Read through the Winograd Commission (AAR of sorts) Israel put together after the 2006 war with Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon, some key points......
12. In the period we examined in the Final Report - from July 18, 2006, to August 14, 2006- again troubling findings were revealed, some of which had already been mentioned in the
Interim Report:
• We found serious failings and shortcomings in the decision-making processes and staff-work in the political and the military echelons and their interface.
• We found serious failings and flaws in the quality of preparedness, decision-making and performance in the
IDF high command, especially in the Army.
• We found serious failings and flaws in the lack of strategic thinking and planning, in both the political and the military echelons.
• We found severe failings and flaws in the defence of the civilian population and in coping with its being attacked by
rockets.
• These weaknesses resulted in part from inadequacies of preparedness and strategic and operative planning which go back long before the
2nd Lebanon war.
13. The decision made in the night of July 12th – to react (to the kidnapping) with immediate and substantive military action, and to set for it ambitious goals - limited Israel's range of options. In fact, after the initial decision had been made, Israel had only two main options, each with its coherent internal logic, and its set of costs and disadvantages. The first was a short, painful, strong and unexpected blow on
Hizbullah, primarily through standoff fire-power. The second option was to bring about a significant change of the reality in the South of Lebanon with a large ground operation, including a temporary occupation of the South of Lebanon and ‘cleaning’ it of
Hezbollah military infrastructure.
14. The choice between these options was within the exclusive political discretion of the government; however, the way the original decision to go to war had been made; the fact
Israel went to war before it decided which option to select, and without an exit strategy – all these constituted serious failures, which affected the whole war. Responsibility for these failures lay, as we had stressed in the
Interim Report, on both the political and the military echelons.
(Winograd Report,
https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/winograd-commission-final-report-january-2008)
Of note, Hezbollah was able to inflict this level of damage to IDF (20 tanks destroyed) back then, and they are night and day difference MORE powerful NOW than they were in 2006.
Rumors of the Taliban getting involved is mostly fake news, highly unlikely in my opinion. If outside non-state forces get involved (other than Hamas and Hezbollah) it'll likely be from the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq. All they would need is the gas money and the thumbs up from the Shiia leaders and they could move through Syria relatively unmolested (especially if they got some bonus anti-aircraft capability from the IRGC) as they are in the good graces of Assad as well as Russia.
The Popular Mobilization Forces have been involved in serious combat (most of IDF have not) and bore most of the fighting against ISIS in urban combat in places like Mosul and Kirkuk. While there are splits among them, they have serious numbers (over 200k) and even if only 20-30k made the trip, it would make a huge difference in the fight, especially bc theyre composed of both shiia and sunni (Christians too, albeit a small amount). They also have the benefit of already being in much of Syria, and with the fight against ISIS essentially over, they have nothing else to do. Not to mention they have had a low level axe to grind against the US and Israel for years, especially after the death of Soleimani.
