Politics

[Pheroze]

It’s too bad it took a war in the Ukraine to get Germany and others to pay their 2%.

I have not heard that Canada is doing anything different than what it has done...which is coattail in an epic fashion

 

[Scott CWO]

Th

If we hadn’t been paranoid after WW2 we wouldn’t have been strategically setting up house keeping all over Europe. One side says one thing, the other side says another. I think it’d be great if Russia would just leave everyone else alone. And it’d be great if the US would get out of nato and quit paying everyone else’s bills.

The point, once again, is Russia had no reason to be paranoid of the West after Germany was soundly defeated and dismantled. Russia succeeded in gaining a lot of territory for the USSR and we didn’t covet the Russian homeland. After WWII, they were the aggressors that we were trying to contain and we had good reason to be worried. What don’t you understand about NATO being a defensive organization? NATO is not even directly fighting the Russians now even though they have invaded another country not in NATO. That’s proof of NATO being defensive in posture.

 

[One Day...]

ABOUT LOOKING FROM THE OTHER SIDE

I'll join the discussion, just in case. The fact is that tomorrow, due to sanctions, there will be a denial of service of Internet servers, and perhaps I will not be able to connect to some foreign resources, if the cross-border Internet persists at all. Whether it will happen or not, and for how many years, I do not know.

I read the articles of One Day with great interest, and I want to say that this material is really minimum at the level of Brzezinski, and in some ways even higher, since the author managed to mostly hold the position of "without anger and partiality”, and in terms of knowledge of the actual material, One Day is in no way inferior to old Zbigniew.
Nevertheless, I will try to show that there can be different views on any event, and based in general on the same facts, the difference is only in the sequence of their presentation and the selection of significant ones – this is where the position manifests itself. On the example of the Caribbean crisis. I quoted a brief description above.
There is nothing to object in general. But you can put the facts in chronological order.
In 1961, the United States began deploying medium-range missiles in southern Italy and Turkey, it was not hidden, Russian diplomats were dissatisfied, they were interested in “why?”, but the answer was like "what can you do?”. There was no protection against such missiles at that time. In the event of an attack on the USSR, Russian similar missiles could in response hit targets only in Europe, but not in America.
In 1961, the United States, completely independent of European affairs, made an attempt to overthrow Castro, who had done nothing wrong up to that time, except that he nationalized the gambling houses of the Italian mafia.
The Soviet government put 2 and 2 together and told Castro: "Listen, man, here's the thing: but our interests coincide at the moment!".
And in 1962, Soviet missiles appeared in Cuba – no worse than Thor or Jupiter. It should be noted that the American government turned out to be much smarter than the Soviet one. The Soviets could not understand why the Americans had placed missiles in Turkey. But the American understood everything at once. The "Caribbean Crisis" broke out. The USSR declared that it would not surrender an ally, and would not be afraid of a nuclear war in the event of a military operation against Cuba (and at that time the ratio of bombs was somewhere 20:1).
But America won. Soviet missiles were withdrawn from Cuba, with great fanfare and publicity, with export control. Then, with much less advertising, missiles were dismantled in Turkey and Southern Italy and, importantly, certain obligations were given to exclude military actions against Cuba. And the Government of Cuba has stood up to our time. At that time, America was ruled by gentlemen, and agreements, even inconvenient ones, were respected.
So the question is: what conclusions from this story have the Russians made for the future, and, by the way, the Cubans, and not only them?

This is just an example, and for almost every episode of history, different interpretations of events and especially motives are possible. You don't have to separate them, but it's better to know if you're going to reach an agreement with the enemy, for obvious reasons.

Brzezinski and Kissinger...

Thank you for the kind words

I certainly do not claim to take an even far-remote backseat to guys like Brzezinski or Kissinger, but I find understanding them fairly simple and common sensical.

Maybe what makes it difficult for many Westerners, is that Western culture, on both side of the Atlantic, tends to have a complex of superiority over the rest of the world. This was decidedly proactively beaten out of me during my formative years...

