Politics

That is awfully generous of you.

However, last I looked the USMC isn't operating main battle tanks in those units are they (or any tracked vehicles at all)? In fact "light" is the operative word isn't it? The Corps regiments use the wheeled LAV - essentially the predecessor to the Army Stryker. The Russians are operating and losing their latest T-80, T-90, and BMP armored fighting vehicles in Ukraine. Not exactly a recon formation's order of battle. Those systems equip armor and mechanized infantry formations. Russian motorized recon formations are equipped primarily with the BTR series of wheeled armored vehicles. They don't look much like tanks either.

Any other corrections?
Correct, and until the Marine Corps got rid of tanks they still employed scout elements within the Tank BNs with TOW equipped HMMWVs. The Marine Corps got rid of tanks due to the change in tactics and order of battle within the Corps (to be better suited for assumed Island seizures and littoral focus in the Pacific)

However the Army still employs a similar method/strategy of Reconnaissance within their ABCTs using Bradleys and M113 variants. That being said.... modern Russian tactics/ employment are different than the Cold War, as are ours. Especially when you consider what potential outcomes they want from this conflict in particular (control of Donbas? realistically undetermined i think).

If I had to guess why we're seeing Russian tanks getting blow up.......it probably has something to do with how much focus US advisors have been giving the Ukrainian Army on employment of Javelins and other anti armor weapons over the past couple of years. (Seems the training was effective so far).

However it seems the Russians have been pulling back and then bypassing any serious resistance they're encountering on the way to seizing/destroying critical military infrastructure. They still don't have total air superiority and didn't emply a "Shock and Awe" Campaign like the US did before OIF1. Ukraine also hasn't been under sanctions and blockades like Iraq was before OIF1. So Russia entered into a fully equipped, fueled, and trained Ukraine.

Casualty reports are unreliable at best right now and propaganda is flowing from both sides. I just hope this thing ends quickly and really have been praying for peace. For now I have no skin in this game and would really just like to see it come to an end... I don't know if Western Countries flooding Ukraine with more weapons is going to help that.
 
Well, I guess one of my friend's daughter was prophetic, she is in her third year at West Point and her major is Russian. She is currently at one of the Eastern European countries in an immersion program. Guess she has a front seat at what's going on.
 
I wish I could contract fertilizers at your numbers.
Nitrogen based products were up 3X and most phosphorus and potash prices were at or near double before the Ukraine invasion ever started. The prices are ridiculous and are targets of opportunity for gouging. There is plenty of all of it.

Nitrogen products are petroleum byproducts so as soon as our fearful leader trashed US production, the fear mongers raised the red flag and prices started going up. Everything else goes with it. Much like soybean prices drop a buck every time a mouse farts in Brazil and some idiot translates it into a devastating wind storm.

Transportation is one of the reasons as well. There is enough supply, getting it to me has been and will be an issue.

You do, and will continue to see prices rise as commodities are correcting. As is what happens every time there is a significant uptick in commodities, every person with a seed or a part for a machine in his hand wants a bigger piece of the “big money” the farmers is getting. Tractors, irrigation, new construction, etc, are all up 15% or more. Funny how those prices never settle back when the market drops.

There isn’t a farmer I know, and I know many across the country, that is willing to cut back on amounts used. Technology (we won’t even get into its cost increase) has brought us to the razor edge of minimum rate to yield ratios as it is with precision ag and variable rate tech. Cutting anything would drop our price per unit much more than our cost per unit at this point.

Sorry if that seemed like a rant but my point is that our government will have you believe this is all because of this war along with a ton of other problems that existed prior to the build up at the Ukrainian border.
They need to blame someone for their incompetence.

We will still keep everyone fed.

Totally agree Randy. Russia/Ukraine are high cost swing producers. We have plenty of fertilizer production in NA to cover our needs. If Moroccan shipments of phosphate were cut off it would have a bigger impact than Russian nitrogen.
 
I would argue they are having the opposite problem. This is not the Red Army. They do not have the logistics resources to sustain high intensity combat operations. Trying to do it while projecting power is even more difficult. I suspect the actual reason more forces haven't moved is because every logistics tap is being turned to maintain the first echelon in combat.

Moreover, militaries, East or West do not "scout" with armor regiments. Assuming those additional troops represent actual combat formations, I have no doubt they would be rolling if they could.

I truly think his "playbook" went out the window 48 hours ago. I am more convinced daily that the sycophants providing his decision matrix misread the Ukrainian will to resist, the effectiveness of their anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, and the West's response. He either has to try and fight this through to the finish (perhaps by starving the trapped civilians?), find a face saving way off the ledge (tomorrow's negotiations?), or Armageddon.

I don't pretend to be an expert on Russian politics, but at some point he is also risking someone else stepping in to resolve the issue.

I’m betting his supply and logistics plan assumed a 2 or 3 day campaign. If that is true, it will take weeks to set up the logistics necessary to support an extended campaign. In that time, the Ukrainians will simply continue to turn the handle on the meat grinder.

There is a tipping point in industrial operations where you have lost an operation and are in damage control mode. I have no expertise in military operations, but I have to believe that the dynamic is similar.

As Joe alludes, if it continues to go badly, Putin may be facing a Russian solution.
 
In the negotiations, Zelinskyy should start with: We will let your troops leave Ukraine without killing all of them, if you move all troops out of and relinquish all control of Crimea. ;)

If this debacle continues they may just be in a position to do that! I’ve spent a fair bit of time in Ukraine with travel throughout Crimea. The characterization of Crimea as primarily Rus is totally at odds with my experience. It certainly may be the case now as they’ve probably moved the Ukrainians out!
 

Interesting read if not a particularly articulate or informed analysis. But the root information potentially adds a lot of context.
could explain why so much infrastructure is still intact, I still can't wrap my head around how the cellular networks and wifi are still up and running, theres random adventure journalist types running around still live streaming. albeit from major cities.....but still
 
I would argue they are having the opposite problem. This is not the Red Army. They do not have the logistics resources to sustain high intensity combat operations. Trying to do it while projecting power is even more difficult. I suspect the actual reason more forces haven't moved is because every logistics tap is being turned to maintain the first echelon in combat.

Moreover, militaries, East or West do not "scout" with armor regiments. Assuming those additional troops represent actual combat formations, I have no doubt they would be rolling if they could.

I truly think his "playbook" went out the window 48 hours ago. I am more convinced daily that the sycophants providing his decision matrix misread the Ukrainian will to resist, the effectiveness of their anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, and the West's response. He either has to try and fight this through to the finish (perhaps by starving the trapped civilians?), find a face saving way off the ledge (tomorrow's negotiations?), or Armageddon.

I don't pretend to be an expert on Russian politics, but at some point he is also risking someone else stepping in to resolve the issue.
I was making my assessment based on my 1st hand knowledge of working with the Russian Military at many locations. LTG Hertling (RET) shares a very similar view in his interview.

They didn't roll into Ukraine in a Blitzkrieg fashion like Germany did in 1939. It took the Wehrmacht around a month to capture Poland, and 8 months later, 3 days for Holland to fall. More recently, Kuwait fell to Iraq in around 2 days. The scale of these invasions IMHO is not what we are witnessing writ large in Ukraine.

Yes, I believe some things have not necessarily gone according to Putin's plan, however I strongly doubt that a lot of these contingencies were not addressed in the Battle Plan. Overwhelming sanctions, cyber attacks by Anonymous, Germany actually providing support, etc were likely variables that were not considered, or were low on the possibility scale.

We're all truly guessing, based on our experiences, trying to predict the next move.
 
You are correct but it’s not as easy as all that. And you’re correct in that milo takes less, I’ve raised 17,000 acres of the stuff. The price shadows corn but still lower and it’s more finicky to store. But you’re at the mercy of the Chinese for a volume market. If corn prices are high they are one of the few who will contract for a few ships…then cancel when they find some cheap corn. There is a reason for its limited acreage in the US.
Soybeans is a no-brainer as well but a great way to trash that market is to overplant them.
I’ve also grown over 120,000 acres of wheat. Maybe road ditches would work for a smaller operation but to maximize returns you need high protein. Few buyers will take low protein wheat and if they do, they don’t pay much.

