I think that it is not that I am thinking tactically and you strategically, rather I am using examples to show why I disagree with your strategic assessment.
You've stated: "great powers all have their (hemi)sphere of influence construct, and enforce it." I am arguing that the Monroe Doctrine was never really enforced, until possibly when Theodore Rex was trying to defend his canal, and if he'd hadn't, we probably would not discuss it. Either way, I think Russia may believe it is a "Great Power", but I think we are learning that they are not.
Yes, you stated you were dealing with hypotheticals, but I think I was poorly pointing out that the US and Canada figured out a long time ago that they are better off supporting each other than they are trying to force their attitude on each other. They do share the longest undefended border in the world. I stand by my assessment that Russia, on the other hand is the "wife beater" compared to the neighbors it married. No one should be surprised those countries went to the "battered wife shelter" that is NATO. And let us be absolutely clear: there are no TLAM bases in Europe. TLAM is meant to be sea launched or air launched, and to suggest that Aegis Ashore is TLAM capable is to repeat Russian propaganda. The bases you are discussing simply do not exist. And I can get a lot closer with an SSGN anyway.
The UN is a "better" League of Nations. I am not a fan of Mr. Wilson for many reasons, but the US never joined the League... The UN I can blame on Mr. Truman and Ms. Roosevelt, but the bottom line is that what is in the Charter is the way we all agreed we would work in the future. If the right of self determination could be used to roadmap the decolonization of Africa in the Soviet's favor, the same charter should be used for the breakup of another empire. It's not "whataboutism", it's consistency. Russia is on the Security Council. They were allowed to stay there when the USSR ceased to exist. They agreed to it as well, if we want to re-litigate how things should work, start there.
I think strategically, instead of focusing on the fig leaf of NATO expansion (which to me is as obvious a piece of propaganda as the excuse that the Berlin Wall was to protect the east from western decadence), there's another way to look at Georgia and Ukraine (and Belarus):
In Belarus, a Russian-leaning government has obviated more "kinetic" requirements. My analogy there remains "battered wife syndrome". Militarily, Georgia is an easier nut to crack than is Ukraine. The MAP was in April, but by memory, Russian planning was going on well before that. My recollection of the summer of 2008 was that there was a highly contested election going on in the US, the incumbent was not able to run, and there was great discontent over his policies. As a strategic planner, that was a really good time to act: the odds that the US would be able to muster a military or diplomatic response was low. In other words, strategically it was a good time to strike. There's your realpolitik: Strategic goals are Operationally grasped when the risk appears to be low.
Similarly, in 2014, while US diplomatic "efforts" supported a change in government in Ukraine (as if there were no other diplomatic "efforts" to place that government there in the first place), a similar assessment was made: The second Libyan Civil War (and the first) showed that there was little appetite for the US administration to lead NATO efforts ("leading from behind"), Syrian "red lines" were shown to be more threat than an ultimatum, Russia had funds from high oil prices, and they determined the risk was low. The use of "little green men" mitigated the risk further. The situation today is similar. Russia expected a lack of resistance, and I think are strategically surprised by the backlash. Heck, I am surprised! Germany buying F-35s? Japan considering development of nuclear weapons? Swiss bankers (you know the guys who had no issues providing banking services to the NSDAP?) are supporting sanctions? The world just changed.
I think that based on Soviet experience in Hungary in '56, Prague in '68, et al, they honestly believed they could shock their way in. They learned otherwise, and are now reacting. They do not integrate air with ground, they did not expect to need to fight at night, they did not expect they would need to sustain (and did not move the resources to support), and, on the air side, they are prey to the same tactical air doctrine mistake that the US is married to: They expected air supremacy, and without it, they are not sure how to react. The concept of air superiority hasn't yet entered into their operations. Why haven't they simply flattened everything? Well, they are starting to, but I believe the initial idea was they didn't want to break something they thought they would use. If there original idea was the conquest would lead to economic benefits, breaking things provides no benefits, and high cost. There's a lesson for Taiwan in there. I'm sure they're watching. An armored Blitzkrieg? What resources to spend? Are the resources enough? Primordial Violence, but subordination, subject to reason. And then the play of chance came in, and in this case, the military leadership was not up to it.