The two classic Western issues that seem to prevent the general understanding of realistic foreign politic in the West seem to be:

1) A notion of moral superiority, sometimes extending to intellectual superiority, and clearly supported by material superiority when it comes to the US (the US primary weapon). Once we are willing to acknowledge that (i) the enemy is entitled to the very same self-serving interests, in their own analysis, as we ourselves deploy, in our own analysis, and (ii) the enemy is no more stupid than we are, then it becomes fairly easy to understand situations.​

It will have escaped no one that "regime change" is considered a good thing in the West when deployed by the West, and a bad thing when deployed by adversaries, never mind that Western-driven regime changes - although driven by good intent and laudable principles - may have catastrophic consequences on the populations upon which they are bestowed, e.g. in recent years Iraq, Kurds, Libya, Afghanistan, Syria, etc. (luckily we dodged the bullet in Egypt despite our incredibly short-sighted casting aside of Mubarak).​

​

2) The fact that quite often US Administrations do not have a foreign politic but export their internal politics (the current administration being a glaring example of that).​

The big differences with people like Brzezinski or Kissinger is that (i) they had zero pretense of moral or intellectual superiority; (ii) they did not consider that the enemy was not entitled to their own vision of the world, and certainly they did not think it was inept; (iii) they had a clear foreign politic which they applied with cold-blooded calculus and without interference from internal politics; and (iv) they did not mislead and encourage satellite states to "poke the Russian bear" or "pull the Chinese tiger's tail" when they knew darn well that the US could/would not back the rhetoric with force.

Cuba / Turkey ... hemisphere vs. sphere

I do not believe that we have a different interpretation of events, and, if memory serves, I did mention that the US withdrew their missiles from Turkey

I believe that the critical difference was that the US had a doctrine of absolute intransigence regarding deployments of foreign/enemy capabilities in the Western hemisphere, the Monroe Doctrine (which I assert continues to be in force), while the Soviet Union did not have a similar doctrine covering entities that were outside their sphere of influence i.e. the Warsaw Pact countries.

In so many words, the US applied the Monroe Doctrine (and I assert will continue to do so) based on a geographic hemisphere basis, while the Soviets did not react to the deployments in Turkey because they took place outside their political sphere (even though the vectors were geographically in range of Russian cities).

It seems that this difference between geographical hemisphere and political sphere continues to this day, because truth be told - despite all the rhetoric about the extension of NATO to the East from a perspective of offensive capabilities - technology has vastly superseded geography in as much as Russia is already well within range of cruise missiles, never mind upcoming hypersonic missiles, potentially deployed from the air from Poland, Romania, etc. and the Belarus and Ukraine ground buffer is from a military perspective not what it used to be when the longest range weapon was wheeled artillery...

 

[Alistair]

Okay fine. Yes, many of us are capable of analyzing things from both sides. The problem is that you Russians just don’t understand the American and European side. EXCEPT FOR GERMANY AND ITALY THROUGH THE 1940s, WE WANT NOTHING TO DO WITH INVADING, OCCUPYING OR TAKING YOUR HOMELAND! WE HAVE ALWAYS JUST BEEN TRYING TO CONTAIN YOUR EXPANSION OF COMMUNISM AND YOUR PARANOIA SINCE WWII. IS THAT CLEAR ENOUGH FOR YOU?? WE ONLY PUT MISSILES IN EUROPE TO BLOW YOU TO HELL IF YOU ATTACK US OR NATO, FIRST!! GET OVER YOUR PARANOIA!!

With respect, I dont think this is a very nuanced view of why Russia acts as it does.

On the one hand, no, America has no ambitions to invade and occupy eastern Europe. That's absolutely true. But it's also not the point.

If you allow a slight diversion, let's consider America's relationship with China. No one in the US is genuinely fearful that China wants to invade or occupy the America's. That'd be laughable. But you are still justifiably concerned with China. Why?

Because China isn't trying to invade, they're conducting economic warfare to attempt to bring the US into their sphere on influence. Theyre intruding on what America considers to be 'their' turf. Negotiations with Africa, with Europe, a skewed balance of trade with America, military investments in territories such as the pacific and South China sea which America considers to be their stomping ground.