But I agree, raising stock is a different thing altogether. Cattle feed is a little more forgiving than people…or should I say buyers.

My statement was more toward potato and vegetable production. Rotations are much more limited. Most processors require at least a five year plan which means land leases and long term contracts for a tone of things need to be in place. It isn’t so easy jot make rotation changes. Margins stay tight but so is everything else for everyone. I’ve produced over 90,000 acres of potatoes to this point and it still amazes me that I get +/- $9/cwt for premium and they sell a couple ounces of fries for a buck+. Same with sweet corn, peas, and green beans, it’s all about premium grade. Cutting back fertilizer when your at the edge already is jeopardizing much more than yield.
Geez maybe I should just grow corn and beans and quit worrying about all this other crap. :unsure:

Anyway, the point is that sanctions will possibly have some effect but the issues were here long before…including inflation.
And I appreciate your thoughts on it. (y)
Comparing what my farm is to what you do is like me comparing myself to somebody that grows a small vegetable garden and raises a few rabbits. Where are your farm?
 
I’m betting his supply and logistics plan assumed a 2 or 3 day campaign. If that is true, it will take weeks to set up the logistics necessary to support an extended campaign. In that time, the Ukrainians will simply continue to turn the handle on the meat grinder.

There is a tipping point in industrial operations where you have lost an operation and are in damage control mode. I have no expertise in military operations, but I have to believe that the dynamic is similar.

As Joe alludes, if it continues to go badly, Putin may be facing a Russian solution.
I don’t know guys. I can’t imagine anyone thinking any army could take over a country the size of Texas with 44 million people in three days. That’s a lot of real estate. I do believe Ukraine has slowed the Russians down and hopefully this doesn’t end well for the Russians but it’s still too early to call I think. I am hopeful but not convinced yet.
 
Comparing what my farm is to what you do is like me comparing myself to somebody that grows a small vegetable garden and raises a few rabbits. Where are your farm?
I’ll PM you and spare the rest my farmer drivel. ;)
 
Slight change of topic.

Went to lunch today. Drove past two interstate overpasses that were completely full of Oklahoman's with American flags waiting for the Freedom Convoy.

Freedom Convoy drove past while we were at lunch. Turn out from a Red state was pretty good. Will be interesting to see what happens when they get to DC area.
 
Trying to understand the "why" so that we do not need to go through the "what" repeatedly...

I have abstained from engaging in this thread so far, because my analysis will likely surprise, but let me preface by saying that Russian military aggression cannot be condoned, period, and that I do not aim to offend.

My point here is NOT to justify what is happening, I condemn it, it is to propose that we try to understand what is happening.

If you allow me, Joe, I will use one of your posts as a starting board :)

The Monroe Doctrine

... This is about relative military and economic power. The Russians do not have forces in the western hemisphere because the United States has the military and economic power to prevent it ...

I agree. This is THE reason. Period.

And not only do the United States have the military and economic power to prevent it, but we also actually have a political doctrine to support it.

It is called the Monroe Doctrine. Going clear back to 1823 this doctrine articulates the fact that the United States will not tolerate interference of any other world power in the Western Hemisphere. The doctrine held that any intervention in the political affairs of the Americas by foreign powers was a potentially hostile act against the U.S.

For example (and I am surprised to have not seen this mentioned already - unless I missed it, in which case I apologize), the United States could not tolerate the deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba, 1,000 miles from Washington DC in 1962, and JFK was likely ready to go to full nuclear WW III over it.

A few bottom line points here can be:

1- The Monroe Doctrine is not based on notions of freedom or democracy. As Red Leg correctly surmised, it is based on sheer power. The US did not invite the world to agree to the Monroe Doctrine, we dictate it, because we unilaterally deem it in our national interest, and we have enforced, it because we indeed had the power to do it.​
2- When the sovereign nation of Cuba decided to exercise their freedom to allow the Soviet Union to install military bases on their soil, the United States deemed their national interest threatened, and we engaged air and sea military action to prevent it, including the threat of nuclear WW III. Thankfully, Khrushchev who knew what war was (he was engaged throughout the entire Great Patriotic War (a.k.a. WW II for us) and he was Political Commissar at Stalingrad) understood that he had gone too far and he withdrew the Soviet missiles from Cuba (and we, discreetly, our missiles from Turkey).​
3- Is the Monroe Doctrine obsolete? Mercifully for our security, and indeed thanks to our military and economic power, as correctly outlined by Red Leg, no one has tested it in recent history. Good! But for the sake of discussion, let us take an hypothetical. Imagine Canada was to invite or allow China to establish military bases, likely including anti ICBM capability and hypersonic missiles capability in Quebec, Ontario and Alberta. What do you think the United States reaction would be? Accept the freedom of the Canadian people to ally with China?​
Realpolitik

It was Prussian Chancellor Otto von Bismarck's statecraft in unifying Germany in the 1800’s that brought the concept of Realpolitik to the world. Real here is to be understood in its German meaning: realistic, practical. Realpolitik is diplomatic or political action based primarily on pragmatic considerations rather than moral or ethical premises.

A few examples here can be:

1- One can likely credit Realpolitik for the fact that neither Russia (since Cuba) nor China (so far) have tried to install military bases in Canada or Mexico. Nobody in their right mind would think about trying it, because everybody in their right mind would know that it is pragmatically a non-starter.​
2- NATO control by the US is a given because the US is the overwhelming military power in NATO. Sure, the Bundeswehr was likely the core of ground forces in Western Europe during the Cold War, and, to be objective, French forces are today the core of military power in Europe, but the bottom line is that NATO does what the US say, because, until Western European Defense becomes a reality, if ever in the near term, NATO for all practical purposes IS the US. Which explains why there is a mutually defeating contradiction at play: most of Europe does not dare to challenge NATO/US because they do not dare step away from under the American defense umbrella; and as long as they do not, they are not motivated to construct a European Defense.​

Note that I am not arguing a side or another here, nor do I loose myself in the usual conspiration theories about the US domination of the world, but this discussion is itself a great example of Realpolitik. Realpolitik IS, it is not about what would/should/could it is about what IS.

Which leads us to quoting Red Leg's post again (Thank You Joe):

... The fact that USSR once had the military power to exercise hegemony over Eastern Europe does not mean that modern Russia has any right whatsoever to demand a buffer zone today any more than Spain should demand the disarmament of France ...

Under the wonderful principles dear to American foreign policy, of democracy, freedom of the people to choose their own destiny, etc., the concept of allowing Ukraine in NATO and the EU sounds great; it is the right thing to do; and Russia indeed has no say in it.

However, Russia happens to disagree with that notion, and, right, wrong, or indifferent, this is a fact.

Ukraine

The Realpolitik questions here are not:
--- whether Russia is right or wrong in its assertion that Ukraine is part of their cultural and historical heritage (although there are indeed reams of historical evidence to this point...);
--- whether Russia is right or wrong in its assertion that Ukraine joining NATO will lead to the creation of American military bases on its soil, likely deploying anti ICBM capability and short to mid range nuclear-capable cruise missiles - Tomahawk currently, hypersonic vehicles soon (although the examples of Estonia, Poland, Romania, etc. are difficult to ignore...);
--- etc.

The Realpolitik questions here are whether Russia - again: right, wrong, or indifferent - perceives it this way - the same way the US perceived Soviet missiles in Cuba as a threat - and whether they can do something about it. The clear answers are yes and yes. Period.

Arguing that NATO is only taking defensive steps in Estonia, Poland and Romania, and if they could in Ukraine and Belarus, and is not a threat to Russia, is as irrelevant as arguing that the Soviet Union was only taking defensive steps in Cuba and was not a threat to the US. This is not the way the US perceived it then, and it was our reality; and it is not the way Russia perceives it now, and it is their reality. Period. This is why Russia has been raising their "security demands."

The fact that Russia did nothing about the NATO expansions of 1999 (Poland) and 2004 (Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania, Slovenia) was also Realpolitik, they were too weak then, and it explains why they did nothing, but this should not hide the fact that they were deeply angered about it. But they could only talk about it, so, of course, nobody listened.

