Politics

[375 Ruger Fan]

 

[geoff rath]

following Ruger 375 Fan's post; can anyone imagine future U S aircraft Carriers called either "USS Joe Biden", or USS Donald Trump" ??

 

[Ray B]

very few students of the Napoleonic campaigns who believe Napoleon would have died anywhere but his bed in Paris had he not taken the Grand Army on its Quixotic march into the heart of Russia.

But then Tchaikovsky wouldn't have had the battles of 1812 to compose his overture about.

As for who will cry Uncle first between Ukraine & Russia- I'd check with Las Vegas prior to placing a bet. I don't see either side giving up soon.

 

[Hunt anything]

Do they name garbage scows?

 

[Ray B]

I don't know of any ships named Fillmore, Buchanan, Arthur or Coolidge either.

 

[Tanks]

I don't know of any ships named Fillmore, Buchanan, Arthur or Coolidge either.

USS Fillmore was an attack transport that was operational between 1945-1947. Don’t know why I remember it.

 

[Corey0372]

Those are all absolutely valid points everyone is making (ok maybe not the likelihood of hordes of DRNK troops entering the fray). I would simply suggest that even operational-level positional warfare is not necessarily a war of attrition. Warfare, particularly since the dawn of the industrial age, rarely is just about numbers, it is about combat power.

As someone noted, the Confederacy was indeed dramatically outnumbered, and once Lincoln found a general willing to take the casualties to achieve ultimate victory, Grant wore down the Army of Northern Virginia in the Overland Campaign of 1864/65. But was that really attritional warfare?

I would argue it was something very different. Though Grant inflicted unsustainable casualties on Lee and suffered enormous ones himself, he did it through operational maneuver. The few occasions he forgot that, such as Cold Harbor and the first attacks at Petersburg, it was he who faced unsustainable casualties and very nearly had a mutiny on his hands among his subordinates.

Lee showed absolute brilliance in the handling of his army following the battle of the Wilderness until the end of the war. Historians have often argued over what may have happened had Lee taken the lessons of Sharpsburg to heart in 1862 and gone over to the operational defensive for the remainder of the war. That would have looked far more like what we see in Ukraine today than anything that actually happened during that war. Without a Gettysburg, I am confident most of historians would agree that the war at least would not have ended in 1865. I think most historians would also agree that sustaining support for the war beyond 1865 would have been very difficult if not impossible.

History offers us numbers of other examples where the operational defensive likely would have been or was the correct strategy. For instance, in the war of the Sixth Coalition the army of France was outnumbered by those of the UK, Russia, and their allies. I can think of very few students of the Napoleonic campaigns who believe Napoleon would have died anywhere but his bed in Paris had he not taken the Grand Army on its Quixotic march into the heart of Russia.

To date at least, following the catastrophe of the initial invasion of Ukraine, the Russian Army has shown little ability to operationally maneuver against Ukrainian forces. Perhaps one could point to the battle of Bahkmut, but I would argue we have not yet seen the final outcome of that campaign. Indeed, I would suggest they have shown no ability to even mass combat power operationally to achieve a decisive battle.

I also wonder about the actual casualty exchange rates in this conflict. The figures we are citing are those being publicly discussed by the US and British DOD and MOD respectively. They are therefore conservative. But what if one side or the other is half again higher, perhaps even 2X? I find it highly unlikely that would be the case of Ukraine, but because they continue to attempt the tactical offensive, I would not at all be surprised if Russia isn't actually approaching, even exceeding half a million.

For instance, as of yesterday, Ukraine claims to have killed 306,860 Russian troops. I think everyone would agree that number is inflated. We'll come back to it in a moment. The next question is what is the Russian WIA to KIA rate? For US forces in the European Theater of Operations in WWII it was roughly 3 to 1. I suspect those rates are closer to the campaign in Ukraine than modern US ratios which can be 10 to 1. Russian field medical capability in particular seem far closer to mid-twentieth century than twenty first century standards.

So let's cut Ukraine's claim by in half to 150,000. Assuming that 3 to 1 casualty ratio, that means Russia has already suffered 600K total casualties in this conflict. Even if their field medical services are far worse than we believe, a 2 to 1 casualty rate leaves us with 450,000 total casualties.

