Politics

the problem with dialogue, particularly when it involves facts and logic is that the conclusions may not agree with the ideology. As I've noted elsewhere there are those that PRODUCE and those that PREVENT. In the perfect world very little would need to be prevented so all efforts could be directed at producing. This is the world that the various left wing groups dream about and try to implement. So they promote strategies such as Defund the Police and Cutback the Military, the two primary preventers in the Free World. IF there was nothing causing problems that needed to be prevented, then funding of preventers could be curtailed. But it doesn't work the other way around- that is just because the police and military are defunded it doesn't follow that the causes of the needs to prevent will cease. Even changing the law so that it isn't against the law to rob someone doesn't make it any more pleasant for the person having his/her property removed.
 
Way cool.

However, instead of showing the actual aircraft as the hangar doors opened, I think strategically placed landing gear only would have drained the blood from the faces of Defense Ministers everywhere. Let them think that when we say “cloaked”, by God we mean “cloaked”. :cool:
 
My Dad was a managing engineer for Avco Aerospace in Nashville right after he retired from the Marines back in the late 70s. They had the contract to build the B2 wings. That was a fascinating process, milling huge billets of aluminum with a water jet. Really cool to see the next generation coming out.
 
In defense of the defense industry.

For most of my lifetime, one of the undebatable beliefs of the left was with respect to the inherent evils of the the US military and its partner in international crime - the defense industry. It was given the attributes of a colossal, single minded entity capable of leading the nation into war for its own gain. No one ever produced any actual evidence of that, but from the late sixties, the left believed it with the sort of fervor they now reserve for climate change and pronouns.

The catalyst, of course, was the Vietnam War coupled with a belief on the left that the fine over enthusiastic socialist fellow travelers in the Soviet Union weren't really the threat the right claimed they represented. The very success of deterrence was touted as the reason it wasn't needed - a circular argument often aimed at NATO as well.

Following that war, the American military and the industry that served it entered a period reassessment on the one hand and economic driven reorganization and consolidation on the other. Fortunately, as the decade came to an end, a post-Vietnam generation of leaders began to exercise authority and vision in the services. An all volunteer force introduced a level of professionalism only dreamed of in previous decades (and somewhat contrary to American faith in its citizen army). That quiet revolution was quickly allied with an equally visionary new administration determined to fully reconstitute a post Vietnam American military.

For all too brief a period, during the Reagan administration, we had a President, with a very capable set of advisors who understood the value an unassailable deterrent meant to the general welfare of the United States and its allies. Reagan did the sort of modernization of the American armed forces that Donald Trump largely talked about. The left continued to undermine that effort where possible, but unlike today, defense initiatives gained the support of moderate democrats as well as the Republican party.

Sometimes we forget that modernization wasn't simply a series of defense appropriations, but was the work of the hundreds of thousands of dedicated citizen patriots who, working with the services, developed that war winning materiel. The Army was in particularly bad shape. New programs such as the M1 Abrams, the M2 Bradley, the AH 64 Apache, and the UH 60 Blackhawk still form the backbone of the force four decades later. A discussion for later.

Thankfully, that military establishment never had to demonstrate its capabilities against the Red Army. Though during the First Gulf War, which was in large measure the last hurrah of that Cold War military structure, it showed its technical and professional overmatch of the Russian equipped and trained Iraqi Army.

The ensuing search for a post-Soviet "peace dividend" saw a significant slashing or lengthening of many programs. A classic example of the effect this can have on price was Northrop's B2 bomber. Originally. conceived against a 200+ fleet requirement, only 20 were built during the nearly two decades it took for Northrop to get a final production configuration from the Air Force. Needless to say technology exploded over that period causing continuous changes to the eventual aircraft and dramatic increases in the scope of the contract - both resulted in further extensions and delays. Yes, it is a nearly two billion dollar bomber when purchased 10 years later than planed with one tenth the number of aircraft. Interestingly, Northrop Grumman and the Air Force rolled out the first prototype of its successor, the B-21 Raider yesterday after a relatively short development begun with contract award in 2015. There will be a hundred - it is undetectable and can penetrate any airspace on the planet - with or without a crew.

Dozens of other programs went through similar cost growth and requirement creep and subsequent delays in or cancelation of actual production or acquisition.

Unlike the mythical monolithic warmongering beast feared by the left, the defense corporations are, like every other publicly traded company, owned by the shareholders. Rather than worrying about starting wars, business leaders were worried about quarterly earnings, acquisitions (contract awards), program performance, and backlog. Preserving programs - awarded contracts - became a critical function in a world of shrinking (in real terms) defense dollars.

