Politics

[Corey0372]

https://twitter.com/x/status/2022394419685822647

 

[Red Leg]

I mean absolutely no disrespect when I ask this some of you gentleman have first hand experience or were in command roles at the time and I don’t wish to offend anyone with my question but if you all had bin Ladin cornered in a cave why didn’t the military/air force just bring the mountain down on him ? From my reading there are smart munitions that can be placed in a cave mouth or window?

Intentionally or not, you have highlighted the problem with smart munitions. There is a huge difference between suspecting the location of a target within say a hundred square Km, and having an actual target located to a hundred square feet. It is why both CIA and the army leadership at CENTCOM and in Washington argued so strongly for the US blocking force on the border routes. The air force tried very hard to kill him. They likely came close. But he successfully crossed the border in a convoy of vehicles and disappeared for a decade plus.

This was the military vision that sponsored the “shock and awe” strategy that promised Iraq would lay down its arms quickly, meaning a large ground force commitment would not be required.

 

[rigbymauser]

I guess you’re forgetting about Afghanistan, huh

He didn´t forget. He didn`t knew. Maybe excused with he wasn`t born at that time.

 

[Altitude sickness]

Intentionally or not, you have highlighted the problem with smart munitions. There is a huge difference between suspecting the location of a target within say a hundred square Km, and having an actual target located to a hundred square feet. It is why both CIA and the army leadership at CENTCOM and in Washington argued so strongly for the US blocking force on the border routes. The air force tried very hard to kill him. They likely came close. But he successfully crossed the border in a convoy of vehicles and disappeared for a decade plus.

This was the military vision that sponsored the “shock and awe” strategy that promised Iraq would lay down its arms quickly, meaning a large ground force commitment would not be required.

Some that were in Afghanistan on the first U.S. wave of action. And knee deep in Tora Bora say they were monitoring U.S.B.’s radio traffic and had him pinned down while they pummeled the hillside.

I’ve heard on the internet rumors that his escape was intentional. That somehow the U.S. wanted him to escape.

But word on the street was it was more due to mistakes and bureaucracy. Using indigenous forces to block retreat into Pakistan. Etc. etc

 

[skydiver386]

Some that were in Afghanistan on the first U.S. wave of action. And knee deep in Tora Bora say they were monitoring U.S.B.’s radio traffic and had him pinned down while they pummeled the hillside.

I’ve heard on the internet rumors that his escape was intentional. That somehow the U.S. wanted him to escape.

But word on the street was it was more due to mistakes and bureaucracy. Using indigenous forces to block retreat into Pakistan. Etc. etc

UBL's convoy, whether foot, horse or vehicle, should have looked like the "Highway of Death" leading out of Kuwait City. Of course easier said than done.

One of the biggest issues was not having good commo with the indig and being able to tell friend from foe. Several friends were on the ground and told me trying to tell tribesman from Taliban was near impossible. Even with GPS guided munitions, our side had more than one friendly fire incident.

 

[Altitude sickness]

I can’t imagine the frustration and even guilt the guys that were on Tora Bora still have. Knowing that nearly 20 more years of death, missing limbs, TBI, PTSD may have been reduced. Plus how many Afghan civilians.

It was primarily US Army. Green Berets, a few CIA guys and British guys that were imbedded with the “Unit” on Tora Bora.

 

[mdwest]

I think only ODA 572 from 5th Group was directly involved in Tora Bora unless there were some support guys running around or maybe a few individuals seconded over to CAG or Jawbreaker… plus:

A Squadron from Delta/CAG
M Squadron from the SBS
CIA Jawbreaker
Afghan Militia

And USAF B1’s and B52’s pounded the hell out of the area as well.

The jawbreaker team requested a battalion of Rangers to act as a blocking force near the Pakistan border, but was denied by Gen Franks.

I’m pretty confident had 3/75 been sent as requested the next 20 years would have looked very different..

I’m not typically a conspiracy theorist… but I have often wondered if that’s not exactly what senior leadership wanted…

 

[Altitude sickness]

mdwest, The guy from the Unit, that was there. And I get my info from says he initially thought it had to be intentional. Then as the war went on and he moved into senior leadership positions. He learned it was more likely than not, simply;

A. Very early in the war so still some Missteps.
B. Bureaucracy and decisions being made from DC instead of the immediate battlefield.
C. Worried about Afghan politics and allowing indigenous forces a piece of the action.

 

[wesheltonj]

Some that were in Afghanistan on the first U.S. wave of action. And knee deep in Tora Bora say they were monitoring U.S.B.’s radio traffic and had him pinned down while they pummeled the hillside.