The fact that Russia went to war in 2008 over the attempted inclusion of Georgia in NATO likewise was Realpolitik, but this time Russia could do something about it and did. But Georgia was too far, and not really in Europe, so everybody soon forgot about it.

The fact that Russia is, again, going to war over the attempted inclusion of, this time, Ukraine in NATO, continues to be Realpolitik, and nobody should be surprised about it. It is not like they have not been telling us for 10 years that this is their (hemi)sphere, and that they too have their own version of our Monroe Doctrine, and their own red lines.

The gain and the pain

Therefore, the question in 1962 for Cuba for the Soviets became: is it important enough for us to have bases in Cuba to risk WW III?

And the question in 2022 for US/NATO is exactly the same: is it important enough for us to have bases in Ukraine and Belarus to risk WW III?

In so many words, is the gain worth the pain?

I know, I know, nowhere in the above are the values of democracy and freedom considered. We are purely in the realm of Realpolitik.

Clearly, the unambiguous - and completely logical and with which I wholeheartedly agree - statements by the US, NATO, France, Germany, that under no circumstance whatsoever would a single American, French, German, etc. soldier be deployed in Ukraine, and that military response options are not on the table - which again, I totally agree with – make it somewhat obvious that the gain is not worth the pain.

But it also makes it somewhat untenable for the West to refuse to consider diplomatically Putin’s security demands.

And it also raises incredibly pertinent questions about NATO's expansion in Eastern Europe.

Everyone will of course understand, agree and sympathize with the almost panic desire of former Eastern Block countries to shelter under the American defense umbrella. One would be a monster to not understand these people.

But the Realpolitik question is unnerving: if these countries are apparently NOT of vital interest to the US (which is precisely the reason why we are not intervening militarily in Ukraine), why did we give them an Article 5 guarantee that we will come defend them and die for them?

Will we honor Article 5? Many folks believe we will, just as we went to war over Poland in 1939 after the Munich appeasement proved to be just what it was: a ruse.

But these were the days before the Atom. Will the USA go to global nuclear WW III to protect itself? Assuredly. Will we do it to protect Ukraine, or Romania, or Slovakia, or Slovenia, or Latvia, or Lithuania, or Croatia, etc. Tough call...........................

What appears clear, it that we are not doing it over Ukraine, which is patently much larger and much more important than all these other recent NATO members (aside from Poland)..........................

Sure, Ukraine is not part of NATO, we have not signed a piece of paper with them, but will such a piece of paper commit New York, Chicago, Dallas, etc. to be on the nuclear front line, push comes to shove, over Slovenia? Again, tough call..........................

The Kurds made the mistake to heed the American encouragement to overthrow their Iraqi master in 1988. They failed to analyze that despite all good human rights principles they were not of vital national interest to the US. They now boast the terrible claim of being the sole population attacked with nerve agents sarin and tabun. America did not react.......................

Georgian President Saakashvili too felt emboldened after the NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008, where the Membership Action Plan (MAP) to integrate Georgia and Ukraine was discussed, even though Germany and France warned that offering a MAP to Ukraine and Georgia would be "an unnecessary offence" for Russia. But then again, Germany and France have been practicing Realpolitik a few centuries, and have paid a heavy price when they ignored it. The Russia-Georgian was ensued. America did not react.......................

Are we misleading Eastern Europe? Are we encouraging democracy and freedom principles that we back only by words (and diplomatic condemnations, and economic sanctions, and equipment deliveries, etc.) but not by blood, because we too, obviously, and logically, and rightly, abide by the principles of Realpolitik?

Should Realpolitik prevail?

In the name of the great principles of democracy, freedom of the people to choose their government and destiny, etc. America recently involved itself in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, etc. We even did with Kosovo exactly what we blame Russia for doing in the Donbass with the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic!

The fundamental issue is that the Western Christian Democracy principles do not seem to work very well with peoples of other cultural heritages, and that despite our laudable intents, our interventions often create pandemonium. Is life for Iraqis better today than it was under Saddam? Is life today in Syria better than what it was before we attempted to remove Bashar al-Assad? Is Libya today better than it was under Gaddafi? Is Afghanistan returned to the Taliban better than it was under Hamid Karzai? Etc. etc.

This is another application of Realpolitik, the ability to accept some evil, as clearly existed under Saddam, Bashar al-Assad, Gaddafi, etc., to continue to use the above example, in order to prevent greater evil: the disintegration of entire States - dictatorships indeed - into utter chaos, and the Butcher's Bill climbing from tens of thousands into multiple hundreds of thousands, if not millions.

And if indeed the principles of freedom and democracy are so sacred that Russia considering Ukraine its buffer toward the West is so unacceptable, what are we waiting for to bestow them on Bahrein, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, China, etc.?

Ah, I get it: we cannot touch Bahrein, Qatar, Saudi Arabia because their oil keep our economy alive; and we cannot touch China because they likely can touch us back. We ARE applying Realpolitik.

This is a complete "two ships passing each other in the dark". Putin is probably laughing at Biden's lecturing him on not attempting to effect regime change or resolve political situations by force, in view of the our recent track record in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, etc. (thanks God we dodged the bullet – barely! – in Egypt). This is the eternal American weakness in foreign politics: do as we say, not as we do...

And both the blessing and the drama is that the US, splendidly geographically isolated in our Western hemisphere, really do not have to pay the heaviest price for ignoring Realpolitik, this is a privilege left to those we leave in place after we retreat.

Is Putin crazy?

Regarding the military developments, I will abstain from prognosticating, but I note that the world opinion seems driven by completely ignorant (from a military perspective) journalists. I personally doubt very, very much that had Russia decided on a complete rapid invasion of Northern and Eastern Ukraine, to Kiev, this would not have been accomplished in three days, such is the disproportion of forces. Maybe someone should provide the definition of invasion to the press. It is patently different from the definition of attack. As Red Leg and I who trained in similar times, in similar positions, in similar places to face the Fulda Gap onslaught, this is NOT was is taking place in Ukraine right now.

Without being callous, and in all respect to the casualties, the very fact that Ukraine report only between 200 and 300 casualties after 4 days of war, tells me that the Russians have not rolled out the Armored Steamroller. I do not interpret Kiev as not haven "fallen" as the Ukrainians preventing the Russians from doing it. Kiev was not taken (yet?) because the Russians have not decided to take it (yet?). Ukraine has not been overrun because Russia likely does not intend to overrun Ukraine.

What is clear to me at this stage, is that Putin is achieving militarily what he could not do diplomatically: the non entry of Ukraine in NATO, and the non deployment of US strategic weapons on his border, what he calls "demilitarization of Ukraine".

I always thought that cornering him too tightly was a mistake, but I am surprised that he chose to attack on a large geographic scale now, although not yet on a large military scale – and this distinction is important. Is he exploiting a combined external/internal perceived American weakness after the withdrawal of Afghanistan and the complete unravelling of the Russian hoax?

So, a question deserves to be asked: are the limited air and ground attacks, Putin’s ultimate raising of the diplomatic stakes? Or is he really committed to full scale ground invasion? But to do what? Occupy Ukraine long term? I doubt it…

Another question that deserves to be genuinely asked is whether Putin is crazy, cunning (e.g. the NATO expansion East is just a pretext and his true aim is to rebuild the Iron Curtain in Eastern Europe – as so many pundits are saying…….. ), or is he genuinely desperate after his constant warnings about Russia security needs being ignored for 10 years?

I lean on desperate, because Russia does not have the beginning of the military power anymore to rebuild the Soviet Union or something like it, and any action against a NATO member (e.g. Poland) would immediately trigger NATO Article 5 with the entire alliance being automatically at war with Russia, a risk that even Putin cannot take. Let us not forget that we are not responding militarily in Ukraine, precisely because Ukraine is NOT part of NATO.

In any case, desperate or not, what Putin did cannot be condoned, and this is what makes the game so easy for the West: it will not be hard to condemn Putin and continue to ignore his rational demands, which will of course extend indefinitely the problem.

As to Crimea...