As the post-Reagan and Soviet era dawned, domestic initiatives of every type demanded their share of the peace dividend. Protection of existing programs and the few new modernization efforts on the horizon became a key component of every defense company's strategy. Many failed and consolidation of the sector followed. The surviving corporations invested in congressional engagement teams. Those specialists briefed staffers and members on programs, offered assessments of acquisition plans, and contributed legally to the campaigns of both parties - No one walked the halls of Congress with bags of cash or advocated for war. Rather, the industry behaved exactly like every other large publicly owned production sector in the country.

This era of survival ended abruptly with 9-11, though the two decades it ushered in were also very different from the Cold War. The planning and leadership of the Al Qaeda terrorist network was located in Afghanistan. The Clinton administration had made a desultory strike at its infrastructure with cruise missiles in August of 1998. True destruction of the network and training bases following the attack on the World Trade Center and Pentagon would necessitate a physical incursion by US ground forces. There was little debate with the regard of the necessity of that operation on either side of the aisle.

However, a curious new force had emerged with the new century, and gained tremendous traction within the Bush administration. Now termed Neo-Cons, this new group of domestic conservatives but international activists seemed to embrace all the wrong lessons from Vietnam. The notion of nation building and the lure of preemptive war seemed apparently irresistible. The invasion of Iraq, which very few in the military understood, was initiated for dubious reasons at best and nothing to do with 9-11. Both it and Afghanistan became quagmires as military objectives were abandoned for ever more nebulous political goals.

Interestingly, for the Defense industry as a whole, it became a period of great uncertainty. Yes, ammunition manufacturers like ATK did well, and General Dynamics and BAE had steady business repairing and modifying tanks and armored fighting vehicles. But much of the budget was used operationally for huge quick fix acquisitions like MRAP vehicles to protect against IEDs and for non-standard light armored vehicles provided to both countries. Except for the Air Force / Navy fighter programs (F-22 and F-35) and the new Virginia class submarine, major new programs languished. As I noted earlier, the Army is still operating 40 year old platforms. The average AH-64 is older than the Lieutenant Colonel commanding the unit, much less the young warrant officers piloting most of them. The point being, it was hardly an environment that the major defense companies would have wished for even if they had the power envisioned by Robert Kennedy, George McGovern, or their long-haired FM loving acolytes.

As they had under Clinton, the major industry players used their Congressional outreach efforts to try to protect programs, particularly as defense oversight shifted to the Obama administration. Major players like Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman shifted more and more of their efforts to space - military, intel, and NASA.

The emergence of the Trump movement, brought a new political force to the table that had been largely quiescent since 1941. The "America First" movement, originally perceived as simply having the laudable goal of pursuing national interests, gradually morphed into a isolationist movement that seems to find no national interests anywhere beyond the nation's shores. Interestingly, this was not a foreign policy which Trump actually followed, but has emerged subsequent to his administration. It is also somewhat humorous that the isolationists, representing the farther right edges of the conservative movement, have now taken up the mantel of opposition to the perceived evils of American military and defense corporate leadership - replacing their alter egos in the radical left.

Fortunately for the country, both the American military and the defense industry that supports it continue to soldier on, producing the most lethal and effective armaments of any nation on the planet. The success of both continue to fuel the arguments against their need. Like the title character in Kipling's poem "Tommy" both tend to be despised or criticized by all too many until they are needed.

A last comment about the defense industry hiring people out of the military - the supposedly evil revolving door. Software, hardware, and systems engineers are easy to find. So are accountants, business managers, and HR mavens. But the products the defense industry builds require specialized knowledge as well. The latest communications idea, fighting vehicle, helmet, or death ray is useless unless it is created with a full understanding how it will be used in the field. The cockpit design for an attack helicopter or fighter is somewhat different than a commercial airliner. Experienced, former soldiers, airmen, and naval personal are a key component to insure the quality of those designs.

Additionally, former NCOs and officers have tremendous leadership and to use a civilian term, managerial, skills and experience. They understand schedule and budget, and they can execute to a mission statement. Placed in a competitive corporate environment, many prosper and competently take the reins of various businesses in the larger corporate organization. This is a win for the company, for its shareholders and the customer.

Still other senior retirees become consultants. Well duh. If I am a business leader preparing a five volume highly competitive proposal valued at $350-500 million, then I would be not merely foolish but failing in my responsibilities to my shareholders not to avail myself of whatever expertise is available to put my proposal in the best light. This is not some evil collusion, but rather perfectly legal business 101 and is exercised in every other form of competitive corporate competition.

I would suggest that the defense industry and the customers it serves will be around for as long as we are a world power. For all its waste, most politically rather than performance driven, it is providing the American military with finest combat tools on the planet. We have barely lifted the corner of the blanket in Ukraine. The people who work for that industry have a strong belief in the value of their efforts, the quality of their products, and a love for the country for which those products are produced. Their loudest critics are inevitably those who seem to know the least about them or their businesses.
While I understand what you're trying to say, I disagree with a couple of your points. The first is a major disagreement, the second somewhat minor.

