An article from 'The Daily Telegraph', which is hidden behind a paywall:
How to take on the Russians and win – by a former Cold War soldier
Before turning to academia Professor James Goodwin spent 12 years in the infantry. He reveals how Russia’s army is getting it so wrong
ByProfessor James Goodwin9 March 2022 • 4:15pm
Professor James Goodwin (right) with his troops
I was a Cold War soldier for 12 years. And not a desk jockey either: foot-slogging infantry. I was commissioned into the Light Infantry in 1977 and spent 12 years of the Cold War with Nato-role battalions, both regular and reserve, before returning to university and becoming a professor of the physiology of ageing.
Every two years in the 1970s and 1980s, my fellow soldiers and I rehearsed our battle positions against the Russians, deployed in the dense forests of Germany for weeks at a time. These intensely fatiguing exercises often formed part of big Nato reinforcements, particularly Exercise Lionheart, a massive ‘war rehearsal’ which took place in north west Europe in 1984. Lionheart was the biggest British Army exercise and biggest mobilisation since the Second World War, involving over 400,000 Nato soldiers including 130,000 regular, reserve and Territorial Army personnel.
I recall vividly my anti-tank blocking position in a forest on the Teutoburger Ridge in north west Gemany, up against a “Russian” advance. And we knew whom to expect – our version of the 3rd Soviet Shock Army, one of the most powerful armoured forces that ever existed. They were coming straight down the autobahn and into our faces.
Today, it seems weird watching the Ukrainian Army doing so well at what we trained to do. But one thing is missing from all the media reports so far – the total absence of any understanding of what it’s like for the infantry soldier on the ground. And often that is the key to what’s happening.
The apparent military incompetence of the Russian Army in Ukraine has been startling. Miles of static armoured and mechanised convoys. Cities like Kharkiv, only 20 miles or so from the Russian border, unoccupied and undefeated. And most revealing, evidence of the pathetic state of ordinary Russian soldiers, out of fuel, out of food and out of morale.
My view that something was very, very wrong in their basic military management was reinforced by video footage of troops advancing into an urban area: all the basics were missing. Troops clung around their small, lightly armoured vehicle. Others were strung out either side, ambling along in no discernible formation. Their reaction to incoming small-arms fire was almost risible – no organised response, no immediate return of fire, no smoke and no supporting fire. And the real giveaway? The vehicle was reversing down its axis of advance, ready for a quick escape.
Any army is only as good as its individual soldiers. The British Army has learnt this lesson multiple times in its illustrious history. Look after your soldiers and they will fight well. Neglect them and your war effort will fall apart. They are your most precious asset. This lesson does not appear to have been learnt by the Russians.
I can’t help but think back to how I prepared my soldiers for the Cold War when I was an officer. On deployment, every single one of them had to understand where we were, what we were doing and what the plan was. Endless hours were spent on pre-deployment briefings and once on the ground, in giving orders for deployment, occupation, defence, patrolling, actions under fire – and especially at night – who was on our left flank, who was on our right, who was behind us. Exhaustive detail. This aspect was so important that during visits of the commanding officer, he would stop and talk directly to all ranks, asking them questions about how they understood the plan. Especially their mission.
Exercise Lionheart, a massive ‘war rehearsal’ which took place in north west Europe in 1984
Fast forward and I’m astonished. What do we see in Ukraine? Not just Russian troops who don’t know where they are, or even where they are going, but worse, troops who have been misled by their officers as to their mission.
Which brings me to another vital issue: morale. In his book,
The Bramall Papers Field Marshall Lord Bramall persistently reflects on the importance of high morale – the feeling that you as a soldier can achieve anything and overcome any odds. In my Cold War trench, I often thought about how I would raise and keep up the morale of my soldiers (and my own, for that matter). By and large we achieved it, by good management, by good discipline and by meeting their basic needs.
Prior to deployment, my company commander insisted that I inspected my men’s feet and check they had the regulation spare socks. On a formal inspection, if a soldier was deficient, they were charged. After two to three weeks of living outside in the freezing wet conditions I understood why. I also understood why I had to check cleanliness and hygiene in the field. And make sure that troops were being rotated, had sufficient sleep where operations allowed and were getting hot food. And why my company HQ made sure that letters from home were delivered.
The sight of Russian troops raiding shops for food or even begging for it can only mean rock bottom morale. When you have been lied to by your officers, I can only think that you won’t believe anyone cares about your welfare – a recipe for doubt, defiance and desertion. And prior to the invasion, these same troops were kept outside in freezing conditions for weeks at a time. Not ideal preparation. Or equally, for days in a static convoy with little apparent resupply.
A Russian army vehicle bogged down in Ukraine CREDIT: Trent Telenko
Resupply is a constant problem down to unit level such as a troop or platoon of 30 soldiers. To give you an idea of the problem, we can highlight ammunition resupply. In the Cold War, the average infantry soldier had a personal first line issue of 80 rounds (four magazines) and carried a belt of 50 rounds for the section machine gun. I often wondered about the wisdom of these scales. Firing aimed shots, our 7.62 mm SLR rifle could empty a magazine in 30 seconds. In a fire fight, that scale of issue would last only minutes. Similarly, our GPMGs (machine gun in the light role) had a deliberate rate of fire of 750 rounds per minute. Yes, there was pre-positioned ammunition available but I think you get the point.
Modern warfare, with its high volumes of fire, requires constant re-supply. If the Russian resupply is as bad as we are led to believe, then that is a compelling reason why the front elements would be reluctant to engage. It’s also another reason why the Ukrainians leave the long Russian convoys alone and interdict (prevent the movement of) their supply lines, stretching for miles over the same endless type of landscape which we defended on the northern German plain. The convoy isn’t going anywhere if it’s out of fuel, has no spares, no battlefield repair, no water, no food and only a first line issue of ammunition.
Abandoned Russian tanks in the Mykolaiv region of Ukraine CREDIT: General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
The problem is made worse if troops aren’t trained in marksmanship. Huge volumes of fire are no substitute for hitting the target, much more difficult for the infantry than people would believe. In the Cold War, we practised the application of fire at all distances, at all kinds of targets, moving and still. Knocking over the enemy conserves ammunition, reduces the odds and raises morale. Blasting away ineffectively is a recipe for defeat. Unless, of course, your tactics are simply to stand off and fire artillery into women and children, removing at a stroke the problems of fighting at close quarters and resupplying your infantry.
At the end of Lionheart we were 400 miles east, on the west bank of the River Leine – famously identified in Tom Clancy’s Red Storm Rising as a major natural obstacle to the Soviets. And after weeks of 20-hour days, we were totally exhausted. On their 400-mile advance from Belarus it will be no different for the Russians. Gnawing, debilitating fatigue will be their constant companion and a huge factor in their ability to fight.
The army trained me exquisitely in how to defeat the Russians. It centred around immaculate and detailed preparation, thorough training, teamwork and sound leadership at all levels from the ground up, to maintain the fighting efficiency and morale of the individual soldier. Given the evidence I have seen, it is not just the higher levels of strategic decision-making that explain the apparent lack of progress of the Russians. It is their callous
failure to look after and manage the individual soldiers whom they require to engage in close fighting against a determined Ukrainian Army. And yet another reason why blasting cities into brick dust is their default option.