Moreover, this is also a war of technology - of combat power. The vast majority of Russia's modernized army is scrap metal on the steppes of Ukraine. That means these columns of attacking forces that are being immolated almost daily on the Avdiivka front are going into battle with ever more ineffective and easily destroyed equipment. So excluding casualties for a moment, I don't think many informed observers would argue that the combat capability correlation of forces hasn't gradually been tipping in Ukraine's favor for most of the war. Therefore, in modern warfare, attrition is as much about erosion of combat power as numbers of troops - in my view, far more so.

So, we come back to casualties. Again, in my view, I think casualty rate has become the latest, or perhaps last refuge of those who have been saying Ukraine can't win this war. There are more Russians, Putin will never quit, ergo Russia wins.

We will see. I believe Putin has lost the window to mobilize additional forces beyond the usual annual draft. If politically, that window ever existed. PRNK troops are not going to be deployed in their tens of thousands to Ukraine. The troops he does have are fighting with ever more inferior equipment than that of their adversaries. That is a formula that looks far more like 1917 than 1945 to me.

One of these two combatants will begin to lobby for a ceasefire and negotiations. Thus far, it clearly is not Ukraine.

Ukraine isn't actively calling for a ceasefire because Zelensky is controlled diplomatically by the West, and his physical security is at the mercy of the Right Sector/Azov types within his country.

Putin obviously plays up the "Ukraine is ran by Nazis" talking point, but since 2014 the crazies have had a lot of leeway inside that country. It's a bigger problem than the West wants to admit, and we don't have the ability to control them the way we did prior to Feb 2022.

 

[CoElkHunter]

Those are all absolutely valid points everyone is making (ok maybe not the likelihood of hordes of DRNK troops entering the fray). I would simply suggest that even operational-level positional warfare is not necessarily a war of attrition. Warfare, particularly since the dawn of the industrial age, rarely is just about numbers, it is about combat power.

As someone noted, the Confederacy was indeed dramatically outnumbered, and once Lincoln found a general willing to take the casualties to achieve ultimate victory, Grant wore down the Army of Northern Virginia in the Overland Campaign of 1864/65. But was that really attritional warfare?

I would argue it was something very different. Though Grant inflicted unsustainable casualties on Lee and suffered enormous ones himself, he did it through operational maneuver. The few occasions he forgot that, such as Cold Harbor and the first attacks at Petersburg, it was he who faced unsustainable casualties and very nearly had a mutiny on his hands among his subordinates.

Lee showed absolute brilliance in the handling of his army following the battle of the Wilderness until the end of the war. Historians have often argued over what may have happened had Lee taken the lessons of Sharpsburg to heart in 1862 and gone over to the operational defensive for the remainder of the war. That would have looked far more like what we see in Ukraine today than anything that actually happened during that war. Without a Gettysburg, I am confident most of historians would agree that the war at least would not have ended in 1865. I think most historians would also agree that sustaining support for the war beyond 1865 would have been very difficult if not impossible.

History offers us numbers of other examples where the operational defensive likely would have been or was the correct strategy. For instance, in the war of the Sixth Coalition the army of France was outnumbered by those of the UK, Russia, and their allies. I can think of very few students of the Napoleonic campaigns who believe Napoleon would have died anywhere but his bed in Paris had he not taken the Grand Army on its Quixotic march into the heart of Russia.

To date at least, following the catastrophe of the initial invasion of Ukraine, the Russian Army has shown little ability to operationally maneuver against Ukrainian forces. Perhaps one could point to the battle of Bahkmut, but I would argue we have not yet seen the final outcome of that campaign. Indeed, I would suggest they have shown no ability to even mass combat power operationally to achieve a decisive battle.

I also wonder about the actual casualty exchange rates in this conflict. The figures we are citing are those being publicly discussed by the US and British DOD and MOD respectively. They are therefore conservative. But what if one side or the other is half again higher, perhaps even 2X? I find it highly unlikely that would be the case of Ukraine, but because they continue to attempt the tactical offensive, I would not at all be surprised if Russia isn't actually approaching, even exceeding half a million.

For instance, as of yesterday, Ukraine claims to have killed 306,860 Russian troops. I think everyone would agree that number is inflated. We'll come back to it in a moment. The next question is what is the Russian WIA to KIA rate? For US forces in the European Theater of Operations in WWII it was roughly 3 to 1. I suspect those rates are closer to the campaign in Ukraine than modern US ratios which can be 10 to 1. Russian field medical capability in particular seem far closer to mid-twentieth century than twenty first century standards.