You state: "The catalyst, of course, was the Vietnam War coupled with a belief on the left that the fine over enthusiastic socialist fellow travelers in the Soviet Union weren't really the threat the right claimed they represented. The very success of deterrence was touted as the reason it wasn't needed - a circular argument often aimed at NATO as well."

I think it's somewhat more insidious than that. Eisenhower laid out quite concisely why we built the system we did (c.f. my previous posts). He was right. The fellow travelers knew that. Those who really wanted the Soviet system really knew that. Step one in breaking the most effective system to halt the Soviet system is to break it by mis-characterizing it, and therefore de-legitimizing it. Their "illogical logic" or touting the success of deterrence as being the reason it wasn't needed wasn't a bug, it was a feature. If you can get people to believe that, then the whole foundation falls. That was the intent. What should grab everyone's attention is the similarity to the "defund the police" mentality. It's not that they don't realize that crime will increase if they do. They actually want that... to the point that people will begin to demand action, at which point the "old guard' of the police officers we know today will have little interest in going back to the job, so they will have the opportunity to hire their own version of the SA. Every authoritarian system has used this method. In the case of the US, it has just taken longer.

I have a minor disagreement with your reasons for former military staying in "the complex". It's not really a disagreement, it's more of a case of "you forgot something". While it's true that some companies will jump at the chance to hire people with a mission-focused background, this desire only goes so far. They will jump to get departing Lieutenants, Captains, Lieutenant Commanders and Majors, because they believe them "young enough" to take their mission-focused background, but "educate" them to their corporate philosophy. More senior officers, on the other hand, are not nearly as welcomed. I have had corporate recruiters advise not to put the word "Colonel" anywhere on a resume. It is thought that the Colonels are too "set in their ways" to get on board with new systems. Sure, they are missing out on some great individuals, and this is a broad generalization, but I assure you, there is truth behind it.

Finally, there's one more point I think you missed (I guess that's a third disagreement?). You stated: "The invasion of Iraq, which very few in the military understood...". While few may have understood, I think that is because they did not understand the impact that Operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch had on Operation Anaconda, they still refuse to see the limitations of a theater JFACC, and they don't know how to read a TPFDD. If they could honestly do those three things, it would make a little more sense.

That helps explain 2003, but the inability of DoS to work with DoD caused the problems from 2003 to today... and that will remain a mystery for all time.
 
Finally, there's one more point I think you missed (I guess that's a third disagreement?). You stated: "The invasion of Iraq, which very few in the military understood...". While few may have understood, I think that is because they did not understand the impact that Operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch had on Operation Anaconda, they still refuse to see the limitations of a theater JFACC, and they don't know how to read a TPFDD. If they could honestly do those three things, it would make a little more sense.
You have made some valuable points that are worth considering. I was understanding your points until this paragraph. If you would be so kind as to provide some elaboration and description of the terms you used, it would be greatly appreciated. In return I can help explain 2 tech, eye-shades, MTER, and banjo coverage. Thank you for your original post.
 
In America, Kevin, we refer to these folks as $h!1 disturbers. Not sure how that term translates into proper English, but there it is. I have ignored him and will proceed with life as if I had never encountered his posts. I will continue to follow the politics thread as before, but will focus more on the safari-related threads. I’m headed to Limpopo in June with Jaco of Kwalata fame. His new area in the Waterburg. I can’t wait! Life is so much more than politics and too short to waste arguing.
Good luck on that hunt Doug, i traveled through the northern foothills a while back, it looks to be good bush, feels right.
 
While I understand what you're trying to say, I disagree with a couple of your points. The first is a major disagreement, the second somewhat minor.

You state: "The catalyst, of course, was the Vietnam War coupled with a belief on the left that the fine over enthusiastic socialist fellow travelers in the Soviet Union weren't really the threat the right claimed they represented. The very success of deterrence was touted as the reason it wasn't needed - a circular argument often aimed at NATO as well."

I think it's somewhat more insidious than that. Eisenhower laid out quite concisely why we built the system we did (c.f. my previous posts). He was right. The fellow travelers knew that. Those who really wanted the Soviet system really knew that. Step one in breaking the most effective system to halt the Soviet system is to break it by mis-characterizing it, and therefore de-legitimizing it. Their "illogical logic" or touting the success of deterrence as being the reason it wasn't needed wasn't a bug, it was a feature. If you can get people to believe that, then the whole foundation falls. That was the intent. What should grab everyone's attention is the similarity to the "defund the police" mentality. It's not that they don't realize that crime will increase if they do. They actually want that... to the point that people will begin to demand action, at which point the "old guard' of the police officers we know today will have little interest in going back to the job, so they will have the opportunity to hire their own version of the SA. Every authoritarian system has used this method. In the case of the US, it has just taken longer.