So how is this relevant to Russia? Well, it's exactly the same situation. America is not looking to invade Russia, but they are certainly working (through Nato) to exert more influence, economic, military and political into what Russia considers to be their sphere of influence - eastern Europe. The long term ideal for Americ and nato would be to pull Russia into Europe completely. To have them as an ally, a friend, a partner, just as they are with Germany. But that's a big problem for Russia, because whilst it would help them, such actions come with strings attached.

Closer links with America, especially for a poor, second rate power tends to result in dependence. See Britain, France, Germany, Japan or South Korea even. They are friends and allies of America sure, but in other respects they can almost be considered client states. Dependent on America for their defense, much of their economy, and with a high degree of cultural dilution and political alignment on things like foreign policy.

Putin fears this. So he works to remain independent. Economic links with China. Economic exchange outside of SWIFT. Works to retain relevance and power over what have traditionally been states who are dependent on Russia such as the Ukraine, Poland, Montenegro etc.

He's not doing this to protect from a traditional land invasion, not really. He's protecting against economic and cultural subordination to America through NATO.

This makes sense. He's a corrupt, autocratic leader. Closer ties with the western world would hurt his power and his bank balance. It'd also hurt his national pride.

Viewed through that lense, this action is just as logical as American support of South Korea, Japan and Australia against China. Maintainance of empire and international relevance against a foe. Not protection of the homeland.

At least, that's my take as a relatively independent observer.

 

[John Wasmuth]

Th

The point, once again, is Russia had no reason to be paranoid of the West after Germany was soundly defeated and dismantled. Russia succeeded in gaining a lot of territory for the USSR and we didn’t covet the Russian homeland. After WWII, they were the aggressors that we were trying to contain and we had good reason to be worried. What don’t you understand about NATO being a defensive organization? NATO is not even directly fighting the Russians now even though they have invaded another country not in NATO. That’s proof of NATO being defensive in posture.

Spent plenty of time taking care of nato countries. Understand it fully. Not impressed with anything I’ve seen from most of NATO, or the un for that matter.

 

[Red Leg]

Spent plenty of time taking care of nato countries. Understand it fully. Not impressed with anything I’ve seen from most of NATO, or the un for that matter.

With respect to the UN, you and I are in full agreement.

 

[Scott CWO]

My post was primarily about war and military aggression but sure, we all have our agendas all over the world. However, do you equate the values of freedom, REAL elections, an open Press and capitalism in the West with the values of the Russians and Chinese? What side are you on? Do you favor the dictators? Obviously we want to protect our way of life and our economic systems but those systems come from a place of more freedom for our people than the Russian and Chinese models. It’s not our fault that the former Soviet states want to move toward the West. Same for China - just ask the citizens of Hong Kong. It’s not even a debate as to which side their people prefer. Still, the West isn’t offensively militarily threatening Russia. We haven’t even directly joined the fight in Ukraine, let alone ever moved on Russia or it’s “forced ally”, Belarus. NATO is defensive.

 

[Scott CWO]

Ye

Spent plenty of time taking care of nato countries. Understand it fully. Not impressed with anything I’ve seen from most of NATO, or the un for that matter.

Yes I am with you on that point. They need to step up and help more.

 

[Vashper]

One reason for the "paranoia" was a fat guy pounding his shoe on the desk at the UN and yelling We will bury you. Just a thought.

This is the same fake (albeit funny) as Snake Island and many others.
That's the trouble, that the policy affecting the lives of billions of people is based on fake news. More precisely, the trouble is that people consider something important not economic or social processes, but some kind of garbage.
And yes, there is a war going on now. Yes, shells are exploding in the cities of Ukraine. In the cities of Donbass, it has been going on for 8 years, and shells are bursting there right now - Ukrainian troops, trained by Western advisers, are firing chaotically at Donetsk and Horlivka. In these cities there are now only women, children and the elderly - all men in the armies of the republics, at the front.
These are facts, not opinions.

 

[Alistair]

My post was primarily about war and military aggression but sure, we all have our agendas all over the world. However, do you equate the values of freedom, REAL elections, an open Press and capitalism in the West with the values of the Russians and Chinese? What side are you on? Do you favor the dictators? Obviously we want to protect our way of life and our economic systems but those systems come from a place of more freedom for our people than the Russian and Chinese models. It’s not our fault that the former Soviet states want to move toward the West. Same for China - just ask the citizens of Hong Kong. It’s not even a debate as to which side their people prefer. Still, the West isn’t offensively militarily threatening Russia. We haven’t even directly joined the fight in Ukraine, let alone ever moved on Russia or it’s “forced ally”, Belarus. NATO is defensive.

