


God's Country

Volume II: Guardians of Eden



L. P. A. Manning

Chosa ng'anga!

I. P. A. MANNING

GOD'S COUNTRY - Vol. II: Guardians of
Eden

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First edition

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For the villagers, traditional leaders and spiritual guardians of the chiefdoms.

When shall we be saved?
We who love the country of darkness!
We who love the country of slavery.
When shall we be saved?

ALICE LENSINA HYMN

Contents

<i>Preface</i>	xx
<i>Acknowledgement</i>	xxii
<i>Working Definitions</i>	xxiii
<i>Introduction</i>	xxx

I THE CHIEFDOM GUARDIANS

1 Ecosocial Chiefdoms	3
The Challenge	4
An International Ecosocialist Manifesto	6
2 Indigenous Kinship	10
The Three Principles of Bantu Life	12
3 Indigenous Rights	18
The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples	20
UN General Assembly Approves Resolution “Rights of Indigenous Peoples” (2020)	23
EGM: Conservation and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 23-25 January 2019 Nairobi, Kenya	25
2018 High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development	26
4 Ubuntu Christianity	28
Ubuntu, Jesus, and Earth: Integrating African Religion, and Christianity in Ecological Ethics	28
God’s Family, God’s Earth: Christian Ecological Ethics of Ubuntu	36
5 Citizens’ Assemblies	38

Citizens' Assemblies - by Marcin Gerwin	38
Guide to democracy that works.	38
Basic standards for organizing citizens' assemblies	48
A UK Citizens' Assembly	51
Irish Citizens' Assembly	51
Canada's Indigenous Rights Framework	52
Draft Resolution of Canadian Chiefs' Assembly (2018)	52
Puerto Rico	55
6 A Guardians' Manifesto	57
Citizens' Assemblies	59
Other Essential Actions	61
Women and Children	64
Land	66
Finance	70
Legal	71
National Parks and Forests	73
Power and Energy	74
Commerce	74
Community-Based Donor Projects	75
Agriculture	75
Socio-ecology	78
Wildlife & Fisheries	78
Chiefs	80
Village assistance	81
7 Municipal Manifesto	83
Imports	84
Debt	84
Annual dividend	85
Action	85
Power	87
Investment	88
Indigenous people (IP)	89
Wildlife	90

Agriculture	91
Plunder economy controls	91
Infrastructure	92
Social wellbeing	93
The Oasis Forum Strategic Plan	93
Finance	94
Political and contractual binding covenant	94
A Five-Year Appraisal	95
Green New Deal in Canada	95
8 A Country Manifesto	99
Dutch Five	100
Action	101
Power	102
Investment	103
Indigenous people	103
Wildlife	104
Agriculture	105
Plunder economy controls	105
Infrastructure	106
Social wellbeing	107
9 Landsafe Chiefdoms	109
10 Action Guides	120
Results Management in Norwegian Development Coop- eration	120
ICCA Consortium	121
Strengthening Your Territory of life: Full Report	121
Rights + Resources	124
IIED: International Institute for Environment and Development	125
Participatory Learning and Action	125
A few Selected Tools	125
PLA 55: Practical tools for community conservation in southern Africa	125

PLA 66 - Tools for supporting sustainable natural resource management and livelihoods	128
PLA 65 - Biodiversity and culture: exploring community protocols, rights and consent	129
PLA 64 - Young citizens: youth and participatory governance in Africa	131
PLA 63: How wide are the ripples? From local participation to international organisational learning	132
PLA 61: Tales of shit: Community-Led Total Sanitation in Africa	133
PLA 59: Change at hand: Web 2.0 for development	135
PLA 58: Towards empowered participation: stories and reflections	136
PLA 57: Immersions: learning about poverty face-to-face	137
PLA 30: Participation and Fishing Communities	138
PLA 23: Participatory Approaches to HIV/AIDS Programmes	139
IIED Strategy 2019–2024	140
African Digital Rights Network	140
GRACE Research Zambia	143
Thesaurus on land governance	144
Tearfund	145
NAMATI Community Land Protection Facilitators Guide	146
The link between chiefs and rural development	147
Organic Insect Pesticide	150
Gender-Based Violence (GBV)	151
FAO: Global Soil Doctors	152
A Vision for Smart Villages (2015)	153
Can Smart Villages help to stem biodiversity loss?	154
Structured Chieftancy Development Model (SCDM)	155
11 The Chiefdoms	156
288 Chiefdoms	158
The Originals	159
Bushmen	159

Twa	159
Ila	160
The Zambia State Landgrab of 1965	161
Current Zambia Land Divisions	165
The Customary Area Landgrab Revealed	166
Estimates of Customary land in Zambia	168
1 Liz Wily	168
2 Sitko et al. The Geography of Zambia's Customary Land	170
3 Rights & Resources Estimate (August 2020)	172
USAID/Land Portal Zambia	173
Context and Land Governance 2021	173
Debates	178
Articles	182
Traditional stewardship and conservation in the Game	
Management Areas of Nkala and Namwala, Zambia. (2014)	183
CBC - Community Based Conservation	184
David Katungula et al. (undated c. 2017)	184
Simon Christopher Metcalfe	185
Chieftainess Mkanda	186
Southern Province Chiefdoms	186
The Land Inequality Initiative (2020)	188
REDD+ Herring	192
Greening of the Earth and its Drivers (2016)	195
Diploma in Leadership and Traditional Governance (2020)	196
Senior Chief Luembe - a legal view	199
12 Chiefdoms' New Deal	201
The Future Springboard	203
Palan Mulonda's Customary Residents' Forum Strategy	206
Customary Commons Strategies	209
Zambia's Game Management Areas	209
Chiefs and Rural Development	210
13 Premodern Zambia	215
Democracy Index 2020: The Economist Intelligence Unit	216

Oasis Forum Statement on Zambia	217
African Declaration of Internet Rights and Freedoms (AfDec)	221
World Food Programme 2019 Report	222
Uncomfortable Knowledge	226
14 Legal Control of Chiefdoms	228
Introduction	229
The Chiefs' Act, 1965	230
Ministry of Chiefs and Traditional Affairs	231
The House of Chiefs	232
National Policy on Chieftainship and Traditional Affairs (2018)	233
Chiefs and the Law in Independent Zambia	237
Registration and Development of Villagers Act 1971	247
IFAD: Chiefs and Traditional Leaders	253
Chiefs walkout on Kapata land policy.	254
Land Tenure and Rural Livelihoods in Zambia	256
A Handbook for Chiefs (1937)	266
15 State Control of Land	272
Africa's land tenure insecurity	272
National Parks and Wildlife Policy (2018)	272
Lands Acquisition Act, 1970.	277
Lands Act, 1995.	278
The Lands (customary tenure) (conversion) regulations:	
S.I. 89 of 1996	279
The Draft National Land Policy	279
Local Government Act of 2019	281
The Public Trust Doctrine	282
Very Little Legal Transparency in Customary Administration	284
16 Game Management Areas	286
Report on GMAs	292
Recommendations	293
Community Resource Boards (Wildlife Act 2015)	294
Zambia National CRB Association	297
GMA additions and subtractions	299

Increasing Chiefdom Poverty	301
Securing empowerment through GMAs	306
Useful References	309

II GOOD INTENTIONS

17 Sustainable Development Goals (UNDP)	315
7th Plan 2017-2021	316
Nagoya Protocol	319
18 UN Convention on Biological Diversity, 2020	323
Preparations for the Post 2020 Framework	323
2030 Action Targets	323
Campaign for Nature	327
Zambia's Sixth National Report (2019)	333
Targets pursued by 2020	334
Targets pursued by 2022	336
Targets pursued by 2025	337
The Implementation Measures	338
Conclusion of progress	342
Summary	342
Biodiversity Facts	344
Main pressures on and drivers of change to biodiversity (direct and indirect)	346
Measures to Enhance Implementation of the Convention	347
Actions taken to achieve the 2020/25 Aichi Biodiversity Targets	348
Support mechanisms for national implementation	349
Zambia has developed a REDD+ Strategy.	349
Mechanisms for monitoring and reviewing implementation	350
Aichi Targets	350
Aichi Implementation Measures	354
Update baseline data on fish, forests and lower plants and wildlife	355
19 International supports	368

RAMSAR Convention	368
Nagoya Protocol and ICCA Consortium	369
IUCN - International Union for Conservation of Nature	374
The European Commission's NaturAfrica Initiative (2020)	375
20 Zambia demographic and health survey 2018.	377

III NEOCOLONIALIST INTRUSIONS

21 The WEIRD White Man	387
The Atlantic	390
Mindless technology	391
The Impacts of the Algorithm	393
The WEIRD Decline	394
Hutterites	397
Lament of the slaves	400
William Buckley, Australia (1852)	401
22 The Witchcraft Tragedy	405
Melland on Witchdoctor Suppression	408
The Witchcraft Act	413
Some Cases	420
Albinism	422
Gender-based violence (GBV) - women beating	422
Observations from Lake Mweru	422
Observations from Bangweulu	423
Witchcraft in Europe	425
Witchcraft beliefs and the Erosion of Social Capital	428
Convention on Biological Diversity	428
23 Prison - A Colonial Gift	430
On Africa's Death Row: Hidden Consequences of Colonial Past [BLOG]	432
Zambian prisons are death chambers.	434
Ubumi Prisons Initiative Zambia	435

President Sata releases 670 poacher-prisoners (24 October 2011)	439
The Socialist Party of Zambia	441
Some statistics	441

IV WORLD THREATS

24 Biodiversity Retreat	445
Global Assessment Report (IPBES)	445
25 Climate Change and Early Burning	452
Climate Change	453
No To Early Burning	455
The toxic rhetoric of climate change	456
5 minutes	462
How we fool ourselves	465
The catastrophe narrative	465
The Cargo Cult Science	466
A Climate of Dialogue	468
A Reality Check on Renewable Energy	468
Geo-Engineering in Africa	469
Biochar - Zambia	471
26 Blockchain & the Privatization Threat	474
Zambia: Blockchained (page 10+)	476
Blockchain	479
Land Unchained	480
Oakland Institute results for Zambia	485

V WEIRD NEOCOLONIALSIM

27 CBNRM	489
Nabwalya Chiefdom, Luangwa.	489
My Quote from 'Plunderers of Eden'	495

Norwegian aid and sustainable development: Project case from Zambia (2003)	496
Evaluation of Norwegian Development Support to Zambia (1991 – 2005)	497
USAID REPORT on CBNRM in Southern Africa (2011)	501
My Comments	501
Panos Institute Report on CBNRM in Zambia (2017)	506
Lessons from Luangwa	509
28 'Life as a Hunt' in Nabwalya Chiefdom	518
29 North Luangwa	538
North Luangwa Conservation Programme	538
Mukungule GMA	541
30 LIRDP (1986-2009)	542
Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project	542
Total Arrests	546
31 ADMADE (1987-1999)	548
Introduction	549
Chiawa Chiefdom GMA, Lower Zambezi	550
32 SLAMU (1999-2015)	554
South Luangwa Management Unit	554
Another view: Lessons from Luangwa	559
33 SLAMU/ZAWA and Gamefields Ltd	561
The State of the Luembe and Nyalugwe Chiefdoms in 2003-2010	568
Luembe Chiefdom pillaged by SLAMU	570
Conclusion.	582
34 CONASA & SEED (2001-2011)	584
CONASA	584
SEED	585
35 REMNPAS (2006-2011)	589
Chiawa Community Partnership Park (CPP)	592
36 AFRICAN PARKS ORG.	595
The Liuwa Plain and Sioma Ngwezi 2003	595

African Parks Grants Kafue \$5m (2017)	602
The President of African Parks	603
March 2021 MOU in Kafue	605
37 GEF/UNDP (2016-2021)	609
A \$60m CBNRM Project in Kafue (2011-2015)	609
Expected Outcomes of ZAWA/UNDP Project	609
Mid-Term Evaluation (2017)	619
My Comments	627
The Contested Kafue Flats Floodplain	629
38 Other Paramilitary-style Projects	631
Game Ranger International (2013 -)	631
Wildlife Crime Prevention Org. (WCP)	635

VI BANGWEULU WETLAND

39 Luapula Chiefdoms	639
Luapula Provincial Administration	643
The pros and cons of the spread of cage aquaculture in Africa	644
40 Kasanka National Park	648
The Plunder Begins	656
The Fruit Bats Endangered	660
Chief Chitambo	661
41 Bangweulu Floodplains	664
42 Bangweulu's Community Partnership Park	670
Chikuni CPP	670
Black Lechwe rent-capture in 2019	676
Hunting-Safaris Reality	677
43 African Parks in Bangweulu	679
Black lechwe aerial census information	680
African Parks Annual Bangweulu Reports (2008-2019)	680
Summary of 11 years of AP's annual glossy reports	704
African Parks Objectives for 2020	708

A notice put out in late December 2020 that Cheetah were introduced	709
Jailed for having game meat	711
Mpika Court Jails 5 for Wildlife Offences	711
4 Men sentenced to 5 years imprisonment for possessing game meat	713
Informed Indigenous Comment	716
44 Terrible Sirpryze	719
Sirpryze Project Engineers	727
EIA: ZEMA	728
45 Swampy Tales	729
KALATA KULI BA MP WESU ABALEISA MU NSHIKU 420	730
46 Lunga Development	737
The Constitution of the LDA	740
Aims of the LDA	742
Lunga Chiefdom Priorities	743
Urgent Issues in Bangweulu	745
Unavoidable Issues	746
An Indigenous NGO	747

VII LEGAL LIBRARY

47 General Legal Background	753
Biblical/African view of land management	755
Natural Resources Act of 1962	756
Conservation and Law Enforcement to the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community 2003	759
The NGO Act of 2009	760
The Urban and Regional Planning Act, 2015.	761
The Forestry Act of 2015	762
Forests (Community Forest Management) Regulations, 2018	763
The A-G Report on Natural Fishery (2015)	764

Conclusion	766
The Protection of Traditional Knowledge, Genetic Resources and Expressions of Folklore Act, 2016	766
The Zambian Parliament's Goals for the Nation 2017	767
Zambia Legal Information Institute on Torts	768
Inheritance law	769
48 Protected Area Network	771
Main pressures on and drivers of change to biodiversity (direct and indirect)	775
A Comparison of National Wildlife Strategies in Africa	777
The Public Trust Doctrine	778
Articles of Interest	779
PERCEPTIONS AND ATTITUDES OF LOCAL COMMUNITIES TOWARDS KAFUE NATIONAL PARK, ZAMBIA	780
Empowering communities to manage natural resources: case studies from Southern Africa	780
Empowering Communities to Manage Natural Resources	780
Underperformance of African protected area networks and the case for new conservation models: insights from Zambia	781
We are Zambians. Don't Tell Us How to Fish! Institutional Change, Power Relations and Conflicts in the Kafue Flats Fisheries in Zambia	781
Feared and Hated but admired and respected- The Status and Plight of the African Lion (<i>Panthera Leo</i>) in Sub Saharan Africa: A Pest facing extinction or a favourite Tourist Attraction?	781
The Impact of Community-Based Wildlife Management Model on Food Security as a Proxy Indicator for Human Development in Game Management Areas in Zambia.	782

Final Baseline Report for Kazungula and Namwala Districts June 2013	782
Mbeza irrigation scheme - case study on conflict and cooperation in local water governance	782
Institutional Arrangements for Conservation, Development and Tourism in Eastern and Southern Africa A Dynamic Perspective	783
The Selous-Niassa Transfrontier Conservation Area and Tourism: Evolution, Benefits and Challenges	783
Community-Based Natural Resource Management and Poverty Alleviation in Namibia: A Case Study	783
Opportunities and Constraints of Local Participation in Ecotourism. A Case Study of Kasanka National Park (KNP), Zambia.	784
Community management of natural resources in Africa	784
Baseline Survey Report for Kazungula & Namwala Districts in Southern Province, Zambia	784
Journal 9 - Exploitation or Conservation	784
Kumalesha borehole - Case study of conflict and cooperation in local water governance	785
Economic and Social Significance of Forests For Africa's Sustainable Development	785
The Zambian wildlife ranching industry: scale, associated benefits, and limitations affecting its development	785
Success in integrating conservation and development? A study from Zambia	786
A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PUBLISHED AND UNPUBLISHED WORK ON THE TONGA-SPEAKING PEOPLE OF ZAMBIA AND ZIMBABWE	786
49 Wildlife Law	787
A-G Report on Wildlife (2014)	787
Auditor-General report on ZAWA (2015)	789
The Zambia Wildlife Act of 2015	790

National Policy on Wetlands (2018)	794
Legal Framework	798
Zambia Vision 2030 and the 7th National Development Plan	800
Wildlife Law and the Legal Empowerment of the Poor in sub-Saharan Africa	800
11. Zambia Laws	801
11.2 Institutional setup and role of stakeholders	801
11.3 Wildlife tenure and use rights	803
11.4 Wildlife management planning	803
11.5 Wildlife conservation (protected areas, protected species, impact assessment)	804
11.6 Wildlife utilization (hunting, ecotourism, ranch- ing, trade and other uses)	805
Legislation Reviewed	808
TORT Zambia Legal Information Institute	811
50 Zambia Legal Institute	812
ZAMBIA: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CONTEXT RE- PORT (2019)	813
Most Important Environmental Laws	814
2 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW TOPICS IN ZAMBIA	818
A ENERGY, MINERALS AND EXTRACTIVES	818
B COASTAL, MARINE AND FISHERIES	820
C AGRICULTURE, PLANTS AND FORESTRY	822
D CLIMATE CHANGE, NATURAL DISASTERS AND AIR QUALITY	823
E WILDLIFE	824
F PROTECTED AREAS	825
G AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW AND RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES	826
51 FAO Legal Database: Zambia	830
Policies	830
Zambia - agricultural and rural development	833
Disaster risk management	834

Environment	835
Fisheries	836
Forestry	837
Land and soil	841
Livestock	846
Water	850
Wild species and ecosystems	852
International agreements	854
52 Digital Rights	857
Zambia Digital Rights Landscape Report	857

VIII LIBRARY: GENERAL

53 Original Landsafe Investment Plan (2003)	869
54 Landsafe Publications	900
Wildlife Conservation in Zambia and the Landsafe Customary Commons	901
The Landsafe Socioecological Development Model	902
55 Author's Advocacy Blogs 2006-2011	930
56 Zambian Economist: Chola Mukanga	932
Draft Land Policy, revised....and now rejected: FRIDAY, 5 OCTOBER 2007	935
A cultural approach to Zambia's development: SUNDAY, 26 AUGUST 2007	942
Ian Manning: TUESDAY, 17 JUNE 2008	961
Securing empowerment through GMAs: WEDNESDAY, 16 DECEMBER 2009	963
57 House of Chiefs I: Chola Mukanga	966
Chiefs and Politics - The Historic Lenses: 9 Feb 2009	966
Post a Comment On: House of Chiefs	974
Traditions Vs Human Rights, 2nd Edition 22 May 2009	983
Fighting deforestation: 1 June 2009	985
Knowledgeable Chiefs: 29 APRIL 2009	985

Traditions Vs Human Rights?: 17 APRIL 2009	988
Our Land, Our People: 15 MAY 2009	991
Plundering or harvesting the chiefdoms of Zambia? (Guest Blog)	996
3 MAY 2009	996
58 House of Chiefs II: Chola Mukanga	1000
A Mwinilunga deal on land: January 2009	1000
Poverty, A Deliberate Policy	1001
The Politics in Chief (Senior Chief Kapalaula II)	1008
Chiefs and the law in independent Zambia	1019
Chiefs in colonial Zambia	1030
Early marriages: can chiefs make a difference?	1038
Fighting for health access: February 2009	1043
Chiefs vs MPs?	1045
The politics of succession (Kalindawalo)	1046
Fighting against corruption.	1047
Landsafe Investment Trust Model	1048
Chiefs and Politics: The Rise of Political Chiefs?	1055
And another thing..	1064
Chiefs and Politics - The Historic Lenses	1065
Pushing for better sanitation...	1073
Pursuing safety.	1074
Foreign investors are our friends..	1074
Fighting for CRB funding.	1076
Luembe wrangles	1078
Traditions vs Human Rights?	1080
Standing against corruption	1084
Our Land, Our People	1085
Go forth and multiply.	1089
On land allocations: June 2009	1090
Calling for dissolution..	1092
In pursuit of community ownership..	1092
Rural starvation?	1096

On Witchcraft, 2nd Edition	1098
On Witchcraft	1098
Land for development?	1100
Chiefs and the economy: Rise of entrepreneurship (January 2010)	1101
Chiefs and the economy : An Economic Institution	1107
A governance deficit.	1115
Chiefs and the economy: Rise of entrepreneurship	1117
Chieftdom led capitalism	1122
Fight for land rights.	1124
On Witchcraft, 3rd Edition	1126
Cleansing the chieftdom, 2nd Edition	1128
Traditional healers and HIV/AIDs	1128
Wising up?	1129
Chieftdom led capitalism, 2nd Edition	1130
Facing starvation	1132
Restoration of the Native Authority Act?	1133
59 Land Organizations	1134
Zambia Land Alliance	1134
Zambia CBNRM forum	1137
Zambia CBNRM Forum lead role in GAPA	1142
Governance Assessment in Protected Areas (GAPA)	1142
Capacity Building Project - Kafue Ecosystem	1144
Forest Reserve Support Project (FRSP)	1146
ICCA Conservation Territories	1147
World Bank: Pilot Program For Climate Resilience Project	1150
LeAP Project	1151
Developing a Theory of Change	1154
Nsansala Conservancy	1157
The Ransom Economy: Canadian Indigenous Land Rights	1163
60 Chronology	1164

61 Conclusion	1188
Epilogue	1189

Preface

Zambia is a territory that has moved successively from an aboriginal occupancy by Bushmen and Pygmy, then by Bantu tribes, followed in 1889 by the British South Africa Chartered Company. In 1924, it became the British Protectorate of Northern Rhodesia, and in 1964, the independent state of Zambia.

Since then, Zambia has become a vassal and subsidiary state of Britain, America, the UN, the World Bank, the IMF, the myriad donors, and big business. This patrimonial neocolonial state is a bewildered inmate of the West's making. It is a land of two parts: one Western capitalist, the other traditional ecosocialist. The customary people, girded by their kinship and spiritual customs, subsist on the wildlands in their ancient ecosocial way, but, as I revealed in Volume I of *God's Country*, are increasingly oppressed by the failings of a pre-modern state and its rent-seeking and land-grabbing through neocolonial conservation, some greedy chiefs, tourism, mining, industrial agriculture, privatizations and aid-project incursions, violating their subsistence needs, and sending them to horrific medieval prisons for + 5-years for eating the state's game animals supported on their land.

While I was re-editing my Bangweulu swamps memoir written in 1975, *Where the Water Meets the Sky*, I chanced upon a blogsite written by Kunda Londa, who had grown up in a village in Bwalya Mponda, an island lying some 15 miles away from our former island home, and then as a 3-year old

had moved to Ng'ungwa village, not far from where I once carried out wildlife research. In his blogs, he reveals his people's lives in the wetland and the increasing intrusions of the state and privatizers. I was aware of an NGO that - in partnership with a rent-seeking wildlife department - had taken over the area.

Like so much of the world's customary commons, Zambia is a magical place, a term I use in the everyday Western sense. In Bangweulu, as an example, its pioneer people were the indigenous Twa (also found in other major wetlands of Zambia) - such as the man on the front cover - a resolute and religious band of people who never accepted slavery, the cruel rampages of warlike tribes, the arrival of the white man who took control of them, introducing laws punishing the benign *Ng'anga* witchdoctors - essential to keeping malign sorcerers under control - and forcing them to adopt capitalist ways. They, and the wave of immigrant Bantu tribes, were herded into large villages, forced to pay hut tax when such a thing as a job was unheard of, 'recruited' forcibly and sent to the newly established mines, their ownership rights to wildlife removed, their inter-tribal trade destroyed by imports. Yet, much of the British reign was enlightened; a fully formed country nurtured and delivered at independence in a mere 75 years. But, unfortunately, an American-style executive presidency was imposed, which soon became big man patrimonial rule and corruption. It is time for the customary people to affirm their kinship and for the country as a whole to redefine its future along indigenous spiritual and ecological lines, not on Western grabbing capitalism. And to do this, they must take back their ownership of their land and natural resources - particularly the fish and game.

The Guardians of the Land - known in Bemba as *umwine wa mpanga* are specifically appointed to a custodians' role. They are fish guardians or guardians having power over certain species - such as elephant and eland. The chiefdoms depend on the *de facto* ownership of natural resources, shared and therefore not plundered. This is conservation at its very heart.

Acknowledgement

I acknowledge the many authors I have quoted liberally in the book, being guided by the necessity to publish as much as possible of what they wrote, bearing in mind that the book is to be used by rural indigenous people. They need to have direct access to J. Henrich's *WEIRD* analysis, to Chola Mukanga's insightful blogsites - *Zambian Economist and House of Chiefs* - now dormant - to Kunda Londa's illuminating blogs from his *Swampy Tales*, and Stuart Marks' incomparable research and writings on Chief Nabwalya's country in the Luangwa since 1966. The Western restrictions through copyright are a severe hindrance to indigenous peoples' understanding of the real issues affecting their development and very existence, hindrances perpetuated by the Western way of thinking, instead of the kinship and ecosocial framework of customary commoners who share everything.

Working Definitions

1. **Alegal** - An unambiguously wrong, disruptive and often deliberately committed act for which there is not yet a specific law making that act expressly illegal.
2. **Agistment rights** - the rights under British common law of landowners to receive payments or profits from cattle grazed on their land
3. **Boma** – Colonial District Headquarters
4. **big man** – the head of a political patronage chain of clients
5. **Biodiversity conservation** - the care, protection or management of biodiversity (wildlife) aimed at a specific objective, e.g. to actively manage species and ecosystems for their long-term viability, to reduce the destruction of a key species' habitat, or to increase benefits from sustainable ecosystem management
6. **Biological diversity (biodiversity)** - Wildlife diversity is the variability among living organisms from all sources, including, amongst other things, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, between species and ecosystems
7. **Chiefdom** - customary area under the control of a customary authority, i.e. a chief and headmen
8. **Chitemene** - swiddening, coppicing or slash-and-burn cultivation
9. **Chola boy** – sycophantic bag-carrier
10. **Chosang'anga** (*Nyanja*) – 'the smeller-out of evil-doers.'
11. **Clientelism** - exchange of political loyalty for the promise of material

rewards

12. **Colony** - an area under the political control of another country
13. **Commons** – has four meanings: 1) being elements of the environment enjoyed and shared by all, 2) being land owned by someone but with commoners allowed to use it in specific ways, 3) the customary commons, being land used in perpetuity by a tribe or clan or community of people for the shared and equal benefit of its members, and 4) the public commons, i.e. state land.
14. [Conservation area](#) - A geographically defined area other than a Protected Area, which is governed and managed in ways that achieve positive and sustained long-term outcomes for the in situ conservation of biodiversity, with associated ecosystem functions and services and, where applicable, cultural, spiritual, socio-economic, and other locally relevant values.
15. **Cornucopianism** - futurists who believe that continued progress and provision of material items for mankind can be met by similarly continued technological advances.
16. **Customary area co-management** - the sharing of the responsibilities and benefits between government, civil society and customary people for the land and the natural resources which it supports, suggesting an evolutionary movement through decentralization and devolution towards semi-autonomous control and management of the customary commons
17. **Comprador** - a person or persons within a country who act as agents for foreign organizations engaged in investment, trade, and economic or political exploitation
18. **Conservancy** - people within a defined geographical area who jointly manage, conserve and use the wildlife and other natural resources
19. **Customary** – that relating to traditional custom
20. **Customary area** – Lands Act 1995 definition of land held under customary tenure
21. **Customary Authority** – Chiefs, headmen and councillors
22. **Customary commons** – all customary area, but in particular those

natural resource elements outside of villages and village agricultural land - forests, atmosphere, rivers and lagoons, fisheries and wildlife that are shared – ideally used and enjoyed by all the people residing there under the authority of chiefs and headmen

23. **Customary residents** - the inhabitants and usufructuaries of a customary area owing allegiance to a chief and headmen
24. **Customary tenure** - land held through long tradition by village headmen under the chairmanship of a chief
25. **Ecosystem** - an ecosystem is the interaction of a natural community (biological life) with its physical and chemical environment and the resulting ecological processes of such interaction.
26. **Ecosystem services** – A) the short and long term benefits people obtain from ecosystems: 1) provisioning goods and services, or the production of basic goods such as food, water, fish, fuels, timber, and fibre; 2) regulating services, such as flood protection, purification of air and water, waste absorption, disease control, and climate regulation; 3) cultural services that provide spiritual, aesthetic, and recreational benefits, and; 4) supporting services necessary for the production of all other ecosystem services, such as soil formation, production of oxygen, crop pollination, carbon sequestration, photosynthesis, and nutrient cycling. But now the reality: ‘On almost all continents, the land is being retooled to produce [saleable ecosystem services](#) as well as palm oil, GM soy or pulpwood. Entrepreneurs and landholders are being invited to manufacture biodiversity, wetlands quality, or species-equivalent tokens that industrialists or developers can then buy to “neutralize” the destruction they are responsible for.
27. **Forest** – [in medieval times in England](#) it denoted land used for hunting and as a source of venison; in Zambia, it is woodland - denoted forests, either protected or part of the customary commons. Zambia, therefore, covered as it is mainly by miombo woodland, relies on chitemene (swiddening) survival strategies by subsistence villagers of the customary commons.
28. **Game** - commonly hunted wildlife species

29. **Game Management Areas** – originally controlled hunting areas within customary area, then declared by the government as quasi protected areas where the state collects hunting revenue (sharing little of it with the chiefdoms), as well as income from tourist lodges - though not sharing with the chiefdoms. In 1971 they were converted to 32 game management areas (GMAs) by statutory instrument. In 1993 they were declared under the Game Management Declaration Order by statutory instrument No.67 of 1993 as areas for the sustainable utilization of wildlife.
30. **ICCA** - Indigenous and Community Conserved Areas
31. **Kakistocracy** – a system of government that is run by the worst, least qualified, or most unscrupulous of citizens
32. **Kleptocracy** - a country whose rulers use political power to steal the resources
33. **Landscape-scale conservation** - conservation and management going beyond biodiversity issues, incorporating the social framework, and serving as a bridge between science and resources management by facilitating information flow among organizations vested in natural resource conservation. There are two forms: American Integrated Landscape Management – which merely integrates only those stakeholders with a financial stake, and the genuinely holistic European Convention on Landscapes.
34. **Landscape framework** - statutory trusts established on customary area, the trusts entering into co-management custodial and harvesting agreements with the state in respect of fisheries, forestry, water and wildlife, assuring customary residents secure access to land and lasting benefits from renewable natural resources, essential to biodiversity conservation and the socio-ecological and cultural integrity of Zambia.
35. **Land alienation** – customary or protected land converted to a 14-year provisional title and then to a 99-year leasehold (renewable)
36. **Land tenure** - the rights of individuals or groups over arable, grazing and residential land, how such rights are acquired, what they consist of, how they operate in the holding, transfer and inheritance of land, and

how they may be extinguished

37. **Liebig's Law** - the amount that a species or ecosystem can produce in a given place and time is limited by the resource in the shortest supply
38. **Natural resources** - land and its biological resources: the soils, vegetation, water and fauna
39. **Neoliberalism** or neo-liberalism refers primarily to the 20th-century resurgence of 19th-century ideas associated with [laissez-faire economic liberalism](#). Those ideas include [economic liberalization](#) policies such as privatization, [austerity](#), [deregulation](#), [free trade](#) and reductions in [government spending](#) to increase the role of the [private sector](#) in the [economy](#) and [society](#). These market-based ideas and the policies they inspired constitute a [paradigm shift](#) away from the post-war [Keynesian](#) consensus which lasted from 1945 to 1980.
40. **Open Area** – that part of customary area not classified under the Laws of Zambia as Game Management Area (GMA), unfortunately signifying an area of open access
41. **Parastatal (Quango)** - an organization or industry having some political authority and serving the state indirectly – the former Zambia Wildlife Authority being an example
42. **Patrimonialism** – an acute degree of apparent disorder, as evidenced by a high level of governmental and administrative inefficiency, a lack of institutionalization, a general disregard for the rules of the formal political and economic sectors, and a universal resort to personal(ized) and vertical solutions to societal problems; the conditions necessary for the operation of big man patronage
43. **Peasant** - a poor farmer of low social status who owns or rents land for cultivation (as it is now a derogatory term it is used chiefly in a historical sense or concerning subsistence farming outside the customary commons)
44. **Plutonomy** – the small percentage of the world's population that is gathering increasing wealth, i.e. the 1%
45. **Precariat** – precarious proletariat
46. **Proletariat** – working-class people

47. **Quango** - chiefly derogatory: a semi-public administrative body outside the civil service and financially supported - and senior appointments made - by the government, i.e. a parastatal
48. **Shushushu** – state security agents of Zambia’s Office of the President (OP)
49. **State land** - land not situated in a customary area (Lands Act, 1995)
50. **Statist** – a political system in which the state has substantial centralized control over social and economic affairs
51. **Sustainable growth** - an oxymoron
52. **Tenure system** - legal and institutional framework that determines how rights to natural resources (property rights) are defined and enforced
53. **Tragedy of the commons** - an unproven economic problem in which every individual tries to reap the greatest benefit from a given resource. As the demand for the resource overwhelms the supply, every individual who consumes an additional unit directly harms others who can no longer enjoy the benefits
54. **Ubuntu** - a quality that includes the essential human virtues of compassion and humanity
55. **Usufruct** - the principle of customary tenure whereby any resident can have access to and the use of a piece of land but cannot claim any form of ownership of it. The holder of a usufruct is known as a usufructuary
56. **Villagers** - Africans living in traditional communal villages
57. **Common acronyms**
58. **ADMADE** - Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas
59. **BINGO** – Big international NGO involved with wildlife conservation
60. **CBNRM** – Community-based natural resource management
61. **DNPW** – Department of National Parks and Wildlife
62. **EIA** - Environmental impact assessment
63. **EIS** – Environmental impact study
64. **EMP** – Environmental management plan
65. **GMA** – Game management area
66. **ICDP** – Integrated conservation and development project

- 67. **IUCN** – International Conservation Union
- 68. **LIRDP** - Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project
- 69. **NPWS** – National Parks and Wildlife Service
- 70. **NRCF** – Natural Resources Consultative Forum
- 71. **PHAZA** – Professional Hunters’ Association of Zambia
- 72. **S.I.** – Statutory Instrument
- 73. **SLAMU** – South Luangwa Management Unit of ZAWA
- 74. **TCZ** – Tourism Council of Zambia
- 75. **WECSZ** – Wildlife and Environmental Conservation Society of Zambia
- 76. **WPAZ** – Wildlife Producers’ Association of Zambia
- 77. **WWF** – World Wildlife Fund
- 78. **ZAWA** – Zambia Wildlife Authority
- 79. **ZDA** – Zambia Development Agency
- 80. **ZEMA** – Zambia Environmental Management Agency
- 81. **ZRL** – Zambezi Resources Limited

Introduction

The arrival of Cecil Rhodes' British South Africa Chartered Company (BSA Company) in the territory in 1889 with a royal charter to exploit and govern the inhabitants and to put down the slave trade ushered in a form of indentured slavery on the mines of Southern and Central Africa through the implementation of the hut tax. However, as [Jan Smuts](#) wrote, Cecil Rhodes, influenced by Jan Hofmeyr, when Prime Minister of the Cape,

Introduced the Glen Grey Act Of 1884 which embodied two main ideas: white settlement to supply the steel framework and the stimulus for an enduring civilization, and indigenous native institutions to express the specifically African character of the natives in their future development and civilization. African policies should arise in Africa, from the experience of the men and women who are daily in contact with its living problems.

The Glen Grey Act was the foundation for Indirect Rule, implemented in Northern Rhodesia in 1929 by introducing Native Authorities, local courts, and where chiefs did not exist - like the Tonga and Soli - they were appointed. In 1936 the Native Authorities were given financial responsibilities and the scope of the 1929 ordinances extended to Barotseland.

Before the advent of colonialism in 1889, the history of the people was notable for wealth being measured by social relationships, not material things, and the ownership or control of land and water were not simply private

property or commons, rights to the land negotiated through ‘earth priests’ (guardians) - in Bemba, *umwine wa mpamga*.

And as David. M. Gordon wrote so memorably when challenging development theory in [*Nachituti's Gift: Economy, Society, and Environment in Central Africa*](#):

Since fisheries in Africa are such distinctive and underappreciated economic activities, their histories tend to challenge some of the central tenets of development theory. In Mweu-Luapula, rules of tenure and ownership over lagoons well stocked with fish and fertile floodplains weakened with the arrival of colonial states. The lagoons became common property, governed by a mix of colonial chiefs and officials and exploited by an array of autochthonous and migrant Africans and Europeans. However, informal tenure arrangements persisted and revolved around social networks linked to “traditional authorities”, rural-urban traders, clans, and families. This historical trajectory challenges one of the central economic expectations of modernity - that private property, freehold tenure, individualism and concomitant forms of investment will accompany and promote economic development and commercial expansion. Economic development and growth have not contributed to more formalized tenure arrangements; instead, Mweru-Luapula’s fishery has witnessed an array of layered claims to increasingly scarce resources. Contrary to the expected trajectories of capitalist development, wealth accrued from the fishery has been devoted to consolidating and expanding social networks. Rights in persons remain a respectable and rational way to invest and display wealth.

Since self-government, the Zambian state as the owner and manager of wildlife and other natural resources, has manifestly failed to support the chiefdoms, its functions increasingly privatized under quangos, embarking in a highly selective and opaque manner on unequal ‘partnerships’ with hunting-safari and ecotourism operators, and customary area commoners, with or without the permission of the chiefdom residents.

Tourism concessions have been leased to investors in national parks without benefit to the former owners of the land and for increasingly longer leases at higher fees, such that they all but resemble leasehold alienations. And we witness large-scale alienations of land in chiefdoms for agricultural schemes such as jatropha or sugar production, with all their proven monocultural damage.

With Independence in 1964 and control taken by non-customary people called politicians, the president with American-style executive powers, the tenure rules have weakened to the extent that only half of the land once occupied by Twa and Bushmen and subsequent invasions of Bantu is now held under customary tenure. But the state owns the big game and extracts tourism rentals from its game management areas - a semi-alienated part of the chiefdoms - 22% of Zambia. The state uses the 288 chiefdoms as a rent basket to extract minerals, water, and land for agro-industrial farming schemes from wherever it chooses. And it sells off customary land.

The chiefs, headmen, spiritual guardians and villagers - people of the customary commons - are still on their land, constantly being subjected to neocolonialist invasions called variously: Integrated Conservation and Developments Projects (ICDP), Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) projects, Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), Community-based Wildlife Programs, tourism concessions; or privatization models of one sort or another with an income percentage payoff to the chiefs, to the wildlife department, to their proxy community resource boards which they imposed on the chiefdoms. And what of the villager? Little, except more wildlife police to harass and arrest him and his family when they poach - as they must - for something to eat bigger than a rat, and then imprison them for up to 7 years for having a piece of meat in his possession. This is the true result of colonialism: nature girds riches and power for the 1%; imprisonment for the remainder.

That parliament has stated that they wish the country to become a middle-income industrial state by 2030 indicates the two-culture contradictions at

work in Zambia. The 60 % of Zambians who are members of the customary commons are not wired mentally and spiritually to seek profit for themselves. Their ambitions are guided solely by their kinship culture, where they think of each other before they think of themselves. The premodern state's plans are predatory and neocolonialist, guided by profit and big business. And then there are the neocolonialist world organizations...

Chiefs serve as guardians of the clan and tribal culture and as the land and wildlife's supernatural custodian. Sadly the government does not consider the supernatural 'rights' of chiefs exercising their powers under traditional law. As a first step, customary people and their chiefs, headmen, and spiritual guardians such as the *Chipupila* must embrace Guardians' Assemblies and empower customary people in the ownership of their wildlife, their forests, their rivers.

The wildlife of Zambia - the game ranches and Liuwa Plain National Park apart - have since 1973 been massively poached because the ownership - and therefore guardianship - and [benefit flows](#) from wildlife has been grabbed by the state, the biomass of large mammals in the national parks 7 years ago at 25.9% of carrying capacity, in GMAs 6.3% - (the Lupande Game Management Area (GMA), long touted as a fine safari-hunting area and in receipt of donor funding, 11%). Across the river from the Lupande, the glorious South Luangwa National Park recorded a dismal 16%, the Kafue National Park 29%, and Lower Zambezi National Park 23%. This at a time when the 5,000 km² of private game ranches recorded 10.5 head per km² - as opposed to the 2.7 of parks and the 1.1 of GMAs.

Now, in 2021, those big game numbers are likely to be half of what they were. In the flagship national parks such as Luangwa, Kafue and Lower Zambezi, the tourists will still be shown the human-habituated game. Still, the GMAs of customary area are in biodiversity decline. [Recent research](#) reveals that the genetic diversity of lion is now 15% less than 100 years ago; their ability to deal with the changes being wrought by global warming and the human population increase, considerably reduced. It is time for lion, leopard, elephant, hippo, and eland to be totally protected.

The Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA), a greedy parastatal (2002-2015)

sought to profit from wildlife, ushering in community-based natural resource management donor projects (CBNRM) such as ADMADE and SLAMU, by way of the classic [Shifting Baseline Syndrome](#) greatly lowered the expectations of villagers:

With ongoing environmental degradation at local, regional, and global scales, people's accepted thresholds for environmental conditions are continually being lowered. In the absence of past information or experience with historical conditions, members of each new generation accept the situation in which they were raised as being normal.

As with the decline of fish biomass in the oceans, a researcher pointed out 'that ridiculously depleted fisheries were using the fish population from just a few decades ago as the starting point of their measurements, their baselines, as it were, rather than what a fish population would be had it never been touched by mankind'.

People invade the chiefdoms, the habitat increasingly modified, the animals poached, the *mukwa* (*Pterocarpus angolensis*), a stately tree with a distinctive bark, seed, flower and leaf, smuggled out for the export market.

Zambia's fishery will continue its precipitous decline, the once functioning indigenous fishing Guardians of Nature cooperatives destroyed by colonialism and 50 years of government meddling. The open-access reality of the fishery lying within customary area and rivers bordering national parks and forests, at present results in its stocks being plundered by all and sundry with the use of mosquito nets, potato sacks (commonly called *sefa-sefa* or *chikukula*), weirs, explosives and poisons', the Department of Fisheries (Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock) overcome by dysfunction and the general plunder of natural resources in the country. The Auditor-General's report of June 2015 already confirms this dysfunction. Except for two species, there is no fish biomass data; there are no fisheries management plans in place; fishermen are operating in fish breeding sites; landing sites are not regulated; the department has 'low staffing levels, inadequate land and water

transport, and untimely, inadequate funding’.¹

IUCN is currently assisting the government ‘to revise and strengthen legal frameworks and institutional arrangements and to provide guidance and recommendations on mainstreaming climate change and biodiversity aspects into planning’, with field projects taking place in Nsama District (Lake Mweru-Wantipa) and Mpulungu District (Lake Tanganyika and Tondwa and Kaputa GMAs) where the increases in temperatures they say range from .5 to 2 degrees Celsius. In March 2018, the Climate Change Framework Strategy and Action Plan for Nsumbu National Park were endorsed. ‘It was agreed that the climate change strategy and action plan, or sections of it, will be implemented as part of the park’s updated General Management Plan (GMP) as part of the 2015 Zambia Wildlife Act’.

But whether climate change or global warming is fact or fiction, the reality is that all villagers, all citizens, must stand up for the land and waters in which they live, must reform the predatory capitalist system and the corrupt political and judicial alliance. The multi-party and Big Money alliances that impose austerity on the masses and further enrich themselves must be defeated.

We must awaken our dormant spirituality. The urbanized global north must be made to re-appraise how they deliver ‘aid’ and corporate philanthropy, how they plunder fixed and renewable resources; they must be made to change how they deal with people marching to a different drummer. There, out in the game lands on the ground, the safari hunters, anti-hunters, animal protectors, conservationists, photo-hunters, lodge operators, agro-ecologists must join with the villagers in the battle to save the wildlife commons.

Zambia must embrace the Guardians of Nature and their traditional knowledge assisted by Landsafe - not landgrab, an eco-religious movement, not an energy substitution race to provide continuing riches and power for the destroyer 1% - the plutonomy. But has it all gone too far to change the game, capitalism’s cooking pot held above the flames by the three rusting legs

¹ “Report Of The Auditor General On Sustainable Management Of Fish Resources In Natural Waters.” Auditor-General Zambia, June 2015. Web. 9 July 2017. <<http://www.ago.gov.zm/reports/Special/2015/FISHERIES%20print.pdf>>.

of financialization, neoliberalism and globalization? And what is humankind prepared to do about it? Will we take the advice of Dylan Thomas and rage against the dying of the light? After all, customary people are doing something about it.

When the PF regime in July 2019 ordered the police to cancel a planned 'the Zambia we want' press conference by the Senior and Concerned Citizen Group - supposed to have been addressed by the venerable activist Simon Zukas and Gilbert Temba, it is time to bring about change in Zambia.

Citizens' Assemblies must be introduced into Zambia and build on a manifesto so that Zambians can have a more direct say in governing the country, and the customary commoners of the chiefdoms - the villagers - must take full charge of their customary land. As the Economist Intelligence Unit has discovered, the neocolonial government's functioning in Zambia is one of Africa's poorest. It is time to re-discover the culture and the genius of kinship.

I

THE CHIEFDOM GUARDIANS

Ecosocial Chiefdoms

*If one knew, he wondered, the facts, would one have to feel pity even for the planets?
If one reached what they called the heart of the matter?*

Graham Greene - *The Heart of the Matter* (1948)

And to my late Mom, Millia Londani Charuza, who grew up in a non-literate society and whose only education was the performance of rituals designed to reinforce social stability and transmit patterns of behaviour necessary for the welfare of the community. She passed them on.

Mario Kawayawaya – [Captured Between Islands](#) (2018)

To destroy Earth is to destroy our life force. For an African, therefore, there is no after-life without Earth.

John Kanya Koma - [Ubuntu, Jesus and Earth](#)

Ubuntu (a Zulu word) serves as the spiritual foundation of African societies. It is a unifying vision or world view enshrined in the Zulu maxim, umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu, i.e. “a person is a person through other persons”.

Augustine Shutte - *Philosophy for Africa* (1993)

Indigenous cultures have known for thousands of years that a human-centred

perspective always leads to dangerous imbalance. Without earnest reflection that seeks complementarity between this Indigenous worldview precept and the anthropocentrism of the dominant worldview, we will continue our death march.

[Four Arrows](#) - Can Adopting a Complementary Indigenous Perspective Save Us?

[The crisis consists](#) precisely because the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum, a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.

Antonio Gramsci

* * *

The Challenge

Zambia must transform itself, its customary commoners banding together under an Ubuntu Christian guardians culture to fight such as dam construction, mining, landgrabs, carbon offsets, fish and game commercial poaching, seed colonialism, soil destruction and poisoning, and state and neocolonial capture of the chiefdoms land and natural resources. And, it must fight the biodiversity extinction and ecosystems ecocide by vigorously asserting its eco-religious traditions and commoner tenure rights of old. In short, a transformative revolution is required.

Out there on the customary commons are indigenous peoples who live outside the tyranny of the Gross National Product (GDP), who collaborate through workgroups, discourage 'tall poppies' and corrupt big man, dispense justice of sorts, have a deep reverence for their 'living ancestors' who once required that Mother Earth be cared for by their Guardians of Nature guilds,

even though they always struggled against the forces of malign sorcery. It is just that they are increasingly forced into an alien, ravaged mindset by outside coercion and rent-seeking and hard times, some of it due to their chiefs not safeguarding their welfare and that of the land. However, they can do little about enforced land alienations for industrial agriculture and mining by the supreme big man president and the signing on with neoliberal perversions such as REDD+, a gross product of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and a neo-colonial landgrab.² Then, the World Bank's [Enabling the Business of Agriculture \(EBA\) project](#) advocates reforms in favour of agribusiness by weakening regulations over seeds, fertilizers and pesticides and strengthening foreign agribusiness power influence. Missing from the partnership are urban peasants squatting in slums with no toilets and indigenous peoples whose livelihoods depend on traditional land uses.

Customary commons villagers are not energy freaks. Indeed they are a major positive factor in the immediate world ecocide, for they are the only free people living, neither urban proletariat nor rural state-controlled peasant. Though politician and government bureaucrat and landgrabber make every attempt to reduce them to a state of peasanthood, something enforced horribly on Alice Lenshina's Lumpa Church's followers in the 1960s on the attainment of self-rule. The world can learn certain truths from Zambia's indigenous peoples energy-free traditional rural lifestyle, poor as it may seem to outsiders, reminding the West of its pre-industrial revolution and communal way of life before the horror of the Enclosures. We need to be reminded of this.³

² Lohmann, Larry. "Nigger" and "Nature": Expanding the Concept of Environmental Racism." *World Rainforest Movement Bulletin* 223. N.p., Apr. 2016. Web. 16 Apr. 2017.

http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/sites/thecornerhouse.org.uk/files/NNEng_0.pdf

³ Bollier, David. "Beyond Development: The Commons as a New/Old Paradigm of Human Flourishing." *Resilience*. N.p., 27 June 2016. Web. 16 April 2017.

<http://www.resilience.org/stories/2016-06-27/beyond-development-the-commons-a-s-a-new-old-paradigm-of-human-flourishing>

An International Ecosocialist Manifesto

An Ecosocial Manifesto was launched in 2001 by Joel Kovel and Michael Lowy.

The twenty-first century opens on a catastrophic note, with an unprecedented degree of ecological breakdown and a chaotic world order beset with terror and clusters of low-grade, disintegrative warfare that spread like gangrene across great swathes of the planet—viz., central Africa, the Middle East, Northwestern South America—and reverberate throughout the nations.

In our view, the crises of ecology and those of societal breakdown are profoundly interrelated and should be seen as different manifestations of the same structural forces. The former broadly stems from rampant industrialization that overwhelms the earth's capacity to buffer and contain ecological destabilization. The latter stems from the form of imperialism known as globalization, with its disintegrative effects on societies that stand in its path. Moreover, these underlying forces are essentially different aspects of the same drive, which must be identified as the central dynamic that moves the whole: the expansion of the world capitalist system.

We reject all euphemisms or propagandistic softening of the brutality of this regime: all greenwashing of its ecological costs, all mystification of the human costs under the names of democracy and human rights. We insist instead upon looking at capital from the standpoint of what it has really done.

Acting on nature and its ecological balance, the regime, with its

imperative to constantly expand profitability, exposes ecosystems to destabilizing pollutants, fragments habitats that have evolved over aeons to allow the flourishing of organisms, squanders resources, and reduces the sensuous vitality of nature to the cold exchangeability required for the accumulation of capital.

***From the side of humanity,** with its requirements for self-determination, community, and a meaningful existence, capital reduces the majority of the world's people to a mere reservoir of labor power while discarding much of the remainder as useless nuisances. It has invaded and undermined the integrity of communities through its global mass culture of consumerism and depoliticization. It has expanded disparities in wealth and power to levels unprecedented in human history. It has worked hand in glove with a network of corrupt and subservient client states whose local elites carry out the work of repression while sparing the center of its opprobrium. And it has set going a network of transtatal organizations under the overall supervision of the Western powers and the superpower United States, to undermine the autonomy of the periphery and bind it into indebtedness while maintaining a huge military apparatus to enforce compliance to the capitalist center.*

***We believe** that the present capitalist system cannot regulate, much less overcome, the crises it has set going. It cannot solve the ecological crisis because to do so requires setting limits upon accumulation—an unacceptable option for a system predicated upon the rule: **Grow or Die!** And it cannot solve the crisis posed by terror and other forms of violent rebellion because to do so would mean abandoning the logic of empire, which would impose unacceptable limits on growth and the whole “way of life” sustained by empire. Its only remaining option is to resort to brutal force, thereby increasing alienation and sowing the seed of further terrorism . . . and further counter-terrorism, evolving into a new and malignant variation of fascism.*

In sum, the capitalist world system is historically bankrupt. It has become an empire unable to adapt, whose very gigantism exposes its underlying weakness. It is, in the language of ecology, profoundly unsustainable, and must be changed fundamentally, nay, replaced, if there is to be a future worth living.

Thus the stark choice once posed by **Rosa Luxemburg** returns: **Socialism or Barbarism!**, where the face of the latter now reflects the imprint of the intervening century and assumes the countenance of ecocatastrophe, terror counterterror, and their fascist degeneration.

But why socialism, why revive this word seemingly consigned to the rubbish-heap of history by the failings of its twentieth century interpretations? For this reason only: that however beaten down and unrealized, the notion of socialism still stands for the supersession of capital. If capital is to be overcome, a task now given the urgency of the survival of civilization itself, the outcome will perforce be “socialist,” for that is the term which signifies the breakthrough into a post-capitalist society. If we say that capital is radically unsustainable and breaks down into the barbarism outlined above, then we are also saying that we need to build a “socialism” capable of overcoming the crises capital has set going. And if “socialisms” past have failed to do so, then it is our obligation, if we choose against submitting to a barbarous end, to struggle for one that succeeds. And just as barbarism has changed in a manner reflective of the century since Luxemburg enunciated her fateful alternative, so too, must the name, and the reality, of a “socialism” become adequate for this time.

It is for these reasons that we choose to name our interpretation of “socialism” as an ecosocialism, and [dedicate ourselves to its realization.](#)

Indigenous Kinship

If Africa is to take her rightful place among the continents, we shall have to proceed on different lines and evolve a policy which will not force her institutions into an alien European mould, but which will preserve her unity with her own past, conserve what is precious in her past, and build her future progress and civilization on specifically African foundations.

J. C. Smuts - Africa And Some World Problems (1930)

We are propagating materialism by every means in our power and at the very time when it has been most discredited in our own civilization... the good of the community used to be his standard: we have substituted the wealth of the individual.

F.H. Melland - African Dilemma (1937)

Descent from populations, who inhabited the country or geographical region at the time of conquest, colonization or establishment of present state boundaries. They retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions, irrespective of their legal status.

Indigenous - International Labour Organization, Convention No. 169.

The Bantu invaders of the territory were predominantly hoe-agriculturists of a pre-industrial culture, with a few tribes such as the Tonga, Ila, Lozi and Ngoni pastoralists but also dependent on hunter-gathering and fishing in the well-watered territory. Canoes were dugouts, loin coverings, barkcloth and antelope skin – with some spinning and weaving of kidney cloth - and they smelted hoe, spear and axe heads.[xv] The BSA Company recorded that when they established Mirongo and Ikawa in 1897 in present-day Northern Province, they found a thriving local industry: the Bemba making bark and cotton cloth; the Bisa cotton cloth - until overrun by the Angoni; the Senga producing good quality tobacco and spun cloth; the Awiwa smelting iron and making implements; and the Wanjamwezi and Swahili making mats and boxes. But by World War I, there were no industries, imports having destroyed all native manufacturing.[xvi]

The patriarchal invaders such as the Bemba and the Ngoni were noted for the rule of tyrants and extreme savagery; behaviour ameliorated later by contact with the British. From this time, reasonably well-developed native African models of community self-government arose, particularly among the Barotse, the latter characterized by an elaborate central political authority from 1885 that has since self-rule in 1964 come under some form of attack by successive Zambian governments. Although Bantu societies all have a rich set of kinships and clans, they vary considerably according to custom. When raided by the Matabele, Tonga had no chiefs and lived in small villages in maternal descent groups. There were then twelve matrilineal clans, some of them linked as ‘joking partners’, signifying a close and privileged relationship. The clan kinship system was – and still is in rural areas - the *sine qua non* of indigenous life, as the early pioneer Stephenson observed:[xvii]

But, of course, they would only help members of their clan or family, or

surname – the last is, perhaps, the nearest equivalent according to our lights. In other words, these people would regard all Smiths in the world, all Browns, all Robinsons, as of the same descent: all Smiths are relations, all Browns are relations, but no Smith is any kind of relative to a Brown – certainly not! Natives of the same surname have, among themselves, particular rights and privileges: they will do for their “brothers” what they would do for themselves. But the strangers from another ‘surname’ is, as the scriptures say, “not with us,” and therefore “against us” – and is treated accordingly.

The Three Principles of Bantu Life

Bantu clan and tribal life - showing a remarkable similarity over a wide area, was wrought in the fires of isolation and environmental hardship. Three principles have long governed their existence:[xviii]

1. The idea of the intimate relation of the natural and supernatural worlds with the consequent interplay of religious and secular functions - the immanence of the supernatural;
2. the conception of tribal and clan unity in both worlds, and the social and moral philosophy built on that foundation;
3. the complicated and interlocking organization of economic reciprocity which regulates the rights and duties of individuals in the various groups, often overlapping, some permanent, others temporary, to which they belong.

What distinguishes the Bantu is their level of social organization and kinship known as The House, established by what was know as a big man. The House continuously competed for members with other Houses, comprising 10-40 people, i.e. an agricultural unit for coppicing, clearing, trapping and hunting.

The House could become extremely large, depending on the soil fertility of the area:[xix]

Membership included kinfolk of the big man, but also friends, clients, and various dependents as well. big man were usually polygamous and gave some of their wives as consorts to young clients to attract men to the House. The ideology of the House was based on the fiction that it was a family, that is, a bilateral group...The big man was the father of all the others and the term for his father was probably a term of address for the leader...there were no lineages, because the definition of lineage requires that the group's descent be 'unilineal', that is, counted through one gender only, consequently free men had a wide choice as to the establishment they cared to join. They could stay with their parents, move to their mother's brothers' House, or to the Houses of any of their grandparents. The village was an aggregate of Houses, led by the big man who founded it, assisted by the big men of the other Houses... the village defended a domain and defended it against outsiders... the village head also received a portion of the hunt. The village, therefore, was the very foundation of society.

Therefore, the wealth of indigenous people is measured in the extent of social networks where "rights-in-persons remain a respectable and rational way to invests and display wealth".[xx] People in rural areas do not act as individuals seeking to advance their wealth beyond those with whom they live. Before colonization, in particular, Nature and man formed an inviolable relationship bound by religion. Elaborate rituals governed this relationship, something carried out – in addition to the 'living ancestors' - by appointed guardians having authority over particular waters where fish were plentiful or by guilds who protected and held the rights to hunt elephant and certain other game species.

Tonga organized themselves around a *sikatongo* (earth priest) and *basangu* (spirit mediums), existing as an ecological state rather than a political entity. Using the *lwiindi* (rain-calling ritual), a *sikatongo* attracted followers, acting

as the land guardian against raiding tribes and colonists. As described by Kaoma:[xxi]

Leza' (God), is the Supreme Vital Force and the source of life who is concerned with community welfare. Of considerable importance are the malende sacred shrines, particular places at which the basangu make appeals during times of stress. In common with most Africans, certain animals are considered ancestral avenues through which ancestors visit their former communities and are often recognized by their descendants. If there is anything that the lwiindi illustrates, it is the belief that ancestors are resident with us on Earth and depend on the produce of Earth for their continual existence. To destroy Earth is to destroy our life force. For an African, therefore, there is no after-life without Earth.

With colonization under British Indirect Rule, the customary commons were fully demarcated, in some cases under new tribal creations with appointed chiefs and headmen who had previously not held such positions.[xxii] Gordon presciently remarked that,

This led to the marginalization of an ecological ideology that had integrated discourses about society with those about nature. The new bureaucracy separated people and nature; nature becoming an object acted on by people, rather than an integral part of societal forces.[xxiii]

While aboriginal people were hunter-gatherers having no impact on natural resources, the successive waves of Bantu invaders in some areas introduced mass game hunting techniques and twenty-one systems of land usage into the territory, the latter mostly of the type developed for forest land.[xxiv] Five staple crops were grown out of more than 100 varieties, of which four were cereals (maize, sorghum, millet and bulrush millet) and one root crop (cassava). Except for some examples of more permanent agriculture based on livestock, these were traditional systems. These systems had in common that they were adaptations and survival strategies of small groups of people,

of low population density, to soils that were highly leached and acidic, in a region governed by an extended annual dry season of seven months. Notable were some shifting cultivation strategies of the *chitemene* type where trees are lopped, whole or in part, and then burnt, the crop seeds planted in the soil and ash for one or two seasons.

With the coming of the BSA Company, notions of forest conservation and land management were introduced that had developed due to the long-settled history of people in the British Isles and written into the King's Law of Magna Carta in 1215. In particular, this affected traditional conservation systems, particularly the fishing and hunting guilds, made considerably worse when the BSA Company introduced the alien concepts of leasehold and freehold land. After political independence, all land was vested in the President of Zambia, powers copied from the British Crown since 1066, still – only in theory - owning all Crown land in the four nations and Canada, New Zealand and Australia.

For the people of the Great Central African plateau who required extensive areas of miombo woodland to carry out *chitemene* (pollarding), any population increase and a more sedentary existence negatively affected the environment. Reports of the extremely wasteful deforestation that took place among the Bemba after their slaving had been brought under control points to this change, their young men taking great pride in cutting down trees, the area far exceeding what was needed for crops, particularly in the southern *chitemene* system where some twenty times the amount of land required annually for crops was swiddened.[xxv]

The agricultural methods of the Bantu invaders were highly developed adaptations to the environment. But the sudden imposition of the plough and other more modern methods caused difficulties, for the culture of people with long-honed survival strategies do not easily absorb sudden change. Moreover, where the movement of Bantu was restricted due to the imposition of native reserves, by concessions taken by chartered companies, and by European settlers - as occurred in present-day Eastern Province and along the railway - some ecological degeneration took place. And the imposition of mines drew men away from their families and lead to village labour shortages and other

adverse effects on the fabric of customary society.[xxvi]

The acquisition of much of the territory by Cecil Rhodes's British South Africa Chartered Company (BSA Company) under a royal charter in 1889 had taken place in the late Victorian era, a time of formal manners and a unifying Christian set of moral standards.[xxvii] This manifested itself in a non-relativist attitude when dealing with the African, i.e. they did not believe in the philosophical position that all points of view are equally valid and that all truth is relative to the individual. The colonials did not believe that anything goes. They had one standard - as did the indigenous people.

[xv] Gluckman, Max. "Social Anthropology in Central Africa, in Human Problems in British Central Africa." The Rhodes-Livingstone Institute Journal XX (1956): pp.1-27.

[xvi] "Industries of Natives in Bembaland, 1890-1927" Chinsali District Notebook Vol 1. p. 190. Web. 17 July 2017. https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B0sCBiNNeEh_c2Z1Vng0aEpoS1k/view?usp=sharing

[xvii] Stephenson, J.E. Chirupula's Tale: A Bye-way in African History. London: Geoffrey Bles, 1937.

[xviii] Culwick, A.T. Good Out of Africa: a study in the relativity of morals. The Rhodes-Livingstone Papers No. 8, Manchester University Press. 1943.

[xix] [Vansina, Jan. "Communities and Big Men." Paths in the Rainforests: Toward a History of Political Tradition in Equatorial Africa. Madison, Wis., U of Wisconsin, 1990. pp. 78-81.](#)

[xx] Gordon, David M. Nachituti's Gift: Economy, Society and Environment in Central Africa. The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison. 2006. p.23.

[xxi] Kaoma, Kapya, John. Ubuntu, Jesus and Earth: integrating African religion and Christianity in ecological ethics. PhD dissertation, Boston University. 2010.

[xxii] Melland, Frank & Young, Cullen. African Dilemma. London, United

Soc'y for Christian Literature eds., 1937. p.39.

[xxiii] Gordon, David M. *Nachituti's Gift: Economy, Society and Environment in Central Africa*. The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison. 2006. p. 83

[xxiv] Winterbottom, J. M. *The Ecology of Man and Plants in Northern Rhodesia*, in Max Gluckman and J.M. Winterbottom, eds., *Human Problems in British Central Africa III*, Rhodes-Livingstone Journal. 1945.

[xxv] Gluckman, Max. *How the Bemba make their living: an appreciation of Richards' Land, Labour and Diet in Northern Rhodesia*, in Max Gluckman and J.M. Winterbottom, eds., *Human Problems in British Central Africa III*, Rhodes-Livingstone Journal. 1945.

[xxvi] Gluckman. *How the Bemba make their living*. 1945.

Indigenous Rights

Of critical importance to modern customary landholders is how far national law supports the land rights it delivers and the norms operated to sustain these...

The African Union's Commission on Human and People's Rights defines indigenous peoples as mainly hunter-gatherers and pastoralists. This grouping comprises around 25 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa, only six percent of Africans who govern their land relations through customary norms today. In this series of briefs, all Africans are regarded as indigenous, and accordingly, the terms customary and indigenous tenure are used interchangeably.

Liz Alden Wily - Customary Land Tenure in the Modern World (2012)

The inhabitants of the territory before the arrival of Europeans, i.e. Westerners

Distinct social and cultural groups that share collective ancestral ties to the lands and natural resources where they live, occupy or from which they have been displaced.

The World Bank

This refers to Afrocentric ways of providing a social safety net to vulnerable members of society. Common elements include collectivity. The approach helps to 'validate worldview and traditions suppressed by Eurocentric cultural hegemony.'^[32] *It is against materialism and individualism. It looks at an individual person as holistically. The social interventions done by social workers, welfare workers and development workers should strengthen, not weaken families, communities, society, the environment and peoples's spirituality. These are the 5 pillars of ubuntu intervention: family, community. society, environment and spirituality.*^[3]

Wikipedia - Ubuntu social work, welfare and development

According to this philosophy, 'actions are right roughly insofar as they are a matter of living harmoniously with others or honouring communal relationships', 'One's ultimate goal should be to become a full person, a real self or a genuine human being'. [Ukama](#), i.e. relationships are important.^[36] *Among the Shona people for example, when a person dies, his or her property is shared amongst relatives and there are culturally approved ways of doing this. The practice is called [kugova](#). Samkange (1980)'s maxim on morality says "If and when one is faced with a decisive choice between wealth and the preservation of the life of another human being, then one should opt for the preservation of life".*

Wikipedia - Ubuntu moral philosophy or ubuntu morality

* * *

The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples

UNDRIP

UNDRIP was adopted by the General Assembly on Thursday, 13 September 2007, by a majority of 144 states in favour, 4 votes against (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States) and 11 abstentions (Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, **Burundi**, Colombia, Georgia, **Kenya**, **Nigeria**, Russian Federation, Samoa and Ukraine)

Recognizing the urgent need to respect and promote the inherent rights of indigenous peoples which derive from their political, economic and social structures and from their cultures, spiritual traditions, histories and philosophies, especially their rights to their lands, territories and resources,

Convinced that control by indigenous peoples over developments affecting them and their lands, territories and resources will enable them to maintain and strengthen their institutions, cultures and traditions, and to promote their development in accordance with their aspirations and needs,

Article 3

Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

Article 4

Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions.

INDIGENOUS RIGHTS

Article 18

Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in decision-making in matters which would affect their rights, through representatives chosen by themselves in accordance with their own procedures, as well as to maintain and develop their own indigenous decision-making institutions.

Article 20

1. Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and develop their political, economic and social systems or institutions, to be secure in the enjoyment of their own means of subsistence and development, and to engage freely in all their traditional and other economic activities.

2. Indigenous peoples deprived of their means of subsistence and development are entitled to just and fair redress.

Article 25

Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual relationship with their traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and used lands, territories, waters and coastal seas and other resources and to uphold their responsibilities to future generations in this regard.

Article 26

1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.

2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories and resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or use, as well as those which they have otherwise acquired.

3. States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories and resources. Such recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned.

Article 27 States shall establish and implement, in conjunction with indigenous peoples concerned, a fair, independent, impartial, open and transparent process, giving due recognition to indigenous peoples' laws,

traditions, customs and land tenure systems, to recognize and adjudicate the rights of indigenous peoples pertaining to their lands, territories and resources, including those which were traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used. Indigenous peoples shall have the right to participate in this process.

Article 28

1. Indigenous peoples have the right to redress, by means that can include restitution or, when this is not possible, just, fair and equitable compensation, for the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used, and which have been confiscated, taken, occupied, used or damaged without their free, prior and informed consent.

2. Unless otherwise freely agreed upon by the peoples concerned, compensation shall take the form of lands, territories and resources equal in quality, size and legal status or of monetary compensation or other appropriate redress.

Article 29

1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the conservation and protection of the environment and the productive capacity of their lands or territories and resources. States shall establish and implement assistance programmes for indigenous peoples for such conservation and protection, without discrimination.

2. States shall take effective measures to ensure that no storage or disposal of hazardous materials shall take place in the lands or territories of indigenous peoples without their free, prior and informed consent.

3. States shall also take effective measures to ensure, as needed, that programmes for monitoring, maintaining and restoring the health of indigenous peoples, as developed and implemented by the peoples affected by such materials, are duly implemented.

Article 32

1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for the development or use of their lands or territories and other resources.

INDIGENOUS RIGHTS

2. States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources.

3. States shall provide effective mechanisms for just and fair redress for any such activities, and appropriate measures shall be taken to mitigate adverse environmental, economic, social, cultural or spiritual impact.

Article 34 Indigenous peoples have the right to promote, develop and maintain their institutional structures and their distinctive customs, spirituality, traditions, procedures, practices and, in the cases where they exist, juridical systems or customs, in accordance with international human rights standards.

UN General Assembly Approves Resolution “Rights of Indigenous Peoples” (2020)

On [19 November 2020](#), the Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee (Third Committee) of the 75th session of the General Assembly discussed the **Rights of Indigenous Peoples**. The Committee took up the draft resolution “Rights of indigenous peoples” (document [A/C.3/75/L.20/Rev.1](#)).

The Committee took up the draft resolution “Rights of indigenous peoples” (document [A/C.3/75/L.20/Rev.1](#)).

The resolution, among other issues, includes:

1 The decision to convene a high-level event in 2022, organized by the

President of the

General Assembly, for the launch of the International Decade of Indigenous

Languages, and further, request the Assembly President to support initiatives relevant

to the successful celebration of the International Decade, within existing resources; 1

2 Underscores the vital importance of full respect for the human rights of indigenous

peoples, who disproportionately face discrimination and xenophobia;

3 Underscores the disproportionate impact of the pandemic on the lives, health and

human rights of indigenous peoples and calls on Member States to ensure their

protection;

4 Encourages the World Health Organization and the United Nations Children's Fund

(UNICEF), among others, to conduct research on the causes of suicide among

indigenous youth and children and good practices in its prevention;

5 Underscores the need to ensure equal protection under the law and equality before

the courts for indigenous women and girls at all levels.

The representative of Bolivia, presenting the draft resolution, underscored the vital importance of the full respect for the human rights of indigenous peoples, who disproportionately face discrimination and xenophobia. Recalling that COVID-19 has infected more than 55 million people and killed 1.3 million, he said indigenous peoples represent 6 per cent of the global population but are among those most affected. They are at a greater risk of dying from diseases and suffer excessively from lockdown measures. The draft underscores the disproportionate impact of the pandemic on the lives, health and human rights of indigenous peoples

and calls on the lusMember States to ensure their protection.

The Committee approved the draft resolution “L.20/Rev.1” by consensus.

EGM: Conservation and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 23-25 January 2019 Nairobi, Kenya

4 December 2018

Indigenous peoples play a crucial role in the conservation of the environment. They make up around 5% of the global population and occupy, own or manage an estimated 20% to 25% of the Earth’s land surface. This land area holds 80% of the planet’s biodiversity and intersects with about 40% of all terrestrial protected areas and ecologically intact landscapes. While the expanse of protected areas nearly doubled from 8.7 million sq. km. to 16.1 million sq km. between 1980 and 2000, some estimates suggest that 50% of protected areas worldwide have been established on lands of indigenous peoples. This proportion is even higher in the Americas, where it may exceed 90% in Central America. The lands of indigenous peoples are very valuable for conservation as about 65% of them have not been intensively developed, compared with 44% of other lands.

However, indigenous peoples’ custodianship of the environment and ecosystems, and their rights to land and housing are unrecognized. They face the negative impacts of conservation programmes, which often have been based on the concept of protecting natural resources and biological diversity, while excluding human beings from these areas. Since the creation of the first State-designated protected area, Yellowstone Park, in the United States of America in 1872 and the subsequent Yosemite

National Park in 1890 whereby the US government violently expelled Native Americans living in or dependent on the resources in the areas, conservation interventions around the world have far too often resulted in gross violations of the rights of indigenous peoples, in particular to their rights to land and housing. This includes forced displacement and evictions from their territories; criminalization and destruction of livelihoods; loss of rights to lands and resources and sacred sites; violence and extrajudicial killings of environmental human rights defenders which have spoken out on behalf of their own indigenous communities Millions of indigenous persons have been dispossessed and displaced due to the exclusionary approach of protected-area management built on the premise that human activities are incompatible with conservation. This approach is often referred to as "fortress" conservation.

2018 High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development

9 July 2018

The [2018 High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development](#) (HLPF) took place from 9–18 July at the UN Headquarters in New York under the theme: “**Transformation towards sustainable and resilient societies**”.

The 2018 HLPF focused on the following Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs):

- Goal 6. Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all
- Goal 7. Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all
- Goal 11. Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable

INDIGENOUS RIGHTS

- Goal 12. Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns
- Goal 15. Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss
- Goal 17: Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development, which will be considered each year.

In 2018, 47 states were undergoing their Voluntary National Reviews (VNRs), including several countries with indigenous peoples (such as Australia, Bhutan, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Namibia, Niger, Paraguay, Republic of Congo, Sri Lanka and Uruguay). Find information on the VNRs and the full list of countries [here](#).

The Indigenous Peoples and Development Branch/Secretariat for the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues hosted a side event on “**Learning from Indigenous Peoples’ Traditional Knowledge**“. The event was co-sponsored by the Permanent Mission of Canada.

Ubuntu Christianity

Ubuntu, Jesus, and Earth: Integrating African Religion,
and Christianity in Ecological Ethics

[Kapya John Kaoma](#)⁴

⁴ Kaoma, Kapya, John. Ubuntu, Jesus and Earth: integrating African religion and Christianity in ecological ethics. PhD dissertation, Boston University. 2010.

ABSTRACT

Africa faces problems of ecological devastation caused by economic exploitation, rapid population growth, and poverty. Capitalism, residual colonialism, and corruption undermine Africa's efforts to forge a better future. The dissertation describes how in Africa the mounting ecological crisis has religious, political, and economic roots that enable and promote social and environmental harm. It presents the thesis that religious traditions, including their ethical expressions, can effectively address the crisis, ameliorate its impacts, and advocate for social and environmental betterment, now and in the future.

First, it examines African traditional religion and Christian teaching, which together provide the foundation for African Christianity. Critical examination of both religious worldviews uncovers their complementary emphases on human responsibility toward planet Earth and future generations. Second, an analysis of the Gwembe Tonga of Chief Simamba explores the interconnectedness of all elements of the universe in African

cosmologies. In Africa, an interdependent, participatory relationship exists between the world of animals, the world of humans, and the Creator. In discussing the annual *hwini* (rain calling) ceremony of Simamba, the study explores ecological overtones of African religions. Such rituals illustrate the involvement of ancestors and high gods in maintaining ecological integrity.

Third, the foundation of the African morality of abundant life is explored. Across Sub-Saharan Africa, ancestors' teachings are the foundation of morality; ancestors are guardians of the land. A complementary teaching that Christ is the ecological ancestor of all life can direct ethical responses to the ecological crisis. Fourth, the eco-social implications of *ubuntu* (what it means to be fully human) are examined. Some aspects of *ubuntu* are criticized in light of economic inequalities and corruption in Africa. However, *ubuntu* can be transformed to advocate for eco-social liberation.