I have a minor disagreement with your reasons for former military staying in "the complex". It's not really a disagreement, it's more of a case of "you forgot something". While it's true that some companies will jump at the chance to hire people with a mission-focused background, this desire only goes so far. They will jump to get departing Lieutenants, Captains, Lieutenant Commanders and Majors, because they believe them "young enough" to take their mission-focused background, but "educate" them to their corporate philosophy. More senior officers, on the other hand, are not nearly as welcomed. I have had corporate recruiters advise not to put the word "Colonel" anywhere on a resume. It is thought that the Colonels are too "set in their ways" to get on board with new systems. Sure, they are missing out on some great individuals, and this is a broad generalization, but I assure you, there is truth behind it.

Finally, there's one more point I think you missed (I guess that's a third disagreement?). You stated: "The invasion of Iraq, which very few in the military understood...". While few may have understood, I think that is because they did not understand the impact that Operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch had on Operation Anaconda, they still refuse to see the limitations of a theater JFACC, and they don't know how to read a TPFDD. If they could honestly do those three things, it would make a little more sense.

That helps explain 2003, but the inability of DoS to work with DoD caused the problems from 2003 to today... and that will remain a mystery for all time.
Thanks for the reply. I actually don't disagree with you. But when one is writing in an attempt to cover 50 years of history a few broad strokes are required to keep it a post rather than a dissertation. ;) Also, the thrust was the defense industry and not a broader analysis of the competing Cold War doctrines.

But yes, the Soviet Union employed a broad range of strategies and tactics to undermine US commitment to its allies, commitment to its ongoing struggle against the communist revolutionary movements, and commitment to its own defense. One of the attributes of that effort was to undermine the need to invest in deterrence. Nothing had ever happened, therefore nothing ever would. I would also heartily agree that many of the same tactics are being used by the left today to undermine basic institutions of the country, whether the police or the courts or free speech.

What I find curious however, from a commitment to a strong defense sector perspective, is the presumably unwitting alliance currently being formed between right and the left. You can find numerous comments in this thread, and clearly not written by a BLM supporter, speaking with absolute assurance about the evil alliance between senior military members and leaders of the defense industry to wage and sustain wars. It is equally nonsensical whether coming from the mouth of a left or right wing nut, but it is a new dynamic.

My father, a fairly gifted historian, noted that left and right were actually poor ways to describe the political landscape. To his mind, a circle was far more accurate. The farther one moved away from center the closer the extremes began to mirror themselves. It is one way to explain a Stalin and a Hitler.

I could also write a fairly lengthy and very informed piece on defense industry hiring practices. Above, I simply tried to separate the target groups generally which you have done more specifically. My only comment to your observations is that different corporations have different cultures with respect to such hires. There are also colonels and there are colonels. In fact one of the prize targets in the industry is the young colonel or brigadier retiring early. Typically having 15-20 years of runway, these hires often can often represent uniquely experienced profit and loss side leadership not just customer insight - assuming he or she can be taught the meaning of profit.

I am confused by your third point. This is again moving beyond the thrust of my original post, but it is fascinating topic with which I was professionally involved at the time. The decision to invade Iraq was not one that the vast majority of senior joint leadership approved. The army was particularly critical of the plan which resulted in an unusual public schism between Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz on one side and Tom White and Rick Shinseki on the other. Those with significant Middle East experience felt it was not merely a perplexing decision but a mistake, with the administration undervaluing Iraq's countervailing influence over Iran regardless of its government. Wolfowitz in particular, had convinced himself (with lots of help from Israel) that the Iraqi people would welcome US forces with open arms. Old Middle East hands knew the Iraqi Shia at the least would be determined to collect a blood debt.

At the conclusion of the First Gulf War the Bush administration encouraged the Shia to revolt. They did, and then US forces stayed behind the ceasefire line and simply watched as the remnants of the Republican Guard brutally brought it to an end. It is a debt upon which we would pay installments for a very long time.

Finally, as you correctly note, the real battle between State and DOD occurred with respect to the occupation. Rumsfeld was determined to retain control of the effort in Iraq indefinitely. The fact that not a single member of the civilian leadership in DOD had any real Arab experience was irrelevant and purely secondary to winning the intramural battle with Powell and Armitage, both of whom had broad Middle East experience. The President sided with Rumsfeld directly leading to the appointment of L. Paul Bremer III - one of the most singularly unprepared choices imaginable. We are still dealing with the residue of his legacy.
 