I’ve heard on the internet rumors that his escape was intentional. That somehow the U.S. wanted him to escape.

But word on the street was it was more due to mistakes and bureaucracy. Using indigenous forces to block retreat into Pakistan. Etc. etc

I heard the US had him pinned down, but wanted the locals to kill him as not to make him a martyr. Instead the locals let him escape. I have zero clue if true or not.

 

[mdwest]

A, B, and C all make sense… especially if a combination of “all of the above” is considered…

My concern about C is… they could have easily accomplished that…

Embed 3x ODA’s into a BN of Afghan forces.. 1 ODA per company sized element of Afghans.. and have them do what SF does…

Instead they embedded 1 ODA at the BN level… which, an ODA is trained and prepared to handle… but in this case, and on a mission of this level of importance, having the ODAs working at the lower level, and right in the thick of the fight with the line elements would have likely produced much better results…

But… that just further validates points A, and B…

 

[Ontario Hunter]

I think we're actually in agreement on this, and maybe just looking at things from a different vantage point..

I 100% completely agree on everything in your first paragraph..

There is also nothing in your second paragraph I'd dispute..

In my earlier post I stated that Iraq was a "coalition of the willing"... there was no attempt to or as I understand it, desire to invoke article 5.. not unlike other conflicts (Gulf War 1, Vietnam, etc) where we have fought with a coalition or partner nations and not invoked article 5..

My point was a counter to Aarons post about NATO reliably jumping in to assist the US whenever it calls vs the US's willingness to do the same for NATO..

4 major NATO countries (including Canada) chose to sit Iraq out.. They thought it wasnt in their national interest to engage, so they didnt.. While 33 nations that were not NATO members chose to get involved..

The US did call upon its NATO allies (ie those that are willing to fight are free to join us), without calling for a vote on Article 5.. Some NATO allies made the choice not to get involved, while others (UK, Poland, Denmark, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Portugal, and Turkey) made the choice to get involved..

Some (Canada as an example) went out of its way to not only not answer the call, but to make it clear that it would only consider joining the coalition if Iraq became a UN action..

My point to Aaron was simply that countries will act in their own strategic interest.. they dont just blindly follow the US wherever it leads out of niceness or being a "friend".. and there should be no expectation that the US would blindly follow another NATO nation either...

Trump is an asshole.. I dont think anyone to include the most avid Trump followers would dispute that..

but, Trump or not, I dont see that as any reason to believe that were Article 5 invoked tomorrow (which I dont think most on this forum understand requires that ALL 32 members of NATO have to vote yes to invoke Article 5.. a unanimous decision is an absolute requirement) that the US wouldnt participate in the supposed conflict.. The US would have had to have already voted "yes" and agreed to the fight to have Article 5 invoked in the first place.. The US then suddenly deciding to not send troops would be nonsensical...

Canada chose to "sit this one out" because it didn't buy the weapons of mass destruction lie. Not that Sadam didn't deserve to be deposed, he did, but some were of the opinion that the Middle East should solve its own problems. It is afterall the world's rectum. As Vietnam proved, intervention can too often result in the intervenor becoming the common enemy of the combatants. In those situations it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to determine who the enemy is. Collateral damage is only tolerable if you're the one inflicting the damage.

 

[wesheltonj]

Canada chose to "sit this one out" because it didn't buy the weapons of mass destruction lie. . .

You mean the gas he actually used on his own people previously. And then later trucked to Syria and used there.

During the 1980s, Iraq developed and used nerve agents like
Tabun, Sarin, and VXagainst Iranian forces and its own Kurdish population, marking the first major combat use of such weapons. These programs were part of a massive chemical weapons initiative, notably used in the 1988 Halabja massacre.
Key Details on Iraq's Nerve Gas Program:

• Development & Usage: Starting around 1984, Iraq produced and used nerve agents, including Tabun, Sarin, and later VX, throughout the Iran-Iraq War.
• Impact: These attacks killed thousands of civilians and troops, notably in the 1988 Halabja massacre, where over 3,000 people were killed.
• Production & Stockpiles: The program, known as "Project 922," was accelerated in the 1980s, reaching its peak in the late 1980s.
• Post-War Findings: Following the Gulf War, UN inspectors (UNSCOM) found, and later destroyed, various chemical munitions, including 155 mm shells filled with mustard gas, but the scale of the nerve agent stockpiles was significantly reduced.
• Controversy: The reliance on, and subsequent failure to find significant stockpiles of, these weapons was a major factor in the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

 

[Red Leg]

A, B, and C all make sense… especially if a combination of “all of the above” is considered…