So let's cut Ukraine's claim by in half to 150,000. Assuming that 3 to 1 casualty ratio, that means Russia has already suffered 600K total casualties in this conflict. Even if their field medical services are far worse than we believe, a 2 to 1 casualty rate leaves us with 450,000 total casualties.

Moreover, this is also a war of technology - of combat power. The vast majority of Russia's modernized army is scrap metal on the steppes of Ukraine. That means these columns of attacking forces that are being immolated almost daily on the Avdiivka front are going into battle with ever more ineffective and easily destroyed equipment. So excluding casualties for a moment, I don't think many informed observers would argue that the combat capability correlation of forces hasn't gradually been tipping in Ukraine's favor for most of the war. Therefore, in modern warfare, attrition is as much about erosion of combat power as numbers of troops - in my view, far more so.

So, we come back to casualties. Again, in my view, I think casualty rate has become the latest, or perhaps last refuge of those who have been saying Ukraine can't win this war. There are more Russians, Putin will never quit, ergo Russia wins.

We will see. I believe Putin has lost the window to mobilize additional forces beyond the usual annual draft. If politically, that window ever existed. PRNK troops are not going to be deployed in their tens of thousands to Ukraine. The troops he does have are fighting with ever more inferior equipment than that of their adversaries. That is a formula that looks far more like 1917 than 1945 to me.

One of these two combatants will begin to lobby for a ceasefire and negotiations. Thus far, it clearly is not Ukraine.

I really LOVE your analysis of historic and current battles and insights into them. I personally, am a VERY AMATEUR aficionado of historic battles. I would argue that the Confederates could have won the battle of Gettysburg had they known the small number of Union troops defending Little Round Top. Thus, the Confederates stopped their advance there which would have divided the Union troops to the Confederates advantage. Poor intelligence. That, and Pickett's "foolish" charge and subsequent annihilation by Union troops instead of retreating and saving his troops to fight another day. By all accounts, Grant was an alcoholic. He left the Army before the Civil War started to work at his father's general store and started to drink heavily. He reenlisted after the war started and quickly advanced in rank due to his strategic brilliance and propensity to aggressively attack the enemy. Grant and McClellan both were great strategists, but Grant would attack the enemy when McClelland would "contemplate" his options for an attack. Lincoln subsequently replaced McClelland with Grant and the rest is history. George Patton and his army would attack and then attack again, even while "under gunned" with inferior tanks. Ukraine's military has attacked Russia over and over again even with the odds against them. Maybe attacking, even when retreating and undermanned and undergunned is beneficial to keep an overwhelmingly larger enemy off balance and maybe forcing them to retreat?

 

[Red Leg]

Ukraine isn't actively calling for a ceasefire because Zelensky is controlled diplomatically by the West, and his physical security is at the mercy of the Right Sector/Azov types within his country.

Putin obviously plays up the "Ukraine is ran by Nazis" talking point, but since 2014 the crazies have had a lot of leeway inside that country. It's a bigger problem than the West wants to admit, and we don't have the ability to control them the way we did prior to Feb 2022.

Based on everything i understand about this conflict and warfare generally, I believe that observation could not be more incorrect.

 

[Corey0372]

Based on everything i understand about this conflict and warfare generally, I believe that observation could not be more incorrect.

There were many units in Ukraine that the US and NATO were not allowed to provide training and equipment to from 2014-2022 because of ideology and alleged crimes committed in Donbas. This was a recurring issue not discussed much because it was an inconvenient truth about the situation. The crazies were useful to get rid of Yanukovych (right, wrong, or indifferent) the problem is.... they're crazy, and they don't just go away, and usually end up causing more problems in the long run. This was also the case with Timber Sycamore in Syria.

Azov tension with Zelensky......

"In 2019, during President Zelensky’s attempted implementation of the controversial “Steinmeier Formula”, which called for elections to be held in seperatist-held areas under Ukrainian legislation and with the supervision of the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe.[61] Part of that process required mutual disengagement of troops and armaments along frong lines in the Donbas, a move opposed by some veterans and volunteers who had fought.[62] A small number of volunteers and veterans refused to comply with the Regiment’s ordered withdrawal from the town of Zolote, perceiving it as a concession to the Russians. Biletsky threatened to mobilize further Azov veterans and National Corps activists.[63] Ultimately, Zelensky visited Zolote to attempt to resolve the crisis, resulting in verbal altercations with National Corps activists.[64]"

-https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/azov-battalion


Issues with funding to Azov and associated militias......