Fifth, the study recognizes that in some cases conflicts exist between ecological values and religious teachings. This conflict is examined in terms of the contrast between awareness of socioeconomic problems caused by population growth, on the one hand,

and advocacy of a traditional African morality of abundant children, on the other hand. A change in the latter religious view is needed since overpopulation threatens sustainable living and the future of Earth. The dissertation concludes that the identification of Jesus with African ancestors and theological recognition of Jesus as the ecological ancestor, woven together with *ubuntu*, an ethic of interconnectedness, should characterize African consciousness and promote resolution of the socio-ecological crisis.

Most theologians put much emphasis on the social aspects of *ubuntu*, but African Earthkeepers point to its ecological aspect. In fact, *ubuntu* implies identifying and respecting the intrinsic value of God's creation. Any person who demeans this inherent value cannot be said to possess *ubuntu* at all. For this reason, what it means to be truly human (*ubuntu*) cannot be understood without addressing the kinship of all creation. It is to this reality that the incarnation of Christ points. Christ's incarnation does not just announce God's kinship with humanity; rather it announces that God can be found in creation even as creation is found in God. It is to this theological conviction that the ethics of *ubuntu* ought to be analyzed.

Page 1

Across Africa, living elders are the visible authority figures in society. Although chiefs and elders are expected to guide the living in making right moral choices, the ancestors and the *basanga* (whose sphere of knowledge is far superior to that of chiefs and living elders) are the just judges of human conduct. Unlike human elders who can easily err, ancestors are all-knowing, and therefore above human corruption. They hold the living accountable and expect them to abide by the set moral codes, thus "ancestorship primarily implies moral activity."¹⁴ As the *Lwinda* illustrated, natural

Africans used animals and other natural goods, but cruelty to animals was generally discouraged. Even wild animals experienced some community protection. Only edible animals were killed, and hunting for pleasure was unheard of. This is because Africans believed that animals were creatures of God or simply *children of God* with rights to life. Among the Tonga of the Gwembe for example, domestic animals are named after their dead relatives. Apart from the spiritual significance of such naming, the act shows how Africans relate to the natural world.

Africans experience abundant life in interdependent community relationships. Due to this community emphasis, African ethics has been declared "deeply anthropocentric," an assertion many theologians and philosophers have supported.

Page 113

In the African ontology of interconnectedness, human actions have community consequences. Whereas in Western ethics emphasis is placed on individual actions, rights and obligations, African ethics emphasizes the consequences and rewards of individual actions on a wider community. That which benefits the community is favored over that which favors an individual. For instance, if a person has wrongly killed another person, the entire clan is guilty of murder.

Page 116

Land as Common Trust

Throughout Africa, land is regarded as a public trust that belongs to the community of the past, present, and future generations. The living have access to the land but it is the duty of the living dead to safeguard the interests of future generations. When Africans refer to ancestors as guardians of the land, they are pointing to the role of the "living-dead" in ensuring the rights of future generations to the land. Although this subject will be explored in detail later, it is important to note that the theme of land as an ancestral trust is imperative in developing African ecological ethics.

Page 117

To Mbiti, African time moves backward rather than forward, and people emphasize events that are happening, or that have happened, rather than those that will or might happen in the future. Thus, Africans have "little or no active interest in events that lie in the future beyond, at most, two years from now; and the languages concerned lack words by which such events can be conceived or expressed."²⁴

Since the future does not constitute actual time, Mbiti argues, Africans consider only a relatively short future, which is part of the present (*sasa*). The *sasa* is the "now period," and has the sense of immediacy, nearness, and newness. It is the period of present concern, since the *sasa* is at the center of human existence. What lies beyond the *sasa* cannot exist, as it is beyond actualization. "*Sasa* is the time in which people are conscious of their existence, and within which they project themselves both into the short future and mainly into the past (*zamani*)."²⁵

Page 124

Another consequence of the money-based economy was that it distanced people from Mother Earth. It was one thing for an individual to make money without being connected to his/her community, but it was another for that individual to do so without being connected to the land. Natural goods which worked to build community life were exploited for individual economic benefits. Since competition rather than cooperation was the norm of the new economic order, Africans were forced to abandon their community values for Western ones.

Abundant life was now understood differently, as people individually and deceptively worked their way up into this new economic system. Land, which was once considered a "commons" and a trust, was now understood as a commodity to be sold for personal gain. This shift not only affected the African ontology but also reduced the value Africans put on *Earth*. In short, the promotion of an ethic of individualism in commerce, religion, and civic life created a moral crisis in African communities.

By defining the crisis as human caused, Christian spirituality can inculcate the ethic of replenishing as an applied biblical mandate to “serve” and “guard” the Earth (Gen 1.15). When people are conscious of the extinction of natural goods due to human overpopulation and environmental degradation, the value of replenishing becomes part of Africa’s Christian moral teaching. The African Earthkeepers’ ministry of tree planting is an excellent example of this ethic. Because African ethics is open to other ethical systems, Earthkeepers have employed diverse theological and scientific outlooks in their endeavor to heal the bleeding Earth. For instance, although they understand that God is the owner of creation, they also understand what types of trees would grow in specific environments by seeking scientific guidance.

Page 343

Finally, this work has argued that the ecological crisis in Africa demands the ecological face of Jesus. Since the Christ is the origin and an ecological ancestor of every species, his “vital force” is inherently active in every creature that exists. Ignoring the current environmental crisis while species are extincted and Earth dies, means ignoring the ethical sanctions of Christ, who is the origin-ancestor and ecological ancestor of all creation. It is, in effect, *spitting in the well from which we all drink*. Jesus, our ancestors and our descendants, however, demand more from us: *ubuntu* rather than indifference and exploitation should characterize African ecological consciousness and conduct.

Page 385

God's Family, God's Earth: Christian Ecological Ethics of Ubuntu

Kapya John Kaoma

Ubuntu is a concept that is central to the African worldview. It is a concept that is often translated as 'humanity' or 'humanness'. It is a concept that is often used to describe the relationship between individuals and the community. It is a concept that is often used to describe the relationship between individuals and the environment.

On a practical level, Ubuntu is a concept that is often used to describe the relationship between individuals and the community. It is a concept that is often used to describe the relationship between individuals and the environment. It is a concept that is often used to describe the relationship between individuals and the community.

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UBUNTU CHRISTIANITY

[illegible][illegible]

about the importance of being seen, and the importance of being seen by others. The author argues that the importance of being seen is not just a matter of vanity, but a matter of survival. In a world where everyone is competing for attention, being seen is a way to ensure that one's needs and desires are met. The author also discusses the importance of being seen by others, and how this can lead to a sense of community and belonging. The author concludes by arguing that the importance of being seen is a universal truth that applies to all people in all cultures.

Citizens' Assemblies

Citizens' Assemblies - by Marcin Gerwin

Guide to democracy that works.

- 1 High-quality decisions developed with the involvement of citizens.*
- 2 The common good is at the heart of the process.*
- 3 Decisions are developed by an independent group of citizens, thanks to the process of random selection.*
- 4 Decisions are made after learning about the issue and listening to people with diverse perspectives. The process includes the deliberation phase and consultations with experts.*
- 5 High-level consent for decisions - at least 80 percent support of the*

citizens' assembly.

6 The process of organizing a citizens' assembly encourages institutions and organizations to search for solutions and to prepare their recommendations.

7 New possibilities and solutions may appear thanks to the nature of the process, which involves the presentation of a wide range of views and perspectives.

8 It is a transparent way of making decisions.

[PDF book.](#)

[Epub](#)

Website: <https://citizensassemblies.org/>

*A **citizens' assembly** is a new form of democracy where decisions are made at a city, national or even at the international level. A citizens' assembly is a randomly selected group of residents according to demographic criteria such as gender and age. It constitutes a city or a country in miniature. The role of a citizens' assembly is an in-depth analysis of a given issue, a deliberation over different solutions, hearing of the pros and cons, and then, making informed decisions.*

Marcin Gerwin's guide is a step-by-step presentation of how to organize a citizens' assembly, with the primary focus on the city level.

Contents

1. Democracy that works
2. Preparation before the citizens' assembly
3. Topic selection
4. Duration of the citizens' assembly
5. Organization team
6. Size of the citizens' assembly
7. Ideal composition of the citizens' assembly
8. Individual profiles

9. Sending invitations
10. Registration of persons willing to participate in the citizens' assembly
11. Promotional campaign
12. Random selection of members of the citizens' assembly
13. Allowance for members of the citizens' assembly
14. Open consultations
15. Programme preparation – learning phase
16. Building an atmosphere – integration phase
17. Programme verification
18. Facilitators
19. Developing recommendations
20. Decision-making – verification of consensus
21. Announcement of the results of the citizens' assembly
22. Implementation of recommendations
23. Citizens' assemblies as a permanent element of democracy
24. Appendix: Basic standards for organizing citizens' assemblies

1. Democracy that works

Imagine a group of people of different ages who meet in order to settle some matter important for a city, a country or for the European Union. This group was not selected through elections but by lot. It was done in such a way that its structure reflects basic demographic characteristics of a given city or country. People's age, gender, place of residence and education level were taken into consideration. In the country-level citizens' assembly it is worthwhile to consider the division into the city and the village. Thus one obtains a city or a country in miniature.

Such a group does not have to be big. It may include 50 or 100 persons. It can be larger when the topic of the assembly is, e.g., changes in the constitution. Its size depends on the size of the city or the country, as well as on the organizational capabilities. It is crucial that the group be considered representative; it should inspire trust and take into

consideration a variety of perspectives and life experiences.

That group will for the following days listen to presentations by experts, representatives of authorities, NGOs and other groups with an interest or expertise in the topic. They will read expert analyses and comments sent by other residents who were not selected to the assembly by lot. Their role is to study a given topic in depth and consider which solutions will be most favourable from the perspective of the common good.

The best name for this group in English, in my opinion, is a citizens' assembly. In Poland we use the name "panel obywatelski" – a citizens' panel, which is also fine. Citizens' assemblies, in different forms and under different names, were 18 organized, among other places, in Australia, Canada, Ireland and USA. They can be organized on almost any topic. The principal limitation here is the time which is needed for the learning phase and for familiarizing oneself with the information necessary to make an informed decision. A short citizens' assembly can be spread over four Saturdays – two days for the learning phase and two days for deliberation – if the matter is simple, however, if need be, there can be a dozen meetings and the entire assembly may be spread over even two years. It all depends on a topic. This method is, by principle, defined as a long-term deliberation.

What good does it do? First of all, it provides an opportunity for a high quality of decisions. Members of the citizens' assembly are selected by lot instead of being selected in elections or indicated by someone, thanks to which they can be independent in their judgements. In Poland both the group who will receive the invitations as well as the final group are selected by lot. Only the persons who received the invitation may join the assembly. Due to the fact that there are no elections, there is no political competition among the members of the citizens' assembly – thinking of running the election campaign is completely redundant. One can then focus on the issue the assembly is dealing with and there is no need to worry that if someone changes their mind, then they will not be selected for the assembly again, they will lose their position in their party or in the eyes of their voters. Psychological mechanisms regarding elections do

not occur during the assembly at all – there exists nothing here which could cause them. Deliberative democracy simply works in a different way.

Before making a decision, the members of the citizens' assembly familiarise themselves in detail with a given topic. They gain knowledge they might not have had before the commencement of the assembly. The premise is that during the learning phase experts present the possibly broadest spectrum of perspectives and solutions in a given matter. Next, in the part of stakeholders' presentations, the representatives of NGOs or institutions are invited to present their positions under the same principles – they enjoy the same time slot for a presentation and their order is selected by lot. The aim is to provide equal opportunities to present different options. Every organization may also send any number of additional educational materials. One councillor from the city of Łódź noted after observing the citizens' assembly in Gdańsk, as a councillor she did not receive such an extensive range of information before making a decision.

The mere fact that the fullest possible spectrum of potential solutions is presented enables the quality of decisions made by the assembly to be potentially higher than if there was no assembly. When a citizens' assembly is organised, experts can be invited who would be disregarded during the standard procedure of decision-making by the municipal office or the government. And it is their proposals which could gain the greatest support of the members of the citizens' assembly and become the most favourable from the perspective of the common good.

Members of the citizens' assembly think of what will be the most beneficial for them as residents, not from the perspective of the next elections but their entire lives, as well as lives of their children and grandchildren. Such was the attitude of the members of the citizens' assembly in Gdańsk when they were making a decision regarding what to do to improve the air quality in the city. They were thinking in the long-term perspective, not only about themselves, but also about their children. Hence, they decided to adopt very definitive solutions regarding the improvement of air quality, i.e. a total ban on burning coal in 20

household furnaces. They did not have to wonder what would the director of the department or the mayor would say, whether they would gain or lose in the voters' eyes. They are the voters and they are the ones who employ the director of the department or the mayor. They make decisions from the position of supreme authority which in democracy are ordinary people. In Poland, this supreme authority of the society (the people) is guaranteed to us in the constitution in article 4.

What is equally crucial when organising a citizens' assembly is to create a positive atmosphere which is conducive to favourable conditions for a conversation and an in-depth consideration of which solutions are the best. At the same time, the transparency of the process is guaranteed – the presentations of experts and stakeholders in the learning phase are transmitted live online and recorded, so it is known who proposes what. In turn, the aspect of universality is guaranteed in such a way that all interested residents may send their comments and remarks to the members of the citizens' assembly.

2. Preparation before the citizens' assembly

It is ideal when the recommendations of the citizens' assembly in a given matter are treated as binding and are implemented. A decision to that effect should therefore be made at the very beginning by the mayor or the councillors. The citizens' assembly may be conducted as public consultations – it will then be a poll on people's expectations in that regard. However, the involvement of members of the citizens' assembly, experts, the municipal office and the organizations will be greater if it is known from the start that whatever is agreed, will be implemented. For a binding effect of the decisions made by the citizens' assembly, it is not necessary to change the law, it can be done informally. A declaration of the mayor or the city council that the assembly's decision will be respected is sufficient. The participatory budgeting has worked under such principles in Poland for many years. Obviously, a change of law would be ideal and if such opportunity arises, it should be done. Nonetheless, one can start with a

declaration.

In Gdańsk, it was agreed that the recommendations which gained the support of the members of the citizens' assembly at 80% will be deemed binding. If the support for a given proposal is lower, then it is treated as a suggestion which the mayor may but does not have to take into consideration. The level of 80% was agreed as almost a complete consensus – a supermajority – it is something that the group of residents considers to be obvious. Such a high threshold of support gives comfort that it will not be an accidental thing but the support for a given proposal will be very high indeed.

If in a given city the rules of public consultation are already adopted (in Poland they are adopted by the city council), then the citizens' assembly should be listed as one of the forms of public consultations.

While organising the first citizens' assembly at the city level, one might consider also organising workshops for the city officials and NGOs (separately), presenting to them how it functions, dispelling any doubts and thus creating a positive atmosphere around the citizens' assembly. An ideal approach on the part of the municipal office is the following: "Dear residents, we would like to find out what your needs and expectations are in this matter. So far, we have been doing this and that, perhaps, however, you would need something more or something different? We are open to your recommendations since our role is to act for your good." Then, it will work.

It should be noted at the very beginning that the recommendations of the citizens' assembly may vary from the results of public polls or open public consultations. The reason for this is that the members of the citizens' assembly make a decision based on the gained knowledge and deliberation. Their position in a given matter may significantly differ at the end from the one at the beginning of the assembly. This is evident in the research done on numerous occasions by James Fishkin who organised deliberative polling. For example, in 2011 the participants of the deliberative poll in South Korea thought at the beginning that the continuation of humanitarian aid for North Korea, regardless of the

threat of nuclear weapon, is not necessary (43%), after the deliberation, however, they changed their mind and 78% of the members of the citizens' assembly were in favour of the continuation of the aid. Thus a transparent course of the education phase of the citizens' assembly is important so that everyone can see the basis on which the decision was made. Recommendations may also be different than the current actions of the municipal office or the council, hence a position of openness to change on part of the municipal office and the councillors is very advisable.

One of the key questions affecting the success of the citizens' assembly is the trust of the municipal office that residents are capable of making reasonable decisions which are favourable for the community even in very complicated and technical matters. The officials may have some negative experiences from previous public consultations and be afraid that the meetings of the citizens' assembly will look the same – for example, that they may have a turbulent course and the residents will not be sufficiently familiar with the topic. However, the citizens' assembly has a completely different dynamic than open public consultations, especially, when it is well organised. The residents are put in a position of decision makers, they have an opportunity to get to know one another, and the rules of conducting discussions are agreed.

An especially important role is played by facilitators who set the tone of the meetings. If the members of the citizens' assembly feel they are treated with respect, that coordinators and the municipal office treat the citizens' assembly seriously, that the entire process is something important, then it will foster a positive attitude to the citizens' assembly and it will translate into their engagement and trust. For all groups of people who participate in the citizens' assembly – for the members of the citizens' assembly, the stakeholders, the experts and for the monitoring team – it is advisable to prepare separate guides in which their role will be presented.

3. Topic selection

When the citizens' assembly at the city level is organised, its topic by

definition can be anything that falls within the competence of the mayor or the city council. Controversial topics or topics difficult for some reasons work especially well in the citizens' assembly. The organization of the citizens' assembly may, moreover, be combined with work on the municipal strategies – then the most controversial questions may be selected for its completion and the members of the citizens' assembly may be asked to settle them. However, they need not only be controversial issues. The citizens' assembly may be treated as a normal way of decision-making in the matters of the city or at the national level. Generally when a matter is more or less obvious, then there is no need to organise a citizens' assembly, so consequently the best selection for the citizens' assembly are the questions that pose a challenge for some reason.

What is important is that the topic be presented in a clear and precise manner and its scope should be narrow enough to be able to reasonably discuss it in the educational phase. For example while organising the first citizens' assembly in Gdańsk on the topic of the city's preparation for an occurrence of torrential rainfall, we identified a dozen of themes of which only three were eventually selected. One Saturday was allocated for each of them. We could have had more themes but then the citizens' assembly should have been longer in order to discuss and present everything in detail.

The topic of the citizens' assembly should, by principle, concern the entire community rather than only its part. For example, if a given problem pertains exclusively to a group of senior citizens or to secondary-school students, then, it is better to organise workshops with representatives of those groups and develop solutions in this way. However, good judgment is advised here – sometimes a new programme which concerns a narrow group of residents may raise controversies and, by the very fact, that it is to be financed from the city budget funds (i.e., the money of all residents), it can become a topic of the citizens' assembly to establish whether the community agrees to its realisation.

Let's also have a look at a proposal of the development of a housing estate in a park – does this topic concern only the residents of the

surrounding areas or rather the whole city? That depends. If it is a park visited by residents from the whole city, then residents from all districts should be invited to participate in the citizens' assembly. However, if it is a small park where only the local residents go for a walk, then the citizens' assembly can be organised at the district level.

At the national level, can the changes in the hunting law be a topic of the citizens' assembly if hunters make up only a small portion of the society? They can because the issue of the wild animals well-being is something that can be considered a subject of interest of the whole society. By the same token, a question of an establishment of a national park may not only be a local matter, although the welfare of the local community is of primary importance here. However, in my opinion, concern for an area which is valuable for its plant and animal life is something that goes beyond the local scope. Hence, such a park is called "national."

A topic of the citizens' assembly can be posed as a question, e.g. "How to promote the use renewable energy in our city?" or in form of a problem to solve. It can look like this: "Some 27 residents say there is a lack of parking spaces in the city centre. What solution will be the best here? Or: "When the drought comes in summer, there is not enough water for all homes. What can we do?"

Who can submit a topic of the citizens' assembly? A mayor, a city council or a group of residents who have, e.g., collected an adequate number of signatures, should have the opportunity to submit a topic proposal. In Gdańsk such an opportunity is provided for in the local law and 1000 signatures are needed under an ordinary motion to organise the citizens' assembly (for around 350 thousand adult residents). Whereas when 5000 signatures are collected then it becomes compulsory for the mayor to organise a citizens' assembly. It is then a powerful tool in the hands of residents. The citizens' assembly can 1 Lyn Carson's "Framing the Remit" can be helpful for phrasing a question for the citizens' assembly. The publication is available on the newDemocracy Foundation website (in "Research Notes") at: www.newdemocracy.com.au. also be organised at the end of the year to establish the topics of the citizens' assembly in

the following year.

Can one discuss matters at the city level regarding which the decisions are made at the parliamentary level? Yes, but then it should be defined clearly what will happen later with the recommendations. For example, the mayor may submit them to a relevant minister or MPs, without guaranteeing, however, that they will be adopted since this lies outside of the mayor's authority.

Basic standards for organizing citizens' assemblies

1. Random selection of participants – all members of a citizens' assembly are selected by lot. Ideally, every member of the population eligible to take part in a citizens' assembly should be able to potentially receive invitation to participate.

2. Demographic representation – the composition of a citizens' assembly should broadly match the demographic profile of the community participating in the process. A set of criteria may be used to ensure demographic representativeness of the group, like age, gender, geographic area, or others. The aim is to create a community in a small scale that "feels like us". The size of the group should allow for inclusion of a wide diversity of views. A stipend should be provided to all participants to the amount that would at least cover the costs of attending the citizens' assembly.

3. Independent coordination – the citizens' assembly is run by an independent team of coordinators, which is responsible especially for preparing the process of random selection, developing the agenda, and inviting experts and facilitators. If the citizens' assembly is organized by local authorities or the parliament, it is important that all members of the coordination team are not part of the civil service. The coordinators

should be impartial, e.g. not active politicians or direct stakeholders.

4. Citizens' assembly can invite experts – despite the programme being prepared by the team of coordinators, the citizens' assembly can invite additional experts of their own choice. This may be in the form of a speech in person, a video streaming, a recording, a written note or other.

5. Inclusion of a widest practical range of perspectives – if there are diverse solutions and perspectives on a subject, ideally all of them should be presented during the educational phase of the citizens' assembly (by expert speakers). A method of combining perspectives due to a limited time or other practical considerations may be applied. Presentations may have the form of a speech in person, a video streaming, a recording, a written note or other.

6. Inviting all stakeholders – any organization, informal group or an institution whose area of work and expertise is related to the topic of the citizens' assembly has the right to present its opinion to the citizens' assembly in person. The role of the team of coordinators is only to identify the stakeholders – they don't make a selection. Due to limited time and a large number of stakeholders, a method of choosing their representatives may be used. In this case, a diversity of perspectives should be taken into account.

7. Deliberation – discussions which include listening to others mindfully and weighing options are the key elements of a citizens' assembly. The programme should involve discussions in small groups as well as in the plenary in order to maximize opportunities to speak and to be heard. The deliberation phase should be run by skilled facilitators.

8. Openness – all members of society should be able to provide input to the citizens' assembly in the form of comments, proposals or suggestions.

9. Sufficient time for reflection – providing a sufficient amount of time for reflection is necessary to achieve well-thought-out decisions. If the matter is not urgent, it is best not to rush. The citizens' assembly should be able to prolong its meetings – their length and number – if it chooses to do so (subject to budgetary limits).

10. Impact – the follow-up to the citizens' assembly's recommendations should be clear from the outset. Ideally, recommendations that receive the support of the citizens' assembly at an agreed threshold should be treated as binding (to such an extent that is legally permissible in the given situation).

11. Transparency – all presentations during the educational, plenary phase should be transmitted live and recorded. All materials presented to the citizens' assembly should be made available online. Clear information about how recommendations of the citizens' assembly will be implemented should be provided online and updated as actions occur. A report presenting details of methodology used for organizing a citizens' assembly should be provided by the coordination team.

12. Visibility – each citizens' assembly is an important event in the life of a community and citizens should be informed that it is happening and information on how they can get involved and follow it should be provided. The citizens' assembly should be publicly announced before it is formed. This set of standards was created by Marcin Gerwin with input from experts around the world.

A UK Citizens' Assembly

Invitations to the assembly were sent out to 30,000 households chosen at random, and of the over 1,500 people who responded asking to be considered, 110 were selected by a computer to be representative of society. There's a mix of ages, genders, ethnic backgrounds and education levels, but also a range of views about the climate crisis.

Irish Citizens' Assembly

The, We The Citizens' Assembly, is a citizens' assembly established in Ireland in 2016 to consider several political questions including the Constitution of Ireland. Questions considered include: abortion, fixed term parliaments, referendums, population ageing, and climate change. Over 18 months a report is produced on each topic. The government is required to respond officially to the reports in the Oireachtas (parliament).

The results of the assembly should be binding, because only in this way would the entire process be taken seriously and it would increase the involvement of all participants, from the members of the citizens' assembly, through to the experts and city officials

Chatham House Rules - its guiding spirit is: share the information you receive, but do not reveal the identity of who said it.

Canada's Indigenous Rights Framework

Abstract

The report analyzes the substantial changes to Indigenous policy and legislation in Canada, which are coalescing around the current Liberal Government's proposed Indigenous Rights, Recognition and Implementation Framework legislation. The Prime Minister has announced that the legislation will be introduced sometime in 2018, yet, there is little transparency in the process or accessible information for communities on these dramatic changes. Our analysis considers the emerging Rights Framework from three "perspectives": Relationship Reform charts how the machinery of government is changing, from the creation of new federal departments on Indigenous issues to nation-to-nation bilateral tables. Policy Reform considers the new direction on self-government, fiscal relations, and land claims policies. Legislative Reform examines impending legislation currently before parliament, including changes to impact assessment regulations and implementation of the UN's Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People. Our analysis reveals that the Rights Framework guides First Nations towards a narrow model of self-government outside of the Indian Act, premised on devolution of program and service delivery, fiscal mechanisms that do not address land rights but focus on accountability, a piecemeal approach to Aboriginal title, and an ongoing neglect of treaty obligations or expansive First Nation jurisdiction generally

Draft Resolution of Canadian Chiefs' Assembly (2018)

Implementing Canada's Recognition and Implementation of Indigenous Rights Framework and clarifying the role of the AFN

WHEREAS: A.

The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (the UN Declaration) states:

i. Article 3: Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right, they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

ii. Article 4: Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions.

iii. Article 18: Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in decision-making in matters which would affect their rights, through representatives chosen by themselves in accordance with their own procedures, as well as to maintain and develop their own indigenous decision-making institutions.

iv. Article 38: States, in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples, shall take the appropriate measures, including legislative measures, to achieve the ends of this Declaration.

B. On February 14, 2018, the Government of Canada reaffirmed its full support for the UN Declaration, without qualification, and committed to its full implementation, including government support for Bill C262, An Act to ensure that the laws of Canada are in harmony with the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

C. Also on February 14, 2018, the Government of Canada launched a national engagement strategy to develop a Recognition and Implementation of Indigenous Rights Framework that would ensure the Government of Canada respects Indigenous rights and provides policies and mechanisms for Indigenous Peoples to exercise their rights.

D. As part of this work, new federal laws, policies and operational practices will be developed to support the rebuilding of Indigenous nations and governments, and advance Indigenous self-determination, including the inherent right of self-government.

E. The current engagement materials were launched without adequate

participation and direction by First Nations rights holders. Additionally, through the inclusion of other partners and stakeholders, current engagement by the Government of Canada does not adequately respect First Nations rights-holders.

F. Feedback from early engagements indicates First Nation rights-holders are concerned about the current process lacking accountability and transparency, with the Government of Canada acting unilaterally.

G. Inherent Aboriginal and Treaty rights are constitutionally protected and guaranteed to First Nations, rather than political organizations and it is the duty of the Crown to consult directly with rights-holders in order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent when contemplating actions affecting them.

H. Government engagement processes with non-rights holders and organizations, such as the Assembly of First Nations (AFN), do not constitute consultation and accommodation and cannot be used to obtain free, prior and informed consent.

THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that the Chiefs-in-Assembly:

1. Declare that the Assembly of First Nations (AFN) and any regional organizations cannot negotiate, support or agree to any changes to Canada's federal laws, policies and operational practices as part of the Recognition and Implementation of Rights Framework or otherwise, without the free, prior and informed consent of First Nations rights-holders. 2. Call on Canada to consult and cooperate in good faith with First Nations through their own representative institutions before adopting and implementing any legislative or administrative measures that may affect First Nations in order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent.

3. Call on Canada to ensure that the comprehensive engagement and consultation process of the Recognition and Implementation of Indigenous Rights Framework respect the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and be committed to the full implementation of Aboriginal and Treaty rights.

4. *Call on Canada to ensure that the national engagement strategy on the Recognition and Implementation of Indigenous Rights Framework fulfills the duty of the Crown to ensure First Nations rights-holders' free, prior and informed consent.*

5. *Call on Canada to ensure that the Recognition and Implementation of Indigenous Rights Framework process is transparent, accessible, takes into account regional perspectives and priorities, and is supported by rights-holders.*

6. *Call on Canada to provide the necessary financial resources to engage directly with First Nations as rights-holders on the Government of Canada's Recognition and Implementation of Indigenous Rights Framework and any federal legislation.*

7. *Call on Canada to work with First Nations rights holders to ensure engagement materials are sufficient, accessible and transparent to support the process.*

Puerto Rico

Zambia should also look to the example of the First Peoples' Assembly in [Puerto Rico](#), which was formed in July 2019:

The assemblies are convened with the intention to provide a truly participatory, horizontal and democratic space where people can share their concerns, voice their frustrations and fears, and present and collaborate on proposals to address the many struggles and obstacles facing Puerto Ricans in the archipelago and beyond. Some assemblies have begun to form committees to work on the major issues that have emerged in the course of these conversations.

A Guardians' Manifesto

A manifesto is a published declaration of the intentions, motives, or views of the issuer, be it an individual, group, political party or government. A manifesto usually accepts a previously published opinion or public consensus or promotes a new idea with prescriptive notions for carrying out changes the author believes should be made.

Wikipedia

Zimbabwe and surrounding countries only have about 10% arable land but all of the land has to support people through agriculture in it's broadest sense. For us, the only long-term sustained basis of any economy is the photosynthetic process – green plants growing on regenerating soil. Neither coal, copper, gold, diamonds nor chrome feed people or prevent floods and droughts, address desertification or climate change.

Allan Savory - [Good Governance](#)

I'm a pessimist because of intelligence, but an optimist because of will.

Antonio Gramsci - Gramsci's prison letters

What's got to be managed is not a nature that exists — or is imagined to exist — apart from the human. Instead, the new effort begins with a planet remade and spirals back on itself — not so much the control of nature as the control of the control of nature.

Elizabeth Kolbert - Under a White Sky

A citizens' assembly (also known as citizens' jury or citizens' panel or people's jury or policy jury or citizens' initiative review or consensus conference or citizens' convention) is a body formed from [citizens](#) or generally people to deliberate on an issue or issues of local or national or international importance. The membership of a citizens' assembly is randomly selected, as in other forms of [sortition](#). It is a mechanism of [participatory action research](#) (PAR) that draws on the symbolism, and some of the practices, of a legal trial by [jury](#). The purpose is to employ a cross-section of the public to study the options available to the state on certain questions and to propose answers to these questions through rational and reasoned discussion and the use of various methods of inquiry such as directly questioning experts. In many cases, the state will require these proposals to be accepted by the general public through a [referendum](#) before becoming law.

The citizens' assembly aims to reinstall trust in the political process by taking direct ownership of decision-making.^[10] To that end, citizens' assemblies intend to remedy the "divergence of interests" that arises between elected representatives and the electorate, as well as "a lack in deliberation in legislatures."^[11]

The use of citizens' assemblies to reach decisions in this way is related to the traditions of [deliberative democracy](#) and [popular sovereignty](#) in [political theory](#). While these traditions stretch back to origins in ancient [Athenian democracy](#), they have become newly relevant both to theorists and politicians as part of a deliberative turn in democratic theory. From the 1980s to the early 1990s, this deliberative turn began, shifting from the predominant theoretical framework of [participatory democracy](#) toward [deliberative democracy](#), initially in the work of [Jane Mansbridge](#)

and [Joseph M. Bessette](#).^[12] Since, citizens' assemblies have been used in countries such as [Canada](#) and the [Netherlands](#) to deliberate on reform of the [system used to elect politicians](#) in those countries.

Ordinarily, citizens' assemblies are state initiatives. However, there are also examples of independent citizens' assemblies, such as the [Le G 1000](#) in Belgium or the [We The Citizens](#) project in Ireland.

Citizen's assemblies have been proposed as a potential solution to dealing with divisive and highly politicised issues such as [same-sex marriage](#), [abortion](#), and [decarbonisation](#) measures.

Wikipedia - Citizens' Assemblies

* * *

Citizens' Assemblies

1. Based on a European [Citizens' Assemblies](#) model, establish chiefdoms' Assemblies in each of the 288 chiefdoms incorporating the powers of the tribal [Guardians of Nature](#) guilds of old. These indigenous guardians will serve the 'living ancestors' to meld African Ubuntu with Christianity. As Zambia is a declared Christian nation, it is recognized that the [Edenic Covenant](#) holds man accountable for Mother Earth's care. Also, establish assemblies in all urban municipalities to deal with urban issues. In Chapter 47, a development association in Lunga chiefdom is presented. The pros and cons of having an association or an assembly, or both, must be debated.

2. Establish, in time, [a national Chiefs' Assembly](#) as an upper chamber in the National Assembly so that they may develop a national implementation plan.
3. The chiefs, headmen and spiritual advisors continue to serve as guardians of the clan and tribal culture and as the supernatural custodian of the land, water, forests and wildlife. The government should consider and accept the supernatural 'rights' of chiefs exercising their powers under traditional law.
4. Make firm contact with the Ministry of Chiefs and Traditional Affairs, particularly the House of Chiefs, supplying them the manifesto and management plan, having studied their [National Policy on Chieftaincy and Traditional Affairs](#), one anchored on Vision 2030, and addressing the fact that the institution of chieftaincy has challenges in adequately discharging its functions. These challenges include but are not limited to:
 - The lack of a comprehensive Government Policy to guide on matters relating to chiefs and traditional affairs;
 - The absence of a Land Policy;
 - The limited scope of authority of chiefdoms precluding them from resolving certain matters;
 - Customs and cultural identity retreat;
 - Limited financial resources for the administration of chiefdoms;
 - The limited capacity of villagers to support the welfare of chiefs;
 - The inappropriate behaviour of some chiefs and headmen; and
 - The lack of support for chiefs and headmen to enhance their governance and the resulting development.

Other Essential Actions

1. Africa's Wildlife Economy Summit hosted by the African Union (AU) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) at Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe, in June 2019 recognized community rights over the ownership, management and use of resources and called for a New Deal for rural communities, wildlife and natural resources. This was the most important conference resolution, a major political issue in all the 288 chiefdoms, particularly in the game management areas (GMAs) already demarcated in some 40-50 chiefdoms. The chiefdom must have ownership of all the wildlife and have responsibility for their management. As a practical bridge to this, community forest schemes should be declared for all of its forests, and all of a chiefdom declared a game ranch - the ownership of wildlife then vested in the chiefdom. In essence, GMAs will be done away with and all responsibility and income from wildlife, fisheries, timber...to go directly to a chiefdom permanent fund to which all customary villagers of a particular chiefdom are beneficiaries. The government must cease to use the chiefdoms as a rent basket. The conference agreed to change the development model from "doing things for communities to financing well-governed communities to do things for themselves." Then, to bring this all to fruition, to incorporate the Victoria Falls Summit's remaining goals. This requires a hands-off strategy by donors/investors who will no longer take over the management of a chiefdom, sidelining a system that has been in place for centuries. The chiefdoms are to become self-governing. Then the following goals will be possible: Strengthen community governance and institutions; Build and enhance local capacity to govern and manage natural resources; Recapitalize the communities and their natural resources, including across boundaries; Ensure that community voices are heard in shaping policy and decision making from the local to the global level; Strengthen evidence-based adaptive management, incorporating indigenous knowledge.
2. [Create large community-managed game ranches](#): A Sustainable Land

Use Option and Economic Incentive for Biodiversity Conservation in Zambia.

3. Fully implement [The Protection of Traditional Knowledge, Genetic Resources and Expressions of Folklore Act No. 16 of 2016 is essential.](#) Under section 27: Subject to this Act, a traditional community has the following rights over its genetic resources: the exclusive right to regulate access to its genetic resources; an inalienable right to use its genetic resources; the exclusive right to share the benefits arising from the utilization of its genetic resources; and the right to assign and conclude access agreements, unlike Target 16 of the Aichi Goals that wishes to ensure that 'Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their utilization is in force and operational, consistent with national legislation', the Protection Act is the law and clear on the rights of clans and tribes in the occupation of the customary area. But it must cancel out much of what is in the Wildlife Act 2015, i.e., a landgrab of customary people's rights to their land and renewable resources. It is of paramount importance that the members of a chiefdom collectively own the wildlife. The present situation where the state owns the wildlife, profits from it, pays the customary people little, if at all, for the privilege, and then imprisons a man and his family for years when he kills something to eat is unconscionable. The EU's newly created NaturAfrica is also respecting '[the rights of communities and indigenous peoples](#)'.
4. Forests (Community Forest Management) Regulations, 2018 [Under these regulations](#), groups may apply to manage and benefit from forests lying within a customary area (GMA and Open Area) and Local forests, but can also be considered in national forests: "(2) Despite sub-regulation (1), the Director in consultation with the Minister may consider Community forest management in any other type of forest."Section (c) specifies that the consent of the chief of the area is required "to recognize the applicants as a community forest management group through the endorsement of the application or map signifying such consent. And 6. (1) A community, forest management group, may apply

to the Director for recognition in Form I set out in the schedule. (2) An application for recognition of a community forest management group shall require—(a) prior consultations with local users and other rights holders of the proposed forest; and(b) the consent of local traditional leaders. (3) An application for recognition shall be accompanied by—(a) a sketch map of the proposed location and area to be established as a community forest;(b) community forest management group constitution including list of the elected representatives of the group;(c) consent of the Chief of the area to recognize the applicants as a community forest management group through the endorsement of the application or map signifying such consent; and(d) a statement of intent for the proposed area indicating a balance between forest protection and management, development, utilization and forest enterprise development in Form I set out in the Schedule.

5. In the longer term - reclaim those parts of national parks removed from the original Native Trust Land or partner in their management and benefit-sharing.
6. Produce community landuse plans.
7. Create a critical mass of appropriate development projects for the socio-ecological well-being of the chiefdoms.
8. Register an investment trust fund account for the sustained investment in the chiefdoms established with a sound system of fiduciary management in place.
9. Establish co-management agreements between the Trusts and Government departments and ministries responsible for fisheries, forestry, wildlife, and water. As a result, these resources conserved for the benefit of the people.
10. Develop safari-hunting, sport fishing, ecotourism and game cropping that are based on rigorous science and management.
11. Implement a fire policy that is not based on early burning but on the latest burning possible to protect fire-resistant plants.
12. [New legislation and policies](#) are required, one recommendation being to allow for the development of Community Wildlife Conservancies

(CWCs) in GMAs and Open Areas, “which implicitly confer ownership of (and/or user rights over) wildlife to the owner of the land, and which does not require fencing to be a pre-requisite for ownership of wildlife by communities in CWCs.” Another recommendation is the [Landsafe Socioecological model](#), which does not alienate any part of the chiefdoms.

Women and Children

1. [Women to be registered usufructuaries](#) (right of an individual to the use of property) of customary land.
2. Women to be protected from child marriage, assault, rape, sexual cleansing, wife exchange (*cidyerano* to the Chewa people), the employment of ‘[a mystery man \(hyena\) to test sexual skills of a girl who has reached puberty](#), and removal of their possessions on the death of their husbands. The state must implement a vigorous program of birth control and the education of women and girls; the violence of a patriarchal society is revealed in the massive percentage of [men who assault women](#)- the true guardians of the land and the future. [Women cook](#) over wood fires in the hut or house. This is a simply massive problem to be solved: the main threat comes from the cocktail of tiny particles and droplets that trigger asthma attacks, allergic responses, heart attacks and stroke.
3. Take notice of [IFAD's Case Study](#): Chiefs and Traditional Leaders Zambia - gender, targeting and social inclusion.⁵ “Women for Change (WFC) is a Zambian NGO working with communities, especially women

⁵ Akamandisa, V.M. 2013. Engaging Traditional Leadership for Women's Rights in Zambia. In Transforming Gender Relations in Agriculture in Sub-Sahara Africa, eds. C. Farnworth, M.F. Sundell, A. Nzioki, V. Shivutse and M. Davis. Stockholm Environment Institute: Swedish International Agricultural Network Initiative
<http://www.sei-international.org/mediamanager/documents/Publications/SIANI-Gender- Africa-book/SIANI-2013-Transforming-Gender-Relations-Agriculture-Africa.pdf>

and children, in rural areas to contribute to sustainable human development using popular education methodologies. While WFC initially developed the approach, other organizations have since become involved in developing community-based organizations of the chiefdoms and working with them on various projects. The *Zambian National Men's Network* is one such organization working with selected chiefs and church leaders.”

4. As Chileshe directs: “The issue of women’s inferior land rights has become particularly important in the context of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Zambia. Better enforcement of women’s rights to land and its inheritance could avoid burdening widows with conflicts over land that are likely to negatively affect their household livelihood. Women in most sub-Saharan African countries in particular also face these problems. Married women’s access to land is subservient to their husbands and consequently life cycle changes such as widowhood, divorce, marriage residence create land access uncertainties for women and make them most vulnerable to dispossession. Rural women in Zambia are also disadvantaged by statutory land tenure. For instance the trend towards individualisation of tenure through conversion of customary tenure to statutory tenure reinforces the traditional male dominated control over land through registration of land rights in men’s names. It erodes customary obligations and common property in crop fields and building sites for married couples. When rights are registered in a man’s name, as is often the case, the joint customary land rights of a wife, which she enjoyed prior to conversion of tenure, are lost. At village level customary common property rights of women, including the right to collect wild edible vegetables, wild mushrooms, fuel-wood, thatch grass and other forest products are also neglected in favour of the individual statutory rights of the elite who are usually men (Chapters 7 and 9). Lastarria-Cornhiel maintains that under statutory land tenure it is common for rural African women to lose access or cropping rights while male household heads strengthen their hold over land (Lastarria-Cornhiel 1997: 1326).” See Ch. 14: Legal Control of Chiefdoms. See

Ch 14 section: Land Tenure and Rural Livelihoods in Zambia. [Roy Alexander Chileshe](#)

Land

1. Common Property Trusts (the chiefdoms). [The principal task](#) is for government to provide the necessary policy and legislative framework making customary common property rights unassailable. In this, common property rights are fully assigned over land and renewable natural resources to responsible guardians, i.e. the chiefdoms, on behalf of all Zambians for customary land over all the natural resources except mining, which is dealt with through the proposed Zambia Permanent Fund. They, through their Trusts, then control market environmentalism, the chiefdoms having had the property rights to them fully assigned. They, therefore, internalize the negative externalities (costs) of pollution or over-harvesting, charging the necessary fees to concessionaires through an auction system. Therefore, the government must recognize public goods and ecosystem services as considerable value to the customary commoners, but not as a further opportunity for the state to rent-seek. Such services cannot under any circumstances be privatized but are to be held under common property by the chiefdom trusts on behalf of the people.
2. In early 2019 no national land policy existed, the [House of Chiefs](#) having rejected the draft policy in March 2018 as it allowed Zambians to buy and sell customary land. A Guardians' land policy is essential for Zambia's future.
3. [FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE](#) 14 July 2020. "The Oakland Institute's new report, [Driving Dispossession: The Global Push to "Unlock the Economic Potential of Land](#), sounds the alarm on the unprecedented wave of privatization of natural resources that is underway around the world. Through six case studies – Ukraine, Zambia, Myanmar, Papua

New Guinea, Sri Lanka, and Brazil – the report details the myriad ways by which governments – willingly or under the pressure of financial institutions and Western donor agencies – are putting more land into so-called “productive use” in the name of development.” The United States is a key player in an unfettered offensive to privatize land worldwide via US blockchain corporations, government agencies, and the World Bank. In Zambia, the Bank has partnered with a subsidiary of the US-based online retailer Overstock.com to use blockchain technology for land titling with the goal of “unlocking trillions of dollars in global mineral reserves that are inaccessible due to unclear land governance systems.” The Assemblies need to take steps to protect customary commoners from an abomination now being used to divest indigenous people of their land. ⁶

4. Accessibility to all - As E. Mutale wrote: ‘Land should be made available to all. Mechanisms need to be worked out on who qualifies, where they qualify, when they qualify and how they are enabled to access the land. Ensure that people do not lose their only land through being forcefully dispossessed or distress sales, or if they do, they are enabled to redeem their land’. Mutale has suggested a biblical/African view of land policy that they should seriously consider (Chapter 18, reference XVI).⁷
5. Mining to be severely limited, strictly controlled, and managed, citizens, benefitting directly from the proceeds as per the Alaska Permanent Fund. For many years the mines have not paid the requisite taxes nor dealt with the horrendous pollution. This has to cease. The state must ration

⁶ At a Land Portal meeting, **Uchendu Chigbu** [held different views:](#)

“Blockchain provides a more transparency focused tool for customary land administration. Using Blockchain will involve the creation (management or administration) of distributed land information databases for peer-to-peer transactions, usually shared between the nodes of a network. The implication is that a central system will record land transactions in real-time and transactions are transparent to all in the system. As Blockchain is emerging, it is worthwhile to use it in the land administration sector to enable transparency, and so reduce corruption.”

⁷ Mutale, E. ‘A Biblical View of Land Policy’ South African Journal of Surveying and Mapping’, Vol. 23, Part 6, Dec. 1996, pp325-332

coal resources.

6. The UNFCCC's REDD+ and the state's landgrab of customary area for agriculture and other commons enclosure schemes to be abolished, and an investigation made of land alienations so that customary commoners recover corruptly alienated land and resource rights.
7. The commodification of ecosystem services to be severely curtailed, for, [as Lohmann writes](#), 'the idea that sale of ecosystem services will make the fortune of Southern countries is about as plausible as the idea that neo-extractivism, by destroying commons, will become a source of redistributable wealth that can repair them'.⁸
8. The First Nation People, the Bushmen, to be accorded full customary rights to land and resources. Bearing in mind the Right to Autonomy and Indigenous Self-Government, moves by the Bushmen should be made to join the initiative by the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA): "A global initiative with local impact, IWGIA – in collaboration with 5 other organisations (Asia Indigenous Peoples Pact, Forest Peoples Programme, International Labour Organization, Tebtebba Foundation and the Danish Institute for Human Rights) – developed the Indigenous Navigator Initiative, a framework and a set of tools for Indigenous Peoples to monitor the level of recognition and implementation of their rights and the UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). Currently, the initiative also provides small grants to Indigenous communities to implement pilot projects based on the needs they self-identify through the collected data."
9. Customary area secured and its renewable resources by providing all customary land tenure – whether *de jure* or *de facto* - with full legal clan ownership on an equal footing with that of state land, with all rights and responsibilities over renewable natural resources. Indigenous customary people safeguard the carbon bank and its wildlife, and they

⁸ "United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples." United Nations, Mar. 2008. Web. 16 Apr. 2017. <http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf>.

Indigenous Nations' Rights in the Balance http://www.livingjusticepress.org/index.asp?Type=B_BASIC&SEC=%7B62C4BC5A-5DD2-44D0-8CF6-32B343F3E4DD%7D

use no energy. The UN's UNFCCC to immediately establish a program for the full legal recognition of customary rights to land presently held under *de jure* or *de facto* land tenure, to be fully launched at the first global stocktake - presently set for 2023, and in broad terms to follow the policy document that the consortium, [Land Rights Now](#), has put forward.

10. The Assemblies must debate the World Bank Land Governance Assessment for Zambia.
11. The land tenure expert, Professor Mvunga, believes that the state as the 'owner' of wildlife being supported on the customary area is liable to pay compensation for losses incurred through legal precedent under English common law. The logical effect of this should be to persuade the state that devolution in respect of wildlife ownership is inevitable.
12. As [Chileshe writes](#): "The current land titling approach in customary lands of Zambia is voluntary and hence sporadic. It is associated with high costs and insecurity of tenure for the poor (section 7.4.4, Chapter 7). A more equitable and less expensive approach would be a compulsory (systematic) approach that allows for demarcation and registration of both family holdings and village commons. This confirms *de facto* rights in land, leaves the people holding the same parcels of land but with the benefit of increased security of tenure (Bruce 1993a). This approach is less expensive per unit and although the initial costs may be high they are in most cases paid for by the state. This approach may be most suitable in rural areas having strong population pressures and competition for land (Larsson 1991). See Ch 14 section: Land Tenure and Rural Livelihoods in Zambia. [Roy Alexander Chileshe](#)

Finance

1. [A basic income/dividend](#) to be paid to all adult citizens (with consideration given to - depending on certain criteria, e.g., being a villager within a customary area (commons), or a worker paying tax - to be paid either [a Basic Income Grant](#) (BIG) or an annual dividend from a Permanent Commons Fund into which the government pays mining, land and carbon taxes. At present, all is confusion. Rushkoff believes that the [Universal Basic Income](#) (UBI) - as it is also commonly known, “under the guise of compassion turns us from stakeholders or even citizens to mere consumers”. As taxpayers, the UBI might merely be another form of a credit card. The money going upwards to the one-percenter holders of capital (in Canada, the average credit card debt is \$4,154). Therefore a Permanent Commons Fund - along the lines of the Alaska Permanent Fund, [is recommended](#). As I wrote earlier: the [Alaska Permanent Fund](#) and the Universal Basic Income have their origins in recommendations made in 1795 by the American revolutionary, [Thomas Paine](#): “To create a national fund, out of which there shall be paid to every person, when arrived at the age of twenty-one years, the sum of fifteen pounds sterling, as compensation in part, for the loss of his or her natural inheritance, by the introduction of the system of landed property. And, also, the sum of ten pounds per annum, during life, to every person now living, of the age of fifty years, and to all others, as they shall arrive at that age.”
2. [The Zambia Permanent Fund](#) - Following the example of Alaska’s state, the Zambian Government should establish the Zambia Permanent Fund with legislation affirming that 75% of all mining royalties be paid to the government as a replacement for taxes, and 25% paid to the Zambia Permanent Fund. Annually, dividends would be paid to the registered residents of the chiefdoms in the form of a living grant to heads of families resident in the villages, the balance - being subject to a means test - paid to those living outside of the chiefdoms. As a *quid pro quo*, chiefdom residents would be responsible for protecting the renewable natural resources, following a Landsafe or similar land use plan supervised by

their Trust and customary authority. It is critical to this exercise that the mining compradors and corrupt politicians overseeing the mining taxes are sidelined to reflect international financial reality.

Legal

1. Carry out a careful classification of advantageous and not disadvantageous legislation to the chiefdoms and take action.
2. Categorize legislation of a neutral nature.
3. Note legislation deemed oppressive.
4. Identify the legislation necessary for the survival and appropriate development of the chiefdoms.
5. Customary commoners use the public trust principle and the rights of customary tenure as predating the colonial multi-party parliamentary system to secure judicial protection for the future commoners and the proletariat existing in the degraded towns.
6. Fully implement [the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People](#), then address its major flaws.⁹ The notion that only law enforcement will solve the biota ravaging without the total involvement of customary commoners, a notion sanctioned by ill-advised British royalty, the international greenwash BINGOs, and some donors, is a distraction from the resistance campaign.[13]And Assemblies should take full note of the African Court of Human and People's Rights decision in June 2017 in favour of the Ogiek Indigenous People of Kenya.
7. The UN Convention on Biodiversity's Zambia [Sixth National Report of 2019](#) to be dealt with by a committee established within a chiefdom's

⁹ [12]"United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples." United Nations, Mar. 2008. Web. 16 Apr. 2017. <http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf>.

Indigenous Nations' Rights in the Balance http://www.livingjusticepress.org/index.asp?Type=B_BASIC&SEC=%7B62C4BC5A-5DD2-44D0-8CF6-32B343F3E4DD%7D

Guardians' Assembly. The first objective is to "Develop and formalise a generic national benefit-sharing framework & domesticate it into a Benefit Distribution System (BDS) by relevant Sectors." N/B The measure relates to national target 13 on the benefit-sharing mechanism: A generic national Benefit-sharing framework defined and are legally recognized under the Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Expressions of Folklore Act of 2016 and is being enforced.

8. The legal question of witchcraft to be re-assessed and properly defined. The colonial idea of witchcraft did not recognize that the term 'witchcraft' defines sorcerers' evil activity, requiring witchdoctors' assistance. For witchdoctors to be attacked shows a lack of understanding that massively harms traditional life. The Witchcraft Act requires redrafting.
9. Customary people use the public trust principle and the rights of customary tenure as predating the colonial multi-party parliamentary system to secure judicial protection for customary villagers and the proletariat existing in the degraded towns.
10. Traditional courts must dispense justice to their people. The horror of the present incarceration system and dysfunctional justice to be utterly reformed by reverting to a new commoner judicial system. Bearing in mind the Right to Autonomy and Indigenous Self-Government, moves by the Bushmen should be made to join the initiative by the **International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA)**: "A global initiative with local impact, IWGIA – in collaboration with 5 other organizations (Asia Indigenous Peoples Pact, Forest Peoples Programme, International Labour Organization, Tebtebba Foundation and the Danish Institute for Human Rights) – developed the Indigenous Navigator Initiative, a framework and a set of tools for Indigenous Peoples to monitor the level of recognition and implementation of their rights and the UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). Currently, in operation in 11 countries, including Bolivia, the initiative also provides small grants to Indigenous communities to implement pilot projects based on the needs they self-identify through

the collected data.”

11. [CYBER Law abuse](#) - The Civil Society Constitution Agenda (CiSCA) is concerned about the violations of freedoms embedded in the Cyber Crimes Bill 2021.
12. In Africa and Asia, very few countries have ratified ILO Convention 169, and almost no countries have legal frameworks providing for the recognition and protection of indigenous peoples' lands. Where legal frameworks exist, the implementation is very weak or non-existent. The Guardians' Assemblies should work together to see that the ILO Convention is ratified. [IWGIA](#)
13. Palan Mulonda's *Customary Residents' Forum Strategy*. As recorded in *Plunderers of Eden*, at the core customary residents' level, it is necessary – as Palan Mulonda advised in his paper, “Policy and legislation Review of the Fisheries, Forestry, Wildlife and Water sectors vis-à-vis Community-based Natural Resource Management, HURID for CONASA/USAID, Lusaka. 2002.” - for a forum of stakeholders to adhere to the [strategy in seeking to regain natural resource ownership](#) on their lands

National Parks and Forests

1. The public commons to be reclaimed by the former customary owners under [Landsafe co-management agreements](#) with the government as originally intended.¹⁰ This is the protected area of national parks and national forests taken by the colonial invaders and inherited and increased by the Zambian state. The first national park was Kafue, in 1950, excised from Native Trust Land. Liuwa Plain National Park, the only park to contain customary residents, should be taken under

¹⁰ Manning, I.P.A. “The Landsafe Socio-Ecological Development Model for the Customary commons of Zambia: Evolution and Formalization.” *52 Nat. Resources J.* 195. Natural Resources Journal, Law School, University of New Mexico., 1 Aug. 2012. Web. 16 April 2017. <http://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol52/iss1/7/>

customary control. It originally was created in 1890 as a game reserve by the *Litunga*.

2. The state's Game Management Areas - considered protected areas even though they are placed in the chiefdoms - must be under the chiefdoms' total control. "[The case is also made](#) that strengthening law enforcement without the involvement of local communities is likely to serve to antagonize these communities, especially when enforcement is carried out in an aggressive or militaristic manner, resulting in worsening PA-community relations, reduced legitimacy of the PA and wildlife agency concerned, and potentially leading to yet further increases in poaching pressures." There are 36 GMAs in the country involving 76 CRBs (community resource boards) - presumably representing 76 chiefdoms out of a total of 288 (26%).

Power and Energy

1. Mega-hydropower development to be phased out, dams to be removed.

Commerce

1. Encourage co-operative ownership structures for businesses.
2. Strictly control imports – bearing in mind the destruction of local industry in Northern Province in 1897 with the arrival of the BSA Company and British imports, and the recent destruction of the textile industry by mainly Chinese imports. The term 'Free Market' is beguiling. It allows the [plundering corporates](#) to be ushered in: The African Continental Free Trade Agreement ("AfCFTA") entered into force on [30 May 2019](#) is a disaster. It will likely be hijacked by such as the Chinese.

Community-Based Donor Projects

1. Phase out all community-based donor schemes that impinge on the sovereignty of the chiefdoms. The chiefdoms' traditional guardians must replace the militaristic anti-poaching operations. Villagers should be tried only in the chiefs' court and not imprisoned. A game quote should be issued by community resource boards (CRBs) to all headmen (in Bangweulu, lechwe and sitatunga) in the 40 or so chiefdoms with GMAs prosecution of villagers. In those chiefdoms without GMAs, the traditional policing system should be the sole responsibility of the traditional fish and game guardians under the chief's direction. The chiefs' court should take responsibility for sentencing poachers from the chiefdom to community service. Invader poachers are to be handed over to the government wildlife authority.

Agriculture

1. It is important to note that in the analysis of threats posed to 8,688 species on the IUCN species endangered list - if one includes agricultural pollution and the introduction of genetic material, agriculture is responsible for 6,942 of the threats.
2. A cogent fire policy to be enforced (late-early-burning) to protect the biotic carbon stocks and commoner agriculturists' ecology. Zambia's annual fire regime needs to be controlled. Early burning policies must be banned and converted to late-early burning - a major difference.
3. The world's soils are degrading at an unprecedented rate. All chiefdoms must implement a [Soil Doctors Programme](#) and ban land chemicals. An agroecological strategy implemented where the 100 drought resistant traditional seeds of history (sorghum, millet, bulrush millet, cassava and the non-hybrid maize) are grown, delivering villagers full protection from the GMO seed/herbicide predators, and where the state is forced to

reform the hybrid maize/nitrogen fertilizer and herbicide tyranny—also, stringent controls on importing chemicals to be implemented along with a ban on maize exports. Chiefdoms must control maize farming - although the state encourages it as an export rent basket.

4. The commodification of ecosystem services to be severely curtailed, for, [as Lohmann writes](#), 'the idea that sale of ecosystem services will make the fortune of Southern countries is about as plausible as the idea that neo-extractivism, by destroying commons, will become a source of redistributable wealth that can repair them'.
5. Implement Project [Drawdown solutions](#) for agriculture (No 5- 19). I selected some - designed to deal with global warming - but suitable for sustainable agriculture as relevant for deriving a Guardian's Manifesto for Zambia.
6. Plant-rich diet - Zambians are over-reliant on the annual maize because of the government profit from maize production. But this monoculture is grown at a massive cost - in 2017, 40% of children were stunted, 10% of women of reproductive age underweight, a high percentage of teenagers pregnant, and children as young as seven used as labour. In rural areas, one maize porridge meal a day is the norm.
7. *Tropical forests* - Zambia's forests are not as they once were, the rampant early burning destructive - though the smoke [fertilizes the Amazon and tropical ocean regions with phosphorous](#).
8. *Educating girls* - their well-being, education, and security of tenure in customary areas is essential. But again, is it measurable? The current oppression of child marriage, sexual cleansing, HIV and the like needs to be tackled by a more aggressive education system, appropriate legislation, and strict cultural controls imposed by chiefs, headmen and spiritual advisers.
9. Family planning - family and population control are essential to the future of Zambia. This solution - Educating Girls-Women Smallholders - would by 2050 reduce the world's population by 1.1 billion fewer people. However, this does not take into account the abuse of girls.
10. Solar farms - photovoltaic (PV) panels provide a small amount of clean

- and low-cost power but considerable damage to customary and public lands elsewhere. If erected, they must be severely limited and off-grid.
11. Regenerative agriculture - to maintain and increase carbon-rich organic matter in soils is essential, given villagers' increasingly sedentary disposition due to population pressure. As Drawdown explains, regenerative agricultural practices include no-tillage, diverse cover crops, in-farm fertility (no external nutrients), no pesticides or synthetic fertilizers, and multiple crop rotations.
 12. Change to an emphasis on perennial crops. At present, in the world, 89% of cultivated land is under annuals. Perennials are far hardier than annuals.
 13. Conservation agriculture - tillage-free agriculture practised for many years under the Chitemene system is a low-population strategy. Zambia now has a population - according to the UN - of 18.5 million. It should, therefore, be discouraged.
 14. Adopt tree intercropping - another variant of trees' carbon locking ability and their delivery of suitable conditions for annuals to flourish and multistrata agro-forestry - this is layered agriculture, a variant of the use of trees and agricultural land.
 15. Alternative cement - in rural areas, there is no need to use cement, traditional pole and dagga (mud) sufficing. But what should be adopted is the ancient construction method of rammed earth, *pisé de Terre*, stamped earth houses. [Association la Voie Nubienne \(AVN\)](#)
 16. Forest protection - in Zambia, the protection of the customary areas is essential for forest protection and everything else to do with Zambia's socio-ecology. The UNFCCC's REDD+ neoliberal scheme needs to be closed.
 17. Composting is an ancient practice not much used in Zambia but increasingly necessary as people become more sedentary.
 18. Women smallholders - do most of the cultivation within their traditional *ichima* workgroups. Their usufructuary rights need to become law.
 19. [A truly essential oil](#), Neem oil (AZADIRACTA INDICA), must be used by all chiefdoms as an organic insect pesticide. Contact: Soft

Chulu (softchulu@gmail.com) School of Engineering Information and Communications University, Lusaka Zambia. And refer to the [article on its uses](#).

Socio-ecology


1. The villager carrying capacity (CC) of the chiefdoms is finite. The CC needs to be assessed, land and resource conservation introduced, and birth control and immigration containment measures implemented.

Wildlife & Fisheries

1. Consideration of the management of the fisheries is of great importance. Full control is to be exerted traditionally through the *Chipupila* fish guardians serving under the chiefs. In *Natchituti's Gift*, Gordon mentions that the "Mweru-Luapula clan heads owned the land and lagoons. Then the colonials imposed new legal regimes that defined the fishery as a tribal commons. When tenure rules are so imprecise, and regulations governing property rights are rarely enforced, informal rules of access and ownership tend to prosper."
2. The problem of damage to life and property by wildlife - given increased human populations and government incapacity - is poorly attended to, leaving villagers exposed and subject to greater food insecurity, made worse by the refusal of the state to pay compensation for wildlife crop damage on the pretext that it is not covered in the Wildlife Act. This major factor in rural poverty where populations of wildlife exist - is not even mentioned in Zambia's poverty reduction strategy. However, the land tenure expert Professor Mvunga believes that the state as the 'owner' of wildlife being supported on customary area is liable to pay

compensation for losses incurred through legal precedent under English common law on which Zambian statutory law is based. The logical effect of this should be to persuade the state that devolution in respect of wildlife ownership is inevitable.

3. Allocate exclusive blocks of land and its wildlife to communities
4. Develop robust and fair Public-Private Partnerships, and implement customary villager anti-poaching measures that do not compromise the spiritual nature of the chiefdom
5. Revise the legal framework to cater to the above
6. As ZAWA was scrapped and replaced by the Department of National Parks & Wildlife (DNPW) government has to take greater responsibility for its funding.
7. The decline of the World's Biodiversity & Ecosystems. In the [Swiss RE Institute's report](#) on the world's rapidly declining state of biodiversity and ecosystem services, Southern Africa's condition is shocking. However, Zambia appears clothed in light green, a moderate status. This 'bleaching' requires an ecological change that customary commoners can only bring about on land having secure land and natural resource tenure. Here lies the challenge supreme.



Chiefs

1. Chiefs must not participate or take sides in politics. But if they do, they must bear the Republican Constitution in mind: Article 168 of the Constitution [Amendment] Act no.2 of 2016 provides that, “(1) Subject to clause (2), a chief may seek and hold a public office. (2) A chief who seeks to hold office in a political party or election or appointment to a State office, except that of Councillor, shall abdicate the chief’s throne.
2. Any chief being party to the alienation of customary land to leasehold must be removed.
3. As [Chileshe](#) concludes: “It is important to note however, that currently on customary lands of Zambia chiefs control land, and it is one of their

main sources of power. For this reason chiefs should not be left out of the land administration committee without representation otherwise disruptive new power struggles would emerge. This means national land policy should lay down how chiefs and headmen will operate as land administrators including a legal requirement for them to work with democratically elected officials from the village community. It is suggested that the law should strengthen the local Village Productivity Committees (VPCs) by democratising them and giving them clear powers to administer land rights on behalf of the village communities.

Village assistance

1. Where electricity is not available, provide basic internet access using solar-powered containers fitted with a VSAT satellite link to the internet and a local Wi-Fi network. [Mach Works](#) and LinkNet can deliver this. These are essential for the wise ecosocial development and conservation of the chiefdoms of Zambia. Works Macha will assist with 1) [establishing a satellite link](#), 2) [holistic assistance](#), 3) [Jatropha bio-oil for farmers scheme](#):

Most popular projects



Solar technology for an internet cafe

Works Macha wants to expand internet connectivity to several rural villages in Zambia. The value of the Internet for a rural town is

Amount 20.000,- one-time investment



Adopt a rural community

Works Macha gets many requests for support from several rural villages in Zambia. The value of the Internet for a rural town is

Amount 40,- one-time investment



Jatropha bio oil for farmers

What would you do without electricity at home? Most of the families in Macha have no access to lighting and have to use wood for cooking. Macha

Amount 250,- per year

Municipal Manifesto

War makes death real to us...All the animal life in us, all schemes of happiness that centred in this world, were always doomed to a final frustration. In ordinary times only a wise man can realize it. Now the stupidest of us knows. We see unmistakably the sort of universe in which we have all along been living, and must come to terms with it.

C.S. Lewis - Learning in War-Time

I'm a pessimist because of intelligence, but an optimist because of will
Antonio Gramsci - Gramsci's prison letters

* * *

Imports

1. **Strictly control imports** – bearing in mind the destruction of local industry in Northern Province in 1897 with the arrival of the BSA Company and British imports, and the recent destruction of the textile industry by mainly Chinese imports. The term 'Free Market' is beguiling, for it allows to be ushered in [the plundering](#) corporates: The African Continental Free Trade Agreement (“AfCFTA”) entered into force on [30 May 2019](#) is a disaster.

Debt

1. The debt problem to be taken in hand. Greg Mills revealed the parlous financial situation in [Zambia](#) in 2019: “Foreign debt has today ballooned to \$9.5-billion, excluding government guarantees estimated at \$1.2-billion. In the process, the debt-to-GDP ratio has increased from 25% in 2012 to more than 70% in 2018 through a combination of regular borrowing from the Chinese and other development partners, a \$3-billion Eurobond issue over three years (2012, 2014 and 2015), taking out “bridging loans” from the Bank of Zambia and syndicated loans with commercial banks, scaling up the issuing of government securities in 2016 and 2017, and the conversion of fuel payment arrears into loans. The 2019 budget highlights that external debt service payments will increase by 90% in 2019 to \$1.4-billion. Debt service costs, which accounted for 27% of all revenue raised in 2018, risks becoming the largest government expenditure component. And the spending hangover is about to strike. Some \$750m of Eurobond debt matures in 2022, \$1-billion in 2024, and \$1.25-billion between 2025 and 2027. The grace repayment period on some of the larger Chinese loans also ends in 2020. Local debt has increased, too, to more than \$5-billion. Rather than being put exclusively to productive purposes

such as investing in infrastructure, much of this new debt has been spent on salaries and corruption. The public service comprises 237,000 of the 625,000 people who are formally employed in the economy. Public service salaries, which have increased by more than 50% in real terms since 2011, account for nearly half the government budget. If debt service is half of the budget and salaries the other half, that will leave nothing over to enable development. Something will have to give.”

Annual dividend

1. A basic annual dividend must be paid to all adults in Zambia from a Permanent Commons Fund into which the government pays a share of mining, land and carbon taxes. Therefore a Permanent Commons Fund - along the lines of the Alaska Permanent Fund, [is recommended](#).

Action

1. Adopt the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction’s (UNDRR) [Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030](#). UNDRR defines itself through its multi-stakeholder coordination approach based on the relationships it has developed with national and local governments, intergovernmental organizations and civil society, including the private sector, and by its mode of operating through a network of global partners.
2. Introduce democratic proportional representation, not first-past-the-post voting
3. Incorporate [The Earth Charter](#) - a soft-law document - of the Earth Charter Commission. In 2008, the Workers Education Association of Zambia joined Earth Charter International as an Affiliate. The

Association has organized several activities to promote the Earth Charter, such as a Local Community Summit on Climate Change, held in October 2008 and promoted by Earth Charter USA. These two organizations also started the Community Action on Poverty and Environment (COPE) Project in 2009. This project continues to promote direct actions to solve some pressing issues in Zambian rural communities.

4. Dismantle power structures for more equitable citizen participation in a local economy, making the local community the building block
5. The *antibiotic resistome* - the worldwide pool of resistance genes that bacteria may acquire - presents a [massive threat to humanity](#). As Ian Angus remarks, "This means that the use of antibiotics—including any new ones that may be discovered—must be stringently limited to essential cases, and all waste must be contained and destroyed. Agricultural use of antibiotics, except to treat specific diseases in individual animals, must be stopped—period." And adding, "Addressing AMR effectively will require a level of global effort and redirection of resources comparable to the fight against climate change, biodiversity loss, and other ecological crises that define the Anthropocene. If pharmaceutical business as usual prevails, the new epoch will be a time when few if any antibiotics work and bacterial evolution will remake Earth's life-support systems in ways we cannot predict." Here the U.N. campaign of action must be supported. The first challenge is to counter the lack of a [comprehensive economic model](#) for fully assessing the impact of antimicrobial resistance and the cost and effectiveness of interventions to reduce the emergence and transmission of such resistance'.
6. Declare ecocide an international crime through the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
7. Confirm the [UN Charter](#), the UN's 17 [Sustainable Development Goals](#), the [Universal Declaration of Human Rights](#), the [UN Framework Convention on Climate Change](#) ([UNFCCC.int](#)), and the [Paris Agreement](#)

8. Introduce GND policies NOT tied to economic growth. (Note the contradictions in [producing renewable power](#))
9. Introduce binding regulations on water conservation and use
10. Fully develop public transportation, a national rail system and bicycle-friendly infrastructure.
11. Discourage global trade so that individual countries consume according to their own ecological limits
12. Regulate financial markets so that financial actors comply with strict sustainability and social criteria that work towards the necessary transitions
13. Ensure appropriate investment which avoids austerity
14. Create and ensure a public Green Investment Plan
15. Provide a legal, universal definition of climate refugees, a legal and universal definition of internally displaced people due to climatic reasons, ensuring that our foreign policies are oriented towards protecting their rights.
16. Ensure a commercial environment where every business person is free from unfair competition and domination by domestic or international monopolies
17. Compulsory saving and confiscatory taxation of higher income
18. Provide full employment
19. Ensure control of the public and customary commons by the chiefdoms

Power

1. Manage power demand through clean, renewable, and zero-emission energy sources following the example of the Netherlands that [‘recently passed a Climate Accord](#) requiring that the community own 50% of all new renewable energy or co-operative groups share profits locally’.
2. Phase-out dams
3. Remove profit from increased energy use and immediately reward

energy conservation.

4. Cease use of palm oil and soy
5. Promote the development of local, small-scale biodiesel production from used vegetable fat - [but bear in mind the pitfalls of biofuels.](#)

Investment

1. Abandon GDP (Gross Domestic Product) as a measure of progress and replace it with a more holistic alternative such as the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI)
2. Invest in decaying public infrastructure
3. Require manufacturers to offer extended warranties on all material products to encourage longer lifespans.
4. Legislate a “right to repair” and introduce laws against planned obsolescence.
5. Ban advertising in public spaces.
6. Introduce financial transaction taxes.
7. Increase resource royalties.
8. Introduce the “polluter pays” principle.
9. [Create public banks](#) tasked with using state and local funds for the public good, not private profit.
10. Implement a European type of Green Rule: privilege environment and climate over the free market, end the quest for profit and rethink our society’s functioning according to ecosystems limits.
11. Plug into EVs; by 2030, ensure all new cars are electric; by 2040, replace all internal combustion engine vehicles with electric vehicles.

Indigenous people (IP)

1. The Battle Plan must meet the demands of IP people for securing indigenous knowledge and being responsible to God for the care of customary land.
 2. In South America, the [Buen Vivir](#) movement supports the IP way forward.
 3. Recognize the ecological debt owed by the global North to the global South
 4. Institute the precautionary principle for all developments.
 5. Severely limit mining and deposit advance funds against future environmental impacts in a trust fund.
 6. Prohibit [IP shareholding in mining & oil pipelines](#) as an affront to their culture
 7. Recognize IP's right to self-determination.
 8. The state to honour and fulfil all obligations that entitle IP to land, water, food, hunting & fishing rights, medical, housing, etc.
 9. Provide reparations for historical injustices and pollution.
 10. With the agreement of the IP, adopt the right to Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) and 1) implement the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and 2) follow the concerns expressed in [*Indigenous Nations' Rights in the Balance: An Analysis of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples*](#).
 11. Support IP in making a "just transition," in which social and ecological needs are prioritized in the shift to an ecological society
 12. Commit to ecological solutions to the climate crisis that foster local autonomy and self-sufficiency
 13. Reject carbon trading
 14. Adopt [The Indigenous Peoples Major Group gold standard](#) on rights-based approaches for restoration and conservation (hopefully endorsed by the Global Landscapes Forum (GLF)):
- Strengthen respect, recognition and protection of the rights of Indige-

nous peoples and local communities, including women

- Bring an end to the criminalization and persecution of land and environment defenders.
- Increase recognition of, and sustained support to, indigenous peoples and local communities –including women – as stewards and bearers of solutions to landscape restoration, conservation, and sustainable use;
- Build partnerships to enhance engagement and support for rights-based approaches to sustainable landscapes across scales and sectors; and
- Dramatically scale-up efforts to legally recognize and secure collective land and resource rights across landscapes.

Wildlife

1. Implement an ecological revolution for equilibrium
2. Invest in wildlife - including species and genetic diversity
3. Maintain non-commercial ecosystem services
4. Restore native plant communities, and re-wild with native species
5. Develop and adopt adequate policy instruments to remedy defaunation - such as a [defaunation index](#), the poaching crisis, and the exploitation and trade of threatened species
6. Increase outdoor nature education for children, and society
7. Preserve ecosystems, their recovery and restoration
8. Ensure that the public commons and waters are protected and that eminent domain is not abused
9. Provide a legal basis for climate justice and ensure climate policies follow the law
10. Map flood plains and other areas of natural vulnerability and adjust land-use plans accordingly

Agriculture

1. Rapidly shift to sustainable agriculture and fisheries, including shorter supply chains, full environmental compliance and food sovereignty.
2. Stop factory livestock production and redeploy land resources by applying taxation, fines and fees.
3. Only allow small-farm agriculture free of most insecticides and chemical fertilizers and allowing for holistic grazing by cattle.
4. Invest in sustainable farming and land-use practices that increase soil health
5. Increase the production of Biochar and compost
6. Secure and support women smallholdings
7. Land should be made available to all. Mechanisms need to be worked out on who qualifies, where they qualify, when they qualify and how they are enabled to access the land. Ensure that people do not lose their only land through being forcefully dispossessed or distress sales, or if they do, they are enabled to redeem their land.

Plunder economy controls

1. Recognize capitalism's exploitation and oppression of humans
2. Oppose market-driven solutions to the climate crisis
3. Introduce proportional representation and consultation on all legislation concerning collective rights, i.e. the public commons and environmental protections, and include legislation that restricts corporate interests
4. Disallow corporate money for political campaigns
5. Close down secrecy jurisdictions and introduce a global minimum corporate tax to wipe out tax evasion. Use the proceeds of these taxes,

and of the above-mentioned fees on resource use, emissions and waste, to (a) help fund the rapid rollout of energy infrastructure, (b) contribute to a universal basic income, and (c) invest in public goods.

