General Milley lost a lot of respect with the Afghanistan withdrawal and the decision to abandon equipment. Trump has a sound bite going around on that subject that is hard to disagree with.
Now, years later, the equipment left is being seen conpletely operational in China, and in the hands of various other designated terror groups. 90 billion founded to terror groups.
There are a lot in the veteran community that still feel slighted at the administrations handling of the withdrawal and aftermath and how no officer truly took ownership and resigned.
There is also little faith left in high ranking intelligence officials and Washington personel after 50 signed a letter in 2020 stating Hunters laptop was Russian collusion and then 3 years later the government enters that same laptop into official evidence against Hunter Biden. No accountability on their outright lying to the American people to literally influence and election.
Shawn Ryan's Episode with Sgt Tyler Vargas who survived the explosion at Abbeyate during the withdrawal paints another picture entirely. It's gut wrenching to hear how much those servicemen and women were failed.
Bob Woodward´s new book "War" is being published the coming tuesday.. In that book Mark Milley call Trump a "Total facist".. Thats strong words coming from a General who worked close over a longer period with him..
I should start by noting I am not a Milley fan, but perhaps not for the reasons some would perhaps assume. Afghanistan is not one of them. The military plans and executes operations based upon the guidance provided by civilian authority. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs plays no part in such planning. He is not even in the chain of command of the primary planning headquarters, which in this case was CENTCOM. All the initial COAs provided the administration by CENTCOM then commanded by General Kenneth McKenzie, Jr (USMC) called for either retaining a footprint in Bagram or having it be the last portal for withdrawal.
None of those COAs met the administration's timeline for withdrawal or the requirement to remove all US forces. Moreover, the administration had to actually order the beginning of the withdrawal through the State Department which was then the lead agency in Afghanistan. CENTCOM could take no overt action until that order was given. Once the executive branch decided to not leave a residual force and once the order was finally given in mid-August, the only way to meet the withdrawal timeline was to close Bagram first and then conduct the final evacuation through Kabul.
McKenzie has repeatedly stated both in testimony and in interviews that as the overall commander of the operation he "alone bears full military responsibility for what happened at Abbey Gate," That is being a good soldier - or in this case marine. But military leadership can only operate within the constraints provided by civilian leadership. I also place a lot of the blame on Secretary of Defense Austin who has carried the term "deference" to new heights of ineffectiveness. Probably due to his military service, but also his personality, he seems either incapable or unable to exercise a strong military voice within the administration - Afghanistan and Ukraine provide the most obvious examples.
The collapse of the Afghanistan Armed Forces obviously further complicated the withdrawal. The vast majority of the equipment left behind had already been or was going to be transferred to the Afghanistan. With the collapse of the Afghan resistance, there was no way to retrieve the material from around the country nor any ally to receive the material not yet issued. Additionally, there was no mechanism within the withdrawal timeline to withdraw any of the major equipment items from Bagram.
However, very little of it was of any real defense value to the United States or one of our adversaries. The armored vehicles were primarily armored recon vehicles not in the US inventory and already operated by the Afghan Army and around 70 mine resistant vehicles (MRAP) which are nothing more than heavily armored trucks. Most of them were disabled.
Around 150 aircraft were "left behind," but again the vast majority were already being operated by the Afghan Armed Forces. 32 of those, which we had provided, were MI 17 helicopters of Soviet design. Some Blackhawks were left, but their maintenance is very demanding and during the Taliban's recent parade at Bagram, the overflight was by the MI 17s.
The most worrisome thing to me was the night vision equipment with which we had equipped Afghan forces for years. They would have value to a terrorist organization.
None of this equipment is of any particular intelligence interest to China or Russia.
Which is a long way around to
@Pondoro's observation. I think it would be a mistake to entirely discount Milley's assessment of Trump. He was there and none of us were. However, I do believe that there is an enormous level of animosity between them, and whatever Trump's obvious failings - particularly between 3 November and 6 January - senior uniformed leadership has a responsibility in our republic to neither like or dislike any political leader. I believe that animosity affected Milley and does to this day. I would suggest I am not alone in that professional judgement.
I think that animosity also led Milley to far too readily embrace some of the more radical goals of the new administration. That is where my issues with him really begin. He had the opportunity to defend the military as an institution with respect to its tradition of providing opportunity and recognizing merit. Instead, he chose to pander to much of the Woke nonsense then blossoming in Washington. It is from that breach of faith with the institution, that the military currently suffers and will require time to overcome.
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