Congress bans arms to Ukraine militia linked to neo-Nazis

A little-noticed provision in the 2,232-page government spending bill passed last week bans U.S. arms from going to a controversial ultranationalist militia in Ukraine that has openly accepted neo-…

thehill.com

Yevhen Karas, leader of C14, which has deep ties with Ukr SBU, describing their ambitions and exploits in a Feb 2022 interview.....

 

[Corey0372]

Based on everything i understand about this conflict and warfare generally, I believe that observation could not be more incorrect.

Also just wanna be clear I'm not trying to pick a fight brother, and not a Russia shill, haha. I mostly just lurk in the politics thread and enjoy the various takes and outlooks. Cheers

 

[Red Leg]

There were many units in Ukraine that the US and NATO were not allowed to provide training and equipment to from 2014-2022 because of ideology and alleged crimes committed in Donbas. This was a recurring issue not discussed much because it was an inconvenient truth about the situation. The crazies were useful to get rid of Yanukovych (right, wrong, or indifferent) the problem is.... they're crazy, and they don't just go away, and usually end up causing more problems in the long run. This was also the case with Timber Sycamore in Syria.

Azov tension with Zelensky......

"In 2019, during President Zelensky’s attempted implementation of the controversial “Steinmeier Formula”, which called for elections to be held in seperatist-held areas under Ukrainian legislation and with the supervision of the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe.[61] Part of that process required mutual disengagement of troops and armaments along frong lines in the Donbas, a move opposed by some veterans and volunteers who had fought.[62] A small number of volunteers and veterans refused to comply with the Regiment’s ordered withdrawal from the town of Zolote, perceiving it as a concession to the Russians. Biletsky threatened to mobilize further Azov veterans and National Corps activists.[63] Ultimately, Zelensky visited Zolote to attempt to resolve the crisis, resulting in verbal altercations with National Corps activists.[64]"

-https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/azov-battalion


Issues with funding to Azov and associated militias......

Congress bans arms to Ukraine militia linked to neo-Nazis

A little-noticed provision in the 2,232-page government spending bill passed last week bans U.S. arms from going to a controversial ultranationalist militia in Ukraine that has openly accepted neo-…

thehill.com

Yevhen Karas, leader of C14, which has deep ties with Ukr SBU, describing their ambitions and exploits in a Feb 2022 interview.....

Allow me to elaborate.

Because I clearly do not fully understand what you are trying to say, or what that might have to do with Ukraine's decision to resist the Russian invasion, then I do not want to misrepresent your assertions.

But seriously, what you have posted has absolutely nothing to do with respect to Ukraine's continued resistance to the Russian Invasion. Certainly the "Asov" elements, to broadly paint Ukrainian nationalists, represent a challenge with respect to Western sensibilities, but they are not an issue as an element of military power to exploit against the Russians. Over a year ago, they were formally incorporated as a brigade into the Ukrainian Army. The defense of Mariupol, which essentially destroyed the Russian naval infantry as a combat force, bears mute witness to their combat value.

But to somehow assume those elements are somehow controlling Ukraine's decision to resist is in my opinion to be guilty of over analysis. I would suggest I am hardly alone in that conclusion.

 

[mark-hunter]

Again, Russia’s population is certainly an advantage and Ukraine will have trouble overcoming it, but in this day and age, I’m not convinced that it’s the same advantage it was in WWII. I’ve not seen the Russians be able to completely swamp Ukrainian forces with sheer numbers thus far.

That is because mass frontal assaults with infantry divisions running over plain open steppe, with fixed bayonets is history of ww2.

 

[Corey0372]

Allow me to elaborate.

Because I clearly do not fully understand what you are trying to say, or what that might have to do with Ukraine's decision to resist the Russian invasion, then I do not want to misrepresent your assertions.

But seriously, what you have posted has absolutely nothing to do with respect to Ukraine's continued resistance to the Russian Invasion. Certainly the "Asov" elements, to broadly paint Ukrainian nationalists, represent a challenge with respect to Western sensibilities, but they are not an issue as an element of military power to exploit against the Russians. Over a year ago, they were formally incorporated as a brigade into the Ukrainian Army. The defense of Mariupol, which essentially destroyed the Russian naval infantry as a combat force, bears mute witness to their combat value.

But to somehow assume those elements are somehow controlling Ukraine's decision to resist is in my opinion nonsensical. I would suggest I am hardly alone in that conclusion.