6. Introduce the ownership and democratic control of production, starting with the energy and financial industries
7. Introduce high taxation of the 1% and the corporations most responsible for the economic and environmental crises
8. Provide an economic bill of rights and financial reform
9. Oppose the global move to centralize economic authority through the Investor-State Settlement System (ISDS) through the TTIP, NAFTA, and CETA. The ISDS allows companies to sue the government if policy changes – even ones to protect public health or the environment – are deemed to affect their profits. These lawsuits bypass domestic courts and occur before an international tribunal of arbitrators, three private lawyers who decide whether private profits or public interests are more important. Across the world, investor-state tribunals have granted big business billions of dollars from taxpayers' pockets – often in compensation for public interest measures.

Infrastructure

1. Introduce progressive taxes on resource use, emissions and waste, or impose caps on these activities and tighten them each year.
2. Spur growth in clean manufacturing
3. Stop building new infrastructure projects that lock us into increased extraction decades into the future.
4. Modernize via rail, expand service and ensure trans-modal connections to light rail and electric buses
5. Develop an alternative to cement such as stamped earth

Social wellbeing

1. Introduce a [Universal Basic Income](#) (UBI)
2. Introduce a Universal Minimum Wage
3. Achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions through a fair and just transition for all communities
4. Provide full employment
5. Provide family planning
6. In rural areas, provide access to clean cooking stoves
7. Provide all people with (i) high-quality health care; (ii) affordable, safe, and adequate housing; (iii) economic security; and (iv) clean water, clean air, healthy and affordable food, and access to nature
8. Ensure immigration status and full protection for all workers.
9. Expand universal social goods and reinstate the commons, to ensure that people can access the resources they need to live well without high-income levels. Introduce a system of [universal basic services](#)
10. Shorten the working week and distribute available work more equally to ensure full employment.
11. [Roll out a wealth tax \(Thomas Piketty\)](#) and a financial transaction tax.
12. Democratize workplaces and encourage co-operative ownership structures for businesses

The Oasis Forum Strategic Plan

1. Conduct public debates and consultations about laws requiring reform
2. Mount a civic education campaign to introduce people to basic principles of a constitution and governance, including the rule of law, through media, workshop meeting
3. Arrange points for collecting submission from the public

4. Gender training in constitutional drafting
5. Drafting a popular constitution
6. Carry out Constitutional development conferences
7. Annual Convention
8. Convening of a Constituent Assembly

Finance

1. Create a People's Bank - suggested as a solution to corruption by a former director of the Reserve Bank of South Africa, Stephen Mitford Goodson. 'Such a bank does not loan money to the government at interest. A conventional central banking system perpetuates neoliberal capitalism'. In his book, [Goodson](#) 'provides a series of appendices on draft legislation for exactly how to implement a sound banking system, creating for the first time genuine sovereignty, prosperity and justice'. A former Goldman Sachs banker, Nomi Prins, adds an opinion in Truthout [\(here\)](#).
2. [Roll out](#) a wealth tax and a financial transaction tax.

Political and contractual binding covenant

1. Citizens' assemblies must take these proposals on board and prioritize actions by themselves for government and progressive social leaders. At elections, any decision by an individual or party must state its policy and sign a legal covenant to the effect that they will not deviate from their publicized position regarding actions needed to destroy nature, climate change, and increasing poverty. Should they break the agreement, the individual, the party, must resign or face legal action.

A Five-Year Appraisal

1. After five years of the full operation of a Guardians' Assembly - hopefully, joined by the Urban Assemblies - a convention of delegates should be pass judgement on the party-political system and functioning of government. Should the vote carry 88% of the delegates, then move to an overdue change and strengthening of the political system, a change which the former leader of the opposition Rhodesia Party, [Allan Savory](#), [recommended](#) as follows: *The country would be divided into electoral districts or constituencies much as today but with the district boundaries determined by the Judiciary and not politicians. The aim would be to prevent manipulation of the voter's roles, constituency boundaries and more by the political parties in power. Any individuals could stand for election if their application to do so were supported by a certain number of signatures of people resident in that constituency (assume 2,000 for illustrative purposes). These individuals would appeal for the vote in their area based on their character, reputation and record in the community and their desire to serve their community and nation in this capacity. They would raise their own funds from supporters and stand on their merit. Any candidate for Parliament found to be financially supported by any corporation or special interest group would be disqualified and never again allowed to stand for public office.*

* * *

Green New Deal in Canada

[Green New Deal Communities organizing Guide](#) 3 March 2021.



What is a Green New Deal?

A Green New Deal is a transformational project that recognizes the urgency of our interlocking crises — including the climate emergency, the COVID-19 pandemic, ongoing colonization, economic inequality, racism, unjust treatment of migrants, and other ways that our society makes people vulnerable — and the scale of change necessary to tackle them. It is more than a policy — it is an idea for massive societal transformation that has sparked movements around the world. The world’s scientists and Indigenous Peoples are telling us that we have to change course — and we need to do it quickly. We have to cut our global greenhouse gas emissions by at least 60 per cent below 2005 levels by 2030 if we are going to have a livable planet in the future. Pledges from governments and Big Oil to reach “net zero emissions by 2050” sound good on the surface but leave a lot of room for interpretation. “Net zero” can be used as a cover for false “solutions” like carbon capture and storage. We need real and substantial emissions reductions in this decade.

A Green New Deal for all will ensure that transformation is carried out equitably, that it is rooted in climate justice principles, that it centres the rights of Indigenous Peoples, and that it creates over a million jobs in the process.

At the Council of Canadians, we want a Green New Deal that:

- Is a Just Transition, divesting from polluting projects and creating jobs in clean-up, renewable energy production, efficiency, and beyond
- Invests in public infrastructure and services
- Centres Indigenous self-determination
- Ensures that social justice, equity, and human rights are a central part of climate action
- Opposes hate and systemic racism
- Defends and expands democracy
- Is paid for by tax fairness
- Prioritizes public health

We take responsibility for real change.

No one else will do this for us. For decades we've been told that only outside experts can solve the climate crisis. But this has only delayed action and kept power in the hands of a polluting and inequitable status quo. By choosing to act in local communities around tangible goals, we're taking responsibility for our community's needs — together.

We start with our own communities.

A Green New Deal led by communities who are connected across distance will address local needs while also building the political power we need to make aggressive shifts in national climate policy. Communities know the local changes they need, and by connecting local movements across distance we're identifying common goals that we can leverage for national change.

Why join Green New Deal Communities?

We work to support local campaigns in multiple locations and make connections so that we can build the Green New Deal together. Through this work we can make tangible change on the ground and organize and inspire communities for bigger wins in the future. If you have already developed, or want to develop, a locally rooted campaign relating to any issues under the banner of the Green New Deal, including but not limited to:

- Emissions targets
- Shutting down or blocking fossil fuel extraction, exploration, and transportation
- Decent work and worker transition to low-carbon jobs
- Education
- Indigenous rights, title, and sovereignty
- Equity, migrant justice, and antiracism
- Policing
- Forestry, mining, or other extractive industry
- Affordable green public housing
- Ending corporate capture of development
- Transit and transportation
- Drinking water and wastewater
- Food sovereignty, agroecology, and reforestation
- Revenue generation to pay for transition
- Another justice issue your community is facing

A Country Manifesto

*A manifesto is a published declaration of the intentions, motives, or views of the issuer, be it an individual, group, political party or government. A **manifesto** usually accepts a previously published opinion or public consensus or promotes a new idea with prescriptive notions for carrying out changes the author believes should be made.*

Wikipedia

Covid-19 has shaken the world. It has already led to the loss or devastation of countless lives, while many people in vital professions are working day and night to attend to the sick and stop further spread. Personal and social losses, and the fight to stop these, demand our continued respect and support. At the same time, it is critical to view this pandemic in historical context in order to avoid repeating past mistakes when we plan for the future.

The fact that Covid-19 has already had such a major economic impact is due, amongst other factors, to the economic development model that has been dominant globally over the last 30 years. This model demands ever-growing circulation of goods and people, despite the countless ecological problems and growing inequalities it generates.

A further weakness of the current system, and one that is not yet

prominent in discussions of the pandemic, is the link between economic development, the loss of biodiversity and important ecosystem functions, and the opportunity for diseases like Covid-19 to spread among humans. These are lethal links and could become much more so.

Dutch Five

* * *

Dutch Five

<[Link](#)>

1. **Move away from development focused on aggregate GDP growth** to differentiate among sectors that can grow and need investment (the so-called critical *public* sectors, and clean energy, education, health and more) and sectors that need to radically *degrow* due to their fundamental unsustainability or their role in driving continuous and excessive consumption (especially private sector oil, gas, mining, advertising, and so forth);
2. **Move to an economic framework focused on redistribution**, which establishes a universal basic income rooted in a universal social policy system, a strong progressive taxation of income, profits and wealth, reduced working hours and job sharing, and recognizes care work and essential public services such as health and education for their intrinsic value;
3. **Move agricultural transformation towards regenerative agriculture** based on biodiversity conservation, sustainable and mostly local and vegetarian food production, as well as fair agricultural employment conditions and wages;
4. **Reduce consumption and travel**, with a drastic shift from luxury and wasteful consumption and travel to basic, necessary, sustainable and

satisfying consumption and travel;

5. **Cancel debt**, especially for workers and small business owners and for countries in the global south (both from richer countries and international financial institutions).

Action

1. Establish citizens' assemblies to deal with ecological overshoot and political corruption.
2. [The ecological solution](#): Remove the crisis's cause by reducing environmental impact as swiftly as humanly possible. The impact is determined by per-capita consumption, population, and efficiencies. Therefore decrease consumption and population as quickly as socially feasible, and increase efficiencies as quickly as technically feasible.
3. Consider adopting the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction's (UNDRR) [Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030](#). UNDRR defines itself through its multi-stakeholder coordination approach based on the relationships it has developed with national and local governments, intergovernmental organizations and civil society, including the private sector, and by its mode of operating through a network of global partners.
4. Introduce democratic proportional representation, not first-past-the-post voting
5. Consider [The Earth Charter](#) - a soft-law document - of the Earth Charter Commission.
6. The *antibiotic resistome* - the worldwide pool of resistance genes that bacteria may acquire - presents a [massive threat to humanity](#). As Ian Angus remarked: *This means that the use of antibiotics—including any new ones that may be discovered—must be stringently limited to essential cases, and all waste must be contained and destroyed. Agricultural use of antibiotics, except to treat specific diseases in individual animals, must be stopped—period.* The first challenge is to counter the lack of a [comprehensive economic model](#) for fully assessing the impact of antimicrobial resistance and the

cost and effectiveness of interventions to reduce the emergence and transmission of such resistance’.

7. Declare ecocide an international crime through the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
8. Confirm the [UN Charter](#), the UN's 17 [Sustainable Development Goals](#), the [Universal Declaration of Human Rights](#), and revisit the [UN Framework Convention on Climate Change \(UNFCCC.int\)](#) and the [Paris Agreement](#)
9. Introduce development policies NOT tied to profit. (Note the contradictions in [producing renewable power](#))
10. Introduce binding regulations on water conservation and use
11. Develop bicycle-friendly infrastructure
12. Discourage global trade so that individual countries consume according to their own ecological limits
13. Create a public Green Investment Plan

Power

1. Phase-out and remove dams.
2. Remove profit from increased energy use and immediately reward energy conservation.
3. Investigate the introduction of TEQs ([Tradable Energy Quotas](#)), an electronic system for fairly reducing consumption of carbon-intensive energy, at the national scale
4. Cease use of palm oil and soy.
5. Realize the potential of natural carbon sinks, reject geoengineering and techno-fixes such as carbon capture and storage.
6. Enshrine the right to renewable energy (consider negative elements again)
7. Promote the development of local, small scale biodiesel production from used vegetable fat - [but bear in mind the pitfalls of biofuels](#).

Investment

1. Abandon GDP (Gross Domestic Product) as a measure of progress and replace it with a more holistic alternative such as the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI)
2. Invest in decaying public infrastructure
3. Ban advertising in public spaces, like Sao Paulo and other cities, have done.
4. Introduce the “polluter pays” principle.
5. [Create public banks](#) tasked with using state and local funds for the public good, not private profit.

Indigenous people

1. Secure indigenous knowledge, belief in Nature and science. In South America, the [Buen Vivir](#) movement supports the people’s way forward, and in Canada, the [Indigenous Guardians movement](#) is now financially backed by the federal government.
2. Recognize the ecological debt owed by the global North to the global South
3. Institute the precautionary principle and Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) for all developments.
4. Severely limit mining and deposit advance funds against future environmental impacts in a trust fund.
5. Prohibit chiefdoms and municipality [shareholding in mining & oil pipelines](#) and industrial agriculture
6. Recognize the chiefdoms’ right to self-determination.
7. The state to honour and fulfil all treaty obligations that entitle IP to land, water, food, hunting & fishing rights, medical, housing, etc.
8. Provide reparations for historical injustices and pollution
9. Promote justice and equity by stopping and repairing Indigenous Peoples’ historical oppression, communities of colour, migrant communities, de-industrialized communities, depopulated rural communities,

the poor, low-income workers, women, the elderly, the homeless, people with disabilities, and youth.

10. With the agreement of IP, implement the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) tied to the right to Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC)
11. Strongly protect women and girls, and assist with birth control.
12. Support IP in making a “just transition,” in which social and ecological needs are prioritized in the shift to an ecological society
13. Reject carbon trading
14. Adopt the [Indigenous Peoples Major Group gold standard](#) on right-based approaches for restoration and conservation (hopefully endorsed by the Global Landscapes Forum (GLF)):
 - Strengthen respect, recognition and protection of the rights of Indigenous peoples and local communities, including women;
 - Bring an end to the criminalization and persecution of land and environment defenders.
 - Increase recognition of, and sustained support to, Indigenous peoples and local communities –including women – as stewards and bearers of solutions to land restoration, conservation, and sustainable use;
 - Build partnerships to enhance engagement and support for rights-based approaches to sustainable landscapes across scales and sectors; and
 - Dramatically scale-up efforts to legally recognize and secure collective land and resource rights across landscapes.

Wildlife

1. Invest in wildlife - including species and genetic diversity
2. Maintain non-commercial ecosystem services
3. Restore native plant communities and re-wild with native species, especially apex (top of the food chain) predators such as lion and leopard
4. Develop and adopt adequate policy instruments to remedy defaunation - such as a [defaunation index](#), the poaching crisis, and the exploitation

and trade of threatened species

5. Increase outdoor nature education for children, and society
6. Preserve ecosystems, their recovery and restoration
7. Ensure that the public and customary commons - the chiefdoms - are protected and that [eminent domain](#) is not abused

Agriculture

1. Shift to sustainable agriculture and fisheries, including shorter supply chains, full environmental compliance and food sovereignty.
2. [Transform agricultural land use.](#)
3. Stop factory livestock production and redeploy land resources by applying taxation, fines and fees.
4. Only allow small-farm agriculture free of most insecticides and chemical fertilizers and allowing for holistic grazing by cattle.
5. Invest in sustainable farming and land-use practices that increase soil health
6. Increase the production of Biochar and compost
7. Food waste to become a thing of the past (see [The Economics of Food Waste](#))
8. Secure and support women smallholdings
9. Make land available to all. Mechanisms need to be worked out on who qualifies, where they qualify, when they qualify and how to give them access to land. Ensure that people do not lose their only land through being forcefully dispossessed, or if they do, ensure they are enabled to redeem their land.

Plunder economy controls

1. Recognize capitalism's exploitation and oppression of humans
2. Introduce proportional representation and consultation on all legislation concerning collective rights, i.e. the public commons and environmental protections, and include legislation that restricts corporate

interests

3. Disallow corporate money for political campaigns
4. Close down secrecy jurisdictions and introduce a global minimum corporate tax to wipe out tax evasion. Use the proceeds of these taxes, and of the above-mentioned fees on resource use, emissions and waste, to (a) help fund the rapid rollout of energy infrastructure, (b) contribute to a universal basic income, and (c) invest in public goods.
5. Revisit [Social Credit](#) which '*is opposed to full employment as a fixed objective. People should only be required to labour in the formal economy insofar as their work is actually needed in the provision of those specific goods and services that they would independently select (i.e. if their choices were not conditioned by the artificial scarcity of money that is an inherent characteristic of the present financial system)*'.
6. Introduce the ownership and democratic control of production, starting with the energy and financial industries
7. Introduce high taxation of the 1% and the corporations responsible for the economic and environmental crises

Infrastructure

1. Review all infrastructure investments for adaptation to climate change.
2. Invest in a public programme of flood defences
3. Remove waste sites, incinerators, polluting industries, generators, transportation hubs and highways from oppressed communities.
4. Introduce progressive taxes on resource use, emissions and waste, or impose caps on these activities and tighten them each year.
5. Spur growth in clean manufacturing
6. Stop building new infrastructure projects that lock us into increased extraction decades into the future.
7. Modernize via rail, expand service and ensure trans-modal connections to light rail and electric buses
8. Develop alternative cement

Social wellbeing

1. Introduce a Universal Basic Income (UBI) and revisit [Social Credit](#)
2. Introduce a Universal Minimum Wage
3. Provide full employment and transition to union jobs.
4. Provide family planning
5. Provide access to clean cooking stoves
6. Provide all people with (i) high-quality health care; (ii) affordable, safe, and adequate housing; (iii) economic security; and (iv) clean water, clean air, healthy and affordable food, and access to nature.
7. Impose fees on [food waste](#) while banning it from landfills, as [South Korea](#) has done.
8. Prevent supermarkets from trashing food, as [France](#) and [Italy](#) have done
9. Oppose many of the social laws artificially imposed by capitalism
10. Revert to the standard of living of the 1970s
11. Build a world of genuine equality and human community—the only conceivable basis for human development and survival
12. End all trade deals that interfere with our attempts to rebuild local economies, regulate corporations and stop damaging extractive projects
13. Ensure immigration status and full protection for all workers.
14. Expand the sectors of our economy that are already low carbon: caregiving, teaching, social work, the arts and public-interest media
15. Introduce a national childcare program
16. Declare “austerity” – which has systematically attacked low-carbon sectors like education and healthcare while starving public transit and forcing reckless energy privatizations – a threat to life on earth
17. Expand universal social goods and reinstate the commons, to ensure that people can access the resources they need to live well without high-income levels. Introduce a system of [universal basic services](#)
18. Shorten the working week and distribute available work more equally to ensure full employment.
19. [Roll out a wealth tax \(Thomas Piketty\)](#) and a financial transaction tax.
20. Democratize workplaces and encourage co-operative ownership struc-

tures for businesses

21. Give people, especially the youth, a voice in our climate and environmental policies.

Landsafe Chiefdoms

Whereas many agriculturally-based rural communities may accept the economic values attached to wildlife, other sources of security such as maintaining and consolidating significant social relations through culturally mediated resource distributions are also important.

Stuart Alexander Marks - Back to the future: Some Unintended Consequences of Zambia's Community-based Wildlife Program (ADMADe), 2001.

In Ephesians II. St Paul speaks with confidence having observed the result of God's method through Christ. Into human life and at the human level, he, so to speak, inserts his own life with its immeasurable potentialities for converting, redeeming, reconciling, and bringing into harmony. From the world's point of view, this low level approach was and still is a ridiculously weak and impracticable way of tackling the deep rooted problems of human nature. Yet it has worked, not invariably and not without failure, but with a result so impressive that even a hostile world cannot disregard it. New powers, new qualities, a new spirit came to birth and began at once to work upon even the most unpromising material to produce whole

men, and of humanity a Whole Man.

J.B. Phillips - Making Men Whole

In the promised land, chiefs are the glue that binds community, culture, the land and the resources it supports. By definition, they, therefore form the upper chamber, the benign aristocracy, and cannot sully their massive responsibility in the tawdry politics implanted by an alien culture. Their massive responsibility is to eschew the feudalism of the likes of the old Mpezeni and Chitimakulu, embracing an enlightened and more democratic way for their people whose destiny is inextricably linked with the land. Having 'created' the chiefdoms over much of the territory under 'Indirect Rule' - with all its faults, we further turned our back on the chiefs, choosing instead the waPolitishi class, setting Zambia back many decades.

Chosang'anga - comment to Chola Mukanga, The Zambian Economist, 21 December 2008.

Sorting truth from fiction - consider the SIFT framework developed at Washington State University that tells people to [stop, investigate the source, find trusted coverage and trace the claims back to the source.](#)

Aids for a Guardians' Assembly

Common sense strategies to reduce vulnerability to extreme weather events, improve environmental quality, develop better energy technologies and increase access to grid electricity, improve agricultural and land use practices, and better manage water resources can pave the way for a more prosperous and secure future. Each of these solutions is 'no regrets' – supporting climate change mitigation while improving human well being. These strategies avoid the political gridlock surrounding the current policies and avoid costly policies that will have minimal near-term impacts on the climate.

And finally, these strategies don't require agreement about the risks of uncontrolled greenhouse gas emissions.

Judith Curry recommends: [December 14, 2019](#)

[Game ranches](#) are to be allowed in Chieftaines Shimukunami of Lufwanyama, Chief Lumpuma of Lufwanyama, Senior Chief Chiwala Chiefdom of Masaiti and Chieftaines Malembeka of Mpongwe.

Lusaka Times 14 Jan. 2019 - Government to open game ranches in chiefdoms

* * *

1 INTRODUCTION

Implementing a [Landsafe](#)¹¹-type Socioecological Development Model, debated and approved by the chiefdom's Guardians' Assemblies and traditional leadership, should be considered for the survival of the chiefdoms, along with other models and recommendations. This model pursues partnerships with government departments, though the Assemblies should now take up the challenge of the Victoria Falls 2019 declaration for full ownership by chiefdoms of their wildlife and natural resources. The state of the chiefdoms and the biodiversity demand it. The particular objectives should include the following:

1. To safeguard customary land and its associated protected areas in

¹¹ Recommended Citation

I.P.A. Manning, *The Landsafe Socioecological Development Model for the Customary Commons of Zambia: Evolution and Formalization*, 52 Nat. Resources J. 195 (2012).

Available at: <https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol52/iss1/7>

perpetuity.

2. To strengthen the traditional authority and encourage democratic structures.
3. To conserve the wildlife and natural resources for the benefit of the chiefdoms.
4. To provide a land and business management plan for the appropriate development of chiefdoms, one that fully respects the ecology and the traditional, cultural and religious norms.
5. To grapple with the bewildering arsenal of legislation directed by a construct of the British colonial state - the premodern state of Zambia - with its multi-party parliament, executive-style president and its neoliberal agenda controlling pre-colonial customary societies in its midst, societies conforming to unwritten laws, customs and spiritual direction provided by chiefs, headmen and spiritual leaders and increasingly Ubuntu-Christianity. This will require the following:
 - 1) a careful classification of legislation that is advantageous and not disadvantageous to the chiefdoms; 2) the categorization of legislation of a neutral Nature; 3) the classification of legislation deemed oppressive; 4) the legislation which is required to ensure the survival and appropriate development of the chiefdoms.
6. To provide an appropriate development plan in conformity with the Sustainable Development Goals.
7. This plan must consider the chiefdom's carrying capacity, its sustainable resources, and the retention of its cultural and traditional life.
8. Where necessary, provide incentives for both investors and the chiefdoms to enter into mutually beneficial co-operative partnerships and investments.
9. To identify, propose and facilitate small co-operative businesses able to harvest natural resources.
10. To negotiate with the government to establish a national trust fund such as the Alaska Permanent Fund and implement development projects required by the customary community.
11. To foster education in the chiefdom's history, culture and religion, and

in its ecology.

12. To foster conservation agriculture, health and education.

2 THE EXPECTED GENERAL OUTCOMES

1. Create and register a Citizens' Assembly within each chiefdom
2. Create large community-managed game ranches - see https://file.scirp.org/pdf/OJE_2014062509224846.pdf¹²

¹² **Game Ranching: A Sustainable Land Use Option and Economic Incentive for Biodiversity Conservation in Zambia.**

Chansa Chomba, Chimbola Obias, Vincent Nyirenda.

Open Journal of Ecology, 2014, 4, 571-581

Abstract

The ten provinces of Zambia were surveyed to determine number and size of game ranches situated in these areas up to the end of 2012/early 2013. Three classes of game ranches were developed as; 1) ≥ 500 hectares as game ranch proper, 2) ≥ 50 - < 500 hectares as game farm, and 3) < 50 hectares as ornamental. A total of 200 game ranches keeping large mammals from the size of common duiker to eland were recorded with a growth rate of 6 per year for the period 1980-2012. The largest number was ornamental 98 (49%); large game ranches were 75 (38%) and the least was game farms 27 (14%). Thirty seven species of large mammals were recorded, of which, 15 were the most abundant with impala topping the list with 21,000 individuals (34%). It was found that of the ten provinces, Luapula, Western and Northern Provinces despite being largely rural with low population densities except for Luapula did not have any game ranch. The province with the largest number was Lusaka 71 (36%), Southern 59 (30%), Central 31 (16%), Copperbelt 19 (10%), Eastern and Northwestern 9 (4.5% each) and Muchinga was the least with 2 (1%). The rapid increase in the number of ornamental category is mainly attributed to the rise in the development of tourist accommodation facilities and high cost residential properties. This growth provides an opportunity to convert to game ranching schemes abandoned farmlands which are not currently useful to agriculture due to loss of fertility and other forms of land degradation. Similarly, parcels of land with natural ecological limitations should also be considered for such schemes. Rehabilitation of degraded land through ranching could also enhance carbon sequestration, a factor critical in minimizing carbon emissions and other green house gases.

3. Under the Forests ([Community Forest Management](#)) Regulations, 2018, create community forests within customary area (GMA and Open Area), Local forests and national forests.
4. In the longer term - reclaim those parts of national parks removed from the original Native Trust Land or partner in their management and benefit-sharing.
5. The production of community landuse plans
6. The creation of a critical mass of appropriate development projects for the socio-ecological well-being of the chiefdoms
7. An investment trust fund account for the sustained investment in the chiefdoms established with a sound system of fiduciary management in place
8. The establishment of co-management agreements between the Trusts and Government departments and ministries responsible for fisheries, forestry, wildlife and water, and as a result, these resources conserved for the benefit of the people.
9. The development of safari-hunting, sport fishing, ecotourism and game cropping
10. Implementing a fire policy that is not based on early burning but on the latest burning possible to protect fire-resistant plants.

3 PROPOSED LANDSAFE OUTPUTS REQUIRED FOR THE CHIEFDOMS

OUTPUT 1: Formalizations

Activity 1: Vesting of land in the Trusts and registration with Registrar of Deeds

Activity 2: Trusts make an application to the Department of National Parks and Wildlife (DNPW), through the CRB, for registration of appropriate land as a community game ranch, with all the conditions and regulations implied DNPW inspects and surveys the proposed areas.

Activity 3: Trust signs co-management agreement with the CRB over the GMA section or makes application for conversion to an unfenced community game ranch or conservancy

Activity 4: Trusts – with the assistance of the embryonic Landsafe Foundation – provide a management plan

Activity 5: Trusts sign co-management agreement with Forestry Department

Activity 6: Trusts sign co-management agreement with the Department of Fisheries within the Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries; requiring the following:

- Declaration of a Fisheries Management Area
- Election of a Fisheries Management Committee

Activity 7: Trusts sign co-management agreement with the Water Affairs Department

Activity 8: Trusts enter into assignment or lease agreements with investors or take up joint ventures

OUTPUT 2: The Community Game Ranches

Activity 1: Conduct a rapid rural appraisal and sensitization exercise

Activity 2: Survey proposed reserves and agreement with Trusts and chiefs on boundaries

Activity 3: Record boundary coordinates and mapping

Activity 4: Compile baseline data on wildlife and forestry

Activity 5: Survey the riverine stretch for suitable lodge and campsites

Activity 6: Assess current poaching activities

Activity 7: Assess adjoining private game ranch fencing

Activity 8: Cost various options

Activity 9: Assess the domestic stock/wildlife disease interactions

Activity 10: Provide all critical potential impacts on the chiefdoms, like those within the Bangweulu chiefdoms where immediate action is

required on proposals to dam the Luapula at Mambalima and Mambatuts falls and permanently flood the wetland. In Zambia, various examples of important zoonotic diseases reported in wild animals include tuberculosis, trypanosomiasis, anthrax, rabies, brucellosis and rift valley fever. Important livestock diseases that have been maintained in wild animals include foot and mouth disease (FMD), theileriosis, African swine fever (ASF) and African horse sickness (AHS), rabies, and malignant catarrhal fever (MCF) (Bengis et al., 2002; Thomson, 1985).

<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/292918377>

OUTPUT 3:Socio-ecological development

Activity 1: Provide a participatory landuse plan for the Trusts

Activity 2: Provide capacity support to the Trust: the care of Trust Funds and the appointment of executive officer

Activity 3: Provide capacity support to the CRBs on animal depredations (Appendix 2), wildlife protection, quota production and monitoring, account management, development project

Activity 4: GPS villager landuse and open land registration books

Activity 5: Support education by providing teacher-assistants cum natural resource officers based in the Village Action Groups (VAGs)

Activity 3: Support health clinics

Activity 4:Implementation of conservation farming

Activity 5: Implement honey production and aquaculture and the establishment of furniture co-operatives

Activity 6: Establish village-based tourism

Activity 7: Implement micro-credit schemes, particularly one serving women

Activity 8: Provide a wildlife crop-raiding programme: assessment and recording (Appendix 2); crop protection...

OUTPUT 4: Business plans and marketing

Activity 1: Provide a business proposal for the respective Trusts for the game ranches and forest conservancies, the GMA and the TFCA

Activity 2: Produce project proposals and business plans

DEVELOPMENT GUIDELINES

1 Customary community land registration

To offset the potentially deleterious effects of ‘free-rider’ immigration into the area and assist in establishing secure usufruct, open a chiefdom land registration book and register - with the use of a GPS - all residents and their agricultural landholdings. These will then be suitably mapped. The success of conservation agriculture to offset *Chitemene* and random movement then becomes essential.

2 Community projects and business development

Design project proposal templates to be used by the Trust in identifying and proposing community projects for consideration by the development of fund trustees. An important part of this process is small business development and the implementation of micro-credit facilities.

3 Natural resource protection

The future protection of the conservancy must follow a simple minimalist approach to conservancy protection and management, based on the verities of ownership:

1. Appoint protection and natural resources officers under guardian spiritual traditions. They must be well-trained, motivated and mobile and will conform to the ‘least possible number’ concerning their

leadership.

2. Training must be constant.
3. Remuneration will conform, and not exceed local norms
4. Operational manuals must be simple and explicit
5. Management manuals must be clear as to fire management, i.e. late-early burning, to improve carrying capacity.
6. Although participatory in nature, the plans and manuals must be drawn up by the Trusts with the Landsafe Chiefdom's Association established by the Guardians' Assemblies and the appropriate government departments and local planning officers' support.
7. NGOs and donors with experience in community development must be invited and encouraged to improve livelihoods in the area, but working within the landuse plan and from a 'bottom-up' perspective.
8. *Not under any circumstances, other than through traditional legal systems which seek equitable solutions to transgressions of the natural and customary law, to arrest or imprison villagers of the customary commons who are involved in subsistence poaching.*

4 The Overarching Framework

A holistic approach to the custodianship of land and natural resources, in general, would embody revisiting the Natural Resource Act 1962 and enshrining the following essential principles :

1. Zambia's customary land is sacrosanct and should not be sold to anyone, not foreigner, not Zambian.
2. Chiefdom Development Trusts should be established in all chiefdoms to be the custodian of the land and natural resources, incorporate the villagers' needs and aspirations, be married with a simple landuse plan, and identify investment projects. The Chief, CBOs, local councils, and significant investors and NGOs would sit as trustees, responsible for managing a trust fund.

LANDSAFE CHIEFDOMS

3. Having identified investment projects, trusts put them on the table for investor scrutiny as usufruct leases only. These leases to be registered with the Commissioner of Lands.
4. Local villagers' agricultural lands to be recorded in a land registry book maintained by the chief. A form of title is therefore recognized, without any need to advance to leasehold and total alienation.

Action Guides

Results Management in Norwegian Development Cooperation

A Practical Guide

After reading and using this Practical Guide, you should recognise:

- » *the importance of setting clear objectives.*
- » *that outcomes represent the most important result-level in results management. You and your partner should stay focused on what ultimately matters: the effects of the intervention on people and systems.*
- » *the significance of developing a limited number of sound indicators with targets as these are the keys to knowing when you and your partner are making measurable progress towards desired results.*
- » *the need to collect baseline values for the indicators in the planning phase. It is difficult to determine what has been accomplished in 3-5*

years if we don't know where we are at present.

» that risk management is an important and integrated part of results management. What are the major risks? How should they be handled or monitored, by whom and when?

» that the results framework with indicators, targets and baselines should be linked to a monitoring and evaluation plan. Make sure reporting and evaluation requirements are aligned with the monitoring and evaluation system of your partner.

» the importance of KISS! If results management is to be successful, it must be grounded in reality and be perceived as useful. This suggests a simple and practical approach to result management. Keep It Simple and Smart!

ICCA Consortium

[Draft of report](#)

Strengthening Your Territory of life: Full Report

[Guidance from communities for communities](#)

Borrini-Feyerabend, G., J. Campese, and T. Niederberger (eds). Strengthening your territory of life: guidance from communities for communities. Online version: ssprocess.iccaconsortium.org. The ICCA Consortium, 2021.

Self-strengthening the Kawawana territory of life The evolution of this guidance began more than a decade ago: the custodians of the Kawawana

territory of life in Senegal were facing major threats to both their territory and community livelihoods. They understood that to address these threats, their 'territory of life' was central and needed to be restored. For that, also their traditional rules for access and use of natural resources, integrated with new understandings and tools, needed to be better recognized and respected. This is exactly what they achieved! How did they do it? They engaged in a process of reflection, discussion, and action: a 'self-strengthening process'. The custodians of the Kawawana territory of life began their self-strengthening process in late 2008, Their story illustrates the power of such a process and provides an example of how it can be approached. The self-strengthening process started in late 2008, when the term Kawawana did not yet exist and the local estuarine territory was in a truly bad shape. At an initial meeting among leaders of the Mangagoulack rural municipality, representatives of the local fisher's organization, and visitors from the ICCA Consortium, the difficult circumstances were discussed. They agreed that their territory needed to be restored to bring decent livelihoods back to the community. In their view, this could be done only if the community was able to reinstate its traditional rules for access and use of natural resources. The traditional rules would put an end to the pillage of the natural resources that was happening under their eyes, by anyone able to fish, cut, gather or collect anything in their territory. For that, however, the backing and support of the government was necessary... They all knew that a leader of a neighbouring community was sent to jail for having unilaterally attempted to enforce local fishing rules. They were scared by that, and saw no way out of the quandary.

With a strong mandate from all participants in the initial meeting, the ICCA Consortium visitors were able to quickly obtain resources to support the community self-strengthening process. Early in 2009, they began with a three-week set of intensive meetings among 150 representatives from the eight villages that comprise the community. The meetings developed as relatively informal but highly focused grassroots discussions, with people examining their situation, envisioning what they wished to achieve and planning what to do. The process was supported by a team of three

external advisers, comprising a fishery biologist, an agro-economist and a governance expert and overall process facilitator. At the beginning, a group of more than twenty experienced and respected fishermen from the eight villages got together to analyze the present and historical situation of the local fisheries, and identified and described trends in the diversity and size of their catch. Then a much broader group of village representatives joined in and heard from the fishermen. Together, they recalled the history of their community, their deep, multiple cultural and spiritual connections with their territory (the Djola culture is as complex and rich as one can imagine) and their shared current ecological and socio-economic situation. The larger group was then accompanied to identify their desired future, or what they mean when they said they want a “good life” (Bourong Badiaké). It turned out that what they all meant was peace, community solidarity, prosperity, a better diet for all, a stop to the urban exodus, and a healthy and productive local environment. For all of this, they recognized that their territory of life– which they named Kawawana or “our collective natural heritage to be conserved by us all”– was essential. Through further discussions and analyses, they all agreed that they needed to restore their Kawawana via the recognition and respect of their traditional rules (integrated with modern tools for biological monitoring). Ultimately, they believed that this was the single most important factor to bring about all the good life results they wished to achieve. This realization was a very powerful moment for all those involved.

If a chiefdom’s Citizens’ Assembly wishes to report on its activities and progress to the ICCA, write to Arju at arju@iccaconsortium.org.

* * *

Rights + Resources

[This report](#) is informed by the imperative to prevent the collapse of global biodiversity while respecting the tenure and human rights of Indigenous Peoples (IPs), local communities (LCs), and Afrodescendants (ADs). It highlights the risks and opportunities for the world's IPs, LCs, and ADs rising from the proposed expansion of conservation areas by asking five key questions:

1. How many people live within important biodiversity conservation areas, including existing protected areas that could be affected by future conservation action to meet biodiversity protection imperatives?
2. What is the distribution of people living in important biodiversity conservation areas according to income status of countries?
3. As a notional exercise, what could be the potential financial cost of exclusionary conservation practices applied to all high biodiversity value terrestrial areas?
4. What are the costs and benefits of community rights-based conservation as an alternate pathway for expansion of areas under conservation to meet biodiversity goals?
5. To what extent would recognizing and enforcing the collective tenure rights of IPs, LCs, and ADs contribute towards area-based targets for conservation?

* * *

IIED: International Institute for Environment and Development

[Letter on the COVID Future](#)

Participatory Learning and Action

<quote>

[A Trainer's Guide](#)

A journal for newcomers and experienced practitioners alike. These pages contain the content of the [journal series from 1988-2013](#). Individual articles and complete issues are available for free download.¹³

A few Selected Tools

PLA 55: Practical tools for community conservation in southern Africa

Community conservation in southern Africa is premised upon the devolution of rights, including:

- the right to benefit;
- the authority to manage resources; and

¹³ I have only included a few of the series here. Therefore go to <https://www.iied.org/participatory-learning-action> in order to access them all

- the right to allocate and dispose of these resources to the best advantage

[This special issue of Participatory Learning and Action](#) features a collection of lessons and innovative tools which have been developed by the facilitators of community-based natural resource management programmes in southern Africa.

December 2006

Guest editors: Brian Child and Brian Jones

The tools described in this issue can be broadly divided into two categories: facilitator's tools and management tools. The facilitator's tools range from Theatre for Africa's role in policy development to the CAMPFIRE game for improving training in financial management. The management tools have been developed to allow communities to manage wildlife in modern market economies. These tools range from the event book system developed in Namibia to the quota setting methodologies developed in Zimbabwe.

This issue will be an important resource for facilitators in other regions.

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Contents

THEME SECTION

1. Practical tools for community conservation in southern Africa Brian Child and Brian Jones
2. Community conservation and participatory policy processes in southern Africa Brian Jones, David Mulolani and Brian Child
3. Revenue distribution for empowerment and democratisation Brian Child

4. Building capacity for local-level management through participatory technology development Lilian Goredema, Ivan Bond and Russell Taylor

5. Marketing hunting and tourism joint ventures in community areas Brian Child and Chris Weaver6. Community-managed tourism small enterprises in Namibia Andee Davidson with Reuben Mufati and Usiel Ndjavera 7 Making financial training fun: the CAMPFIRE game Sam Murinye, Lilian Goredema, and Ivan Bond

8. Participatory wildlife quota setting Norman Rigava, Russell Taylor, and Lilian Goredema

9. The event book system: community-based monitoring in Namibia Greg Stuart-Hill with Richard Diggle, Bevan Munali, Jo Tagg and David Ward

10. PGIS and mapping for conservation in Namibia Jo Tagg and Julie Taylor

11. Using theatre in participatory environmental policymaking Tamara Guhrs, Liz Rihoy and Miranda Guhrs

GENERAL SECTION

12. Inspire: a UK participatory public art evaluation Christopher Hartworth and Joanne Hartworth

13. Piloting a methodology to investigate poverty dynamics Tariq Omar Ali, Mehnaz Rabbani and Munshi Sulaiman

14. Using participatory video to develop youth leadership skills in Colombia Harriet Menter, Maria Cecilia Roa, Omar Felipe Beccera, Clara Roa and Wilson Celemin

15. Survey results: PLA 54 Mapping for Change – practice, technologies and communications Holly Ashley

REGULARS

Editorial

.....

Tips for trainers.....

.....

In Touch.....

.....

RCPLA Network.....

.....

Editorial

PLA 66 - Tools for supporting sustainable natural resource management and livelihoods

September 2013

Edited by: Holly Ashley, Nicole Kenton, Angela Milligan

This 66th issue of Participatory Learning and Action (PLA) includes general articles on participatory approaches to development submitted by readers and explores the links between participation, sustainable natural resource management and improving livelihoods, including:

- How a participatory three-dimensional modelling project in the Solomon Islands has generated multiple benefits, including ecosystem-based adaptation to climate change.
- How a modified form of scoring, used within a livelihoods framework, revealed how famine was averted in Southern Africa.
- How community-led action in India is improving animal health and work practices.
- How digital mapping is helping to identify and plan around key natural resources with pastoralists in Kenya and Tanzania.
- How a blend of PLA methods and ethnographic approaches proved invaluable in conducting HIV/AIDS research with fishing communities in Uganda.
- How a former bonded-labour group in Nepal have campaigned to uphold their rights of access, use and control of community forests.
- How an evaluation of a drought-rehabilitation project in Niger combined qualitative participatory and quantitative gendered budget analysis.

The issue also includes a selection of other articles, including how urban community groups in Chile have opposed two urban redevelopment projects;

the use of participatory impact assessment tools to define, measure, monitor, review and analyse progress; and a discussion of ethical issues and standards for participatory work. There are also reflections from members of the international Resource Centres for Participatory Learning and Action (RCPLA) network, a foreword from IIED's Camilla Toulmin and reflections from Robert Chambers of the Institute of Development Studies (IDS).

The PLA series is 25 years old this year, and at this milestone, IIED is taking stock to look at PLA's legacy and future direction. After this issue, the series will be put on hold, pending the findings from an external evaluation.

[Download the complete issue.](#)

PLA 65 - Biodiversity and culture: exploring community protocols, rights and consent

This special issue of PLA explores two important participatory tools that indigenous peoples and local communities can use to help defend their customary rights to biocultural heritage.

June 2012

Guest editors: Krystyna Swiderska with Angela Milligan, Kanchi Kohli, Harry Jonas, Holly Shrumm, Wim Hiemstra, Maria Julia Oliva

[Download complete issue](#)

[Also available in Spanish \(Español\)](#)

Many rural communities in the global South – including some 370 million indigenous peoples – directly depend on biodiversity and related traditional knowledge for their livelihoods, food security, healthcare and well-being. But with the loss of biodiversity, valuable resources such as climate-resilient crops, medicinal plants and wild foods are being lost. Cultural diversity is being eroded at an unprecedented rate, and with it, ancestral knowledge of how to use and conserve biodiversity.

This issue of PLA explores two important participatory tools:

- Community protocols – or charters of rules and responsibilities – in which communities set out their customary rights to natural resources and land, as recognised in customary, national and international laws; and
- Free, prior informed consent (FPIC) processes, in which communities decide whether or not to allow projects affecting their land or resources to go ahead and on what terms.

The issue reviews experiences of communities in Asia, Latin America and Africa in developing and using these tools in a range of contexts, including developing mechanisms for access and benefit-sharing (ABS) for genetic resources and traditional knowledge; confronting threats from mining and protected areas, and improving forestry partnerships.

It also looks at government experiences of establishing institutional processes for FPIC and benefit-sharing. It identifies practical lessons and guidance based on these experiences and aims to strengthen the capacity of a range of actors to support these rights-based tools effectively in practice.

This special issue aims to provide guidance for those implementing the Nagoya Protocol and other natural resource and development practitioners and to raise awareness of the importance of community designed and controlled participatory processes.

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[Download complete issue.](#)

PLA 64 - Young citizens: youth and participatory governance in Africa

This special issue of PLA describes how young people in Africa are exercising their right to participate and how they are developing the knowledge, skills and confidence to effect change.

December 2011

Guest editors: Jessica Greenhalf, Rosemary McGee

[Download complete issue](#)

[Also available in French \(Français\)](#)

All over the world, citizens are starting to demand accountability from those in power. We see exciting experiments in participatory governance. But are they working for young people? What spaces are most promising for the participation of children and young people in governance?

Across Africa, youth (particularly boys and young men) are seen as a 'lost generation': frustrated, excluded and marginalised from decision-making processes.

Contributors to this special issue demonstrate how this is changing. Young people in Africa are challenging the norms and structures that exclude them, engaging with the state and demanding accountability. This issue explores methods of communication, appraisal, monitoring and research which are involving young people in decision-making spaces. It asks: how can we re-shape how young people perceive and exercise citizenship? How can we redefine and deepen the links between young citizens and the state?

This edition of PLA demonstrates the persistence, passion and enthusiasm that youth bring to governance processes – and how they are driving change in creative and unexpected ways. It highlights how young Africans are addressing the documentation gap that surrounds youth and governance

in Africa and enabling other participatory practitioners – young and old – to learn from their experiences.

It will also be valuable for those working in other regions.

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PLA 63: How wide are the ripples? From local participation to international organisational learning

In this issue of Participatory Learning and Action, various authors share their reflections and experiences of bringing grassroots knowledge and information from participatory processes to bear at an international level.

September 2011

Guest editors: Hannah Beardon, Kate Newman

Do you work with or in an international or northern office of an international non-governmental organisation (INGO)? Do you facilitate participatory processes at the grassroots? Have you ever wondered how wide an impact the process might have?

When a pebble is thrown in the water, it creates ripples. But just as the ripples fade as they lose momentum, the strong local impact of good quality participatory grassroots processes also weakens as it gets further away from the original context. Yet, the insight and analysis, evidence and stories generated and documented during participatory processes are just the kinds of information that are needed to inform good development policy and planning.

This issue examines the possibilities and challenges involved in sharing grassroots knowledge – as well as strategies for strengthening practice. It aims to inspire empowered activists working with international NGOs to be a conscious and active part of change: to bring about more accountable, equitable and participatory development.

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[Download the complete issue.](#)

PLA 61: Tales of shit: Community-Led Total Sanitation in Africa

This edition of Participatory Learning and Action focuses on a radical new participatory approach called Community-Led Total Sanitation.

November 2010

Guest editors: Petra Bongartz, Samuel Musembi Musyoki, Angela Milligan and Holly Ashley

Where do you shit? In developing countries, the answer to this question may determine whether you live or die. Around 2.6 billion people do not have access to a toilet – about four in ten of the world's population (2021 approx 3.2 billion). Instead, they defecate in the open – in the bush, the forest, by riverbanks and lakes, near train tracks and by the side of the road. The consequences are dire. Shit carries disease and is a major killer. Lack of sanitation also impacts on general well-being, human dignity and personal freedom. Despite this, many sanitation programmes have failed to convince rural communities of the benefits of good hygiene.

This has begun to change in recent years with the development of a radical

new participatory approach called Community-Led Total Sanitation (CLTS).

CLTS has encouraged millions of people around the world to look at, talk about and tackle the problems caused by open defecation. This has not happened through education, force or monetary incentives, but through the facilitation of a participatory process called 'triggering'. Using Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) tools, communities analyse their hygiene habits and practices and mobilise to take collective action to totally sanitise their environments.

Following its development and spread in Asia, CLTS is now being piloted in Africa. This special issue of Participatory Learning and Action draws on a growing body of experience and includes case studies from East, Southern and West Africa.

The overview article provides an introduction to CLTS and discusses key elements for successful CLTS and issues around scaling up CLTS in Africa.

The resources section highlights key publications, websites and online communities for CLTS practitioners.

This issue will be of interest to the many organisations and individuals involved in implementing and taking CLTS to scale in Africa and elsewhere, as well as to other participatory practitioners.

About the editors: Petra Bongartz is coordination, communication and networking officer for CLTS at the Institute of Development Studies (IDS), University of Sussex, UK. Samuel Musembi Musyoki is the director of programmes for Plan International Kenya. Angela Milligan and Holly Ashley are co-editors of Participatory Learning and Action.

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Follow the links below to download the whole issue or individual articles in pdf format:

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PLA 59: Change at hand: Web 2.0 for development

This special edition of Participatory Learning and Action looks at emerging web services and applications that encourage users to collaborate and interact online, commonly known as Web 2.0.

June 2009

Guest editors: Holly Ashley, Jon Corbett, Ben Garside and Giacomo Rambaldi

Web 2.0 is radically changing the ways we create, share, collaborate and publish information via the internet. Participatory Web 2.0 for development – or Web2forDev for short – is a way of employing web services to intentionally improve information-sharing and online collaboration for development. Web 2.0 presents us with new opportunities and challenges which we need to better understand and grasp.

This special issue shares learning and reflections from practice and considers the ways forward for using Web 2.0 for development:

- Part I introduces both Web 2.0 tools and the concept of Web2forDev.
- Part II examines some uses of specific Web 2.0 tools for development purposes.
- Part III focuses on the integration of multiple Web 2.0 tools to address specific issues.
- Part IV discusses theory and reflections on practice, including lessons learnt from experience, challenges identified, and ways forward.
- Part V Tips for trainers provides a collection of short introductions to Web 2.0 tools.

Most of the themed articles are based on presentations made at the Web2forDev conference, which was held in September 2007 at the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) headquarters in Rome, Italy. The conference was the first international event focusing specifically on how

Web 2.0 tools could be used to the advantage of Southern development actors operating in the sectors of agriculture, rural development and natural resource management.

Co-published by [IIED](#) and [CTA](#).

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Follow the links below to download the whole issue or individual articles in pdf format.

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PLA 58: Towards empowered participation: stories and reflections

This issue of Participatory Learning and Action focuses on deliberative democracy and reviews successes and failures in citizen involvement programmes.

June 2008

Guest-editors: Tom Wakeford and Jasber Singh

This issue has a reflective focus and follows on from the 40th issue, which focused on participatory methods and approaches that seek to enhance deliberative democracy and citizen empowerment.

It critically reflects on those rarely-discussed elements of processes that are disempowering to those with the least power. 'Citizen participation' has typically elicited enthusiastic support from policy elites. However, past editions of PLA and numerous other studies have suggested that such initiatives have rarely impacted the mainstream political decision-making processes. Often referred to as "citizen engagement" or "public consultation", these processes may, in reality, be little more than smokescreens behind which the systems of democratic accountability fought for by progressive social

movements over many decades are allowed to decay.

The overall aim of the issue is to allow practitioners to reflect on some of these aspects of participation. By fostering a deeper understanding of participation, we hope to promote improved policies and practices. We believe the articles call for increased global solidarity among those committed to transforming the power of oppressed peoples via participation.

The issue is split into four sub-themes:

- Citizens' juries and similar participatory processes: strengths and weaknesses
- Participatory budgeting: lessons from Latin American and the UK
- Gender issues and challenges of representation
- Community activism from the grassroots

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[Download the complete issue.](#)

PLA 57: Immersions: learning about poverty face-to-face

The theme for this special issue centres on experiences of learning about poverty face-to-face often referred to as immersions. Immersions are opportunities for development professionals to spend a period of time living with and learning from a poor family.

December 2007

Guest editors: Izzy Birch, Raffaella Catani with Robert Chambers

This issue of Participatory Learning and Action is a timely reflection of

an emerging trend in development practice, drawing together the richness of immersion experience. It explores both the limitations and potentials of immersions by

- bringing together diverse experiences, identifying their challenges and opportunities, and exploring their impacts;
- encouraging readers to talk about immersions, share their experience, and recognise that there are many sorts of immersion;
- inspiring people to have them, and help make immersions a regular practice for development professionals; and
- enabling readers to reflect, get/stay in touch, and follow up.

A critical mass of interest in this concept is gathering among major donors and civil society groups. Yet, the impact of immersions is only now being tested. Different models are being developed: some are structured around a specific theme; others are more experiential and open-ended. But their common purpose is to bring immersion participants face-to-face with ordinary people, to test old assumptions, develop new perspectives, and strengthen their commitment to the challenge of poverty eradication.

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PLA 30: Participation and Fishing Communities

The special theme section in this issue of Participatory Learning and Action explores the use of participatory approaches with fishing communities.

October 1997

Guest Editor: Marie-Thérèse Sarch

This issue examines how participatory approaches can be used to tackle the challenges of small-scale fisheries development and covers fisheries development efforts aimed at a spectrum of objectives ranging from co-management for sustainable fish stocks to improving the welfare of fishing communities. The authors show how participatory approaches have been used to understand the resource, manage fisheries and plan for development.

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PLA 23: Participatory Approaches to HIV/AIDS Programmes

This issue of Participatory Learning and Action includes articles that describe experiences and issues relating to participatory approaches to HIV and AIDS programmes.

June 1995

Guest Editor: Alice Welbourn

The articles in this edition show how the use of PRA can help people to feel empowered to address the issues around HIV for themselves. The four papers presented to highlight some of the exciting contributions which participatory approaches can make to HIV work in Africa and in Asia.

This issue also includes ten general articles.

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«Unquote»

IIED Strategy 2019–2024

<https://www.iied.org/iied-strategy-2019-2024>

* * *

African Digital Rights Network

Many countries in Africa are experiencing a closing of civic space: a reduction in the freedom of citizens to openly discuss politics, criticise government policies, and to take an active part in key decisions that affect their health, education, liberty and livelihoods.

In Ethiopia and Zimbabwe, for example, when the government arrested journalists and banned public demonstrations, young people responded creatively, using the internet and mobile phones to open civic space. Using SMS, social media, encrypted messaging and even satellite TV to connect, organise, develop policy alternatives and successfully challenge the government narrative.

This Global Challenge Research Fund (GCRF) funded network, brings together activists, analysts and researchers from seven African countries who have tracked and analysed hashtag campaigns like #BringBackOurs-

Girls in Nigeria and #RhodesMustFall in South Africa and advocated against government-initiated network disruptions including through the #KeepItOn campaign. Some members of the network have also organised digital security training for human rights defenders to safely communicate online including in dangerous and restrictive environments.

The network is also studying the growing use of digital surveillance tools by governments and the employment of ‘coordinated inauthentic actors’ such as so-called troll farms, bot armies and cyborg networks to drown out debate and close civic space online.

‘Digital rights’ are universal human rights in digital spaces. They include, but are not limited to, the right to privacy, freedom from violence, freedom of political opinion, freedom of expression and freedom of association. The overall objective of the African Digital Rights Network (ADRN) is to produce a better understanding of the actors and technologies involved in the opening and closing of civic space online, and to build the capacity of citizens to exercise, defend and expand their rights online and offline.

To build the network the Digital & Technology Cluster at the Institute of Development Studies is working with the analyst and author Nanjala Nyabola, Berhan Taye from Access Now, Atnafu Berhane from CARD Ethiopia, Keketso Moeti from Amandla.mobi, Jan Moolman from the Association of Progressive Communications (APC), Juliet Nanfuka from the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA), Natasha Msonza from the Digital Society of Zimbabwe, Kiss Abraham from New Zambian Innovations, Turgay Celik and Iginio Gagliardone from the University of the Witwatersrand, Anand Sheombar from HU University of Applied Sciences Utrecht, Tanja Bosch from the University of Cape Town, George Karekwaivanane from the University of Edinburgh, Ayo Ojebode from the University of Ibadan, and Sam Phiri from the University of Zambia.

This collaborative research project includes activists, analysts, and practitioners with deep contextual knowledge into a multi-disciplinary research team. The network will begin by producing seven Country

Digital Landscape Reports to scope the existing political and technological landscape in Nigeria, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa.

An analysis of existing capacity and gaps will inform the design of a broader programme of research beyond the inception year. We will use the Country Digital Landscape Reports to identify cross-cutting research themes and produce thematic reports that build the knowledge and capabilities of citizens to exercise, defend and expand the rights guaranteed to them in law but denied to them in practice.

The network is funded by the Global Challenges Research Fund (GCRF) through the United Kingdom Research Institute (UKRI) fund for Digital Innovation for Development in Africa (DIDA) in the research area Digital Rights.

Zambia Digital Rights Landscape Report - Sam Phiri and Zorro

For our purposes, we define civic space as ‘the set of conditions that determine the extent to which all members of society, both as individuals and in informal or organised groups, are able to freely, effectively and without discrimination exercise their basic civil rights’ (Malena 2015: 14) and delimit the notion of digital rights to human rights during the era of the internet. These are basically civil rights that relate to the right of online privacy, freedom of expression and freedom of online association (Hutt 2020). Thus, the report takes a bird’s eye view of the political situation over the past 20 years, closely examines the status of Zambian civic space and scrutinises the technologies used. It concludes that the fortunes of the country’s digital rights situation could depend on: the emergence of more vibrant civic activism; the building of a culture of respect for human rights; creation of more open civic spaces; and ensuring greater civic participation in policy formulation and implementation.

GRACE Research Zambia

[The GRACE Research Zambia Project](#) is a Sub-Project of the overall Gender Research in Africa into ICT for Empowerment GRACE. Its current purpose is to explore how internet dialogues on gender by men can support men to examine how they can contribute to a gender just and balanced Zambia while being aware of their own feminist values and experiences.

Kiss Brian Abraham

Director | [KBA Innovation](#) | Zambia

Kiss Brian ABRAHAM is a Zambian civil society social change activist. He is actively involved in the development of the Zambia Social Forum process. (The goal of the forum is to create a space for meaningful debate and alternative thinking). He is a member of the Media Institute of Southern Africa and sits on the Africa Social Forum Council. He is the project coordinator of GRACE. The GRACE Zambia Research on Mobile Cellular Phone Service Provision and the Advancement of Women in Zambia is a sub project of the overall Gender Research in Africa into ICT for Empowerment. The Zambia project explores the processes involved in the provision of Mobile cellular phone services, examines the roles of key players and explores the social, economic, and cultural effects of the service on the country with a specific focus on the status of women.



Kiss Abraham - New Zambian Innovations

* * *

Thesaurus on land governance

[How to use LandVoc?](#)

Due to the fact that LandVoc works as a linking tool, LandVoc can be used in a variety of different ways.

*Firstly, the hundreds of terms contained within LandVoc can be **integrated into libraries, repository systems and websites** that publish any kind of information related to land governance. This allows your own information or that of your organization to be classified,*

*indexed and therefore **more discoverable**.*

*Secondly, and closely related to this first point, because information is now classified and indexed, those searching for **key land governance topics** can have access to a wide array of information on their topic matter of their choice, including its related terms and translations.*

*Finally, LandVoc goes beyond the sphere of land related matters. It works to **connect to and exchange** information with other databases linked to other vocabularies. LandVoc is currently integrated within FAO's AGROVOC and LandVoc concepts are partly mapped to other vocabularies like AGROVOC is in turn linked to EUROVOC, Cadastre and Land Administration Thesaurus (CaLAThe), Chinese Agricultural Thesaurus (CAT), Aquatic Sciences and Fisheries Abstracts (ASFA), Linked Thesaurus fRamework for Environment (LusTRE), National Agricultural Library Thesaurus (NALT), United Nations Bibliographic Information System Thesaurus (UNBIS), General Multilingual Environmental Thesaurus (GEMET), etc. The main takeaway here is that connections are being made between terms with one main goal, making information more discoverable and accessible.*

* * *

Tearfund

[Tearfund](#) is a Christian international development and humanitarian organisation with more than 50 years' experience. We work in over 50 countries worldwide, in partnership with communities, churches and local organisations.

* * *

NAMATI Community Land Protection Facilitators Guide

AUTHORS: RACHAEL KNIGHT, MARENA BRINKHURST AND JARON VOGELSANG.

ABOUT THE COMMUNITY LAND PROTECTION FACILITATORS GUIDE

This Facilitators Guide describes Namati's approach to community land protection in detail. Each chapter suggests various strategies and practices that facilitators can use as they support communities to protect their land claims. It is accompanied by short animated videos that demonstrate the community land protection process visually, available at <http://namati.org/ourwork/communityland>. This Guide is intended for the directors and staff of local, community-based organizations, national civil society organizations, faith-based organizations, government actors, and other community land protection advocates and activists. The Guide refers to these groups as "facilitating organizations," and their field staff as "facilitators." We recommend reading the entire Guide at least once before beginning community land protection efforts. Facilitators can then review specific sections of the Guide as they support communities to move through the process. However, because all the activities within each "step" are inter-related, it is best to be familiar with all the land protection activities before beginning facilitation. To support the adaptation

and re-ordering of community land protection activities, this Guide has been designed to be printed as a binder so that facilitators can easily move chapters around, or replace chapters with more updated versions that reflect emerging learnings and strategies. To access the most recent versions of the Guide and connect with Namati, visit namati.org/communityland.

* * *

The link between chiefs and rural development

[Ntanda J. Ngwelela \(2017\)](#). The International Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Research. Zambia <http://www.ijmdr.net/>

Abstract - Debates over whether or not chiefs were a hindrance or facilitators of rural development have been going on. The purpose of the study was to explore the link between traditional leaders and rural development. A case study of Kaoma and Senanga districts, Nkaya and Lusi chiefdoms respectively of Western Province.

The distribution of Zambian population shows that 61% of the people resided in rural areas (CSO, 2010). Rural development is a development strategy designed to improve the socio-economic well-being of the rural poor. From community development perspective, rural development aims to make rural areas more attractive, productive and less vulnerable to natural hazards, poverty and exploitation. One of the main socio-economic concerns of Zambia as a nation is the plight of poverty of the people living in rural areas. Rural poverty has remained at above 75%. It has been a burden on the national economy, and households are adversely affected. In an effort to improve the livelihoods of the rural community various development agents' efforts have been met with

varying resistance by some traditional leaders. Decisions, development programs and projects, traditional leaders believe are imposed on them by the formulators. Achieving sustainable rural development in Zambia requires access to data and information so that those involved in decision making can reach the level of knowledge and understanding needed for development planning and service delivery.

Methodology: The study took an integrated approach of data collection, which combined literature search with community level consultations, stakeholder interviews, courtesy calls and field visits. Self-report questionnaires were administered to 60 traditional leaders, 10 councilors, 5 clergymen, and 5 chief executive officers, 7 leaders of traditional local structures or institutions, 4 NGO officials and 5 heads of sector departments. In addition, in-depth interviews with 4 chiefs in their respective chiefdoms were conducted. Data was further collected from group discussions, Focused Group Discussions (FGDs) ,

Qualitative and quantitative data was then analyzed.

Results: *It was established that there is a weak linkage between the traditional leaders (chiefs) and rural development agents. Chiefs occupy strategic positions in their communities; they can use their privileged positions and influence to help bring about development. The rural community hold traditional leaders in high esteem and considered chieftdoms as institutions that were closer to their development window. Traditional leaders were respected, listened to, and generally their views and actions had a huge impact on their subjects. Chiefs should therefore be engaged in all the stages of development process.*

Conclusion: *In embracing the concept of sustainable development as a key national priority, strategic partnership and information sharing, or networking and collective action was cardinal in the quest for rural development. This would enhance capacity in local communities to debate, articulate and negotiate their development agenda. Zambia is committed to fully integrate principles of sustainable development in order to meet the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).*

The purpose of the study was to explore the link between traditional leaders and rural development. A case study of Kaoma and Senanga districts of Western Province of Zambia. One of the main socio-economic concerns of Zambia as a nation is the plight of poverty of the people living in rural areas. The distribution of Zambian population shows that 7,978,274 people (61%) resided in rural areas (CSO, 2010). Traditional leaders play an important role in many societies around the world. This study investigates the

performance of chiefs in the context of rural development in Zambia and some districts in particular. Rural development was mainly concerned with decreasing the gap between those who sought a livelihood in rural areas and their counterparts in urban areas. Chiefs have been identified as important drivers in fostering development especially in rural areas. Traditional leadership comprising the paramount chiefs, senior chiefs, sub chiefs and village headpersons are key persons in rural development. Traditional leadership is a key institution in the formation, preservation and modification of customary practice and responsible for peace and unity. Traditional leadership or authority also known as traditional domination is a form of leadership in which authority or ruling regime is largely tied to tradition or customs. The physical and material well-being of the tribal people is supported by traditional institutions and functionaries. Although traditional leaders tend to be ignored and even depowered by development efforts, many of these systems still survive today. Chiefs occupy strategic positions in their communities; they can use their privileged positions and influence to help bring about development. The traditional belief systems still form the roots and branches of the knowledge systems of rural people in Africa. The rural

community held chiefs in high esteem and considered chieftdoms as institutions that were closer to their development window.

Keywords: *Traditional leaders, chiefs, rural, development, poverty.*

* * *

Organic Insect Pesticide

NEEM Seed: [A truly essential oil](#)

EFFECTIVENESS OF NEEM SEED (AZADIRACTA INDICA) OIL AS AN ORGANIC INSECT PESTICIDE

(Paper ID: CFP/1671/2020)

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ABSTRACT

Neem tree is proved to be the richest in active compounds and one of potent sources of natural bioinsecticides among the studied botanicals worldwide. Crude extracts of Neem seeds showed significant results as insecticides in this study where optimum doses are recommended for several vegetable pests. The research was carried out at Chansa farm in Sinda district Eastern Province of Zambia over a period of 4 months starting from April 2018 to September to prepare Neem seed (Azadiracta Indica) Oil as an Organic insect Pesticide. In order to achieve this Matured seed was harvested from the neem tree. The process of extracting involved 6 stage in the extraction of oil from seed (Azadiracta Indica)

the researcher observed that the extracts of Neem, appeared to be the very effective among the two treatments. Repelling observed and recorded for neem extracts treatment was as high as 100% for diamond back moth, red spider mite and absolute tuta. Therefore, the researcher highly recommends that the poor resource farmers are encouraged to use Neem Extracts as alternatives to the synthetic Pesticides as they have less impact to the environment and is a cheaper way for pest management for small scale farmers.

Key Words: *Azadiracta Indica, Neem Seed, Neem Oil extracts, diamond back moth, red spider mite and absolute tuta*

and there were: i. Seed harvesting ii. Drying the seed, iii. soaking the dried seed & peeling, iv. pounding the seed, v. pre-heating the powder and vi. finally extracting oil from the oil extractor machine. After preparation of neem oil, it was treated by way of spraying on two plots, one for cabbage infested with diamond back moth and the other was for tomato infested with absolute mite and red spider mite. Different dosage was used 20mls, 30mls and 50mls and this was done to determine the correct dosage and the effectiveness on different pests. The findings of the study revealed that plant extracts of oil from neem effective in controlling insects. Further

<http://www.multiresearch.net/cms/publications/CFP16712020.pdf>

* * *

Gender-Based Violence (GBV)

A USAID project brief supporting systematic land documentation had this to say in December 2020:

GBV is widespread in Zambia and affects women and girls disproportionately, with the 2018 Zambia Demographic and Health Survey reporting that 36 percent of Zambian women have experienced physical violence at least once since the age of 15 and 32 percent of ever-married women have experienced controlling behaviors by their husbands. More than half (52 percent) of women never sought help or told anyone about the violence they had experienced (Zambia Statistics Agency, Ministry of Health, & ICF, 2019). Despite the adoption of the Anti-Gender-Based Violence Law in 2011, GBV remains pervasive, deeply rooted in wider gender inequality

and highly tolerated, especially in rural areas. In fact, Zambian women in rural areas (54 percent) are more likely than those in urban areas (37 percent) to agree that a husband is justified in hitting or beating his wife for reasons such as burning food, going out without telling him, or refusing to have sexual intercourse. Almost half (47 percent) of widowed women were dispossessed of their husband's property, with this figure reaching 59 percent in rural areas (Zambia Statistics Agency et al., 2019).

USAID has supported customary land documentation in Zambia since 2014 and has supported partners to document the land rights of over 50,000 people so far, out of which 47 percent are women. USAID uses a socially inclusive technology known as [Mobile Approaches to Secure Tenure \(MAST\)](#) and promotes gender integration throughout the land documentation process to ensure that women's land rights are registered and interests and priorities are addressed.

Over 2019 and 2020, USAID's Integrated Land and Resource Governance program (ILRG) local partners Chipata District Land Alliance (CDLA) and Petauke District Land Alliance (PDLA) have collected qualitative data and stories while documenting customary land.

[The full article.](#)

* * *

FAO: Global Soil Doctors

Who are Soil Doctors?

How to implement the Global Soil Doctors Programme?

What are the benefits of being a Soil Doctor?
How does it work?
How do local farmers benefit from the Global Soil Doctors Programme?
How do countries that ALREADY HAVE a similar initiative implement the Global Soil Doctors Programme?
Who to contact and how to get involved?
Welcome to the Global Soil Doctors Programme

[A farmer-to-farmer training platform](#)

This webpage is designed as a **source of soil information and knowledge on the different components and aspects of the Global Soil Doctors Programme - a farmer-to-farmer training platform**, and the **importance of soil as a vital resource** for farmers, policymakers, development planners, agricultural extension workers, NGOs, private sectors and any other practitioners/interested stakeholder.

What is the programme about?

The programme is a farmer-to-farmer training initiative to be implemented at the global level on a volunteer basis. Email Soil-Doctor@fao.org to know more.

* * *

A Vision for Smart Villages (2015)

<https://e4sv.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/05-Brief.pdf>

[Smart Villages Research Group](#)

info <at> e4sv.org

Smart Villages Research Group Ltd
15 Lady Place
Abingdon
OX14 4FB

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- [Bucket-mounted Solar Systems](#) Posted on 6th November 2020
- [The InnovateUK Energy Catalyst and working with SVRG partners](#) Posted on 6th July 2020

Can Smart Villages help to stem biodiversity loss?

By [Smart Villages](#) in [Technical Report](#) (2017)

Technical report

Biodiversity is important at various levels, including the economic, social and environmental. It is critically important for rural communities through the provision of ecosystem services, including energy access, a link that is often overlooked. The concept of 'Smart Villages' is that

modern energy access in the form of sustainable renewable energy can contribute as a catalyst for development—education, health, food security,

environment, productive enterprises, and participatory democracy—and for the alleviation of poverty. Seventy per cent of the poorest people live in rural areas and are farmers, of whom about half are women. One of the key ideas is that while biodiversity preservation and the alleviation of abject poverty are seen as two distinct objectives, smart villages can contribute to both since there is considerable overlap in practice. By an integrated approach, smart villages can help to stem biodiversity loss by the skilful adoption and integration of modern technologies that improve biomass utilisation, agricultural practices, and genetic conservation, priorities that are compatible with several of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals. Smart villages enable rural communities to take

an active role in preserving their environment instead of depleting natural capital for their day-to-day survival.

* * *

Structured Chieftancy Development Model (SCDM)

Structured Chieftancy Development Model' [SCDM].” SCDM is premised on the Smart Village [SV] concept, which seeks to have an inclusion of the rural population in national and community issues ranging from the political, economic, demographic, socio-cultural, infrastructural, innovative, technological, educational, legal and environmental [PEDSITELE] perspectives.

The Chieftdoms

Africans were concerned to use the land, not to hold it. They saw themselves as dealing with the earth as a sacred entity which existed independently of men. A claim to control the earth might very well amount to sacrilege.

Elizabeth Colson (1917-2016, died in Monze)¹⁴

Zambia needs now to look back to its roots for a way out of this impasse - the donors cannot help - indeed they remain the major hindrance. Where then be your renaissance men brave enough to question the status quo? Where be your Marx?

Chosang'anga

We are in full agreement. Zambia will not develop until we develop a unique philosophical consensus consistent with our culture. Importing ideas from outside will never work. I discuss this point under the blog [A](#)

¹⁴ Elizabeth Colson, "The Impact of the Colonial Period on the Definition of Land Rights in *Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960*, ed. Victor Turner (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1971.3: 193-215, 199.

cultural approach to development .

Chola Mukanga

ZLA is saddened by remarks attributed to the Minister of Mines and Minerals Development, Hon. Richard Musukwa in parliament this week, where he said he has powers to overrule the Chiefs' refusal to give consent to mining investors

Zambia Land Alliance - 9 Oct 2019

land categories (1947) - parliament's customary area miscalculations (2010) - Fifth National Development Plan land alienation facility (2006-2010) - Sixth National Development Plan - REDD+ madness (2011-2015) - Co-operating Partners Group - Denmark damage - customary area landgrab - state landgrab - Sipatunyana - Chiawa - Mkushi - Muchinda - Chiwala - Mufulira and Musele - Nakonde, Isoka - Mpika - Mazabuka - Machiya - District Councils landgrab - Mumbwa and Chief Kaindu - Mwape - NGOs - landgrab - AWF - Petauke - Mikuni - Simwatachela - Mukonchi - Nalubamba - Mpumba - land sold by chiefs - Nyalugwe - Luembe - Sinazongwe - Sekute - Mushima - illegal state land alienation - West Mvuvye National Forest – customary area in danger - Nyimba forest project - Community Partnership Parks - Chiawa - Chikuni - other CPP attempts - what to do?

Vol. 1: Plunderers of Eden - Landgrab of the Chiefdoms

Plundering or harvesting the chiefdoms of Zambia?

House of Chiefs Blogspot May 2009.

The game reserve *is the only community-owned game reserve in Zambia, wholly owned and managed by the community which also has total wildlife user rights. Speaking during the handover on Saturday, FQM Country Manager General Kingsley Chinkuli said the game reserve will be restocked with a starter population of 100 impalas and various antelope species, an investment of about US\$150,000 over the ...*

Fqm Hands Over Community Game Reserve to Ntambu Chiefdom - Lusaka Star 28 Sept. 2020

On the Nansanga farming bloc, chief Muchinka said the government did not consult chiefs in the area over the undertaking. "How can they sell my land? That land belongs to the chiefs. We have got the House of Chiefs; it is just that there is no say [in the House of Chiefs]. They don't do anything. They ask us to send submissions, but nothing happens," said chief Muchinka. "We are eight chiefs in Serenje. We are going to sit down and take this issue to government...that government, how do you sell our land? We shall take this case forward," said chief Muchinka.

* * *

288 Chiefdoms

[Chiefdoms/Chiefs in Zambia](#): The complete list.

These chiefdoms are comprised of the following: 36 GMAs with 76 CRBs (community resource boards) - presumably representing 76 chiefdoms out of a total of 288 (26%). Therefore 74% of the chiefdoms are not divided into GMA and Open Area, have no CRB/government control over big game resources.

The only recent map available - but not for the public - was produced in Northern Rhodesia days in 1958. The chiefdoms have declined to half of what they were in pre-colonial times - not counting the game management area (GMA) excisions and controls over the people - GMAs taking up 22% of the country.

The Originals

The area of what is modern-day Zambia was inhabited by the [Khoisan](#) and [Batwa](#) peoples until around AD 300 when migrating [Bantu](#) began arriving.^[21] It is believed the [Khoisan people](#) groups originated in East Africa and spread southwards around 150,000 years ago. The Twa people were split into two groups; one, the [Kafwe Twa](#) in the [Kafue Flats](#) while the others, the [Lukanga Twa](#), and the Bangweulu Twa lived in the [Lukanga Swamp](#) and Bangweulu swamps.^[22] Many of the ancient rock arts in Zambia like the [Mwela Rock Paintings](#), [Mumbwa Caves](#), and [Nachikufu Cave](#) are attributed to these early [hunter-gatherer](#) groups. The Khoisan and the Twa formed a [patron-client relationship](#) with farming Bantu peoples across central and southern Africa, eventually either displaced, killed or absorbed into the Bantu groups.

Wikipedia

Bushmen


Khoisan people, i.e. Bushmen, now only found in Western Provençe, have no official customary area - and no chiefs.

Twa

The Twa are supposedly a pygmoid group, though the Twa in Bangweulu has tall people admixed (see the book's cover).

Ila


Ila village on the Kafue Flats ("A fractal is a shape made of parts similar to the whole in some way.")



These communities have been of interest to mathematicians due to their fractal pattern design.

The Ila are said to be of Hamitic origin.