Trump responding to the Musk revelations. Look, I don't like the way social media shaped the election, but this is a bit over the top. I'll allow that the first paragraph reads like TRUMP being TRUMP. The second, however, from my perspective and I suspect most Republicans, much less the rest of the country, sounds batshit crazy.

While it may have the hard core of his base cheering, all this does is provide enormous ammunition to those who oppose him, and increase the doubts of those still making up their minds.

I also wonder which "Founder" was the great one? :unsure:

"So, with the revelation of MASSIVE & WIDESPREAD FRAUD & DECEPTION in working closely with Big Tech Companies, the DNC, & the Democrat Party, do you throw the Presidential Election Results of 2020 OUT and declare the RIGHTFUL WINNER, or do you have a NEW ELECTION?"

"A Massive Fraud of this type and magnitude allows for the termination of all rules, regulations, and articles, even those found in the Constitution,

Our great 'Founder' did not want, and would not condone, False & Fraudulent Elections!"
 
Trump responding to the Musk revelations. Look, I don't like the way social media shaped the election, but this is a bit over the top. I'll allow that the first paragraph reads like TRUMP being TRUMP. The second, however, from my perspective and I suspect most Republicans, much less the rest of the country, sounds batshit crazy.

While it may have the hard core of his base cheering, all this does is provide enormous ammunition to those who oppose him, and increase the doubts of those still making up their minds.

I also wonder which "Founder" was the great one? :unsure:

"So, with the revelation of MASSIVE & WIDESPREAD FRAUD & DECEPTION in working closely with Big Tech Companies, the DNC, & the Democrat Party, do you throw the Presidential Election Results of 2020 OUT and declare the RIGHTFUL WINNER, or do you have a NEW ELECTION?"

"A Massive Fraud of this type and magnitude allows for the termination of all rules, regulations, and articles, even those found in the Constitution,

Our great 'Founder' did not want, and would not condone, False & Fraudulent Elections!
Im afraid this is all we can expect from the man.
 
You have made some valuable points that are worth considering. I was understanding your points until this paragraph. If you would be so kind as to provide some elaboration and description of the terms you used, it would be greatly appreciated. In return I can help explain 2 tech, eye-shades, MTER, and banjo coverage. Thank you for your original post.
OK I'm walking a real fine line between trying to be helpful and requiring a pre-publication review, but here goes:

Remember the state of the world in 2002. While we were chasing a specific individual through the Hindu Kush, we were also still flying (11 years later) Operations Northern Watch (ONW) and Southern Watch (OSW), which were enforcing the no-fly zones over Iraq. This was a legacy of Desert Storm.

Operation Anaconda took place high in the mountains. Not a Good Day to Die, by Sean Naylor (Penguin, 2005) tells the tale well. One of the notable points is that the Land Forces did not take their organic fires capability (mortars are really heavy, and more so in the mountains), but also did not coordinate well with air forces.

The JFACC is the Joint Force Air Component Command. A theater JFACC controls all air forces within the combatant command (in this case, US Central Command, or CENTCOM). Hence, one guy (actually, one staff) had to juggle the air capabilities over ONW, OSW, and support all of Afghanistan. As you can imagine, determining the priority between the three (and everything else) tends to stretch things a bit thin. Additionally, an Air Tasking Order (ATO) is set for 72 hours. It's really hard to change things once you're in that 72 hour cycle. This was apparent when Anaconda needed fires for which they had not planned, and not in the ATO. Also (open source, refer to Not a Good Day to Die) the on call fires available in the ATO were not sufficient for the battle they encountered. Forcing coordination with forces on the Saudi peninsula (and we don't exactly have overflight rights with Iran, do we?) added unnecessary complications. People who wear blue will tell (and have told) me I'm wrong, but I really think theater JFACCs are a bad idea. They like centralized command/centralized control, but I'm much more of a centralized command/decentralized control type.

So at the Operational Level of War, you are faced with balancing the triangle of time, space, and forces available. This forces a choice at the Strategic Level. Do you abandon ONW and OSW in order to generate forces (and in a very real sense, admit defeat), or do you resolve the problem forcing you to dedicate forces for ONW and OSW by removing the requirement? RedLeg points out well those who disagreed, but Secretary Rumsfeld's argument won the day.

As an aside, my disagreements with the Secretary are well known, and will not be repeated here. I still haven't forgiven him for many of what I consider his misjudgments, which we are still living with today. But that said, he was indisputably correct when he said that you go to war with the army you have, not the army you wish you had. That's a reality that can never be forgotten, especially when you are discussing force reductions. The other reality is the enemy gets a vote.

