Chuck Colson's book where he said the NVC said they could not handle Hanoi being bombed for 30 days under Nixon so asked us to stop. Did we counteroffer to stop if they left South VN alone? No, it was a political game not a fight to win. What happens to the surfs AKA pawns in such games?

 

[Randy F]

And sometimes the fine print means absolutely nothing.
In this case Puttin is doing what he wants and doesn't need to give a reason for it. Just toss out some BS about maps from ancient times or security border and let it rip.
The Cartels own Mexico and nobody sends their army to free them.
The small fish countries on Earth would passes back and forth as they did in the old earth days if it weren't for NATO or the USA. One king grabbed them then sometime down the road another king grabbed them and sometimes they took themselves back. They allied with Egypt when they were strong to keep King X or Y or Z from grabbing them.
Same stuff different day or year or millennium. One king had a huge number of chariots, modern day tanks, another had bow and arrows. They still fought for the spoils. Modern day oil and other raw materials.
Here's a question to ponder.
Would the world leaders give Ukraine to Putin if that would keep him from pushing a nuclear button?
If so, would that be his go to button to get what he wanted next?

Read Chuck Colson's book where he said the NVC said they could not handle Hanoi being bombed for 30 days under Nixon so asked us to stop. Did we counteroffer to stop if they left South VN alone? No, it was a political game not a fight to win. What happens to the surfs AKA pawns in such games?

"Would the world leaders give Ukraine to Putin if that would keep him from pushing a nuclear button?
If so, would that be his go to button to get what he wanted next?"

That's just paying ransom. The next "kidnapping" with be a more important VIP. Not a game to play.

 

[jpr9954]