THE CHIEFDOMS



Provincial Centre for Geographic Information Services

The Zambia State Landgrab of 1965

The abrogation of the [Barotseland Agreement 1964](#), less than a year after independence, was a shameful act, presaging a massive landgrab of a semi-independent state. . As I describe in *Plunderers of Eden*:

On 24 October 1964, the two protectorates – Barotseland, surrounded by Northern Rhodesia, merged as a condition for the creation of the Zambian unitary state. Under the agreement, the Litunga of Barotseland, Paramount Chief Lewanika – in consultation with his Barotseland National Council, was authorized to make laws for Barotseland (at

the time comprising 16% of Zambia and which included parts of the present-day Copperbelt, Central, Western, Southern and North-Western Provinces) with full authority over local government, land, forests, fishing, hunting, game preservation and the control of bush fires. The agreement was very specific on the issue of land:[xii]

On 24 October, Zambia became independent.

In 1965, they abrogated the Barotse Agreement 1964:

Contrary to Clause (8) of the [Barotseland Agreement 1964](#) stating that 'The Government of the Republic of Zambia shall take steps as may be necessary to ensure that the laws for the time being in force in the Republic are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement', Kenneth Kaunda and Sikota Wina (Minister of Local Government) abrogated the Agreement by enacting the Local Government Act No 69 of 1965. Section 113 stated, 'The provision of this Act shall apply in Barotseland and the powers contained here may be exercised about Barotseland notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other written law as or in the Barotseland Agreement 1964'. As Nahayaluna wrote in The Barotseland Walk to Freedom, 'Thus the beginning of an unlawful and spiteful orgy of legislating against his constitutional obligations under which Her Majesty's Government had granted independence to Zambia.'

Then Sikota Wina produced a statutory instrument abolishing the Barotse National Council and provided in its place five district councils staffed by members he had appointed. The Barotse Native Treasury was closed down, the funds purloined. According to a report to parliament in 2013 by Vice-President Guy Scott, the Minister of Local Government Arthur Wina had taken £411,000 from the Barotse Royal Treasury and supposedly 'distributed it among district councils across the country'. All the administrative staff under the Barotseland Royal Establishment (BRE) was relocated to government offices. Also enacted was the Chiefs Act 1965, which empowered the president to recognize or withdraw the recognition

of chiefs, including the Litunga and the chiefs serving under him. On 7 September 1965, Sikota Wina in parliament haughtily rationalized what he had done, *"The Barotse, Mr Speaker, are no longer interested in being regarded as museum specimens, or to be regarded as pure preservation of old happy Africa as seen through the eyes of Stanley."* In April 1966 the Local Courts Act was enacted, repealing the Barotse Native Courts Ordinance and abolishing the Barotse native courts; another outrageous action that shames Zambia to this day.

Kaunda now decided to utterly destroy the Agreement. On 17 June 1969, he arranged a constitutional referendum to amend the constitution and remove the requirement for future amendments of clauses protecting fundamental rights to go to a public referendum, and instead requiring only a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly. The referendum was supposedly passed with an 85% 'yes' vote, turnout recorded reaching 69.5%.

Not to be outdone by Neil Armstrong's walk on the moon on 21 July, Kaunda in a speech to UNIP on 11 August 1969 entitled, *Towards complete independence*, declared:

"I shall now deal with other types of mineral rights. The Litunga holds rights to determine conditions of prospecting licences, mining leases, etc. and to claim royalty on minerals in certain areas. I am afraid I have to terminate these rights completely and without compensation. The rights of the Litunga should not be different to those of our other traditional rulers. The rights of the Litunga are not different to those of the Nation, and I, and my Government are elected custodians of the interests of the Nation. The Litunga can rest assured, however, that we shall exercise these rights in the best interest of the Nation as a whole."


The Mines and Minerals Act of 1969 made this law. In the same year, this annus horribilis, Kaunda announced that thenceforth Barotseland would be known as Western Province. The Referendum Act was then enacted allowing parliament to amend the constitution without going to a national referendum. One of the objectives of the Referendum Act resulting from the constitutional referendum was to allow Kaunda to

confiscate land held by absentee landowners – duly carried out. Kaunda's despotic thunderclap, the Zambia Constitution (Amendment No. 5) Act No. 33 of 1969 (the Referendum Act), utterly destroyed the Barotse Agreement. The carcass was picked clean by another legislative vulture, the Western Province (Land and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act No 47 of 1970, which removed the Litunga's powers over wildlife and natural resources and vested them in the President, all land in the Western Province being 'Hereby vested in the President as a Reserve within the meaning of and under the Zambia (State Lands and Reserve) Orders 1928 to 1964'. This was the willful destruction of the Barotse Guardians of Nature, for in a stroke was ignored, not only the Agreement, but the fact that Barotseland was a model for future decentralization and the careful use of natural resources, where, from 1936, the Barotse Orders, Rules and Regulations saw the indigenous knowledge and management systems codified.

There were at one time 26 Orders under Section 8 of the Ordinance of 1936, such as the Forest Orders dealing with the management of the teak forests. In 1968 the Barotse Forest Fund had £221,000 in its account, destroyed later by the Forestry Act of 1973, which centralized all forest administration in the Forestry Department (no mention being made of Barotseland).

All of Barotseland, 16% of present-day Zambia, was grabbed by the Zambian state and renamed Western Province. In 2021, with over a million people, it is the poorest province in Zambia. The Liuwa Plain area, first protected by the Paramount Chief in 1890, is now a national park, yet still contains villages.

Current Zambia Land Divisions



LandMarkmap: Customary Commons (blue). Protected & Private land, & water (white)

The Customary Area Landgrab Revealed




Figure 4: Overlay of public lands with Titania

Based on the Integrated Land Use Assessment (ILUA II) data collected from 248 sample plots between 2005 and 2008, the distribution of land ownership amongst various types of owners, shows that the amount of land owned by private individuals across the country is 10.5 % and that by the state is at 19 %.

Table 2: Land ownership

	Total Hactares	%	Cumulative %
Private Individual]	44.6	10.5	10.5
Private Industry	6.4	1.5	12.0
Private Other	6.0	1.4	13.4
Public State	80.9	19.0	32.4
Public Local Government	0.0	0.0	32.4
Public Customary	262.1	61.6	94.0
Unknown (No information)	24.3	5.7	99.7
Other (Not specific)	1.3	0.3	100
Total	425.5	100	

Source: Mulolwa 2008, compiled from ILUA I data

[Source LandMarkmap.org](http://LandMarkmap.org)

[Notes by Liz Alden Wily, 2015.](#)

THE CHIEFDOMS



The estimate of total community land area is derived through exclusion of TPA, urban lands, private leasehold lands in the rural sector and a standard subtraction of 1% of country area for rural public service lands.

Note that in order to estimate the total community land area a major adjustment to the total TPA area has been made through excluding 17% of protected area land on the grounds that these fall within the customary sector. This includes areas governed jointly by communities and state agencies through joint forest management agreements or under the aegis of wildlife management boards.

While the law (1995) protects customary rights and disallows alienation of community lands ("customary lands") without the permission of traditional authorities (chiefs), it does not provide for the formalization of customary rights by individuals, families or communities other than through extinguishing customary rights in favour of statutory leaseholds; this eliminates community jurisdiction and transfers the lands into state land, from which the state issues leases. There is a lack of official or consistent information on the area alienated. The figure of 12.9% is used here, of which around half was located in customary lands adjacent to urban areas. (Key source on data: Augustine Mulolwa, pers. comm. Sept 2015).

Refer elsewhere on site for legal review against indicators (Liz Alden Wily).

Upload date

2017/06/23

Estimates of Customary land in Zambia

1 Liz Wily

67.5% - Customary Area

8.6% - National Parks

9% - National and Local forest

14.9% - State Land (State and private leasehold land)

Total: 100%

This reveals a customary area reduction of 26.5% from the official 94% figure.

[Liz Alden Wily](#):¹⁵

Four avenues to greater progress present themselves. Changing the law is a priority. As long as individuals, families, and collective holdings in the customary sector do not have legal force as properties in this highly commoditised world, half a billion Africans will remain tenants of the state, or, in the words of an appeal court judge in Tanzania in 1994, "squatters on their own lands".

A more strategically sensible approach is to recognize that customary rights to land have the force of modern real property, whether registered or not. The forces against such recognition, however, are as strong today as they were a century ago. They may even be more so, given the way that elite interests dovetail with policies that aim to keep as much untitled

¹⁵ Liz Alden Wily. Customary Land Tenure in the Modern World Rights to Resources in Crisis: Reviewing the Fate of Customary Tenure in Africa - Brief #1 of 5. (2012). Rights+ Resources. <https://rightsandresources.org/wpcontent/exportedpdf/rightstoresourcesincrisiscompiledenglish.pdf>

land as possible under the de facto ownership of governments; this enables them to dispose of their citizens' lands at will, including to domestic and foreign investors.

Furthering democratization of land and resource administration is also crucial. Solidarity within and between communities is handicapped by the absence of enabling institutional mechanisms and powers. The devolution of forest governance has played an important role in Africa in increasing recognition that many forests belong to communities, but has in practice delivered on this tenure in only a handful of states (Gambia, Liberia, South Africa, Mozambique, and Tanzania).

Tenure security policies need to shift focus from farms to commons. Many governments are loath to remove customary-sector families from their houses and farms but have no compunction in reallocating their commons to other uses and users. This is because compensation, albeit of a token nature, is now normally required when houses and crops are interfered with, even on untitled customary lands, but is rarely extended to commonly held forests, rangelands, and marshlands. Yet such unfarmed commons are the major asset of most rural communities. They are often the main or only source of livelihood for the land-poor and landless; with assistance, they have the income-generating potential to raise millions out of poverty.

Reasons to pursue a pro-poor approach to customary rights include:

- a. the poor are the majority in the customary sector (75% by international measures),*
- b. the poor are most dependent on common resources, and which are the natural capital most easy for states and private sectors to appropriate,*
- c. not just the state but local elites have proven best able to manipulate customary norms in their own favor, and at the expense of the majority poor, and*
- d. elites have proven most able to escape the subordination by governments of rights to customary landholdings.*

While the law (1995) protects customary rights and disallows alienation of community lands ("customary lands") without the permission of

traditional authorities (chiefs), it does not provide for formalization of customary rights by individuals, families or communities other than through extinguishing customary rights in favour of statutory leaseholds; this eliminates community jurisdiction and transfers the lands into state land, from which the state issues leases. There is a lack of official or consistent information on the area alienated. The figure of 12.9% is used here of which around half was located in customary lands adjacent to urban areas. (Key source on data: Augustine Mulolwa, pers. comm. Sept 2015).

Refer elsewhere on site for legal review against indicators (Liz Alden Wily). Updated 23 June 2017.

Source <http://landmarkmap.org>

(Liz Alden Wily, 2015)

2 Sitko et al. The Geography of Zambia's Customary Land

Sitko et al.: [The geography of Zambia's customary land](#): Assessing the prospects for smallholder development computed 51-54% as the customary area.¹⁶ They declared the following:

- 54% of Zambia's land is under customary tenure
- Customary populations are clustered in market-accessible regions.
- The majority of customary villagers live in regions with above-average rainfall.
- Land commodification and alienation are occurring in high-density, market-accessible customary areas.
- The land policy must be attentive to these changes to retain growth opportunities for smallholder farmers.

¹⁶ Sitko, N. J., & Chamberlin, J. (2016). Land Use Policy The geography of Zambia's customary land: Assessing the prospects for smallholder development. Land Use Policy, 55, 49–60. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2016.03.026>

Sitko et al. sound a warning:

Policy makers and development practitioners, therefore, rarely consider land access to be a constraint to smallholder production. Perhaps as a result of this pervasive belief, the enactment of a comprehensive land policy has stagnated for decades (Nolte 2014). Instead of tackling thorny issues related to smallholder land access, Zambian policy-makers have opted to pass procedural laws, such as the 1995 Land Act, which provides guidelines for the transfer of customary land to leasehold tenure, but does not seek to regulate land allocations or administrative systems (Sitko et al. 2014)...recent evidence shows that local elites are increasingly utilizing Zambia's opaque land administration system to alienate large tracts of customary land for speculative purposes

And the shock:

However, this estimate does not adequately account for the large tracks of land that have been acquired for commercial farming purposes outside of traditional state land areas and for which spatially explicit data are not available. This includes the more than 1 million hectares of former customary land now controlled by the Zambian Development Agency under the Land Bank Programme. Moreover, significant areas of land have been alienated from customary administration for industrial purposes, including large-scale mining licenses and government-sponsored "multi-facility economic development zones." As shown in column (K), once these are accounted for the share of available customary land declines to 51 percent, or roughly 38 million hectares.

Ministry of Lands data reveals that since 1995, over 280,000 hectares of land has been converted from customary to leasehold title by small-scale land investors for agricultural purposes alone ([Sitko and Jayne 2014a, 197](#)):

Smallholders' capacity to utilize agriculture as a means to a more

prosperous livelihood requires, among other things: 1). Reasonably low population densities and land ownership inequality to allow future generations to access land without significant fragmentation of existing farms; 2). Reasonable access to input and output markets and basic services, and 3). Agro-ecological conditions that are adequate for rain-fed production systems and stable enough to limit the risk of routine weather-induced crop failure.

3 Rights & Resources Estimate (August 2020)

52.7%

The report by Rights & Resources Initiative entitled “[Estimate of the area of land](#) and territories of Indigenous Peoples, local communities, and Afro-descendants where their rights have not been recognized.” acknowledges the input of Liz Alden Wily and now gives a new estimate for customary land area in 2020 of 52.7% of Zambia. But then mention is made below on the diagram’s right that the total percentage of land held under customary control, but not legally, is 94%? Taking the 17% of the land, which is a protected area - originally trust land and converted over to state land, and added to the 52.7%, would still only give 70.35.

So, it would appear that 50% or so of customary land has been gobbled up in the colonial and post-colonial maw. Also, the state has converted 22% of Zambia from customary area to game management area (GMA), rent-seeking blocks for safari-hunting, tourism and agriculture. So, in reality, the chiefdoms now only have true control of 30% of the land.

Land Matrix reveals some indication of land investments in Zambia.

[The full list](#) of farming and mining landgrabs indicates a massive surge in Chinese farm alienations.

Land Matrix reveals some indication of land investments in Zambia. [The full list](#) of farming and mining landgrabs indicates a massive surge in Chinese farm alienations.

USAID/Land Portal Zambia

Context and Land Governance 2021

Currently, there are major issues plaguing land governance in Zambia, including cases of uncontrolled and ungoverned customary land allocations [6], corruption in urban land allocation, and political cadreism in land allocation in both urban and peri-urban and rural areas [7]. Exogenous factors such as those underpinning large scale land acquisition (LSLAs) and the evolution of customary practices in response to socio-economic national dynamics put pressure on land and related resources. This compromises management regimes of customary land in the country. Land-based investments, such as the US\$8billion Smart Resort City by Sirpryze Continental Zambia Limited planned on over 40,000ha in Senior Chief Kalasa Mukoso's chieftdom in Luapula province [8], continue to pose threat on local communities. These investments also threaten local enterprising individuals such as John Mulenga [9] who has been working hard to build an agri-business that has been hailed by the Zambia National Farmers Union.

The VGGT in Zambia

Zambia is a member of the United Nations Committee on World Food Security (CFS), and has endorsed the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure (VGGT) on 11 May 2012. The CFS at its 38th (Special Session) on 11 May 2012, among other points: i) endorsed the VGGT; ii) noted that the VGGT are voluntary and not legally binding; and iii) encouraged all stakeholders to promote, make

use of and support the implementation of the VGGT when formulating relevant strategies, policies and programmes. ([See FAO Council Report of the 38th \(Special\) Session of the Committee on World Food Security \(11 May 2012\), Rome, 11-15 June 2012](#)). In addition, Zambia endorsed the VGGT at the 2014 Global Forum for Food and Agriculture. [The summary of Results of the Global Forum for Food and Agriculture 2014](#), states that, among others, "We, the agriculture ministers assembled at the GFFA: [...] establish and protect tenure rights to land, forests and fishing grounds as well as water rights for all – in particular vulnerable people – as a basic prerequisite for sustainable farming in line with the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security endorsed by the Committee on World Food Security (CFS).

The VGGT are being used to advance gender-equitable governance of tenure in Zambia. [Read more.](#)

Policy, legal and organizational frameworks

The Land Acquisition Act of 1970 inspired the 'zambianisation' (nationalisation) program, which sealed the deal of the 1975 Land (Conversion of Titles) Act] that halted freehold tenure system in Zambia [4]. All land in Zambia has since then been vested in the President, who holds it in perpetuity on behalf of the Zambian people [3].

The Lands Act 1995 allowed for conversion of customary land into leasehold titles, thereby creating land markets and causing a surge in land transactions in the country [5]. Consequently, through a Presidential Decree passed in 2002, it became possible to establish farm blocks on customary land in nine provinces. Property rights are conceived as social conventions by which individuals legally lay a 'claim to a benefit or income stream that the state will agree to protect through the assignment of duty to others who may covet, or somehow interfere with, the benefit stream' [10]. Constitutionally, land in Zambia cannot be owned [11]. Occupants only have access and user rights. In addition, the right to land does not include the right to access and use forests and related resources. The rights to land are not permanent as the President can, if deemed to

be in national interest, expropriate the land [11]. The occupant in this case is constitutionally obliged to yield. The occupant can submit claim to the Minister of Lands who will respond to serve the claimant with a notice to yield within a period not less than two months, but subject to how urgently the land might be needed as certified by the President. When titled state land is acquired in this manner, the occupant must be monetarily compensated from Parliamentary funds established for this purpose, otherwise, they are compensated through “a grant of other land not exceeding in value the value of the land acquired, for an estate not exceeding the estate acquired and upon the same terms and conditions, as far as may be practicable, as those under which the land acquired was held” [12].

The draft Lands Policy (2015) acknowledges the bias the current land administration has towards state land, and the informality of customary land [13]. The Policy proposes a comprehensive land management system that recognises that customary land rights have the same weight and validity as those held under leased land. Moving forward, the government intends to invest in land reforms focusing on land mapping, auditing and titling to streamline land administration and management, make it more robust, transparent and ensure efficient land allocation [14]. Occupants on titled land have to pay taxes in form of land rents, and therefore, this process broadens the revenue collection base of the government.

Gender and land

Zambia is one of the countries where the scope of large scale land acquisitions (LSLAs) is hard to understand. There is lack of data on the scope of land acquisitions [23]. Nonetheless, land is being given out to foreign investors, particularly of Chinese origin who are able to go to rural areas where others are reluctant to go. National elites are also involved. There has been a scramble for land in Zambia that has not been controlled despite calls from civil society organisations, including the President himself.

With the intention to promote investments, the government gave the

mandate to Zambia Development Agency to look for investors to invest in land. The government itself has therefore, been an agent promoting LSLA. However, since land administration is restricted to state land, many investor choose to deal directly with traditional authorities who they corrupt with some money far below the value of land. These investors can start developing the land even before the title deeds are granted through the government land administration channels. While there is a level of legal order in the administration of state land, there is none on customary land where LSLAs actually happen.

Constitutionally, where the beneficiary is entitled, they are compensated "in respect of the unexhausted improvements on unutilised land, provided that such compensation shall be limited to the value, for the purpose for which the land is acquired, of such unexhausted improvements" [12]. For compensations involving customary land, it is a negotiation between the affected communities and the investor. This poses problems because of the power differentials between communities who are poor with humble education levels, if any, and the investors who have the financial stamina, educated and know the value of land and mostly connected to government officials. Reports from Nansanga farm block and Kalumbila mine indicate that communities do not receive what they are promised in terms of compensation [24]. Even when communities are promised what to be given, they are often not considered equal partners in land investment projects. Currently, despite the wave of LSLAs in the country and huge media coverage on it, the Ministry of Lands where the presiding authority in land matters sits, is only a stakeholder in the resettlement policy for people disadvantaged due to LSLAs [15]. With multiple stakeholders, the lead institution in the resettlement policy is the Office of the Vice President through the Department of Resettlement. Rights of smallholders are not adequately protected in the country [13].

"the current statutory laws do not discriminate against anyone on the basis of gender. The Government has however, recognised that women still lack control over land especially in customary areas as opposed to lacking access that they gain through their male relatives. The reason

for this lies in customary practices.” [20] [25]. The National Agricultural Policy, the draft Lands Policy and the Lands Acts 1995 and 2015 are also written in gender-neutral [26]. However, due to economic factors, ideology and power differentials [27] women do not enjoy the same opportunities of access to properties in general, and to land in particular. When land is being leased, one of the conditions is proof that the interested party is capable of developing the land. However, many women especially in rural areas do not have the same level of access to financial means to favourably compete with men.

Some cultural norms do not grant women land rights that are equal to those of men. Women in patrilineal societies with virilocal marriages do not have title to land, and those in uxorilocal marriage communities, male family members control the use of the land [26]. Additionally, women on customary land, de jure and de facto, do not benefit from any legal protection because customary land does not have any legal institutions and frameworks to administer it [15]. In terms of accessing financial services that would need land as collateral, women on customary land are therefore, unable to access the services. They may live on valuable but not valued land because the land lacks legal documentation. Socio-economic disparities, cultural norms and lack of legal documentation for customary land pose challenges to women regarding their access to land.

The law recognises these challenges and views women as victims. Currently, Intestate Succession Act 1989, the National Gender Policy 2000, the Climate Change Gender Action Plan 2016, the Marriage Act, the Village Act and the Mining Act constitute important legal provisions on gender in the country [26][28]. The draft Land policy (2015) has proactively guided that 30 percent of state land will be allocated to women, and 70 percent will be competed for by both men and women [28]. To reflect the socio-economic disadvantaged positions that women have, the government proposed in the Sixth National Development Plan that there be increased representation of women in decision-making positions and in formal employment from 21 percent in 2010 to 30 percent in 2015 [29]. Due to poor policy implementation, when land is acquired, women

are disproportionately affected. Household responsibilities are highly gendered in rural areas. Collecting firewood for domestic use depends on having access and user rights to land and associated resources. This is a woman's responsibility, culturally. Generally, women are confined to responsibilities that are not as economically rewarding as those of men. Women hold higher proportion of seasonal jobs compared to men who hold more permanent positions on out-grower farms [29]. Land problems primarily affect women's abilities to improve themselves, provide for families and to care for children. In this way, LSLAs exacerbate the vulnerable socio-economic situation of women, locking them further in the cycle of poverty that most investments on land promise to get them out of. Improving the precarious women-land relationship in the country will require eliminating the cultural norms that hinder female participation in land rights, providing land rights information, ensuring legal protection of customary land tenure, and improving land administration and enforcement of policies such as the 30 percent land allocation to women in the National Gender Policy 2000 [28].

[Browse the FAO gender and land rights database for more information on gender and land in Zambia.](#)

The Lands Act 2015 outlines 10 conditions that would allow non-Zambians to have access and user rights to land.

Debates

1 Customary Land Recognition: Zambian Approach to Documentation and Administration - Debate Report February 2018

Why Customary Land Rights: *With perhaps over 50% of the world's land surface de facto managed by indigenous peoples and local communities, there is a need to recognize and subsequently document these rights to land and associated natural resources. Many of these systems have been*

governed through unwritten, though locally legitimate, customary norms that rely on traditional leaders. With the recognition of customary rights there is also a need to ensure that state and customary institutions are able to communicate, share information, and work toward complementary objectives.

Emmanuel Tembo commented:

The government's role on customary land is based on the Lands Act of 1995 together with the procedures as laid out in the Land Circular of 1985. Specifically, for any grant of land to be effected on customary land the local authority (the district council and the chief) must recommend to the Commissioner of Lands such grant. The Commissioner of Lands will make sure that the recommendation is accompanied by the Chief's written consent and minutes of the Full Council. In respect of planning customary land as well as maintaining Forest land in customary areas the government relies on Urban and Regional Planning (URP) Act of 2015 and the Forest Act of 2015 respectively. The URP Act provides for the preparation of Integrated Development Plans in all planning areas which include areas under the jurisdiction of traditional authorities. Section 25 of the Act provides for local authorities to enter into planning agreements with chiefs in customary areas. The Forest Act provides for sustainable utilization of forest resources in both customary and state land.

2 [The Debate 2019](#):

Emmanuel Mutale commented on the minimal legal transparency in customary administration:

Like most African countries Zambia has a dual land tenure system. Customary tenure deriving from indigenous customary laws and practices and statutory tenure deriving from the country's British colonial legacy. The following are the legal instruments that have explicit or implicit

references to customary land or its administration.

- *Constitution*
- *Lands Act*
- *Chiefs Act*
- *Registration and Development of Villages Act*
- *Urban and Regional Planning Act*
- *Local Courts Act*
- *Subordinate Courts Act*
- *High Court Act*

There is currently no law or written regulations specific to customary land administration. The limited guidance available relates to the conversion of customary land to state land. However, to the extent that customary land tenure and its administration are provided for or implied in other public legal instruments, it could be argued that there is a very limited level of legal transparency with regard to this form of land administration.

In practice, access to customary land in Zambia is facilitated by chiefs through village headpersons and Indunas (chiefs' advisors) and follows a more simple process compared to the complex and bureaucratic procedures governing access to state land. However, these customary processes vary from chieftdom to chieftdom and are not codified and could be argued, are less transparent as there is no explicit guidance on the roles and responsibilities of traditional leaders in managing customary land.

Although chiefs hold and administer land on behalf of their subjects, the decision making process is not very transparent especially when land is subject to conversion from customary to state land. There are reported instances when chiefs have been accused of allocating huge tracts of land to investors without consulting the local communities.

Jur Schuurman offered suggestions for clarity - to include the voice of farmers:

Focusing my contribution on Zambia, and rather than answering some

questions myself, I would like to make some suggestions in order to obtain (more) clarity on the issues raised.

The information on (the transparency of) customary land administration in Zambia is ambiguous, at least if one consults the, to my knowledge, main and most comprehensive source: the application of the World Bank's Land Governance Assessment Framework (LGAF) to the situation in the country^[1]. On the one hand, some highly critical remarks are made regarding the patriarchal nature of customary land acquisition, the unclear definition of customary land rights and chiefs that do not consult their communities, and “ (...) the unwritten nature of customary law or practices used to administer customary tenure, leaves room for manipulation and corruption.” These statements are very much at odds with the “A” score (i.e. the highest) on indicator 6.1.2.a: “Non-documentary evidence is effectively used to help establish customary rights.” In other words, it is not that easy to answer the question to what extent the customary land administration is transparent in Zambia. It would be pertinent to invite the LGAF author to participate in the debate and shed some light on this question.

Regarding the challenges of the ‘cohabitation’ of customary and statutory tenure, it is probable, in Zambia and anywhere else, that there will be problems when two competing administration systems lay a claim on the same portion of land. These problems have been discussed at length in the Land Portal's debate on [Customary Land Recognition: Zambian Approach to Documentation and Administration](#), where mention was made of the possibility of “passing laws that elevate existing customary land rights up into nations' formal legal frameworks, thereby making customary land rights equal to documented land claims”, a step suggested by Rachael Knight in her influential study on the statutory recognition of customary land rights. I consider the idea very valuable, precisely because of the aforementioned overlapping claims and the corruption risks that they entail, particularly in a country where corruption in general is at a high level according to the Corruption Perception Index (35/100), and probably pervades all areas of governance. I would like to know what Ms

Knight has to say about the specific case of Zambia and am, therefore, suggesting to ask her to participate in the debate.

And finally, let's try to avoid turning the debate into an exchange of opinions about the ultimate stakeholders but without giving them a voice. Farmers are by no means the only social category that has a stake in land, but they are one of the most important ones, in any part of Africa. The Zambia National Farmers' Union (ZNFU) has on some occasions intervened in the land debate in their country, and it would be of much added value to take into account their views (and/or or those of the Zambia Land Alliance, of which ZNFU is a member) on the relationship between customary land rights, corruption and tenure security for their constituency. Nothing about them without them!

In conclusion, rather than pretending to be able to write a full-fledged essay on customary land rights and corruption in Zambia, I prefer to try to advance the debate by making suggestions for other sources of information: Mulolwa, Knight, ZNFU.

* * *

Articles

Traditional stewardship and conservation in the Game Management Areas of Nkala and Namwala, Zambia. (2014)

Francis Xavier Mkanda

Abstract

We investigated the effects of socio-economic, institutional, and governance factors on two adjacent Game Management Areas in Zambia: Nkala, which is relatively pristine, and Namwala, which is degraded. Monetary benefits from the Nkala Game Management Area were almost double those from Namwala, which may have been sufficient incentive for the communities of Nkala not to occupy the area or conduct activities that were detrimental to wildlife conservation. There was no such incentive in Namwala, where traditional leaders may have considered settlement and cultivation a better alternative to wildlife conservation. The degradation of the area is largely attributable to weak governance amongst the traditional leadership, which allowed unauthorized migrants to settle and cultivate regardless of the effects of their activities. In contrast, there was good governance in Nkala, where the local chiefs did not allow settlement within the Game Management Area. We hope our findings will be useful in informing the management of Game Management Areas and other wildlife-conservation areas.

* * *

CBC - Community Based Conservation

Title: The Impact of Community-Based Wildlife Management Model on Food Security as a Proxy Indicator for Human Development in Game Management Areas in Zambia. (2011)

* * *

David Katungula et al. (undated c. 2017)

Innovative Customary Land Governance in Zambia: Experiences, Lessons Learned and Emerging Impacts.

This paper will demonstrate the experiences, emerging impacts and lessons learned on securing land rights of poor, women and vulnerable groups in the context of customary land governance in Zambia. It will describe the implementation of fit for purpose land administration approaches in empowering poor households in rural lands, particularly women. The paper will also endeavor to inform other stakeholders in similar contexts in Zambia and in other countries how best they can govern land in customary settings, with a focus on inclusive and participatory approaches, use of appropriate land tools, the importance of good leadership in land governance and the commitment to empower women and indigenous communities.

* * *

Simon Christopher Metcalfe

Communal land reform in Zambia: governance, livelihood and conservation (2006).

ABSTRACT Customary tenure in Africa has tended to be marginalized in favour of statutory control and privatisation, including public areas protected for wildlife and forest conservation. Zambia has retained a significant proportion of customary land, recognised statutorily through the person of the traditional ruler. Although customary land tenure has lost formal control of wildlife, forestry and mineral wealth, private access to land granted by the chief, has real estate value. There is high demand in the tourist sector for Zambezi River frontage linked to tourism experiences around Livingstone. The paper provides the context for commercial use of Zambian communal land and a comparative case study contrasting two traditional chiefdoms. Both are managing commercial investors but the outcomes are different. The paper outlines and evaluates an experiment in establishing democratic community development trusts, designed to complement patriarchal rule with downward participatory accountability. The communal areas in question have the opportunity to use their land to leverage sustainable development but also risk alienating it in perpetuity. The outcome is uncertain. A reliable positive result depends on a new holistic policy and legislative environment, accompanied by sound extension services. Failing that, the outcome hinges on the situational and subjective responses of individual chiefs, and on whether communities can make their chiefs more accountable.

* * *

Chieftainess Mkanda

A Chieftainess's Stand Enables [Women's Land Ownership](#) (2020)

Chieftainess Mkanda's commitment to land ownership gives the women in her community peace of mind that their land is safe. USAID Integrated Land Resource Governance Project Standing in her compound on the top of a low hill, Chieftainess Mkanda surveys her chiefdom. Mud huts with thatch roofs dot the landscape - and signs of progress abound.

* * *

Southern Province Chiefdoms

[Study on drivers of change](#) in three chiefdoms of Southern ... (2007)

This report results from the Norwegian Embassy in Lusaka's support for a community development project in three chiefdoms of Southern Province in Zambia, targeting traditional leaders as local development drivers. The question posed is whether conventional approaches fail because they do not relate to the actors that hold power in rural areas. The study looks at ways in which the ...

* * *

[Chiefdom Land Committees](#) and reducing insecurity over land ... (2019)

THE CHIEFDOMS

*The **Chieftdom** level, where the project will collect information on the number of reported cases over land at both the magistrate and local courts in each **chieftdom**; and the household level data to capture perceived tenure security and the incidence of disputes within selected **chieftdoms**.*

* * *

Local Government Association of Zambia-Luapula chapter ... (2020)

*Chief Mpundu Mambwe moved the **chieftdom** to Chishinga. Here there were a lot of Lions which terrorized the area. This forced Chief Mpundu Mambwe to embark on a war against these deadly Lions. When all the Lions were killed he called himself as, “Mushota wa kushota utwalo” and all the **chieftdoms** gathered to dance AMALAILA because the land was now free of the Lions.*

* * *

Tetra Tech: Strengthening Wildlife Resource Governance in Zambia ... (2020)

*Zambia has partially decentralized management of its wildlife sector to CRBs, as well as to fisheries and forest management groups. CRBs operate across vast **chieftdoms** where government and customary institutional responsibilities overlap. But, there are no guidelines on the role of women in these groups, only strong customary gender norms that sideline women in resource management and benefits ...*

* * *

NOVEMBER 24, 2020, ROME - IN A NEW STUDY RELEASED TODAY, RESEARCHERS SAY THAT LAND INEQUALITY IS RISING IN MOST COUNTRIES.

Worse, new measures and analysis proves that land inequality is significantly higher than previously recorded, with data reporting a 41 percent increase compared to traditional census data.

The report, Uneven Ground: land inequality at the heart of unequal societies, is the first of its kind, shedding new light on the scale and speed of this growing phenomenon and providing the most comprehensive picture available today. The report was informed by 17 specially commissioned research papers as well as analysis of existing data and literature under a wide partnership led by the International Land Coalition, and in close collaboration with Oxfam.

* * *

The Land Inequality Initiative (2020)

Synthesis report

Towards a blueprint for action on land

The following actions can contribute to taking us off the path of growing land inequality, and instead build more equitable access to land as a basis for a sustainable and inclusive future.

Democratize land governance

Land governance, from national policies to local institutions, should be based on broad representation. Decision-making should include representatives of the state and organisations of producers and other local land users. These should function in the framework of people-centred land policy frameworks and governance structures, aimed at the common good.

Strengthen land-related regulation

Governments should develop land ownership, land use, and land distribution policies and institutions to address patterns of land inequality and their drivers. At national and decentralised levels, these should be reconceived based on broad social consensus, in light of contemporary circumstances and taking into account the full range of causes and impacts of land inequality.

Invest in well-functioning land registries

Governments and their partners should invest in institutions and technology for efficient and fully transparent land registries, including at decentralised levels. Land registries should include information regarding institutional ownership and control of land through sophisticated financial instruments, including listed and unlisted funds. This provides an informed basis for land taxation and other redistributive measures.

Strengthen transparency and monitoring of land holdings

Governments should ensure public access to information about all transfers of rights to use land, whether through purchase, rental, usage, or shareholding. At the same time, there should be greater investment in the capacity of citizen-led monitoring initiatives, including the monitoring of companies and their shareholders operating in agriculture and land-related activities and controlling production. Public support, including development finance for investments or projects, should be contingent on the release of all relevant information.

Legally enforce responsible corporate practice

Governments, especially of investor countries, should hold companies registered in their jurisdictions to account. They should oblige companies to report against the principles of key international frameworks, including the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, and the Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture of the CFS. Legal frameworks of host countries should be upgraded to be equal to or stronger than the standards of international frameworks.

Protect common and customary rights

Governments should recognise and protect customary land claims, ranging from legally recognised and documented community land rights through to non-statutory and undocumented rights. An urgent task is recognising the territorial rights and governance systems of indigenous peoples. In all cases, free, prior, and informed consent should be a standard procedure for all decisions affecting the territories of indigenous peoples and local communities.

Recognise and protect women's land rights

Governments should ensure gender equality in land rights, in law and in practice. This requires a range of actions, from legislating for equal opportunity and rights to encouraging adaptation of social norms, attitudes, or behaviours that support women's self-directed decision-making and ability to benefit from land. Legal mechanisms should enforce women's rights to land when they are under threat and provide mechanisms for redress, including in collective land tenure systems.

Respect and strengthen civil society institutions and capacities

Strong CSOs have a key role to play in monitoring, promoting accountability, and challenging power relations. Powerful and representative constituency-based organisations – belonging to farmers, pastoralists, indigenous peoples, women, and fisher folks – can ensure that the voices

and priorities of land users are heard.

Build more sustainable and equitable production models and food systems

Governments should support the more resilient and sustainable production models of small-scale producers and family farmers. This means allowing them greater autonomy from corporate production systems and the ability to get reasonable returns from employing agroecological, or at least low-external-input, production practices, linked with local markets. Public investment is needed not just for their access to good-quality land, but also for improved public market spaces, protection of national agricultural produce markets from international commodity market pressures, research for improved ecologically sound inputs such as seed and genetic stock, and appropriate storage and processing technologies.

* * *

[International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights](#) (undated)

Rights of customary people

First, Article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights obliges states to respect, protect and fulfil the right to food. This would indicate that any land transfer that is obviously increasing food insecurity for the original land users is unjust. Article 8 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples mandates that states should provide mechanisms for preventing any action,

* * *

REDD+ Herring

*A **red herring** is something that misleads or distracts from a relevant or important question. It may be either a logical fallacy or a literary device that leads readers or audiences toward a false conclusion. A **red herring** may be used intentionally, as in mystery fiction or as part of rhetorical strategies (e.g., in politics), or may be used in argumentation inadvertently.*

Wikipedia

Here I refer to the REDD+ projects in Zambia (see Plunderers of Eden Ch.21)
Recently the REDD-Monitor carried the following headline:

Mark Carney's Taskforce on Scaling Voluntary Carbon Markets: The global financial elite's plan to profit from the climate crisis while maintaining business as usual for Big Oil

26 January 2021.

[Chris Lang \(REDD-Monitor\) writes:](#)

To describe Mark Carney as a member of the global financial elite would be an understatement. He spent 13 years working at Goldman Sachs. From 2008 to 2013, he was governor of the Bank of Canada, and from 2013 to 2020 he was governor of the Bank of England. From 2011 to 2018, he was chair of the Financial Stability Board...

And then introduces the Green Finance Observatory who sent an [open letter to Mark Carney](#) pointing out what's wrong with carbon markets and why we need "environmental policies mandating a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions and a public debate on how to allocate carbon budgets and share costs fairly".

The Green Finance Observatory's letter is entitled: *IS SCALING UP VOLUNTARY CARBON OFFSET MARKETS REALLY WHAT THE CLIMATE NEEDS?*

Here follows a short introduction:

1. Carbon offset markets have been a spectacular failure over the past 12 years, with plenty of documented evidence of the appalling track record of the Kyoto Clean Development Mechanism.

2. Carbon offsets have also been and still are riddled with fraud and human rights abuses. Frauds range from companies manufacturing greenhouse gases to later destroy them and collect credits, to the re-use of expired credits by a European member state and more recently fake forestry offsets. Unfortunately, while fraud can be addressed, other more serious issues cannot. Many carbon offset projects have been documented to result in land use and land ownership conflicts, land grabs and human rights violations against indigenous communities, including violence, torture and murder against local communities.

3. Carbon markets rely on debunked assumptions (traditional regulations have failed, polluting is free today, price-based mechanisms would be more effective, markets are efficient and able to price scarcity).

4. Carbon offset markets suffer from intractable conceptual issues, including dubious equivalences, incalculable additionality and the absence of a price signal.

5. Carbon offsetting does not accelerate but on the contrary has been shown to delay climate action. The priority is to curb GHG emissions immediately and drastically. Since it is too late to avoid climate change, we will also need to rely in addition on so-called 'negative emissions technologies' such as the sequestration of GHG gases from the atmosphere

through forestry. But this is VERY different from offsetting: firstly, this sequestration targets past emissions, whereas offsetting is an enabler of current emissions; secondly this sequestration must come IN ADDITION TO curbing emissions and not instead of. Yet, offsetting by definition puts emission reduction and sequestration on an equal footing, thereby implicitly favouring the latter, as it is much cheaper. This is also the case with 'net zero' targets that mix both together. In fact, offsetting is already being used by some governments to hide their failure to reduce emissions. As noted by Kevin Anderson, the British Committee on Climate Change's 'latest report is relying on approximately 40% higher negative emission technologies by 2050 than in their previous analysis. As we fail on mitigation, we simply turn up the negative emission technologies' dial.'

6. Large-scale forest carbon sequestration & offsetting could cause food prices to skyrocket A recent study published in the journal Environmental and Resource Economics found that 'meeting half the Paris Agreement's goal for atmospheric carbon reduction would send food prices soaring, especially in developing economies. In some places, food prices would get so high that it would never happen (...) Significant forest carbon sequestration leads to reductions in food supply at the same time we're expecting population increases. This is a simple supply and demand problem.' As forest carbon sequestration competes with cropland and disproportionately affects the poor, it can at best only be a small piece of the puzzle. As one of the authors of the study puts it, 'if we want to be serious about climate change, there is no way around reducing emissions.'

7. Who really needs scaled-up voluntary carbon markets? Two major new international carbon offset compliance markets are already being created, one to "offset" civil aviation emissions and the other linked to the Paris Agreement. In addition, the main European carbon market called the EU ETS is also being expanded to new sectors as part of the European Green Deal. Why would we need a dramatic expansion of voluntary markets in addition? It is also worth remembering that only compliance

markets have seen significant demand historically, as the demand is created by legislation: as an example, most of the demand for Kyoto Clean Development Mechanism credits came from the EU ETS. While the demand for voluntary credits for altruistic or brand management motives exists, it has always been very limited, and does not appear to justify the massive scaling up envisioned.
etc, etc.

There then follows a list of academic signatories.

* * *

Greening of the Earth and its Drivers (2016)

[An international team](#) of 32 authors from 24 institutions in eight countries has just published a study titled “Greening of the Earth and its Drivers” in the journal *Nature Climate Change* showing significant greening of a quarter to one-half of the Earth’s vegetated lands using data from the NASA-MODIS and NOAA-AVHRR satellite sensors of the past 33 years. The greening represents an increase in leaves on plants and trees. Green leaves produce sugars using energy in the sunlight to mix carbon dioxide (CO₂) drawn in from the air with water and nutrients pumped in from the ground. These sugars are the source of food, fibre and fuel for life on Earth. More sugars are produced when there is more CO₂ in the air, called CO₂ fertilization.

* * *

Diploma in Leadership and Traditional Governance (2020)

Chiefs and Traditional Affairs Minister Lawrence Sichalwe says Chiefs need to embrace capacity building programmes in order to have understanding of their subjects and natural resources under them.

And House of Chiefs chairperson Senior Chief Luembe has noted with sadness the succession and boundary wrangles being experienced in most chiefdoms throughout the country.



House of Chiefs chairperson Senior chief Luembe at the launch of the Chalimbana University first diploma program in leadership and traditional governance at Cresta Golf View Hotel in Lusaka on December 7, 2020 – Picture by Tenson Mkhala

In a speech read on his behalf by acting permanent secretary Madrine Mbuta at the launch of the Chalimbana University first diploma programme in leadership and traditional governance in Lusaka, Monday, Sichalwe said Chiefs should embrace capacity building as a tool of governance.

“As Minister of Chiefs and Traditional Affairs, we are happy to be associated with this course being offered by Chalimbana University aimed at building capacity of the office of Chiefs in leadership and

governance. The Ministry considers this course as an important tool that will enhance the operations of the office of Chiefs for the benefit of rural communities. Capacity building is important because it will enhance Chief's understanding and management of their subjects and natural resources under them. So Chiefs should embrace capacity building as a tool for good governance," Sichalwe said.

Sichalwe said by offering the course, Chalimbana University was reinforcing unity in diversity by bringing traditional Chiefs together for a common goal of enriching their management skills.

"I am glad through this course, Chalimbana University has reinforced unity in diversity where traditional leaders from different parts of the Country have come together for a common goal of enriching their management skills. I am therefore, urging you traditional leaders to take this programme very serious," said Sichalwe.

And House of Chiefs chairperson Senior Chief Luembe noted with sadness the succession and boundary wrangles being experienced in most chiefdoms.

"I would like to thank government through Chalimbana University for the initiative of bringing their royal highnesses in this manner where they will be imparted with knowledge on leadership and governance issues. It is saddening to note that there are a lot of succession and boundary wrangles being experienced in most chiefdoms through out the country. It is my hope that after gaining knowledge from this training, there will be transformation in the way disputes will be managed by all of us," said Chief Luembe.

Meanwhile, Chalimbana University vice chancellor Geoffrey Tambulukani thanked USAID for their financial and academic support.

46 Chiefs have so far enrolled for this programme.

Senior Chief Luembe - a legal view

I spent from 2003-2008 working with the late Acting Senior Chief Luembe (Francis Kalunga Njovu), who had come to the title corruptly. He had already sold two large parts of his chieftdom on the Luangwa River by the time I arrived to implement my chieftdoms' Landsafe model. When I established the Luembe Conservancy Trust and a Luembe Community Association, I pressed forward with the Luembe people and established a community game ranch in the Open Area part of the chieftdom for their sole benefit. Soon after, the chief, with the Nymba District Council's corrupt assistance, sold the ranch to a local trader. All my efforts to fight this failed. The corruption which I exposed - including the activities of a SLAMU/ZAWA poaching ring (in which the chief was involved) - resulted in the seizure of my safari concession in the chieftdom, my jailing and deportation, followed by that of my family. On the death of the chief Francis Njovu in 2013, a new chief was appointed - but not the expected chief - and who did nothing to reverse the corruption and illegality. When I discovered recently that he had been appointed a governor of the board of the Zambia Community-Based Resource Management Forum (ZCBNRM Forum), I realized that something was sorely amiss. And when in 2021, he was appointed Chairman of the House of Chiefs, I knew I needed to reveal all. I communicated this to a lawyer who replied as follows in March 2021:

There is nothing new about Chief Luembe, we all know how corrupt the system is. His ascent to the chieftainship was via corruption. He is worse than the late chief. On the issue of appointments, the House of Chiefs is mandated by the law to appoint whoever can lead them, it's their constitutional right. As for the issue of the Luembe Conservancy Trust it is very simple: there is a legally binding agreement between the Luembe people and the Trust, the violation of which allows the aggrieved party to sue and compel the other party to honor their contractual obligations.

The challenge we have is that we have a corrupt system which requires a lot of resources to fight such a battle!

Article 18 of our constitution provides a presumption of innocence. Chief Luembe has not been convicted of any criminal offense and as such he has a constitutional right to be appointed as a chairman or anything else. But on moral grounds he is untitled. The Luembe Trust as a legal entity is entitled to sue and be sued. The contract was not with the chief in his official capacity, but with the Luembe community. The chief as an institution is a patron to the Trust, therefore it is for the traditional council to take action.

Still, one has to ask why did the present Acting (?) Senior Chief not honour his predecessor's agreement and compel the traditional council to correct the corruption?

Chiefdoms' New Deal

The irony of writing the history of 'post-Independence' Zambia is, sadly, the nation's stark lack of genuine independence. Over the course of her forty-odd years as an internationally recognized state, Zambia – like much of Africa – has had less and less to say about the basic facts determining the welfare of her citizens. A further irony is that Zambia's vulnerability to forces beyond her control – a condition which can be termed 'subsidiarity' – seems to have deepened in the wake of the post-Cold War onslaught of liberalization that promised to revitalize the nation's economy and her democratic institutions. Evidence of Zambia's deeply rooted subsidiarity is extensive. For starters, her constitutional order, and indeed a sizable chunk of her extant legislation, are not of the nation's own making but a colonial legacy. Zambia's gross national product – based heavily on copper export revenues – is hostage to strategic commercial, military and technological decisions made in cabinet meetings and corporate boardrooms on distant continents. Her state budget, and the policy instruments by which government claims to address the banes of poverty, unemployment, ill-health and illiteracy, are

strictly controlled by transnational debt-masters in Washington. Even Zambia's major religious bodies – and their concomitant items of doctrine and faith – are beholden to unassailable episcopal hierarchies the apices of which reside in Europe and North America. On the whole, Zambians have virtually no say at all on vital questions of life and death – like the price of copper and fossil fuels, the right of Christian clergy to exorcise demons or the affordability of anti-retroviral drugs. Her state budget, and the policy instruments by which government claims to address the banes of poverty, unemployment, ill-health and illiteracy, are strictly controlled by transnational debt-masters in Washington. Even Zambia's major religious bodies – and their concomitant items of doctrine and faith – are beholden to unassailable episcopal hierarchies the apices of which reside in Europe and North America.

The frailty of Zambia's sovereignty is well known, yet still we continue to use the vocabulary of 'independence'. Why is this? Partially, no doubt, out of discretion. Given devastating deterioration of living standards over the past four decades, the benefits of Zambian citizenship have been reduced to little else than a rather empty juridical sovereignty. Etiquette aside, the prevailing conceptual diplomacy is also based on the premise that 'independence' is the normal state of affairs for a sovereign nation like Zambia. The endless list of caveats that belie this fundamental truth, for Zambia as for countless of her neighbors, must be aberrations.

Jeremy Gould - Subsidiary Sovereignty And The Constitution Of Political Space In Zambia (2008). In: One Zambia, many histories.

* * *

The Future Springboard

Africa's Wildlife Economy Summit Hosted by the African Union and United Nations Environment Programme Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe - June 25, 2019

[DECLARATION](#) - Voices of the Communities: A New Deal for rural communities and wildlife and natural resources

We, the over 40 community representatives of 12 countries across Africa have met prior to Africa's Wildlife Economy Summit, to tell the stories of our experiences of living with and among Africa's wonderful wildlife that our forebears watched over and cared for from time immemorial as an integral part of their societies' culture, traditions and economies. We have discussed the role of communities in managing wildlife resources on their land – bearing the costs of living among them sustainably over centuries, despite the continuing legacy of dis-empowering colonial laws and policies. We are the front line of defence in protecting natural resources and combatting illegal wildlife trade.

A key component of Africa's economic potential lies in its biodiversity and wildlife economy, as a unique competitive advantage, for fighting poverty and building resilient communities. Given rapid changes facing Africa in terms of growing poverty and inequality, impacts of climate change, and increasing land transformation that have the potential to destabilize economies of the continent, urgent attention needs to be paid to these threats. We are not helpless communities. We have strong capacity to take this New Deal forward ourselves, if our rights of ownership, governance and use of our natural resources are recognized and respected, as shareholders and not mere stakeholders.

We therefore implore you the Heads of State and governments in Africa together with the private sector and international organizations to recognize the role of communities in the ownership, management and conservation of natural resources that drives the wildlife economy across Africa and to address our concerns, in the spirit of environmental and economic justice. Let us move from a raw-deal to a New Deal.

Goals

Noting increasing rural poverty across the continent, loss of wildlife and habitat, lack of inclusion of communities in decision making and lack of rights, our goal is to reset the agenda for community based natural resources management to:

- Reduce poverty at household level;*
- Turn wildlife into a rural economic engine;*
- Achieve self-determination and security of rights and tenure; and*
- Develop strong community institutions to govern wildlife sustainably.*

Solutions and way forward

With consideration of the above arguments, we the communities of Africa propose the following as the way forward to achieve a New Deal:

- Recognize community rights over the ownership, management and use of resources*
- Strengthen community governance and institutions*
- Build and enhance local capacity of communities to govern and manage natural resources*
- Recapitalize the communities and their natural resources including across boundaries*
- Ensure that community voices are heard in shaping policy and decision making*
 - from the local to the global level*

CHIEFDOMS' NEW DEAL

- *Strengthen evidence-based adaptive management, incorporating indigenous knowledge*
- *Promote investment partnerships in a community-owned wildlife economy.*
- *Ensure that a full and fair share of benefits from the wildlife economy flow directly to the communities.*
- *Change the development model from doing things for communities to financing well-governed communities to do things for themselves*

This is an invitation to Heads of State and governments of Africa, the private sector and international organizations to work with us to allow our continent's communities to achieve a New Deal that will become a stronger foundation of Africa's Wildlife Economy. We trust that this is the first step in a meaningful process bringing us together as communities, government, private sector and international organizations as equal partners to conserve our biodiversity into the future. We call on the global community to support this initiative as our biodiversity is a global asset.

It is our request that this Declaration be part of the formal record of this Summit.

The summation of the June 2019 African Union/United Nations (UNEP) Wildlife Economy Summit at Victoria Falls, where four regional African Presidents and 1000 delegates attended, agreed to do the following:

- 1 Recognize community rights over the ownership, management and use of resources*
- 2 Strengthen community governance and institutions*

3 Build and enhance local capacity of communities to govern and manage natural

resources

4 Recapitalize the communities and their natural resources including across

boundaries

5 Ensure that community voices are heard in shaping policy and decision making from

the local to the global level

6 Strengthen evidence-based adaptive management, incorporating indigenous

knowledge

7 Promote investment partnerships in a community-owned wildlife economy.

8 Ensure that a full and fair share of benefits from the wildlife economy flow directly

to the communities. Change the development model from doing things for communities

to financing well-governed communities to do things for themselves

These eight recommendations hold the key to the survival of many indigenous people and their vital natural resources. Guardian Assemblies need to first concentrate on them.

Palan Mulonda's Customary Residents' Forum Strategy

The chiefdoms can use this invaluable strategy within a province, but certainly at a national level.

As Mulonda advised in his outstanding paper, "Policy and legislation Review of the Fisheries, Forestry, Wildlife and Water sectors vis-à-vis Community-based Natural Resource Management, HURID for CONASA/USAID, Lusaka.

2002.” - for a forum of stakeholders to adhere to the following [strategy in seeking to regain natural resource ownership](#) on their lands:

i) In the area of policy and legislative formulation, Cabinet Office to be courted and, in particular, an input made into the ongoing review of policy and legal formulation processes by the Management Development Division under which the Public Sector Capacity Building Project, inaugurated in October 2000, is being managed. This will allow non-state actors to feature prominently in policy and legislative formulation, especially during the initial stages.

ii) Customary stakeholders need to understand the policy and legal formulation procedures of government to implement a tracking system for the current state of policy and legislation.

iii) The Parliamentary Subcommittee entrusted with natural resources sectors needs to be lobbied, and the Executive checked through the Action Taken mechanism.

iv) Friends of the stakeholders within government and beyond need to be identified so that public opinion may be influenced. These should include technocrats within government line Ministries entrusted with the initiation of policy and legislation, as well as co-operating partners of the state capable of providing both financial and technical support necessary for effecting change and new developments.

v) Small working groups need to be set up that will specialise in specific natural resources to enhance effectiveness and efficiency and to build the requisite expertise and contact with relevant authorities. Close contact should be maintained with Cabinet Liaison Officers of line Ministries dealing with natural resources, as well as with staff of the Policy and Analysis Co-ordination Division at Cabinet Office, and lawyers within the Attorney-General's Chambers, in particular, the Legislative Drafting Department.

vii) Customary community stakeholders should facilitate the establishment of community-based resource boards or institutions to enhance the flow of information between the local and the national level. They

will require legal persons as well as capacity building in understanding policy and legislative measures in the natural resources sector. To assist this process, policies and laws affecting the various community resource boards should be simplified and translated into languages local communities can read and understand best.

This forum of stakeholders would be the Guardians' Assemblies. Mulonda analyzed the tragedy of the demise of the Natural Resources Act of 1962:

It is contended here that the Natural Resources Act Cap 315 of 1962 contained a better community based management practice. The community based organs/or practices were operational and directly developmental, that is to say, their primary focus was on the wise use of natural resources for resource sustainability. The conservation committees were established as bodies corporate, independent of direct Government control and political interference. The committees had definite development functions whose benefits to the community were clear. Proponents for the Act argue that an environment for authority, independence and responsibility was created and demanded of these bodies. Their rights and the rights of any person with respect to the provisions of the Natural Resources Act were addressed by the Natural Resources Tribunal, thereby effecting a system of checks and balances. By the structure of the law every one was treated as capable and equally endowed to develop and manage natural resources. Critics of the 1970 changes to the Natural Resources Act argue that the changes resulted in compromising the independence and roles of community based organs. The character and composition of the organs was changed. The functions of the committees changed to those of an administrative body covering established political boundaries, supervising the wise use of natural resources (more regulatory) and managed by the Minister and the Natural Resources Advisory Board as opposed to the former arrangement where the community was engaged in the wise use of the natural resources

Customary Commons Strategies

1 For the record, my [Landsafe model](#) for the commons of 2012 contains a core proposal concerning common-property trusts in the chiefdoms:

The principal task is for government to provide the necessary policy and legislative framework making customary common property rights unassailable. In this, common property rights are fully assigned over land and renewable natural resources to responsible guardians, i.e. the chiefdoms, on behalf of all Zambians for customary land over all the natural resources except mining, which is dealt with through the proposed Zambia Permanent Fund. They, through their Trusts, then control market environmentalism, the chiefdoms having had the property rights to them fully assigned. They, therefore, internalize the negative externalities (costs) of pollution or over-harvesting, charging the necessary fees to concessionaires through an auction system. (Note) Government must, therefore, recognize public goods and ecosystem services as things of considerable value to the customary commoners, but not as a further opportunity for the state to rent-seek. Such services cannot under any circumstances be privatized, but are to be held under common property by the chiefdom trusts on behalf of the people.

Zambia's Game Management Areas

[Lindsey](#) et al. propose three key recommendations required to address and correct the poor performance of GMAs, of which there are 36 spread out among approximately 50 chiefdoms out of the 288 in existence in Zambia:

1. *Develop new models for the structure and functioning of GMAs. These*

models would have two essential components:

a) Allocating exclusive ownership of blocks of land and the wildlife therein to specific communities (after defining the membership of such communities). In such areas, fencing should not be pre-requisite for communities to obtain ownership of wildlife, as is currently the requirement. These measures would provide the basis for enabling communities to develop and benefit directly from wildlife-based land uses and retain important ecological connectivity within and between GMA's and national park complexes.

b) Encourage significant and long-term private investment in GMAs and the development of robust and fair public-private partnerships. Such arrangements should allocate leases to investors following a simple, fair and transparent tender or auction process, and should provide scope for both consumptive and/or non-consumptive wildlife-based revenue-generating options. Such investment would provide for much greater antipoaching law enforcement, which in turn would pay substantial dividends in wildlife recovery and income generation.

2) Increase governmental funding of the ZAWA to increase their capacity and reduce the need to generate revenue at the expense of sustainable wildlife management. ZAWA should play a key role in facilitating development of wildlife economies on community lands in GMAs and regulating them to ensure they operate within acceptable parameters.

3) Revise the legal framework for GMA's to facilitate recommendations 1-2.

Chiefs and Rural Development

[Ngwelela Ntanda](#)

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1INZFaagceyyLypNWcx9QuD9bJs1_EuTp/view?usp=sharing

Introduction:

The distribution of Western Province population shows that 13.3 percent of the total population was residing in urban areas while 86.7 percent was in rural areas (CSO, 2010). For more than two decades, government and development agencies have focused on rural development. Rural development is a development strategy designed to improve the socio economic well-being of the rural poor. Although tremendous strides have been made, rural areas such as Western Province have not seen much development. Decisions, development programmes and projects, traditional leaders believe are imposed on them by the formulators. One of the main socio-economic concerns of Zambia as a nation is the plight of poverty of the people living in rural areas. Rural poverty has remained at above 80 percent in the Western Province. It has been a burden on the national economy, and households are adversely affected. In an effort to improve the livelihoods of the rural community various development agents' efforts have been met with varying resistance by some traditional leaders.

Generally, the 1998 forest policy, in the state it was could not be implemented through the 1973 Forests Act because piece of legislature did not provide sufficient scope for participation of communities, traditional institutions and other stakeholders in sustainable forest management. The major weaknesses of the 1973 Forests Act were that it focused on giving control of forest planning and management to the central government through the Forestry Department. The traditional institutions that were once very powerful in forest resources management and utilization had no place in this piece of legislation (EFZ, 2012). The exclusion of the local people, the village indunas (traditional leaders) and honorary forest officers had created a very serious law enforcement vacuum in the management of forest resources. It has as well been established that

there had been no inventory of development programmes and projects that had failed due to the chiefs' non approval. From the foregoing, it was evident that a gap existed among and between key stakeholders in rural development. There was no formal and clear process for including communities in the development of policy processes related to them. Communities felt they were not empowered to actively engage in decisions of meetings within the community. These are some of the glaring gaps.

Insecure land tenure system under the customary land administration was a challenge to rural development. Although this tenure system entitled individuals to communal holding of public goods, this did not guarantee sustainable development because the fundamental matter that forms the core of the problem was not clearly addressed under this system. Land security was not guaranteed under the customary tenure system. There was no assurance such as they could not easily be evicted to pave way for foreign investors.

Traditional leaders, like other leaders in communities, exerted a significant amount of influence on the members of their communities. They were respected, listened to, and generally their views and actions had a huge impact on their subjects. In view of this, traditional leaders had a responsibility to ensure that the actions that they took were in the best interests of their subjects. However, unclear application of laws and its supporting policies, rules and regulations to development agenda had led to slow or stagnation of rural development and an increase in rural poverty. Consequently, these had contributed towards the emigration of a number of the rural population, especially the young generation.

7.0 RECOMMENDATIONS

Developing country like Zambia needed customized strategies which took its specific situation into account.

- 1. Zambia needed to understand its own dynamics and apply its own theories because culture played a big role in development.*

2. Reconcile the present disconnect between rural development agents and traditional leaders.

3. The traditional leaders should be consulted and sufficiently explained to on all important issues beforehand and obtain their consent. Development agents should take more time and effort to plan development interventions jointly with communities and the traditional leaders.

4. Zambian government should strengthen decentralization process and ensure there were strong mechanisms for participation within strengthened decentralized systems.

5. Studies should be conducted with wider coverage to include more chiefdoms on how traditional leaders could be effectively engaged in development programmes.

6. Future research should be based on data collected at different stages of development process to determine more precisely where the gap was.

7. Chiefs possess unique tools and mechanisms that could be employed in efforts to developing rural areas.

8. Traditional knowledge with its technical, social and spiritual dimensions needed to be accepted as the starting point for development.

9. Chieftains have to open up and include accountability, transparency, predictability, participation and dynamism in their governance if it they have to enforce development in their respective areas.

10. Local ownership and public participation were essential for development success. Participation was about empowerment of people, about everybody having a voice in public decision-making in their community.

11. Cultural identity and initiatives of local people could provide important keys to sustainable rural development. Appropriate education and training for indigenous and local communities that could enable sustainable development while being compatible with their traditions was necessary.

12. To raise awareness among the development partners on the role of traditional leaders for sustainable rural development.

13. Government and other development agents should be engaging

traditional leaders and other stakeholders at community level in the design and execution of development programmes as they were partners in development.

14. Chiefs could use their privileged positions and influence to help bring about development in chiefdoms in order to improve the lives.

Premodern Zambia

Many of the nations in Sub-Saharan Africa are concentrated at the bottom of the Democracy Index rankings. The continent has only one “full democracy”—Mauritius—and six “flawed democracies”. The number of countries classed as “hybrid regimes”, at 13, is two less than in the 2019 index, as Burkina Faso and Mali slipped down the ranking to become “authoritarian regimes”, alongside 22 other African states. The overall average regional score fell to 4.16 in 2020, down from 4.26 in 2019—by far the lowest score for the continent since the index began in 2006.

[DEMOCRACY INDEX 2020](#) - IN SICKNESS AND IN HEALTH?

The right to freedom of expression is protected in article 20 of the [Zambian Constitution](#). But restrictive laws like the [Information Communication Technologies](#) and the 2009 [Electronic Communications and Transactions](#) Acts “criminalize certain online activities that impede the right to freedom of expression” the study noted. The combination of these laws and state surveillance has limited freedom of expression in the country.

[Nwachukwu Egbunike](#) - Freedom of expression in a downward spiral

in Southern Africa, [says new study](#). Some of the laws reviewed have [a chilling effect](#) on digital freedom.

Since self-government, the Zambian state as the owner and manager of wildlife and other natural resources, has manifestly failed to support the chiefdoms, its functions increasingly privatized under quangos, embarking in a highly selective and opaque manner on unequal 'partnerships' with hunting-safari and ecotourism operators, and customary area commoners, with or without the permission of the chiefdom residents. Tourism concessions have been leased to investors in national parks without benefit to the former owners of the land and for increasingly longer leases at higher fees, such that they all but resemble leasehold alienations. And we witness large-scale alienations of land in chiefdoms for agricultural schemes such as jatropha or sugar production, with all their proven monocultural damage.

Nachituti's Gift, Economy, Society, and Environment in Central Africa - David. M. Gordon

* * *

Democracy Index 2020: The Economist Intelligence Unit

Zambia is a dual state: indigenous and Western pre-modern. On the land managed by chiefs, headmen and spiritual guardians, life is directed within clans by kinship and social capital; and in the towns, by ill-functioning political leadership, authoritarianism and corruption - and true poverty. Africa's Democracy Index reveals the massive failure of plunder capitalism.

Zambia and [Sub-Saharan Africa](#)

Zambia is ranked 99th globally and 15th in Africa overall and is considered a hybrid regime, i.e. flawed and authoritarian.

A hybrid regime is defined as:

Hybrid regimes: Elections have substantial irregularities that often prevent them from being both free and fair. Government pressure on opposition parties and candidates may be common. Serious weaknesses are more prevalent than in flawed democracies—in political culture, functioning of government and political participation. Corruption tends to be widespread and the rule of law is weak. Civil society is weak. Typically, there is harassment of and pressure on journalists, and the judiciary is not independent.

These rankings are based on Western mores, not indigenous standards. The time has come for such an assessment to be made of the 288 chiefdoms.

Oasis Forum Statement on Zambia

OASIS FORUM STATEMENT ON ZAMBIA'S 54TH INDEPENDENCE ANNIVERSARY

Zambia's Independence Nightmare: The Return of the Nightmare

On 24th October 1964, Zambia woke up from the nightmare of colonialism and found itself living the dream of democracy. The nightmare had been a prolonged period of apartheid, in a country run by a privileged white elite where Africans were second class citizens. By contrast, independence brought the dream of equality of opportunity, not only to employment but also to political power. This ideal was to be

achieved largely by the principle of equality of access to education and to all the other services made available by the State; a government of the people, by the people, for the people.

In a number of ways, we as a nation, made some positive slides over the years to inculcate a democratic culture in our country and deliver unto ourselves a better Zambia, a land of work and joy, where women and men can stand and sing, freely and proudly. But gradually, over a period of fifty-four years, the dream has slipped away and the nightmare has gradually returned. But not entirely in the same form; instead of a ruling white elite we now have a ruling African elite. Instead of an imposed colonial dictatorship we instead have a locally grown autocracy. Otherwise, the similarities with the colonial system of government are quite startling – a government of the elite, by the elite, for the elite.

Some of the essential features of our present nightmare are as follows:

1. Erosion of Equality of Opportunity. In the early days of independence, people ascended to positions of power and influence mainly on the basis of selection by merit, especially as measured by educational achievement. But nowadays, the elite class is largely self-perpetuating from one generation to the next, with the elite purchase of expensive education, and with the intra-elite selection for employment and promotion. Elite class membership now supersedes educational level.

2. Lack of Separation of Powers can especially be seen between the Executive and Parliament, where the ruling party typically has an overwhelming majority so that Parliament becomes a rubber stamp for Executive decisions, and has virtually abdicated its primary role of holding power to account. Whereas the Mung'omba Constitutional Review Commission and the Technical Committee on the Drafting of the Zambian Constitution established that people wanted a separation of powers by having ministers appointed from outside parliament, parliament itself quashed this popular demand as part of its wholesale 'amending' of the Draft Constitution in 2016.

3. The Current Debt Burden has seriously eroded our economic and political independence, and even eaten away our sovereignty. With the

conditions attached to donor funding and loans, donors and creditors have achieved influence over investment priorities, over government policies, and over foreign immigration. In some cases foreign creditors are even able to demand the transfer of national assets to foreign companies in lieu of unpaid debts. The thirty (30) percent of the budget now going to debt servicing has drastically reduced government expenditure on education, health and social services, with poverty levels now sinking to colonial levels.

4. The Erosion of the Rule of Law has become a main means for the repression of political criticism and the oppression of opposition parties. The main principle of the rule of law is that all people shall be equal in law and before the law. Therefore it is a reversal of the rule of law to try to 'fix' perceived and actual political opponents by first looking for a law (however trivial or archaic) that they have abrogated, and then bringing them before a court to answer charges.

5. The Development of a Police State has greatly contributed to the unconstitutional powers assumed by a dictatorial type governance. The police service, which is supposed to be a professional institution guided by the constitution and the law, is instead found to be taking instructions from the government and even directly from the ruling party. This is in large part due to the infiltration of this once-professional body by party cadres. Gross misuse of police powers is most notably revealed in the misuse of the Public Order Act (POA), where the police prohibit and sometimes brutally attack public protests and opposition party meetings, and even arrest people, on the pretext that such meetings do not have a police permit. However there is no requirement for a police permit in the POA. In this way the ruling party effectively 'outlaws' public organization and mobilization of political opposition and contributes to the perpetual stay in power of a dictatorial government by inducing fear in the citizenry through reckless conduct of some police officers who seem to specialize in violating people's right to lawful assembly and freedom of expression.

6. Massive Corruption is a main means by which the ruling elite

maintain their position as a wealthy ruling minority. Every year the Auditor General's Report reveals massive misappropriation of public funds by the civil service and each report is traditionally followed by lack of action against the culprits by way of administrative disciplinary action, let alone by bringing criminal charges. This situation is but a one off-shoot of the de-professionalization of the civil service and its infiltration by party cadres. Far more serious, and far less transparent, is the siphoning by the political elite of large slices of foreign loans intended for massive infrastructural projects. Many of these projects have doubtful investment value and some are obviously mere prestige or vanity projects with no observable economic return from the investment.

7. Corruption as the Fuel for Ruling Class Maintenance. Corruption has become a central necessity for keeping the ruling class in power. Unlike the former racial elite, whose whiteness was the basis of superiority, wealth is the basis of the superiority of the present ruling elite. And wealth, unlike whiteness, has to be constantly maintained. But wealth is not merely a matter of social prestige, it is also necessary for maintaining a system of patrimony – especially a corrupt system of maintaining the political support of big business by giving contracts, favours and concessions. Perhaps even more expensive is the cost of buying votes during election time, involving both the cost of bribing voters and the cost of various forms of election rigging. All of these three aspects of ruling class maintenance involve massive theft from the public purse.

Conclusion

All the above seven aspects of the Nightmare point to different aspects of our long fifty-four year slippage from Independence and Freedom into Dependence and Dictatorship. By the same token, all of these seven aspects of the Nightmare point to different aspects of our slippage from constitutional government and the rule of law into the repression of a police state. We broke free from a colonial white elite, but have instead gradually fallen into the hands of a local ruling elite that has imposed a similar system of oppression and dictatorship.

We call upon all citizens, including politicians, members of parliament,

the judiciary, civil servants and the church to wake up and recognize the Nightmare. The momentous task at hand is the struggle to regain our Independence.

Eddie Mwitwa

CHAIRPERSON – OASIS FORUM

Issued On 23rd October, 2018 in Lusaka on behalf of Convenors:

Fr. Emmanuel Chikoya – General Secretary (CCZ)

Mr. Eddie Mwitwa – President (LAZ)

Ms. Sara Longwe – Board Chairperson (NGOCC)

Fr. Cleophas Lungu – Secretary-General (ZCCB)

African Declaration of Internet Rights and Freedoms (AfDec)

A [recent study](#) by the coalition of the African Declaration of Internet Rights and Freedoms (AfDec) reviewed extant legislation and its impact on the right to freedom of expression in seven countries in Southern Africa— Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe:

“But what has not changed, and has to some extent escalated, are the fear-driven efforts by African states to control use of the internet; to shut it down or block parts of it. Shutdowns have in fact increased, and new forms of control have emerged. These include taxes and tariffs on social media; cybersecurity legislation that criminalises speech and justifies mass or arbitrary surveillance; and requirements for bloggers to register or apply for licences. Another disturbing development is the increase in online misogyny and harassment of women and girls, as well as misinformation and hate speech, often encouraged or initiated by governments or political parties. Digital divides still exist and in some ways are widening. Governments are embracing digital identity

programmes, mostly without data protection frameworks being in place. In other words, the African Declaration is even more relevant now than it was in 2014.”

In Zambia, non-Zambian certified investors who are bloggers who dare to criticise and expose government corruption have their businesses closed, are arrested, imprisoned briefly, and physically removed from the country. Shortly thereafter, family members not involved in the criticism are either similarly treated or given a week to leave the country. In chieftdom concession holders and investors, the customary villagers and headmen and chiefs are bereft of their partners, their investors, their employment, their defender of their rights. The investors surface on some other foreign shore; their capital is gone, their houses and equipment and vehicles going. But what of the investors' mother country, the guardian of their citizenship? What action do they take? Answer: none at all. But one part of the neocolonial story, a game played between big business, the Washington consensus and the myriad of donors.

World Food Programme 2019 Report

1. Country analysis

1.1 Country context

1. Zambia is a lower-middle-income country with a population of 17.1 million people. It is in the “medium” human development category, ranking 144th of 189 countries. 2 Despite growth in gross domestic product (GDP) since the mid-1990s, Zambia’s debt and debt servicing obligations have increased and the country has one of the world’s most unequal

societies. A Gini coefficient of 0.69 indicates extreme income inequality: while the poorest 50 percent of households hold only 7.3 percent of total income, the richest 10 percent retain 56 percent. More than half of the population lives below the poverty line with less than USD 1.90 a day.³ Poverty rates are higher among households headed by women (56.7 percent) than those headed by men (53.8 percent)⁴ and in rural areas (76.6 percent of households) than urban ones (23.4 percent).

2. In the 2018 Global Hunger Index Zambia ranked 115th of 119 countries, with a score of 37.6 comparable to those of countries experiencing conflict and civil strife and indicating an “alarming” food security situation. A stunting rate of 40 percent among children under 5 indicates the chronic nature of hunger in Zambia. Between 2007 and 2014, among children under 5, the prevalence of underweight remained at 15 percent while the mortality rate dropped from 70 to 45 deaths per 1,000 live births.

3. The incidence of natural and climate-related disasters has increased in recent years, disproportionally affecting poor people. Over the last 30 years, the impacts of climate change such as floods and droughts are estimated to have cost Zambia more than USD 13.8 billion in lost GDP.⁷ During the 2015/16 agricultural season, the country experienced strong El Niño effects, and normal or below normal rainfall patterns are expected in much of the country during 2018/19.⁸ The impact of climate-related disasters has a disproportionate effect on women and girls, leading to negative coping strategies that tend to affect woman-headed households in particular.

4. In 2017, Zambia ranked 125th of 160 countries on the Gender Inequality Index. Approximately one in four Zambian households are headed by women, and gender disparities that are disadvantageous to women are evident in public health indicators, workforce participation, household expenditure, employment opportunities, access to education,

agricultural livelihood choices, freedom of movement and subjection to violence.

5. Zambia hosts about 40,000 refugees and asylum seekers 10 most of whom (80 percent) are women and children, mainly from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Zambia has hosted refugees since attaining independence, and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that there will be 58,000 refugees living in the country by 2020.

1.2 Progress towards SDG 2 Targets

6. While Zambia has made progress in economic growth, rates of poverty and inequality remain high and core human development indicators are below both national and global targets.

7. Ensure access to safe, nutritious and sufficient food. Zambia is a food-surplus country, with domestic production exceeding national food requirements. Heavy emphasis on maize and a lack of crop diversification create challenges for food availability and year-round access to sufficient nutritious food. Access to food is further hampered by high poverty rates and income inequalities, high unemployment rates and food prices in urban areas, and low productivity and revenues from farm activities in rural areas. The Government is addressing these issues through efforts in national social protection for equitable food access and food availability. With higher prevalence of unemployment and poverty among women than men, and inequitable gender roles, women tend to face more challenges in access to adequate food.