As to Crimea, the historic reality is that it was never Ukrainian. It was captured from the Turks by the Tsars in the 1700’s and “given” by Khrushchev to Ukraine as recently as 1954 to commemorate the 300th anniversary of the unification of Ukraine with Russia in 1654, which was a purely symbolic gesture within the boundaries of the Soviet Union, especially considering that 90%+ of its population have been ethic Russians for centuries, and up to now.

In Crimea, Russia has built and operated for over 300 years Sevastopol, the only major warm waters Russian naval base, from which they exert control over the Black Sea, and from which they get passage to the Mediterranean. It is as vital to Russia as San Diego, Norfolk, or Pearl Harbor are to the US. It is as irreplaceable to the Russians sea power in the Mediterranean as Naval Station Guantanamo Bay is irreplaceable to the US sea power in the Caribbean.

Notwithstanding the fact that Crimea is likely genuinely historically Russian, from a Realpolitik perspective, would we really expect the Russians to give up Sevastopol? After all the US kept Guantanamo in Cuba...

Is this analysis crazy?

Over the last two weeks, I thought it might be, because it seems so distant from what must obviously be a common sense analysis of the situation (e.g. Ukraine is right, Putin is just a megalomaniac thug), because that analysis is so common.

Then, yesterday while looking for data on the 2014 beginnings of the Donbass movements, I found this fascinating University of Chicago's R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor in Political Science, John J. Mearsheimer's conference: UnCommon Core: The Causes and Consequences of the Ukraine Crisis.

As incredible as it sounds, this is an 8-year-old conference. You would think it was given yesterday.

This reassured me, for I apparently stand in good, although meager, company as my analysis is apparently akin to that of the great Henry Kissinger.

1646010559876.png



Another great piece worth reading, this one referring George Kennan, the architect of America’s successful containment of the Soviet Union, is the editorial of Thomas L. Friedman in the Washington Times:


1646010700726.png


I will finish the way I started: the Russian military aggression cannot be condoned. Period. My point here is NOT to justify what is happening, I condemn it, it is to propose that we try to understand what is happening.

In summary, from a Realpolitik perspective, Russia is as entitled to its own Monroe Doctrine - we could call it Greater Russia, or as the Tsars once said "Tsars of all the Russias", as the United States of America are, and it is my understanding that they are asserting it.

I hope this was of interest...
 
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Trying to understand the "why" so that we do not need to go through the "what" repeatedly...

I have abstained from engaging in this thread so far, because my view will likely surprise, but let me preface by saying that Russian military aggression cannot be condoned. Period.

My point here is NOT to justify what is happening, I condemn it, it is to propose that we try to understand what is happening.

If you allow me, Joe, I will use one of your posts as a starting board :)

The Monroe Doctrine



I agree. This is THE reason. Period.

And not only do the United States have the military and economic power to prevent it, but we also actually have a political doctrine to support it.

It is called the Monroe Doctrine. Going clear back to 1823 this doctrine articulates the fact that the United States will not tolerate interference of any other world power in the Western Hemisphere. The doctrine held that any intervention in the political affairs of the Americas by foreign powers was a potentially hostile act against the U.S.

For example (and I am surprised to have not seen this mentioned already - unless I missed it, in which case I apologize), the United States could not tolerate the deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba 1,000 miles from Washington DC in 1962, and JFK was likely ready to go to full nuclear WW III over it.

A few bottom line points here can be:

1- The Monroe Doctrine is not based on notions of freedom or democracy. As Red Leg correctly surmised, it is based on sheer power. The USA did not invite the world to agree to the Monroe Doctrine, we dictate it because we unilaterally deem it in our national interests, and we have enforced it because we indeed had the power to do it.​
2- When the sovereign nation of Cuba decided to exercise their freedom to allow the Soviet Union to install military bases on their soil, the United States deemed their national interest threatened, and we engaged air and sea military action to prevent it, including the threat of nuclear WW III. Thankfully, Khrushchev who knew what war was (he was engaged throughout the entire Great Patriotic War (a.k.a. WW II for us) and he was Political Commissar at Stalingrad) understood that he had gone too far and he withdrew the Soviet missiles from Cuba.​
3- Is the Monroe Doctrine obsolete? Mercifully for our security, and indeed thanks to our military and economic power, as correctly outlined by Red Leg, no one has tested it in recent history. Good! But for the sake of discussion, let us take an hypothetical. Imagine Canada was to invite or allow China to establish military bases, likely including anti ICBM capability and hypersonic missiles capability in Quebec, Ontario and Alberta. What do you think the United States reaction would be? Accept the freedom of the Canadian people to ally with China?​
Realpolitik

It was Prussian Chancellor Otto von Bismarck's statecraft in unifying Germany in the 1800’s that brought the concept of Realpolitik to the world. Real here is to be understood in its German meaning: realistic, practical. Realpolitik is diplomatic or political action based primarily on pragmatic considerations rather than moral or ethical premises.

A few examples here can be:

1- One can likely credit Realpolitik for the fact that neither Russia (since Cuba) nor China (so far) have tried to install military bases in Canada or Mexico. Nobody in their right mind would think about trying it, because everybody in their right mind would know that it is pragmatically a non-starter.​
2- NATO control by the US is a given because the US is the overwhelming military power in NATO. Sure, the Bundeswehr was likely the core of ground forces in Western Europe during the Cold War, and, to be objective, French forces are today the core of military power in Europe, but the bottom line is that NATO does what the US say, because, until Western European Defense becomes a reality, if ever in the near term, NATO for all practical purposes IS the US. Which explains why there is a mutually defeating contradiction at play: most of Europe does not dare to challenge NATO/US because they do not dare step away from under the American defense umbrella; and as long as they do not, they are not motivated to construct a European Defense.​

Note that I am not arguing a side or another here, nor do I loose myself in the usual conspiration theories about the US domination of the world, but this discussion is itself a great example of Realpolitik. Realpolitik IS, it is not about what would/should/could it is about what IS.

Which leads us to quoting Red Leg's post again (Thank You Joe):



Under the wonderful principles dear to American foreign policy of democracy, freedom of the people to choose their own destiny, etc., the concept of allowing Ukraine in NATO and the EU sounds great[; is the right thing to do; and Russia indeed has no say in it.

However, Russia happens to disagree with that notion, and, right, wrong, or indifferent, this is a fact.

Ukraine

The Realpolitik questions here are not:
--- whether Russia is right or wrong in its assertion that Ukraine is part of their cultural and historical heritage (although there are indeed reams of historical evidence to this point...);
--- whether Russia is right or wrong in its assertion that Ukraine joining NATO will lead to the creation of American military bases on its soil likely deploying anti ICBM capability and short to mid range nuclear-capable cruise missiles - Tomahawk currently, hypersonic vehicles soon (although the examples of Estonia, Poland, Romania, etc. are difficult to ignore...);
--- etc.

The Realpolitik question here are whether Russia - again: right, wrong, or indifferent - perceives it this way - the same way the US perceived Soviet missiles in Cuba as a threat - and whether they can do something about it. The clear answers are yes and yes. Period.

Arguing that NATO is only taking defensive steps in Estonia, Poland and Romania, and if they could in Ukraine and Belarus, and is not a threat to Russia, is as irrelevant as arguing that the Soviet Union was only taking defensive steps in Cuba and was not a threat to the US. This is not the way the US perceived it then, and it was our reality; and it is not the way Russia perceives it now, and it is their reality. Period. This is why Russia has been raising their "security demands."

The fact that Russia did nothing about the NATO expansions of 1999 (Poland) and 2004 (Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania, Slovenia) was also Realpolitik, they were too weak then, and it explains why they did nothing, but this should not hide the fact that Russia was deeply angered about it. But they could only talk about it, and, of course, nobody listened.

The fact that Russia went to war in 2008 over the attempted inclusion of Georgia in NATO likewise was Realpolitik, but this time Russia could do something about it and did. But Georgia was too far, and not really in Europe, so everybody soon forgot about it.