My concern about C is… they could have easily accomplished that…

Embed 3x ODA’s into a BN of Afghan forces.. 1 ODA per company sized element of Afghans.. and have them do what SF does…

Instead they embedded 1 ODA at the BN level… which, an ODA is trained and prepared to handle… but in this case, and on a mission of this level of importance, having the ODAs working at the lower level, and right in the thick of the fight with the line elements would have likely produced much better results…

But… that just further validates points A, and B…

mdwest, The guy from the Unit, that was there. And I get my info from says he initially thought it had to be intentional. Then as the war went on and he moved into senior leadership positions. He learned it was more likely than not, simply;

A. Very early in the war so still some Missteps.
B. Bureaucracy and decisions being made from DC instead of the immediate battlefield.
C. Worried about Afghan politics and allowing indigenous forces a piece of the action.

In large measure, you are both correct. Let me state up front that no one wanted or expected Bin Laden to escape.

It is difficult through hindsight to put one's own mind into those of senior defense leadership of the period. It is far easier to say that there was some mysterious conspiracy to allow the Al Qaeda command structure to slip away than to deal with them as either prisoners or bodies. The conspiracy usually involves appeasing the Saudis or the Paks or both or perhaps Putin's little green men. What I experienced and what I believe is the truth, is both far simpler and far more complex.

What is often overlooked in histories of the period is our, and every other nation's, tendency to prepare for the last war. What we forget is that in 2000 the previous war was not Desert Storm, though the wrong lessons were taken from it as well, but was the Balkans. It was a war, at least from NATO's perspective, that was successfully waged from thirty-thousand feet.

This fit the narrative that the Air Force and lesser extent Navy centric lobbies had been flogging since the early nineties that the Gulf War was won by smart munitions, and the Iraqi government would have collapsed if the air campaign had simply continued for the X number of days, weeks, or months that were necessary. You can do your own research on the likelihood of that actually happening - but a good place to start is the relative damage to the Iraqi armed forces inflicted by the Air Force and Navy on one hand and coalition ground forces in 96 hours on the other (hint - it wasn't air power).

But, the Balkans offered, at least in the mind of air power enthusiasts, an irrefutable example of the shape of future warfare. Gen(ret) Wesley Clark, an Army GO but also NATO Supreme Allied Commander during the war, wrote an extremely influential book that was published in 2001, but about which he had been lecturing for several years, titled "Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat (2001)." While it spent a great deal of effort addressing the problems and challenges of coalition warfare, it largely rides on the assumption that the decisive weapon in future conflict will be air delivered precision strikes. Donald Rumsfeld was a committed believer in that strategic vision which would lead to a host of decisions that decided the initial outcomes of both the Afghanistan and Iraq incursions.

To give you an idea of his commitment to that vision, in the few months prior to 911, two of Rumsfeld's initiatives were directed toward dramatically pruning Army capability. The most dramatic would have been to drawdown the Army from ten to eight divisions. Two of the remaining divisions would be organized and equipped as "peace enforcement" commands designed for the next Balkan-like peacekeeping mission. Additionally, he initiated efforts to terminate several Army programs, the most important of which was the Crusader artillery system. The logic there was that ground forces could rely entirely on "joint fires" in future conflict; a judgement that the 3rd Brigade, 101 ABN and TF Mountain /10th Mountain Div would pay for in blood in the all to near future during Operation Anaconda.

My job during those weeks was to light backfires on the Hill until the President made a decision. With regard to end strength, the Army eventually was successful (with a lot of help from our enemies who also have a vote), but not with respect to Crusader.

So, back to the early days of Afghanistan. Rumsfeld initially firmly believed that the objectives in Afghanistan could be achieved through SOF, the CIA, anti-Taliban Afghan forces, and precision strikes. Up until December of 2001, the first two months of Operation Enduring Freedom had seemingly justified that belief. By the first of December, US intelligence had a high degree of certainty that the remnants of the Al Qaeda leadership to include Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri were confined to the Tora Bora mountain area. We know from subsequent prisoner interrogations that they were indeed there.

Neither SOF nor CIA leadership were confident that the Afghan militias were competent or loyal enough to culminate the action in Tora Bora. The Air Force was hitting every potential cave entrance they could target, but much of the terrain was not targetable due to the slant angles being blocked by intervening terrain. As a result, a joint SOF CIA plan was created that was forwarded to the SECDEF and CENTCOM which had at its centerpiece the deployment of a Ranger battalion to seal the escape routes from Tora Bora to Pakistan. Army leadership supported the plan and provided a formal warning order to the Ranger regiment for imminent deployment. Incidentally, there were only three primary routes that could be used from the region occupied by Al Qaeda to get to the Pak border.