Why he made the decision he made is simple to me: He thought he could intimidate his way in, and the West would accept it. There were some obvious signs there wouldn't be resistance ("minor incursions", anyone?) and honestly, if the Ukrainians had not put up a solid resistance, would anyone have really sanctioned? The fact that it took several days to figure out some banks (and by no means all) should be removed from SWIFT is a clue: On day one it looked like the game was worth the candle.
What concerns me (and I think the better discussion) is "what's next?" Is there a face saving way for Russia to back out? If not, do they ramp up destruction?
I really appreciate your input, because you take the time to provide reasoned points of view. We may agree or disagree, but this is an intellectually worthy exercise, without common measure with posts where the argumentation (or lack thereof) is limited to name calling. Thank you for your feedback, I mean it.
Speaking of intellectually worthy exercise, and as demanded by intellectual honesty, let me start by saying that
I stand corrected on the issue of Tomahawk missiles (TLAM indeed technically, but I am not sure everyone knows the acronym). My information from European think tanks was dated (almost a decade ago, when the deployment of Aegis Ashore was decided, and at that time apparently, deploying TLAMs was considered). The bottom line is that even tough the MK-41 launchers ARE Tomahawk capable, you are correct that the TLAMs themselves are not stationed in Poland and Romania. I use bold/italic above to make sure that readers catch this paragraph, I am more concerned about being accurate than being right, and I proactively acknowledge when I was wrong, in order to prevent the spread of misinformation.
Regarding the use of the Monroe Doctrine, or maybe more accurately, modern derivatives of it, my analysis is that the US reaction to the deployments of missiles in Cuba WAS an implementation of the Monroe Doctrine, and I would add that many Europeans, and possibly others in the world, are seeing the deployment by the US of extraterritoriality as a modern form of the Monroe Doctrine. Be it as it may, perception is reality for those who hold the perception, and just FYI, it is a fairly widely distributed perception outside the US. My source for this is that I continue to be in contact with many Academy (St Cyr) class mates in the military and civilian spheres, and they use the reference regularly.
There is no arguing your point about Russia being, to use your expression, the "wife beater", and I agree that it applies just as well in Belarus (passive/aggressive) as in Ukraine (aggressive). My point was never to characterize the Russian action in term of right or wrong - it is obviously wrong - nor to justify the action - it is obviously unjustifiable - but to lay a path to
understand the action, as it is difficult to negotiate an out to any situation if the "why" behind the "what" is not understood.
I continue to be dubious as to whether Putin did (past tense) launch an all out invasion of Ukraine, and maybe we are actually in agreement in as much as we may (?) agree that he did (past tense) not initially, and maybe will (future tense) do it now or later. Whether ground forces are employed massively or not, and how they are employed, will tell us whether he goes full scale. I see the rather static deployment of the famed 40 miles convoy as an indicator that Russia is not (yet) in an all-out move. We can agree to disagree on this one.
Yes indeed, the only real question now is, as it always was, how do we get out of this.
To me, analyzing and UNDERSTANDING why we got in it, was the first step in the process of getting out of it. It seems that Putin will bear a lot of responsibility in how this works. If he is indeed deceptive, cunning, etc. (I do not think he is crazy) and goes fully "medieval" on Ukraine, it will be hard to clear a path for him to get out of it without loosing face, or worth. Conversely, if he is - my continued speculation so far (?) - still in a mode of ramping up soviet-style diplomatico/military stakes to strengthen his negotiation position on his "security demands", we may yet be able to stop this before it gets too stupid.
The bottom line is simple I believe:
--- We either - right, wrong or indifferent - make the calculation that pain avoidance prevails - the gain is not worth the pain - and we somehow accept Putin's "security demands", whether they are genuine - Russia's own Monroe Doctrine and US/EU/NATO Realpolitik acceptance of it - or not genuine - us pretending to believe the pretext allows him to save face. In any case, trying to understand these "security demands" was the point of my earlier posts. The obvious risk is the syndrome of "negotiating with terrorists".
--- Or we make the decision that the principles at stake bears no compromise, and short of Putin willingly withdrawing in humiliation, which seems unlikely to me, we will have to drive him out one way of the other, probably economically rather than militarily, unless he indeed has become genuinely "certifiable". The obvious risk is escalation.
--- or, as usual, and most likely, negotiations bring out some hybrid of the above.
In any case, I appreciate the exchange. It is highly enriching to understand other reasoned folks', like you or
Red Leg, approach to the situation.