What I'm saying is that there are elements within the Ukrainian government who would be willing to kill Zelensky if he were to seriously attempt a ceasefire they didn't like or approve of. I understand the extremist factions aren't the bulwark of the Ukrainian Army, never were, but that doesn't mean they don't have a major role in the inner workings of decision making across the levers of power there.

 

[mark-hunter]

Over a year ago, they were formally incorporated as a brigade into the Ukrainian Army

It is also not unknown in history
We had similar units in Croatian war, wearing ww2 collaborationists insignia, with nazi salutes, black flags, uniforms, etc in early 90-ies. HOS.
By 93, they were incorporated under formal Croatian army units.

 

[Dragan N.]

Those are all absolutely valid points everyone is making (ok maybe not the likelihood of hordes of DRNK troops entering the fray). I would simply suggest that even operational-level positional warfare is not necessarily a war of attrition. Warfare, particularly since the dawn of the industrial age, rarely is just about numbers, it is about combat power.

As someone noted, the Confederacy was indeed dramatically outnumbered, and once Lincoln found a general willing to take the casualties to achieve ultimate victory, Grant wore down the Army of Northern Virginia in the Overland Campaign of 1864/65. But was that really attritional warfare?

I would argue it was something very different. Though Grant inflicted unsustainable casualties on Lee and suffered enormous ones himself, he did it through operational maneuver. The few occasions he forgot that, such as Cold Harbor and the first attacks at Petersburg, it was he who faced unsustainable casualties and very nearly had a mutiny on his hands among his subordinates.

Lee showed absolute brilliance in the handling of his army following the battle of the Wilderness until the end of the war. Historians have often argued over what may have happened had Lee taken the lessons of Sharpsburg to heart in 1862 and gone over to the operational defensive for the remainder of the war. That would have looked far more like what we see in Ukraine today than anything that actually happened during that war. Without a Gettysburg, I am confident most of historians would agree that the war at least would not have ended in 1865. I think most historians would also agree that sustaining support for the war beyond 1865 would have been very difficult if not impossible.

History offers us numbers of other examples where the operational defensive likely would have been or was the correct strategy. For instance, in the war of the Sixth Coalition the army of France was outnumbered by those of the UK, Russia, and their allies. I can think of very few students of the Napoleonic campaigns who believe Napoleon would have died anywhere but his bed in Paris had he not taken the Grand Army on its Quixotic march into the heart of Russia.

To date at least, following the catastrophe of the initial invasion of Ukraine, the Russian Army has shown little ability to operationally maneuver against Ukrainian forces. Perhaps one could point to the battle of Bahkmut, but I would argue we have not yet seen the final outcome of that campaign. Indeed, I would suggest they have shown no ability to even mass combat power operationally to achieve a decisive battle.

I also wonder about the actual casualty exchange rates in this conflict. The figures we are citing are those being publicly discussed by the US and British DOD and MOD respectively. They are therefore conservative. But what if one side or the other is half again higher, perhaps even 2X? I find it highly unlikely that would be the case of Ukraine, but because they continue to attempt the tactical offensive, I would not at all be surprised if Russia isn't actually approaching, even exceeding half a million.

For instance, as of yesterday, Ukraine claims to have killed 306,860 Russian troops. I think everyone would agree that number is inflated. We'll come back to it in a moment. The next question is what is the Russian WIA to KIA rate? For US forces in the European Theater of Operations in WWII it was roughly 3 to 1. I suspect those rates are closer to the campaign in Ukraine than modern US ratios which can be 10 to 1. Russian field medical capability in particular seem far closer to mid-twentieth century than twenty first century standards.

So let's cut Ukraine's claim by in half to 150,000. Assuming that 3 to 1 casualty ratio, that means Russia has already suffered 600K total casualties in this conflict. Even if their field medical services are far worse than we believe, a 2 to 1 casualty rate leaves us with 450,000 total casualties.

Moreover, this is also a war of technology - of combat power. The vast majority of Russia's modernized army is scrap metal on the steppes of Ukraine. That means these columns of attacking forces that are being immolated almost daily on the Avdiivka front are going into battle with ever more ineffective and easily destroyed equipment. So excluding casualties for a moment, I don't think many informed observers would argue that the combat capability correlation of forces hasn't gradually been tipping in Ukraine's favor for most of the war. Therefore, in modern warfare, attrition is as much about erosion of combat power as numbers of troops - in my view, far more so.

So, we come back to casualties. Again, in my view, I think casualty rate has become the latest, or perhaps last refuge of those who have been saying Ukraine can't win this war. There are more Russians, Putin will never quit, ergo Russia wins.

