My parents were of the New Improved generation- we had a new car or two every three years and used stuff was discarded for new. As a result i can count of several things that got thrown away that I really wanted and are now highly sought items. Oh well, you can't pick your parents. They're both gone and now I find I run out of room because I'm such a pack rat.
Same thing happened when we moved my brother and I had some collectable silver coins, baseball cards, and Case XX knives that got lost during the moving process.
Sums up the Biden and Liberal way of dealing with things....
Zechariah 14:2-9 I will gather all the nations to Jerusalem to fight against it.....
These things used to be called "Conflict of interest." Now they just announce it didn't influence my decision, like the judge some years back deciding a case involving gays while in a gay relationship himself. Mr Pelosi made his statement to the media with a smiling wife standing next to him.
Symptoms include:
I don’t believe Lenin or Stalin or any other of the main power players in the Revolution “met” any of their perceived enemies they had executed. As in most all similar plays in history, the big shots use or hire low ranking disposable followers and thugs to do their dirty work. Just like everything associated with this Putin-Ukraine subject thread, those who are Putin/Russia groupies and sympathizers have a hard time reading for accuracy and content. I never said Lenin met Rasputin…. Dumb ass
Exactly. No Bolshevik was needed to perceive the evil influence of a Rasputin.
However I found this fascinating. It is from "The Economist" of October of 1853. As I assume most reading this thread would know, 
that was during the height of the Crimean War which pitted Great Britain, France, and the Ottoman Empire (Turkey) against Imperial Russia. This is a bit of cut and paste from the article.
Exactly. No Bolshevik was needed to perceive the evil influence of a Rasputin.
The most interesting relationship during that period was between Lenin and his co-conspirators who were members of the German government and military. A classic case of unintended consequences arising from an otherwise logical short term objective (get Russia out of the war).
I am always suspicious about cultural generalizations. As a Southerner, I get "generalized" quite a bit.
The specific aspersions cast with respect to national character are both overblown and reflect a then common biased perception of Russian culture (though one that somehow seems to get periodically refreshed). However, the general thrust of the article and the effect of corruption and a hierarchal dictatorial leadership model on combat performance, the plight and characteristics of the common soldier, and the fundamental weakness of the Imperial state is striking when one looks at the failures thus far in Russia's "special military operation."
This unexpected weakness of Russia in military matters arises from four concurring causes, of which three are inherent in her system, and, if not absolutely incurable, are at least little likely to be cured.
In the first place, the nature of the country and the want of roads. Her resources may be vast but they are scattered and remote. Her forces may be immense, but they are necessarily in great measure distant from the scene of action.
Secondly. The Russian armies are often armies on paper only. Not only are their numbers far fewer than are stated in returns and paid for out of the official purse, but they are notoriously ill-provided with everything necessary to the action of a soldier. The colonels of regiments and officers commissariat have a direct interest in having as large a number on the books and as small a number in the field as possible — inasmuch as they pocket the pay and rations of the between these figures. They have an interest also in the men being as inadequately fed and clothed as possible — inasmuch they pocket the difference between the sum allowed and the sum expended on the soldiers’ rations and accoutrements. The Emperor provides (or believes he does) for the food, clothing, lodging, arms and ammunition of 5 or 600,000 men; but every one of these who is or can be made non-existent is worth two or three hundred roubles to some dishonest official or officer; every pair of shoes or great coat intercepted from the wretched soldier is a bottle of champagne for the ensign or the major; every ammunition wagon which is paid for by Government, but not provided, is a handsome addition to the salary of the captain or the contractor. Robbery and peculation of this sort is universal, in every rank, in every district, in every branch. It runs through every department in the Empire; and its operation upon the efficiency of the military service may be easily imagined and cannot be easily exaggerated.