8. End malnutrition. The prevalence of undernourishment in Zambia is among the highest in the world, with 48 percent of people unable to meet their minimum calorie requirements. Among children under 5, 40 percent are stunted (an improvement of just 5 percentage points

since 1997), 15 percent are underweight, 6 percent suffer from wasting and almost 60 percent are anaemic; the infant mortality rate is 45 per 1000 live births.¹² Ten percent of girls and women aged 15 to 49 years are underweight and 23 percent are overweight or obese. The main contributors to malnutrition are poor dietary diversity, micronutrient deficiencies, inadequate mother and child care and poor environmental and sanitary conditions, along with structural inequalities and policy gaps such as a lack of national guidelines for food fortification.

9. *Smallholder productivity and incomes.* Zambia has an estimated 1.5 million farmers, 80 percent of whom cultivate 2 hectares or less. Smallholders represent 75 percent of farming households and produce most of the domestic food supply. Agricultural productivity and revenues are low, principally as a result of overreliance on rainfed agriculture, exposure to climate-induced risks and limited access to high-quality inputs, finance, information, extension services, efficient markets, improved seeds, fertilizer and labour. Post-harvest losses are estimated at 30 percent for cereals and result from a lack of expertise and access to technology. To increase productivity and incomes for smallholders, the Government is implementing a farmers' input support programme and a package of inputs in support of food security. Analysis by the World Bank revealed that both of these are poorly targeted and implemented and are contributing towards an overreliance on maize production. Women maize farmers, who have less access to productive inputs, services and information, record lower productivity rates than men do. A recently launched e-voucher programme implemented by the Government with support from FAO is aimed at addressing gaps in the farmers' input support programme.

10. *Women constitute 64 percent of the rural population and approximately 80 percent of food producers.* 14. While women constitute a large segment of smallholder farmers, they face many barriers, including being less likely than men to own land and, when they own land, having smaller

holdings. Women face challenges in graduating from subsistence farming as they have limited access to agricultural inputs and labour and benefit less than men from available resources. Women smallholder farmers have identified limited access to production technology that conserves soil fertility as one of the challenges that lead to lower productivity. To address these challenges and structural gender inequalities, significant investments must be directed to women's empowerment, including their financial and economic empowerment.

11. Sustainable food systems. Climate shocks, poor natural resource management, inadequate rural infrastructure and demanding food safety standards pose barriers to the attainment of sustainable food systems. The food system is dominated by maize, with government spending skewed towards the production, marketing, storage and distribution of maize¹⁵ and only minimal investments in other key drivers of agricultural growth such as infrastructure, research and technology. The value chains for other food commodities have attracted limited investment, further impeding market development. Agricultural growth has been the result of increased land use – which causes rapid deforestation – rather than improved productivity.¹⁶ The resultant food system is highly susceptible to climate-induced shocks.

Uncomfortable Knowledge

Posted on [March 3, 2021](#), by [curryja](#) | [173 Comments](#)
by Judith Curry

On the misuse of science and scientific authority.

The latest issue of [The Breakthrough Journal](#) is a tour de force. Excerpts from the [Introduction](#) to the issue:

Faced with a world of irreducible complexity, humans must construct simplified versions of reality in order to act. But when institutions are unable to integrate uncomfortable knowledge into policy making, the consequences can be grave. This is true not just with regard to short-term policy outcomes, but also to the long-term credibility of the institutions.

The uncomfortable knowledge in Zambia is that the state has modelled its existence on a foreign, non-kinship and declining spiritual model where the double bed is filled with the bloated presence of a bonded couple ever on the feed: the politician and the big money man. The simplified version of reality in Zambia lies in its chiefdoms, in its guardians.

Legal Control of Chiefdoms

F.H. Melland who had served in Northern Rhodesia as a BSA Company magistrate, native collector and native commissioner from 1901-1924, wrote strongly from his experience of direct rule that the dual mandate system of Indirect Rule - whereby the administration of the country was carried out by the chiefs, required to be reformed so that Africans "could produce an autochthonous (indigenous) civilization that would provide a notable contribution to world civilization."

*African Dilemma, Frank **Melland**, Cullen Young. Published by The United Society for Christian Literature, London, 1937. p. 51.*

He was sternly critical of what had been done: "...it is necessary to repeat that the establishment of Indirect Rule was every whit as autocratic as our original assumption of direct rule. It is we who have decreed how the Africans shall be governed, just as we have decided what laws he shall obey, to what parts of his religion and customs he may adhere, what he shall or shall not learn."

African Dilemma, p. 30.

As regards the chiefs, they did not relish the change, in many cases because they had lost the habit of ruling, and still more because they did not regain the right to rule in accordance with custom, but were forced to rule on lines laid down by their white overlords, to administer justice and to punish on those lines.

African Dilemma, p.45.

For the wise men of old, the cardinal problem had been how to conform the soul to reality, and the solution had been knowledge, self-discipline, and virtue. For magic and applied science alike the problem is how to subdue reality to the wishes of men: the solution is a technique; and both, in the practice of this technique, are ready to do things hitherto regarded as disgusting and impious.

C.S. Lewis - The Abolition of Man

* * *

Introduction

The plethora of legal instruments to control the [288 chiefdoms](#) by an indigenous Western-style government and an Executive President is shocking. By law, the President controls the land, the chiefs the big-game, the fish, the minerals, the forests, the water, etc. The government ministries exert all controls over the chiefdoms, their people, land, water and wildlife, exhorted on by the aid and extractive industries. The customary commoners use a piece of customary land on usufruct. Still, the government uses fifty or so of

those chiefdoms to extract rentals from safari-hunting, game capture, and photo-tourism. But what is not realized is the plethora of Acts, Regulations and national policies arming and empowering many ministries in the total regulation of their fellow citizen villagers who live close to nature, yet in return provide little support.

The Chiefs' Act, 1965

The Chiefs' Act of 1965 defined a chief as a person who the President of Zambia recognizes. Since 2008 this has been carried out under a statutory instrument - Chiefs (Recognition) (No. 6) Order – though it does not recognize headmen, only deputy chiefs and *kapasus* (messengers). The president has the power to appoint or remove a chief.

9. (1) There shall be attached to every Chief and Deputy Chief, for the purpose of aiding and assisting him in the discharge of the functions of his office, such number of kapasus as the President may determine.

15. (1) Any person who, immediately before the commencement of this Act-(c) was recognised under the Native Authority Act, Chapter 157 of the 1965 Edition of the Laws, as a Paramount Chief, Senior Chief, Chief or Sub-Chief; shall be deemed to have been accorded equivalent recognition under this Act.

The Zambian Constitution, amended in 1996 by President Chiluba and introducing Article 129, which prohibited chiefs from entering national politics, defined the institution of a chief as 'A corporation sole with perpetual succession and with the capacity to sue and be sued and to hold assets or

properties in trust for itself and the peoples concerned'.¹⁷ And the Local Government Act (1995) and the Development and Registration of Villages Act (1971) provides the main institutional framework on how chiefs are supposed to be integrated into development at the local level, the latter Act being an instrument of one-party rule in 1972, remaining unchanged to this day.

[As Mulolwa wrote](#) in the *LAND GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENT Zambia Country Report of 2016*:

Part XIII, article 127, allows for continuation of the existence of the Institution of Chief in any area of Zambia in accordance with the culture, and traditions of the peoples concerned. In addition, Article 128 of Part XIII allows the Institution of Chief to operate as a corporation and to hold assets or properties in trust for itself and the peoples concerned. Special mention should be made of articles 127 and 128. The recognition of the chiefs' establishments as institutions, that they should continue in existence according to their traditions, and that they can hold property in trust for their people, has significance in relation to how customary land should be administered. Chiefs are already custodians of customary land, and if they should continue in existence according to their traditions, it means even administration of land should continue to be based on those same traditions. Since they do already hold land, it can be said that they do constitutionally hold that land in trust for their people.

Ministry of Chiefs and Traditional Affairs

[Established in 2011.](#)

¹⁷ Republican Constitution: Article 168 of the Constitution [Amendment] Act no.2 of 2016 provides that, "(1) Subject to clause (2), a chief may seek and hold a public office. (2) A chief who seeks to hold office in a political party or election or appointment to a State office, except that of Councillor, shall abdicate the chief's throne.

The House of Chiefs

There are 288 chiefs in Zambia, 4 of them paramount, 43 senior, and 10 provinces. [The House of Chiefs](#), established under Article 169 of the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act No. 2 of 2016, comprises 50 chiefs with a mandate for five years. The House falls under the Ministry of Chiefs and Traditional Affairs, created in 2011 by President Sata.

The House of Chiefs is responsible for performing the following functions as provided for under Article 169 (5) of the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act No. 2 of 2016:

1 Consider and discuss a Bill relating to customs and tradition referred to it by the President before the Bill is introduced into the National Assembly;

2 Initiate, discuss and make recommendations to the National Assembly regarding socio-economic development;

3 Initiate , discuss and decide on matters relating to customary law and practice;

4 Initiate, discuss and make recommendations to a local authority regarding the welfare of communities in a local authority;

5 Make proposals on areas in customary law that require codification;

6 Advise the Government on traditional and customary matters; and

7 Perform other functions as prescribed.

Six chiefs signed up for the Bangweulu community-based scheme (CBNRM) scheme: Kopa, Chitambo, Nsamba, Bwalya Mponda, Kabinga and Chiundaponde, but only one of them, Senior Chief Kopa of the Bisa, sits in the House for the period 2016-2021. Other Bangweulu chiefs such as Kasoma of Samfya, Kalasa Lukangaba and Kasoma of Samfya do sit in the house until 2021. Still, they are not included in the Bangweulu Management Board privatization with African Parks.

National Policy on Chieftainship and Traditional Affairs (2018)

Policy issued by the [Ministry of House of Chiefs & Traditional Affairs](#).

Some noteworthy quotes:

Zambia has seventy three (73) ethnic groupings and two hundred and eighty eight (288) chiefdoms. Chiefs are regarded as supreme Traditional Leaders of their respective ethnic communities and ascendance to the throne differs from one ethnic group to another.

The institution of chieftaincy has had challenges in adequately discharging its functions. These challenges include but are not limited to:

- a) Lack of a comprehensive Government Policy to provide guidance on matters relating to chiefs and traditional affairs;*
- b) Limited scope of authority which precludes them from resolving certain matters in the Chiefdoms;*
- c) Dilution or diminishing customs and cultural identity;*
- d) Limited financial resources for the administration of chiefdoms;*
- e) Limited capacity of subjects to support the welfare of Chiefs;*
- f) Perceived inappropriate behaviour by some Traditional Leaders; and*
- g) Lack of capacity building for Traditional Leaders to enhance governance and development.*

Some points:

1. There is a growing trend by Chiefs and headmen/women to spend extended time away from their chiefdoms for several reasons.
2. Most Chiefs in Zambia live in dilapidated houses as palaces.

3. Conflicts in chiefdoms are resolved mostly by traditional courts. Although these traditional courts serve an important role in dispensing justice, they are not part of the country's judiciary.
4. There is a growing call to develop and implement the code of ethics to guide Chiefs as they discharge their functions.
5. Malaria remains a leading cause of mortality and morbidity, especially in rural areas, while maternal deaths accounted for 10% of all deaths among women aged 15 – 49.
6. Ending child marriage will help break the intergenerational cycle of poverty by allowing girls to grow into women and participate more fully in society.
7. The impacts of these hazards have included crop failure, outbreaks of animal diseases (such as foot and mouth disease, swine fever and Newcastle, among others), dislocation of human populations and destruction of property and infrastructure chiefdoms.
8. Therefore, it is paramount to involve the communities in their respective chiefdoms' forest management to ensure adequate protection.
9. Most of the chiefdoms in Zambia experience communication challenges attributed to poor road infrastructure, electronic and print media, and communication towers.
10. The Republic of Zambia's laws does not recognize the reality of practising witchcraft as it cannot be proved scientifically. However, the law provides penalties to whoever names or makes an input to the act of witchcraft; it also provides penalties on professional witchdoctors for professing knowledge of witchcraft.

To do:

- a) Facilitate the review of legislation for the participation of Traditional Leaders, in consultation with local communities, in decision making processes relating to natural and other resources in their chiefdoms;*
- b) Develop and implement the resource mapping framework for documenting natural and other resources in the chiefdoms;*

LEGAL CONTROL OF CHIEFDOMS

c) Create awareness among traditional leaders and communities on their role in the management and control/administration of natural and other resources;

d) Strengthen linkages with other Government Ministries dealing with the diverse natural resources found in the chiefdoms;

e) Facilitate the undertaking of consultation of traditional leaders by Government in matters relating to investment in natural and other resources;

f) Facilitate the undertaking of capacity building among traditional leaders in matters relating to management, control/administration of natural and other resources; and

g) Facilitate the retention of a percentage of royalties for the benefit of the host chiefdom and the incumbent Chief.

Responsibility of the Ministry:

1. Responsible for lands and natural resources.
2. Administration of land and management natural resources for sustainable use in chiefdoms
3. Responsible for water development, sanitation and environmental protection
4. Shall provide guidelines on land alienation procedures
5. Facilitate the resolution of land disputes and the sustainable utilization of natural resources in chiefdoms;

The following laws need to be repealed or amended:

Enabling Act	Essence/Purpose/Role	Remarks
Chiefs Act, Cap 287	The Act sets out the recognition of Chiefs as well as their functions.	The Act needs to be repealed and replaced so that it conforms to the provisions in the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act No. 2 of 2016. In addition, it is necessary that the institution of chieftaincy is not only safeguarded but also strengthened.
Villages Registration & Development Act, Cap 289	The Act provides for the registration of villages and the inhabitants thereof, the establishment of Village Development Committees as well as Village Productivity Committees.	The Act also requires to be repealed so that the issues covered therein are incorporated in the Traditional Leadership law.
Witchcraft Act, Cap 90	The Act prescribes allegation of use of charms to harm others.	The Act needs to be reviewed to ascertain its validity.
National Heritage Conservation Commission Act, Cap 173	The Act is responsible for the protection and management of cultural and natural heritage in the country.	The NHCC Act needs to be reviewed in order to allow traditional leaders to be involved in the management and protection of heritage.

Environmental Management Act No. 12 of 2011	It is the principal Act on environmental protection and management through enforcement of EIAs and monitoring and control of pollution.	Developmental projects taking place in chiefdoms ought to take issues of environmental protection seriously. Matters of environmental pollution affecting local communities must be adequately checked to avoid harm, now and in future, to local people.
Local Government Act, No. 6 of 2010	Provides for the governance and administration of local authorities.	There is need for effective representation of the local communities in the Council.
House of Chiefs Regulations, Statutory Instrument No. 41 of 1998	The SI sets out the Regulation, Rules and Procedure that guide all proceedings related to the House of Chiefs.	The SI needs to be reviewed so that it takes into account the constitutional requirements.

Chiefs and the Law in Independent Zambia

[Chola Mukanga 15 August 2008](#)

<quote>

The [last post](#) in this [series on traditional authorities](#) discussed how chiefs adapted to newfound responsibilities, carefully balancing the requirements of the Colonial State with the expectations of the rural populace. In the process, it was argued that beyond these requirements, Chiefs also leveraged their influence, assisted by the vast wealth of native treasuries, to support the political struggle and development of rural entrepreneurship. With the advent of independence, the political spectrum was soon to be shattered. This post explores the processes that led to that change, and; how the authority of chiefs was altered. In particular, it focuses on the key institutional changes that have emerged since independence and the extent to which they have shaped the role of chieftaincy in modern Zambia.

The emergency of Zambia in 1964 marked a momentous occasion of political emancipation from both Britain and the white supremacies. Zambia was now an independent political state able to determine its place in the world. However, as many have noted, in many respects this was only the beginning of the struggle for true self-determination. The real struggle that lay ahead for her government was how to turn the achieved political independence into true internal cohesion and viable economic independence in the long term. Zambia of course is not unique in this respect. All new nations strive to be economically independent and ensure that they manage any external pressures that threaten internal cohesion. But in Zambia this problem was particularly acute, for two reasons:

First, *the country's economy was quite exceptionally dependent on copper*, which placed Zambia's economy at the mercy of unpredictable world demand for copper. Moreover, under colonial rule the country had had little stake in, let

alone control over the mining industry – mining was essentially a foreign business (and many would argue that it still is). But what made the situation even worse was the fact that at independence, Zambia had to rely on Rhodesia, South Africa or Mozambique for nearly all communication with the outside world, for much of its trade, for skilled manpower and for employment of its citizens. This dependence on white supremacies presented a significant challenge to Zambia's political independence.

Secondly, *at independence, the nation emerged with deep regional divisions*, often reflected in different political bases for the competing parties of UNIP and ANC. In addition to this cultural diversity, the Zambian government inherited a very unequal society, with the Copperbelt dwellers more well off than their rural counterparts. This aggravated the regional rivalries or “tribalism” during and after independence. There was thus considerable scope for hostile foreign powers to exploit internal disaffection for their own ends.

Thus, at the time of independence national unity seemed essential, not only to confront the tasks of economic development but counter internal subversion and external attacks. Chiefs and Native Authorities (NAs) were an embodiment of these twin threats. As noted in the [last post](#), NAs and their treasuries had become quite powerful prior to independence, spawning the emergence of a new “boma class” that was principally seen by many rural dwellers as beneficiaries of colonial rule. And whilst it is correct to observe that the “boma class” and NAs, were broadly supportive of the independence struggle their continuous allegiance to the colonial state generated deep suspicions, which were probably justified. In the eyes of many Zambian politicians, the role played by the NAs was typically one which restrained the nationalist movement. They saw the local administration a function of the colonial state and the chieftaincy as an anachronistic vestige of the old Northern Rhodesia that had no place in the new Zambia political landscape. Simply put, NAs' powers had to be curtailed because the loyalty of chiefs to the UNIP government was questionable.

The economic arguments for reform appeared strong. Zambia had inherited an inefficient and fragmented administrative structure: a diffuse collection

of government departments enjoying a large measure of autonomy and only loosely controlled by any central, coordinating body, whether bureaucratic or political. The immediate task for the government was how to transform the inherited structure of provincial administration - the focal point of the colonial system of government - into an instrument of economic development. The challenge for the government was how to design a system that achieved their stated economic objectives but also allowed the party to reassert its authority and minimise future imbalances of political power.

The government's preferred method was to abolish the old system of provincial and district government and replace it with a new, more limited structure. From the government's perspective, this reformed provincial and district government arrangement was intended to coordinate and implement government policies and provide a link between government and the new structure of party power, in the process wresting power from the Chiefs to the ruling party. The aim was to take forward the Zambianisation of the new institutions without indigenisation. To that effect, the NAs and local administration were stripped of most of its predecessor's functions, which were distributed among central government ministries and their agencies, as follows:

- The Local Courts Department of the Ministry of Justice took over the reorganization and running of the old Native Authority courts.
- Responsibility for law and order was devolved on the police, although local authorities retained a small force of constables to assist in the enforcement of council bye-laws.
- The Ministry of Local Government became responsible for supervising the rural local authorities through its own cadre of local government officers.
- The other important functions of NAs such as responsibility for agriculture, conservation and primary education, were passed onto to Central Government.

In short, the reforms streamlined the local system, but also led to the

centralisation of responsibility. That in itself is not unusual, but it is interesting that the central government assumed responsibility for certain functions that appear could have been performed locally e.g. conservation. There's also the wider question of whether by eliminating Chiefs from administrative responsibility they ended up removing the people's ownership of the development process. It might be argued that at that time many people associated themselves on tribal lines, and a coherent approach to development probably required significant involvement of chiefs in the day to day administration of affairs, with gradual reduction of their influence over time. Clearly, for the government of the day, this was not a concern, probably because they had already concluded that the interests of the people and chiefs were not always aligned, or a mechanism could not easily be developed that created positive incentives for chiefs to act in peoples' interests.

The new changes to local administration caused some disquiet among chiefs. In the successive years, partly due to pressure from chiefs and partly due to political imperatives, some attempts were made to placate traditional leaders. Four areas can be readily identified as significant in shaping the relationship between traditional authorities and the State.

First, ***chiefs are formally recognised in Zambian law*** through two separate legislation:

- The Chiefs Act (1965) defines a chief as a person who is recognised by the President under the provisions of the Act as the Litunga of Western Province, a Paramount Chief, Senior Chief, Chief or Sub-Chief or a person who is appointed as Deputy Chief. The Chiefs Act also empowers the President with the ability to withdraw recognition of Chiefs. In practice, this does not mean someone stops being a chief (see [Masebo's clarification in 1995](#)), but it does mean that the said chief would not enjoy certain privileges. These include withdrawal of "subsidies" set out under the Chiefs Act, as well as other entitlements such as subsidised vehicle loans. For their part, chiefs have a responsibility to maintain public order

in their area of influence. It requires them *“to preserve the public peace in his area and to take reasonable measures to quell any riot, affray or similar disorder which may occur in that area”*.

- The Zambian Constitution, since 1965 has always contained a provision for chieftaincy. The current constitution, amended in 1996, specifically defines the institution of chief as *“a corporation sole with perpetual succession and with the capacity to sue and be sued and to hold assets or properties in trust for itself and the peoples concerned”*, it also makes references to the Chiefs Act (1965) in terms of defining who might be recognised as chief.

Secondly, ***the loss of administrative power following the abolition of NAs continues to be partially been offset at the local level by countervailing legislation.*** As the political imperatives changed towards “single party participatory democracy”, further political reforms were undertaken. At the local level, the Development of Villages and Registration Act (1971) was aimed at getting chiefs more involved in the economic development of areas through formal registration of villages and their inhabitants; the establishment of Village Productivity Committees, and; establishment of Ward Councils and Ward Development Committees. Chiefs also may, at any time, within their area attend a meeting of the Productivity Committee, the Ward Council or the Ward Development Committee and address the respective members on any subject conducive to the well-being of the villagers in the area. The Act is still in force, with some minor amendments in 1994.

These provisions are reinforced by the Local Government Act (1995), which provides for representation of chiefs at the council level. Under Act, the composition of the local council shall include, “two representatives of the Chiefs, appointed by all the Chiefs in the district”. However, chiefs are forbidden to hold Mayoral offices, perhaps to ensure that they remain non-partisan in their activities. More on this issue in a later blog on chiefs as agents of political change.

Taken together the Local Government Act (1995) and the Development and

Registration of Villages Act (1971) provides the main institutional framework on how chiefs are supposed to be integrated into development at the local level. Many including President Mwanawasa have noted the “impracticality” of the current framework, especially the Development and Registration of Villages Act which was clearly developed in accordance with the One Party State ethos.

Perhaps a fundamental point to emphasise is that previous legislation has missed a fairly basic point. The incentives for chiefs to get involved in development also appears weak. It's clearly one thing to give chiefs a *right* to get involved in local discussions and planning, it's quite another thing to ensure that their participation is meaningful and generate positive social returns. If the current government wants to involve chiefs in development, it clearly needs to focus on how it can shape its incentives much more strongly than previous governments have done, and as we shall see as we go through this series, that's no easy task, but that is where policy thinking needs to begin.

Thirdly, ***chiefs continue to retain significant de-facto power over land.*** Zambia inherited four categories of land in 1964: State Land (formerly Crown Land); Freehold Land; Reserves and Trust Land. But this changed after independence when chiefs were relieved of their *de jure* responsibilities for land allocation. The Land (Conversion of Titles) Act (1975), vested all land in Zambia in the hands of the President, to be held by him in perpetuity on behalf of the people of Zambia. Freehold land held by commercial farmers was converted into leaseholds for 100 years and unutilised tracts of land were taken over by the state. Freehold titles in residential areas were similarly treated. All sales of land *per se* (excepting the developments on the land such as buildings, farm infrastructure, etc.) were prohibited.

However, in spite of these legislative changes, chiefs' *de facto* position remained broadly unchanged as they were not replaced by effective structures. Indeed, in 1985, partly to gain favour with the chiefs and partly in recognition of their custodianship of customary law and rights, the government decided

that the chiefs ought to be formally consulted when customary land was being granted for leasehold purposes. These powers are confirmed by the Lands Act (1995), which continues to be the substantive land law in place. A significant concession considering customary land accounts for 94% of the land, giving chiefs a significant amount of influence. This power is often leveraged through the way chiefs allocate land.

Historically, chiefs did not allot the land directly to their subjects who used it. Rather, the land was allocated to sub-chiefs who in turn allotted shares to village headmen. The headman then allotted land to heads of subsections or heads of families and they distributed the land to their dependants. Each of the persons granted land in this way was, therefore, sort of secure in his rights and could not be expropriated without fault. He could transmit his rights to heirs, but could not transfer them to anyone else without the permission of his seniors. If rights are vacated they rest in the next senior in the hierarchy. In many parts of Zambia, this practice continues but increasingly, the lure of cash from “foreign investors”, have led chiefs to the more direct allotment. The lure of men in briefcases has clearly turned out to be too hard for the existing system to resist. Why let the headman take the bait when you can do it yourself?

Another by-product of the increasingly lucrative nature of the land has increased the attractiveness of chieftainship and the desire for some [chiefs to go beyond their existing boundaries](#). Significant succession disputes have developed, with anyone with a hint of royal connection seeking to be a chief. We’ll examine these issues in a later post on chiefs as agents of change. It suffices to say here that the current power struggles among chiefs reflect the *de-facto* power that the Land Act (1995) confers and the lack of clear territorial boundaries among chiefdoms.

The government of course would argue that it’s precisely for this reason why the Lands Act (1995) still vests all land in the President who is required to give consent to a person who wishes to sell, transfer or assign any land. These powers which are delegated to the Commissioner of Lands are meant to act as a natural brake on irrational behaviour from chiefs.

In addition, to deal with the problem of investors, the Land Act permits the President to alienate land to a non-Zambian who is a permanent resident and to those non-Zambians who are investors within the meaning of the Investment Act 1993. Through this mechanism, it is hoped that chiefs would be more shielded from “foreign investors” by making it easy for foreign investors to approach the government directly. The practice of course is different, and many foreign investors continue to go through chiefs to get land (interesting to contrast this with mineral exploration rights which are granted through the Ministry of Mines, with chiefs only knowing about it when a would be prospector knocks on the doors of the palace with a [prospecting licence for the whole area](#) - the incentives to the mining industry to get government permission first rather than the chiefs’ is clearly strong with mining issues!).

Successive Zambian governments have always struggled over the role of the chiefs in land administration and a great deal of ambiguity surrounds their current status. For their part chiefs (and many of their supporters) argue that far from leveraging *de-facto* power, chiefs are the victims. Many argue that chiefs are not well informed about the law and there are many widely reported incidents of land grabbing by government officials. To complicate matters, it appears if customary land is leased and for some reason is repossessed, it no longer falls under the jurisdiction of the chief. Thus it would seem that once the land is granted in leasehold, all customary rights to that land are extinguished and so is the authority of the chief over that land.

As it turns out, things might soon get worse for chiefs with [the new plans to repossess land to explore for oil](#). A proposed petroleum exploration and production bill presented to parliament this week for adoption says the government will as a first step grant exploration licences to investors in areas where analysis of soil samples suggest the presence of oil. The government will then proceed to grant the investors petroleum development and production licenses :

“The entire property (oil blocks)... and control over petroleum and accompanying substances, in whatever physical state, located in any land in Zambia is hereby vested exclusively in the president on behalf of the state. .where the president considers that any land is required to secure the development or utilization of the petroleum resources of Zambia, the president may compulsorily acquire such land.”

These powers appear more extensive than those granted under the Lands Act (1995), as they do not specifically require prior agreement from chiefs.

Finally, *chiefs retain some advisory role at the national level in the House of Chiefs*. The House of Chiefs has the remit as an advisory body to the Government on traditional, customary and any other matters referred to it by the President. In all appearances very similar to House of Lords in the UK, but in substance no more powerful a smaller part of a weak government ministry. The House of Chiefs consists of 27 members over a three-year-term rotating membership. It has no legislative function: it may consider bills but not block their passage. Perhaps not surprising considering that the house of chiefs sits within the Department of Local Government and Housing, something that has been questioned even by chiefs themselves. And just in case you wondering, as “perfect civil servants” according to a recent change in the constitution chiefs supposed to remain non-partisan. “A person shall not while remaining a Chief, join or participate in partisan politics”, says the 1996 amendment, primarily designed to bar influential chiefs who had political aspirations at the time.

So rather than an independent body to provide advice, the representatives in the House of Chiefs are more like civil servants directly under the control of a government Ministry. They are there to give legitimacy to the argument that “government consults traditional leaders”. It’s much worse than this of course because the House of Chiefs comes with significant spending from tax payers’ money. Chiefs get paid for sitting on the House of Chiefs in the same way that MPs do, which has led many people, including chiefs to question its

value for money. It's fair to say, that in its current role, the House of Chiefs is a gross waste of tax payers' money, whose only sole purpose appears to be a tool for any incumbent government to capture chiefs in the country for especially at election time and placating them for lost powers of pre-1964.

The general picture, therefore, is one in which the role of chiefs in independent Zambia has been an outcome of political expedience rather than design. The Zambian political system has not figured out where chiefs could be usefully employed. But this failure is not just of politicians but also of the Zambian intellectual community, which has so often to consider the appropriate relationship of chiefs and traditional development.

In light of the above discussion, what lessons can we learn from this as we take forward independent assessment of traditional authorities and development? Three things come mind:

- First, ***the political struggle has left inefficient systems in place that does enough to placate both sides but generate costs directly and indirect to society.*** At the national level, chiefs continue to occupy a poor value for money position in the House of Chiefs. At the local level, the Development and Registration of Villages Act continue to provide an ineffective mechanism for integrating chiefs in development. Understanding the constraints both mechanisms currently impose on national development is critical in the path towards successful reform.
- Secondly, ***the incentives for political systems to reform how chiefs are integrated in development appear weak.*** Whilst it is true that successive governments have struggled to reform, that struggle is partly a combination of the difficulty of reform and the lack of incentives. Chiefs currently do just fine in an inefficient position that remains wholly subservient to the government at the national level. Any type of reform, whether reducing their powers or increasing their influence would have to come from pressure from outside. Zambian intellectuals have a significant role to play in illustrating the trade-offs associated with that position, and civil society can do much to push for that change.
- Finally, ***land reform cannot be ignored.*** Until Zambia reaches a position

where its land policy has been whole figured out, we'll always struggle with balancing the competing needs in the nation. In an era of increasing foreign direct investment, it becomes critical to ensure that a framework is put in place that guarantees land security for many inhabitants of our villages while ensuring that people benefit from additional local investment. A new social contract on land between the people and government is necessary is long overdue.

In the next three posts, we'll turn our attention to explore three ways - political, social and economic - in which the chieftaincy has been positive or negative agents of change in Zambia and any lessons we can draw from that. To allow a more fertile discussion of the issues raised in each post, I am allowing at least some time between the parts. A full list of the topics which are being covered in this series can be found [here](#).

<unquote>

Registration and Development of Villagers Act 1971

As mentioned before, this Act was an instrument of one-party rule in 1972, remaining unchanged to this day; a draconian law unfit for modern democracy - in particular for customary commoners living according to customary tenure, and predating the two colonial regimes, 1) Britain (1889-1964), and 2) native-nationalist (1964-present) with its succession of big man leaders. The villagers of the chiefdoms remain the true indigenous people.

(3) A Chief shall in his area-

(a) ensure that every Headman duly performs the duties imposed upon him pursuant to subsection (2); and

(b) compile and maintain the master village register of all villages in his area mentioned in paragraph (a) (ii) of subsection (1).

(4) Every inhabitant of a village shall furnish the particulars mentioned in subsection (2) when required by his Headman and shall attend before him at such place and time as the Headman may appoint and notify to him either individually or collectively with other inhabitants of the village.

6. *(1) There shall be established a Village Productivity Committee (hereinafter referred to as the "Productivity Committee") for each village within the Republic consisting of-*

(1) A Chief having jurisdiction in the area in which a Productivity Committee is to be established shall summon the first meeting of the inhabitants of each village, or combination of villages as mentioned in subsection (1) of section six, within his jurisdiction for the purpose of electing members of the Productivity Committee. Such meeting shall be held as soon as practicable after the commencement of this Act, and the result of the election at such meeting shall be determined by a majority of votes of the inhabitants present and voting at the meeting.

17. *A Chief may, at any time, within his area attend a meeting of the Productivity Committee, the Ward Council or the Ward Development Committee and address the respective members thereof on any subject conducive to the well-being of the villagers in his area.*

18. *Under the provisions of this Act and in addition to the duties imposed upon him under subsection (3) of section three, the duties of a Chief in his area shall be-*

(a) to ensure that the Productivity Committees are established and are functioning effectively;

(b) to promote and foster the spirit of unity among his people;

(c) to promote the spirit of self-reliance among his people by rendering all possible assistance in the projects relating to higher productivity in agriculture and industry;

(d) to encourage such projects which may improve the standard of living of his people;

(e) to encourage educational and economic growth and to assist in the

improvement of all facilities necessary for the maintenance of health and sanitation in the villages;

(f) to report to the Productivity Committees and Ward Development Committees the decisions reached in the House of Chiefs affecting or concerning his people; and

*(g) to report to the District Governor mentioned in section thirteen
(c) (ii) on all activities of the Productivity Committees and Ward Development Committees.*

Section 19 of the Act (see below) lays out what he is duty-bound to do by this legislation, failing which he can be imprisoned for up to a month and fined, making it clear that a villager is a mere vassal in a feudal society, one on whom the state-appointed monarch imposes fealty, i.e. the chief, in return for his labour: registering his domicile, having to attend meetings and take instructions, maintaining roads, etc. Although the Chiefs Act does not mention Headmen, in this Act, they come to the fore:

19. Any inhabitant of a village who-

(a) when required, fails to furnish the particulars and other information mentioned in and in accordance with section three; or

(b) on ceasing to be an inhabitant of a village, fails to inform forthwith the Headman of that village that he has so ceased to be an inhabitant of that village in accordance with section four; or

(c) on becoming an inhabitant of another village, fails to inform forthwith the Headman of that village that he has become an inhabitant of that village in accordance with section four; or

(d) wilfully obstructs a Chief or Headman or any other person assisting him in his duties under this Act; or

*(e) in giving any information for the purposes of this Act, knowingly or recklessly makes any statement which is false in any material particular;
or*

(f) contravenes any of the provisions of this Act or any regulations

made thereunder or, without lawful cause, fails to comply with any lawful demand or requirement under this Act or such regulations;

shall be guilty of an offence and be liable to a fine not exceeding one hundred and fifty penalty units or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one month, or to both.

(As amended by Act No. 13 of 1994

FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES OF A PRODUCTIVITY COMMITTEE:

1. To elect one of its members other than the Chairman to represent the Productivity Committee on the Ward Council.

2. To plan the growth and development of a village and to promote the well-being of the villagers, and in particular-

(a) to build, improve and maintain school buildings or buildings of other educational establishments, and to participate in all educational programmes;

(b) to provide and improve water supplies in the village;

(c) to build and improve village health centres and other like institutions with a view to ensuring the highest standard of sanitary conditions for the villagers;

(d) to build roads to service the village and neighbouring villages;

(e) to establish depots for serving the village;

(f) to build an administrative centre in the village;

(g) to provide facilities for the welfare, recreation and social enjoyment of the villagers;

(h) to plan and to effectuate the establishment and growth of new villages.

3. To make decisions on such matters as are referred to it by the villagers.

4. To promote the spirit of unity among the villagers.

5. To encourage greater production in agriculture.

6. To organise the marketing of village produce and animal products.

LEGAL CONTROL OF CHIEFDOMS

- 7. To establish co-operatives for the purposes of marketing village produce and animal products.*
- 8. To promote and encourage family savings and investment.*
- 9. To promote the establishment of small-scale village industries and encourage inter-village commerce.*
- 10. To encourage advancement of education in a village.*
- 11. Generally, to do all such things as may be necessary or desirable for the establishment, promotion and development of facilities for the betterment and happiness of the villagers socially, culturally, economically and politically and to create awareness among the villagers towards those ends.*

FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES OF A WARD COUNCIL:

- 1. To elect the members of the Ward Development Committee.*
- 2. To discuss in general problems of the ward and make decisions to guide the Ward Development Committee in the administration of the ward.*
- 3. To review plans for the development of the ward and to approve programmes for its development.*
- 4. To assist the Ward Development Committee in assessing the requirements of the villagers in the ward and in organising ways and means whereby the Ward Development Committee can assist in improving the economic and social conditions of the villagers.*
- 5. Generally to help facilitate in every possible way the work of the Ward Development Committee.*

FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES OF A WARD DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE:

- 1. To provide an efficient and effective administrative machinery for the*

villagers in a ward.

2. To supervise the work of Productivity Committees.

3. To organise an efficient and effective utilisation of the ward's natural and human resources in order to increase the capacity of the villagers in the ward to raise their standards of living. The Ward Development Committee shall assess the total needs of the ward, working out priorities and harmonising them with overall Government priorities in order to achieve for the ward maximum advantage from the implementation of the projects under the management of the ward and those under Government control.

4. To create machinery through which the villagers can undertake increasing responsibilities to solve their individual, family, village and ward problems.

5. To assist the villagers in a ward to understand the role of individuals, families and villages in the Republic.

6. To support and facilitate regional planning through the rural council responsible for the area of a ward.

7. To provide efficient and modern techniques for raising productivity in the area of a ward and, in particular, the Ward Development Committee shall-

(a) determine the best crop for the area and ensure the highest level of productivity of that crop;

(b) give maximum attention to the rearing of animals best suited to the area to ensure maximum financial return;

(c) discourage the villagers from growing unproductive crops and from keeping animals purely for traditional prestige;

(d) ensure the highest standards of maintenance of paddocks and improvement in grazing;

(e) encourage the villagers to move from unproductive areas to areas with greater prospects for economic advancement and prosperity;

(f) make use of water where it is available for irrigation purposes so that the ward can grow more than one crop annually;

(g) participate in the construction and maintenance of water drainage

systems.

8. *To assist in the construction of road networks within the area of a ward.*

9. *To encourage the establishment of co-operative societies to engage in agricultural production, marketing, transportation and construction and also to establish consumer co-operatives.*

10. *To encourage individual and family savings and investment.*

11. *To encourage the growth of small-scale industries in the area of a ward.*

12. *To encourage inter-ward co-operation in schemes of communal interest.*

13. *To assist in the organisation and co-ordination of inter-village schemes for the construction and maintenance of school buildings in the area of a ward.*

14. *To ensure that there is proper cleanliness and sanitation in each village in the area of a ward.*

IFAD: Chiefs and Traditional Leaders

Case study: 2013-2016

Women for Change (WfC) is a Zambian NGO working with communities, especially women and children, in rural areas to contribute to sustainable human development using popular education methodologies. While WfC initially developed the approach, other organizations have since become involved in developing community-based organizations of the chiefdoms and in working with them on various projects. The Zambian National Men's Network is one such organization that is working with selected chiefs and church leaders.

Chiefs walkout on Kapata land policy.

By [Mukosha Funga](#),

- [1st March 2018](#)

Angry traditional leaders yesterday walked out on Lands Minister Jean Kapata to express displeasure on the land policy which they feel disregards their role as chiefs.

This was during a stakeholders meeting held at Intercontinental Hotel in Lusaka where government was hoping to validate the land policy.

But House of Chiefs Chairperson Chief Ngabwe, who spoke on behalf of about five chiefs from each province who were present, warned that there would be chaos in government went ahead to implement the policy in its current form.

He charged that there were some civil servants who were sabotaging government by trying to cause of a change regime.

“What we are seeing, after analyzing this document is I think there are civil servants who are working against government and for the purpose of what? Changing the government?” Chief Ngabwe asked.

He lamented that government had disregarded their efforts to infuse their ideas in the draft policy.

“The document that is before us was looked at [in] 2006 by the House of Chiefs because some of the members of the House of Chiefs were there in 2003. The document was submitted to government on what the 288 chiefs felt about coming up with a better document to administer land in this country. Those documents are still in the ministry and I don’t think they looked at it. They didn’t look at the submissions that the chiefs made. 2016, we were invited, we picked the chiefs who were new members but

then the gentleman who was presenting was given our views and in fact, to make it very clear, he was told that the chiefs do not accept the contents of the document, we rejected it and we were prepared to give our views as chiefs of this country. We invited the Ministry of Lands to the House of Chiefs for discussions, the first time they didn't come, the second time they came and we had a very good meeting, we gave them our sentiments, we sent the document, under the signature of the clerk of the house to the ministry and we advised that after they had incorporated our ideas, they should come back to us to discuss the draft document before calling us to this meeting but that has not been done. The following are the views of the chiefs, both from the House of Chiefs and all the 288 chiefs in this country. I will read it, the ministry has a copy of this document," he said.

"The chiefs objectives of the national land policy should be to protect the chieftaincy in Zambia, to uphold and preserve the customary land tenure in Zambia, we don't want to copy anything from another country...to empower chiefs with the authority to issue customary land titles to provide legal protection to land owners of customary land like those under lease of tenure, to compel government to legally recognize the practices that teach youths to allocate and alienate parts of land to their subjects or all Africans and practices that they use to manage conflict."

Chief Ngabwe wondered whether government was ready to manage chaos which would erupt by implementing the policy.

"The issue of segregation among men and women does not exist in chiefdoms. In chiefdoms, a husband and a wife can have their own piece of land and no one stop them but this has been exaggerated by NGOs and other people who don't even live in the chiefdoms, they have never visited their own homes, they only know it on their NRC, to compel government to adopt prerogative procedures, we are prepared to work with government ourselves and when we call other stakeholders so that we administer the land properly in this country. But however, in the policy, there is no inclusion of a chief anywhere. Who is going to be in charge of the communities? Who is going to be in charge of this title deed which you have referred to? You have not even defined the procedures you are

going to use. We want to preserve national peace. Any implementation of this particular document is going to bring chaos in this country, are you prepared to manage it? It is the chiefs that have kept peace in this country. This nation was born through the fight for land by the forefathers, people who have died. At the moment, all of us have children and grandchildren. If every piece of land in Zambia is given to particular individuals, where will they settle? You people in Lusaka, where are you going to find land if all the land in the chiefdoms is given away? We want equity, that is what the chiefs have been demanding,” said Chief Ngabwe before leading his colleagues out of the meeting without waiting for Kapata’s response.

Earlier, Chieftainess Nkomeshya Mukamambo II described the draft land policy as a government document which she did not want to be part and parcel of a process to validate it.

She asked government to take back their document and shelve it.

After the chiefs walked out, Kapata told remaining delegates from civil society organizations, government institutions among other stakeholders that her ministry had made efforts to consult chiefs.

“My ministry has made an effort in consulting the royal highnesses. We did appear before the House of Chiefs and we left the document with them so that they could put an input to it. To date, the ministry has never received those documents through the clerk of House of chiefs,” said Kapata.

Land Tenure and Rural Livelihoods in Zambia

Roy Alexander Chileshe

The present customary rights in land and natural resources enjoyed by

households in the village communities should be given more definite and permanent form and recognised by law to belong to the people. Greater specification and formal recognition of customary rights and responsibilities are needed to give village communities the capacity to control key resources on which they depend for their livelihoods. This means that the present land tenure policy in Zambia, which is focussed on replacement of customary tenure, must submit to a more adaptive government facilitated evolution of customary land tenure systems. The change should be gradual and supported by village communities (Bruce 1993; Migot-Adholla et al 1991; Platteau 2000a).

The thrust of this approach should be to promote the adaptability of current tenure systems and to rely on local procedures administered by local representative structures. This suggests strengthening of village community capacities for land administration and dispute settlement rather than focussing on promoting conversion of customary tenure to individual tenure. It is advisable to build on and modernise existing customary land holding structures to suit the rural socio-economic contexts in which the changes are to be effected. It is thus important to take into consideration trends established through empirical research as guides to what can be done in land tenure reform. For example this and other studies have established or corroborated that customary land use rights in crop and residential sites are individual and that private property rights in land have emerged with some land being used for cash cropping. Further that gathering and processing of natural resources from the village commons and de facto private lands remains a vital source of employment and income to the village communities. Thus customary land use is characterised by both individual and communal use.

Tenure reform should thus be flexible enough to cater for the tenure needs of people in various stages of commercialisation or money economy in rural Zambia. As Okoth-Ogendo points out the challenge for tenure

reform here is to recognise the variety of complex land use and holding systems that characterise the African customary lands and to design innovative tenure regimes to suit them (Okoth-Ogendo 2000: 132). Further, West has aptly observed that: The need for tenure conversion presents to African countries a unique opportunity for innovation, invention, and planning. This opportunity must be seized in order to avoid not only the undesirable social consequences of unfettered private enterprise, but also, alternatively, the disincentives and diseconomies that have been found to accompany certain forms of collectivism (West 1982: 11).

Land tenure reform should thus provide for a system of land holding in which people can construct livelihoods from various land uses, private, communal, agricultural and nonagricultural. As Cousins points out securing rights to residential sites, crop fields and common property resources on customary land need not take the form of titling but clear definition in law as in Mozambique or Tanzania (Cousins 2003a: 285).

Through an Act of parliament it would be possible to provide statutory rights on customary land without involving the current expensive and restrictive land survey and registration procedures. In this way individuals and households in village communities would forthwith get legal protection for their land and natural resource use rights. The system should respond to particular tenure needs of people living on customary land. This means securing people's rights to land and resources within a range of tenure systems and with gender equality as an important objective (Cousins 2003a). Thus, although the land may be vested in the village community individual holders of customary rights for residential and cropping purposes on application to the land administration committee maybe granted indefinite, exclusive or inheritable rights of land use under a certificate of customary land grant.

Similar to the situation in Botswana it should also be possible for

common law leases of relatively long period and subject to reversion to the community to be granted and registered. Rather than to enforce tenure change, the proposed common law leases should be used to secure tenure of customary land users with felt insecurity or those users who need title deeds for collateral As I conclude this section I must also add that it is important to bear in mind some feasible but narrower solutions to land tenure reform in customary lands of Zambia.

For example, the current land titling approach in customary lands of Zambia is voluntary and hence sporadic. It is associated with high costs and insecurity of tenure for the poor (section 7.4.4, Chapter 7). A more equitable and less expensive approach would be a compulsory (systematic) approach that allows for demarcation and registration of both family holdings and village commons. This confirms de facto rights in land, leaves the people holding the same parcels of land but with the benefit of increased security of tenure (Bruce 1993a). This approach is less expensive per unit and although the initial costs may be high they are in most cases paid for by the state. This approach may be most suitable in rural areas having strong population pressures and competition for land (Larsson 1991).

12.3 Customary land administration: The role of chiefs

By tradition chiefs have the responsibility of land stewardship and to ensure equitable access to land by all villagers for their livelihood through village headmen. According to the Lands Act of 1995, all land in Zambia is vested in the President (Republic of Zambia 1995). By implication, land governed under customary law is not vested in the chief or headman. However the Land Act of 1995 by the provision that chiefs should be formally consulted before conversion of customary tenure to statutory leasehold tenure confirms the chief's customary powers. In fact chiefs administer land tenure in customary land by permissive legal acknowledgement but without support from central government

...the present conversion of tenure process is not democratic. Section 8(2) of the Land Act of 1995, requires a chief's consent before conversion of customary tenure to leasehold tenure (Republic of Zambia 1995). Nevertheless, chiefs do not usually consult the village community on matters concerning land especially if they stand to benefit economically from such transactions. It is unwise to vest such great power on which livelihoods of village communities depend on one person. The conversion of tenure should be treated as a village community issue because of its impact on community interests in land and common property resources. The law on the other hand does not compel chiefs or headmen to consult the village communities whose land rights are at issue. Consequently there is no opportunity for the village communities or individuals at a local level to raise objections. Yet this is a serious process, which should require transparency and accountability. This weakness has allowed some influential elite in collusion with chiefs to convert customary tenure of large tracts of land, over which the village community has prior common property rights to individual tenure. In this way the present conversion of tenure process often undermines the common property resource rights of the village community and their economic viability. Villagers are now questioning the integrity of their traditional leaders in handling issues of land allocation, conversion of tenure and protection of common property rights (see 7.4.4, Chapter 7 and 9.4.4 Chapter 9). Regrettably the problem of chiefs abusing customary land rights by treating village land, as personal private property are reported to be widespread on customary lands of Zambia .

There are two lessons from here, first that the current system where the chief is the sole allocating authority is defective and secondly that security of land tenure and livelihoods for rural households are unlikely to be realised only through conversion of tenure and exercise of registered private property rights.

In the absence of a democratic and transparent land administration

system as the situation now stands in the customary lands of Zambia, land administration procedures are more prone to abuse thereby contributing to insecurity of customary rights of villagers. There is a clear need to improve the traditional institutions dealing with customary land in Zambia.

It is also important to take into consideration emerging policy recommendations for African customary lands, which advocate for legal recognition of customary land rights, clear definitions of people's land rights and natural resource use rights and the strengthening of local community institutions for land administration and management. Government support for community level institutions and procedures for mediation and negotiation, are also emphasised. For Zambia this will require legal and administrative innovations such as government taking a deliberate position to clearly and seriously recognise customary tenure and devolution of land rights management to village communities. This should strengthen local institutions to mediate interests of individuals and households in land and common property resources. T

Within the Southern African region Botswana is one example from which Zambia can learn on how to deal with strengthening or improving customary land administration. Before 1968, Botswana experienced similar customary land management problems like Zambia with about eighty 80 percent of its land under tribal land tenure systems and administration controlled by chiefs (Quan 2000a; Munshifwa 2002). To improve the administration of tribal land the government in 1968 enacted the Tribal Land Act. The Act provided for the establishment of representative Land Boards and transferred all land-related functions of chiefs to these boards including policy formulation, land allocation, grant of customary rights, grant of land rights under common law, adjudication and land use planning (Adams et al 1999; Munshifwa 2002). In this way customary tenure systems in Botswana have been integrated with a modern and democratic system of land administration.

The current land law recognises customary tenure and chiefs as custodians but does not legally recognise village communities as owners of customary land. It is thus suggested that the land be vested within the people who occupy and work the land rather than in the representative structure. In this way the people will have democratic authority over the institution that represents them and the institution in turn will be responsive to the people it represents (PLAAS/NLC 2003).

It is important to note however, that currently on customary lands of Zambia chiefs control land, and it is one of their main sources of power. For this reason chiefs should not be left out of the land administration committee without representation otherwise disruptive new power struggles would emerge. This means national land policy should lay down how chiefs and headmen will operate as land administrators including a legal requirement for them to work with democratically elected officials from the village community. It is suggested that the law should strengthen the local Village Productivity Committees (VPCs) by democratising them and giving them clear powers to administer land rights on behalf of the village communities. In this way a village community participatory adjudication procedure driven by the VPCs can then ensure that conversion of tenure and land allocations to outsiders are not a direct threat to livelihoods of the local people. This is only possible when central government is willing to play the key role of supporting local land administration institutions (Cousins 2003a; Wily 2004). In the next section I discuss policy implications of the study findings with regard to land and natural resource rights at village and household levels. This is done with a focus on social differences along the axes of gender.

In Matrilineal chiefdoms chiefs or headmen who are usually the senior most matrilineal males on behalf of the village matrilineal core take village community level decisions about land. As a consequence, men and women outside the village core matrilineal descent group do not have access to land in the village on equal terms. They are regarded as guests

of the village community and can only hold land at the pleasure of the chief or headman or through a wife or husband. At household level land is by tradition acquired and cleared by men for their wives, mothers, daughters and nieces. Thus generally land rights of women are acquired through husbands or male relatives.

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The issue of women's inferior land rights has become particularly important in the context of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Zambia. Better enforcement of women's rights to land and its inheritance could avoid burdening widows with conflicts over land that are likely to negatively affect their household livelihood. Women in most sub-Saharan African countries in particular also face these problems. Married women's access to land is subservient to their husbands and consequently life cycle changes such as widowhood, divorce, marriage residence create land access uncertainties for women and make them most vulnerable to dispossession (PLAAS/NLC 2003; Wanyeki 2003; Whitehead and Tsikata 2003; Tsikata 2003).

Rural women in Zambia are also disadvantaged by statutory land tenure. For instance the trend towards individualisation of tenure through conversion of customary tenure to statutory tenure reinforces the traditional male dominated control over land through registration of land rights in men's names. It erodes customary obligations and common property in crop fields and building sites for married couples. When rights are registered in a man's name, as is often the case, the joint customary land rights of a wife, which she enjoyed prior to conversion of tenure, are lost. At village level customary common property rights of women, including the right to collect wild edible vegetables, wild mushrooms, fuel-wood, thatch grass and other forest products are also neglected in favour of the individual statutory rights of the elite who are usually men (Chapters 7 and 9). Lastarria-Cornhiel maintains that under statutory land tenure it is common for rural African women to lose access or cropping rights while male household heads strengthen their hold over land (Lastarria-Cornhiel 1997: 1326).

For the customary lands of Zambia the current land policy challenge in respect of gender is to establish government supported local land administration committees at village community level, and to provide training for members on importance of gender equity. In addition there is a need for affirmative action in favour of women, by making them members of the village land administration committee to ensure that they contribute on land issues and settlement of disputes.

In particular the exclusion of women from land inheritance reinforces existing customary gender inequality in favour of men and requires to be tackled (Agarwal 1994a; Ellis 2000).

In conclusion, policy on customary land rights must be informed by a strong government commitment to securing land rights and livelihoods of individuals and households, gender equity, and a devolution and democratisation of land administration. However in order to ensure

that potential benefits of devolution of land administration are achieved, it is important to pay attention to provision of information, training and government support to land administrators at village level. The successful development of a pro-livelihood land tenure policy aimed at establishing local and equitable systems of land rights administration for customary lands will require the full support and participation of central government, traditional leaders and village communities.

Thus, in order to attain more sustainable livelihoods a land policy which takes into account not only the land tenure security needs of cash crop farmers but also the land and natural resource rights of ordinary rural households in particular the poor whose livelihoods are most vulnerable is needed. In sum land policy should be informed by the whole socio-economic context of rural people's livelihoods.

These circumstances require that land tenure reform in rural Zambia must aim to secure land rights and common property resource rights of individuals and households to ensure sustainable livelihoods through guaranteed access and control.

It is important for the state to take a central role in ensuring that the land tenure adaptation strategy works by providing sufficient resources and a legal and land administration environment for the evolutionary change in customary tenure (Bruce et al 1994; Cousins 2003a). Government must be committed to secure land rights of rural households and village communities, gender equity and devolution and democratisation of land administration through strengthening of local structures and institutions in land administration. Further, government must also be committed to provide sustainable economic opportunities and good governance to households and village communities. It is a fact that land tenure reform is an onerous and time-consuming process, which calls for public participation. The current Zambian Government land advocacy programme in which the Zambia Land Alliance is taking part is an

opportunity to engage chiefs, headmen and village communities and other stakeholders on priority land policy issues.

A Handbook for Chiefs (1937)

F.B. Macrae (District Commissioner Lundazi, Northern Rhodesia))

LEGAL CONTROL OF CHIEFDOMS





LEGAL CONTROL OF CHIEFDOMS

2.

A second class court that is all the chiefs
Chiefs.

CRIMINAL

1 month imprisonment at the House

2 fine.

3 lessons at the House.

Not more than two of these at the same time
not all three.

CIVIL

A civil case about a matter that is with
GDS or less.

When there is a case in court the Clerk
writes it down. He does not talk at all.

The Kapang stands and also does not talk.
He is there to do as the chief tells him.

Neither of them can judge the case or ask
questions. The Kapang can ask a name in court
against people who break the rules that it is
his work to see about. Then the Kapang can
ask questions and speak.

(7)

CIVIL CASES.

A Civil case is a case between two people
only. A Debt is a Civil case. A case
about marriage is a civil case.

These are the fees for civil cases

1 For a <u>Surrender</u>	6d.
2 For the case	Not less than 1/-
	Not more than 5/-

These fees are not punishments. They are
paid to the court for the hearing of the
case.

If people have got money, make them pay
the fees before the case. If the man loses
his case he loses his fee money. If he
wins then the loser pays him. When a man
has won a case the loser must pay him
as the court says, unless the loser wants
to appeal. If the loser does not pay then
the winner can go to court about it again.
If the loser has the money and just refuses
to pay then he can go to prison till he
does pay.

CRIMINAL CASES.

There are other cases that are so serious
that though only two men are in the case yet
all are concerned about it. These are
Criminal cases. Assault, Murder, Theft are
all Criminal Cases because it is everybody's
business to stop these Cases if they
can. These matters the chief enquires
about as soon as he hears of them. He does
not wait for the people to come to the
court.



Distict Commissioner Lundazi (1937). Lundazi DNB Vol iv P.50-54.

State Control of Land

Africa's land tenure insecurity

[Six infographics on land and property rights in Sub-Saharan Africa](#)

National Parks and Wildlife Policy (2018)

[August 2018](#).¹⁸

The Nature Conservancy (TNC), World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and United Nations Development Programmes (UNDP) provided the funds and technical assistance for this policy.

¹⁸ <https://www.wpazambia.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/National-Parks-and-Wildlife-Policy-7-2018.pdf>

Salient Points:

A. It defines a GMA as:

A protected area comprising mostly customarily – owned land that is used primarily for the sustainable utilization of wildlife, through hunting and/or non-consumptive tourism concessions, for the benefit of local communities and the wildlife resource, but which can also be used for other land uses, such as settlement, agriculture, forestry, mining etc.

Comment: Game Management Area (GMA) - 22% of the country and occurring in some 38+ chiefdoms out of the 288 - is **TOTALLY** customary area where the state has assumed the rights for the utilization of game for hunting for only the partial financial benefit of the chief and his people; but where the commoners have no rights to big game, suffering a military invasion which arrests them for having some game meat in their possession, and imprisons them for up to 7 years for doing so in conditions which defy description. The state may also grab any customary land, be it GMA or Open Area, when it so wishes for settlement, agriculture, forestry, mining, dam construction, etc. The financial benefits overwhelmingly in favour of the government and neo-colonial land invaders. And the state pays no compensation to villagers for the loss of life, crops and habitation from wildlife.

B. It defines Open Area as:

An area other than a national park, game management area or sanctuary where wild animals are found.

Comment: This is incorrect. An Open Area is that part of a customary area not classified as a GMA. Most of the chiefdoms are Open Area.

C. This policy intends the following:

1. To transform wildlife into an economic asset that will contribute to national economic development through promotion of nature based tourism, creation of employment and increased local community participation in wildlife management.

Comment: It does not address wildlife user rights and ownership on behalf of chiefdoms. The chiefdoms support the big game, yet they are not allowed to own it. The impact of this on the social well-being of tribal peoples is massively damaging.

2. To ensure effective conservation through a rationalised and consolidated system of protected areas in the changing national, regional and global context. Such a system will serve as the focal point for conservation programmes, and the continued successful management of the protected areas will act as a barometer of the country's commitment to the conservation of biodiversity.

Comment: Essentially, the only difference between Liuwa National Park and the GMAs is that in the latter, the safari-hunting of a quota of game animals is allowed - for all of them have customary landowners living there.

3. To strengthen the government's commitment to develop a wildlife sector characterized by increased participation by all stakeholders; greater institutional responsiveness to policy measures and increased partnerships between state and non-state actors in the sector and society at large.

Comment: This extends the ownership of game species by the state, its rent-seeking, and its interference in the fishery, which has been totally owned and managed by customary people in the past.

4. To ensure that the wildlife sector in Zambia internalises and reflects aspects of the changed context of national development agenda, inter alia Vision 2030 and government's growing emphasis on a smart and green economy, the Global Sustainable Development Goals, government's policy on decentralisation.

*Comment: This does not reflect the conclusion of Vision 2030 of the government to create a new Zambia defined as a "prosperous **middle-income** nation that provides opportunities for improving the well-being of all, embodying values of socio-economic justice."*

5. Provide clear policy guidance on adoption and implementation of new innovations and responses to sector challenges and leverage on emerging opportunities in the sector.

Comment: This is 'consultant-speak'.

6. To foster cross-sectoral collaboration by harmonizing the wildlife policy to other sector policies; redefine the roles of Government and other stakeholders in the management of wildlife in the country.

Comment: Why are the chiefdoms - which take up half of the country - not mentioned?

D. Policy Related Matters

a) Inadequate funding from central treasury for wildlife conservation;

b) Inadequate incentives for conservation of wildlife on customary lands vis-à-vis lack of security of tenure, and inability to adequately access and benefit from wildlife resources;

c) Weak sectoral linkages and coordination with other sector policies that

have both direct and indirect bearing on the wildlife and Tourism Sector;

Comment: Here lies the nub of the matter. There is no mention that 40-50 chiefdoms have had large parts of their area declared GMA so that government can extract rents from it. And no mention is made of the inalienable rights of customary people for the use of its natural resources and the land's protection from industrial agriculture and mining, etc. landgrabs.

E. Threats

Direct - these include widespread poaching, rampant wildfires, deforestation fuelled by subsistence and commercial agriculture; charcoal production, unplanned human settlements and, an ever expanding mining footprint.

Indirect Threats – inadequate financing of the Protected areas due to continued and constrained economic returns from the national parks and GMAs on account of deteriorating infrastructure; inadequate development and marketing of tourism products resulting in lowered private sector investment and tourist attraction profile for tourism in national parks; and under-pricing of wildlife products arising from issues related to market failure.

Comments: there is no admission here of the failure of conservation, and the absolute necessity for handing over the wildlife custodial powers to the chiefdoms, for their benefit - apart from tax. Among the Guiding Principles of the policy, the following point is made:

f) Decentralization - Devolve wildlife management rights; costs and benefits, wherever this is appropriate and tenable, to land owners and communities where wildlife exists.

Comment: The vague language apart, they mean the Game Management

and Open Areas of the chiefdoms. However, they have not mentioned that national parks and forests were all alienated from trust land - held by the customary villagers - in particular parks such as Nsefu and Luambe, and from which the former owners receive no income or compensation for their loss.

j) Indigenous Knowledge - traditional knowledge, rights and practices shall be recognised and incorporated in the management plans.

Comment: Traditional rights shall be recognized? Whether this policy will be followed or not, the chiefdoms must make full use of the following:

1) Forests (Community Forest Management) Regulations, 2018. [Under these regulations](#), groups may apply to manage and benefit from forests lying within customary area (GMA and Open Area) and Local forests, but can also be considered in national forests; and

2) **[The Protection of Traditional Knowledge, Genetic Resources and Expressions of Folklore Act No. 16 of 2016 is essential](#)**. Under section 27: Subject to this Act, a traditional community has the following rights over its genetic resources:

- 1) the exclusive right to regulate access to its genetic resources;*
- 2) an inalienable right to use its genetic resources;*
- 3) the exclusive right to share the benefits arising from the utilization of its genetic resources;*
- 4) and the right to assign and conclude access agreements.*

Lands Acquisition Act, 1970.

3. Subject to the provisions of this Act, the President may, whenever he is of the opinion that it is desirable or expedient in the interests of the Republic so to do, compulsorily acquire any property of any description.

Lands Act, 1995.

An Act to provide for the continuation of Leaseholds and leasehold tenure; to provide for the continued vesting of land in the President and alienation of land by the President; to provide for the statutory recognition and continuation of customary tenure; to provide for the conversion of customary tenure into leasehold tenure; to establish a Land Development Fund and a Lands Tribunal; to repeal the Land (Conversion of Titles) Act; to repeal the Zambia (State Lands and Reserves) Orders, 1928 to 1964, the Zambia (Trust Land) Orders, 1947 to 1964, the Zambia (Gwembe District) Orders, 1959 to 1964, and the Western Province (Land and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1970; and to provide for matters connected with or incidental to the foregoing.

All land is vested in the President.

(3), the President shall not alienate any land situated in a district or an area where land is held under customary tenure- (a) without taking into consideration the local customary law on land tenure which is not in conflict with this Act; The Laws of Zambia Copyright Ministry of Legal Affairs, Government of the Republic of Zambia (b) without consulting the Chief and the local authority in the area in which the land to be alienated is situated, and in the case of a game management area, and the Director of National Parks and Wildlife Service, who shall identify the piece of land to be alienated; (c) without consulting any other person or body whose interest might be affected by the grant; and (d) if an applicant for a leasehold title has not obtained the prior approval of the chief and the local authority within whose area the la

(7) In alienating land the President shall take such measures as shall be necessary to- (a) control settlements, methods of cultivation and utilisation of land as may be necessary for the preservation of the natural resources on that land; and (b) set aside land for forest reserves and game management areas and national parks and for the development and

control of such reserves, game management areas and national parks.

The Lands (customary tenure) (conversion) regulations: S.I. 89 of 1996

(1) A person using and occupying land in a customary area with the intention of settling there for a period of not less than five years; may apply, to the Chief of the area where the land is situated in Form I as set out in the Schedule, for the conversion of such holding into a leasehold tenure.

(2) The Chief shall consider the application and shall give or refuse consent.

The Draft National Land Policy

On 13 June 2018, parliament debated the Draft Land Policy in Parliament:

Minister Ms Kapata: ... to February, 2018, on the Draft National Land Policy. This was for purposes of ensuring wide stakeholder participation in the policy development process. On Wednesday 28th February, 2018, a national validation meeting was convened to validate the draft policy. The Draft National Land Policy was rejected by twenty-two chiefs who attended the national validation meeting. The main reasons advanced by the chiefs for rejecting the document were that:

1. the draft document did not adequately provide for the roles of the chiefs in land administration and management;
2. the document suggested that the powers of the chiefs were being taken away; and

3. The twenty-two chiefs' invitation to the validation meeting was not adequate, considering that there are 288 chiefs in *total*.

Ms Kapata: Mr Speaker, well, I am not aware that the Draft National Land Policy is about power. All I can say is that one of the issues that the chiefs referred to was on the vestment of land in the Republican President, which they think should be struck out. As it stands, I do not think we would be moving in the right direction if we did that. Therefore, we will wait to hear what the conclusion of the indaba will be. Then, we will come back to inform the House on the way to go.

Mr Mbulakulima (Milenge): Mr Speaker, definitely, the chiefs are against the establishment of the Land Commission because it will take away powers from them. It is also common knowledge that there are some chiefs who sell land indiscriminately. I would like to find out whether the chiefs are trying to put in place some safeguards or some measures which will be sort of self-regulatory to help this country because we know that there are some chiefs who have no regard for their people and indiscriminately sell land. Are they critically looking at that to help this country?

Kapata: In the new Draft National Land Policy, there will be no chiefs who will be allowed to give away land without considering the 50 percent consent from the manduna or the sub-chiefs in the chieftdom. This is where the bone of contention lies. The chiefs do not want the Government to include the sub-chiefs in the issuance of land. It is unfortunate that we were unable to bring the document now, but I would like to assure hon. Members that my ministry will lay the paper on the Table so that they can go through it to understand what is contained therein.

Local Government Act of 2019

An Act to provide for an integrated local government system; give effect to the decentralisation of functions, responsibilities and services at all levels of local government; ensure democratic participation in, and control of, decision making by the people at the local level; revise the functions of local authorities; provide for the review of tariffs, charges and fees within the area of a local authority; provide for the proceedings of the council and committees; provide for the role of traditional leadership in democratic governance; repeal and replace the Local Government Act, 1991; and provide for matters connected with, or incidental to, the foregoing [11th April, 2019 ENACTED by the Parliament of Zambia

PART V : WARD DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEES

36. (1) There is established in each ward a Ward Development Committee in the area of a local authority consisting of the following part time members appointed by the Town Clerk or Council Secretary: (a) an elected zonal representative from each zone; (b) an extension officer from the department responsible for agriculture, fisheries and livestock or economic sectors appointed based on the economic activity pre dominant in the ward as determined by the local authority; (c) an extension officer from the department responsible for education; (d) an extension officer from the department responsible for health; (e) an extension officer from the department responsible for community development; (f) a representative from a local non governmental organisation in a ward; (g) a representative of the Zambia Agency for Persons with Disabilities; (h) a representative from a marginalised group; (i) **a representative of the Chief in the ward**; (j) Ward Councillor; (k) a trustee from the local authority; (l) a youth, sports and recreation focal point person; and (m) a gender focal point person.

The Public Trust Doctrine

Patricia Kameri-Mbote. 'The use of the Public Trust Doctrine in Environmental Law', 3/2 Law, Environment and Development Journal (2007), p. 195, available at <http://www.lead-journal.org/content/07195.pdf>

Whatever approach is taken, the fundamental emphasis is on communal rather than private rights. In cases where communal rights protector negates the rights of some, it implies a denial of the application of the PTD as argued by Piemmar and van der Schyff in this issue.

3

APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE OVER NATURAL RESOURCES

Natural resources have traditionally been found either under the sovereignty of a particular state or in the so-called global commons. Where the resources are held by a state, the essence of the PTD is that the state or governmental authority, as trustee, has a fiduciary duty of stewardship of the public's 'environmental capital'. These resources must be held in trust by the state for the benefit and use of the general public. This public includes current and future generations.¹³ The State must not alienate trust property unless the public benefit that would accrue outweighs the loss of the public use or 'social wealth' derived from it.

be held available for use by the general public;

- the property must not be sold, even for fair cash equivalents; and
- the property must be maintained for particular kind of uses, such as navigation, recreation, or fishery.¹⁵

The most fundamental duty that a trustee has is the duty of loyalty and an obligation to act solely in the interest of the beneficiaries. The trustee also has a duty to use care and skill to preserve the trust property (including the duty to protect against 'invasion of the trust'). In addition, the trustee has a duty to furnish information to the beneficiaries, a duty to make the trust productive, and a duty to deal impartially with beneficiaries. In meeting its duties, the trustee must act prudently, diligently, and in good faith.¹⁶

The public trust doctrine has been used to prevent governments from conveying public resources to private enterprises (prohibition on conveyance) as well as to guarantee the public access to natural resources after the resources have been conveyed to private interests for purposes such as fishing and navigation (prohibition with impairment). In many African countries, the imperatives of prohibition on conveyance are assured through vesting critical

So neither can the King intrude upon the common property, thus understood, and appropriate it to himself or the fiscal purposes of the nation; the enjoyment of it is a natural right which cannot be infringed or taken away, unless by arbitrary power, and that, in theory at least, could not exist in a free government.¹⁴

The trust imposes three kinds of restrictions on the state:

- the property subject to the trust must not only be used for a public purpose, it must

natural resources such as water in the state implying a trust on behalf of the citizenry to ensure sustainable management of the resources.¹⁷ One implication of the trust is securing the right of the citizenry to access these resources.

The PTD's prohibition on conveyance can be used to defeat private ownership of natural resources. In the case of *Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois*,¹⁸ the state legislature had transferred ownership of the

¹³ Edith Brown Weiss, in *Fairness to Future Generations: International Law, Common Patrimony and Intergenerational Equity* 219 (Tokyo: UN University, 1989).

¹⁴ *Arnold v. Mundy*, Supreme Court of Judicature of New Jersey, 6 N.J.L. 1, 30 Am.Dec. 356 (1821).

¹⁵ Note 9 above.

¹⁶ James T. Paul, 'The Public Trust Doctrine: Who Has the Burden of Proof?', 8 (July 1996), available at: <http://www.machil.org/library/getfile.cfm?PID=190>.

¹⁷ See e.g. Section 3 of the Kenya Water Act, 2002, available at: <http://www.wilco.org/kenia/c0206.pdf>.

¹⁸ *Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. State of Illinois*, Supreme Court of the United States, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).

Conclusion

There is a need to consider ways of ensuring a systematic 'reaching back' of PTD to correct anomalies in governmental decisions of allocating natural resources, made over time and to recover the public estate. This has to be considered in the context where state holding of public resources as a trustee has been without clear definition of the trustee role. Additionally, the emergence of strong patrimonial and sometimes unaccountable states has resulted in wanton and illegal conversion of public land and resources to private ownership allocation in total disregard of the public interest. There are an increasing number of cases where different communities seek the return of their property that has now become privatised. This calls for pro-active measures on the part of the state to avert possible instability in the institution of property as guaranteed in the Constitution. With regard to South Africa, the application of the PTD needs to be considered in cases where it is acknowledged that allocation mistakes have been made and need to be corrected. There is recognition of the need for restitution in the realm of land in South Africa. Insulation of water rights from restitution dilutes the quantum of property rights of holders of restituted land. This cannot

be the intention of the land reform programme architects in South Africa. In my view, restitution of public water rights allocated during apartheid is necessary for the realisation of the right to water enshrined in South Africa's Constitution.

Very Little Legal Transparency in Customary Administration

Emmanuel Mutale 2019

Like most African countries Zambia has a dual land tenure system. Customary tenure deriving from indigenous customary laws and practices and statutory tenure deriving from the country's British colonial legacy. The following are the legal instruments which have explicit or implicit references to customary land or its administration.

- *Constitution*
- *Lands Act*
- *Chiefs Act*
- *Registration and Development of Villages Act*
- *Urban and Regional Planning Act*
- *Local Courts Act*
- *Subordinate Courts Act*
- *High Court Act*

There is currently no law or written regulations specific to customary land administration. The limited guidance available relates to the conversion of customary land to state land. However, to the extent that customary land tenure and its administration are provided for or implied in other public legal instruments, it could be argued that there is a very limited level of legal transparency with regard to this form of land

administration.

In practice, access to customary land in Zambia is facilitated by chiefs through village headpersons and Indunas (chiefs' advisors) and follows a more simple process compared to the complex and bureaucratic procedures governing access to state land. However, these customary processes vary from chieftdom to chieftdom and are not codified and could be argued, are less transparent as there is no explicit guidance on the roles and responsibilities of traditional leaders in managing customary land.

Although chiefs hold and administer land on behalf of their subjects, the decision making process is not very transparent especially when land is subject to conversion from customary to state land. There are reported instances when chiefs have been accused of allocating huge tracts of land to investors without consulting the local communities.

Game Management Areas

Communities are profoundly impacted by the effects of national policy decisions and development projects. Often, decisions related to these policies and projects are made without meaningful input from those that will bear the most direct impacts, i.e. indigenous peoples and local communities. This lack of involvement in the planning and implementation of projects can lead to a number of problems, including serious human rights violations.

Natural Justice.org on Community Protocols

Game Management Areas is a preserve of the Zambia Wildlife Authority.

WB Land Governance Assessment 2016

We find that households in GMAs enjoy higher levels of income overall, particularly through wage earnings and self-employment, but the gains accrue mostly to wealthier households. Furthermore, households located in prime GMAs (with higher levels of biological diversity) accrue greater benefits, but are also more likely to suffer damage from crop losses related to wildlife. The findings suggest that tourism and wildlife conservation are positively associated with household welfare, but have implications

GAME MANAGEMENT AREAS

for natural resource management policies and the objectives of pro-poor tourism development, which may be sustainable only if the benefits are distributed more equitably and if human–wildlife conflicts are minimized or compensated.


Robert B. Richardson et al - Wildlife Conservation in Zambia: [Impacts on Rural Household Welfare](#)

* * *




36 GMAs in pink

There are 36 GMAs with 76 CRBs (community resource boards) - presumably representing about 50 chiefdoms out of a total of 288. Therefore 74% of the chiefdoms are not divided into GMA and Open Area and have no CRB/government control over big game resources, and therefore no income.



GMA's (dark), NP's striped (Lindsey et al.)

GAME MANAGEMENT AREAS



LandMarkmap: Customary Commons (blue). Protected & Private land, & water (white)




Figure 4: National Parks, Game Management Areas and Forest Reserves in Zambia (Source: GIRZ Forestry Department, 2014)

The game management area part of customary area amounts to 22% of Zambia, whereas customary area is 52% of Zambia - about half of customary area.

Originally, game management areas were brought in by the old Game Department under the Wildlife Act of 1968 to assist chiefdoms in managing wildlife. They have since become semi-nationalized and often privatized parts of customary area to extract tourism rentals.