We will see. I believe Putin has lost the window to mobilize additional forces beyond the usual annual draft. If politically, that window ever existed. PRNK troops are not going to be deployed in their tens of thousands to Ukraine. The troops he does have are fighting with ever more inferior equipment than that of their adversaries. That is a formula that looks far more like 1917 than 1945 to me.

One of these two combatants will begin to lobby for a ceasefire and negotiations. Thus far, it clearly is not Ukraine.

I am curious in your estimation how many casualties has Ukraine suffered in this conflict ?

Obviously firepower matters but I would imagine that you also need people to use said firepower. Several of these articles talk about critical manpower shortages in the Ukrainian army. There also appears to be a fracturing between Zelensky and his top military brass. Something must be going on to cause this. In my opinion this hints at the presence of major problems but we shall see.

I would argue from a layman's perspective that drones and artillery have been the two most important weapon's systems in this conflict. Russia's ability to domestically produce both is greater than Ukraine's. This is also part of the "attritional" aspect of this conflict.

Defensively I would say the Surovikin line has held up fairly well. Ukraine failed to make any significant breach this summer. Even using its western tech. I would imagine this is why Zaluzhny stated that the war had reached a stalemate. Neither side is able to make any significant gains at this point. It will now depend which side can wear the other out or gain some decisive technological advantage, I cannot see what that would be.

When I first read claims about the prospect of NK soldiers being used by Russia I thought it was kind of ludicrous. But given that Russia has in recent months become increasingly desperate for men or "meat" and that they are now utilizing NK artillery and have significantly expanded ties with NK I could actually see something like this happening-although I think the possibility of this is quite remote... I also think Putin would be less inclined to agree to this than Kim would be.

However, there is an unknown number of NK laborers working across the remote parts of the Russian far east. All North Korean men have military training. I assume a large number of them have also learned some Russian. I could see them being shipped to the front line. Russia has also been pressing illegal migrants from central Asia into its army in recent months.

After seeing the entire Canadian parliament give a standing ovation to a SS veteran, who described 1941-43 as being the best years of his life, nothing would surprise me anymore.

With all that being said I'd be willing to wager a bet with you that Ukraine will be the first to blink in this conflict...

 

[Corey0372]

It is also not unknown in history
We had similar units in Croatian war, wearing ww2 collaborationists insignia, with nazi salutes, black flags, uniforms, etc in early 90-ies. HOS.
By 93, they were incorporated under formal Croatian army units.

And the US also supported the KLA in the 90s, another controversial organization with some serious issues.

 

[Tanks]

…

With all that being said I'd be willing to wager a bet with you that Ukraine will be the first to blink in this conflict...

If this becomes a war of attrition and support from the USA dries up due to politics at home it will depend on whether Europe will keep on investing in Ukraine.

 

[VertigoBE]

If this becomes a war of attrition and support from the USA dries up due to politics at home it will depend on whether Europe will keep on investing in Ukraine.

“Will keep on investing” and possibly “Can keep on investing”

 

[375 Ruger Fan]

UK and Poland sign £4bn air defence system deal​

The UK and Poland defence industries have signed a deal worth £4bn to continue the next stage of Poland’s future air defence programme.
UK firm MBDA has signed a sub-contract with Polish defence company PGZ, in a programme that will provide Polish forces with an enhanced ground-based air defence system capable of launching missiles to engage air threats.
This includes cruise missiles and fighter jets, at ranges of more than 40 kilometres. The deal will create more than 1,000 Common Anti-Air Modular Missiles – Extended Range (CAMM-ER) and over 100 iLaunchers.
Grant Shapps, the defence secretary, said: “This is another crucial step forward for our historic defence ties with Poland, supplying next generation air defence capabilities to act as a clear deterrent to our adversaries.
“We continue to fully back our thriving UK defence industry, and this landmark export deal is yet another example of the huge potential our collective defence sectors boast.”
The Ministry of Defence says the deal “will bolster European security in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.”
Chris Allam, managing director of MBDA UK, said: “The scale and ambition of NAREW is truly impressive – building a Polish air defence shield using our CAMM family missiles and iLaunchers that will protect the entirety of Poland’s skies.
“The transfer of technology in NAREW will be transformative for Poland’s sovereign complex weapons capabilities, and we are deeply proud of the trust placed in us by Poland and excited for the future of our partnership with PGZ.”