Rumsfeld flatly rejected the plan, and Tommy Franks was not the sort of combatant commander who would challenge Rumsfeld - a character flaw he demonstrated repeatedly in the lead up to the Iraq invasion. Over the years, to include in his bio, Rumsfeld provided a number of reasons to include uncertainty that Bin Laden was actually in Tora Bora, or the "necessity" to maintain a small conventional footprint - reasons or excuses that went totally by the way once Bin Laden escaped and the insurgency began.

I am convinced it was simple stubbornness on Rumsfeld's part to prove, especially to the professional military, that he personally knew best how to wage "modern" war. This trait would further color decisions well into both campaigns. For instance, again using Franks, he would personally review the Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) for conventional forces, striking, sometimes critical, supporting units as unnecessary. The most egregious such action was forbidding the 10th Mountain and 101st Divs from deploying with their organic artillery to Afghanistan. As a result, during the Battle of Anaconda, the only organic fire support available to the elements of the 101st and 10th Mountain Divisions were the mortars they carried on their backs. Soldiers died waiting on air strikes that took up to two-hours to respond. I can highly recommend Sean Naylor's superb account of the battle, "Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda."

So Bin Laden escaped. Not through conspiracy, but largely through the arrogant hubris of Rumsfeld, and the sycophantic obedience of Franks. As I noted in my earlier posting, I suspect the history of our involvement in Afghanistan would have been very different had the Al Qaeda leadership been decapitated in Tora Bora. A path not taken.

 

[mdwest]

Having spent a good bit of time around Rumsfeld just a few years after Tora Bora, what you state is 100% believeable.. he might have been the single most arrogant and egotistical SOB I met during my stint in DC (and that is saying quite a bit considering the circles my team ran in back then and the senior officials we were exposed to)..

While Rumsfeld was a "vulcan", there was an interesting dynamic I witnessed with him.. Almost all of the "vulcans" got along exceptionally well.. they were a team.. the exceptions were Cheney and Rumsfeld.. they generally were not liked and did not work well with Rice, Wolfowitz, Powell, Armitage, Perle, etc..

Rice, Powell, and Wolfowitz in particular were actually pretty humble people I thought.. clearly all brilliant and all in positions of power and influence, etc.. but all knew their role, knew the end goal, and worked very well together in an attempt to achieve it (whether anyone thinks those goals and objectives were right/wrong/good/bad.. the group were all true believers.. and they made a pretty solid team overall I thought in terms of knowing each others strengths, weaknesses, capabilities, limitations, etc..)...

 

[Red Leg]

You mean the gas he actually used on his own people previously. And then later trucked to Syria and used there.

During the 1980s, Iraq developed and used nerve agents like
Tabun, Sarin, and VXagainst Iranian forces and its own Kurdish population, marking the first major combat use of such weapons. These programs were part of a massive chemical weapons initiative, notably used in the 1988 Halabja massacre.
Key Details on Iraq's Nerve Gas Program:

• Development & Usage: Starting around 1984, Iraq produced and used nerve agents, including Tabun, Sarin, and later VX, throughout the Iran-Iraq War.
• Impact: These attacks killed thousands of civilians and troops, notably in the 1988 Halabja massacre, where over 3,000 people were killed.
• Production & Stockpiles: The program, known as "Project 922," was accelerated in the 1980s, reaching its peak in the late 1980s.
• Post-War Findings: Following the Gulf War, UN inspectors (UNSCOM) found, and later destroyed, various chemical munitions, including 155 mm shells filled with mustard gas, but the scale of the nerve agent stockpiles was significantly reduced.
• Controversy: The reliance on, and subsequent failure to find significant stockpiles of, these weapons was a major factor in the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

Part of my disability determination is having been beneath the nerve agent plume of the Khamisiyah munitions depot when its bunkers were destroyed on 4 and 10 March 91. Subsequent investigations by a United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM determined that the depot contained both artillery munitions and rocket warheads armed with the nerve agents sarin and cyclosarin. There was no reason to believe that Iraq had changed its commitment to the production and use of such agents in the subsequent decade particularly as the regime obstructed efforts to inspect facilities to provide assurance the programs had indeed been terminated.

 

[farmer_john]

Canada chose to "sit this one out" because it didn't buy the weapons of mass destruction lie. Not that Sadam didn't deserve to be deposed, he did, but some were of the opinion that the Middle East should solve its own problems. It is afterall the world's rectum. As Vietnam proved, intervention can too often result in the intervenor becoming the common enemy of the combatants. In those situations it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to determine who the enemy is. Collateral damage is only tolerable if you're the one inflicting the damage.