The fact that Russia is, again, going to war over the attempted inclusion of, this time, Ukraine in NATO, continues to be Realpolitik, and nobody should be surprised about it. It is not like they have not been telling us for 10 years that this is their (hemi)sphere, and that they too have their own version of our Monroe Doctrine, and their own red lines.

The gain and the pain

Therefore, the question in 1962 for Cuba for the Soviets became: is it important enough for us to have bases in Cuba to risk WW III?

And the question in 2022 for US/NATO is exactly the same: is it important enough for us to have bases in Ukraine and Belarus to risk WW III?

In so many words, is the gain worth the pain?

I know, I know, nowhere in the above are the values of democracy and freedom considered. We are purely in the realm of Realpolitik.

Clearly, the unambiguous - and completely logical and with which I wholeheartedly agree - statements by the US, NATO, France, Germany, that under no circumstance whatsoever would a single American, French, German, etc. soldier be deployed in Ukraine, and that military response options are not on the table - which again, I totally agree with – make it somewhat obvious that the gain is not worth the pain.

But it also makes it somewhat untenable for the West to refuse to consider diplomatically Putin’s security demands.

And it also raises incredibly pertinent questions about NATO's expansion in Eastern Europe.

Everyone will of course understand, agree and sympathize with the almost panic desire of former Eastern Block countries to shelter under the American defense umbrella. One would be a monster to not understand these people.

But the Realpolitik question is unnerving: if these countries are apparently NOT of vital interest to the US (which is precisely the reason why we are not intervening militarily in Ukraine), why did we give them an Article 5 guarantee that we will come defend them and die for them?

Will we honor Article 5? Many folks believe we will, just as we went to war over Poland in 1939 after the Munich appeasement proved to be just what it was: a ruse.

But these were the days before the Atom. Will the USA go to global nuclear WW III to protect itself? Assuredly. Will we do it to protect Ukraine, or Romania, or Slovakia, or Slovenia, or Latvia, or Lithuania, or Croatia, etc. Tough call...........................

What appears clear, it that we are not doing it over Ukraine, which is patently much larger and much more important than all these other recent NATO members (aside from Poland)..........................

Sure, Ukraine is not part of NATO, we have not signed a piece of paper with them, but will such a piece of paper commit New York, Chicago, Dallas, etc. to be on the nuclear front line, push comes to shove, over Slovenia? Again, tough call..........................

The Kurds made the mistake to heed the American encouragement to overthrow their Iraqi master in 1988. They failed to analyze that despite all good human rights principles they were not of vital national interest to the US. They now boast the terrible claim of being the sole population attacked with nerve agents sarin and tabun. America did not react.......................

Georgian President Saakashvili too felt emboldened after the NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008, where the Membership Action Plan (MAP) to integrate Georgia and Ukraine was discussed, even though Germany and France warned that offering a MAP to Ukraine and Georgia would be "an unnecessary offence" for Russia. But then again, Germany and France have been practicing Realpolitik a few centuries, and have paid a heavy price when they ignored it. The Russia-Georgian was ensued. America did not react.......................

Are we misleading Eastern Europe? Are we encouraging democracy and freedom principles that we back only by words (and diplomatic condemnations, and economic sanctions, and equipment deliveries, etc.) but not by blood, because we too, obviously, and logically, and rightly, abide by the principles of Realpolitik?

Should Realpolitik prevail?

In the name of the great principles of democracy, freedom of the people to choose their government and destiny, etc. America recently involved itself in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, etc. We even did with Kosovo exactly what we blame Russia for doing in the Donbass with the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic!

The fundamental issue is that the Western Christian Democracy principles do not seem to work very well with peoples of other cultural heritages, and that despite our laudable intents, our interventions often create pandemonium. Is life for Iraqis better today than it was under Saddam? Is life today in Syria better than what it was before we attempted to remove Bashar al-Assad? Is Libya today better than it was under Gaddafi? Is Afghanistan returned to the Taliban better than it was under Hamid Karzai? Etc. etc.

This is another application of Realpolitik, the ability to accept some evil, as clearly existed under Saddam, Bashar al-Assad, Gaddafi, etc., to continue to use the above example, in order to prevent greater evil: the disintegration of entire States - dictatorships indeed - into utter chaos, and the Butcher's Bill climbing from tens of thousands into multiple hundreds of thousands, if not millions.

And if indeed the principles of freedom and democracy are so sacred that Russia considering Ukraine its buffer toward the West is so unacceptable, what are we waiting for to bestow them on Bahrein, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, China, etc.?

Ah, I get it: we cannot touch Bahrein, Qatar, Saudi Arabia because their oil keep our economy alive; and we cannot touch China because they likely can touch us back. We ARE applying Realpolitik.

This is a complete "two ships passing each other in the dark". Putin is probably laughing at Biden's lecturing him on not attempting to effect regime change or resolve political situations by force, in view of the our recent track record in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, etc. (thanks God we dodged the bullet – barely! – in Egypt). This is the eternal American weakness in foreign politics: do as we say, not as we do...

And both the blessing and the drama is that the US, splendidly geographically isolated in our Western hemisphere, really do not have to pay the heaviest price for ignoring Realpolitik, this is a privilege left to those we leave in place after we retreat.

Is Putin crazy?

Regarding the military developments, I will abstain from prognosticating, but I note that the world opinion seems driven by completely ignorant (from a military perspective) journalists. I personally doubt very, very much that had Russia decided on a complete rapid invasion of Northern and Eastern Ukraine, to Kiev, this would not have been accomplished in three days, such is the disproportion of forces. Maybe someone should provide the definition of invasion to the press. It is patently different from the definition of attack. As Red Leg and I who trained in similar times, in similar positions, in similar places to face the Fulda Gap onslaught, this is NOT was is taking place in Ukraine right now.

Without being callous, and in all respect to the casualties, the very fact that Ukraine report only between 200 and 300 casualties after 4 days of war, tells me that the Russians have not rolled out the Armored Steamroller. I do not interpret Kiev as not haven "fallen" as the Ukrainians preventing the Russians from doing it. Kiev was not taken (yet?) because the Russians have not decided to take it (yet?).

What is clear to me at this stage, is that Putin is achieving militarily what he could not do diplomatically: the non entry of Ukraine in NATO, and the non deployment of US strategic weapons on his border, what he calls "demilitarization of Ukraine".

I always thought that cornering him too tightly was a mistake, but I am surprised that he chose to attack on a large geographic scale now, although not yet on a large military scale – and this distinction is important. Is he exploiting a combined external/internal perceived American weakness after the withdrawal of Afghanistan and the complete unravelling of the Russian hoax?

So, a question deserves to be asked: are the limited air and ground attacks, Putin’s ultimate raising of the diplomatic stakes? Or is he really committed to full scale ground invasion? But to do what? Occupy Ukraine long term? I doubt it…

Another question that deserves to be genuinely asked is whether Putin is crazy, cunning (e.g. the NATO expansion East is just a pretext and his true aim is to rebuild the Iron Curtain in Eastern Europe – as so many pundits are saying…….. ), or is he genuinely desperate after his constant warnings about Russia security needs being ignored for 10 years?

I lean on desperate, because Russia does not have the beginning of the military power anymore to rebuild the Soviet Union or something like it, and any action against a NATO member (e.g. Poland) would immediately trigger NATO Article 5 with the entire alliance being automatically at war with Russia, a risk that even Putin cannot take. Let us not forget that we are not responding militarily in Ukraine, precisely because Ukraine is NOT part of NATO.

In any case, desperate or not, what Putin did cannot be condoned, and this is what makes the game so easy for the West: it will not be hard to condemn Putin and continue to ignore his rational demands, which will of course extend indefinitely the problem.

As to Crimea...

As to Crimea, the historic reality is that it was never Ukrainian. It was captured from the Turks by the Tsars in the 1700’s and “given” by Khrushchev to Ukraine as recently as 1954 to commemorate the 300th anniversary of the unification of Ukraine with Russia in 1654, which was a purely symbolic gesture within the boundaries of the Soviet Union, especially considering that 90%+ of its population have been ethic Russians for centuries, and up to now.