I'm on the side of whatever country gives me the freedoms and life that I desire, same as everyone else. That's the West.

But that's irrelevant. This is realpolitik. It's not about right or wrong, it's about reality, what's possible and what is not. Truth is also dependent on the observer, and for many people in these countries, they're in the right, especially if they're in a position of power in the current system (and therefore 'matter'). From a purely selfish, personal standpoint, why on earth would Putin work to change the system that's put him in almost undisputed power and made him a billionaire?

Horrid though it sounds, right and wrong is decided after the fact, and only by the victors.

Yes, militarily, NATO is defensive. But politically and economically, the Western world is encroaching on Russia, just the same as China is encroaching on the western world. Now this is probably to the benefit of the Russian people (just as in the past, Chinese enroachment has benefited US people in their quality of life and US corporations in their profit margins). In both cases, the 'aggessor' (a loaded, but not inaccurate term) offers a mutually beneficial exchange, one so good that the recipient can't refuse. Cheap goods, cost reduction, military support, a seat at the table. All have worked at one point or the other in Europe, in Asia and in America.

But they help the country (at least in the short term), they don't necessarily help Putin. And Putin is not beholden to the Russian people. He's beholden to a small group of key backers upon who his power rests. Military leaders, oligarchs, senior religious or community leaders, senior governmental officials, police forces. It doesn't help them either. That's why stuff like the Marshall plan generally only works in relatively democratic societies, and not in places like Africa. Because it benefits the country as a whole, and in countries where political survival depends on popular support, benefitting the country benefits the leader. In autocratic systems, that's not always the case.

 

[One Day...]

I think we can begin to draw some conclusions about where we are. Where we are going is a bit more difficult.

I think it has become very clear that this "operation" was based upon a number of false assumptions for which the Russian military, the Russian people, and the Russian economy are paying dearly. It waits to be seem if those costs come due for Russia's leadership.

Those false assumptions included but are not limited to:

1) The will of Ukrainian people and the capabilities of the Ukrainian armed forces.
2) The capabilities of the Russian armed forces - particularly with respect to force protection operations including

a) The logistics to support and sustain operations
b) The command and control expertise (different than technology) necessary to execute combined operations in contested battle space.
c) The difficulty of trying to accomplish any of the above against a motivated and trained opponent (Ukrainian regular forces) armed with peer technology.

3) The reaction of NATO and the West.
4) Timeline, casualties, and material losses to achieve objectives.


Current situation:

1) The ground attack in the north has culminated. That is a military term which means that the attacker can no longer maintain the momentum of the advance. The Russians are no doubt working very hard to resume that attack, but this is now a logistics driven rather than personnel or weapons system calculus. As the northern battle group, seemingly dependent upon a single MSR, tries to untangle itself, the Russian Rasputitsa is preparing to throw itself into the battle. The spring thaw and mud will affect both sides, but is far more detrimental to the attacker - particularly a highly mobilized one.

Assuming that the Russians can get the attack moving again, one would expect an eventual encirclement of Kiev characterized by the sort of sustained bombardment of urban areas now occurring in the south.

2) The ground attacks in the South, which are supporting efforts, are still progressing, however very slowly. Russian forces seem to have captured Kherson and no doubt are attempting to generate combat power to drive on Odessa and Mariupol.

3) The battle for Kharkov continues with Russian forces resorting to planned bombardment of urban and civic areas.

The greater success in the south can be attributed to the major supporting depot and staging infrastructure in Crimea which shortens lines of resupply dramatically.

4) The air space above Ukraine is still contested. Russia can exercise local and time limited air superiority, but has been unable to do so across the battlespace.