The Wildlife Act No 65 of 1968 transferred all powers over the Game Department to the minister, ensuring the departure of senior expatriate wildlife officers. Penalties for poaching were increased as the hunting-safari industry expanded as part of the patronage system and merchants' drive to obtain foreign exchange. The government passed a further eight statutory instruments outlining new regulations governing hunting licences, trophies, protected animals and legal methods of hunting. One of the prescriptions was that the first and second class hunting areas- the latter controlled by the chiefdoms - within the chiefdoms were converted to 32 game management areas (GMAs), created by statutory instrument in 1971 under the National Parks and Wildlife Act of 1968.

The National Parks and Wildlife Act of 1968, which had introduced GMAs,

was replaced by the wildlife [Act No 10 of 1991](#):

54. (1) The President may, by statutory order, declare any area of land within the Republic to be a game management area for the purposes of this Act, and may, in like manner, define or alter or extend the limits of any such area or order any such area to cease to be a game management area:

Here was introduced the ominous and inappropriate official: The Wildlife Police Officer.

This was nothing; it seemed a planning framework for integrated conservation and development endeavour in customary areas. In reality, it was a massive landgrab of customary land and resource rights, not any different to the Liuwa National Park, where people have always lived.

The fact that GMAs were created instantly at the whim of a minister by the simple issue of a statutory instrument (SI), and without consultation with parliament – let alone the customary residents and their chiefs, was a soundless coup of a third of Zambia's customary area (22% of the country as a whole). This is born out by the continuing land and resource grab of the state's chiefdoms ever since. So much so that many civil servants and members of parliament believe GMAs to be state land. Statutory Instruments (SI's) allow for a stealthy bludgeoning of democracy, as is the UK's case, they who bequeathed the iniquitous legal device to Zambia. As George [Monbiot](#) [wrote](#) of the use of SI's in the UK:

Statutory instruments cannot be amended. Thanks to a combination of the government's control over the parliamentary timetable and some arcane and archaic procedures, hardly any have been blocked in the 70 years of their existence. Already their power is freely abused. They are supposed to be reserved for technical matters: straightening out laws in ways that don't alter our relationship to the state. Increasingly, they are used to sneak more significant changes through Parliament.

And in the case of Zambia, as I wrote some time ago:

In general, Zambia has had an adequate legislative framework. However, it is in the area of the compilation and drafting of statutory instruments where there is considerable concern, regulations being drafted, checked by the Ministry of Justice and then peremptorily signed into law by Ministers without sight - or the participation of civil society, thus creating the tyranny of the law. This process is not helped by the fact that the Department of Justice does not even have in stock the full list of SI's, nor are they available at the Government Printer; and many bills remain unpublished. The law, therefore, remains a distant and intangible artifact to the common man, to the poor who are always with us. English Common Law and its equivalent, customary law, remains the law of daily use. Zambian statutory law remains therefore distant from those it is meant to serve, though its calamitous hand falls everywhere.

Report on GMAs

A paper entitled 'Zambian Game Management Areas' [was published in 2013](#) by P. Lindsey et al. They singled out the main reason for the failure of GMAs:

Community-related issues are primarily related to the fact that local people do not receive adequate benefit flows from wildlife in GMAs, because community ownership of land and wildlife resources is not recognized in GMAs and because 'community membership' is not defined, with the effect that outsiders are free to move in and exploit natural resources and further diminish minimal per-capita wildlife-based benefits. The modest per capita benefits generated from trophy hunting are frequently misused and tend to favour local elites due to problems with the structure, functioning and accountability of Community Resource Boards (CRBs). Consequently GMAs are effectively open access regimes and there is an incentive for communities to occupy land and kill wildlife to obtain meat or harvest trees before someone else does, resulting in rapid and widespread immigration, encroachment, habitat destruction and bush meat poaching.

Also, they expounded on 1) the increasing invasion of customary areas as

Zambia's population rockets - now 18.5 million; 2) ZAWA - the parastatal, and its proxy the Community Resource Boards, were a total disaster; 3) the hunting-safari industry abjectly managed and largely unprofitable; 4) the numbers and diversity of wildlife had massively declined; 5) customary villagers received little financial benefit but suffered massive costs due to wildlife predation on themselves and their crops; 6) photo tourism was not encouraged in GMAs, and where they did exist, contributed little to villagers.




Figure 4. The biomass of wild ungulates larger than a bushbuck (and excluding predators or hippos) in GMAs, national parks and extensive game ranches in Zambia

The diversity of wild ungulates (excluding small species and hippos) is also lower in GMAs (5.5 ± 0.71 species) than in national parks (7.6 ± 1.2 species) or extensive game ranches (11.1 ± 0.86 species). (F Ratio 8.0, d.f=2, $p<0.01$) (Figure 5).

Recommendations

- 1 Allocate exclusive blocks of land and its wildlife to communities
- 2 Develop robust and fair Public-Private Partnerships, and implement anti-poaching measures
- 3 Revise the legal framework to cater to the above
- 4 As ZAWA was scrapped and replaced by the Department of National Parks & Wildlife (DNPW) government has to take greater responsibility

for its funding.

5 Develop Community Wildlife Conservancies (CWCs)

Community Resource Boards (Wildlife Act 2015)

In Part V of the 2015 Wildlife Act, CRBs are defined:

	<p style="text-align: center;">PART V</p> <p style="text-align: center;">COMMUNITY RESOURCES BOARDS</p>
<p>Community resources boards</p>	<p>32. (1) A local community along geographic boundaries contiguous to a chiefdom in a Game Management Area, an open area or a particular chiefdom with common interest in the wildlife and natural resources in that area, may apply to the Minister for registration as a community resources board.</p> <p>(2) The Minister shall register as a board, a local community which, in addition to the pre-requisites described in subsection (1), meets the requirements of subsection (3) and shall, in consultation with that board, develop management plans for the Game Management Area, open area or any part of the Game Management Area or open area which is under its jurisdiction.</p> <p>(3) A board registered under subsection (2) shall serve for a fixed term of three years and shall comprise—</p>

etc., etc.

Summary:

32.

GAME MANAGEMENT AREAS

1. A chieftom may apply to the Minister to register a CRB.
 2. The CRB will develop management plans for the GMA and Open Area under its jurisdiction.
 3. It will serve three years and comprise 7 to 10 elected reps - including one District Council rep, a chief's rep, and a person seconded by the Minister.
 4. A CRB can invite someone to attend a meeting but not vote.
 5. The chief of the area is the patron of the board.
 6. The Minister may, in consultation with the Director of the Department of National Parks and Wildlife (DNPW) and the particular board, determine the allowances and honorarium that shall be payable to a Chief.
 7. In consultation with the Minister and the majority of the members of the local community represented by a board, the Director can dissolve and de-register that board.
 8. A board will decide on its own procedure and will keep minutes.
- 33.
1. A board may convene a meeting at any time.
 2. The CRB's functions are to promote and develop an integrated approach to managing human and natural resources in the customary area.
 3. Functions of a CRB:
 - negotiate, in conjunction with the DNPW, co-management agreements with hunting outfitters and photographic tour operators;
 - manage the wildlife under its jurisdiction within quotas specified by the Department;
 - appoint community scouts to perform the duties of a wildlife police officer under the supervision of a wildlife police officer in the area
 - in consultation with the Director DNPW, develop and implement management plans which reconcile the various uses of land in areas falling under the CRBs jurisdiction

- perform such other functions as the Minister or Director of DNPW may direct or delegate to it.

34.

1. The preparation and implementation of general management plans in Community Partnership Parks, GMAs and Open Areas shall be under such regulations as the Minister may prescribe, in consultation with the Director.
2. There shall be a secretariat for each CRB which shall consist of such appropriately qualified officers as the board may appoint on such terms and conditions as it may determine.
3. The Minister shall second an officer to the board who shall serve as part of the secretariat.

35

1. A CRB shall establish a fund to enhance the local community's economic and social well-being within the area described in section thirty-two.
2. There shall be paid into the fund of a CRB, in addition to the revenues referred to in paragraph (o) of subsection (2) of section five, such monies as the board may, with the approval of the Minister, except by way of grants and donations from any source within or outside Zambia.
3. A CRB shall cause to be kept proper books of account and other records relating to its accounts.
4. The accounts referred to in subsection (3) shall be open for inspection by the Minister, the Director or any other member of that local community.
5. A CRB shall, not later than ninety days after the end of the financial year, submit to the Minister, through the Director — Secretariat of board Financial provisions 350 No. 14 of 2015] Zambia Wildlife - (a) an audited balance sheet; (b) an audited statement of income and expenditure; and (c) a report concerning its activities during that financial year.
6. A person who misuses any money belonging to a CRB shall — (a) be

liable to a surcharge; and (b) commits an offence and is liable, upon conviction, to a fine not exceeding one hundred thousand penalty units or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, or both.

7. A CRB shall submit quarterly reports to the Director.
8. CRB accounts shall be audited annually by independent auditors appointed by the CRB with the minister's approval.

Zambia National CRB Association

secretariatzncrba@gmail.com Bupe Banda

[The Association](#)¹⁹ is funded by USAID, its current National Administrator, Bupe Banda:

The Zambia Community Resources Board Association represents 76 CRBs across Zambia. As a unifying organization, how does the association help these community organizations?

Banda: CRBs have many challenges. One of the principle problems is obtaining their fair share of revenue from the government. For this, they need a strong, collective voice that can help guarantee their rights and benefit from the natural resources they are managing

What is the relationship between the CRBs and the government?

Banda: When trophy hunting and safari operators use the lands and resources of the communities, 50% of the revenue is returned to the communities, and the other 50% goes to the government. The

¹⁹ <https://www.land-links.org/2020/09/usaaid-partnership-in-zambia-strengthens-advocacy-for-community-rights/>

challenge is that the Department of National Parks and Wildlife and other government entities have been erratically dispersing the money. In 2020, the association successfully campaigned for the release of outstanding funds due to communities and has begun lobbying for better policies that empower communities.

What do CRBs do with this money?

Banda: In game management areas, for example, these funds represent employment and a source of money for community development. In the eyes of the community, the CRB is much more respected than many of the government agencies, because CRBs implement livelihoods projects from which every household stands to benefit. This is why the association's role as mediator is important. When CRBs talk, we make sure the government hears it; and when the government talks, we make sure the CRBs hear it.

How has the role of advocacy resulted in benefits for the CRBs?

Banda: To date our crowning achievement has been lobbying for the release of 19.8 million Zambian kwacha to CRBs earlier this year. The funds were the overdue fees from the 2018 and 2019 hunting seasons. We held a series of meetings with government ministers and mobilized chiefs from the communities. This led the Minister of Finance to commit to making the payments. This is advocacy with development.

How is USAID-funded leadership training helping to build the capacity of the association?

Banda: USAID has supported the ZCRBA leadership team to participate in a year-long regional training cohort called the African Conservation Leadership Network. This leadership training program is really helpful for an emerging leader like myself and an eye-opener of what it takes to build teams, be a leader, and what is involved in sometimes being a follower.

What new tools have you acquired?

Banda: We learned practical tools and techniques, models of planning, how to manage meetings, focus our work plan and relate to counterparts. We have refocused our strategy, communications, board governance, and fundraising. The fundraising aspect is very important. Currently we only

receive USAID funding and subscription fees from our CRB constituents, but we want to expand our funding from other donors. The training was an opportunity to learn more about building networks for the sake of fundraising, how important our communications strategy is. These are reminders that we all need.

[CRBs in Western Province](#) have formed a sub-organization.

GMA additions and subtractions

In 1993, under the Game Management Declaration Order, Statutory Instrument No. 67, 35 GMAs in all were proclaimed, the 32nd from 1971 added to by 1) Kalasa Mukosa in 1973 – established in the Bangweulu Command of the time to protect the black lechwe on the west bank of the Luapula; 2) Inangu in 1985 on Lake Tanganyika - to accommodate the ZCCM landgrab (later cancelled); 3) Chiawa in 1989 - on the upstream side of the Lower Zambezi National Park, and 4) Rufunsa in 1993 – taking up the rest of the area surrounding the Lower Zambezi National Park (10,000 ha alienated to Iqbal Alloo in 2001, this later increased to 39,000 ha). In 2013 the number of GMAs supposedly increased to 38 – though I account for 36.

The Wildlife Act No. 12 of 1998 Act, which proclaimed the establishment of the Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA), stated that the minister, in consultation with the local community and ZAWA, may declare a GMA for 1) the ‘sustainable utilization of wildlife’ 2) land may be alienated to leasehold without the permission of ZAWA, 3) Anyone living in a GMA must conform to a management plan, 4) anyone hunting game would be fined or imprisoned for up to five years. This legislation was proclaimed without the agreement of customary commoners or the chiefs and headmen. A very great and terrible injustice for which Kaunda should be ashamed is to add to the Barotse Agreement’s abrogation and the Hitlerian crimes against the Lumpa. The irony is that under British Indirect Rule, the villagers and their

headmen and chiefs had been given control of their areas under the Native Authority. Now the rural poor live amongst big-game without any access to them for food, with virtually no schools, medical clinics, roads or canals, etc. Depending on how much money they extract from a particular GMA, the state sends in the military 'wildlife police officers'. Naturally, they take part in the poaching - as I proved when taking over the Luembe GMA for hunting safaris to fund a community game ranch and other investments on behalf of the villagers.

Although the Wildlife Act No.12 of 1998 allowed for the co-management of GMAs between ZAWA and their proxy community resource boards - and devolved authority to CRBs for wildlife management, they are viewed by the government as state land under their control, a view supported by the GMA's importance in providing government income from hunting-safari concession fees and hunting licences. While this has served to hamper untrammelled alienation in GMAs, it also blocks development generally, a mixed blessing. However, few management plans of any substance have been forthcoming for GMAs and national parks, and little credible scientific work carried out to provide the basis for a sustainable offtake of wildlife for hunting, cropping or capture - as the Auditor-General confirms.

The Act of 1998, in making certain legal assumptions of the control of the GMAs on customary area, was contradicted by both customary and statutory law (the Lands Act of 1995) and by such traditional practices under common law as contracts of agistment whereby owners of livestock are obliged to pay rent for grazing rights. Furthermore, ZAWA (1998-2016), had by dint of statutory instruments, attempted to further control customary area commoners by laying out draconian punishments for setting or not reporting fires. As the 'owner' of wildlife, ZAWA was supposed to pay 50% of the money received from hunting concession and game licence fees to the chiefdom's customary authority where hunting was taking place. This they failed to do.

While originally 50% of concession and trophy fees were supposed to be paid to CRBs in the hunting concessions, concession fees were later reduced by an *ad hoc* CRB committee to 20%, the chiefs 8%, leaving both chiefs and villagers out of pocket. In late 2006 at a meeting between CRBs and ZAWA,

they agreed that the income would be equally shared. This did not happen; their tripartite partner, ZAWA, defrauded the CRBs and the concession residents.

On the Department of National Parks and Wildlife (DNPW) Facebook site, it states:

The Community Resource Board Association has petitioned the Ministry of Tourism's Permanent Secretary for its failure to pay them their share of hunting income in 2016 and 2018: this being the amount of ZMO 19.8 million (\$1.038,846 US).

That part of customary area not designated GMA, i.e. areas depleted of wildlife and without much value for the rent-seeking state, are denoted Open Area. These are the areas that are often targeted for large-scale land alienation.

The status of the biodiversity in the GMAs where hunting concessions are placed seriously deteriorated under ZAWA. Some hunting concessions still had the strongly interactive keystone game species such as buffalo, which are of immeasurable importance to the ecosystems on which many other species are dependent. But most GMAs, with the assistance of uncontrolled fires and the increasing brittleness of rangelands, continue to deteriorate.

[Women being elected to CRBs](#) is a welcome new development.

Increasing Chieftdom Poverty

Most seriously of all, rural people, although still with access to a plentiful supply of land and adequate rainfall in much of the country, are denied ownership or proper access to the benefits of the natural resources supported on their customary area, being criminalized in their subsistence hunting, their land increasingly under the threat of landgrabs.

Every year numerous villagers suffer attacks from wildlife - in 2005 as

an example, a total of 56 people were killed – certainly, an undercount, by crocodile (34 victims), hippo (12), elephant (7), lion (2) and hyena (1), with no compensation from the state. Nor are they compensated for the depredations of wildlife on their crops, an important factor in their increasing food insecurity and poverty.

[Susan Siamundele](#) assesses this problem:

Figure 1. Causality level of food insecurity in Game Management Areas



I argue that community-based wildlife management approaches have often not adequately accounted for the adverse impacts of wildlife conservation on the local people in GMAs. I concur with Barrett et al. (2001, p.497) that a more robust CBC (community-based conservation) design is desirable, which may “involve distributing authority across multiple institutions, rather than concentrating it in just one”. Armitage (2008) supports this view and urges for flexibility and distribution of institutional forms. Political ecological interpretations, therefore, help to reveal the challenge of actualizing the CBC principles and the contextual

forces that make entrenched, top-down management systems resistant to change and provide tools to critique the cross-scale drivers that undermine local property rights and management practices (Armitage, 2008).

I find the political ecology of conservation analytical framework adequate for understanding the interacting factors of political (policy and legislative limitation), socio-economic (opportunity costs from lack of compensation for loss incurred from damages caused by wild animals, restricted land usage and lack of capacity focus to address food security issues), and historical and cultural (displacement to non-arable areas mostly affected by ecological conditions) factors in explaining the CBC model in Zambia's wildlife sector...

It was also very difficult for villagers, normally dependent on wildlife for their food, to cope with [anti-poaching scouts](#), many of whom are involved with the crime syndicates and harass local people, along with the many unpaid CRB Scouts who take part in the same. In addition to ZAWA's negative presence in a customary area, ZAWA in 2006 spent only 8% of its budget on GMAs, although GMAs generated more than 50% of ZAWA's revenue. ZAWA's salaries and administration costs in 2006 took up almost 70% of total expenditure. The conclusion here is that ZAWA was a factor in creating poverty, urgently suggesting a revolutionary socio-ecological change needed in GMAs if chiefdom residents are to see any improvement in their life prospects.

An additional negative factor in GMAs is that the rural elite captures the CRB funds available through travel allowances, accommodation and meetings. As mentioned, most CRBs remained unpaid for most of the years they have been in existence. The Nyalugwe and Luembe chiefdom CRBs with 43 village scouts at one time owed on average 14 months salary, with some not paid for more than three years. The Natural Resources Consultative report written by Simasiku et al. painted an alarming picture of Zambia's GMAs in terms of economic, sociological and ecological benefits: natural habitats and wildlife decreasing at an alarming rate in most GMAs; villagers 30% poorer than

elsewhere; 28% of GMA households female-headed, compared to 22% in non-GMAs; female-headed households living near national parks on average enduring 19% less per capita consumption than male-headed households. The reason for this massive discrepancy is the depletion of wildlife by criminal syndicates to feed the ivory and bushmeat trade resulting from the failure to uphold decentralization and empowerment policies.

My friend Freddy, [Chief Chitambo](#), in August 2020, tells us how it is in his Bangweulu chiefdom, a chiefdom which contains the national Park, Kasanka:

Here in Chitambo district, the feeder roads are in a deplorable state. If they are talking about construction of roads, maybe they should talk about roads in urban areas and Lusaka in particular. The health centres have no essential medicines. The only drugs you can find is Panadol. We are relying on a self-help health post. And health minister Dr Chitalu Chilufya came here and drove an ambulance around. But that ambulance is only used for transportation of pregnant women. And 56-years after independence, this place has only one secondary school, which is Justine Mukando Boarding School. The rest are basic schools with few teachers manning these education facilities. The mobile phone network is still a challenge in this district. There's no development to talk about.

GAME MANAGEMENT AREAS



Chief Chitambo



Chief Chitambo and John Hannah (former D.C. Chinsali) visiting me in Burford, Oxon. John lived in Burford.

Securing empowerment through GMAs

[The Zambia Economist](#) of 16 December 2008 writes.”

A recent paper examines the economic empowerment of Game Management Areas (GMAs) in Zambia :

The study finds that the gains from living in a game management area and from active participation in natural resource management are large but unevenly distributed. Only game management areas near Kasanka, Lavushi, Isangano, and South Luangwa national parks in the sample show significant benefits to general and participating households. And in those areas, the poor do not seem to gain even when they participate

actively. More even distribution of gains from game management areas across households near different park systems and across the poor and the non-poor should be a continuing goal of national policy makers.

The paper does not explain how such an “even distribution of gains” may be attained. It seems obvious that two things must at least be part of the solution. First, tackle corruption in Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) - see previous discussions [here](#), [here](#), and [here](#). Secondly, review the revenue sharing mechanism with a greater focus on infrastructure spending, which would benefit residents. In that sense, infrastructure would provide a minimum floor of benefits for the people. This, of course, is easier said than done within the current corrupt operational framework of ZAWA. An added complication is that such an approach may also require pooling of resources across Community Resource Boards - not an easy task and likely to face opposition.

Comment: Friends of Lower Zambezi (Ian Manning)

Well, on the matter of just how well off or poor are the residents of GMAs – in

comparison to the poor of other rural areas, Messrs. Sushenjit Bandyopadhyay and Gelson Tembo in their May 2009 World Bank paper trail named, ‘Household welfare and natural resource management around National Parks in Zambia’ have gone over their former tracks as fellow authors of the 2007 paper by Hamilton et al (including the duo as co-authors) entitled ‘The real economic input of nature tourism in Zambia (NRCF), and as well for the June 2008 paper (Simasiku et al , also under the NRCF) and containing the names of the duo as co-authors of ‘ The impact of wildlife management policies on communities and conservation in Game Management Areas of Zambia’. Strangely, the duo do not have in their references the 2007 or 2008 papers, though they

acknowledge the help of some of the authors. The 2008 study stated that the 2007 study confirmed that households were on the average better off in GMAs but that this was captured by the elite residents and the CRB/VAG members. The same 2008 study concluded that GMA residents were 30% poorer than the national average. But let us get back to the May 2009 paper by the duo.

They define GMAs as buffer zones around National Parks (not entirely true of course); and that they are areas where subsistence hunting is allowed (not true). They refer to landuse in GMAs as having to submit to the provisions of management plans (what plans we ask?). They then refer to the 'Wildlife Conservation Revolving Fund as being in action (last heard of thumping to the ground with the rhino in the late 80s); and to the wide latitude of CRBs spending their funds (here the duo are right but for the wrong reasons: there is no official allowable latitude, it being laid down the percentage which has to be spent on community development and so on; however, the funds are trousered or not paid).

They found that the average household earnings in the 50:50 sampling of GMA and non-GMA residents, that the average income was K846,000 (about 50 cents a day). They also concluded that the Bangweulu and Luangwa GMAs were appreciably better off than the Zambezi and Kafue GMAs. Why this should be so when places like Isangano and Lavusi Manda NPs have been long denuded of their wildlife and with no safari hunting taking place is obviously a mystery. They did find that GMAs and their institutions (CRBs/VAGs) do not benefit the poor in the slightest, and that there were substantial gains associated with GMAs and participation in the CRB/VAGS, allowing the 40% 'actively to take part in natural resource management' they say.

They say the gains are unevenly distributed, but make no suggestion of what to do about it. Has the World Bank got nothing better to say.

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II

GOOD INTENTIONS

Sustainable Development Goals (UNDP)

[Declaration on 2015](#): 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

The new integrated [sustainable development goals](#) (SDGs) came into effect on 1 January 2016. The 17 goals are as follows:

- Goal 1. End poverty in all its forms everywhere
- Goal 2. End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture
- Goal 3. Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages
- Goal 4. Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all
- Goal 5. Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls
- Goal 6. Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all

- Goal 7. Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all
- Goal 8. Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all
- Goal 9. Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation
- Goal 10. Reduce inequality within and among countries
- Goal 11. Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable
- Goal 12. Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns
- Goal 13. Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts
- Goal 14. Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development
- Goal 15. Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss
- Goal 16. Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels
- Goal 17. Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development

UNITED NATIONS: TRANSFORMING OUR WORLD: THE 2030
AGENDA FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

7th Plan 2017-2021

The utopian 7th National Development Plan (2017-2021) being attempted to achieve [Vision 2030](#) is the responsibility of the new Ministry of National

Development Planning, assisted by [The Policy Monitoring and Research Centre](#) - a non-profit - who have provided a guide entitled: "Towards a Successful Implementation of the 7th National Development Plan." They give what they consider as the key reforms to be undertaken during the 7th NDP's short life:

- 1. Decentralisation – whose objective is to devolve some central government functions to lower levels with matching resources;*
- 2. Public Service Management Reforms – aimed at strengthening the efficient operations of the public service for enhanced service delivery;*
- 3. Private Sector Development Reforms – to create an enabling environment for the private sector to efficiently and effectively participate in the socio-economic development of the country;*
- 4. Public Finance Management Reforms – aimed at improving transparency and accountability in the utilization of public resources, while enhancing systems for accounting for development results; and*
- 5. Financial Sector Development Reforms – aimed at creating an enabling environment to facilitate smooth functioning of financial markets by removing bottlenecks that constrain the operations of the market.*

At the local level, the Ward Development Committees (WDCs) have been introduced, while the District Development Coordinating Committees (DDCCs) and the Provincial Development Coordinating Committees (PDCCs) will continue performing their functions as before. At the sector level, Sector Advisory Groups (SAGs) have been substituted with Cluster Advisory Groups (CAGs), which are an assembly of sectors sharing common overall objectives. At the central level, the Cabinet through the National Development Coordinating Committee (NDCC) will continue playing an oversight role. For the objectives of the Plan to be effectively realised there is need to strengthen synergies between the various implementation institutions. In this regard the following will be undertaken:

- a. Strengthen coordination and implementation processes at all levels*

The Government intends to put in place stronger coordination mechanisms involving NDCC, CAGs, PDCCs, DDCCs, WDCs and other frameworks leading to improved attainment of desired results. To effectively achieve the business focus of these frameworks, the NDCC, CAGs, PDCCs and DDCCs will be aligned to the development outcomes outlined in this Plan.

b. Strengthen capacity on planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation

The Government will devise and undertake capacity development programmes in planning and implementation for planners and other stakeholders to enhance attainment of desired outcomes. Further, planning, financing and implementation capacities at district and provincial levels will be strengthened to support the devolved functions.

CONCLUSION

*PMRC calls for a Mindset Education Programme to be established and implemented in view towards the successful implementation of the 7NDP as well as other key policies being put in place. The first step occurred in the change of the 7NDP planning using the Integrated Development Approach, which among other things allows for domesticating of the **Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)**.*

Through the Ministry of National Development Planning as well as Ministry of Higher Education, a programme should be designed, that defines the traits of a positive Zambian identity and promotes new models of development. This culture should be widespread and designed based on the positive traits as learned from case studies provided. The changing of mindsets will require strong institutions and management, which will strengthen our strategies and facilitate for cohesive policies and implementation.

This interpretation of the 7th NDP - includes the necessity to domesticate the new integrated [sustainable development goals](#) (SDGs), which came into

effect on 1 January 2016. (Ch. 18)

As Zambia is a state where 60% of the population follows the unfamiliar capitalist trail, the other half, the well-worn traditional eco-spiritual track, the SDGs are not a panacea for both. Neither is the 7th NDP plan. In a simple exercise, what is required is for Citizens' Assemblies created in the chiefdoms to consider which they wish to take on board. To repeat, Zambia is a country of two cultures, each with its own priorities.

In addition to this, the Nagoya Protocol and others are now in play.

Nagoya Protocol

In *Plunderers of Eden*, I wrote:

The Convention on Biodiversity on 29 October 2010 in Japan produced the Aichi Biodiversity targets and strategic plan for 2011-2020; the Convention also giving birth to a supplementary agreement, the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization (ABS). This protocol provided a legal framework for the 193 Contracting Parties (including Zambia):

- 1. Take measures providing that genetic resources utilized within their jurisdiction have been accessed in accordance with prior informed consent, and that mutually agreed terms have been established, as required by another contracting party*
- 2. Cooperate in cases of the alleged violation of another contracting party's requirements*
- 3. Encourage contractual provisions on dispute resolution in mutually agreed terms*
- 4. Ensure an opportunity is available to seek recourse under their legal systems when disputes arise from mutually agreed terms*

5. *Take measures regarding access to justice*
6. *Take measures to monitor the utilization of genetic resources after they leave a country including by designating effective checkpoints at any stage of the value-chain: research, development, innovation, pre-commercialization or commercialization*

The NGO, Natural Justice: Lawyers for Communities and the Environment, established in South Africa in 2007, took this all further, developing biocultural community protocols and a toolkit for community facilitators. As Kabir Sanjay Bavikatte wrote in his blog, '*Biocultural community protocols and the future of conservation*' in justconservation.org on 9 September 2014:

"The rights of communities in the swathe of legal instruments birthed by the Convention on Biological Diversity are rooted in the principle that effective conservation and sustainable use of ecosystems can only be ensured by recognizing the rights of those who manage and govern these ecosystems as common pool resources. These rights are increasingly referred to in law as 'biocultural rights' and are justified not on the basis of communities having a formal legal title to certain lands and waters, but on the basis of historical stewardship founded on the cultural practices and spiritual beliefs."

The development of a biocultural community protocol (BCP) in July 2014 between the Bushmen and Namibian government in the Bwabwata National Park is a massive step forward in the way we view property and ecosystem resources, and just how we secure protected areas – the public commons, that were once part of the customary commons. But it remains to be seen how the protocol deals with the mining plans of Rio Tinto for the park. In 2017 the park was battling to save its elephant from extinction.

Lending massive force to the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol is the ICAA Consortium, a Swiss-based institution created in October 2008

and promoting 'Indigenous Peoples' and Community Conserved Areas and Territories' and closely collaborating with the Secretariat of the CBD, UNEP, IUCN, GEF and others.

The Nagoya Protocol and the ICAA Consortium were really conceived at the Fifth World Parks Congress in Durban in 2003 - the year I started work on my Landsafe framework – where it was ‘clarified that indigenous peoples and local communities – crucial actors in conservation – should be fully recognized in their governance roles; and where indigenous peoples representatives made clear that the ‘respect of their rights would actually advance, rather than diminish, conservation outcomes’. In 2004 the CBD at CoP7 approved the CBD Program of Work on Protected Areas (PoWPA), which supports a “new approach” to protected areas, calling for attention to governance types and quality, equity in conservation, and indigenous peoples’ rights’.

All GMAs in Zambia fit the ICAA Consortium definition, being populated to a lesser or greater degree by:

1) A people or community closely connected to a well-defined territory, area or species (e.g., because of survival and dependence for livelihood, because of historical and cultural reasons);

2) The community is the major player in decision-making (governance) and implementation regarding the management of the territory, area or species, implying that a community institution has the capacity to develop and enforce regulations; (in many situations other stakeholders are involved, but primary decision-making rests de facto with the community);

3) The community management decisions and efforts lead to the conservation of the territory, area or species and associated cultural values (the conscious objective of management may be different than conservation per se, and be, for instance, related to material livelihood, water security, safeguarding of cultural and spiritual places, etc.)

In September 2014, as Natural Justice reported, the UN General Assembly adopted the Outcome Document of the [World Conference on Indigenous Peoples](#) (World Conference), reaffirming:

a) support for the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; b) commitments to obtain free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting Indigenous peoples' lands or territories and other resources, c) commitments to acknowledge, advance and adjudicate the rights of Indigenous peoples pertaining to lands, territories and resources; and d) the significant contribution of indigenous peoples to the promotion of sustainable development and ecosystem management, including their associated knowledge.

UN Convention on Biological Diversity, 2020

Preparations for the Post 2020 Framework

That 30% of the earth be protected.

<quote>

2030 Action Targets

12. The framework has 20 action-oriented targets for 2030, which, if achieved, will contribute to 2030 Milestones and the outcome-oriented goals for 2050. Actions to reach these targets should be implemented consistently and in harmony with the Convention on Biological Diversity

and its Protocols and other relevant international obligations, taking into account national socio-economic conditions.

(a) Reducing threats to biodiversity

Target 1. By 2030, [50%] of land and sea areas globally are under spatial planning addressing land/sea use change, retaining most of the existing intact and wilderness areas, and allow to restore [X%] of degraded freshwater, marine and terrestrial natural ecosystems and connectivity among them.

Target 2. By 2030, protect and conserve through well connected and effective system of protected areas and other effective area-based conservation measures at least 30 per cent of the planet with the focus on areas particularly important for biodiversity.

Target 3. By 2030, ensure active management actions to enable wild species of fauna and flora recovery and conservation and reduce human-wildlife conflict by [X%].

Target 4. By 2030, ensure that the harvesting, trade and use of wild species of fauna and flora are legal, at sustainable levels and safe.

Target 5. By 2030, manage, and where possible control, pathways for the introduction of invasive alien species, achieving [50%] reduction in the rate of new introductions, and control or eradicate invasive alien species to eliminate or reduce their impacts, including in at least [50%] of priority sites.

Target 6. By 2030, reduce pollution from all sources, including reducing excess nutrients [by x%], biocides [by x%], plastic waste [by x%] to levels that are not harmful to biodiversity and ecosystem functions and human health.

Target 7. By 2030, increase contributions to climate change mitigation adaption and disaster risk reduction from nature-based solutions and ecosystems-based approaches, ensuring resilience and minimizing any

negative impacts on biodiversity.

(b) Meeting people's needs through sustainable use and benefit-sharing

Target 8. By 2030, ensure benefits, including nutrition, food security, livelihoods, health and well-being, for people, especially for the most vulnerable through sustainable management of wild species of fauna and flora.

Target 9. By 2030, support the productivity, sustainability and resilience of biodiversity in agricultural and other managed ecosystems through conservation and sustainable use of such ecosystems, reducing productivity gaps by at least [50%].

Target 10. By 2030, ensure that nature-based solutions and ecosystem approach contribute to the regulation of air quality

Target 11. By 2030, increase benefits from biodiversity and green/blue spaces for human health and wellbeing, including the proportion of people with access to such spaces by at least [100%], especially for urban dwellers.

Target 12. By 2030, increase by [X] benefits shared for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity through ensuring access to and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from utilization of genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge.

(c) Tools and solutions for implementation and mainstreaming

Target 13. By 2030, integrate biodiversity values into policies, regula-

tions, planning, development processes, poverty reduction strategies and accounts at all levels, ensuring that biodiversity values are mainstreamed across all sectors and integrated into assessments of environmental impacts.

Target 14. By 2030, achieve reduction of at least [50%] in negative impacts on biodiversity by ensuring production practices and supply chains are sustainable.

Target 15. By 2030, eliminate unsustainable consumption patterns, ensuring people everywhere understand and appreciate the value of biodiversity, and thus make responsible choices commensurate with 2050 biodiversity vision, taking into account individual and national cultural and socioeconomic conditions.

Target 16. By 2030, establish and implement measures to prevent, manage or control potential adverse impacts of biotechnology on biodiversity and human health reducing these impacts by [X].

Target 17. By 2030, redirect, repurpose, reform or eliminate incentives harmful for biodiversity, including [X] reduction in the most harmful subsidies, ensuring that incentives, including public and private economic and regulatory incentives, are either positive or neutral for biodiversity.

Target 18. By 2030, increase by [X%] financial resources from all international and domestic sources, through new, additional and effective financial resources commensurate with the ambition of the goals and targets of the framework and implement the strategy for capacity-building and technology transfer and scientific cooperation to meet the needs for implementing the post-2020 global biodiversity framework.

Target 19: By 2030, ensure that quality information, including traditional knowledge, is available to decision makers and public for the

effective management of biodiversity through promoting awareness, education and research.

Target 20: By 2030, ensure equitable participation in decision-making related to biodiversity and ensure rights over relevant resources of indigenous peoples and local communities, women and girls as well as youth, in accordance with national circumstances.

Campaign for Nature

A working [paper](#) analyzes the economic implications of the proposed 30% target for real protection in the draft post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework.

1. The World Economic Forum now ranks biodiversity loss as a top-five risk to the global economy, and the draft post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework proposes an expansion of conservation areas to 30% of the earth's surface by 2030 (hereafter the "30% target"), using protected areas (PAs) and other effective area-based conservation measures (OECMs). Two immediate concerns are how much a 30% target might cost and whether it will cause economic losses to the agriculture, forestry and fisheries sectors.

2. Conservation areas also generate economic benefits (e.g. revenue from nature tourism and ecosystem services), making PAs/Nature an economic sector in their own right.

3. If some economic sectors benefit but others experience a loss, high-level

policy makers need to know the net impact on the wider economy, as well as on individual sectors.

4. The current report, based on the work of over 100 economists/scientists, analyses the global economic implications of a 30% PA target for agriculture, forestry, fisheries, and the PA/nature sector itself. (OECMs were only defined by the CBD in 2018, too recently to economically model, but we include a qualitative treatment of them.)

5. We carried out two analyses: a global financial one (concrete revenues and costs only); and a tropics focused economic one (including non-monetary ecosystem service values), for multiple scenarios of how a 30% PA target might be implemented.

6. Our financial analysis showed that expanding PAs to 30% would generate higher overall output (revenues) than non-expansion (an extra \$64 billion-\$454 billion per year by 2050). (Figure 1-2).

7. In the economic analysis, only a partial assessment was possible, focusing on forests and mangroves. For those biomes alone, the 30% target had an avoided-loss value of \$170-\$534 billion per year by 2050, largely reflecting the benefit of avoiding the flooding, climate change, soil loss and coastal storm surge damage that occur when natural vegetation is removed. The value for all biomes would be higher.

8. Implementing the proposal would therefore make little initial difference to total (multi-sector) economic output, although a modest rise in gross output value is projected.

9. The main immediate difference between expansion and non-expansion is therefore in broader economic/social values. Expansion outperforms non-expansion in mitigating the very large economic risks of climate change and biodiversity loss (Figure 5). The 30% target would also

increase by 63%-98% the area recognised as Indigenous Peoples' and local communities' land-based nature stewardship contribution (within appropriate rights and governance frameworks).

10. Economic growth in the PA/nature sector (at 4-6%) was also many times faster than the 1% growth expected in competing sectors (Figure 3). Marine expansion restores growth to fisheries (after a shock) but non-expansion leads to a mid-term contraction (Figure 4).⁶

11. The annual investment needed for an expanded (30%) PA system is \$103 – \$178 billion¹This figure includes \$68 billion for the existing system, of which only \$24.3 is currently spent. (Underfunded systems lose revenue, assets, carbon and biodiversity).

12. Most of the investment need is in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). These often have a competitive asset advantage in terms of natural areas, but they may need international support to capitalise on that opportunity. Otherwise, growing the PA sector could also entrench global economic inequalities.

13. Benefits and costs also accrue to different stakeholders at smaller (e.g. local) scales, making welfare distribution a challenge that needs addressing, as well as on individual sectors.

In the executive summary of the Campaign for Nature, they suggest in (1) that the 30% increase will harm agriculture, forestry and fisheries. But then, in (9), they conclude that: “The 30% target would also increase by 63%-98% the area recognised as Indigenous Peoples' and local communities' land-based nature stewardship contribution (within appropriate rights and governance frameworks).”

This seems somewhat contradictory. Then they reveal the real problem of donors and investors seeing CBNRM as a sure way to empower indigenous people, but in reality, being a ruse to extract rentals from the land through

tourism with massive negative effects on the customary people. Here lies the neo-colonial problem.

[An Open Letter](#) recently was sent to the authors of the Campaign for Nature report.

This open letter, signed by authors from multiple institutions, explains a series of reservations about that working paper.

Dear Colleagues,

We write to you as you are the lead investigators of the project which produced the recent draft working paper '[Protecting 30% of the planet for nature](#)'. This paper proposes extensive new protected areas in which all agriculture, herding and fishing will cease. We are concerned that there are significant omissions and failings in this paper. Its approach continues the marginalisation of rural people who will be most affected by its measures. It ignores decades of research and experience on the social impacts of conservation. It fails to appreciate the political contexts in which protected area conservation are embedded, or indeed the importance of the politics that surround its own creation.

In detail our concerns are:

1 You have not said how many people would be affected by your proposals, where they live or how they will be affected. More specifically, you are proposing a large increase in areas in which all farming, livestock keeping and fishing will be prohibited. You have not said how many people will have to find new livelihoods because of these changes, nor indicated what these possible alternatives might be.

2 You have not indicated that there has been any consultation with any of the people who will be affected, their chosen representatives, or organizations that work with them. This lack of consultation suggests of a lack of prior and informed consent, a hallmark of any and all ethical work with living communities. Your calculation of compensation ignores [long established methods](#) for tackling the full spectrum of risks of impoverishment that physical or economic displacement must entail.

Your proposal only to compensate for lost land value would particularly marginalise and disenfranchise women in patriarchal societies where they do not own land. Further the land value calculation is based on the terra nullius approach that underpinned settler colonialism around the world. This primitive school of thought ascribes value to land and none whatsoever to the human societies thereon.

3 You overlook decades of social science research which demonstrates that the costs of loss of access to land and resources as a result of conservation policies can contribute to a deep sense of loss of culture and status, curtailing aspirations and reducing life opportunities. These losses cannot be measured in and compensated for in monetary terms, for either present or future generations.

4 Your proposal to generate tourism revenues ignores the fact that tourism industries do not generate revenues for rural farmers or fishing people in poorer countries. There is substantial research showing how tourism embeds and extends existing inequalities because ownership often lies with international companies and profits accrue externally. Indeed your reliance on tourism as an economic model proposes to make entire societies, particularly in the global south, dependent of foreign patronage, rather than their own resilience. It does not take sufficient account of the changing and fickle nature of the international tourism industry. Finally it fails to recognise that using international tourism as a means of saving biodiversity relies on aviation, a key contributor to climate change, which in turn is a driver of biodiversity loss.

5 Your method of counting costs adds up gains and losses at the national scale. It does not adequately recognise that the distribution of these costs locally and sub-nationally is essential to the palatability, and hence sustainability, of your plans. It mentions these local effects, but fails to appreciate their implication for the plans you propose.

6 You do not adequately consider the implications for food security due to food price increases. There is a wealth of data that demonstrate as people become more food insecure, biodiversity suffers. You do not adequately consider the potential cascading effects of your proposals.

7 You have released your findings into the public domain but you have not made the GIS layers that produce them publicly available.

8 You do not address important drivers for the loss of biodiversity that have been identified by numerous studies, including high levels of consumption, especially by wealthy countries, that are built into economic planning and the Sustainable Development Goals. These entail continued extraction of natural resources for global consumption and the habitat loss associated with that extraction, the use of fossil fuels and so on.

9 Finally, we are concerned by the constitution of your research team. Social science, outside of a specific form of economics, is poorly represented. Further, your recommendations are global, but your research team is drawn primarily from institutions in the global north (see the [tables of authorship below](#)).

These criticisms have serious implications for your work. You may believe that you have taken on board some of the criticisms of conservation by social scientists, but you have not. You are not asking the right questions about the practicability or wisdom of your plans. You have not assembled a diverse team which would have allowed you to ask these questions. Nor do you seem to realise that you have made these mistakes.

The result is that this paper reads to us like a proposal for a new model of colonialism. It is driven by environmental interests from countries with the highest carbon emissions and imposed on the countries whose resources scientists based in wealthy countries now appear to wish to control. To illustrate, we have left the last column of the [tables below](#) blank. We encourage you to complete them. When you have done so, please ask yourselves if you are comfortable with the pattern that they show.

At a time when most academic disciplines are working to decolonize their curricula, when Indigenous scholars are pushing for more equality in research, and when the Black Lives Matter movement is gaining momentum worldwide, we find the report regressive and potentially dangerous. We urge you to find more socially just and effective ways of promoting your vision for a better conserved world. We urge you to root

these plans in local economies, needs, livelihoods and politics. These are, after all, precisely the circumstances in which all protected areas must exist.

We believe that a world with more protected areas could be a much better place. But that hinges on the types of protected areas that are promoted and the means by which they are sustained. [Opposition to your plans](#) reflects the opacity as to the sorts of protected areas you are actually proposing. You pass over crucial questions of what changes will be required and by whom, and combine that with too much optimism about the potential of tourism to pay for conversation.

As these plans develop, we will continue to provide the critical scrutiny that good science requires. Please help this debate to progress more meaningfully by assembling teams whose work will not lead us to ask such basic questions as those above. Please make your data publicly available for the scrutiny such important plans require.

We look forward to engaging with you on these plans and further research work about them in the future.

Finally, to the other authors named on this working paper, a number of whom are respected colleagues and/or early career researchers, we ask you to note that our letter is only addressed to the senior researchers who directed the work that led to the working paper report.

*Yours faithfully (and in alphabetical order),
Arun Agrawal, University of Michigan et al*

Zambia's Sixth National Report (2019)

[Sixth National Report](#), 2018-2019

Targets pursued by 2020

1 *Zambians, especially local communities, are aware of and appreciate the values of biodiversity and the need for its sustainable utilization. [[link](#)]*

Last updated October 2017

2 *Biodiversity values have been integrated into the Seventh National Development Plan (7NDP), provincial and district development plans and other planning processes as well as being incorporated into national accounting and reporting systems as appropriate.*

3 *Selected incentives for biodiversity conservation and sustainable use are in place and applied, and the most harmful subsidies are identified, and their gradual phase-out is initiated.*

[SI_11_Community Forest Management Regulation_2018.pdf](#)

[The Zambia Wildlife Act, 2015-1.pdf](#)

<http://www.dfnrmp.org.zm/resource/community-forestry-guidelines-zambia-wo-annexes/> Version July 2018

4 *Baselines for critical biodiversity is established.*

5 *Deforestation rate in Zambia is reduced by at least 25%.*

[drivers-deforestation-Zambia-WEB_final \(1\).pdf](#) May 2013

[The Forest Act 2015.pdf](#)

[NATIONAL STRATEGY TO REDUCE DEFORESTATION AND FOREST DEGRADATION book](#)

[\(1\) \(1\).pdf](#) REDD+ strategy

[ILUA II - Final Report Draft ForPrinting_V2_New Cover V2](#) 2016

[19062017_EDITED_03.08.2018.pdf](#)

[Environmental Management Act 12 of 2011.pdf](#)

5 Fisheries co-management regimes are established in 60% of all major fisheries.

6 Pollution, including excess nutrients from industry (mining, agriculture etc.), has been brought to levels that are not detrimental to ecosystem functions and biodiversity.

[Environmental Management Act 12 of 2011.pdf](#)

7 Invasive Alien Species (Mimosa pigra, Water Hyacinth, cray fish and lantana camara) and pathways are identified and controlled and eradicated.

8 Zambia's protected area network is rationalized to achieve representativeness and ecological connectivity at the landscape level.

[Mukungule GMA Land Use Plan.pdf](#)

[Blue Lagoon National Park GMP.pdf](#)

9 Zambia defines and enforces a generic national benefit framework to genetic resources.

[The Protection of Traditional Knowledge, Genetic Resources and Expressions of Folklore](#)

[Act No. 16 of 2016.pdf](#)

10 The traditional knowledge, innovations and practices of local communities relevant to the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity are respected, subject to national legislation, and relevant international obligations are respected and fully integrated with the implementation of the Convention with the participation of local communities at all relevant levels.

[The Protection of Traditional Knowledge, Genetic Resources and Expressions of Folklore](#)

[Act No. 16 of 2016.pdf](#)

11 The knowledge, the science base and technologies, relevant to Biodiversity, its values, functions, status and trends, and consequences of its loss, are improved, distributed and transferred and applied.

[Icomos Evaluation of Barotse Cultural Zambia 1429_EN \(1\).pdf](#)

[The Joint Management Plan Final Zambia Zimbabwe 2014.pdf](#)

Targets pursued by 2022

12 The populations of threatened and endemic species and their protection status has been improved and sustained.

[Sesheke MA&D Phases 1&2.pdf](#)

[Sioma MA&D Phases 1&2.pdf](#)

[Herbivore and Waterbird Population Status Kafue Flats Aerial Survey Report-](#)

[FinalReport.pdf](#)

[Bangweulu Swamps Report 2003 ShoeBills_Kamweneshe et al_2003.pdf](#)

[Population and distribution of wattled cranes_Kamweneshe and Belfuss.pdf](#)

Targets pursued by 2025

13 Areas under agriculture and forestry (forest reserves, parks, Game Management Areas) are managed sustainably, ensuring biodiversity conservation.

[SL_11_Community Forest Management Regulation_2018.pdf](#)

[Decentralized Forest and other natural resources management project website](#)

[The Forest \(Concession Licence\) Regulations, 2016.pdf](#)

[The Zambia Wildlife Act, 2015-1.pdf](#)

[The Forest Act 2015.pdf](#)

[SL_#31_ Control of Goods \(Forest Produce\) Regulation_2017.pdf](#)

[Environmental Management Act 12 of 2011.pdf](#)

[Reclassification Conservation Plan - FINAL.pdf](#)

[Fire Management Plan Final_Kafue National Park.pdf](#)

[Blue Lagoon National Park GMP.pdf](#)

[Mukungule GMA Land Use Plan.pdf](#)

14 The genetic diversity of cultivated plants and farmed and domesticated animals and of wild relatives, including other socio-economically and culturally valuable species is maintained and strategies have been developed and implemented for minimizing genetic erosion and safeguarding their genetic diversity.

15 Zambia takes deliberate steps to protect critical ecosystems of the Zambezi, Kafue and the Luangwa Watersheds.

[NATIONAL STRATEGY TO REDUCE DEFORESTATION AND FOREST DEGRADATION book](#)

[\(1\) \(1\).pdf](#)

16 Zambia mobilizes sufficient internal and external financial resources for the effective implementation of NBSAP 2.

The Implementation Measures

1 Raise public awareness on the importance of conserving biological diversity and using it sustainably.

[SpeciesRichness_ZMB.png](#)

2 Quantify and monitor the economic, social and environmental value of biodiversity and ecosystem services using appropriate valuation tools.

[EcosystemServiceUsage_ZMB.png](#)

[KeyBiodiversityAreaProtection_ZMB.png](#)

3 Mainstream Biodiversity into district, provincial, 7th National Development Plan (7NDP) and national accounting system

[Biodiversity Finance Initiative - Zambia web page](#)

4 Promote appropriate incentives that encourage the conservation of biodiversity and its sustainable use.

5 Phase out the most harmful subsidies for the conservation of biodiversity.

6 Update baseline data on fish, forests and lower plants and wildlife.

[ThreatenedSpeciesRichness_ZMB.png](#)

7 Promote sustainable utilization of resources within limits.

[DegradationWithinEcoregions_ZMB.png](#)

8 Promote effective information exchange and knowledge management on biodiversity conservation and its sustainable use.

9 Promote sustainable agricultural practices.

[DegradationWithinEcoregions_ZMB.png](#)

[CarbonSequestrationPotential_ZMB.png](#)

10 Promote alternative renewable energy technologies.

11 Strictly enforce EIA and SEA provisions of the Environmental Management Act (2011).

12 Institutionalise integrated landuse planning across sectors.

[EcoregionProtection_ZMB.png](#)

13 Promote community-public-private partnerships in fisheries management areas.

14 Improve monitoring capacity among key stakeholders (Government, industry, communities) to curb illegal fishing activities

15 Develop an equitable benefit distribution system (BDS) for key stakehold-

ers

engaged in fisheries co-management.

16 Promote natural restocking in fishery management areas, and other fish depleted water bodies by protecting fish breeding areas.

17 Promote sustainable agriculture practices in areas designated for agricultural production in line with national, regional and international standards.

18 Promote aquaculture in identified areas and ensure that the practice does not contribute to erosion/extinction of indigenous species.

19 Mainstream climate change adaptation measures that will enhance the resiliency of priority ecosystems.

20 Promote community forest management, joint forest management and private forest management as provided for in the Forestry Policy (2014) and Forest Act (2015).

[EcosystemServiceUsage_ZMB.png](#)

21 Promote the management of wildfires in biodiversity areas such as forests, GMAs, NPs and wetlands.

[DegradationWithinEcoregions_ZMB.png](#)

22 Promote the management of National Parks and GMAs following Management Plans.

23 Regularise Forest Management Plans for NPs to ensure connectivity, habitat resilience and ultimate refugia for wildlife in the face of climate change.

[ProtectedConnectedIndex_ZMB.png](#)

24 Rezone GMAs (legally), identify and map wildlife refugia taking into

account existing land uses (e.g. settlements, agriculture and infrastructure).

25 Revise EIA regulations to provide for strict enforcement of provisions in the EMA on pollution control management.

<http://www.zema.org.zm>

+++ 25 more implementation measures. Of particular importance are the following:

- [ProtectedAreaManagementEffectiveness_ZMB.png](#)
- [ThreatenedSpeciesRichnessWithinEffectivelyManagedProtectedArea_ZMB.png](#)
- Increase rhino populations
- Shoebill & Wattled crane conservation - [ThreatenedSpeciesRichness_ZMB.png](#)
- Promote resilient crops
- Safeguard species from genetic erosion
- Develop and formalise a generic national benefit-sharing framework & domesticate into a Benefit Distribution System (BDS) by relevant Sectors
- Legislate major headwaters of the Zambezi, Kafue and Luangwa as well as other headwaters as no go areas for large infrastructural development, including mining - [EcoregionProtection_ZMB.png](#)
- Lobbying for parliamentary ratification of the customary land bill
- Documentation of traditional knowledge, innovations and biocultural practices for biodiversity conservation
- The World Heritage Committee Referral Decision

In Section 111, they assess ‘progress’.

Conclusion of progress

All state/donor plans reveal minimal progress and success, being endlessly repeated extended over the years. The basis of true development lies in establishing Guardian Assemblies in the chiefdoms and the latter's semi-autonomous existence. There needs to a House of Chiefs - an upper house - placed within the national assembly, not merely as an adjunct of the Ministry of Traditional Affairs.

Zambia Environmental Outlook Report 2017

[The Forests \(Community Forest Management\) Regulations, 2018](#)

[The Zambia Wildlife Act, 2015-1.pdf](#)

[National Guidelines for Community Forestry, 2018](#)

[Drivers of Deforestation, 2012](#)

[The Forest Act 2015.pdf](#)

[National Strategy to Reduce Deforestation and Degradation](#)

[Integrated Land-Use Assessment Phase 2 Final Report, 2016](#)

[Environmental Management Act 12 of 2011.pdf](#)

Status and trends of biodiversity, including benefits from biodiversity and ecosystem services

The content of this biodiversity profile is still draft. The text below has been prepared by SCBD and remains subject to final approval by the Party concerned.

Summary

Zambia's vision for biodiversity conservation is driven by Vision 2030 which promotes economic development that takes into account social and environmental safeguards and is operationalized in the country's five-year national development planning cycle (soon to enter its 7th phase).

Considered highly relevant to Zambia's priorities, the 5 strategic goals of the current global plan and its Aichi Targets provide the overarching framework for Zambia's second NBSAP for 2015-2025, which includes 18 national targets, accompanied by 45 strategic interventions, key performance indicators, key activities, responsible entities, narratives and assumptions. NBSAP-2 is underpinned by 11 principles promoting sustainable use, responsibility, equity, participation, awareness-raising, co-existence, knowledge, informed decision-making, strategic partnerships, enhanced conservation and financial sustainability. The document has been developed as a transformative strategy emphasizing evidence-based interventions, fully participatory processes, the important role of protected areas, incorporation of climate change resilience principles, restoration activities, the need for diverse financing mechanisms and a supportive policy, legal and regulatory framework. In the last five years, Zambia has undertaken other important initiatives supportive of biodiversity conservation. Key among these include completion of its Strategy on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) (2015), Forestry Policy (2014), Forestry Act (2015), Water Resources Management Act (2011), and the ongoing development of a Wetlands Policy and revision of the Wildlife Policy and Act. Among its other targets, by 2020, Zambia expects to have integrated biodiversity values into its Seventh National Development Plan (SeNDP), provincial and district development plans and planning processes, as well as incorporated reporting systems in national accounting, as appropriate. NBSAP-2 will also address the establishment of a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation framework, however there will still be a need to establish baselines for the various biodiversity components where gaps have been identified in the monitoring and evaluation plan.

Biodiversity Facts

<quote>

1. Zambia is a landlocked country in southern Africa. Forests, agroecosystems and wetlands are the most important ecosystems to the national economy and rural livelihoods. Biodiversity conservation to date has been undertaken through the management of the existing protected areas system and promotion of sustainable utilization of natural resources in Open Areas.
2. Data collected from 2000 to 2011 confirms a significant deterioration in Zambia's forest reserves due to encroachment through cultivation and settlement. By the end of this period, it was estimated that less than 50% of the forest reserve estate could be considered free from these threats. Over the past decade, more than 280,000 hectares of forest reserve have been de-gazetted or excised. A study published in 2014 concluded, using 2010 figures, that direct and indirect forest values (excluding the market value of carbon) directly contributed about 4.7% or USD 932.5 million to the GDP. However, when the multiplier effects of forestry and tourism-related activities on other sectors are considered, the overall contribution of forests to the GDP was estimated to be at least 6.3% or USD 1,252 million. The same study estimated that overall income derived from non-wood forest products is around USD 135.8 million per year.
3. Wetlands, including 8 Ramsar sites, cover 3.6 million hectares (4.8%) of the total land area. The fisheries sub-sector contributes about 3.2% to the GDP, with 300,000 persons directly or indirectly obtaining part of their income from this sector. Fish accounts for 29% of the animal protein supply in Zambian diets. More than 200 Crustacean species exist in various ecosystems in Zambia, of which more than half are endemics. The highest fish species richness is found in Lake Tanganyika, estimated to have over 200 species, of which over 70% are endemic to the lake. This fishery needs special conservation attention, especially since it is a

transboundary water body shared by four riparian countries (Tanzania, DR Congo, Burundi, Zambia). Catch assessment surveys are ongoing for the sardine known as *Kapenta*, originating from Lake Tanganyika, whose stocks have been significantly overexploited in the last 2 decades. A report to the Ramsar Convention in 2015 indicated improvement in the status of the Lukanga swamps, Bangweulu swamps and Liuwa Plains, although details on the scope of improvement are not provided.

4. Zambia's agro-ecological systems are categorized into 3 agro-ecological regions (AERs), differentiated mainly by the amount of rainfall received per annum. Small-scale farmers are responsible for producing 80% of output (their contribution to livestock production is around 30%). A small number of commercial or large-scale farmers are involved in commercial crop production in wheat, soya bean and sugar cane, and livestock production. Despite agro-biodiversity being a vital resource for the country, it has not been given adequate attention in management and utilization compared to forestry, wild animals and fisheries. As a result, agroecological systems are threatened today by several causes.
5. Mammal diversity is estimated at 224 species, with over 28 species and subspecies considered threatened, endangered or vulnerable. A project on Reclassification and Effective Management of National Protected Areas System (2010) identified approximately 43 species of large mammals as important in terms of the potential income that can be generated from their use in photographic and consumptive tourism; their contribution to local household economies, as a source of protein and as a source of income through illegal market structures; and in terms of their aesthetical appreciation by the global community, including their existence value. These mammals comprise 9 species of large carnivores, 2 species of odd-toed ungulates, 31 species of even-toed ungulates and 1 species of elephant.
6. Since 2009, 24 new bird species have been identified in Zambia. However, over the past 15 years, a decline of around 35% has been recorded in site occupancy in the most Important Bird Areas (42 IBAs exist, 82% of which receive some form of protection). Current

stocktaking lists 11 bird species as endangered.

7. Analysis of annual rainfall data for the 1950s-2000s period shows no trend in rainfall pattern across the country's main agro-ecological regions (AERs), except concerning the eastern part of AER III, consisting of Luapula, Northern and Muchinga Provinces and northern parts of Central Province, where there has been some increase in annual rainfall over time. In the meantime, temperature increases have been estimated at an average of 1.3 degrees Celsius over the past few decades.

<unquote>

Main pressures on and drivers of change to biodiversity (direct and indirect)

<quote>

1. Forest reserves are today significantly threatened by encroachment through cultivation and settlement. In the North-Western Province, this process is driven mostly by mining, while Northern Zambia has lost much of its primary cover to shifting cultivation. In the east, central and southern parts of Zambia, the conversion of forest land to permanent crop agriculture is the main driver of loss. Bush fires, overexploitation of timber trees, invasive alien plant species are other contributing factors.
2. Threats to national parks, game management areas and mammals include human encroachment and illegal wildlife use, such as the poaching of large mammals for the bushmeat market. Other threats are habitat degradation caused by conversion for cropping, livestock grazing, charcoal production, among other factors. Furthermore, mining activities conducted for aquamarine, tourmaline, and red garnets in certain protected areas have negatively affected wildlife species and their habitats. Although mining licenses can be granted as long as an EIA is carried out and approved by the Zambia Environmental Management

Agency, some small-scale miners carry out activities without licenses. Additional threats are wildfires, diseases and pesticides.

3. Threats to birds include habitat loss, hunting pressure, bird food shortage, droughts, floods and temperature variation.
4. Threats to aquatic systems and fish include habitat modification due to rivers' damming, among other causes. They are also threatened by invasive alien species (water hyacinth, Kariba weed, carpetweed) and poor aquaculture practices.
5. Threats to invertebrates and their habitats include pollution, overexploitation of edible invertebrates (e.g. caterpillar worm) and uncontrolled fires threatening certain species the butterfly *Acrea acrita ambigua* whose larvae is destroyed by frequent fires.

<unquote>

Measures to Enhance Implementation of the Convention

<quote>

Zambia's first NBSAP (1999) set out 14 targets distributed among 6 goals on: conservation of ecosystems through protected areas; conservation of genetic diversity; improving the legal and institutional framework and human resources to implement the strategies for conservation of biodiversity; sustainable use and equitable sharing of benefits from biodiversity; sustainable use and management of biological resources; developing an appropriate legal and institutional framework and needed human resources to minimize the risks of GMOs; and ensuring the equitable sharing of benefits from the use of Zambia's biological resources. However, due to a lack of monitoring, coordination and financing frameworks for this NBSAP, a review of achievements has revealed feeble direct results.

Actions taken to achieve the 2020/25 Aichi Biodiversity Targets

1. Community involvement in conservation activities has increased as a result of incentives offered. A mechanism for sharing benefits from hunting concessions and other income sources with communities, through Community Resource Boards (CRBs) and Game Management Areas (GMAs), has been developed. Zambia also expects to accede to the Nagoya Protocol on ABS by 2016.
2. Measures have been put in place for the control/eradication of invasive species at Lochinvar and Victoria Falls National Parks.
3. Recommendations from the project on the Reclassification and Effective Management of the National Protected Areas System (REMNPAS) carried out in 2010 address the gaps in the representation of certain plant species (e.g. Dry Evergreen Forest, Kalahari Woodland, Miombo Woodland) and animal species (giraffe, Black lechwe, Kafue lechwe, Black Rhinoceros), within the existing National Parks and Game Management Areas. The project also recommended that the management effectiveness of the overall system be improved. The network of Zambia's statutory protected area today covers almost 40% of the country's total surface area. Lusaka National Park was created in 2011 and is stocked with species, including endangered ones. Zambia's protected areas system includes 480 Forest Reserves (305 Local Forests and 175 National Forests). The management objective in Local Forests is to meet the needs for forest products for present and future generations of local people. The objective for establishing National Forests is to protect and conserve major water catchments and their biodiversity.

Support mechanisms for national implementation

Zambia enacted the Environmental Management Act in 2011, which is the parent environmental legislation with strict requirements for EIA and SEA for any large-scale development project. The Wildlife Act is under review while the revised Forest Policy was approved in 2014 and the Forest Bill was enacted in 2015. Also, a National Heritage Policy is under formulation. Although the Mines and Minerals Development Act was adopted in 2012, it fails to recognize the important role of biodiversity conservation and allows mineral development in protected areas. In 2013, the Mining Policy was adopted, promoting concepts of sustainable development, among other standards. The Water Resources Management Act and Fisheries Act were both adopted in 2011.

Zambia has developed a REDD+ Strategy.

Zambia has not commenced the growing of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). However, the Government has adopted a precautionary principle on GMOs and products made from GMOs, as required by the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. Through this approach, Zambia developed the Biotechnology and Biosafety Policy (2003), Biosafety Act (2007), and a few necessary regulations and guidelines. Two local laboratories were also set up for detecting GMOs. To that effect, the National Biosafety Authority Board was inaugurated in 2015 and charged with regulating research, development, application, import, export, transit, contained use, release or placing on the market of any GMO. The Zambian Africulture Research Institute has also been established for researching the genetic diversity of cultivated crops.

The Biodiversity Finance Initiative (BIOFIN), for which Zambia is a pilot country, will help strengthen the financing framework for the revised NBSAP.

Mechanisms for monitoring and reviewing implementation

A key lesson learned from implementing the first NBSAP (1999) was the need for long-term investment in a well-coordinated and mainstreamed biodiversity monitoring system, which shall be addressed in the revised NBSAP.

Aichi Targets

SUBMITTED ON: 31 DEC 2018 LAST UPDATED: 28 FEB 2019

Target 1

By 2020, Zambians, especially [local communities](#), are aware of the values of biodiversity and the steps they can take to conserve and use it sustainably.

Target 2

By 2020, biodiversity values have been integrated into the Seventh National Development Plan (SeNDP), provincial and district development plans and planning processes, and reporting systems, are being incorporated into national accounting, as appropriate. *This national target was adopted through a broad stakeholder consultation through various engagements including workshops during the formulation of the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP) in 2015*

Target 3

By 2019, selected incentives for biodiversity conservation and sustainable

use are in place and applied, and the most harmful subsidies are identified and their gradual phase-out is initiated.

Target 4

By 2020, baselines for sustainable production and utilization of fisheries, forests and wildlife are established and updated.

This national target was set through a consultative process during the formulation of the NBSAP in 2015.

Target 5

By 2020, the deforestation rate in Zambia is reduced by at least 25%

Target 6

By 2020, fisheries co-management regimes are established in 60% of all major fisheries.

11. Protected areas

16. Nagoya Protocol on ABS

Target 7

By 2025, areas under agriculture, aquaculture and forestry (forest reserves, parks, Game Management Areas, forest concessions, Open Areas) are managed sustainably, ensuring biodiversity conservation.

[SI_11_Community Forest Management Regulation_2018.pdf](#)
[Decentralised Forest and other natural resources management project website](#)

[The Forest \(Concession Licence\) Regulations, 2016.pdf](#)

[The Zambia Wildlife Act, 2015-1.pdf](#)

[The Forest Act 2015.pdf](#)

[SI_#31_ Control of Goods \(Forest Produce\) Regulation_2017.pdf](#)

[Environmental Management Act 12 of 2011.pdf](#)
[Reclassification Conservation Plan - FINAL.pdf](#)
[Fire Management Plan Final_Kafue National Park.pdf](#)
[Blue Lagoon National Park GMP.pdf](#)
[Mukungule GMA Land Use Plan.pdf](#)

Target 8

By 2020, pollution, including excess nutrients from industry (mining, agriculture, etc.), has been brought to levels that are not detrimental to ecosystem function and biodiversity.

[Environmental Management Act 12 of 2011.pdf](#)

Target 9

By 2020, invasive alien species (*Mimosa pigra*, Hyacinth, crayfish, and *Lantana camara*) and their spreading pathways are identified and prioritized, controlled or eradicated, and measures are in place to manage pathways to prevent their spread and establishment.

5. Loss of habitats

8. Pollution

12. Preventing extinctions

14. Essential ecosystem services

Target 10

By 2020, Zambia's Protected Area (PA) network is rationalized to achieve representativeness and ecological connectivity at landscape level.

[Mukungule GMA Land Use Plan.pdf](#)

[Blue Lagoon National Park GMP.pdf](#)

Target 11

By 2022, the populations of threatened and endemic species and their protection status, has been improved and sustained.

[Sesheke MA&D Phases 1&2.pdf](#)

[Sioma MA&D Phases 1&2.pdf](#)

[Herbivore and Waterbird Population Status Kafue Flats Aerial Survey Report-FinalReport.pdf](#)

[Bangweulu Swamps Report 2003 ShoeBills_Kamweneshe et al_2003.pdf](#)

[Population and distribution of wattled cranes_Kamweneshe and Beilfuss.pdf](#)

Target 12

By 2025, the genetic diversity of cultivated plants and farmed and domesticated animals and of wild relatives, including other socioeconomically as well as culturally valuable species, is maintained, and strategies have been developed and implemented for minimizing genetic erosion and safeguarding their genetic diversity.

6. Nagoya Protocol on ABS

18. Traditional knowledge

Target 13

By 2020, Zambia defines and enforces a generic national benefit-sharing mechanism to genetic resources.

[The Protection of Traditional Knowledge, Genetic Resources and Expressions of Folklore Act No. 16 of 2016.pdf](#)

Target 14

By 2025, Zambia takes deliberate steps to protect critical ecosystems of the Zambezi, Kafue and the Luangwa Watersheds

[NATIONAL STRATEGY TO REDUCE DEFORESTATION AND FOREST DEGRADATION book \(1\) \(1\).pdf](#)

Target 15

By 2020, the traditional knowledge, innovations and practices of local communities relevant to the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, are respected, subject to national legislation and relevant international obligations are respected and fully integrated in the implementation of the Convention with participation of local communities at all relevant levels

[The Protection of Traditional Knowledge, Genetic Resources and Expressions of Folklore Act No. 16 of 2016.pdf](#)

Target 16

By 2020, the knowledge, the science base and technologies, relevant to Biodiversity, its values, functions, status and trends, and consequences of its loss, are improved, distributed and transferred and applied

[Icomos Evaluation of Barotse Cultural Zambia 1429_EN \(1\).pdf](#)

[The Joint Management Plan Final Zambia Zimbabwe 2014.pdf](#)

Target 17

By 2025, Zambia mobilizes sufficient internal and external financial resources for the effective implementation of NBSAP 2

Aichi Implementation Measures

Raise public awareness on the importance of conserving biological diversity and using it sustainably

[SpeciesRichness_ZMB.png](#)

Quantify and monitor the economic, social and environmental value of biodiversity and ecosystem services using appropriate valuation tools

[cosystemServiceUsage_ZMB.png](#)

[KeyBiodiversityAreaProtection_ZMB.png](#)

Mainstream Biodiversity into district, provincial, 7th National Development Plan (7NDP) and national accounting system

[Biodiversity Finance Initiative - Zambia web page](#)

Promote appropriate incentives that encourage the conservation of biodiversity and its sustainable use

Phase out the most harmful subsidies for the conservation of biodiversity

The regulations to operationalist SEA are not yet developed or approved and therefore the measure is not being implemented.

Update baseline data on fish, forests and lower plants and wildlife

[ThreatenedSpeciesRichness_ZMB.png](#)

This measure is related to national target 6. Establishment of fishery management plans (FMPs) and implementation plans (IPs) in all commercial fishery areas is among key indicators. The FMPs and IPs for Mweru-Luapula, Bangweulu and Kafue floodplain were developed, but actual implementation has not received financial support/injection. Preparatory work towards development of FMP and IP for Lukanga was started through Fisher Stakeholder sensitization in 2016 but later halted due to lack of resources. No external natural resource organizations have been brought on board for support. Effective implementation of sustainable fisheries resources management/utilization has been faced with inadequate to lack

of “sustainability will” among fisher stakeholders as use of unsustainable fishing practices (illegal gears) has been on the increase despite some sensitization undertaken. There is no longer self-policing among fishers against unsustainable practices. Bigger challenge being inadequate to lack of government personnel in all fishery camp stations except a lean staff at district offices, this is common in Mweru-Luapula and Bangweulu fishery areas despite FMPS and IPs being in place. The research wing has embarked on studies to identify and demarcate fish breeding areas. Central government has continued to finance implementation of annual fishing ban meanwhile partially, the local authority have begun to get involved in mobilizing resources for monitoring unsustainable fishing practices.

Forest cover: The total forest area in the country is estimated at 44.17 million hectares representing 58.7% of the country land surface area.

Growing stock: The total growing stock is estimated at 3,178 million m³ distributed across provinces of which the highest proportion was found in North-Western Province (34%) and the lowest in Lusaka Province (2.4%). The majority of this volume, 2,602 million m³, is contained in forest woodlands commonly referred to as miombo.

Biomass: Total biomass in the standing trees (dbh > 10 cm) was estimated at 2.74 billion tons, while for the saplings (dbh 5 - 9.9 cm) it was estimated at 220.9 million tons. Biomass from the stumps and lying dead wood was estimated at 68.4 million tons and 107.4 million tons respectively. Biomass in standing trees varied across provinces: North-Western Province recorded the highest (113.2 tons/ha) while the lowest biomass was recorded in Lusaka Province (55.9 tons/ha). Standard error of mean forest biomass (above-ground biomass) was 2.4 tons/ha representing a 6.9%.

Carbon: Total carbon from standing trees was estimated at 1.34 billion tons compared to 108.3 million tons from saplings, 33.5 million tons from stumps and 52.6 million tons from dead wood. Carbon content was highest in North-Western Province (55.5tons/ha) and the lowest was recorded in Lusaka Province (27.4 tons/ha).

Species abundance: More than 200 tree species are found in Zambia. Species such as *Julbernardia paniculata* are the most abundant species.

Pterocarpus angolensis, which is regarded as one of the most valuable timber species in the country, was among the 10 most abundant tree species. This species was also found to be the most abundant tree in Luapula Province.

Regeneration: Seedlings with a height of less than 1.3 m represented 80% of seedlings counted during the inventory assessment done in Zambia. The highest density of seedlings in the country was found in Muchinga Province and the lowest in Southern and Copperbelt Provinces. This suggests that forests in Muchinga have higher regeneration potential than forests in Southern or Copperbelt Provinces.

Deforestation: Based on a land cover change analysis between 2000 and 2014, the official annual deforestation rate was estimated to be 0.6%; losing approximately 276,021 ha per annum from 2000 to 2014. This rate is presented and endorsed as the official deforestation rate for Zambia. The drivers of deforestation have been identified as agricultural expansion, timber extraction, bush fires, mining, land use and infrastructure development.

Forests and livelihood: The national average of forest area cleared per household was estimated at 0.73 ha in 2015. Forest clearing for agriculture was highest in Lusaka Province and lowest in Luapula Province, suggesting that provinces with a high income cleared more forest area than provinces with a low income.

Forests and wooded land, and particularly the forest woodland vegetation, continue to be the main source of livelihood in all the provinces of Zambia. Overall crop production ranked first as a main livelihood activity. Wood and non-wood forest products collection at household level was among the top ten activities contributing to household income in Zambia. Of these forest products, charcoal and fuelwood contributed more to household income than other products assessed. The distance and time taken to reach forest collection areas varied from province to province, and overall respondents indicated that the time and distance necessary to travel to these sites was increasing.

Lower Plants

550 excluder plants (plants that can absorb heavy metals in mining areas)

were successfully collected and identified in tailing dams around Kitwe, Mufulira and Luanshya districts. In 2013, Zambia conducted a nationwide aerial survey which established the baseline for wildlife species for large mammals including elephants as the iconic species. A follow up aerial survey was conducted in 2015 restricted to elephant range areas i.e the Kafue ecosystem, Luangwa Valley ecosystem, the lower Zambezi Ecosystem and the Sioma Ngwezi. 2015 also saw the wet season aerial survey for the Kafue echo. Quotas for sustainable production and utilisation of wildlife is based on the above mentioned aerial surveys, signings and hunting efforts

Implementation has been slow due to inadequate financial and human resources, and equipment to implement strategies. Programmes are budgeted for and approved by parliament but there is no corresponding release of funds. No comprehensive fish species inventory have been undertaken in the past four (4) years, but a few fish species monitoring surveys were conducted in all commercial fishing areas.

Inadequate Financial support to conduct intensive sampling of the distribution of lower plants. The country will have a wider understanding of the distribution of lower plants and identify lesser-known species and their uses to benefit forest user groups.

Aerial surveys are costly in terms of finance and qualified personnel, ground counts also require sufficient manpower, effective aerial surveys can only be done in the dry season.

Promote sustainable utilization of resources within limits

[DegradationWithinEcoregions_ZMB.png](#)

Human, financial and material resources for undertaking baseline studies for most resources are inadequate.