A TPFDD is a database that (in simple terms) outlines Time-Phased Force Deployment Data. At a very broad brush level, it tells you the forces you have available, and how you will sequence them in. It includes when you need to get them to a port in order to reach their destination at a given time. In this specific case (early 2003), a look at the TPFDD will quickly point out that the aviation forces available for Operation Iraqi Freedom included a lot of the forces already dedicated to ONW/OSW. If they weren't in that mix, they were either just returned from that mix, or working up to go to that mix. Not a lot left available for other things. That Peace Dividend was really paying off, wasn't it?

Yes, yes, yes, there were discussions and disagreements at very high levels. A decision was made. What's interesting is no one really likes to talk about the first 90 days or so after the "march up" dust had settled. There are books written and yet to be written about the disagreements between Secretary Rumsfeld and Secretary Powell. Of note, "breaking things" is a DoD function, but the Secretary was very insistent that "building things" (i.e. nations) was his department. His fellow secretary wanted to redeploy and move to the next task. Unfortunately, the "building things" selection was (as RedLeg pointed out) improvident at best. And did no one look at a map and notice a specific country now had Great Satan forces deployed on both its east and its west? It took them 90 to 180 days, but then they started to play some of their cards. Seems like the overall policy was focused on Step 1, which it did well, but did not plan for Steps 2, 3, 4,...n. Oops. Somebody didn't read their Clausewitz very well...

At the same time, the unity generated by fear from the September two years earlier was fading... mostly because the policies put in place afterwards had successful effects. I won't blame a party, but I won't forgive certain individuals for putting their quest for power in front of what was really needed. Once upon a time, stating "I voted for that, before I voted against it" would be considered a point against judgement, not a request for a vote.

This is my personal opinion. Others have different opinions, but I was part of that game, I played an important role in it, and I saw a lot of it first hand. Other parts, I saw second, third, and fourth hands. In my view, the original decision to go was both necessary and defensible. I fault many senior people for the follow on decisions after that. Standard disclaimer: "Please understand that the above is my personal opinion, and is not the opinion of the US DoD, USCENTCOM, the Department of the Navy, etc., etc., etc.
 
OK I'm walking a real fine line between trying to be helpful and requiring a pre-publication review, but here goes:

Remember the state of the world in 2002. While we were chasing a specific individual through the Hindu Kush, we were also still flying (11 years later) Operations Northern Watch (ONW) and Southern Watch (OSW), which were enforcing the no-fly zones over Iraq. This was a legacy of Desert Storm.

Operation Anaconda took place high in the mountains. Not a Good Day to Die, by Sean Naylor (Penguin, 2005) tells the tale well. One of the notable points is that the Land Forces did not take their organic fires capability (mortars are really heavy, and more so in the mountains), but also did not coordinate well with air forces.

The JFACC is the Joint Force Air Component Command. A theater JFACC controls all air forces within the combatant command (in this case, US Central Command, or CENTCOM). Hence, one guy (actually, one staff) had to juggle the air capabilities over ONW, OSW, and support all of Afghanistan. As you can imagine, determining the priority between the three (and everything else) tends to stretch things a bit thin. Additionally, an Air Tasking Order (ATO) is set for 72 hours. It's really hard to change things once you're in that 72 hour cycle. This was apparent when Anaconda needed fires for which they had not planned, and not in the ATO. Also (open source, refer to Not a Good Day to Die) the on call fires available in the ATO were not sufficient for the battle they encountered. Forcing coordination with forces on the Saudi peninsula (and we don't exactly have overflight rights with Iran, do we?) added unnecessary complications. People who wear blue will tell (and have told) me I'm wrong, but I really think theater JFACCs are a bad idea. They like centralized command/centralized control, but I'm much more of a centralized command/decentralized control type.

So at the Operational Level of War, you are faced with balancing the triangle of time, space, and forces available. This forces a choice at the Strategic Level. Do you abandon ONW and OSW in order to generate forces (and in a very real sense, admit defeat), or do you resolve the problem forcing you to dedicate forces for ONW and OSW by removing the requirement? RedLeg points out well those who disagreed, but Secretary Rumsfeld's argument won the day.

As an aside, my disagreements with the Secretary are well known, and will not be repeated here. I still haven't forgiven him for many of what I consider his misjudgments, which we are still living with today. But that said, he was indisputably correct when he said that you go to war with the army you have, not the army you wish you had. That's a reality that can never be forgotten, especially when you are discussing force reductions. The other reality is the enemy gets a vote.

A TPFDD is a database that (in simple terms) outlines Time-Phased Force Deployment Data. At a very broad brush level, it tells you the forces you have available, and how you will sequence them in. It includes when you need to get them to a port in order to reach their destination at a given time. In this specific case (early 2003), a look at the TPFDD will quickly point out that the aviation forces available for Operation Iraqi Freedom included a lot of the forces already dedicated to ONW/OSW. If they weren't in that mix, they were either just returned from that mix, or working up to go to that mix. Not a lot left available for other things. That Peace Dividend was really paying off, wasn't it?