This horrible and fatal system originates in two sources, both, we fear, nearly hopeless, and certainly inherent in Russian autocracy: the rooted dishonesty of the national character, and the incurable inadequacy of despotic power. Cheating, bribery, peculation pervade the whole tribe of officials, and are, in fact, the key-note and characteristic of the entire administration. There seems to be no conscience, and not much concealment, about it. The officers are ill paid, and of course pay themselves. Regard for truth or integrity has no part in the Russian character. We have heard those who know them well say that there are only three honest men in the Empire:— Woronzow is one, Nesselrode another — and men differ about the name of the third. We have heard Statesmen, who strongly incline towards a Muscovite alliance, say that the Russians are liars above all things: it is their spécialité. Then the power of the Autocrat, absolute as it is and vigorously as it is exercised, is utterly insufficient to meet the evil. What can a despot do who has no instruments that can be trusted? There is no middle class who pay the taxes and insist upon knowing how they are expended. There is no free Press, with its penetrating and omniscient vigilance, to compel honesty and drag offenders to light and retribution. There is only one eye over all: and that eye can of course see only a small corner of this vast Empire. What the Emperor looks at, or can visit, is well done: everything else is neglected or abused. It is the common and inevitable story wherever you have centralisation and barbarism combined.
Thirdly. The common soldiers, brave and hardy as they are, devoted to their Czar, and careless of privation, have no love for their profession, and no interest in the object of the war. If we except the household regiments, who are near the person of the Emperor, the Russian private has no zeal for glory, no taste for fighting, no pleasure in bold and exciting enterprises. He is serf, seized by the conscription, and condemned to hopeless slavery for life. He is torn from his family and his land, drilled by the knout*, neglected by his officers, fed on black bread, where fed at all, always without comforts, often without shoes. How can such troops be expected to make head,— we do not say against French enthusiasm, we do not say against British resolution, we do not say against fanatical and hardy mountaineers, like Shamyl** and his warriors, — but even against courageous well fed Turks, fighting for their country and their faith, and officered by competent commanders? We need not wonder to read that at Oltenitza and Silistria the Russians had to be on to the assault with menaces and blows; that general had to sacrifice their lives in an unprecedented manner in order to encourage the soldiers to make head against the foe; and that the prisoners of war begged as a mercy to be permitted to enlist in the army that had captured them rather than return to misery by being exchanged.
Lastly. There is another source of weakness in the Russian Empire. That vast State is in a great measure composed of spoils which she has torn from surrounding nations. She is a patchwork of filched and unamalgamated materials. Her frontier provinces are filled with injured, discontented, hostile populations, whom, being unable to reconcile to her rule, she has endeavoured to enfeeble and to crush; and many of whom wait, with more or less of patience and desire, the blessed day of emancipation and revenge. … Since the great Roman Empire probably, no State ever enfolded so many bitter enmities within its embrace, or was girt with such a circle of domestic foes.
Now these three last sources of Russian weakness are perennial. They belong to her as a despotism as a centralised administration, as an Empire formed by conquest and unconsolidated and unsecured by conciliation. Until, therefore, her whole system changed; till an honest middle class has been created; till her Government be liberalised and de-centralised; till a free Press be permitted and encouraged to unveil and denounce abuses; and till the rights and feelings of annexed territories be habitually respected, we do not think that Russia need henceforth be considered as formidable for aggression. She has been unmasked; it will be the fault of Europe if it dreads her, or submits to be bullied by her, any longer.
Thanks Joe. Pulls it into perspective. I've known and employed more than a dozen Russian's a couple decades ago. The excerpts you shared sums a lot of that experience up well. I saw bits and pieces of all of that... Albeit in a different setting than military.Exactly. No Bolshevik was needed to perceive the evil influence of a Rasputin.
The most interesting relationship during that period was between Lenin and his co-conspirators who were members of the German government and military. A classic case of unintended consequences arising from an otherwise logical short term objective (get Russia out of the war).
I am always suspicious about cultural generalizations. As a Southerner, I get "generalized" quite a bit.
The specific aspersions cast with respect to national character are both overblown and reflect a then common biased perception of Russian culture (though one that somehow seems to get periodically refreshed). However, the general thrust of the article and the effect of corruption and a hierarchal dictatorial leadership model on combat performance, the plight and characteristics of the common soldier, and the fundamental weakness of the Imperial state is striking when one looks at the failures thus far in Russia's "special military operation."
This unexpected weakness of Russia in military matters arises from four concurring causes, of which three are inherent in her system, and, if not absolutely incurable, are at least little likely to be cured.
In the first place, the nature of the country and the want of roads. Her resources may be vast but they are scattered and remote. Her forces may be immense, but they are necessarily in great measure distant from the scene of action.