In Crimea, Russia has built and operated for over 300 years Sevastopol, the only major warm waters Russian naval base, from which they exert control over the Black Sea, and from which they get passage to the Mediterranean. It is as vital to Russia as San Diego, Norfolk, or Pearl Harbor are to the US. It is as irreplaceable to the Russians sea power in the Mediterranean as Naval Station Guantanamo Bay is irreplaceable to the US sea power in the Caribbean.

Notwithstanding the fact that Crimea is likely genuinely historically Russian, from a Realpolitik perspective, would we really expect the Russians to give up Sevastopol? After all the US kept Guantanamo in Cuba...

Is this analysis crazy?

Over the last two weeks, I thought it might be, because it seems so distant from what must obviously be a common sense analysis of the situation (e.g. Ukraine is right, Putin is just a megalomaniac thug), because that analysis is so common.

Then, yesterday while looking for data on the 2014 beginnings of the Donbass movements, I found this fascinating University of Chicago's R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor in Political Science, John J. Mearsheimer's conference: UnCommon Core: The Causes and Consequences of the Ukraine Crisis.

As incredible as it sounds, this is an 8-year-old conference. You would think it was given yesterday.

This reassured me, for I apparently stand in good, although meager, company as my analysis is apparently akin to that of the great Henry Kissinger.

View attachment 454739


Another great piece worth reading, this one referring George Kennan, the architect of America’s successful containment of the Soviet Union, is the editorial of Thomas L. Friedman in the Washington Times:


View attachment 454740

I will finish the way I started: the Russian military aggression cannot be condoned. Period. My point here is NOT to justify what is happening, I condemn it, it is to propose that we try to understand what is happening.

In summary, from a Realpolitik perspective, Russia is as entitled to its own Monroe Doctrine, as the the United States of America are, and it is my understanding that they are asserting it.

I hope this was of interest...
Mersheimer is someone I wish our leaders would've paid more attention to
 
I’ll PM you and spare the rest my farmer drivel. ;)

My first retirement was from one of Agrium’s divisional president roles. I enjoy your farmer drivel!
 
As always, I deeply appreciate and respect the analysis on any subject offered by @One Day... I also readily admit that my longer emersion in our peculiar craft leads me to focus more on the immediate tactical and operational aspects of this particular fiasco than the strategic.

Allow me to step back from the present battle for a few paragraphs.

Firstly, in a tripolar world, it is ridiculous for Russia not to be generally aligned with the United States and Europe with respect to any potential economic or military competition or conflict with China. I do not believe that is open to debate. Indeed, though there may be several losers, in the current situation, the one sure winner is likely to be the PRC. Peter and Catherine the Great would certainly support such collective engagement. Such wise strategic thinking is, for the moment, impossible to even articulate.

The immediate cause and real impediment to the US and Europe are the three lost years of the Trump presidency where investigations and impeachment made a "real politic," much less a mutually beneficial engagement with Russia, impossible. That paralysis rolled directly into the Biden administration regardless of what cleared-eyed pragmatists may or may not have made their way onto the National Security Counsel. Russia had become the political boogey-man, our own national interests be damned.

Therefore, an engagement vacuum was created that has extended for more than a decade. Inevitably, nations looked to their most immediate national interests. Eastern Europe and the Baltics sought protection from their traditional oppressor. Meanwhile Russia dreamed of its past glory and authority, and the United States worried with its own navel.

A few days ago we awoke to find ourselves here. The fact that the administration and so many analysts are surprised speaks volumes.

But we are here. The world of strategic "should have been" has given way to tactical and operational reality. Our unnecessary foe has made a bid which he seemingly can't fully underwrite, and we can't afford to completely trump his play. The options out of this hand are very limited, I just wish I had more confidence that both of the primary players were bidding while at the top of their game.
 
As always, I deeply appreciate and respect the analysis on any subject offered by @One Day... I also readily admit that my longer emersion in our peculiar craft leads me to focus more on the immediate tactical and operational aspects of this particular fiasco than the strategic.

Thank you for the kind words.

The advantage of having served as an officer in a French Army that never had the luxury since Napoleon of dismissing strategic issues because it did not have the military power anymore to ignore them, and to have served at the time when France was not part of the integrated command of NATO, was indeed that strategic matters were always part of the thinking. No point in winning the battle, if we are loosing the war. I have retained the habit, and it has served me well in the business world.

You are correct too that your military career has been much longer and much more distinguished than mine. I made the painful decision as a junior officer after the election of socialist Mitterrand as French President in 1981 that I would not serve in the armed forces of a socialist country, nor for a French government that included Communist Ministers of State. This is when I made the decision to emigrate to the USA.

Firstly, in a tripolar world, it is ridiculous for Russia not to be generally aligned with the United States and Europe with respect to any potential economic or military competition or conflict with China. I do not believe that is open to debate. Indeed, though there may be several losers, in the current situation, the one sure winner is likely to be the PRC. Peter and Catherine the Great would certainly support such collective engagement. Such wise strategic thinking is, for the moment, impossible to even articulate.

This is unquestionably true and this further illustrates the shortness of sight of the Western "leadership" when the US/NATO/EU summarily dismissed Putin's overture to actually join NATO and the EU in the early 2000's.

We are currently forcing Russia to a rapprochement with China, which is deadly to both Russia and the Western world. How our political "elites" can apparently not see this is simply beyond me...

The immediate cause and real impediment to the US and Europe are the three lost years of the Trump presidency where investigations and impeachment made a "real politic," much less a mutually beneficial engagement with Russia, impossible. That paralysis rolled directly into the Biden administration regardless of what cleared-eyed pragmatists may or may not have made their way onto the National Security Counsel. Russia had become the political boogey-man, our own national interests be damned.

Amen!

Therefore, an engagement vacuum was created that has extended for more than a decade. Inevitably, nations looked to their most immediate national interests. Eastern Europe and the Baltics sought protection from their traditional oppressor. Meanwhile Russia dreamed of its past glory and authority, and the United States worried with its own navel.

A few days ago we awoke to find ourselves here. The fact that the administration and so many analysts are surprised speaks volumes.

Amen again! The only thing that surprises me is that our "Administration" is surprised. Did everyone really forget Georgia?

But we are here. The world of strategic "should have been" has given way to tactical and operational reality. Our unnecessary foe has made a bid which he seemingly can't fully underwrite, and we can't afford to completely trump his play. The options out of this hand are very limited, I just wish I had more confidence that both of the primary players were bidding while at the top of their game.

Yes, decisions have this nasty habit of bearing consequences.

From a Realpolitik perspective - call me a cynic if you prefer - I fail to see the point of the position the West is taking right now in Ukraine when:
1- we know darn well that we are going to do nothing about it; hence all we are doing is raising false hopes;
2- we also know darn well that Russia's claim to their own Monroe Doctrine is as inevitable and as justified as our own;
3- we also know fully that we will need Russia - as much as Russia will need us - to face China.

To me it seems like a loose/loose/loose proposition (Ukraine/Russia/US-EU-NATO), which is why I am taking the risk of attracting the incomprehension and reprobation of the community on AH to point out that primitive Russia bashing on Ukraine is likely not the most accurate nor constructive perspective.

Blame it on a somewhat Pascalian (Blaise Pascal, 1623-1662) and Seldian (John Selden 1584 – 1654) education by a somewhat stern father, but I am also quite sensitive to the inherent limitations of "orthodoxy on one side of the Pyrenees may be heresy on the other” and "do as I say but not as I do".

The hard reality is that we should not build foreign policy on the expectation that other world powers are not entitled to the same Machiavellism as we display ourselves when protecting our own interests, and that our short term urge the "win the battle against Russia" is compromising our long-term survival need to "win the war against China".
 
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Trying to understand the "why" so that we do not need to go through the "what" repeatedly...

I have abstained from engaging in this thread so far, because my analysis will likely surprise, but let me preface by saying that Russian military aggression cannot be condoned, period, and that I do not aim to offend.

My point here is NOT to justify what is happening, I condemn it, it is to propose that we try to understand what is happening.

If you allow me, Joe, I will use one of your posts as a starting board :)

The Monroe Doctrine



I agree. This is THE reason. Period.

And not only do the United States have the military and economic power to prevent it, but we also actually have a political doctrine to support it.