Yes, yes, yes, there were discussions and disagreements at very high levels. A decision was made. What's interesting is no one really likes to talk about the first 90 days or so after the "march up" dust had settled. There are books written and yet to be written about the disagreements between Secretary Rumsfeld and Secretary Powell. Of note, "breaking things" is a DoD function, but the Secretary was very insistent that "building things" (i.e. nations) was his department. His fellow secretary wanted to redeploy and move to the next task. Unfortunately, the "building things" selection was (as RedLeg pointed out) improvident at best. And did no one look at a map and notice a specific country now had Great Satan forces deployed on both its east and its west? It took them 90 to 180 days, but then they started to play some of their cards. Seems like the overall policy was focused on Step 1, which it did well, but did not plan for Steps 2, 3, 4,...n. Oops. Somebody didn't read their Clausewitz very well...

At the same time, the unity generated by fear from the September two years earlier was fading... mostly because the policies put in place afterwards had successful effects. I won't blame a party, but I won't forgive certain individuals for putting their quest for power in front of what was really needed. Once upon a time, stating "I voted for that, before I voted against it" would be considered a point against judgement, not a request for a vote.

This is my personal opinion. Others have different opinions, but I was part of that game, I played an important role in it, and I saw a lot of it first hand. Other parts, I saw second, third, and fourth hands. In my view, the original decision to go was both necessary and defensible. I fault many senior people for the follow on decisions after that. Standard disclaimer: "Please understand that the above is my personal opinion, and is not the opinion of the US DoD, USCENTCOM, the Department of the Navy, etc., etc., etc.
Wow! Ok, now I understand what you are talking about. Besides buying you a beer, I probably need to get you a new key board. Thank you for the great effort in explaining.(y)
 
OK I'm walking a real fine line between trying to be helpful and requiring a pre-publication review, but here goes:

Remember the state of the world in 2002. While we were chasing a specific individual through the Hindu Kush, we were also still flying (11 years later) Operations Northern Watch (ONW) and Southern Watch (OSW), which were enforcing the no-fly zones over Iraq. This was a legacy of Desert Storm.

Operation Anaconda took place high in the mountains. Not a Good Day to Die, by Sean Naylor (Penguin, 2005) tells the tale well. One of the notable points is that the Land Forces did not take their organic fires capability (mortars are really heavy, and more so in the mountains), but also did not coordinate well with air forces.

The JFACC is the Joint Force Air Component Command. A theater JFACC controls all air forces within the combatant command (in this case, US Central Command, or CENTCOM). Hence, one guy (actually, one staff) had to juggle the air capabilities over ONW, OSW, and support all of Afghanistan. As you can imagine, determining the priority between the three (and everything else) tends to stretch things a bit thin. Additionally, an Air Tasking Order (ATO) is set for 72 hours. It's really hard to change things once you're in that 72 hour cycle. This was apparent when Anaconda needed fires for which they had not planned, and not in the ATO. Also (open source, refer to Not a Good Day to Die) the on call fires available in the ATO were not sufficient for the battle they encountered. Forcing coordination with forces on the Saudi peninsula (and we don't exactly have overflight rights with Iran, do we?) added unnecessary complications. People who wear blue will tell (and have told) me I'm wrong, but I really think theater JFACCs are a bad idea. They like centralized command/centralized control, but I'm much more of a centralized command/decentralized control type.

So at the Operational Level of War, you are faced with balancing the triangle of time, space, and forces available. This forces a choice at the Strategic Level. Do you abandon ONW and OSW in order to generate forces (and in a very real sense, admit defeat), or do you resolve the problem forcing you to dedicate forces for ONW and OSW by removing the requirement? RedLeg points out well those who disagreed, but Secretary Rumsfeld's argument won the day.

As an aside, my disagreements with the Secretary are well known, and will not be repeated here. I still haven't forgiven him for many of what I consider his misjudgments, which we are still living with today. But that said, he was indisputably correct when he said that you go to war with the army you have, not the army you wish you had. That's a reality that can never be forgotten, especially when you are discussing force reductions. The other reality is the enemy gets a vote.

A TPFDD is a database that (in simple terms) outlines Time-Phased Force Deployment Data. At a very broad brush level, it tells you the forces you have available, and how you will sequence them in. It includes when you need to get them to a port in order to reach their destination at a given time. In this specific case (early 2003), a look at the TPFDD will quickly point out that the aviation forces available for Operation Iraqi Freedom included a lot of the forces already dedicated to ONW/OSW. If they weren't in that mix, they were either just returned from that mix, or working up to go to that mix. Not a lot left available for other things. That Peace Dividend was really paying off, wasn't it?