Secondly. The Russian armies are often armies on paper only. Not only are their numbers far fewer than are stated in returns and paid for out of the official purse, but they are notoriously ill-provided with everything necessary to the action of a soldier. The colonels of regiments and officers commissariat have a direct interest in having as large a number on the books and as small a number in the field as possible — inasmuch as they pocket the pay and rations of the between these figures. They have an interest also in the men being as inadequately fed and clothed as possible — inasmuch they pocket the difference between the sum allowed and the sum expended on the soldiers’ rations and accoutrements. The Emperor provides (or believes he does) for the food, clothing, lodging, arms and ammunition of 5 or 600,000 men; but every one of these who is or can be made non-existent is worth two or three hundred roubles to some dishonest official or officer; every pair of shoes or great coat intercepted from the wretched soldier is a bottle of champagne for the ensign or the major; every ammunition wagon which is paid for by Government, but not provided, is a handsome addition to the salary of the captain or the contractor. Robbery and peculation of this sort is universal, in every rank, in every district, in every branch. It runs through every department in the Empire; and its operation upon the efficiency of the military service may be easily imagined and cannot be easily exaggerated.
This horrible and fatal system originates in two sources, both, we fear, nearly hopeless, and certainly inherent in Russian autocracy: the rooted dishonesty of the national character, and the incurable inadequacy of despotic power. Cheating, bribery, peculation pervade the whole tribe of officials, and are, in fact, the key-note and characteristic of the entire administration. There seems to be no conscience, and not much concealment, about it. The officers are ill paid, and of course pay themselves. Regard for truth or integrity has no part in the Russian character. We have heard those who know them well say that there are only three honest men in the Empire:— Woronzow is one, Nesselrode another — and men differ about the name of the third. We have heard Statesmen, who strongly incline towards a Muscovite alliance, say that the Russians are liars above all things: it is their spécialité. Then the power of the Autocrat, absolute as it is and vigorously as it is exercised, is utterly insufficient to meet the evil. What can a despot do who has no instruments that can be trusted? There is no middle class who pay the taxes and insist upon knowing how they are expended. There is no free Press, with its penetrating and omniscient vigilance, to compel honesty and drag offenders to light and retribution. There is only one eye over all: and that eye can of course see only a small corner of this vast Empire. What the Emperor looks at, or can visit, is well done: everything else is neglected or abused. It is the common and inevitable story wherever you have centralisation and barbarism combined.
Thirdly. The common soldiers, brave and hardy as they are, devoted to their Czar, and careless of privation, have no love for their profession, and no interest in the object of the war. If we except the household regiments, who are near the person of the Emperor, the Russian private has no zeal for glory, no taste for fighting, no pleasure in bold and exciting enterprises. He is serf, seized by the conscription, and condemned to hopeless slavery for life. He is torn from his family and his land, drilled by the knout*, neglected by his officers, fed on black bread, where fed at all, always without comforts, often without shoes. How can such troops be expected to make head,— we do not say against French enthusiasm, we do not say against British resolution, we do not say against fanatical and hardy mountaineers, like Shamyl** and his warriors, — but even against courageous well fed Turks, fighting for their country and their faith, and officered by competent commanders? We need not wonder to read that at Oltenitza and Silistria the Russians had to be on to the assault with menaces and blows; that general had to sacrifice their lives in an unprecedented manner in order to encourage the soldiers to make head against the foe; and that the prisoners of war begged as a mercy to be permitted to enlist in the army that had captured them rather than return to misery by being exchanged.
Lastly. There is another source of weakness in the Russian Empire. That vast State is in a great measure composed of spoils which she has torn from surrounding nations. She is a patchwork of filched and unamalgamated materials. Her frontier provinces are filled with injured, discontented, hostile populations, whom, being unable to reconcile to her rule, she has endeavoured to enfeeble and to crush; and many of whom wait, with more or less of patience and desire, the blessed day of emancipation and revenge. … Since the great Roman Empire probably, no State ever enfolded so many bitter enmities within its embrace, or was girt with such a circle of domestic foes.
Now these three last sources of Russian weakness are perennial. They belong to her as a despotism as a centralised administration, as an Empire formed by conquest and unconsolidated and unsecured by conciliation. Until, therefore, her whole system changed; till an honest middle class has been created; till her Government be liberalised and de-centralised; till a free Press be permitted and encouraged to unveil and denounce abuses; and till the rights and feelings of annexed territories be habitually respected, we do not think that Russia need henceforth be considered as formidable for aggression. She has been unmasked; it will be the fault of Europe if it dreads her, or submits to be bullied by her, any longer.
