Because Great Britain retained the strategic initiative, I think one must conclude it was a strategic British victory. However, the German High Seas Fleet inflicted destruction of twice the tonnage on the British Fleet than they themselves suffered. British personnel losses were three times higher. Then and now it was broadly seen as a tactical German victory, though obviously Great Britain worked hard to paint it differently. In fairness to Jellicoe, and as Churchill noted at the time, he was the one man who could lose the war in an afternoon. He also was not particularly well served by his battle cruiser flotilla commander Admiral Beatty.
Regardless of the debate, Admiral Scheer concluded that the High Seas Fleet could not withstand another "victory" like Jutland. It essentially imprisoned itself in the Baltic for the remainder of the war. In 1917, Germany resorted to unrestricted submarine warfare as a strategic alternative to another attempt to gain control of the North Sea through fleet action. Therefore, I think one has to consider the outcome clearly a British strategic victory.
A lot of debate and scholarship has filled articles and books over the years largely due to the perceived missed opportunity to actually destroy the German fleet. I tend to think Jellicoe played his cards very carefully, and the remainder of the war proved he was correct.