5) The Russian military is suffering grievous losses in personnel and equipment. Four days ago they admitted to approximately 500 deaths and 1500 wounded. Based on the Russian record of honesty about such matters, I would comfortably estimate the actual numbers or 3X to 4X what was announced and of course there has been at least another 96 hours of combat since that tally. During the whole ten years of the Afghanistan campaign, the Soviet army lost roughly 14,500 killed and 53,000 wounded out of roughly 600,000 involved over that decade. The casualty rate with respect to forces committed in Ukraine is far higher.

To be sure the Russians will do everything in their considerable power to hide these losses, but at this loss rate, they will quickly become apparent to the population.

Additionally, US Army doctrine, built around a force model with far more experienced leadership at platoon and company level deems units unfit for offensive operations when casualties reach 20-25%. I suspect many Russian first echelon formations are at or above that critical loss rate.

6) It is correct that Russia itself is not a military risk. However the best forces in the Russian army are proving remarkably ineffective and are taking meaningful casualties at a rate not seen since WWII. Moreover, while the state is not at risk, I am not sure the same can be said about the current government.

6) War is expensive. Whatever preparations the Russian government has made, whatever its gold and foreign exchange reserves may be, it is still the state of Texas attempting to conduct a foreign war. They are easily burning 1 - 1.5 billion a day based upon a now badly damaged currency. With an inflation rate already north of 8 %, the economy is running the risk of a return to pre-Putin hyperinflation.

a. Roughly half of Russia's foreign reserves are trapped in sanctioned institutions.
b. Though gas is flowing in the pipelines, Russian crude and LNG are being offered at great discount. Interestingly, as of today, most shipping carriers are refusing to carry either regardless of the wishes of prospective buyers.
c. I suspect the upturn in price is hardly perceived as a windfall particularly as those prices also affect their domestic costs.

Were I attempting to exercise economic leverage, this would not be the hand I would wish to hold.

Both the Russian national command authority and military planners have bungled this operation from the outset and they can not continue at this pace, level of incompetence, or expense indefinitely. Most significantly, that incompetence has put the whole developed world at risk.

I see four possible outcomes:

1) Partial Russian withdrawal.

A complete withdrawal is extremely unlikely regardless of Putin's health. Acknowledgement of Crimea and a minimal eastern territorial concession is an outcome Ukraine could concede if objections to EU and perhaps NATO membership were dropped. Russia could claim "victory" and Ukraine would rid itself of a constant cause for conflict.

2) Russian "victory" achieved through brutal destruction of infrastructure and mass civilian casualties. Since the coup de main has already failed, this would seem to be the current Russian objective.

The feasibility of this seems to rest, at least for the moment, on the continuing "success" of the southern offensive. An interesting analysis to which I do not have the component data (but I am sure DIA is churning furiously) is how long can such a WWI like offensive battle be sustained. And it is important to remember that General Raputitsa (the Russian thaw) will enter the fight in the south before he does the north.

3) Russian miscalculation likely driven by desperation.

As we discuss this, major staging areas are being developed on the Polish and Hungarian borders with Ukraine for the onward shipment of humanitarian relief supplies and weaponry. Those NATO forward operating bases will pose a tempting target to the leadership of a collapsing military operation. Whether ordered by Putin or a subordinate commander, a strike against one or more of these depots (particularly by a tactical nuclear weapon) would be an act of war. I am confident that NATO would respond immediately and in kind with strikes at either or both staging areas in the Crimea and Belarus. Obviously this could and perhaps likely would spiral out of control into a full nuclear exchange.

4) A new cold war with a new iron curtain running along the Dnieper River.

If the Ukrainians continue to fight, I see little evidence that the Russian military is capable of occupying and subduing the whole country. The Dnieper, as a limit of advance might be achievable. In such a scenario, the West will quickly recover economically, but the Russian people potentially will be looking at another Soviet-like economic dark age.

Numerous news stories are out today concerning a potential declaration of martial law by Putin in Russia as early as tomorrow. Numerous Russian nationals with means seem to be leaving the country ahead of such draconian measures.

Who knows the veracity of these reports. But should such a state of emergency be declared it would not exactly be the action of an enlightened government on a noble quest to liberate a neighbor from fascism - or the action of a government that believes it is "winning." No doubt it would be couched in the terms of the "threat" posed by NATO.