Promote effective information exchange and knowledge management on biodiversity conservation and its sustainable use

Biofin WhatsApp group has been effective in information exchange

on biodiversity issues

Promote sustainable agricultural practices

[DegradationWithinEcoregions_ZMB.png](#)

[CarbonSequestrationPotential_ZMB.png](#)

The adoption levels of conservation agriculture remains low as there are concerns on the level of productivity and the ability to achieve food security using this farming systems.

Promote alternative renewable energy technologies

Low levels of adoption rates of some renewable energy sources coupled with the perceived cheap level of charcoal making it widely used among households

Strictly enforce EIA and SEA provisions of the Environmental Management Act (2011)

The measure relates to target 5 on reducing the rate of deforestation
www.zema.org.zm

Institutionalise integrated land use planning across sectors

The measure contributes to the achievement of national target 5 on reducing the rate of deforestation. Urban and Regional Planning Act of 2015 has been enacted which is intended to strengthen spatial planning in the country. This legislation will strengthen the capacity of institutions to promote land use planning. The Act makes it mandatory for local authorities to undertake integrated land use planning, indicating priority areas for environmental management. Guidelines for Integrated Development Planning were developed in 2012 to guide IDP preparation. National Urbanisation Policy is being developed to

ensure sustainable urbanization.

[EcoregionProtection_ZMB.png](#)

Promote community-public-private partnerships in fisheries management areas

The measure relates to national target 6 on fisheries co-management. An assessment of the institutional landscape the fisheries sector has been carried out with Government pumping in huge capital investment in the sector to promote it. A World Bank funded project on aquaculture development has been started. The program has targeted empowering communities, particularly the youth by providing them with training in aquaculture before providing them with loans

Improve monitoring capacity among key stakeholders (Government, industry, communities) to curb illegal fishing activities

The measure relates to national target 6 on fisheries co-management. Guidelines for fisheries co management and promotion of entrepreneurs in fisheries have been developed. This has been strengthened with the training of fisheries entrepreneurs, particularly the youths before providing them with funding to engage in fisheries management

Develop an equitable benefit distribution system (BDS) for key stakeholders engaged in fisheries co-management

The measure relates to target 6 on fisheries co-management. An assessment of an equitable benefit sharing mechanism in fisheries sector has been undertaken and used in the disbursement of grants and loans to beneficiaries to engage in fish farming

Promote natural restocking in fishery management areas and other fish depleted water bodies by protecting fish breeding areas

This measure relates to target 6 on fisheries co-management. An assessment of fish stocks in Zambia's fisheries areas has been carried with the re stocking needs identified. The breeding grounds of the fisheries have been identified. A fishing ban has been imposed each year from November to March, which is the spawning period to enable the fish to breed.

Promote sustainable agriculture practices in areas designated for agricultural production in line with national, regional and international standards

The measure relates to target 7 on sustainable managing areas under agriculture. The Ministry of Agriculture has introduced Climate-Smart Agriculture (CSA) approach which is a sustainable means of farming to address loss of biodiversity. CSA addresses productivity, climate change adaptation and also results in reduced GHG emissions (mitigation)

Promote aquaculture in identified areas and ensure that the practice does not contribute to erosion/extinction of indigenous species

The measure relates to national target 7 on agricultural lands. Zambia Aquaculture Enterprise Development (ZAEDP) was launched in August 2017 with support from the African Development Bank (AfDB) with the aim of increasing aquaculture production and productivity and enhancing entrepreneurship in aquaculture. Five aquaculture parks have been identified and being developed to create enabling environment for the growth of the aquaculture sector. Land-based aquaculture are situated in Rufunsa, Kasempa and Mungwi. Lake-based aquaculture parks are situated in Chipopo

(Kariba) and Bangweulu (Samfya). The Project will strengthen (19) Government Fish Farms and Aquaculture Research Stations to be able to produce quality fingerlings and provide aquaculture extension services in order to contribute to increased fish production.

Mainstream climate change adaptation measures that will enhance the resiliency of priority ecosystems

Inadequate financing for adaptation, and also the challenge of time taken to demonstrate impacts of adaptation on livelihoods as building resilience takes long.

Promote community forest management, joint forest management and private forest management as provided for in the Forestry Policy (2014) and Forest Act (2015)

[EcosystemServiceUsage_ZMB.png](#)

Resolving issues of land ownership's difficult as these are in customary areas.

Promote the management of wildfires in biodiversity areas such as forests, GMAs, NPs and wetlands

[DegradationWithinEcoregions_ZMB.png](#)

Inadequate fire equipment, inadequate management of existing fire breaks, inadequate trained personnel in fire management, expensive software.

Promote the management of National Parks and GMAs under Management Plans


This measure contributes to the achievement of national target 7 on sustainable managing areas under agriculture. All 40 Game Management Areas (GMAs) have management plans and encroachment is minimized, however, it is important to state

that some human activities, including settlements, are allowed in GMAs, unlike the core National Parks. General Management Plans (GMP) contributed to the sustainable management of National Parks, out of the 20 National Parks, 8 have GMPs and are being sustainably managed. Four have expired GMP, two have draft GMPs while 7 do not have any at all.

The GMPs development process takes into account assessing and updating of corridors. Most of the wildlife corridors have been incorporated in the development of GMPs for the national parks and the GMAs.

[ProtectedAreaManagementEffectiveness_ZMB.png](#)

As GMAs are not restricted areas in some human activities, there has been encroachment in most of them.



Regularise Forest Management Plans for NPs to ensure connectivity, habitat resilience and ultimate refugia for wildlife in face of climate

change

[ProtectedConnectedIndex_ZMB.png](#)

Rezone GMAs (legally), identify and map wildlife refugia taking into account existing land uses (e.g settlements, agriculture and infrastructure)

Outdated GMPs which are not updated for some time due to inadequate resources.

Revise EIA regulations to provide for strict enforcement of provisions in the EMA on pollution control management

The measure relates to national target 8 on reducing pollution. The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) regulations were reviewed to align them with the Environmental Management Act No. 12 of 2011. This was accompanied by several changes to the regulations. In the absence of updated regulations, the EIA Regulations of 1997 are still being used for regulating the EIA process.

Delays in finalization (approval) of EIA regulations, inadequate financial resources and inadequate capacity (human, financial and equipment) for environmental monitoring

Oblige all industries to contribute to the Environmental Protection Fund (EPF)

The Environmental Protection Fund (EPF) was created through legislation to cater for mining industries in addressing any environmental liabilities upon closure of mining operations. The Mines make contributions to the fund but can claim their contributions back, if after closure, the audit confirms that they have no environmental liabilities left. The main obstacle is legal, as including other industries would require amending the Act which created this fund and at the moment this has not received support

Lobbying for parliamentary ratification of the customary land bill

Measures taken to contribute to the implementation of your country's national biodiversity strategy and action plan

The measure relates to national target 16 on traditional knowledge and innovations. Measure not undertaken

National Target(s)

By 2020, the traditional knowledge, innovations and practices of local communities relevant to the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, are respected, subject to national legislation and relevant international obligations are respected and fully integrated in the implementation of the Convention with participation of local communities at all relevant levels

Assessment of the effectiveness of the implementation measure taken in achieving desired outcomes

Unknown

tools or methodology used for the assessment of effectiveness above
there has been no measure undertaken and so no assessment done

EN

Other relevant information

The lobbying was premised on the customary land bill being developed but this has not been done.

EN

Obstacles and scientific and technical needs related to the measure taken

The formulation of the customary land bill has been hindered due to the absence of the National Land Policy. The country has been working on putting in place a National Policy on Land and it was assumed that the bill would be developed based on the Policy

Documentation of traditional knowledge, innovations and biocultural practices for biodiversity conservation

Measures taken to contribute to the implementation of your country's

national biodiversity strategy and action plan

The measure relates to national target 16 on traditional knowledge and innovations. An Act of Parliament on the Protection of Traditional Knowledge, Genetic Resources and Expressions of Folklore of 2016 was passed. The Act provides a transparent legal framework for the protection of, and use of traditional knowledge, genetic resources and expressions of folklore, which also guarantees equitable sharing of benefits and effective participation of holders.

National Target(s)

By 2020, the traditional knowledge, innovations and practices of local communities relevant to the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, are respected, subject to national legislation and relevant international obligations are respected and fully integrated in the implementation of the Convention with participation of local communities at all relevant levels

Assessment of the effectiveness of the implementation measure taken in achieving desired outcomes

Measure taken has been partially effective

tools or methodology used for the assessment of effectiveness above

Existence of legal framework on statute books, hydrological monitoring, ecological assessments, visitation levels to the sites, reports on proposed developments and human wildlife conflict.

Other relevant information

Documentation of indigenous knowledge was undertaken between 2010-2014 within the context of the proposed nomination of the Barotse Plains as a World Cultural Landscape. NHCC intends to resume research towards the nomination of the site next year. One of the focus areas will be on the traditional management system. The World Heritage Committee Referral Decision highlights, among others.

In the planning and conservation of natural heritage sites, local community beliefs associated with sites are considered. Among all waterfalls in the country, have spiritual sites associated with communities living around them. Areas considered by the traditional communities to be sacred are recognized in the management plans of the site. National Heritage Conservation Commission has also finalized the Strategic Plan 2019-2023. One of the SP strategies is to “encourage and strengthen the utilization of indigenous knowledge in heritage management to promote the conservation of heritage sites and objectives and prevent the loss of indigenous knowledge.

Other relevant website address or attached documents

[The World Heritage Committee Referral Decision](#)

Obstacles and scientific and technical needs related to the measure taken

- inadequate financial resources
- some aspects of indigenous knowledge are considered sensitive and therefore accessing
- it is not easy
- inadequate time, as documenting indigenous knowledge is time-consuming
- inadequate equipment such as motor vehicles to undertake field visits

<unquote>

International supports

RAMSAR Convention

[The Ramsar Convention](#) on wetlands entered into force in Zambia in December 1991.

Bangweulu Swamps

Site number: 531 | Country: Zambia | Administrative region: Northern Province, Luapula Province, Central Province Area: 1,100,000 ha | Coordinates: 11°25'S 29°58'59"E | Designation dates: 28-08-1991 View Site details in RSIS Bangweulu Swamps. 28/08/91; Northern Province; 1,100,000 ha; 11°25'S 029°59'E.

*Includes National Parks, Game Management Areas. In addition to providing a breeding ground for birds, fishes and wildlife (e.g., the African elephant *Loxodonta africana*, the buffalo *Syncerus caffer*, and Sitatunga*

Tragelaphus spekei), the site is known to support large numbers of the endemic, semi-aquatic Black Lechwe (vulnerable *Kobus leche*) and is home to the threatened Wattled crane (*Grus carunculatus*), as well as the only home in Zambia for the threatened Shoebill (*Balaeniceps rex*). The swamp is a natural flood controller and important for groundwater recharge and water quality control. The site contains the historical Nachikufu caves with bushman paintings, maintained by the National Heritage Conservation Commission. Threats to the wetland such as poaching will be addressed by the National Wetlands Steering Committee with a proposed general management plan that will steer development away from sensitive habitats. The Zambian Wildlife Authority in collaboration with WWF-Zambia is collaborating on improving sustainable livelihoods and ecotourism possibilities. The site was extended from 250,000 to 1,100,000 ha on 2 February 2007.

The Convention Partners

- BirdLife International
- International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN)
- International Water Management Institute (IWMI)
- Wetlands International
- WWF International

Nagoya Protocol and ICCA Consortium

In *Plunderers of Eden*, I wrote:

The Convention on Biodiversity on 29 October 2010 in Japan produced the Aichi Biodiversity targets and strategic plan for 2011–2020; the Convention also giving birth to a supplementary agreement, the Nagoya Protocol

on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization (ABS). This protocol provided a legal framework for the 193 Contracting Parties (including Zambia):

- 1. Take measures providing that genetic resources utilized within their jurisdiction have been accessed in accordance with prior informed consent, and that mutually agreed terms have been established, as required by another contracting party*
- 2. Cooperate in cases of the alleged violation of another contracting party's requirements*
- 3. Encourage contractual provisions on dispute resolution in mutually agreed terms*
- 4. Ensure an opportunity is available to seek recourse under their legal systems when disputes arise from mutually agreed terms*
- 5. Take measures regarding access to justice*
- 6. Take measures to monitor the utilization of genetic resources after they leave a country including by designating effective checkpoints at any stage of the value-chain: research, development, innovation, pre-commercialization or commercialization*

Then the NGO, Natural Justice: Lawyers for Communities and the Environment, established in South Africa in 2007, took this all further, developing biocultural community protocols and a toolkit for community facilitators. As Kabir Sanjay Bavikatte wrote in his blog, '*Biocultural community protocols and the future of conservation*' in justconservation.org on 9 September 2014:

"The rights of communities in the swathe of legal instruments birthed by the Convention on Biological Diversity are rooted in the principle that effective conservation and sustainable use of ecosystems can only be ensured by recognizing the rights of those who manage and govern these ecosystems as common pool resources. These rights are increasingly

referred to in law as 'biocultural rights' and are justified not on the basis of communities having a formal legal title to certain lands and waters, but on the basis of historical stewardship founded on the cultural practices and spiritual beliefs."

The development of a biocultural community protocol (BCP) in July 2014 between the Bushmen and Namibian government in the Bwabwata National Park is a massive step forward in the way we view property and ecosystem resources and just how we secure protected areas – the public commons, that were once part of the customary commons. But it remains to be seen how the protocol deals with the mining plans of Rio Tinto for the park. In 2017 the park was battling to save its elephant from extinction.

Lending massive force to the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol is the ICAA Consortium, a Swiss-based institution created in October 2008 and promoting 'Indigenous Peoples' and Community Conserved Areas and Territories' and closely collaborating with the Secretariat of the CBD, UNEP, IUCN, GEF and others.

The Nagoya Protocol and the ICAA Consortium were really conceived at the Fifth World Parks Congress in Durban in 2003 - the year I started work on my Landsafe framework – where it was 'clarified that indigenous peoples and local communities – crucial actors in conservation – should be fully recognized in their governance roles; and where indigenous peoples representatives made clear that the 'respect of their rights would actually advance, rather than diminish, conservation outcomes'. In 2004 the CBD at CoP7 approved the CBD Program of Work on Protected Areas (PoWPA), which supports a "new approach" to protected areas, calling for attention to governance types and quality, equity in conservation, and indigenous peoples' rights'.

All GMAs in Zambia fit the ICAA Consortium definition, being populated to a lesser or greater degree by:

- 1) A people or community closely connected to a well-defined territory,*

area or species (e.g., because of survival and dependence for livelihood, because of historical and cultural reasons);

2) The community is the major player in decision-making (governance) and implementation regarding the management of the territory, area or species, implying that a community institution has the capacity to develop and enforce regulations; (in many situations other stakeholders are involved, but primary decision-making rests de facto with the community);

3) The community management decisions and efforts lead to the conservation of the territory, area or species and associated cultural values (the conscious objective of management may be different than conservation per se, and be, for instance, related to material livelihood, water security, safeguarding of cultural and spiritual places, etc.)

In September 2014, as Natural Justice reported, the UN General Assembly adopted the Outcome Document of the World Conference on Indigenous Peoples (World Conference), reaffirming: a) support for the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; b) commitments to obtain free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting Indigenous peoples' lands or territories and other resources, c) commitments to acknowledge, advance and adjudicate the rights of Indigenous peoples pertaining to lands, territories and resources; and d) the significant contribution of indigenous peoples to the promotion of sustainable development and ecosystem management, including their associated knowledge.

From 2016 Zambia became Party to the [Nagoya Protocol](#) on Access and Benefit Sharing:

Community Protocols

Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities all over Africa are the original custodians of their lands and natural resources. Their traditional knowledge and practices play an important role in the conservation and

sustainable use of biodiversity. However, communities usually do not receive fair benefits from the use of their resources. Their traditional knowledge is not valued and is often under threat.

A number of new policy frameworks are trying to share the costs and benefits of conservation more equitably. One such framework is the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing (ABS) under the Convention on Biological Diversity. For the first time, this legally binding international framework gives rights to communities over traditional knowledge and genetic resources.

The implementation of these frameworks brings opportunities for communities in Africa and elsewhere. Nevertheless, they also bear risks if they are not implemented in respect of community rights, and if they do not take into account local realities.

We Aim To:

- 1. Protect traditional knowledge and ensure fair and equitable benefit sharing.*
- 2. Ensure the responsible implementation of the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing.*
- 3. Support communities who want to engage in ABS negotiations, or who are already part of ABS value chains.*

We Do This By:

- 1. Defending the rights of communities to their genetic resources and traditional knowledge, including the protection and revitalisation of that knowledge.*
- 2. Providing information, training and assistance on ABS, including through the development of community protocols, and by facilitating dialogue with other actors.*
- 3. Providing technical input into the development of national ABS frameworks and engaging with regional and international policy processes to ensure that community rights remain*

This led directly in the same year to the Zambian legislation, [The Protection of Traditional Knowledge, Genetic Resources and Expressions of Folklore Act No. 16 of 2016](#)

IUCN - International Union for Conservation of Nature

The official position of the IUCN is as follows:

19.21 Indigenous People and the Sustainable Use of Natural Resources

ACKNOWLEDGING the major international Covenants of 1966 on Civil and Political Rights, and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, according to which **no people may under any circumstances be deprived of its means of subsistence**;

RECALLING that the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development, in Chapter 26 of Agenda 21, recognized the valuable role of indigenous people and local communities in maintaining sustainable use of nature's resources and underlined, in Principle 22 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the importance of the active participation of indigenous people in environmental management;

CONSCIOUS of the conclusions in the World Commission on Environment and Development report of 1987 on the need for empowerment of vulnerable groups to promote citizen participation in sustainable development;

COGNISANT of the International Labour Organisation Convention 169, which lends support to the special relationships that exist between indigenous people and nature;

NOTING that the United Nations has begun preparation of a Draft Universal

Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People and has declared the Decade of Indigenous People; The General Assembly of IUCN - The World Conservation Union, at its 19th Session in Buenos Aires, Argentina, 17-26 January 1994:

1. DECLARES its continued commitment to advancing the principles contained in the above-cited Conventions and Agreements and to further their integration in the work of IUCN;

2. CALLS on governments, and especially State members of IUCN, to recognize and give effect in their national policies and programmes for sustainable use and development to the principles relating to indigenous people contained in the Covenants and Agreements cited above.

Note. This Recommendation was adopted by consensus. The delegations of the State members Australia and New Zealand indicated that had there been a vote; they would have abstained because their countries had not adopted or ratified ILO Convention 169, in the case of New Zealand because of the special position accorded to the Maori people by the Treaty of Waitangi.

The European Commission's NaturAfrica Initiative (2020)

In June 2020, Chris Lang of REDD-Monitor produced an article entitled: *The EU's NaturAfrica must avoid colonialism in conservation: Protected areas should be managed by Indigenous Peoples themselves:*

"On 11 December 2019, European Commission published a Communication setting out a [European Green Deal](#) for the European Union and its citizens. The Communication referred to its Comprehensive Strategy with Africa, and mentioned an initiative called "NaturAfrica":

The EU will launch a "NaturAfrica" initiative to tackle biodiver-

sity loss by creating a network of protected areas to protect wildlife and offer opportunities in green sectors for local populations.

In March 2020, the European Commission published a Communication titled, "[Towards a comprehensive Strategy with Africa](#)", and "NaturAfrica" got another brief mention:

The EU and Africa should take joint action to protect and reduce pressure on forests, water and marine ecosystems while enhancing their management by tackling illegal harvesting and combating environmental crime, thereby tackling the drivers of biodiversity loss. This can be done inter alia by launching a 'NaturAfrica' initiative.

Inclusive and holistic

In February 2020, a group of 14 NGOs put out a [Briefing](#) titled, "Making the European Green Deal work for international partnerships". The Briefing recommends:

An inclusive and holistic approach to 'NaturAfrica'. The NaturAfrica Initiative outlined in the Communication should be developed in consultation with all stakeholders, with particular attention to local communities, indigenous peoples, and women. It should support African governments and local populations to tackle major drivers of biodiversity loss and environmental degradation in a holistic and systematic way, including support for well managed protected area networks that involve and respect the rights of communities and indigenous peoples. The Initiative should include integrated land/seascape approaches to address unsustainable use of natural resources and ecosystem degradation, particularly freshwater and forest ecosystems, tackle illegal wildlife trafficking, corruption and poor natural resource governance.

The Guardians' Assemblies must resist their subjugation.

Zambia demographic and health survey 2018.

The comprehensive [2018 survey](#) of the health of Zambians is summarised:

2 Housing Characteristics

Drinking water: In Zambia, 72% of households have access to an improved water source. ■ Sanitation: 54% of households have access to improved sanitation. ■ Electricity: 34% of households have electricity (69% in urban areas and 8% in rural areas). ■ Household population and composition: The Zambian population is relatively young; almost half of the population (48%) is age 0-14, while only 3% is age 65 or older.

3 Characteristics

■ *Literacy: Two-thirds (66%) of women and 82% of men age 15-49 are literate. ■ Exposure to mass media: Only 5% of women and 13% of men have access to three specified types of mass media (newspaper, television,*

and radio) on a weekly basis. ■ *Internet use:* Overall, 12% of women and 26% of men age 15-49 have used the internet in the past 12 months. ■ *Employment:* 45% of women are currently employed, as compared with 75% of men age 15-49. Among those employed in the 12 months preceding the survey, 34% of women and 31% of men work in agriculture. ■ *Health insurance:* Health insurance coverage is low, with only 2% of women and 3% of men age 15-49 having any type of health insurance. ■ *Tobacco:* One percent of women and 19% of men age 15-49 smoke tobacco.

4 Marriage and Sexual Activity

Current marital status: Fifty-six percent of women and 50% of men age 15-49 are currently married or living together with a partner as if married. ■ *Polygyny:* Eleven percent of women age 15-49 have one or more co-wives. ■ *Median age at first marriage:* Median age at first marriage is 19.1 years among women and 24.4 years among men age 25-49. ■ *Age at first sexual intercourse:* Seventeen percent of women had sexual intercourse by age 15, as compared with 11% of men. ■ *Median age at first sexual intercourse:* Median age at first sexual intercourse is 16.6 years among woman.

5 Fertility

Total fertility rate (TFR): The TFR in Zambia is 4.7 children per woman. Urban areas have a lower TFR (3.4) than rural areas (5.8). ■ *Median birth interval:* The median birth interval in Zambia is 38.3 months. ■ *Menopause:* The percentage of women who are menopausal ranges from 4% among those aged 30-34 to 46% among those aged 48-49. ■ *Median age at first birth:* The median age at first birth among women age 20-49 is 19.2 years. ■ *Teenage motherhood:* The percentage of women age 15-19 who have begun childbearing increases with age, from 6% among those age 15 to 53% among those age 19.

6 Fertility Preferences

▪ *Desire for another child:* Seventeen percent of currently married women age 15-49 want to have another child soon, and 35% want to wait at least 2 years before having another child. ▪ *Limiting childbearing:* Overall, 38% of women do not want another child or are sterilised. ▪ *Ideal family size:* Women prefer 4.6 children as their ideal family size, as compared with 4.9 children among men. ▪ *Unwanted births:* Of all births in the past 5 years and current pregnancies, 62% were wanted at the time of conception, 33% were mistimed, and 5% were not wanted. ▪ *Wanted fertility:* The total wanted fertility rate (4.0) is lower than the actual fertility rate (4.7)

7 Famil Planning

▪ *Contraceptive use:* The contraceptive prevalence rate (CPR) among currently married women age 15-49 is 50%. ▪ *Contraceptive discontinuation:* In the 5 years preceding the survey, 36% of episodes of contraceptive use were discontinued within 12 months. The most common reason for discontinuation was wanting to become pregnant (30%). ▪ *Demand for family planning:* Total demand for family planning among currently married women increased from 45% in 1992 to 69% in 2018. ▪ *Unmet need for family planning:* Twenty percent of currently married women have an unmet need for family planning. ▪ *Future use of contraception:* Sixty percent of currently married women who are not using contraception intend to use family planning in the future.

8 Child Mortality

▪ *Current levels:* In the 5 years before the survey, neonatal, infant, and under-5 mortality rates were 27, 42, and 61 deaths per 1,000 live births, respectively. ▪ *Trends:* Neonatal mortality increased from 24 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2013-14 to 27 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2018.

Under-5 mortality declined from 75 deaths per 1,000 live births to 61 deaths per 1,000 live births over the same period. ■ Perinatal mortality: The perinatal mortality rate for the 5 years before the survey was 33 deaths per 1,000 pregnancies.

9 Maternal Health Care

■ *Antenatal care: The majority of women (97%) age 15-49 who had a live birth in the 5 years preceding the survey received antenatal care (ANC) from a skilled provider during their most recent birth. Sixty-four percent had at least four ANC visits. ■ Components of antenatal care: Most women who received antenatal care for their most recent pregnancy had a blood sample taken (96%), had their blood pressure measured (95%), and had a urine sample taken (65%). ■ Delivery services: More than 8 in 10 live births in the past 5 years were delivered in a health facility (84%). ■ Postnatal care: Seventy percent of mothers and 72% of newborns had a postnatal check during the first 2 days after delivery*

10 Child Health

■ *Birth weight: Information on birth weight was obtained for 80% of the births in the last 5 years. Among births with a reported birth weight, 9% had a low birth weight (less than 2.5 kg). ■ Vaccinations: Overall, 75% of children age 12-23 months had received all basic vaccinations by the time of the survey, and 46% had received all age-appropriate vaccinations. ■ Symptoms of acute respiratory infection (ARI): Two percent of children under age 5 had symptoms of ARI in the 2 weeks before the survey. Advice or treatment was sought for 76% of children with ARI symptoms; 40% were taken for advice or treatment the same or next day. ■ Diarrhoea: Fifteen percent of children under age 5 had diarrhoea in the 2 weeks before the survey, and advice or treatment was sought for 69% of these children. Seventyeight percent of children with diarrhoea received oral rehydration therapy (ORT), and 34% received a combination of oral rehydration salts*

(ORS) and zinc. Fifteen percent of children with diarrhoea received no treatment.

11 Nutrition Children and Women

■ *Nutritional status of children:* Thirty-five percent of children under age 5 are stunted (short for their age), 4% are wasted (thin for their height), 12% are underweight (thin for their age), and 5% are overweight (heavy for their height). ■ *Breastfeeding:* Almost all children (98%) born in the 2 years before the survey were breastfed at some point. Seven in 10 children age 0-5 months are exclusively breastfed. ■ *Minimum acceptable diet:* Overall, 13% of children age 6-23 months were fed a minimum acceptable diet in the 24 hours before the survey. ■ *Anaemia:* The prevalence of anaemia in children age 6-59 months is 58%. One-third (31%) of women age 15-49 are anaemic.

12 Malaria

■ *Household possession of mosquito nets:* Although the percentage of households with at least one insecticide-treated net (ITN) increased from 12% in 2001-02 to 78% in 2018, there remains a gap with respect to the availability of sufficient nets to cover all household members, with only 41% of households reporting having at least one ITN for every two residents. ■ *Use of mosquito nets by children:* Sixty-four percent of children under age 5 in households with at least one ITN slept under an ITN the night prior to the survey. ■ *Indoor residual spraying (IRS) against mosquitoes:* Sixty-one percent of households had at least one ITN for every two persons and/or IRS in the past 12 months. ■ *Use of intermittent preventive treatment (IPTp) by women during pregnancy:* Ninety-four percent of pregnant women received one or more doses of SP/Fansidar, 81% received two or more doses, and only 59% received three or more doses. ■ *Prevalence, diagnosis, and prompt treatment of children with fever:* Sixteen percent of children under age 5 had a fever in the 2 weeks

prior to the survey. ■ Type of antimalarial drugs used: Ninety-seven percent of children with fever who took an antimalarial took artemisinin-based combination therapy (ACT). ■ Haemoglobin <8.0 g/dl in children: Four percent of children age 6-59 months have haemoglobin levels below 8.0 g/dl.

13 HIV/Aids

■ Comprehensive knowledge of HIV: Less than half (46%) of women and men age 15-49 have comprehensive knowledge about HIV. ■ Knowledge of mother-to-child transmission of HIV: Sixty percent of women and 50% of men age 15-49 know that HIV can be transmitted during pregnancy, during labour/delivery, or by breastfeeding. ■ Multiple sexual partners: Two percent of women and 15% of men age 15-49 reported having two or more sexual partners in the 12 months prior to the survey. ■ Condom use: Thirty-five percent of women and 54% of men reported using a condom during their last sexual intercourse with a nonmarital or noncohabiting partner. ■ Coverage of HIV testing: Eighty-five percent of women and 75% of men age 15-49 have ever been tested for HIV and received the test results. ■ Male circumcision: Thirty-two percent of men age 15-49 are circumcised.

14 HIV

■ HIV prevalence: Overall, 11.1% of women and men age 15-49 in Zambia are infected with HIV; HIV prevalence is higher among women than men (14.2% versus 7.5%). ■ HIV prevalence by residence: HIV prevalence is twice as high in urban areas as in rural areas (15.9% versus 7.1%). ■ HIV prevalence according to province: HIV prevalence is highest in Copperbelt (15.4%), where it is nearly three times as high as in Muchinga (5.4%) and Northern (5.6%). ■ HIV prevalence among young people: Overall, 3.8% of young women and men age 15-24 are HIV positive. HIV prevalence is higher among young women than young men

(5.6% versus 1.8%). ■ *HIV prevalence by circumcision: HIV prevalence is 5.9% among men age 15-49 who have been circumcised (by either traditional or medical practitioners) and 8.3% among men who have not been circumcised.*

15 Mortality

■ *Adult mortality: One hundred sixty-seven of every 1,000 women and 234 of every 1,000 men age 15 are expected to die before age 50.* ■ *Maternal mortality: Maternal deaths account for 10% of all deaths among women age 15-49.* ■ *Lifetime risk of maternal death: At current fertility and mortality rates, 1 in every 100 women in Zambia will die from maternal causes.* ■ *Maternal mortality ratio: The maternal mortality ratio for the 7-year period before the 2018 ZDHS is estimated at 252 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births.* ■ *Pregnancy-related mortality ratio: The estimated pregnancy-related mortality ratio for the 7-year period preceding the 2018 ZDHS is 278 deaths per 100,000 live births.*

16 Women's Empowerment

■ *Decision on how wife's cash earnings are used: Thirty-one percent of married women mainly decide on their own how to use their cash earnings.* ■ *Ownership of house and land: Among both women and men, ownership of a house or land is higher in rural areas than in urban areas.* ■ *Women's participation in decision making: Fifty-seven percent of currently married women make decisions either alone or jointly with their husband about their own health care, daily household purchases, major household purchases, and visits to their family and relatives.* ■ *Attitude towards wife beating: Forty-six percent of women agree with at least one specified reason justifying wife beating, as compared with 26% of men age 15-49.* ■ *Negotiating sexual relations: Men (66%) are more likely than women (56%) to believe that a woman is justified in refusing*

sex when she knows that her husband has sex with other women.

17 Domestic Violence

■ *Experience of violence: More than one-third (36%) of women age 15-49 have experienced physical violence at least once since age 15, and 18% experienced physical violence within the 12 months prior to the survey.* ■ *Marital control: Thirty-two percent of ever-married women age 15-49 reported that their current or most recent husband or partner has ever exhibited at least three types of specified controlling behaviours.* ■ *Spousal violence: Forty-seven percent of ever-married women have experienced physical, sexual, or emotional violence by their current or most recent husband or partner.* ■ *Injuries due to spousal violence: Among ever-married women who had experienced spousal physical violence in the past 12 months, 35% reported having sustained physical injuries.* ■ *Help seeking: More than half (52%) of women never sought help and never told anyone about the violence they had experienced.*

III

NEOCOLONIALIST INTRUSIONS

The WEIRD White Man

Joseph Henrich makes a thoroughly empirically based argument showing that a people's psychology is heavily structured by their kin-based institutions and norms; and that the WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic) characteristics of Europeans can be directly connected to their monogamous families, weak kinship ties, and development of institutions based on impartial and impersonal (as opposed to interpersonal) norms.

[Ricardo Duchesne](#) - *Has Kinship Been The Foundational Institution Shaping Human Psychology Throughout History?* — 5

The real problem of humanity is the following: we have paleolithic emotions; medieval institutions; and god-like technology. And it is terrifically dangerous, and it is now approaching a point of crisis overall.

E. O. Wilson, who also said, "Free will is an illusion."

* * *

The main population involved with imperialism, colonialism, mercantilism - and now neocolonialism and globalization, are North Americans and Western Europeans:

Europe 196.5 million

North America 370 million

Total: 566.5 million (.566 billion)

World population 7.8 billion

Rounding this up to .6 billion people out of 8 billion gives a figure of 7.5%. This is the hardcore, being joined by Westerners elsewhere, giving a percentage of about 12% of the world's population.

Joseph Henrich's book, *[The WEIRDest People](#) in the World: How the West Became Psychologically Peculiar and Particularly Prosperous* (September 2020), explains the massive psychological and neurological difference between Westerners, 12 % of the world's population - and the rest of humans. He says the white man is WEIRD: Western, educated, industrialized, rich and democratic; the non-Westerner remarkable for high kinship intensity resulting in his prevalence of shame rather than guilt, in-group loyalty rather than universalism, nepotism rather than impartiality, and holistic rather than analytic thinking. As [Alec Mackiel](#) comments:

The central argument of Henrich and his collaborators is that there has been and continues to be an over-reliance on WEIRD samples in research. And while many of these findings purport to shed light on the human mind and behavior in general, they actually only illuminate the psychology of a small proportion of the human species. WEIRD people make up only around 12 percent of the world's population and yet over 90 percent of the subjects in psychology research. While this methodological critique was and continues to be extremely important for researchers, it left the question of how WEIRD psychology came to be, unresolved.

Explaining WEIRD psychology, together with elucidating the key factors that contributed to the scaling-up of small Western societies into large complex states, are the two central focuses of The WEIRDest People in the World. Joseph Henrich addresses them in this sweeping and magisterial book, likely to become as foundational to cultural psychology as the WEIRD acronym he and his colleagues coined a decade ago.

The Harvard Gazette Interview

GAZETTE: How did [WEIRD societies originate?](#)

HENRICH: It goes back to medieval European history and to a set of prohibitions, taboos, and prescriptions about the family that were developed by one particular branch of Christianity. This branch, which evolved into the Roman Catholic Church, established, during late antiquity in the early Middle Ages, a series of taboos on cousin marriage, a campaign against polygamous marriage, and new inheritance customs, where individuals could inherit as individuals rather than after someone dies having a property divided among a network of relatives or going laterally out to cousins. As a result, all of these restructured European families — from kindreds, clans, and other formations that anthropologists have documented around the world — formed into monogamous nuclear families. In the book, I provide evidence suggesting that it's this particular family structure and variation and the variants of it that lead to particular ways of thinking that are more individualistic, analytic, and impersonal.

GAZETTE: At this particular moment, why is understanding how psychological differences have given rise to the modern world so important?

HENRICH: As we're trying to understand cultural diversity and human

diversity, I think it's valuable to recognize that people actually think quite differently about the world and that how people think about the world has been shaped by the social environments that we created culturally and then passed down from one generation to the next, creating enduring differences among populations. That then leads to some of the cultural legacies we see today where it can take decades, or even longer, for people to culturally adapt their norms along with their ways of thinking and feeling to these formal institutions —laws and forms of government — that were imposed upon them by foreign (often colonial) powers.

The Atlantic

Starting around 1500 or so, the West became unusually dominant, because it advanced unusually quickly. What explains its extraordinary intellectual, technological, and political progress over the past five centuries? And how did its rise engender the peculiarity of the Western character?

Given the nature of the project, it may be a surprise that Henrich aspires to preach humility, not pride. WEIRD people have a bad habit of universalizing from their own particularities. They think everyone thinks the way they do, and some of them (not all, of course) reinforce that assumption by studying themselves. In the run-up to writing the book, Henrich and two colleagues did a literature review of experimental psychology and found that 96 percent of subjects enlisted in the research came from northern Europe, North America, or Australia. About 70 percent of those were American undergraduates. Blinded by this kind of myopia, many Westerners assume that what's good or bad for them is good or bad for everyone else.

What role did the psychological differences between the colonizer and the non-industrialized indigenous people he continues to colonize have to play?

What is not realized is that because the white man's model for business and living is in stark contrast to the kinship-based clans and communities of non-Westerners, in particular of indigenous peoples, the fact that this very different and destructive mentality continues to be forced upon the poorer nations, imported in the form of international globalization and control by the World Bank, the IMF, foreign aid and trade and resource extraction, is forcing a kinship-based culture to bow to the non-kinship destructive capitalism of the WEIRD. And what is only becoming clear now is that the 7.5% of the Westerners of North America and Europe - who really control run world affairs at the moment - out of a population of 8 billion are so hypnotized by the internet, manipulated by algorithms, which few understand, that they have lost control of their basic decision making, neocolonialism now running amuck.

Zambia needs to keep its head down and follow its own kinship path.

Mindless technology

To add to the WEIRD problem, we have the algorithm problem. [The Social Dilemma](#) lays it out:

The problem beneath all other problems

Technology's promise to keep us connected has given rise to a host of unintended consequences that are catching up with us. If we can't address our broken information ecosystem, we'll never be able to address the challenges that plague humanity.

All of the big tech platforms—Facebook, Google, Twitter, Youtube, etc—have a digital model of you. All of the information they collect is gathered into the model, and their programs are constantly testing those models to see what works on you. In the film, we bring this to life through a virtual avatar to represent the vast data that is being collected on each and every one of us. As they collect more data, the model becomes more and more accurate. For example, [a 2016 ProPublica report found some 29,000 different criteria](#) for each individual Facebook user—those models are only getting better and better.

Surveillance capitalism is a term popularized by film subject Shoshana Zuboff in her book [The Age of Surveillance Capitalism](#). It refers to the mass surveillance of our online activity in ways that we are often unaware, and the commodification of this data for commercial purposes. The unprecedented scale of the data collected by these online companies and its use to predict and influence our purchases, behaviors, and thoughts has made them some of the richest companies in the history of the world.

In the broadest sense, an algorithm is simply a set of calculations to be carried out, often to perform a mathematical function. Artificial intelligence (AI) is a very broad term that applies to the many different advanced uses of algorithms to mimic and/or replace the need for human intelligence. Unlike a simple fixed algorithm, AI uses a system of algorithms and can create or modify algorithms without human intervention through the process of continually optimizing for better and better results – often referred to as machine learning.

As the surplus of data generated by our digital life grows, corporations are increasingly building AI algorithms that draw upon this data to model our behavior, target us, and make complex business decisions. The promise of an algorithm's objectivity has engendered our trust in these data-driven approaches, however when used outside of a purely mathematical context, algorithms reflect an instance of logic programmed by a human – logic that frequently reflects the individual bias or the

interests of the company they represent.

The Impacts of the Algorithm

Algorithms promote content that sparks outrage, hate and amplifies biases within the data that we feed them.

1 The Mental Health Dilemma

*A 5,000 person study found that higher social media use correlated with self-reported declines in mental and physical health and life satisfaction.
American Journal of Epidemiology, 2017*

Persuasive design techniques like push notifications and the endless scroll of your newsfeed have created a feedback loop that keeps us glued to our devices.

2 The Democracy Dilemma

*The # of countries with political disinformation campaigns on social media doubled in the past 2 years.
New York Times*

Social media advertising gives anyone the opportunity to reach huge numbers of people with phenomenal ease, giving bad actors the tools to sow unrest and fuel political divisions.

3 The Discrimination Dilemma

64% of the people who joined extremist groups on Facebook did so because

the algorithms steered them there.
Internal Facebook report, 2018

All of this makes it horribly clear that the West is deteriorating, and along with it, the world. The only hope is for non-Westerners to cling to their kinship ways and the traditional lands that support it, being extremely guarded about Western technology or imposed influence.

[Duchesne, in another article](#), asks an important question:

So, we have to ask ourselves, though I don't expect Henrich to ask this question, what will happen if China, Japan, India and the Muslim world refuse to follow these increasingly WEIRD paths, but decide instead to retain some aspects of their kinship past, strong national identities, and more traditional norms? Will the current West really maintain its success, or will the [Chinese find a more successful model](#) based on the retention of relatively strong extended family ties, a strong national identity, a higher average IQ population, and a modern scientific economy?

The WEIRD Decline

Zambia is a premodern state, the product of the colonization of its lands and culture by Britain, yet partly secured by the intensive kin-based institutions of its clans and chiefdoms. But this is changing, the continuing inroads of Western landgrabbers and an autocratic 'Western-style government' continuing to pose a great danger to the traditional kinship-based livelihoods and culture of its people. The Westernizing process has already transformed itself into an avaricious warlike force.

But the same Westerners are now losing control because the advancements

in technology have subverted the judgement and morality of its moneyed people. The era of Trump is an example. The change in the lives of Americans in but a few decades is frightening. A report on the U.S. in December 2017 by United Nations Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Professor Philip Alston, entitled [America too is in dire straights](#), reveals the results of extreme capitalism on its people:

1. In 2013 US infant mortality rates were the highest in the developed world.
2. On average, Americans live shorter and sicker lives than in other developed countries.
3. Tropical diseases are increasingly common, and 12 million Americans live with a neglected parasitic infection.
4. The US is at No.1 in obesity.
5. On access to water and sanitation, it ranks 36th in the world.
6. It has the highest – by far – incarceration rate in the world.
7. The highest youth poverty rate in the developed world.
8. It ranks 36 out of 37 for poverty and inequality.
9. It has the highest GINI coefficient of all Western countries – the UK second.
10. In 2016, 38.3% of households with incomes below the Federal poverty line were food insecure.
11. In the OECD, the U.S. placed 28th in voter turnout, compared with an OECD average of 75%
12. American life expectancy at birth declined for the second consecutive year in 2016, fueled by a staggering 21% rise in the death rate from drug overdoses.
13. The US has the lowest rate in the OECD of social mobility.

<https://www.counterpunch.org/2018/02/08/poverty-american-style/>

<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsI>

[D=22533&LangID=E](#)

This is not the society Zambia should wish to emulate. The kinship clans of the chiefdoms represent something solid and sustainable. Western man is not only in decline; he is dying.

White people, mainly of North America, Europe, New Zealand, Australia, and South Africa, now consist of Christian oldies, the Christian right-wing evangelicals, and atheist millennials. And as their white population decreases massively in the USA (now 63% - a minority in 2040), Canada (now 70% - 50% in 2037), South Africa (now 8.7%) and Zambia (now .2% of the population - at Independence 2%), now no longer bear just an external burden, but one now terminally internal.

An analysis by the University of Haifa of 7,518 articles concluded that between 1973 and 2011 – showing no signs of decreasing, the white man's sperm count – the little beasts which fertilize the eggs of our Glories of Creation – has declined by 50-60% - though not affecting the indigenous men of Africa, South America, and Asia. By 2050, the living white man's sperm will be all but gone, killed off by the endocrine-disrupting chemicals and pesticides we produce, by heat, diet, stress, smoking, an inflated Body Mass Index, car exhaust, probably constricting underwear, and all the other effects of the white man's modern lifestyle. [Recent studies](#) have shown that the poor sperm count of the white man is associated with increased rates of morbidity.²⁰ And the use of antihistamines have made matters worse.

This is now the true white man's burden, a horrible irony, as Hamlet declared, of the engineer of it all:

There's letters sealed, and my two schoolfellows,

²⁰ **Temporal trends in sperm count: a systematic review and meta-regression analysis**

Hagai Levine, Niels Jørgensen, Anderson Martino-Andrade, Jaime Mendiola, Dan Weksler-Derri, Irina Mindlis, Rachel Pinotti, Shanna H Swan

Human Reproduction Update, Volume 23, Issue 6, November-December 2017, Pages 646–659, <https://doi.org/10.1093/humupd/dmx022>

Published: 25 July 2017

Whom I will trust as I will adders fanged,
They bear the mandate. They must sweep my way
And marshal me to knavery. Let it work,
For 'tis the sport to have the engineer
Hoist with his own petard.²¹

Hutterites

Should the chiefdoms need to become more technological, they could consider how the [Hutterite religious community](#) in North America have organized themselves:

The structure of Hutterite colonies remains unchanged, although the nature of the economic activities in which they are involved may vary. Each colony elects an executive council from the managers of various enterprises, and together with the colony minister, the executive deals with important matters that will be brought before the assembly (all baptized male members - that is, men 20 years of age and older). Although women have an official subordinate status, their informal influence on colony life is significant. They hold managerial positions in the kitchen, the kindergarten, the purchase of dry goods, and vegetable production.

Economic Structure

Although there is co-operation among the colonies, each colony operates as an independent economic unit. The Hutterites practise a highly mechanized and efficient mixed-farming economy. Because of their well-managed, large-scale operations, when compared to the amount of land they own, the Hutterites produce more than their proportionate

²¹ Hoist with his own petard means - "victimized or hurt by one's own scheme."

share of agricultural produce within the prairie economy. For instance, in Manitoba in 1991, Hutterites owned 144,920 hectares, or 1.9 per cent of Manitoba farmland, but they accounted for 9.5 per cent of the Manitoba farm population. In 1991 each colony had an average of 1,834 hectares. With an assumed 15 families per colony, each family had 122 hectares. This was slightly more than 40 per cent of the average Manitoba farm, which had 301 hectares.

To put Hutterite agricultural productivity in perspective, on this relatively small amount of land, in 1991, Hutterites accounted for over 25 per cent of the laying hens, over 25 per cent of the turkeys and 35 per cent of the hogs in Manitoba alone.

Group Maintenance

The survival of the Hutterites and their unique way of life is largely the result of their ability to retain their basic and fundamental beliefs, while simultaneously adopting all the features of contemporary society essential for their economic and social well-being. This strategy of survival includes uncompromising adherence to their religious beliefs and customs, retention of their ancestral German dialect, insistence on their own colony schools and a sound agricultural economy. Although some young people have always left the colonies, most used to return. As a result, assimilation was never a serious problem for the Hutterites. This may be changing as technology finds its way into traditional life and shows the diversity of the outside world.

Hutterites have adapted to technological change in different ways. Some colonies ban television, others allow it along with radio. Many use cellphones and the Internet, with varying degrees of restrictions. Online access has allowed Hutterite communities to interact with each other, while also introducing a way of life fundamentally different from their traditions.

Section 143 of the Income Tax Act of Canada, introduced in 2007 and modified in 2014 with section 108(5), contains special rules to accommodate Hutterite colonies. According to a 2018 Senate report,

colonies do not file income tax returns as corporations, but as individual members:^[43]

Based on a memorandum of understanding between the Hutterites and the Minister of National Revenue, section 143 creates a fictional trust to which all the property of the Hutterite colony and any associated income belongs. The trust's income may then be allocated to the individual Hutterite members, according to a formula set out in section 143, who can then claim the income on their personal tax returns.

In 2018, the Senate of Canada asked the House of Commons to review the legislation, because Hutterites were not being allowed to claim the Working Income Tax Benefit refundable tax credit (WITB), which was available to other farmers in Canada.^[43]

Wiki

As part of their [Anabaptist](#) teachings of nonresistance, Hutterites historically have avoided getting involved in litigation within the secular justice system. One of the early founders of the Hutterites, [Peter Riedemann](#), wrote about the Hutterites' stand on going to court in Peter Riedemann's Hutterite Confession of Faith: "Christ shows that Christians may not go to court when he says, 'If anyone will sue you and take away your coat, let him have your cloak also.' In effect Jesus is saying, 'It is better to let people take everything than to quarrel with them and find yourself in a strange court.' Christ wants us to show that we seek what is heavenly and belongs to us, and not what is temporal or alien to us. Thus, it is evident that a Christian can neither go to court nor be a judge."

Lament of the slaves

*I ain't got no home, ain't got no shoes
Ain't got no money, ain't got no class
Ain't got no skirts, ain't got no sweater
Ain't got no perfume, ain't got no bed
Ain't got no mind*

*Ain't got no mother, ain't got no culture
Ain't got no friends, ain't got no schooling
Ain't got no love, ain't got no name
Ain't got no ticket, ain't got no token
Ain't got no God*

*And what have I got?
Why am I alive anyway?
Yeah, what have I got
Nobody can take away?*

*Got my hair, got my head
Got my brains, got my ears
Got my eyes, got my nose
Got my mouth, I got my smile
I got my tongue, got my chin
Got my neck, got my boobs
Got my heart, got my soul
Got my back, I got my sex*

*I got my arms, got my hands
Got my fingers, got my legs
Got my feet, got my toes
Got my liver, got my blood*

THE WEIRD WHITE MAN

*I've got life, I've got my freedom
I've got the life*

*I've got the life
And I'm gonna keep it
I've got the life
And nobody's gonna take it away
I've got the life*

Nina Simone Lyrics: "Ain't Got No (I Got Life)"

William Buckley, Australia (1852)

[An Englishman writes](#) of living as an Australian aborigine for 32 years and then meeting up with some English settlers...

As I have already said, I was very anxious, but at the same time grateful, believing the period had arrived for my departure. My anxiousness I cannot describe; and, as I could not explain them in my mother tongue, I showed the initials W E as one of my aims, by which they began readily to sympathize and look upon me as a long lost and weary wanderer—treating me accordingly, by giving me well cooked food, shelter, and refreshment. Word by word I began to comprehend what they said, and soon understood—as if by instinct—that they intended to remain in the country;—that they had seen

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revel of the Ojibwa claim, with whom—as they said—they had nothing but all sorts of ill-will for long; but that I knew could not have been, because, unlike other savage communities, or people, they have an ill-feeling in possessing any superior right over the soil; it shows only being in the hands of America. I also know that if any transaction had taken place, it must have been because the natives have nothing of the value of the country, except on hunting grounds, supplying them with the means of personal existence; I therefore looked upon the last deadly episode of an earlier loss of the white man, to possess the substance of the civilized nation of the forest, who lived in the vast American Continent will very soon be no more, and whose cities and avenues are fast fading away amongst other uncertainties of the past.

erred of the native tribes, with whom they collabo-
red and captured all sorts of things for land; but
that I have not met here him, because, unlike other
strong communities, or people, they have no dis-
tinction in possessing any superior rights over the soil;
thereby only living in the hands of themselves. I also know
that if any transactions had taken place, it must have
been because the natives have nothing of the value of
the country, except on hunting grounds, supplying them
with the means of present existence. I therefore look
upon the land during a system of so southern laws of
the white race, to possess the significance of the civilized
nation of the forest, whose trail in the vast American
Continents will very soon be no more heard, and whose
moans and wailers are fast fading away amongst other
civilizations of the past.

Several of the twelve tribes, with whom—on the day-
before last—exchanged all sorts of things for lamb; but
that I have could not have been, however, rather the
strongest recommendation, or people, they have no
claiming or possessing any superior right over the soil:
there is only being as the lands of the tribes. I have
known that if any man could not take them, it must have
been because the natives have nothing of the value of
the country, except on breeding grounds, supplying them
with the means of personal existence. I therefore looked
open the land, looking at them as another tribe of the
white race, to possess the liberties of the untroubled
nation of the South, whose wealth in the race, Australian
Confederate with very few, to no more land, and whose
wealth and sources are fast fading away amongst other
modern loss of the race.

The life and adventures of William Buckley

First published in 1852

PEOPLE [William Buckley \(1780–1856\)](#)PLACES Victoria

The Witchcraft Tragedy

Witchcraft

Witchcraft (or witchery) is the practice of [magical](#) skills, spells, and abilities. Witchcraft is a broad term that varies culturally and societally and thus can be difficult to define with precision.^[1] Historically, the most common meaning is the use of [supernatural](#) means to cause harm to the innocent; this remains the meaning in most traditional cultures worldwide, notably the [Indigenous cultures](#) of Asia, Latin America, [Africa](#), the [African diaspora](#), and [Indigenous Nations in the Americas](#).^{[2][3][4][5]}

Wikipedia

Witchcraft, traditionally, the exercise or invocation of alleged supernatural powers to control people or events, practices typically involving sorcery or magic. Witchcraft thus defined is an imaginative stereotype that has a long history and has constituted for many cultures a viable explanation of evil in the world.

Britannica

The modern, Western definition of Witchcraft refers to the combination of knowledge and skills, that is, the craft, that allows one to manipulate reality in positive or negative ways through the use of personal energy in the form of focused thought or emotion, the casting of spells and the creation of magical items using natural materials.

Witchipedia

Sorcery

Sorcery, the practice of malevolent [magic](#), derived from casting lots as a means of divining the future in the ancient Mediterranean world. Some scholars distinguish sorcery from witchcraft by noting that it is learned rather than [intrinsic](#). Other scholars, noting that modern witches claim to learn their craft, suggest that sorcery's intent is always evil and that of witchcraft can be either good or bad. In the early Christian era, the term was applied to any magician or wizard but by the Middle Ages only to those who allegedly practised magic intended to harm others. In Western popular [culture](#), and in Western [children's literature](#) in particular, the sorcerer often assumes a more positive guise.

Britannica

Witchdoctor

- a professional worker of magic usually who often works to cure sickness (Merriam-Webster)
- originally a type of [healer](#) who treated ailments believed to be caused by [witchcraft](#)^[1]. It is now more commonly a term used to refer to [healers](#), particularly in regions that use [traditional healing](#) rather than [contemporary medicine](#). (Wikipedia)
- **a person** in some [societies](#) who [cures people](#) using [traditional magic](#) or [medicine](#) (Cambridge dictionary)

- Witch doctors who use their powers only for good are known as ng'angas.; also called: shaman *or* medicine man a man in certain societies, especially preliterate ones, who appears to possess magical powers, used to cure sickness but also to harm people; a person who seeks out or hunts witches in some African tribal cultures (Free Dictionary)

Summary

Witchcraft

Harms the innocent (Wikipedia)

To many cultures it explains the evil in the world (Britannica)

It can be either good or bad (Britannica)

Witchcraft is the influence of magic or sorcery; from the Anglo-Saxon wiccecraft

meaning "craft of the wise."; cure illness and keep away evil magical influences. (Free

Dictionary)

Sorcery

Malevolent magic (Britannica)

Use of supernatural power over others through the assistance of spirits (witchcraft); the art, practices, or spells of magic, esp black magic, by which it is sought to harness occult forces or evil spirits to produce preternatural effects in the world; the practices of a person who is thought to have supernatural powers granted by evil spirits; black magic; witchery: the belief in magical spells that harness occult forces or evil spirits to produce unnatural effects in the world; the use of power gained from evil spirits; witchcraft or magic in general (Free Dictionary)

Witchdoctor

a man in certain societies, especially preliterate ones, who appears to possess magical powers, used esp to cure sickness but also to harm people; a person who seeks out or hunts witches in some African tribal cultures; a person in some societies who attempts to cure sickness and to exorcise evil spirits by the use of magic; witch doctors who use their powers only for good are known as "ng'angas." (Free Dictionary)

a professional worker of magic usually in a primitive society who often works to cure sickness (Merriam-Webster)

a healer or benevolent worker of magic in a nonliterate society (Britannica)

A ng'anga uses powers for good; a muloshi (sorcerer) uses powers for evil (IM)

Chosa ng'anga - a benign witchdoctor who 'takes out' evil (IM)

* * *

Melland on Witchdoctor Suppression

F.H. Melland in *African Dilemma* deals with the subject of Witchcraft. Melland joined the BSA Company as a Native Collector in 1902, serving as a magistrate for 26 years. I have written of him in *Where the Water Meets the Sky*.

Apart from being a colonial administrator, Melland was a hunter and explorer who admired the African. To illustrate his breadth of knowledge and experience, I extract some of the points he made from his chapters written in

a co-authored book, *African Dilemma*, published in 1936:

1 We are propogating materialism by every means in our power and at the very time when it has been most discredited in our own ciilization... the good of the community used to be his standard: we have subsituted the wealth of the invividual. (p. 16)

2 Coupled with this is an argument against the obsession for 'grow more cash crops' (i.e. crops for sale for export).(p. 17)

3 The next point is for a live, active and positive Christianity (p.17)

4 All that we do, apart altogether from prohibitions and penal enactments, is breaking down the old native religions overriding everything and linked with everyday life. (p.18)

5 Witchcraft...is a factor of supreme importance in our problem and our task...the imposition of our law and much that goes with it, has directly brought the law into disrepute by substituting an unrecognized alien code for a recognized indigenous one. (p.19)

6 The natives may continue to obey, but the chieftainship ceases to be a native institution. (p.20)

7 As regards the chiefs, they did not relish the change, in many cases because they had lost the habit of ruling, and still more because they did not regain the right to rule in accordance with custom, but were forced to rule on lines laid down by their white overlords, to administer justice and to punish on those lines. (p.45)

8 By the introduction of exotic breeds of cattle we have introduced diseases to which native herds have fallen a ready prey. By stopping tribal raids

we have intensified in-breeding, to the deterioration of native beasts , besides leading to overstocking, which, in its turn, has accelerated (as has the introduction of the plough) the greatest danger facing Africa - soil erosion...this soil erosion is robbing the native of more land than European settlement has ever done. (p.46)

9 The African native is an intensely religious being...he takes his religion wherever he goes, whatever he does...when you remove it, the whole edifice crumbles. (p.59)

10 Our civilization is founded on Christianity, and it will not survive without it. (p.60)

11 A campaign should be started for greater and better-balanced consumption, for better crops for the community, built on a moral idea (which is indigenous in a simple form), of making a better community, and leaving export or cash crops for later. (p.60)

12 Our law does not, in many cases, suit African conditions today, on which grounds it stands condemned. African tribes have laws, they are rich in them, and there is, for instance, nothing inherently wrong in their classing as torts²² some acts which we call crimes. (p.113)

²² A **tort**, in [common law](#) jurisdiction, is a [civil wrong](#) (other than breach of contract) that causes a claimant to suffer loss or harm, resulting in [legal liability](#) for the person who commits the tortious act. It can include intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, financial losses, injuries, invasion of privacy, and many other things.

Tort law involves claims in an [action](#) seeking to obtain a private [civil remedy](#), typically money [damages](#). Tort claims may be compared to [criminal law](#), which deals with [criminal wrongs](#) that are punishable by the state. A wrongful act, such as an assault and battery, may result in both a civil lawsuit and a criminal prosecution, although in the U.S., the civil and criminal legal systems are separate. Tort law may also be contrasted with [contract law](#), which also provides civil remedies after breach of duty that arises from a contract

Wikipedia

13 It was customary and almost obligatory in my time in Northern Rhodesia, when proceeding under the so-called Witchcraft Suppression Ordinance (Witch-doctor Suppression were an apter title) to use an alternative indictment under the Vagrancy Act of 1824, the framers of which never envisaged such cases. (p.123)

The white man's law on witchcraft - adopted without pain by the modern African state - is an abomination, for it has destroyed the backbone of African culture and diminished the cultural power of chiefs, be they male or female. Witchcraft is confused with sorcery - the latter not even mentioned in the Zambian law - including the Witchcraft Suppression ordinance, a malign force. In contrast, witchdoctors, whose job is to negate sorcerers' effects and activities, are a force for good and essential to the equilibrium of Africans and numerous peoples worldwide. This is a perfect example of duplicate colonialism's malign effects, i.e. British and African Governing-Party neo-colonialism. The Witchcraft Act makes no bones about the matter.

A benign witchdoctor (*ng'anga*) is a medium that usually protects Zambians against evil sorcerers (*muloshi*). My Zambian name, *Chosang'anga*, was given to me by the Zambian staff in the Game Department. It means 'taker-out of evil'.

Sorcerers cast a pall of terror over much of Africa, requiring individuals, be they chiefs, politicians or ordinary people - to seek the protection of a witchdoctor against a sorcerer's malign powers. In 1956-1958 in Barotseland, they prosecuted 1212 people for sorcery, and nine sentenced to death and executed. These sorcerers had made use of *kaliloze* witch-guns (short-barreled muzzleloaders, the barrel made of a human tibia), killing people and often consuming their flesh. Since the wars of liberation, the *kaliloze* is often the AK47 assault rifle, known as the *karavina*.

The Witchcraft Suppression Ordinance of Northern Rhodesia, which stated that any person practising as a witchdoctor would be guilty of an offence, is to blame for the confusion. And how an African government can carry on implementing such a law is truly unbelievable.

As few Africans exist today who do not fear being bewitched, this ordinance - based on considerable ignorance and misunderstanding, would have had the effect of driving witchdoctors underground, making them subversive and secretive, an unhealthy development in the psyche of a people already under the yoke of a foreign culture and religion. As Melland wrote:

A witch or sorcerer in African society is someone who ceases to be a person and can, therefore, be killed without affecting society. Obviously, this belief is not accommodated by Western mores and customs. Bantu customary law is, like English common law, unwritten, evolving as a result of the pressures and adaptations of people to their environmental and cultural circumstances. African justice at its heart is based on offences against fellow clan members or members of closely related clans. The primary concern of any clan is to survive and multiply. Therefore discord and transgressions must be acted on and clan equilibrium reinstated. This notion is not possible under Western statutory law where one of its main punishment options is imprisonment. Customary law became a compendium of tribal laws and customs enforceable in the native court that was established early in BSA Company times. Under customary tenure, for instance, there was no such thing as freehold or leasehold land, only usufruct (use of the land, not ownership), land disputes being settled by the headmen or chiefs. In Northern Rhodesia, the English court could review a decision of the native court, or hear an appeal from a native court. Customary law, which came into force in a dispute between a native and a foreigner, was generally enforceable.

Melland also made the point on p. 113 of African Dilemma that:

Our law does not, in many cases, suit African conditions today, on which grounds it stands condemned. African tribes have laws, they are rich in them, and there is, for instance, nothing inherently wrong in their classing as torts some acts which we call crimes.

In other words, the white man has criminalized the actions and culture of the black man; and the neocolonial big man Zambian carries on the horror. In point No 13, Melland mentions the necessity when dealing with a witchcraft case to use the Vagrancy Act of 1824. What do Zambian prosecutors do now?

The Witchcraft Act

<quote>

The Witchcraft Act No. 13 of 1994

An Act to provide for penalties for the practice of witchcraft and to provide for matters incidental to or connected therewith.

[9th May 1914]

Arrangement of sections

Section

- 1. Short title*
- 2. Interpretation*
- 3. Penalty for naming or imputing witchcraft*
- 4. Penalty on professional witch doctors*
- 5. Penalty for professing knowledge of witchcraft*
- 6. Acts constituting witchcraft*
- 7. Employment or solicitation of persons in matters of witchcraft*
- 8. Presence at tests*
- 9. Carrying out advice in matters of witchcraft*
- 10. Deceiving or imposing by means of witchcraft*
- 11. Possessing charms, etc.*

12. *Penalty on chief or headman encouraging witchcraft*
13. *Obtaining goods, etc., by false pretences*

CHAPTER 90

WITCHCRAFT

5 of 1914

47 of 1948

31 of 1952

47 of 1963

Government Notice

493 of 1964

24 of 1977

26 of 1993

Act No. 13 of 1994

1 This Act may be cited as the Witchcraft Act.

2 In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires interpretation

- “act complained of” includes the throwing of bones, the use of charms and any other means, process or device adopted in the practice of witchcraft or sorcery.
- “boiling water test” means the dipping into boiling water of the limbs or any portion of the body of a person;
- “property” includes animals;
- “witchcraft” includes the throwing of bones, the use of charms and any other means, process or device adopted in the practice of witchcraft or sorcery.

3 Penalty for naming or imputing witchcraft

Whoever-

(a) names or indicates or accuses or threatens to accuse any person as being a wizard or witch; or

(b) imputes to any person the use of non-natural means in causing any death, injury, damage or calamity; or

(c) asserts that any person has, by committing adultery, caused in some non-natural way death, injury, damage or calamity;

shall be liable upon conviction to a fine not exceeding seven hundred and fifty penalty units or to imprisonment with or without hard labour for any term not exceeding one year, or to both:

4 Penalty on professional witch doctors

Whoever shall be proved to be by habit or profession a witch doctor or witch finder shall be liable upon conviction to a fine of not more than one thousand five hundred penalty units or to imprisonment with or without hard labour for any term not exceeding two years, or to both.

(As amended by No. 47 of 1948, No. 31 of 1952, No. 26 of 1993 and Act No. 13 of 1994)

5 Penalty for professing knowledge of witchcraft

Any person who-

(a) represents himself as able by supernatural means to cause fear, annoyance, or injury to another in mind, person or property; or

(b) pretends to exercise any kind of supernatural power, witchcraft, sorcery or enchantment calculated to cause such fear, annoyance or injury;

shall be liable to a fine of not more than one thousand five hundred penalty units or to imprisonment with or without hard labour for any term not exceeding two years.

6 Acts constituting witchcraft

Whoever shall-

(a) by the exercise of any witchcraft or any non-natural means whatsoever,

pretend or attempt to discover where and in what manner any property supposed or alleged to have been stolen or lost may be found or to name or indicate any person as a thief or as the perpetrator of any crime or any other act complained of; or

(b) in the pretence of discovering or in the attempt to discover whether or not any person has committed any crime or any other act complained of, administer or cause to be administered to any person with or without his consent any emetic or purgative or apply or cause to be applied to any person with or without his consent the boiling water test or any other test whatsoever; or

(c) instigate, direct, control or preside at the doing of any act specified in the foregoing part of this section;

shall be liable upon conviction to the punishments provided by section *four*.

7 Employment or solicitation of persons in matters of witchcraft

Whoever employs or solicits any person-

(a) to name or indicate any person as being a wizard or witch;

(b) to name or indicate by means of witchcraft or by the use of any non-natural means or by the administration of any emetic or purgative or by the application of any test whatsoever any person as the perpetrator of any alleged crime or other act complained of;

(c) to advise him or any person how by means of witchcraft or by the use of any non-natural means or by means of any emetic or purgative or test whatsoever the perpetrator of any alleged crime or other act complained of may be discovered;

(d) to advise him on any matter or for any purpose whatsoever by means of witchcraft or non-natural means;

shall be liable upon conviction to the punishments provided in section *three*.

8 Carrying out advice in matters of witchcraft

Any person who is present at the administration to any person of any test,

the administration of which is punishable under the provisions of this Act, shall be liable upon conviction to a fine not exceeding two hundred penalty units or to imprisonment with or without hard labour for any term not exceeding one year, or to both.

Provided that no person called as a witness to prove the administration of any test as aforesaid shall be deemed to be an accomplice or to need corroboration as such by reason only that he was present at the administration of any test as aforesaid.

*(As amended by No. 31 of 1952, No. 26 of 1993
and Act No. 13 of 1994)*

9 Deceiving or imposing by means of witchcraft

Whoever, on the advice of any person pretending to have the knowledge of witchcraft or of any non-natural processes or in the exercise of any witchcraft or of any non-natural means, shall use or cause to be put into operation such means or processes as he may have been advised or may believe to be calculated to injure any person or any property shall be liable upon conviction to the punishments provided by section *four*

10 Every person professing to be able to control by non-natural means the course of nature

Every person professing to be able to control by non-natural means the course of nature or using any subtle craft, means or device by means of witchcraft, charms or otherwise to deceive or impose upon any other person shall be liable upon conviction to a fine not exceeding two hundred penalty units or to imprisonment with or without hard labour for any term not exceeding one year, or to both.

*(As amended by No. 31 of 1952, No. 26 of 1993
and Act No. 13 of 1994)*

11 Possessing charms, etc.

(1) Any person who collects, makes, sells or uses or assists or takes part in collecting, selling, marking or using any charm or poison or thing which he

intends for use either by himself or by some other person for the purpose of any act punishable by this Act shall be liable upon conviction to a fine not exceeding two hundred penalty units or to imprisonment with or without hard labour for any term not exceeding one year, or to both

(2) Any person who has in his possession any charm or poison or thing which he intends for use either by himself or by some other person for the purpose of any act punishable by this Act shall be liable upon conviction to a fine of not more than one hundred penalty units or to imprisonment with or without hard labour for any term not exceeding six months, or to both.

(3) A person found in possession of anything commonly used for the purpose of an act punishable by this Act shall be deemed to have intended such thing for use for an act punishable by this Act unless and until the contrary be proved.

*(As amended by No. 31 of 1952, No. 26 of 1993
and Act No. 13 of 1994)*

12 Penalty on chief or headman encouraging witchcraft

Any chief or headman who directly or indirectly permits, promotes, encourages or facilitates the commission of any act punishable by this Act or who knowing of such act or intended act does not forthwith report the same to a police officer of or above the rank of Sub Inspector or, where there is no such police officer, to a District Secretary or an Assistant District Secretary, shall be liable upon conviction to a fine or to imprisonment with or without hard labour for any term not exceeding three years.

*(As amended by G.N. No. 493 of 1964, No. 24 of 1977,
No. 26 of 1993 and Act No. 13 of 1994)*

13 Obtaining goods, etc., by false pretences

(1) Any person who shall receive or obtain any consideration whatsoever or the promise thereof for or in respect of the doing by such person of any act punishable by this Act shall, if he has actually received such consideration, be deemed guilty of the offence of obtaining by false pretences and if he has not actually received such consideration but only the promise thereof, be

THE WITCHCRAFT TRAGEDY

deemed guilty of the offence of attempting to obtain by false pretences and shall be liable upon conviction to punishment accordingly.

2) Any agreement for the giving of any consideration for or in respect of the doing of any act punishable by this Act shall be null and void.

<unquote>

An inhuman law



Some Cases

3 December 2020.

[A wildlife police officer pretends to be a 'witchdoctor'](#) and is not prosecuted! But one of the accused who admitted to having some wildlife trophy remains is put in jail for 5 years.

A Zambia Wildlife Officer had to pretend as a witchdoctor to apprehend three farmers of Kalomo District who were found with a Genet skin and pangolin scales among others.

Byta FM Court Beat Journalist reports that this is in a case where Godwin Siamulonzya is jointly charged with Clever Hibajeene and Tinda Towinse on three counts of unlawful possession of government trophy. The accused persons are appearing before Resident Magistrate Ethel Phiri in the Choma Magistrate's Court. In the first count, the defendants are on 20th November this year alleged to have been found with three Genet skins. In the second count, the accused persons are alleged to have been found in possession of four pangolin scales without any lawful authority. And in the last count, the defendants are alleged to have been found with a python skin without legal authority.

Siamulonzya and Towinse denied the charges while Hibajeene pleaded guilty to all of them. The statement of the offense revealed that the Wildlife officer disguised himself as a witch doctor from whom the accused persons wanted to seek rituals which would make them rich. The three were arrested in the process as they were waiting for money to start falling from the sky. The court found Hibajeene guilty on personal admission. Magistrate Phiri handed a five year jail sentence to Hibajeene while granting the other accused persons a K20, 000 bail in their own recognizance with two working sureties. The duo will be appearing on 14th December, 2020 for mention.

Comment:

Ian Manning [December 14, 2020 At 11:12 pm](#)

Under the Witchcraft Act No. 13 of 1994 “Every person professing to be able to control by non-natural means the course of nature or using any subtle craft, means or device by means of witchcraft, charms or otherwise to deceive or impose upon any other person shall be liable upon conviction to a fine not exceeding two hundred penalty units or to imprisonment with or without hard labour for any term not exceeding one year, or to both.”

(As amended by No. 31 of 1952, No. 26 of 1993 and Act No. 13 of 1994)

How does the magistrate allow a WPO to pretend to be a witchdoctor – an imprisonable offense? Hibajeene has been given 5 years imprisonment for a miner poaching of wildlife. Magistrate Phiri needs to understand that the Witchcraft Act is an insult to Zambian culture. And what he has done to Hibajeene is a disgrace.

11 May 2016

[In another case](#), four men are sent to the High Court for trial, two soldiers, one airforce civilian and a ‘traditional doctor’ for the murder of 7 people in 2016. A further 8 people were also arrested but not yet charged. An [article](#) reported that “hundreds of people rioted in Zambia’s capital city of Lusaka in 2016, following a spate of ritual killings blamed on foreigners.” 250 residents of the area were arrested.

Zambia is holding a general election in August, when Lungu will seek to extend his term. Ritual killings and child sacrifice, in particular, have previously occurred across Africa in the run-up to national elections—a Uganda-based charity said in February that [six children were mutilated and murdered](#) prior to the February 18 vote, while [Ivory Coast set up a special unit](#) to investigate a series of suspected ritual killings prior to the 2015 elections. The practise is sometimes believed to bring good fortune.

21 December 2020

[A Soldier recounts how police nailed his toe to chair over the 2016 ritual killings.](#)

Albinism

The killing of [albinos](#) in Zambia is common, with 150 reported killings in southern Africa since 2014. “Impunity for crimes against people with albinism continues as a result of ineffective investigations, including the poor handling of cases and evidence.”

“A seven-year-old [albino girl](#) in Zambia has had her hand chopped off by unknown people as she was sleeping.”

Gender-based violence (GBV) - women beating

This imbalance often leads to pervasive cultural stereotypes and attitudes that perpetuate the cycle of GBV. Communities, especially in the rural areas, have continued to embrace [negative cultural beliefs](#) whereby GBV is the norm. If a man does not beat his wife, it is taken to mean he does not love her. Some beliefs condone men’s infidelity but never women’s.

Observations from Lake Mweru

[Gordon’s observations:](#)

Urban-rural relations have become “a hotbed for rumors about potent occult forces....Villagers tend to suspect urbanites of using occult forces to enrich themselves, while urbanites profess to be afraid of the levelling impact of the villagers.”

Observations from Bangweulu

WHO SHALL DELIVER US FROM THIS SWAMPY DARKNESS?

Kunda Londa

Tricky question. Death has overcome many human beings. Everywhere. Maybe because even when you read the bible, you are informed that “God has set the world in their heart (KJV), has even put eternity in their heart (NWT), has planted eternity in the human heart (ESV).” Even translators had to figure out the right meaning of the original Hebrew word “Olam,” which means eternity, or darkness, depending on the context. Is it any wonder that many people all over the world fail to come to terms with death?

In trying to understand it, people in my village have usually turned to supernatural sources such as divination. And all sorts of crooks, manipulators, and downright conmen have taken advantage of the “eternity in the human heart” to earn a living. They have misled communities into believing that there’s no such thing as an accident, natural death, or sickness. They will always point at a malicious causer to every illness, incident, accident, and death, regardless of the circumstances. Imagine the death of my cousin working in Switzerland, who is hit by a drunk motorist, being attributed to my grandfather at Ponga fishing camp in Lunga!

In the Bangweulu swamps, death has been used by many to inflict pain on others, to con them, and set families on fire. Nuclear families

have declared war on each other, clans pitted against clans, and innocent people falsely accused and have suffered unjustified retribution. This has resulted in backwardness, fleeing of the most progressive entrepreneurial minds to areas where they feel their investment would be safe, in addition to fueling hate against each other.

In Chiunda Ponde chieftdom, a man was set on fire right in his hut. His relatives turned their kinsman's poor home into Gehenna. All because someone told them he was the killer of all deceased family members. The man pleaded his innocence in vain. The diviner had earned and went to his bank smiling.

Another old man was lured by his two nephews to go and consult a diviner. They had, for long, suspected him of being behind many deaths in the family. Earlier, in his absence, one diviner told the two young men to look no further; for the villain was their mother's elder brother. And so, they took him along so he could be exonerated by divination. But, when they reached a forest, they murdered him in cold blood and buried him in a shallow pit.

Somewhere on one of the islands came a story of a prosperous businessman who was accused of turning into a predator that snatched and killed a relative to boost his business. The man's shop and house were brutally damaged and was forced to flee the area. Their family relationship permanently soured and severed.

I can go on and on narrating these gloomy stories of many innocent victims of death in families. There's no family in the swamps that has remained unscathed by these imprudent actions.

The most interesting thing about these all accusations is that in the long run, many of them turn out to be fake. But people never learn from past experiences. They continue to be fooled by men of far much less intelligence than themselves. All because these conmen pretend and claim to have supernatural powers to delve into the world beyond human understanding. It would be, therefore, foolhardy to leave this situation unattended while we seek development in these areas.