It was there my dude. Thats a pervasive myth.

 

[mdwest]

Canada chose to "sit this one out" because it didn't buy the weapons of mass destruction lie. Not that Sadam didn't deserve to be deposed, he did, but some were of the opinion that the Middle East should solve its own problems. It is afterall the world's rectum. As Vietnam proved, intervention can too often result in the intervenor becoming the common enemy of the combatants. In those situations it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to determine who the enemy is. Collateral damage is only tolerable if you're the one inflicting the damage.

and yet another time that the supposed PhD didnt do his research and chose instead to spout nonsense and bullshit based on nothing more than a thought rather than any facts..

Canada did not join the Coalition of the Willing because Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, a prominent and lifelong member of the liberal party believed that the UN needed to create a mandate for "moral and legal legitimacy".. He also stated that Canada was already involved in Afghanistan, and that the Afghanistan war was eating all of the resources that Canada had the ability to provide (which isnt a surprize since Canadas military has had a serious deficit of materials, equipment, and people for better than the last 40 years)... He didnt have much of a choice in Afghanistan due to every other NATO member country jumping on board with the Article 5 and two dozen Canadians dying on 9/11.. Even in Afghanistan however the liberal government took a "limited liability view" during the initial year of the war.. specifically stating that it would commit to manageable, limited liability actions only rather than a full scale military deployment.. this changed a bit over time.. specifically when Harper became Prime Minister in 2006, he commited Canada to larger scale operations in Afghanistan..

Canada very specifically and intentionally never opposed the war in Iraq publicly..

you'd think that by now you'd actually use Google, Grok, or ChatGPT before spouting off nonsense that you obviously know nothing about....

 

[roverandbrew]

Canada chose to "sit this one out" because it didn't buy the weapons of mass destruction lie. Not that Sadam didn't deserve to be deposed, he did, but some were of the opinion that the Middle East should solve its own problems. It is afterall the world's rectum. As Vietnam proved, intervention can too often result in the intervenor becoming the common enemy of the combatants. In those situations it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to determine who the enemy is. Collateral damage is only tolerable if you're the one inflicting the damage.

Can I ask you @Ontario Hunter how you define a weapon of mass destruction. Feel free to use doctrine or doctrine combined with your experience in the region. While in thought...Does capability (single or dual use facilities and technology) coupled with intent matter?

 

[PerH]

My Dear Fellow Sportsmen,

For the last 18 months after the previous pro Indian bootlicking Awami League government was overthrown from Bangladesh on August 5th of 2024… I had been approached by the Interim Government to act temporarily as IGF (Inspector General Of Forests) until an elected government came to power. Despite being 73 years old at the time and against the better judgement of my family, I took the responsibility & came out of my 19 year retirement from the government service because my country needed me again.

Today, I am immensely proud to say that I have successfully completed my tenure as IGF. Fortunately, Bangladesh Nationalist Party has won the elections by a landslide and our country remains free from the evils of Shariah Law & any form of moral policing which Islamic governments are notorious for implementing. I am personally quite pleased with the outcome. While I would hate for my country to become an Indian neocolony again, I definitely would not want it to fall into the hands of anybody who idolizes the Taliban.

It was a wild 18 months; bringing back much needed discipline to the Department Of Forests. We had to contend with poachers, timber thieves, human traffickers, all forms of miscreants (both Indian & local) and Islamists who just can’t seem to leave minorities alone to live in peace. But I succeeded, despite getting shot in the right arm last month (fortunately it was just a flesh wound) and losing two of my men in the process.

Today, I can proudly return to my retirement once more. Spend time with my family & friends, tend to my nursery, lecture my students at the University, enjoy more hunting (OF COURSE !), complete authoring my second book (concerning my African adventures) and most importantly… return to Africa for my next Safari (preferably for a black rhinoceros). The government gifted me a trophy for my endeavors and finally acknowledged me officially as a veteran of the 1971 Indo-Pak war.

If the country ever needs me again, I’ll obviously jump back into the fray. But for now, retirement feels good !
View attachment 745428
After a long time, I was able to tend to my plants today.
View attachment 745427

Very good election result all of you got there . Wish something similar would happen here also . That would solve much of the worries and hidden treaties . Well as the List contents dropped here recently , it may be so, but one can never get anything for granted before it’s so .
If your country need you again , consider it very good . But until then , relax and plan safaris and visit to the North

 

[Nyati]

This morning I heard Sec. Rubio speak at the Munich Conference.

He focused on US-Europe Defense cooperation in a rational way.

Without insulting anybody.

I like this guy !