It is called the Monroe Doctrine. Going clear back to 1823 this doctrine articulates the fact that the United States will not tolerate interference of any other world power in the Western Hemisphere. The doctrine held that any intervention in the political affairs of the Americas by foreign powers was a potentially hostile act against the U.S.

For example (and I am surprised to have not seen this mentioned already - unless I missed it, in which case I apologize), the United States could not tolerate the deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba, 1,000 miles from Washington DC in 1962, and JFK was likely ready to go to full nuclear WW III over it.

A few bottom line points here can be:

1- The Monroe Doctrine is not based on notions of freedom or democracy. As Red Leg correctly surmised, it is based on sheer power. The US did not invite the world to agree to the Monroe Doctrine, we dictate it, because we unilaterally deem it in our national interest, and we have enforced, it because we indeed had the power to do it.​
2- When the sovereign nation of Cuba decided to exercise their freedom to allow the Soviet Union to install military bases on their soil, the United States deemed their national interest threatened, and we engaged air and sea military action to prevent it, including the threat of nuclear WW III. Thankfully, Khrushchev who knew what war was (he was engaged throughout the entire Great Patriotic War (a.k.a. WW II for us) and he was Political Commissar at Stalingrad) understood that he had gone too far and he withdrew the Soviet missiles from Cuba (and we, discreetly, our missiles from Turkey).​
3- Is the Monroe Doctrine obsolete? Mercifully for our security, and indeed thanks to our military and economic power, as correctly outlined by Red Leg, no one has tested it in recent history. Good! But for the sake of discussion, let us take an hypothetical. Imagine Canada was to invite or allow China to establish military bases, likely including anti ICBM capability and hypersonic missiles capability in Quebec, Ontario and Alberta. What do you think the United States reaction would be? Accept the freedom of the Canadian people to ally with China?​
Realpolitik

It was Prussian Chancellor Otto von Bismarck's statecraft in unifying Germany in the 1800’s that brought the concept of Realpolitik to the world. Real here is to be understood in its German meaning: realistic, practical. Realpolitik is diplomatic or political action based primarily on pragmatic considerations rather than moral or ethical premises.

A few examples here can be:

1- One can likely credit Realpolitik for the fact that neither Russia (since Cuba) nor China (so far) have tried to install military bases in Canada or Mexico. Nobody in their right mind would think about trying it, because everybody in their right mind would know that it is pragmatically a non-starter.​
2- NATO control by the US is a given because the US is the overwhelming military power in NATO. Sure, the Bundeswehr was likely the core of ground forces in Western Europe during the Cold War, and, to be objective, French forces are today the core of military power in Europe, but the bottom line is that NATO does what the US say, because, until Western European Defense becomes a reality, if ever in the near term, NATO for all practical purposes IS the US. Which explains why there is a mutually defeating contradiction at play: most of Europe does not dare to challenge NATO/US because they do not dare step away from under the American defense umbrella; and as long as they do not, they are not motivated to construct a European Defense.​

Note that I am not arguing a side or another here, nor do I loose myself in the usual conspiration theories about the US domination of the world, but this discussion is itself a great example of Realpolitik. Realpolitik IS, it is not about what would/should/could it is about what IS.

Which leads us to quoting Red Leg's post again (Thank You Joe):



Under the wonderful principles dear to American foreign policy, of democracy, freedom of the people to choose their own destiny, etc., the concept of allowing Ukraine in NATO and the EU sounds great; it is the right thing to do; and Russia indeed has no say in it.

However, Russia happens to disagree with that notion, and, right, wrong, or indifferent, this is a fact.

Ukraine

The Realpolitik questions here are not:
--- whether Russia is right or wrong in its assertion that Ukraine is part of their cultural and historical heritage (although there are indeed reams of historical evidence to this point...);
--- whether Russia is right or wrong in its assertion that Ukraine joining NATO will lead to the creation of American military bases on its soil, likely deploying anti ICBM capability and short to mid range nuclear-capable cruise missiles - Tomahawk currently, hypersonic vehicles soon (although the examples of Estonia, Poland, Romania, etc. are difficult to ignore...);
--- etc.

The Realpolitik questions here are whether Russia - again: right, wrong, or indifferent - perceives it this way - the same way the US perceived Soviet missiles in Cuba as a threat - and whether they can do something about it. The clear answers are yes and yes. Period.

Arguing that NATO is only taking defensive steps in Estonia, Poland and Romania, and if they could in Ukraine and Belarus, and is not a threat to Russia, is as irrelevant as arguing that the Soviet Union was only taking defensive steps in Cuba and was not a threat to the US. This is not the way the US perceived it then, and it was our reality; and it is not the way Russia perceives it now, and it is their reality. Period. This is why Russia has been raising their "security demands."

The fact that Russia did nothing about the NATO expansions of 1999 (Poland) and 2004 (Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania, Slovenia) was also Realpolitik, they were too weak then, and it explains why they did nothing, but this should not hide the fact that they were deeply angered about it. But they could only talk about it, so, of course, nobody listened.

The fact that Russia went to war in 2008 over the attempted inclusion of Georgia in NATO likewise was Realpolitik, but this time Russia could do something about it and did. But Georgia was too far, and not really in Europe, so everybody soon forgot about it.

The fact that Russia is, again, going to war over the attempted inclusion of, this time, Ukraine in NATO, continues to be Realpolitik, and nobody should be surprised about it. It is not like they have not been telling us for 10 years that this is their (hemi)sphere, and that they too have their own version of our Monroe Doctrine, and their own red lines.

The gain and the pain

Therefore, the question in 1962 for Cuba for the Soviets became: is it important enough for us to have bases in Cuba to risk WW III?

And the question in 2022 for US/NATO is exactly the same: is it important enough for us to have bases in Ukraine and Belarus to risk WW III?

In so many words, is the gain worth the pain?

I know, I know, nowhere in the above are the values of democracy and freedom considered. We are purely in the realm of Realpolitik.

Clearly, the unambiguous - and completely logical and with which I wholeheartedly agree - statements by the US, NATO, France, Germany, that under no circumstance whatsoever would a single American, French, German, etc. soldier be deployed in Ukraine, and that military response options are not on the table - which again, I totally agree with – make it somewhat obvious that the gain is not worth the pain.

But it also makes it somewhat untenable for the West to refuse to consider diplomatically Putin’s security demands.

And it also raises incredibly pertinent questions about NATO's expansion in Eastern Europe.

Everyone will of course understand, agree and sympathize with the almost panic desire of former Eastern Block countries to shelter under the American defense umbrella. One would be a monster to not understand these people.

But the Realpolitik question is unnerving: if these countries are apparently NOT of vital interest to the US (which is precisely the reason why we are not intervening militarily in Ukraine), why did we give them an Article 5 guarantee that we will come defend them and die for them?

Will we honor Article 5? Many folks believe we will, just as we went to war over Poland in 1939 after the Munich appeasement proved to be just what it was: a ruse.

But these were the days before the Atom. Will the USA go to global nuclear WW III to protect itself? Assuredly. Will we do it to protect Ukraine, or Romania, or Slovakia, or Slovenia, or Latvia, or Lithuania, or Croatia, etc. Tough call...........................

What appears clear, it that we are not doing it over Ukraine, which is patently much larger and much more important than all these other recent NATO members (aside from Poland)..........................

Sure, Ukraine is not part of NATO, we have not signed a piece of paper with them, but will such a piece of paper commit New York, Chicago, Dallas, etc. to be on the nuclear front line, push comes to shove, over Slovenia? Again, tough call..........................

The Kurds made the mistake to heed the American encouragement to overthrow their Iraqi master in 1988. They failed to analyze that despite all good human rights principles they were not of vital national interest to the US. They now boast the terrible claim of being the sole population attacked with nerve agents sarin and tabun. America did not react.......................

Georgian President Saakashvili too felt emboldened after the NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008, where the Membership Action Plan (MAP) to integrate Georgia and Ukraine was discussed, even though Germany and France warned that offering a MAP to Ukraine and Georgia would be "an unnecessary offence" for Russia. But then again, Germany and France have been practicing Realpolitik a few centuries, and have paid a heavy price when they ignored it. The Russia-Georgian was ensued. America did not react.......................