'Thousands' of Russians flee amid fears Putin will declare martial law after protests

Fears are growing Russia could impose martial law on the country after a wave of mass protests against the invasion of Ukraine.

www.lbc.co.uk

Vladimir Putin may declare martial law in Russia. Here's what it would mean for Russians.

As the invasion of Ukraine grinds on and unrest grows in Russia, Putin may declare martial law to crack down on opposition to the incursion.

www.usatoday.com

I know that pessimism is not really needed at a time dark enough, but while I generally agree with Red Leg's analysis, at the conceptual level, and we share a lot of views when it comes to the egregious strategic mistake committed by Putin in going to war in Ukraine (egregious strategic mistake in the realms of both foreign politic and internal politics), I am a bit more pessimistic as regards what is coming on the ground.

While some see air superiority as being still contested, and the ground attack in the north as having culminated, I do not, and I think that the strongest blow is yet to come, precisely in the North.

While I do agree with Red Leg's assessment in the South and East, including that Ukrainian resistance has been much more effective than the Russians, and - truth be told - most of the world expected, my assessment in the North is different:

1) A large number of European analysts believe that the Russian HAVE gained air superiority. Western intelligence indicates that from the 100+ aircrafts (the number advanced is 123) in the Ukrainian arsenal, about 50 were air worthy on the night of the attack, and that the large majority of those were destroyed by a combination of air, missile, and ground (special forces) operations in the first hours of the war. Reportedly (British and French intelligence) a few airplanes and drones were at the last minute moved by the Ukrainian acting upon shared US intelligence, and European analysts estimate that Ukraine may currently own half a dozen air-worthy combat aircrafts and a few drones (they only had 12 for sure, and possibly up to 20 (?), to begin with), but as good as the TB2 may be, this is no Reaper or even Predator.​

​

2) While indeed no one in their right mind would park a 40 mile convoy in open view, the very reason, most European analysts believe, why the Ukrainians have not destroyed it, is that they simply do not have the military capability to do it. It falls under fairly simple logic that if Ukrainian forces had the aircrafts and drones required to take out the convoy, they would. How indeed could such an opportunity be missed, if not by sheer impossibility to do it... (I exclude the "ineptitude" - this time Ukrainian - explanation).​

Similarly, and even if the Ghost of Kyiv "combat sequence" video had not been proven a hoax taken from a video game, most fighter pilots who have commented on the narrative of shooting down six Russian combat planes (and no troop transports, mind you, two Su-35s, two Su-25s, one Su-27 and one МіG-29) in the Kyiv offensive in a single day on 24 February 2022, find it extremely unlikely. As to the undisputable video of a Su-27 being shot over Kyiv, it turned out to be a blue-on-blue incident of the Ukrainians shooting down their own plane.​

​

3) My fear is that the convoy has not run out of fuel; that the Ukrainians are incapable of destroying it from the air; and that the hundreds of Javelins and TOWs that would be required to destroy it on the ground are not in the hands of ground troops qualified to use them.​

I analyze this convoy as Putin clear message to Ukraine/EU/US/NATO: "Look, I have the military capability to unleash on Kyiv what I did on Grozny, and you can do nothing about it, so let's discuss how we end this".​

Back to hared views with Red Leg, I agree that time is running out for Putin on a multitude of clocks in both foreign politic and internal politics, and that there is a growing risk of Putin further miscalculation driven by desperation.

However, I do not see the risk of miscalculation driven by desperation at a nuclear level (unless the West would be doing something as stupid as sending A10s over that convoy, or unless US Senators would continue to do something as idiotic as openly calling for his assassination, or any other ineptitude along these lines); I see the risk of miscalculation driven by desperation ay conventional level in the full scale attack and leveling out of Kyiv as done in Chechnya or Syria.

I hope to be wrong, but it seems to me that it is urgent for the negotiations to yield some results as Putin is indeed running out of time...

 

[Ray B]

This is the same fake

Oh, I see. So now you are saying that I didn't see that fat guy on TV pounding his shoe on the desk and shouting that he would bury us.

Well, YOU do not know what you are talking about.

I was there and I saw it.

 

[John Wasmuth]

With respect to the UN, you and I are in full agreement.