Yes, yes, yes, there were discussions and disagreements at very high levels. A decision was made. What's interesting is no one really likes to talk about the first 90 days or so after the "march up" dust had settled. There are books written and yet to be written about the disagreements between Secretary Rumsfeld and Secretary Powell. Of note, "breaking things" is a DoD function, but the Secretary was very insistent that "building things" (i.e. nations) was his department. His fellow secretary wanted to redeploy and move to the next task. Unfortunately, the "building things" selection was (as RedLeg pointed out) improvident at best. And did no one look at a map and notice a specific country now had Great Satan forces deployed on both its east and its west? It took them 90 to 180 days, but then they started to play some of their cards. Seems like the overall policy was focused on Step 1, which it did well, but did not plan for Steps 2, 3, 4,...n. Oops. Somebody didn't read their Clausewitz very well...

At the same time, the unity generated by fear from the September two years earlier was fading... mostly because the policies put in place afterwards had successful effects. I won't blame a party, but I won't forgive certain individuals for putting their quest for power in front of what was really needed. Once upon a time, stating "I voted for that, before I voted against it" would be considered a point against judgement, not a request for a vote.

This is my personal opinion. Others have different opinions, but I was part of that game, I played an important role in it, and I saw a lot of it first hand. Other parts, I saw second, third, and fourth hands. In my view, the original decision to go was both necessary and defensible. I fault many senior people for the follow on decisions after that. Standard disclaimer: "Please understand that the above is my personal opinion, and is not the opinion of the US DoD, USCENTCOM, the Department of the Navy, etc., etc., etc.
We need to have a drink sometime.

The infuriating thing about the losses in Anaconda was that we had the lessons of airmobile insertions burned deeply into our psyche in Vietnam. Yet here we were, inserting ground forces by Chinook no less, with no covering Army organic fire support. I won't get into it here, but Naylor's book is pretty accurate. A good man as well. I'll simply say that the Army recommended deployment of adequate artillery and Rumsfeld with the concurrence of Tommy Franks, to his ever lasting shame, struck that support from the deployment list. This was an opportunity, like the "shock and awe" employed in Iraq, to demonstrate the superiority of joint fires.

To your other point, I'll leave for another day comprehending the genius of carrying out a deliberate attack with a hostile power on the flank and no operational reserve. MG Buff Blount, commanding 3rd Infantry Infantry Division, and Scott Wallace conducted one of the most brilliant offensive campaigns in our history. Buff has been rewarded for that effort by not even having a Wikipedia page.

We'll politely agree to disagree with respect to the wisdom or justification of entering Iraq. I suspect that we would agree completely on the inadequacy of the force and planning for the post operational occupation.
 
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The Pentagon can’t account for more than 60 percent of its assets. That’s the news from the latest of the Department of Defense’s audits, the results of which were released last month. Despite not knowing where trillions of dollars are.........
 


The Pentagon can’t account for more than 60 percent of its assets. That’s the news from the latest of the Department of Defense’s audits, the results of which were released last month. Despite not knowing where trillions of dollars are.........
That isn't what the audit found. It is what the article wishes the reader to believe. To be blunt an author (who writes for the Atlantic and Daily Beast among others) with an agenda is using a lie to create a narrative. "61% of the audits found issues, weaknesses, or discrepancies" is very different than DOD can't account for 60% of its assets. The article gives no indication of the relative size of the areas with discrepancies with respect to the total budget. For instance the Corps of Engineers and military retirement were considered "clean." Those alone are a large bite of the apple.
 
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an author with an agenda is using a lie to create a narrative.
This activity is so widespread I wonder if it is taught as part of a college journalism curriculum. I have friends that are employed at various state agencies that no longer give interviews because their statements are edited and then matched with interviewer comments that completely change the context and meaning. It gets hard to decipher what actually happened to any event.
 
That isn't what the audit found. It is what the article wishes the reader to believe. To be blunt an author (who writes for the Atlantic and Daily Beast among others) with an agenda is using a lie to create a narrative. "61% of the audits found issues, weaknesses, or discrepancies" is very different than DOD can't account for 60% of its assets. The article gives no indication of the relative size of the areas with discrepancies with respect to the total budget. For instance the Corps of Engineers and military retirement were considered "clean." Those alone are a large bite of the apple.

The author may have a beef to grind, but when the media chooses not to report news a person is sometimes stuck using the news as reported by those that will cover it.

When was the last time the Pentagon had an unqualified audit?


 

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Preparing for the adventure of a lifetime. Looking forward to my 2026 Africa hunt with Van Wijk Safaris in South Africa.
Monster Free range Common Reedbuck!!
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What a great way to kick off our 2025 hunting season in South Africa.

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We are looking forward to the next week and a half of hunting with our first client of the year.
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