Are we misleading Eastern Europe? Are we encouraging democracy and freedom principles that we back only by words (and diplomatic condemnations, and economic sanctions, and equipment deliveries, etc.) but not by blood, because we too, obviously, and logically, and rightly, abide by the principles of Realpolitik?

Should Realpolitik prevail?

In the name of the great principles of democracy, freedom of the people to choose their government and destiny, etc. America recently involved itself in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, etc. We even did with Kosovo exactly what we blame Russia for doing in the Donbass with the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic!

The fundamental issue is that the Western Christian Democracy principles do not seem to work very well with peoples of other cultural heritages, and that despite our laudable intents, our interventions often create pandemonium. Is life for Iraqis better today than it was under Saddam? Is life today in Syria better than what it was before we attempted to remove Bashar al-Assad? Is Libya today better than it was under Gaddafi? Is Afghanistan returned to the Taliban better than it was under Hamid Karzai? Etc. etc.

This is another application of Realpolitik, the ability to accept some evil, as clearly existed under Saddam, Bashar al-Assad, Gaddafi, etc., to continue to use the above example, in order to prevent greater evil: the disintegration of entire States - dictatorships indeed - into utter chaos, and the Butcher's Bill climbing from tens of thousands into multiple hundreds of thousands, if not millions.

And if indeed the principles of freedom and democracy are so sacred that Russia considering Ukraine its buffer toward the West is so unacceptable, what are we waiting for to bestow them on Bahrein, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, China, etc.?

Ah, I get it: we cannot touch Bahrein, Qatar, Saudi Arabia because their oil keep our economy alive; and we cannot touch China because they likely can touch us back. We ARE applying Realpolitik.

This is a complete "two ships passing each other in the dark". Putin is probably laughing at Biden's lecturing him on not attempting to effect regime change or resolve political situations by force, in view of the our recent track record in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, etc. (thanks God we dodged the bullet – barely! – in Egypt). This is the eternal American weakness in foreign politics: do as we say, not as we do...

And both the blessing and the drama is that the US, splendidly geographically isolated in our Western hemisphere, really do not have to pay the heaviest price for ignoring Realpolitik, this is a privilege left to those we leave in place after we retreat.

Is Putin crazy?

Regarding the military developments, I will abstain from prognosticating, but I note that the world opinion seems driven by completely ignorant (from a military perspective) journalists. I personally doubt very, very much that had Russia decided on a complete rapid invasion of Northern and Eastern Ukraine, to Kiev, this would not have been accomplished in three days, such is the disproportion of forces. Maybe someone should provide the definition of invasion to the press. It is patently different from the definition of attack. As Red Leg and I who trained in similar times, in similar positions, in similar places to face the Fulda Gap onslaught, this is NOT was is taking place in Ukraine right now.

Without being callous, and in all respect to the casualties, the very fact that Ukraine report only between 200 and 300 casualties after 4 days of war, tells me that the Russians have not rolled out the Armored Steamroller. I do not interpret Kiev as not haven "fallen" as the Ukrainians preventing the Russians from doing it. Kiev was not taken (yet?) because the Russians have not decided to take it (yet?). Ukraine has not been overrun because Russia likely does not intend to overrun Ukraine.

What is clear to me at this stage, is that Putin is achieving militarily what he could not do diplomatically: the non entry of Ukraine in NATO, and the non deployment of US strategic weapons on his border, what he calls "demilitarization of Ukraine".

I always thought that cornering him too tightly was a mistake, but I am surprised that he chose to attack on a large geographic scale now, although not yet on a large military scale – and this distinction is important. Is he exploiting a combined external/internal perceived American weakness after the withdrawal of Afghanistan and the complete unravelling of the Russian hoax?

So, a question deserves to be asked: are the limited air and ground attacks, Putin’s ultimate raising of the diplomatic stakes? Or is he really committed to full scale ground invasion? But to do what? Occupy Ukraine long term? I doubt it…

Another question that deserves to be genuinely asked is whether Putin is crazy, cunning (e.g. the NATO expansion East is just a pretext and his true aim is to rebuild the Iron Curtain in Eastern Europe – as so many pundits are saying…….. ), or is he genuinely desperate after his constant warnings about Russia security needs being ignored for 10 years?

I lean on desperate, because Russia does not have the beginning of the military power anymore to rebuild the Soviet Union or something like it, and any action against a NATO member (e.g. Poland) would immediately trigger NATO Article 5 with the entire alliance being automatically at war with Russia, a risk that even Putin cannot take. Let us not forget that we are not responding militarily in Ukraine, precisely because Ukraine is NOT part of NATO.

In any case, desperate or not, what Putin did cannot be condoned, and this is what makes the game so easy for the West: it will not be hard to condemn Putin and continue to ignore his rational demands, which will of course extend indefinitely the problem.

As to Crimea...

As to Crimea, the historic reality is that it was never Ukrainian. It was captured from the Turks by the Tsars in the 1700’s and “given” by Khrushchev to Ukraine as recently as 1954 to commemorate the 300th anniversary of the unification of Ukraine with Russia in 1654, which was a purely symbolic gesture within the boundaries of the Soviet Union, especially considering that 90%+ of its population have been ethic Russians for centuries, and up to now.

In Crimea, Russia has built and operated for over 300 years Sevastopol, the only major warm waters Russian naval base, from which they exert control over the Black Sea, and from which they get passage to the Mediterranean. It is as vital to Russia as San Diego, Norfolk, or Pearl Harbor are to the US. It is as irreplaceable to the Russians sea power in the Mediterranean as Naval Station Guantanamo Bay is irreplaceable to the US sea power in the Caribbean.

Notwithstanding the fact that Crimea is likely genuinely historically Russian, from a Realpolitik perspective, would we really expect the Russians to give up Sevastopol? After all the US kept Guantanamo in Cuba...

Is this analysis crazy?

Over the last two weeks, I thought it might be, because it seems so distant from what must obviously be a common sense analysis of the situation (e.g. Ukraine is right, Putin is just a megalomaniac thug), because that analysis is so common.

Then, yesterday while looking for data on the 2014 beginnings of the Donbass movements, I found this fascinating University of Chicago's R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor in Political Science, John J. Mearsheimer's conference: UnCommon Core: The Causes and Consequences of the Ukraine Crisis.

As incredible as it sounds, this is an 8-year-old conference. You would think it was given yesterday.

This reassured me, for I apparently stand in good, although meager, company as my analysis is apparently akin to that of the great Henry Kissinger.

View attachment 454739


Another great piece worth reading, this one referring George Kennan, the architect of America’s successful containment of the Soviet Union, is the editorial of Thomas L. Friedman in the Washington Times:


View attachment 454740

I will finish the way I started: the Russian military aggression cannot be condoned. Period. My point here is NOT to justify what is happening, I condemn it, it is to propose that we try to understand what is happening.

In summary, from a Realpolitik perspective, Russia is as entitled to its own Monroe Doctrine - we could call it Greater Russia, or as the Tsars once said "Tsars of all the Russias", as the United States of America are, and it is my understanding that they are asserting it.

I hope this was of interest...

This is incredibly interesting. I had to read it a couple of times to absorb it. But, I think the bottom line is that Russia never rose up to any level of potential after the fall of the USSR. It crashed around and failed to inspire allegiances. Its leadership has not given any country and real reason to remain aligned. Since it hasn't developed any new paradigm for its relationships, it uses the old school, USSR technique of making them an offer they can't refuse. Maybe, with its enormous intellectual capital, it's natural resources, and keen sense of purpose, Russia could have found new glory and new relationships. Instead, Europe and the rest of civilization have to protect themselves from offending a well armed bully.

I don't think this is about anyone other than Russia. The country has not figured out how to unlock its potential so it will just drag everyone else down to its level.
 

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idjeffp wrote on Jon R15's profile.
Hi Jon,
I saw your post for the .500 NE cases. Are these all brass or are they nickel plated? Hard for me to tell... sorry.
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