I’m sure we are in agreement on a lot of things it’s just over years and years of the US being abused by NATO, especially involving accountability for arms, munitions and money we have given them through the years they should be able to stand on their own hind feet against the bear. I remember telling a team mate years ago when the USSR fell apart, “Make no mistake, the bear isn’t dead. He just hibernates”. And true to form the bear awakens.

 

[Ray B]

A smaller country is attacked by a larger country. The smaller country asks the world community to help remove the attacking army. A coalition of countries is assembled and the aggressors army is moved out of the small country.

the difference between two similar situations is that when Kuwait was the target, the US had a real president in office. Unfortunately, I don't expect Ukraine to have the luxury of waiting three years for the electorate in the US to change that.

 

[CoElkHunter]

A smaller country is attacked by a larger country. The smaller country asks the world community to help remove the attacking army. A coalition of countries is assembled and the aggressors army is moved out of the small country.

the difference between two similar situations is that when Kuwait was the target, the US had a real president in office. Unfortunately, I don't expect Ukraine to have the luxury of waiting three years for the electorate in the US to change that.

I agree, but the major difference between the two scenarios, is we currently have an apparently "mentally imbalanced" Putin with his finger on a nuclear trigger with no clear fail safe/counter balances in place. This is why Iran must NEVER be allowed to possess a nuclear weapon. These dictators, as we see now, use the nuclear option to hold the world hostage as they pursue their regional/global conquests. AND, what sane leader allows his military to target an active nuclear power plant(s)? Clearly, Putin has/is losing his damn mind!

 

[nztimb]

I wonder how many of you can watch this and hold to the same opinion as to the cause of the present situation.

 

[One Day...]

A smaller country is attacked by a larger country. The smaller country asks the world community to help remove the attacking army. A coalition of countries is assembled and the aggressors army is moved out of the small country.

the difference between two similar situations is that when Kuwait was the target, the US had a real president in office. Unfortunately, I don't expect Ukraine to have the luxury of waiting three years for the electorate in the US to change that.

Quite pragmatically, I am afraid that the key differentiating factor between Ukraine and Kuwait, is not who was US President then, but the fact that Kuwait seats on the 6th largest oil reserve in the world.

George Bush the Father was a consummate Realpolitik player, good enough actually to stop the war when Kuwait was liberated, and not go on and topple Saddam Hussein and initiate Iraq's disintegration as a stabilizing force in the Middle East and a counterpower to Iran, however brutal his dictature may have been.


PS: this makes it all the more incomprehensible why the same Bush Senior encouraged Kurds to revolt against Saddam, knowing full well that he could not help them, neither on the Turkish nor on the Iraqi side, and they would be massacred. This was in my mind a lapse in reasoning as surprising as Senator Graham's recent "Brutus" tweet.

 

[Vashper]

Brzezinski and Kissinger...

Thank you for the kind words

I certainly do not claim to take an even far-remote backseat to guys like Brzezinski or Kissinger, but I find understanding them fairly simple and common sensical.

Maybe what makes it difficult for many Westerners, is that Western culture, on both side of the Atlantic, tends to have a complex of superiority over the rest of the world. This was decidedly proactively beaten out of me during my formative years...

The two classic Western issues that seem to prevent the general understanding of realistic foreign politic in the West seem to be:

1) A notion of moral superiority, sometimes extending to intellectual superiority, and clearly supported by material superiority when it comes to the US (the US primary weapon). Once we are willing to acknowledge that (i) the enemy is entitled to the very same self-serving interests, in their own analysis, as we ourselves deploy, in our own analysis, and (ii) the enemy is no more stupid than we are, then it becomes fairly easy to understand situations.​

It will have escaped no one that "regime change" is considered a good thing in the West when deployed by the West, and a bad thing when deployed by adversaries, never mind that Western-driven regime changes - although driven by good intent and laudable principles - may have catastrophic consequences on the populations upon which they are bestowed, e.g. in recent years Iraq, Kurds, Libya, Afghanistan, Syria, etc. (luckily we dodged the bullet in Egypt despite our incredibly short-sighted casting aside of Mubarak).​

​

2) The fact that quite often US Administrations do not have a foreign politic but export their internal politics (the current administration being a glaring example of that).​

The big differences with people like Brzezinski or Kissinger is that (i) they had zero pretense of moral or intellectual superiority; (ii) they did not consider that the enemy was not entitled to their own vision of the world, and certainly they did not think it was inept; (iii) they had a clear foreign politic which they applied with cold-blooded calculus and without interference from internal politics; and (iv) they did not mislead and encourage satellite states to "poke the Russian bear" or "pull the Chinese tiger's tail" when they knew darn well that the US could/would not back the rhetoric with force.

