I don't know anything about you and you know nothing about me, my education, or my experiences. I suggest you reflect on that before accusing me of not knowing my history. I'll simply say I am comfortable with credentials.
Plan "Red" like the period Plan "Orange" and a host of other contingency plans have been developed as planning exercises since WWI. The Pentagon still does them and reviews and updates pertinent ones on the shelf. It was indeed declassified because it was a no longer a relevant plan. That the Canadians were upset that they would be targeted in the case of such a war plan is I suppose understandable, but should hardly be surprising from a pure planning perspective. I know of no single respected historian who believes that the United States and Great Britain were ever remotely close to hostilities after WWI.
The United States, Great Britain, and Japan were indeed involved in a tense game of high stakes poker with respect to the five interwar naval treaties. Begun with a Euro-focus in 1922, Japan's emerging power changed that emphasis to the Pacific. All three countries were acting absolutely in their own national interests. The US and Great Britain both came out of those negotiations pretty well and both at Japan's expense; so much so that Japan eventually denounced the 5/5/3 construct (note the agreed parity between the US and UK). Germany was a bit player with little real voice in the outcome. Italy and France chose to largely ignore them.
Your unsubstantiated claims about Lend Lease remain curious to me. I repeat, the structure was created to prevent a financial burden to the UK. Roosevelt was certain the US would have to eventually enter the war against Germany, and was willing to provide whatever materiel could be spared from the US's rearmament program. However, he was opposed by a powerful isolationist consensus in the Republican Party and similar wing in his own. "Lend Lease" allowed him to end cash sales to Britain for the temporary "lease" of basing rights - most of which were never meaningfully utilized. In other words, the US essentially gave Britain whatever it had available - there was no expectation the "loaned" materiel would ever be returned. Thus, not only did the US not "nullify" a non-existent threat, it did everything in its power to increase the war fighting potential of Great Britain. With all due respect, this isn't even a debatable point.
I will agree, at the time, some in the UK government saw it as a one-sided deal in the favor of the US. However, by the end of the war, any clear thinking politician and every historian saw the agreement as the first step leading to the great Anglo-American partnership of WWII.
And with respect to the Wickes class and other four-stack destroyers, what other country gave the UK a single hull of any sort? Certainly, the US Navy was beginning a cautious ship construction effort as war loomed, and the older destroyers of the reserve fleet would shortly become obsolete. Also, many of them required extensive repair and overhaul. However, the Navy opposed the provision of these ships due to the needs generated by Pacific and Atlantic war-planning exercises. Indeed, those that remained in the US Navy soldiered on through WWII. "Lend lease" provided a fig-leaf to give 50 ships of that class to the UK and Canada. It is not like any were returned. If anything, FDR acted to aid Britain in spite of his Navy experience. And while you may denigrate that loan or gift, they were certainly more capable than the armed trawlers with which the UK was supplementing convoy escorts at the time.