Cuba / Turkey ... hemisphere vs. sphere

I do not believe that we have a different interpretation of events, and, if memory serves, I did mention that the US withdrew their missiles from Turkey

I believe that the critical difference was that the US had a doctrine of absolute intransigence regarding deployments of foreign/enemy capabilities in the Western hemisphere, the Monroe Doctrine (which I assert continues to be in force), while the Soviet Union did not have a similar doctrine covering entities that were outside their sphere of influence i.e. the Warsaw Pact countries.

In so many words, the US applied the Monroe Doctrine (and I assert will continue to do so) based on a geographic hemisphere basis, while the Soviets did not react to the deployments in Turkey because they took place outside their political sphere (even though the vectors were geographically in range of Russian cities).

It seems that this difference between geographical hemisphere and political sphere continues to this day, because truth be told - despite all the rhetoric about the extension of NATO to the East from a perspective of offensive capabilities - technology has vastly superseded geography in as much as Russia is already well within range of cruise missiles, never mind upcoming hypersonic missiles, potentially deployed from the air from Poland, Romania, etc. and the Belarus and Ukraine ground buffer is from a military perspective not what it used to be when the longest range weapon was wheeled artillery...

Russia cannot completely leave the Western Hemisphere, because its territory is there too, albeit in a small piece.
It should be noted (although few people know this in my country) - Russia immediately recognized the Monroe doctrine, and in 1825 renounced its state rights to the Pacific coast of North America (except Alaska), which then stretched to the border with the Spanish Empire (now Mexico). Now there are 4 US states in these territories.
But in Europe there was an partial analogue of the Monroe doctrine – the so-called Westphalian system. It was confirmed, in particular, by the Helsinki Act of 1975. As it turned out, this did not satisfy many, and something has changed since then. The strongest factor of destruction was the "right of nations to self-determination", formulated mainly by the Entente and Woodrow Wilson, and used against the German, Austrian, Ottoman and Russian Empires. And then against the British. It's funny that both the principles of "inviolability of borders” and "self-determination" are included in the main UN documents, although they contradict each other. I personally do not see a way out of this trap in modern conditions.

Well, speaking of more specific and sadder things– the problem with medium-range missiles is not that they are such a deadly and final weapon. They dramatically reduce the decision-making time. A week ago I wrote about our doctrine, about the use of nuclear weapons. Literally on the same day, a law was adopted to clarify the criteria. The basis for a retaliatory strike is not a "nuclear attack”, but a "mass launch of missiles" (that's right, well, don't wait for the missiles to arrive to determine whether they are nuclear missiles or just missiles). As well as the failure of missile attack warning devices. And imagine that a group launch of missiles from Poland and Romania has been recorded – and what should the Russian leadership do? The time to make a decision is 4-5 minutes.
Yes, I read that "Spain has no right to demand the demilitarization of France." But nevertheless. Russia demands a return to the situation in 1997, when the treaty between Russia and NATO was signed. The tales that NATO was moving to our borders “to protect against communism" were valid until 1991, now they do not look convincing. Russia demands security guarantees, and promises like "an honest scout's word” are not enough for this.

As for ”moral superiority", everyone has it. I somehow got to the Gypsy forum – and read too much. That's where the superiority is, the Anglo-Saxons are nervously smoking in the corner.

 

[Jfet]

Do the maintenance.

 

[LivingTheDream]

If you allow a slight diversion, let's consider America's relationship with China. No one in the US is genuinely fearful that China wants to invade or occupy the America's. That'd be laughable. But you are still justifiably concerned with China. Why?

I disagree with this. If China thought they could be successful invading the US, they would do it tomorrow.