Can people develop without working together? If families are in tatters,

how can the community unite? Should we go to school to master conflict resolution without first addressing the source of conflicts?

And the other critical question is: Can someone address this question of witchcraft in our area? Who should that be? When can that be done?

Thousands of our men and women in the swamps are not even aware of the illegality of accusing another person of practicing witchcraft. Because the accused never seek legal resolution of such conflicts, accusers are never punished for the offense. And so, the retrogressive practice goes on and on.

The Witchcraft Act, Chapter 90 section 3 of the Laws of Zambia states that:

“Whoever- (a) names or indicates or accuses or threatens to accuse any person as being a wizard or witch, or (b) imputes to any person the use of non-natural means in causing any death, injury, damage or calamity; or (c) asserts that any person has, by committing adultery, caused in some non-natural way death, injury, damage or calamity; shall be liable upon conviction to a fine not exceeding seven hundred and fifty penalty units or to imprisonment with or without hard labour for any term not exceeding one year, or to both.”

There you are. The government has done its part to end the circus. Who else, amongst us, shall address this darkness? Who shall enlighten our people on this? Can Lunga Development Association (LDA) and the Member of Parliament be part of the solution?

Just ruminating!

Witchcraft in Europe

In The Modern Forms of Witchcraft in Zambia: An Analysis of Local Witchcraft Narratives in Urban Settings of Lusaka, [Kateřina Mildnerová](#) writes:

Since the late 1980s, Zambians have experienced what James Ferguson

calls a failure of modernity. The proclaimed development that Zambians desired failed to deliver the much promised economic progress. Modernisation and development became a myth – in some respects, a trap and a tragedy – for those whose hopes and expectations were shattered. The end of modernity, most visible in the urbanised Copperbelt province, manifested itself in Zambia's disconnection from the world community. It became excluded from the mainstream global economy, a situation which was accompanied by feelings of disillusion, abjection and betrayal. Zambians again became "second class citizens". The development myth brought new forms of economic and social inequality, an increase in unemployment, more difficult access to education and health care, and the deterioration of urban infrastructure. The privatisation of the Zambian economy also pushed many adults into the informal economy.

The African Independent Churches (AICs) represent an extremely important structural component of Zambian society today, especially in urban centres, where they occur in large numbers. As the majority of Zambians are strong believers, belonging to a church community is a fundamental part of their social and political life. Christian churches located in every Lusaka compound represent a space where strong feelings of being (locality and identity), belonging (kin, reciprocity, the others) and believing (morality, agency) are constructed. Zambia has a particular make-up that gives the church a special importance from the socio-political point of view. As many Zambians living in the compounds lack sufficient education and their social and economic capital is rather limited, the majority of them are also excluded from participating in politics or civil service. In this situation, the religious milieu, in particular the AICs, or traditional medicine remains the only "socio-political field" where ordinary Zambians can gain social prestige and authority. The role of the AICs is also important in the transmission of beliefs in witchcraft. Such churches are particular syncretic "prophet-healing churches" ("spirit type churches") and "African Independent Pentecostal churches" that share but simplify the miscellaneous indigenous spiritual world by embracing

a number of different spirits under the united category of demon, which is put in contrast to the Holy Spirit considered to be the only source of truth and healing. These AICs provide healing through the Holy Spirit combining both the Christian and indigenous methods of healing. Their increasing popularity lies in their ability to respond flexibly to the burning problems that the low-income urban population encounter such as unemployment, poverty, alcohol abuse, promiscuity, marital and family problems, and physiological and psychological disorders. The priests and prophets of these new churches put stress on the “rejection of traditions” represented by indigenous medicine, the belief in traditional spirits (ancestors, mashabe spirits), and witchcraft, which in their opinion hinder progress and modernity. At the core of their doctrine stands the idea that the origin of human suffering lies in the world of invisible powers such as demons and witches. A devotee is thus incited to “be strong in belief and prayers” to overcome devilish wiles. The omnipresent obsessive pursuit of witchcraft eradication is reflected in the arrangement of the so-called deliverance services, during which priests practise exorcism. The activities of the AICs in Lusaka thus significantly contribute to the spread of the belief in witchcraft.

The assumptions of initiators of development projects in Africa that “traditional magical superstitions” – ideas about witchcraft, the power of talismans and sorcerers – would disappear as a result of further political-economic development and the growth of education were soon rebutted after decolonization. Indeed, the unprecedented proliferation of witchcraft which anthropologists identified throughout Africa from the 1980s proved the opposite. The proliferation of witchcraft has been interpreted as a result of the failure of efforts towards modernization and as a response to the crisis of modernity and development, which has been accompanied by deepening social and economic differences between the inhabitants of villages and towns resulting from unequal access to material resources, education and power.

Witchcraft beliefs and the Erosion of Social Capital

Boris Gershman²³

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the relationship between witchcraft beliefs, a deep-rooted cultural phenomenon, and various elements of social capital. Using novel survey data from nineteen countries in Sub-Saharan Africa we establish a robust negative association between the prevalence of witchcraft beliefs and multiple measures of trust which holds after accounting for country fixed effects and potential confounding factors at the individual, regional, and ethnic-group levels. This finding extends to other metrics of social capital, namely charitable giving and participation in religious group activities. Such coexistence of witchcraft beliefs and antisocial attitudes stands in stark contrast to a well-explored alternative cultural equilibrium characterized by religious prosociality. Evidence from societies beyond Africa shows that in preindustrial communities where witchcraft is believed to be an important cause of illness, mistrust and other antisocial traits are inculcated since childhood. Furthermore, second-generation immigrants

Convention on Biological Diversity

The CBD is an international convention that mandates contracting parties to preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous

²³ Murdock, G.P. et al. 1978. World distribution of theories of illness. *Ethnology* 17 (4), 449-470.

peoples and local communities. It aims to promote the wider use and application of such knowledge with the involvement and approval of knowledge holders and encourage equitable sharing of benefits arising from this utilization. The key article in the CBD, which makes specific reference to the protection of traditional knowledge, is Article 8 (j). It requires that each contracting party :

shall, as far as possible and as appropriate: Subject to national legislation, respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity and promote their wider application with the approval and involvement of the holders of such knowledge, innovations and practices and encourage the equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of such knowledge innovations and practices.

Article 10 (c) requires parties to “as far as possible and appropriate, protect and encourage customary use of biological resources in accordance with traditional cultural practices.”

Prison - A Colonial Gift

“The degree of civilization in a society can be judged by entering its prisons.”

Fyodor Dostoyevsky

Strangely, in pre-colonial times, African societies rarely used death as an officially sanctioned punishment or form of societal control, preferring to deal with the most serious crimes by banishing the guilty party from the community. Banishment may sound like a lenient sentence but being forced to live alone and unprotected in Africa’s harsh conditions was a terrible punishment. Often, the removal of the protection and support of the community resulted in death by starvation, exposure or suicide. Although death was sometimes the end product of this system of state sanction, there is a distinction to be made from a system in which the community or “state” takes it upon itself to act as executioner, as is the practice today.

Carol Gilbert, 2012.

PRISON - A COLONIAL GIFT

* * *



A modern Zambia Prison



B.S.A Company rule in N.E. Rhodesia

On Africa's Death Row: Hidden Consequences of Colonial Past [BLOG]

By [Cathal Gilbert](#)

PRISON - A COLONIAL GIFT



Crowded sleeping conditions in Mukubeko Maximum Security Prison in Zambia.

Mukubeko Maximum Security Prison stands on a patch of dusty ground outside the provincial town of Kabwe, in Zambia's Central Province. Mukubeko, or Maximum, as this place is known locally, is an imposing structure that was built for some 450 people but now houses over 1,600 male convicts and remand prisoners awaiting trial. Most of the prisoners spend their days out in the sun walking and talking in the central courtyard, avoiding while they can the stench and darkness of the tiny communal cells where they spend 12 hours a day crammed in together.

In a separate section that is completely caged in, the facility's "condemned" prisoners are kept apart from the main population as they wait on death row for executions that will never happen. Their crimes include aggravated robbery, murder and treason and some have been here for as long as twenty years. Although Zambia continues to sentence people to death for these crimes, the country last carried out an execution in 1997. The story of these prisoners is not unique, and although less countries employ the death penalty the ghosts of old laws continue to linger and in many cases result in serious human rights abuses.

Zambian prisons are death chambers.

Imprisoned from April to August 2017 in Mukubeko hell.

Opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema has given a chilling account of his 127-day stay in prison describing his experience as terrible torture.

And Mr. Hichilema has refused to state whether he will now recognize President Edgar Lungu as duly elected Head of State now that he has been freed.

In an interview with the BBC's Kennedy Gondwe from his New Kasama residence, Mr. Hichilema said his stay in prison was dehumanizing.

He said a lot of torture goes on in Zambian prisons describing the facilities as death chambers.

Mr. Hichilema who was released on Wednesday disclosed that a lot of deaths occur in prison and go unreported.

The UPND leader said his stay in prison was terrible and that he was made to sleep on the cold floor and use the same bucket to answer the call of nature for urine and fecal matter.

"It was terrible, the treatment was dehumanizing. A lot of torture goes on in those prisons. We were made to sleep on the cold floor. It's a 2.5 x 2-meter cells and people sleep by standing. There is no space in there and you are locked up 16 Hours," Mr. Hichilema narrated.

He charged that nobody should be made to go through those conditions in Zambia or anywhere else.

"There is no ventilation there and the conditions are terrible. People die in there and the health standards are very poor. You cannot treat citizens like that," he said.

Mr. Hichilema stated that he still feels for those inmates he has left behind in prison adding that he feels he is not released yet because of the many people he has left behind in prisons.

"Some of the people still in there shouldn't be there at all," he said.

Ubumi Prisons Initiative Zambia

The [Ubumi](#) Prisons Initiative works to support children, juveniles and seriously/terminally ill in Zambian correctional facilities, as well as health, education and skills-building in more general terms. See [PhD Dissertation by Anne Egelund](#):

1 In 2016, the prison population reached an all-time high of more than 19,000 inmates. In Zambia, the overcrowding is more than 400% of capacity in some prisons. Hygiene is poor, with soap and detergents rarely distributed by the authorities. The diet is poor; breakfast consists of rice, and lunch/dinner is combined in one meal consisting of beans or dried fish with nshima (a kind of thick maize porridge). The food is of poor quality, the amount of food is insufficient, and many go hungry. Malnutrition and general poor health is common. Prisoners cannot survive in the longer term on the diet provided by Correctional Service alone, and relies on family or others to support them. However, many are abandoned by their families and have very few or no social networks, which leaves them vulnerable in the prison system (Human Rights Watch 2010, CARITAS 2007, Todrys 2011, Zambia Prisons Service 2015).

Lengthy periods of incarceration, including long remand times, are the rule in Sub-Saharan prisons. I have spoken to several remand prisoners in Zambia who had waited up to seven years for a trial⁶, and long remand times have been documented (Paralegal Alliance Network February 2008, Human Rights Watch 2010). As seen in the above chart, remand prisoners and pre-trials detainees constitute more than 25% of the prison

population. It has not been possible to access recent figures on detainees in police cells. These groups contribute significantly to overcrowding in prisons. Very few organisations provide legal aid or paralegal aid⁷ and they are able to take on only few individual cases (Paralegal Alliance Network, February 2008). Prisoners (and prison staff) consider the long remand times and lack of legal support as extremely unjust. This situation contributes immensely to a chronic feeling of uncertainty and causes extreme tension in individuals and between prisoners (Jefferson 2009). Overcrowding contributes to poor health. The sleeping conditions, where 120-180 inmates share a space of approximately 40 square metres, provide optimal breeding grounds for opportunistic infections. Fungal infections, scabies and lice are common and contribute to the stress of incarceration. Depending on the space available and the individual prison, prisoners may sit either squatted or lie head to toe. When squatted, one prisoner leans up against another prisoner in the same position, and with a third person between his legs, and so forth, resting against his chest from early evening to the next morning. The poor conditions contribute to severe physical ailments of stiff joints, muscular pain, oedemas and problems with blood circulation. Access to quality health care remains low and arbitrary. Unnecessary suffering due to ill-health is common, as are deaths which could have been avoided. AIDS related disease and tuberculosis is common, as are various forms of diarrhoea which also regularly cause otherwise avoidable deaths (Ubumi Prisons Initiative June 2015). (p.217)

2 Mental health is a major issue in prisons globally (Simenda 2013, Mayeya et al 2004, Mwape et al 2010, CARITAS 2007, Sarkin 2008, Liebling and Maruna 2005, Birmingham 2003). Zambia Human Rights Commission noted psychological trauma in almost every case encountered (Zambia Human Rights Commission 2013). A study conducted in Lusaka Central Prison and published in 2011 documented a prevalence of mental health issues in that 63% of prisoners had at least one mental disorder (Nseluke and Siziya 2011). Another study on the same issue conducted in Mukobeko Maximum Prison showed a prevalence of 29% (Nseluke and

Siziya 2016). This finding is consistent with other studies from the West that show a lower prevalence in higher security institutions. Nseluke and Siziya suggest that the pre-trial status of many prisoners in medium institutions adds on to the stress of incarceration and has an impact on mental health (Nseluke and Siziya 2016). p.17

3 Christianity plays an important part in the everyday structuring of prison activities, and most prisoners must relate to Christianity in one way or another through their stay in prison. In 1991 Zambia was deemed a 'Christian Nation' by the then newly appointed President Chiluba, and Christianity is at the forefront of political debate as well as in all strata of community living (Phiri 2003). For many prisoners, Christianity and faith take on a new presence and meaning in prison, and several of the informants claimed to be 'born again'. Some inmates become preachers, preaching the word of God in the cells or during the day to anyone interested. Much like studies in the Western context have documented, the born-again experience radically changed perceptions of self, attitudes and thoughts (Kerley and Copes 2008, Maruna et al 2006). p.94

4 In Zambia, certain categories of mentally ill (schizophrenics etc.) prisoners (named HEP – His Excellency's Pleasure) will be sent to a mental health hospital, but many remain in prison for a long time, awaiting transfer. There is only one visiting psychiatrist in Zambia, who visits the prisons twice a year. In conversations with him, he called attention to the problem that in Zambia it is only the court who can sentence a person to psychiatric hospitalisation, but as the courts generally do not have psychiatric counsel, it becomes very arbitrary as to whether mentally ill patients receive the help they need. Even if the visiting psychiatrist identifies a person needing specialised attention, he cannot refer him to the hospital. This means that there a good number of prisoners, who rightly should be hospitalised, but are not. (p.96)

5 Another area which I have neglected, is the role of witchcraft. In Zambia, witchcraft is often understood as black magic motivated by greed (Taylor 2006). Many prisoners believe that they were cursed and therefore wrongly imprisoned (mostly in the sense that they claim not

to have committed the crime, yet they were found guilty). One extreme example of the power of witchcraft is one prisoner who had killed several women. He claimed that he was bewitched and therefore could hardly be made responsible for his actions. To my astonishment many did indeed believe him, and his death sentence was commuted to life in prison by the president. Commutation to life is often a first step to be pardoned for fixed sentences, so this man may in principle be found outside prison in some years from now. Stories of how witchcraft can be used to kill, harm or affect judicial outcomes are commonplace. Prison Officers, too, may accused of witchcraft, and in my view with problematic and biased outcomes, which are not necessarily in line with what one may consider modern day public sector management. (p.163)

President Sata releases 670 poacher-prisoners (24 October 2011)



[PRESIDENT Sata has pardoned](#) over 670 prisoners serving prison terms for mostly wildlife-related offences as an independence anniversary gesture of goodwill.

Mr Sata said he set the prisoners free because the MMD government had respected animals more than human beings by throwing hundreds of poor Zambians into prisons on minor offences.

He announced the pardon in his address to the nation yesterday on the eve of the 47th independence anniversary.

“When I dissolved the ZAWA (Zambia Wildlife Authority) board last week, I said this institution and the MMD government seemed to have respected animals more than human beings. As a result, a lot of poor people were imprisoned over minor wildlife-related offences.

“As we celebrate 47 years of our independence, I have extended a gesture of goodwill to these people by pardoning a total of 673 prisoners, majority of whom were jailed over these minor wildlife-related cases,” Mr Sata said.

President Sata announced the dissolution of the ZAWA board of

directors at State House last Thursday.

He said a number of people were languishing in prisons over more wildlife-related cases than any other offences.

"There are certain institutions which have more respect for animals than human beings. I have today dissolved the ZAWA board, and I have to look at it, to reconstitute it.

"If you look at our prisons there are more people related to ZAWA than any other offence. We cannot run a country like that. God gave us animals for us to admire, and not animals to turn against us," Mr Sata said.

However, inhumane treatment due to the poor conditions of imprisonment is a concern. At the moment the Zambian Correctional Service holds more than 22,000 inmates (2018), and they try their best to do what they can within their limited means. Currently, ZCS have 3050 staff members, 25 health facilities in the more than 80 institutions around the country, meaning that many prisons have no health facilities at all.

Zambian prisons hold the dubious record of the most overcrowded prisons in Africa. In some facilities it is up to 600% of capacity, causing not only stress but physical ailments such as scabies, tuberculosis and other infectious diseases are spread at alarming rate. HIV/AIDS rates are high, though the current prevalence is uncertain, but the last national survey showed a 27% prevalence rate. Water supply is eradicate in some prisons, and this leads to poor hygiene. Soap, detergents and disinfectants are a rare commodity. Lack of hygiene of course contributes to the health problems.

The food provided by Zambia Correctional Service is not sufficient, making food donations from relatives necessary for the individual prisoner. However, due to poverty and stigma many inmates are left to fend for themselves. Malnutrition causes amongst other diseases the condition 'swollen legs' which ultimately has a deadline outcome, if left untreated. Death can be a very real outcome of a prison sentence.

The Socialist Party of Zambia

5.6 Rights of prisoners

"It is said that no one truly knows a nation until one has been inside its jails. A nation should not be judged by how it treats its highest citizens, but its lowest ones." Nelson Mandela.

Prisoners should be treated with respect befitting all human beings. Even the worst criminals do not lose their inalienable rights. And a judge is the proper authority to determine the humanity of prison or detention conditions.

Some statistics

[Prison studies](#)

GOD'S COUNTRY - VOL. II: GUARDIANS OF EDEN

Country	Zambia
Ministry responsible	Ministry of Home Affairs
Prison administration	Zambia Prisons Service
Contact address	PO Box 88928, Kabino, Zambia
Telephone	+260 977 975 621
Fax	+260 5 227916
Website	http://zpriso.org/za/
Head of prison administration (and title)	Dr Chisoka Chikoko Commissioner of Prisons
Prison population total (including pre-trial detainees / remand prisoners)	22 823 at December 2013 (Ministry of Home Affairs)
Prison population rate (per 100,000 of national population)	123 based on an estimated national population of 11.6 million at December 2013 (from United Nations figures)
Pre-trial detainees / remand prisoners (percentage of prison population)	28.5% (May 2012) Further information
Female prisoners (percentage of prison population)	c. 3.8% (2014) Further information
Juveniles / minors / young prisoners fact definition (percentage of prison population)	2.5% (17.8.2012 - under 20)
Foreign prisoners (percentage of prison population)	2.1% (2.12.2011)
Number of establishments / institutions	93 (2015 - 54 standard prisons, 38 open-air prison farms)
Official capacity of prison system	8 250 (May 2012)
Occupancy level (based on official capacity)	301.6% (May 2012)

IV

WORLD THREATS

Biodiversity Retreat

Global Assessment Report (IPBES)

On Monday, 6 May 2019, was revealed the [most comprehensive report](#) ever produced on the state of biodiversity by the UN's Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES). Their Global Assessment Report warns that more than a million plant and animal species are in danger of extinction as a result of - in descending order: (1) changes in land and sea use; (2) direct exploitation of organisms; (3) climate change; (4) pollution and (5) invasive alien species. The conclusion of this is that the Sustainable Development Goals cannot be met - 'an environmental issue, but also a developmental, economic, security, social and moral issue'. 'Climate Change' (the term global warming being a controversial subject) obviously colours the report.

Notable findings

Three-quarters of the land-based environment and about 66% of the

marine environment have been significantly altered by human actions. On average these trends have been less severe or avoided in areas held or managed by Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities.

More than a third of the world's land surface and nearly 75% of freshwater resources are now devoted to crop or livestock production.

The value of agricultural crop production has increased by about 300% since 1970, raw timber harvest has risen by 45% and approximately 60 billion tons of renewable and nonrenewable resources are now extracted globally every year – having nearly doubled since 1980.

Land degradation has reduced the productivity of 23% of the global land surface, up to US\$577 billion in annual global crops are at risk from pollinator loss and 100-300 million people are at increased risk of floods and hurricanes because of loss of coastal habitats and protection.

In 2015, 33% of marine fish stocks were being harvested at unsustainable levels; 60% were maximally sustainably fished, with just 7% harvested at levels lower than what can be sustainably fished.

Urban areas have more than doubled since 1992.

Plastic pollution has increased tenfold since 1980, 300-400 million tons of heavy metals, solvents, toxic sludge and other wastes from industrial facilities are dumped annually into the world's waters, and fertilizers entering coastal ecosystems have produced more than 400 ocean 'dead zones', totalling more than 245,000 km² (591-595) – a combined area greater than that of the United Kingdom.

Negative trends in nature will continue to 2050 and beyond in all of the policy scenarios explored in the Report, except those that include transformative change – due to the projected impacts of increasing land-use change, exploitation of organisms and climate change, although with significant differences between regions.

Scale of Loss of Nature

Gains from societal and policy responses, while important, have not stopped massive losses.

Since 1970, trends in agricultural production, fish harvest, bioenergy production and harvest of materials have increased, in response to population growth, rising demand and technological development, this has come at a steep price, which has been unequally distributed within and across countries. Many other key indicators of nature's contributions to people however, such as soil organic carbon and pollinator diversity, have declined, indicating that gains in material contributions are often not sustainable .

The pace of agricultural expansion into intact ecosystems has varied from country to country. Losses of intact ecosystems have occurred primarily in the tropics, home to the highest levels of biodiversity on the planet. For example, 100 million hectares of tropical forest were lost from 1980 to 2000, resulting mainly from cattle ranching in Latin America (about 42 million hectares) and plantations in South-East Asia (about 7.5 million hectares, of which 80% is for palm oil, used mostly in food, cosmetics, cleaning products and fuel) among others.

Since 1970 the global human population has more than doubled (from 3.7 to 7.6 billion), rising unevenly across countries and regions; and per capita gross domestic product is four times higher – with ever-more distant consumers shifting the environmental burden of consumption and production across regions.

The average abundance of native species in most major land-based habitats has fallen by at least 20%, mostly since 1900.

The numbers of invasive alien species per country have risen by about 70% since 1970, across the 21 countries with detailed records.

The distributions of almost half (47%) of land-based flightless mammals, for example, and almost a quarter of threatened birds, may already have been negatively affected by climate change.

Indigenous Peoples, Local Communities and Nature

At least a quarter of the global land area is traditionally owned, managed, used or occupied by Indigenous Peoples. These areas include approxi-

mately 35% of the area that is formally protected, and approximately 35% of all remaining terrestrial areas with very low human intervention.

Nature managed by Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities is under increasing pressure but is generally declining less rapidly than in other lands – although 72% of local indicators developed and used by Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities show the deterioration of nature that underpins local livelihoods.

The areas of the world projected to experience significant negative effects from global changes in climate, biodiversity, ecosystem functions and nature's contributions to people are also areas in which large concentrations of Indigenous Peoples and many of the world's poorest communities reside.

Regional and global scenarios currently lack and would benefit from an explicit consideration of the views, perspectives and rights of Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities, their knowledge and understanding of large regions and ecosystems, and their desired future development pathways. Recognition of the knowledge, innovations and practices, institutions and values of Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities and their inclusion and participation in environmental governance often enhances their quality of life, as well as nature conservation, restoration and sustainable use. Their positive contributions to sustainability can be facilitated through national recognition of land tenure, access and resource rights in accordance with national legislation, the application of free, prior and informed consent, and improved collaboration, fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the use, and co-management arrangements with local communities.

Global Targets and Policy Scenarios

Past and ongoing rapid declines in biodiversity, ecosystem functions and many of nature's contributions to people mean that most international societal and environmental goals, such as those embodied in the Aichi Biodiversity Targets and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

will not be achieved based on current trajectories.

The authors of the Report examined six policy scenarios – very different ‘baskets’ of clustered policy options and approaches, including ‘Regional Competition’, ‘Business as Usual’ and ‘Global Sustainability’ – projecting the likely impacts on biodiversity and nature’s contributions to people of these pathways by 2050. They concluded that, except in scenarios that include transformative change, the negative trends in nature, ecosystem functions and in many of nature’s contributions to people will continue to 2050 and beyond due to the projected impacts of increasing land and sea use change, exploitation of organisms and climate change.

Policy Tools, Options and Exemplary Practices

Policy actions and societal initiatives are helping to raise awareness about the impact of consumption on nature, protecting local environments, promoting sustainable local economies and restoring degraded areas. Together with initiatives at various levels these have contributed to expanding and strengthening the current network of ecologically representative and well-connected protected area networks and other effective area-based conservation measures, the protection of watersheds and incentives and sanctions to reduce pollution .

The Report presents an illustrative list of possible actions and pathways for achieving them across locations, systems and scales, which will be most likely to support sustainability. Taking an integrated approach:

*In **agriculture**, the Report emphasizes, among others: promoting good agricultural and agroecological practices; multifunctional landscape planning (which simultaneously provides food security, livelihood opportunities, maintenance of species and ecological functions) and cross-sectoral integrated management. It also points to the importance of deeper engagement of all actors throughout the food system (including producers, the public sector, civil society and consumers) and more integrated landscape and watershed management; conservation of the diversity of genes, varieties, cultivars, breeds, landraces and species; as well as*

approaches that empower consumers and producers through market transparency, improved distribution and localization (that revitalizes local economies), reformed supply chains and reduced food waste.

*In **marine systems**, the Report highlights, among others: ecosystem-based approaches to fisheries management; spatial planning; effective quotas; marine protected areas; protecting and managing key marine biodiversity areas; reducing run-off pollution into oceans and working closely with producers and consumers.*

*In **freshwater systems**, policy options and actions include, among others: more inclusive water governance for collaborative water management and greater equity; better integration of water resource management and landscape planning across scales; promoting practices to reduce soil erosion, sedimentation and pollution run-off; increasing water storage; promoting investment in water projects with clear sustainability criteria; as well as addressing the fragmentation of many freshwater policies.*

*In **urban areas**, the Report highlights, among others: promotion of nature-based solutions; increasing access to urban services and a healthy urban environment for low-income communities; improving access to green spaces; sustainable production and consumption and ecological connectivity within urban spaces, particularly with native species.*

Across all examples, the Report recognizes the importance of including different value systems and diverse interests and worldviews in formulating policies and actions. This includes the full and effective participation of Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities in governance, the reform and development of incentive structures and ensuring that biodiversity considerations are prioritized across all key sector planning.

The IPBES Global Assessment Report offers the best available expert evidence to help inform these decisions, policies and actions – and provides the scientific basis for the biodiversity framework and new decadal targets for biodiversity, to be decided in late 2020 in China, under the auspices of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity.”

BIODIVERSITY RETREAT

* * *



3-Global Conditions

Climate Change and Early Burning

Radiant energy reaching the Earth from the Sun is the only source of heat to maintain or vary global climate. Solar radiation varies according to the spectral wavelengths emitted, the number of sunspots, the extent of sunspot activity on the side of the Sun facing the Earth and the proximity of the Earth to the Sun in the normal course of its elliptical orbit. The maximum intensity of radiation due to distance is at perigee.

IPCC reports are not based on scientific method. Instead, they use computer algorithms to assess selected data in large numbers of papers by 'climatologists' that support the conclusions they want policymakers to believe. Natural climate change cycles before 1765 (the industrial revolution) occurred without industrial CO₂ in the atmosphere.

Richard Elliston - AM, FAusIMM(CP), Order of Australia.

I am still waiting for a moral argument that justifies, in the name of the 'climate crisis', preventing the development of grid electricity in the poorest regions of Africa that can support development of an advanced economy.

I suspect that I will be waiting a long time for such a justification, because there isn't one.

Judith Curry - The blame game

Posted on [December 7, 2020](#) by [curryja](#) | [692 Comments](#)

* * *

Climate Change

Global warming is now called Climate Change. It is massively controversial. Scientists, under intense pressure, present differing views of how serious the threat to life on earth is. In Zambia, it has delivered all sorts of corruption and more land-grabbing of customary areas - REDD+ being central to this. The reaction of the Parliamentary Committee on [Lands, Agriculture and Natural Resources 2020](#) was as follows:

Globally agriculture is facing a serious threat from climate change and this has resulted in, among other things, reduced production and productivity, increased food prices and to some extent global food insecurity. The Seventh National Development Plan (7NDP) has acknowledged that Zambia has been experiencing the effects of climate change, resulting in extreme weather conditions such as droughts, rising temperatures and unpredictable rainfall patterns. The frequency and intensity of climate events is expected to rise in future, with a negative impact on the productive sectors of the economy, which include agriculture, and consequently on people's livelihoods. In an effort to adapt and mitigate the effects of climate change on the agriculture sector, the Government through the 7NDP seeks to promote the adoption of agricultural environment-friendly practices (climate-smart and organic

techniques) such as conservation farming, crop rotation, less use of chemical fertiliser and creating public awareness on the adverse effects of climate change.

Inadequate Funding for Effective Forest Management. The Committee in the previous Session had observed with concern that, despite having favourable forestry policies and legislation, forest management was unsustainable because of inadequate funding and understaffing of the Forestry Department as well as the lack of forestry inventory equipment which had hampered effective monitoring and regulation of forest resources. This had put Zambia's forests at risk of over-exploitation.

Also, they urged the Government to:

- take steps to ensure a deliberate policy to **increase collaboration in land use planning** to ensure a balance was struck between fostering economic development and the sustainable use of biodiversity.
- Promote renewable, clean and alternative energy sources to reduce the demand for charcoal and wood.
- Promote alternative livelihood sources such as beekeeping, sustainable agriculture, aquaculture, horticulture, and many others.
- Promote the exploitation of forest resources should be prioritised as an economic activity to avert deforestation (in 2017/8 442 containers of Mukula trees had been illegally exported).
- promote early burning of forests (a retrograde step) and employ and fund forest officers to carry it out ("**A TOOL OF DESPAIR**")

No To Early Burning

The final recommendation of the Parliamentary Committee of 2020 is ecologically indefensible and very damaging. The late Peter Moss, the authority on the Kafue National Park, clarifies that early burning is unnatural. A world's expert on the issue, Fraser Darling called it a "tool of despair", eliminating fire-sensitive plants and converting the vegetation into a monotonous woodland.

²⁴ Moss wrote:

The Lozi people, cattle keepers of the Barotse Floodplains and the Ila of the Kafue Flats, were ecologically attuned to the carrying capacity of the habitats they lived in. They and their cattle moved as fresh grass grew and as the seasons changed. Early administrators recorded the fact that both tribes never burned the grass on their floodplains until the annuals had seeded, and the perennials had completed a year's growth, so that in places where there was standing dry grass at the end of the dry season fires would be started to clear the dead or dying growth and to encourage the new flush, the rest having been grazed to a low incombustible state. This form of controlled burning in fact coincided with the lightning storms of the early rains thus emulating natural fire that allowed natural succession to take place and a broad mosaic of vegetation types and stages in succession to prevail. This was well known to the Administration and was a well-respected policy for edaphic grassland management practiced by traditional rulers. After many years of research and practical endeavour the objective for the Kafue National Park was set as follows: 'To protect as much of the park as possible from fire and to delay fire incursions as long as possible.'

Peter de Vere Moss, Annual Tragedy - Kafue National Park Burning. Times of Zambia 10 June, 2010.

²⁴ Darling, F. Fraser (Frank Fraser), 1903-
Wild life in an African Territory.
London, New York, Oxford University Press, 1960

Yet the present administrators of the Kafue National Park and the Nature Conservancy (TNC) ignore Moss and Darling's view and [promote early burning](#).

Perhaps the most compelling and level-headed explanation of the climate issue I can find appears in a blogsite by a former climate professor, Judith Curry.

The toxic rhetoric of climate change

Posted on [December 14, 2019](#) by [curryja](#) | [443 Comments](#)

by Judith Curry

We have been hearing increasingly shrill rhetoric from Extinction Rebellion and other activists about the 'existential threat' of the 'climate crisis', 'runaway climate chaos', etc. In a recent op-ed, Greta Thunberg stated: "Around 2030 we will be in a position to set off an irreversible chain reaction beyond human control that will lead to the end of our civilization as we know it." From the Extinction Rebellion: "It is understood that we are facing an unprecedented global emergency. We are in a life or death situation of our own making."

It is more difficult to tune out similar statements from responsible individuals representing the United Nations. In his opening remarks for the UN Climate Change Conference this week in Madrid (COP25), UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres said that "the point of no-return is no longer over the horizon." Hoesung Lee, the Chair for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), said "if we stay on our current path, [we] threaten our existence on this planet."

So . . . exactly what should we be worried about? Consider the following statistics:

§ Over the past century, there has been a 99% decline in the death toll from natural disasters, during the same period that the global population quadrupled.

§ While global economic losses from weather and climate disasters have been increasing, this is caused by increasing population and property in vulnerable locations. Global weather losses as a percent of global GDP have declined about 30% since 1990.

§ While the IPCC has estimated that sea level could rise by 0.6 meters by 2100, recall that the Netherlands adapted to living below sea level 400 years ago.

§ Crop yields continue to increase globally, surpassing what is needed to feed the world. Agricultural technology matters more than climate.

§ The proportion of world population living in extreme poverty declined from 36% in 1990 to 10% in 2015.

While many people may be unaware of this good news, they do react to each weather or climate disaster in the news. Activist scientists and the media quickly seize upon each extreme weather event as having the fingerprints of manmade climate change — ignoring the analyses of more sober scientists showing periods of even more extreme weather in the first half of the 20th century, when fossil fuel emissions were much smaller.

So . . . why are we so worried about climate change? The concern over climate change is not so much about the warming that has occurred over the past century. Rather, the concern is about what might happen in the 21st century as a result of increasing fossil fuel emissions. Emphasis on ‘might.’

Alarming press releases are issued about each new climate model projection that predicts future catastrophes from famine, mass migrations, catastrophic fires, etc. However these alarming scenarios of the 21st century climate change require that, like the White Queen in Alice and Wonderland, we believe ‘six impossible things before breakfast.’

The most alarming scenarios of 21st century climate change are associated with the Representative Concentration Pathway RCP8.5 greenhouse gas concentration scenario. Often erroneously described as a ‘business as usual’ scenario, RCP8.5 assumes unrealistic long-term trends for population and a slowing of technological innovation. Even more unlikely is the assumption that the world will largely be powered

by coal.

In spite of the implausibility of this scenario, RCP8.5 is the favored scenario for publications based on climate model simulations. In short, RCP8.5 is a very useful recipe for cooking up scenarios of alarming impacts from manmade climate change. Which are of course highlighted and then exaggerated by press releases and media reports.

Apart from the issue of how much greenhouse gases might increase, there is a great deal of uncertainty about how much the planet will warm in response to a doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide – referred to as ‘equilibrium climate sensitivity’ (ECS). The IPCC 5th Assessment Report (2013) provided a range between 1 and 6°C, with a ‘likely’ range between 1.5 and 4.5°C.

In the years since the 5th Assessment Report, the uncertainty has grown. The latest climate model results – prepared for the forthcoming IPCC 6th Assessment Report – shows that a majority of the climate models are producing values of ECS exceeding 5°C. The addition of poorly understood additional processes into the models has increased confusion and uncertainty. At the same time, refined efforts to determine values of the equilibrium climate sensitivity from the historical data record obtain values of ECS about 1.6°C, with a range from 1.05 to 2.7°C.

With this massive range of uncertainty in the values of equilibrium climate sensitivity, the lowest value among the climate models is 2.3°C, with few models having values below 3°C. Hence the lower end of the range of ECS is not covered by the climate models, resulting in temperature projections for the 21st century that are biased high, with a smaller range relative to the range of uncertainty in ECS.

With regards to sea level rise, recent U.S. national assessment reports have included a worst-case sea level rise scenario for the 21st century of 2.5 m. Extreme estimates of sea level rise rely on RCP8.5 and climate model simulations that are on average running too hot relative to the uncertainty range of ECS. The most extreme scenarios of 21st century sea level rise are based on speculative and poorly understood physical processes that are hypothesized to accelerate the collapse of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet.

However, recent research indicates that these processes are very unlikely to influence sea level rise in the 21st century. To date, in most of the locations that are most vulnerable to sea level rise, local sinking from geological processes and land use has dominated over sea level rise from global warming.

To further complicate climate model projections for the 21st century, the climate models focus only on manmade climate change – they make no attempt to predict natural climate variations from the sun’s output, volcanic eruptions and long-term variations in ocean circulation patterns. We have no idea how natural climate variability will play out in the 21st century, and whether or not natural variability will dominate over manmade warming.

We still don’t have a realistic assessment of how a warmer climate will impact us and whether it is ‘dangerous.’ We don’t have a good understanding of how warming will influence future extreme weather events. Land use and exploitation by humans is a far bigger issue than climate change for species extinction and ecosystem health.

We have been told that the science of climate change is ‘settled.’ However, in climate science there has been a tension between the drive towards a scientific ‘consensus’ to support policy making, versus exploratory research that pushes forward the knowledge frontier. Climate science is characterized by a rapidly evolving knowledge base and disagreement among experts. Predictions of 21st century climate change are characterized by deep uncertainty.

As noted in a recent paper co-authored by Dr. Tim Palmer of Oxford University, <https://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/early/2019/11/26/1906691116.full.pdf>, there is “deep dissatisfaction with the ability of our models to inform society about the pace of warming, how this warming plays out regionally, and what it implies for the likelihood of surprises.” “Unfortunately, [climate scientists] circling the wagons leads to false impressions about the source of our confidence and about our ability to meet the scientific challenges posed by a world that we know is warming globally.”

We have not only oversimplified the problem of climate change, but we have also oversimplified its 'solution'. Even if you accept the climate model projections and that warming is dangerous, there is disagreement among experts regarding whether a rapid acceleration away from fossil fuels is the appropriate policy response. In any event, rapidly reducing emissions from fossil fuels to ameliorate the adverse impacts of extreme weather events in the near term increasingly looks like magical thinking.

Climate change – both manmade and natural – is a chronic problem that will require continued management over the coming centuries.

We have been told that climate change is an 'existential crisis.' However, based upon our current assessment of the science, the climate threat is not an existential one, even in its most alarming hypothetical incarnations. However, the perception of manmade climate change as a near-term apocalypse has narrowed the policy options that we're willing to consider. The perceived 'urgency' of drastically reducing fossil fuel emissions is forcing us to make near term decisions that may be suboptimal for the longer term. Further, the monomaniacal focus on elimination of fossil fuel emissions distracts our attention from the primary causes of many of our problems that we might have more success in addressing in the near term.

Common sense strategies to reduce vulnerability to extreme weather events, improve environmental quality, develop better energy technologies and increase access to grid electricity, improve agricultural and land use practices, and better manage water resources can pave the way for a more prosperous and secure future. Each of these solutions is 'no regrets' – supporting climate change mitigation while improving human well being. These strategies avoid the political gridlock surrounding the current policies and avoid costly policies that will have minimal near-term impacts on the climate. And finally, these strategies don't require agreement about the risks of uncontrolled greenhouse gas emissions.

We don't know how the climate of the 21st century will evolve, and we will undoubtedly be surprised. Given this uncertainty, precise emissions targets and deadlines are scientifically meaningless. We can avoid much

of the political gridlock by implementing common sense, no-regrets strategies that improve energy technologies, lift people out of poverty and make them more resilient to extreme weather events.

The extreme rhetoric of the Extinction Rebellion and other activists is making political agreement on climate change policies more difficult. Exaggerating the dangers beyond credibility makes it difficult to take climate change seriously. On the other hand, the extremely alarmist rhetoric has frightened the bejesus out of children and young adults.

JC message to children and young adults: Don't believe the hype that you are hearing from Extinction Rebellion and the like. Rather than going on strike or just worrying, take the time to learn something about the science of climate change. The IPCC reports are a good place to start; for a critical perspective on the IPCC, Climate Etc. is a good resource.

Climate change — manmade and/or natural — along with extreme weather events, provide reasons for concern. However, the rhetoric and politics of climate change have become absolutely toxic and nonsensical.

In the mean time, live your best life. Trying where you can to lessen your impact on the planet is a worthwhile thing to do. Societal prosperity is the best insurance policy that we have for reducing our vulnerability to the vagaries of weather and climate.

JC message to Extinction Rebellion and other doomsters: Not only do you know nothing about climate change, you also appear to know nothing of history. You are your own worst enemy — you are triggering a global backlash against doing anything sensible about protecting our environment or reducing our vulnerability to extreme weather. You are making young people miserable, who haven't yet experienced enough of life to place this nonsense in context.

A [review of two books](#) recently revealed the need for Africa's people to step back from a developed world neurosis. One of the books is by [Bjorn Lomborg](#):

In poor countries, higher energy costs harm efforts to increase prosperity.

A solar panel, for instance, can provide electricity for a light at night and a cell phone charge, but it cannot deliver sufficient power for cleaner cooking to avoid indoor air pollution, a refrigerator to keep food fresh, or the machinery needed for agriculture and industry to lift people out of poverty. Countries in the developing world need cheap and reliable energy, for now mostly from fossil fuels, to promote industry and growth. Not surprisingly, a recent study of the consequences of implementing the Paris Agreement showed that it will actually increase poverty. We need to be aware that when we insist, as part of foreign aid packages, that the developing world align with our climate priorities, we are enacting a kind of imperialism. We are not listening to what the citizens of these countries want. We are jeopardizing their opportunity to lift their populations out of poverty for the sake of our own concerns. This isn't just bad policy. It's grossly unethical.

5 minutes

Posted on [July 11, 2021](#) by [curryja](#) | [451 Comments](#)

by Judith Curry

Let me start with a quick summary of what is referred to as the 'climate crisis:'

*It's warming. The warming is caused by us. Warming is dangerous. We need to urgently transition to renewable energy to **stop** the warming. Once we do that, sea level rise will stop and the weather won't be so extreme.*

So what's wrong with this narrative? In a nutshell, we've vastly oversimplified both the problem and its solutions. The complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity of the existing knowledge about climate change is being kept away from the policy and public debate. The solutions that have been proposed are technologically and politically infeasible on a global scale.

*Specifically with regards to climate science. The sensitivity of the climate to a doubling of carbon dioxide has a **factor of three** uncertainty. Climate model predictions of alarming impacts for the 21st century are driven by an emissions scenario, RCP8.5, that is highly **implausible**. Climate model predictions neglect scenarios of **natural** climate variability, which dominate regional climate variability on interannual to multidecadal time scales. And finally, emissions reductions will do little to improve the climate of the 21st century; if you believe the climate models, **most** of the impacts of emissions reductions will be felt in the 22nd century and beyond.*

*Whether or not warming is ‘**dangerous**’ is an issue of values, about which science has **nothing** to say. According to the IPCC, there is not yet evidence of changes in the global frequency or intensity of hurricanes, droughts, floods or wildfires. In the U.S., the states with by far the largest population growth are Florida and Texas, which are **warm**, southern states. Property along the coast is **skyrocketing** in value. Personal preference and market value **do not yet** regard global warming as ‘dangerous.’*

*Climate change is a **grand narrative** in which manmade climate change has become the **dominant** cause of societal problems. Everything that goes wrong **reinforces** the conviction that that there is only one thing we can do prevent societal problems – stop burning fossil fuels. This grand narrative misleads us to think that if we solve the problem of manmade climate change, then these other problems would also be solved. This belief leads us away from a deeper investigation of the true causes of these problems. The end result is narrowing of the viewpoints and policy options that we are willing to consider in dealing with complex issues such as public health, water resources, weather disasters and national security.*

*Does all this mean we should do **nothing** about climate change? No. We should work to minimize our impact on the planet, which isn’t simple for a planet with 7 billion inhabitants. We should work to minimize air and water pollution. From time immemorial, humans have adapted to*

*climate change. Whether or not we manage to drastically curtail our carbon dioxide emissions in the coming decades, we need to **reduce** our vulnerability to extreme weather and climate events.*

*With regards to energy. All other things being equal, everyone would prefer clean over dirty energy. However, all other things are not equal. We need secure, reliable, and economic energy systems for all countries in the world. This includes Africa, which is currently lacking grid electricity in many countries. We need a 21st century infrastructure for our electricity and transportation systems, to support continued and growing prosperity. The urgency of rushing to implement **20th century** renewable technologies risks **wasting** resources on an inadequate energy infrastructure and increasing our vulnerability to weather and climate extremes.*

How the climate of the 21st century will play out is a topic of deep uncertainty. Once natural climate variability is accounted for, it may turn out to be relatively benign. Or we may be faced with unanticipated surprises. We need to increase our resiliency to whatever the future climate presents us with. We are shooting ourselves in the foot if we sacrifice economic prosperity and overall societal resilience on the altar of urgently transitioning to 20th century renewable energy technologies.

We need to remind ourselves that addressing climate change isn't an end in itself, and that climate change is not the only problem that the world is facing. The objective should be to improve human well being in the 21st century, while protecting the environment as much as we can.

This view is confirmed in one of the comments by Professor Emeritus Gerald Ratzer, McGill University, Montreal:

<https://www.dropbox.com/s/zovdf6a9cbm2ab3/WCD-CO2-17June.pdf?dl=0>

<https://www.dropbox.com/s/4w3jssld6vjynq4/CO2%20is%20close%20to%20its%20warming%20limit-28June21.pdf?dl=0>

How we fool ourselves

Posted on [October 4, 2020](#) by [curryja](#) | [262 Comments](#)

by Judith Curry

Crowdsourcing examples of fallacious thinking from climate science:

The first principle is that you must not fool yourself, and you are the easiest person to fool. – physicist Richard Feynman

Cognitive biases relate to self-deception, leading to incorrect conclusions based on cognitive factors, including information-processing shortcuts (heuristics) (Tversky and Kahnemann 1974). Cognitive biases can abound when reasoning and making judgments about a complex problem such as climate change.

The catastrophe narrative

Posted on [November 14, 2018](#) by [curryja](#) | [421 Comments](#)

by Andy West

Within the public domain, there is a widespread narrative of certainty (absent deep emissions cuts) of near-term (decades) climate catastrophe. This narrative is not supported by mainstream science (no skeptical views required), and in the same manner as an endless sequence of historic cultural narratives, propagates via emotive engagement, not veracity.

The catastrophe narrative is propagated by all levels of authority from the highest downwards, granting it huge influence, and differentially via favored functional arms of society, plus at the grass roots level. Over decades, various forms via which the catastrophe narrative best propagates have become established via selection, and can be categorized.

While covering a large range, these forms typically feature powerful emotive cocktails (mixed emotions invoked simultaneously) and great urgency, which are highly adapted to undermining objectivity.

This narrative elephant in the room not only tramples upon the mainstream output of science, but all other attempts at objectivity, at a minimum invoking bias wherever it propagates, and at maximum a complete disconnect from domain realities. While the catastrophe narrative is sometimes acknowledged even by those on the orthodox side of the climate change issue, it is typically neither studied nor opposed (and not infrequently its propagation is praised). On the skeptic side, there is often misunderstanding regarding who propagates this narrative and who merely fails to oppose it, which leads to mis-labelling. These issues are discussed in more detail within a companion post to be released shortly. Below deals just with narrative propagation and the forms via which this occurs.

The Cargo Cult Science

[Richard Feynman](#) (Nobel Prize Physicist, 1974)

Some remarks on science, pseudoscience, and learning how to not fool yourself. Caltech's 1974 commencement address.

In the South Seas, there is a Cargo Cult of people. During the war, they saw airplanes land with lots of good materials, and they want the same thing to happen now. So they've arranged to make things like runways, to put fires along the sides of the runways, to make a wooden hut for a man to sit in, with two wooden pieces on his head like headphones and bars of bamboo sticking out like antennas—he's the controller—and they

wait for the airplanes to land. They're doing everything right. The form is perfect. It looks exactly the way it looked before. But it doesn't work. No airplanes land. So I call these things Cargo Cult Science because they follow all the apparent precepts and forms of scientific investigation, but they're missing something essential because the planes don't land.

Now it behooves me, of course, to tell you what they're missing. But it would be just about as difficult to explain to the South Sea Islanders how they have to arrange things so that they get some wealth in their system. It is not something simple like telling them how to improve the shapes of the earphones. But there is one feature I notice that is generally missing in Cargo Cult Science. That is the idea that we all hope you have learned in studying science in school—we never explicitly say what this is, but just hope that you catch on by all the examples of scientific investigation. It is interesting, therefore, to bring it out now and speak of it explicitly. It's a kind of scientific integrity, a principle of scientific thought that corresponds to a kind of utter honesty—a kind of leaning over backwards. For example, if you're doing an experiment, you should report everything that you think might make it invalid—not only what you think is right about it: other causes that could possibly explain your results; and things you thought of that you've eliminated by some other experiment, and how they worked—to make sure the other fellow can tell they have been eliminated.

Details that could throw doubt on your interpretation must be given if you know them. You must do the best you can—if you know anything at all wrong, or possibly wrong—to explain it. If you make a theory, for example, and advertise it, or put it out, then you must also put down all the facts that disagree with it, as well as those that agree with it. There is also a more subtle problem. When you have put a lot of ideas together to make an elaborate theory, you want to make sure, when explaining what it fits, that those things it fits are not just the things that gave you the idea for the theory; but that the finished theory makes something else come out right, in addition.

In summary, the idea is to try to give all of the information to help

others to judge the value of your contribution; not just the information that leads to judgment in one particular direction or another.

If you've made up your mind to test a theory, or you want to explain some idea, you should always decide to publish it whichever way it comes out. If we only publish results of a certain kind, we can make the argument look good. We must publish both kinds of result. For example—let's take advertising again—suppose some particular cigarette has some particular property, like low nicotine. It's published widely by the company that this means it is good for you—they don't say, for instance, that the tars are a different proportion, or that something else is the matter with the cigarette. In other words, publication probability depends upon the answer. That should not be done.

A Climate of Dialogue

Posted on [February 12, 2021](#) by [curryja](#) | [39 Comments](#)
by Judith Curry

A Reality Check on Renewable Energy

Road to Climate Neutrality

Posted on [February 8, 2021](#) by [curryja](#) | [190 Comments](#)
by Judith Curry

Spatial Requirements of Wind/Solar and Nuclear Energy and Their Respective Costs

“In addition to the energy sector, the climate debate also needs a transition. From ideology and wishful thinking, to facts, figures and rationality.”

An important document was published last week, a collaborative instigated by two members of the European Parliament – one from the Netherlands and the other from Czechoslovakia. One of the editors on the resulting report is [Lucas Bergkamp](#), who has written several [guest posts](#) at Climate Etc.

The study is now available for download on the website www.roadtoclimate.neutrality.eu.

This document provides a critical reality check on the rush to replace fossil fuels with renewable energy.

Geo-Engineering in Africa

by [Anja Chalmin](#)

The [interactive geoengineering map](#), generated by ETC Group and the Heinrich Böll Foundation, documents geoengineering projects and experiments worldwide. An analysis of the data shows that on the African continent the topic „Geoengineering“ has received little attention so far. Nevertheless, about 70 geoengineering projects, 5 % of the total documented projects, were executed on the African continent. The majority of these projects are research projects and have been initiated and funded by public and private donors from North America, Europe and Australia. Very few programs are known to have been launched by African institutions, and very few researchers stationed in Africa participate in geoengineering discussions. In recent years, the number of active geoengineering projects on the African continent has declined.

In contrast, interest in African land for geoengineering activities has grown. This article describes the various geoengineering projects on the African continent and their backers. It also looks at proposals from the Global North to use African territories and resources for future large-scale geoengineering projects as well as the risks of such projects and the risks of climate change for the African continent.



Biochar

Biochar projects account for more than 50 % of the documented projects on the African continent. The [interactive geoengineering map](#) currently documents 37 biochar activities in various African countries. Most of these projects (32) were completed between 2010 and 2015 and conducted within the framework of research projects. With few exceptions, these research projects were financed by institutions in Northern America, Europe and Australia. The only known [ongoing research project](#) is led and financed by the Norwegian Geotechnical Institute (NGI). The NGI program combines laboratory work in Norway and field trials abroad, e.g., in Zambia, and aims to investigate the potential of biochar to sequester carbon and to improve soil quality.

The EU-funded Biochar PLUS was conducted from 2014 to 2017.

This project initiated the [African Biochar Partnership](#) in 2016. The partnership is based in Cape Verde. The website highlights completed biochar projects, e.g., the [Biochar for Sustainable Soils \(B4SS\)](#) project or [Agricultural and environmental Benefits from Biochar use in ACP Countries \(BeBi\)](#) and gives no information on new developments.

Biochar - Zambia

Biochar in weathered agricultural lands in Zambia: “carbon sequestration and improved livelihoods” in 2010-2021.

The main aim of the project is to investigate the potential of organic waste biochar to sequester carbon and improve the quality of weathered and/or acidic Zambian soils.

This includes:

systematic study of successful and non-successful soil-biochar combinations for Zambian acid soils

Field tests on the effect of biochar on soil acidity, aluminium toxicity, and nutrient availability / fertilizer need

Identification of optimal feedstocks and optimal concepts for biochar generation



Addition of biochar gives significant increased crop yield in Zambian sandy soils. Already 4-5 tonnes pr hectare give 4 times improvement in crop yield.

Recent new developments are the start of a new research program “Climate-Smart Agriculture in Zambia” (CSAZ), where biochar practice will be integrated in climate-smart farming practices.

NGI is also part of the program “Academic cooperation on climate-smart agriculture in Zambia”, financed by the Norwegian Centre for Internationalization and Education (SIU), with student exchange and summer schools. The first summer school will take place in January 2018 in Zambia.

[See also report on “Super farmer” in Mkushi.](#)

Continuous monitoring of soil moisture with and without biochar. Biochar helps to retain precious moisture.

Conservation Farming Unit (CFF) Lusaka, Zambia

Blockchain & the Privatization Threat

In 2018, Zambia allowed the Medici Land Governance (USA) large-scale project to begin operations. This was the advance guard of a massive threat to customary area. This was revealed to us by the Oakland Institute in the U.S.

<quote>

July 14, 2020

The Oakland Institute's new report, [*Driving Dispossession: The Global Push to "Unlock the Economic Potential of Land,"*](#) sounds the alarm on the unprecedented wave of privatization of natural resources that is underway around the world. Through six case studies — Ukraine, Zambia, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, and Brazil — the report details the myriad ways by which governments — willingly or under the pressure of financial institutions and Western donor agencies — are putting more land into so-called “productive use” in the name of development.

Driving Dispossession highlights the United States as a key player in an unfettered offensive to privatize land around the world via US blockchain

corporations, government agencies, and the World Bank. In Zambia, the Bank has partnered with a subsidiary of the US-based online retailer Overstock.com to use blockchain technology for land titling with the goal of “unlocking trillions of dollars in global mineral reserves that are inaccessible due to unclear land governance systems.” In Sri Lanka, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, a US government entity, is targeting state land — it intends to map and record up to 67 per cent of the country to “promote land transactions that could stimulate investment and increase its use as an economic asset.” In Ukraine, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund leveraged the economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic to coerce “Europe’s breadbasket” into putting its agricultural land for sale in a land market.

The same logic is at play in Myanmar. In 2018, the Vacant, Fallow, and Virgin Land Law was amended to boost economic development by making so-called “vacant” lands available for agriculture, mining, and other purposes. In Papua New Guinea, where 97 per cent of the land is customary, the government wants to “unlock” this land so it can be “mobilized” and put in “productive use” to ensure “private sector growth.” In Brazil, Bolsonaro has been aggressively expanding ranching and exploitation of the Amazon at the expense of the Indigenous People and the forests they live in and steward.

Driving Dispossession also provides a striking compilation of offers made by governments to attract investors. Hundreds of millions of hectares of land are being made available, including from some of the poorest countries, which raises serious concerns about this “development” strategy and the ability to curb the overexploitation of natural resources eventually. But local communities, civil society organizations, and Indigenous People are standing up to resist and preserve their livelihoods and the environment, as documented in the report.

Privatization of land is being touted as a development imperative. *Driving Dispossession* debunks the myth that it leads to human development, and provides a strong rebuttal to the Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto’s pseudo-scientific thesis about the positive impact of titling, often cited to back such policies.

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[Full Report](#)

Zambia: Blockchained (page 10+)

Land Unchained? Blockchain to “Unlock the Economic Value of Land”

Blockchain technology is presented as the silver bullet solution for securing land rights, with over 20 governments worldwide implementing or considering the technology for land registration (see Box 1). The Zambian government has partnered with Medici Land Governance (MLG), a blockchain company and subsidiary of the US-based online retailer Overstock.com, to assist with land registration and titling.

At the time of independence in 1964, there was no private land in Zambia (*incorrect: IM*), with 94 per cent (*incorrect: IM*) of the country under customary tenure and the remaining six per cent under state control. This started to change in the early 1990s when the World Bank and the IMF required the government to change land laws towards privatization as a condition for the restructuring of its international debt. Although the resulting 1995 Land Act recognized customary land, it also created legal pathways for reducing the amount of land under customary land tenure. The Lands Act combined reserve/trust land into customary land, strengthened state leasehold rights at the expense of customary rights, eased restrictions on foreign ownership of land, and facilitated the conversion of land from customary to state. As a result, Zambia saw a drastic reduction of customary land, from 94 per cent to less than 60 per cent today. This so-called formalization of land tenure

resulted in shifting the control over land from people to the government, thereby making it available for exploitation by private interests. In the years after the Act was passed, conversions of customary land to leasehold increased, displacement became common, and while investors reaped the benefits, local villagers suffered through **“social and economic exclusion, elite capture, displacement, intra-community conflict, and the enclosure of common-pool resources.”**

Ignoring the plight of local communities, the Zambian government decided to go farther on the path of land reform by launching a National Land Titling Program in 2014. The stated objective of the program is to “carry out a systematic registration of all property in the country in order to provide security of tenure to property owners.” Zambia’s 2017-2021 National Development Plan confirms the country-wide land titling program, alongside the development of a digitized governance system in the land sector and a comprehensive land audit.

Following the release of the development plan, in 2018 the Zambian government signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with MLG, “to develop a program for systematic land governance within the country.” The project uses blockchain technology to create and digitize land titles (see Box 1). MLG’s initial 2018 project issued 50,000 titles “to serve as proof of concept for a systematic, streamlined process to scale up the country’s land titling program.” Less than a year later, the company signed a second MOU, this time with the Lusaka City Council, to issue “no fewer than 250,000 certificates of title” to people living in Zambia’s capital.

“There are also trillions of dollars in value in global mineral reserves that cannot be accessed by the mining firms...which have difficulty conducting operations where land governance is not clearly established because of various laws and regulations that go back to the 1940s. We believe our work can unlock those values. In the process of unlocking such tremendous values, there should be a few shekels for us, and mountains of shekels that will come into the possession of the world’s poorest.”– Patrick Byrne, Former CEO, Overstock.com, July 15, 2019

As expressed by its former CEO, Overstock.com’s interest in land titling

is closely tied to the Bank's motto that private property rights can help unlock the economic potential of land. In communications with investors, Byrne cited "trillions of dollars in value in global mineral reserves that cannot be accessed by mining firms" due to unclear land governance systems. Private titles would allow mining companies to enter into agreements with landowners to exploit vast natural resources, and ensure that the wealth extracted through mining is enjoyed by land rights holders and corporations. Under this scenario, Overstock.com would also benefit financially from unlocking this "dead capital," though exactly how this would be negotiated remains unknown. What is known in terms of revenue models is that in Zambia, the company expects to receive a cut of the tax revenues generated through government land titling and the resulting increase in taxes. In addition, Byrne has commented that donor countries pay healthy sums for land titling projects, suggesting that international development aid dollars could potentially support MLG's efforts globally.

The day after MLG signed its first MOU in Zambia, it also penned an agreement with the World Bank to collaborate in other countries to "support the design, implementation, and evaluation of pilot programs that will create systems to ensure secure land tenure." The Bank's lead economist on land issues, Klaus Deininger, commented: "Joining forces with MLG allows the Bank to provide client countries access to cutting edge technology, work with the countries on adapting the technology to their context, and then document the impact of the updated process. We are excited about the opportunities this collaboration offers us to generate transformative innovations and make the case for greater public and private investment in an area that is key for development." According to Byrne, the Bank is now helping open doors for blockchain-based land titling "all over the world."

Blockchain

Blockchain is a digital ledger that keeps track of transactions with “blocks” of information that store data such as the date, time, amount, and participants of a transaction in a chronological “chain.” It is a distributed ledger, which means whenever a transaction occurs, it must be verified by a network of thousands or possibly millions of computers around the world before the transaction can be recorded as a block on the chain. Once verified, the added block is given a unique identifier called a hash, as well as the hash of the previous block in the chain. This makes blockchain difficult to hack.

Blockchain was invented in 2008 for Bitcoin, the world’s leading cryptocurrency, by an anonymous entity called Satoshi Nakamoto. The security and transparency provided by blockchain technology has caused many to try to adapt it for a wide range of applications such as medical records, property records, private contracts, and election ballots. Within the field of agriculture, applications include crop insurance and traceability in supply chains.

In recent years, there has been a surge of American and European startups attempting to apply blockchain technology to land registries. Georgia, India, Ukraine, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Colombia, Saudi Arabia, Kenya, Honduras, Bermuda, Brazil, Mexico, St. Kitts and Nevis, Ghana, Rwanda, Zambia, Liberia, India, Ethiopia, and Papua New Guinea are all at various stages of implementing blockchain land registries.

Proponents of using the technology for land administration argue that it has the potential to improve the security and transparency of land registries by storing all information on property boundaries and owners in an immutable, online source. However, for blockchain technology to bring about improvements in the security of land tenure, claims over land ownership would first have to be determined and verified. As a result, implementing this technology requires countries to move towards systems of private land

ownership, which will require registration and digitalization.

The World Bank, one of the major proponents for the use of blockchain for land registration, claims that countries without the required records need simply to “clean up” their registry in order to make blockchain work. However, this “clean up” is a much larger and more expensive undertaking than suggested by the Bank, given it requires “documenting rights in the first instance, resolving and demarcating boundaries, and establishing the necessary policies and laws for an effective modern land administration infrastructure.”

This process runs the risk of further marginalizing disadvantaged groups by allowing wealthy and powerful interests to access land that does not belong to them and formalize their claims through blockchain. Thus, blockchain does nothing to help countries who maintain communal land systems and who have abstained from privatizing land to create more secure records, and instead encourages governments to create individual, private land ownership.

<unquote>

Land Unchained

Andy Currier/Oakland Institute

16 September 2020

<quote>

[Challenging the Assumptions of Blockchain Land Titling](#)

Most of the land on the planet is not registered under a system of private titles. Globally, up to [65 per cent of land \(link is external\)](#) is governed by

local communities or Indigenous People through collective or customary tenure systems. Across the Global South, land registries are often incomplete, as governments only recognize a fraction of these lands under customary systems, officially demarcating them as government-owned, public land. So while [three-quarters of the world's poorest people live in rural areas where land is a key asset, over a billion of these people\(link is external\)](#) lack legal documents formalizing their ownership of the land. In Sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, [90 per cent \(link is external\)](#) of rural land is not formally documented. This lack of formal documentation is however not seen as a problem for many, who consider land – like water – as a common good, with high social and cultural values, that must be shared and preserved for current and future generations.

For blockchain technology to be used in the administration of land, claims over land ownership first would have to be determined, documented, and verified. The World Bank, one of the major proponents of the use of blockchain for land registration, [claims \(link is external\)](#) that countries without the required records need simply to “clean up” their registry in order to make blockchain work. However, this “clean up” is a much larger and more expensive undertaking than suggested by the Bank, given it requires “documenting” rights in the first instance, demarcating parcel boundaries, resolving disputes, and, establishing the necessary procedures and laws for a “modern” land administration infrastructure. As recently as 2018, [only a third of all countries \(link is external\)](#) – including just two in Sub Saharan Africa (Rwanda and South Africa) – maintained land records digitally. In many countries where legal institutions are weak or susceptible to corruption, the process of formalizing ownership claims through individual titles can do [little to improve tenure security\(link is external\)](#), allow governments to solidify their claims to “vacant” land, and make it available for “investment,” as detailed in [Driving Dispossession](#).

Ultimately, shifting land registries to blockchain requires countries to move towards systems of private land ownership, which will require registration and digitalization. All of the 25 ongoing blockchain land projects around the world are focused on providing individual titles to land while ignoring the

millions of hectares managed under customary or collective tenure systems. Thus, blockchain does nothing to help countries that maintain communal land systems and who have abstained from privatizing land and instead encourages countries to move towards individual, private land ownership. **The process of transferring land away from customary systems to facilitate blockchain private titles risks further marginalizing disadvantaged groups and allowing wealthy and powerful interests to access and solidify their claims to land that does not belong to them.**

Zambia, one of the most advanced countries in the application of blockchain technology for land titling is clearly on this path to privatization. At the time of independence in 1964, there was [no private land in Zambia\(link is external\)](#), with 94 per cent of the country under customary tenure and the remaining six per cent under state control. This started to change in the early 1990s, when the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) required the government to change [land laws towards privatization\(link is external\)](#) as a condition for the restructuring of its international debt. As a result of this and subsequent legal changes, Zambia saw a [drastic reduction of customary land\(link is external\)](#), from 94 per cent to less than 60 per cent today. This so-called formalization of land tenure resulted in shifting the control over land from people to the government, thereby making it available for lease to private interests. In the years after the [Lands Act](#) was passed, conversions of customary land to leasehold increased, displacement became common, and while investors reaped the benefits, local villagers suffered through [“social and economic exclusion, elite capture, displacement, intra-community conflict, and the enclosure of common pool resources.”](#)

Instead of protecting land rights for communities, blockchain titling programs are actually geared towards promoting private investment. While the process of transitioning land registries onto blockchain ignores customary tenure systems, it opens the door to corruption, and can lead to dispossession, it simplifies the process of acquiring land for companies and therefore “unlocks the economic potential of land” for the private sector.

This motivation was made explicitly clear in Zambia. In 2018, the Zambian government signed a [memorandum of understanding \(MOU\) \(link](#)

[is external](#)) with Medici Land Governance (MLG), a blockchain company and subsidiary of the US-based online retailer Overstock.com, to “develop a program for systematic land governance within the country.” MLG’s initial [project \(link is external\)](#) used blockchain to create and digitize land titles and issued 50,000 titles “to serve as proof of concept for a systematic, streamlined process to scale up the country’s land titling program.”

Less than a year later, the company [signed a second MOU \(link is external\)](#), this time with the Lusaka City Council, to issue “no fewer than 250,000 certificates of title” to people living in Zambia’s capital. As expressed by its former CEO Patrick Byrne, Overstock.com’s interest in land titling is closely tied to the World Bank’s motto that private property rights can help unlock the economic potential of land. In communications with investors, [Byrne cited\(link is external\)](#) “trillions of dollars in value in global mineral reserves that cannot be accessed by mining firms” due to unclear land governance systems. The explicit goal is that private titles will allow mining companies to enter into agreements with landowners to exploit vast natural resources, and ensure that the [wealth extracted through mining\(link is external\)](#) is enjoyed by land rights holders and corporations. Under this scenario, Overstock.com would also benefit financially from unlocking this “dead capital,” though exactly how this will be negotiated remains unknown.

What is known in terms of revenue models is that in Zambia, the company expects to receive a [cut of the tax revenues generated\(link is external\)](#) through government land titling and the resulting increase in taxes. In addition, Byrne has [commented\(link is external\)](#) that donor countries pay healthy sums for land titling projects, suggesting that international development aid dollars could potentially support MLG’s efforts globally.

This motivation to benefit the private sector is shared by many of the blockchain startups that have been engaged in land titling projects. Seso Global [plans to\(link is external\)](#) “unlock US\$100 billion trapped in Nigeria’s real estate market using blockchain technology” while in the United Arab Emirates, Tech Mahindra’s project to shift the land registry onto blockchain [promises to\(link is external\)](#) “create value which can bring benefits to citizens and multiple entities associated with municipalities (like property developers,

banks).”

The day after MLG signed its first MOU in Zambia, it also [penned an agreement with the World Bank\(link is external\)](#) to collaborate in other countries to “support the design, implementation, and evaluation of pilot programs that will create systems to ensure secure land tenure.” The Bank’s lead economist on land issues, Klaus Deininger, [commented\(link is external\)](#): “Joining forces with MLG allows the Bank to provide client countries access to cutting edge technology, work with the countries on adapting the technology to their context, and then document the impact of the updated process. We are excited about the opportunities this collaboration offers us to generate transformative innovations and make the case for greater public and private investment in an area that is key for development.” [According to Byrne\(link is external\)](#), the Bank is now helping open doors for blockchain-based land titling “all over the world.” However, details of the partnership with Overstock.com remain confidential and have not been made public by the World Bank. The World Bank’s Access to Information Department was “unable to fulfil” the Oakland Institute’s request for information regarding the partnership and other ongoing blockchain land titling projects.

Exploiting More Natural Resources or Preserving the Commons

The Bank’s involvement in facilitating blockchain titling contradicts its commitment to safeguarding customary tenure systems that have [been shown in many cases](#) to provide tenure security and safeguard natural resources. In a [2019 paper\(link is external\)](#), the World Bank itself acknowledged that “customary land has proven to be highly resilient, continuous and flexible” and that safeguarding [customary land] rights should be a “development priority.” Despite this statement, the Bank’s programs facilitating blockchain titling continue to directly undermine customary and collective forms of land governance, putting millions at risk of losing their land and livelihoods.

As demonstrated by the Zambia case, shifting land registries onto blockchain is a part of the broader move to “unlock the economic potential of land” in order to put more land and natural resources into exploitation by private interests. While implementing the technology can be attractive to corporate interests eager to access land, it can be a tool of dispossession

for those whose livelihoods depend on land governed under customary tenure systems. As a number of governments consider applying blockchain to land titling, they must understand and pay heed to the true motivations and implications of this technology.

<unquote>

Oakland Institute results for Zambia

https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/search?search_api_views_fulltext=Zambia&op=

<https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/events/driving-dispossession-webinar-september-17>

<https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/revoke-agra-agnes-kalibata-special-envoy-2021-un-food-systems-summit>

<https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/highest-bidder-takes-all-world-banks-scheme-privatize-commons>

<https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/stop-financing-world-bank-enabling-business-agriculture>

<https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/down-seed-world-bank-enabling-business-agriculture-corporate-takeover>

<https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/events/unfair-game-politics-poaching>

<https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/blog/why-world-bank-missing-point-on-agricultural-development>

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<https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/african-govts-give-away-continent%E2%80%99s-natural-heritage-acre-acre>

<https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/where-best-invest-africa>

<https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/africa-continent-sale>

<https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/foreign-farmers-undermine-food-security-zambia>

V

WEIRD NEOCOLONIALSIM

CBNRM

Nabwalya Chiefdom, Luangwa.



Stuart Marks - ch. 17 - whom I had first met in the Luangwa in 1966, has since that time immersed himself in the anthropology, biology, sociology and history of the Nabwalya customary commoners to the present. (I had conducted the first hunting safaris there in 1969 and returned with my client, Bill Faeth, in 1979, on the last black rhino hunt in the country). Marks points out the [failures of ADMADE'S CBNRM program](#) in the Nabwalya Chiefdom in his penetrating paper, *Back to the Future: Some Unintended Consequences of Zambia's Community-Based Wildlife Program (ADMADE)*.²⁵

I have extracted 45 of the points Marks made about CBNRM (Community-based Natural Resource Management) in, *Back to the Future*. There is no more succinct and penetrating analysis of the WEIRD neocolonialist attempts to deliver 'conservation' to the chiefdoms in existence.

<quote>

1. Under most community-based wildlife initiatives, local people are expected to forgo their "opportunity costs" of living with wildlife together with their "traditional" access rights in exchange for strictly economic benefit streams generated from wildlife uses by outsiders.
2. Whereas many agriculturally based rural communities may accept the economic values attached to wildlife, other security sources such as maintaining and con-solidating significant social relations through culturally mediated resource distributions are also important.
3. Sustaining these resource networks while perpetuating cultural and social identities are central concerns for many small-scale communities' survival in difficult environments.
4. Zambia's failure to achieve local wildlife conservation through the ADMADE initiative resulted from an inappropriate understanding of the specific context of wildlife uses and related livelihood practices within

²⁵ Stuart A. Marks. *Back to the Future: Some Unintended Consequences of Zambia's Community-Based Wildlife Program (ADMADE)*. February 2001. *Africa Today* 48(1):120-141. DOI: 10.1353/at.2001.0012

its Game Management Areas (GMAs).

5. ADMADE presumed that rural residents would be converted to conservation largely as a matter of economics and expediency. This objective could be accomplished by establishing an alliance with the “traditional authority” (i.e., the chief) its main link within these rural communities.
6. New conservation initiatives to become effectively embedded in community processes must grapple with the role and significance of key resources in marginal agricultural communities and with those actors traditionally responsible for their procurement, management, and distribution.
7. With wildlife remaining a crucial and significant resource, residents often see government agents as a problem around which they must manoeuvre.
8. This program has only marginally benefitted rural communities while increasing state control in these rural areas.
9. As household and lineage methods of taking wildlife have turned increasingly from guns to the indiscriminate snaring method, the resulting impacts upon wildlife have been devastating.
10. Local residents’ activities to acquire “bushmeat” assumes local meaning within the context of their historic survival strategies and within ADMADE’s attempts to restrict local off-takes to increase wildlife populations for the more lucrative tourist and safari industries.
11. Currently, most local wildlife harvests are illegal (without license or permit), belong to the “second economy” (MacGaffey 1991), and have become part of a “hidden transcript” in cultural survival (Scott 1990).
12. Success at agricultural tasks often demands group rather than individual strategies and highlights the importance of cooperative networks for sustaining livelihoods.
13. Wildlife enforcement agents represent such outside concerns and may have little empathy for the plights of local people. Local perspectives recognize that livelihood practices are not disembodied from the social relations that bind individuals and groups.
14. The collection of natural resources, involving wild plants, forest prod-

ucts, fishing and hunting, is an integral part of their agricultural activities.

15. Various social commitments and obligations shape Their livelihoods and household priorities for food and income.
16. Flooding of fields, drought conditions, and cycles of agricultural pests (rodents, birds and insects) all contribute to the uncertainties of producing crops within the Luangwa valley. These problems are partly addressed through redistributive mechanisms based on cooperative networks of kin relations.
17. Social relations commonly include both living and dead members of a particular group.
18. Although their importance is differentially acknowledged by being denied, banned, or discouraged, the numbers of small spirit shrines (*mfuba*) scattered in settlements testify to the importance attributed to the residential group's ancestors.
19. Hunters often solicit ancestral aid for protection and for securing the game before proceeding into the bush.
20. The significance of hunting practices relates to its cultural and symbolic values as to their economic importance.
21. Specific resources (such as wildlife) become the products of meaningful actions in determinant social and historical contexts and are not reducible to mere economics.
22. Local hunters are individuals who attest to a "dream summons" prompted by a revered ancestor which sanctions his calling and status, who possess a "guardian protective presence" (an ancestral ghost), who have spent a period of training under an elder, and who have inherited or has access to a lineage weapon—usually a muzzle-loading gun or modern weapon.
23. The takers of wildlife have changed from elders (who controlled the authority and symbols of the hunt) and middle-aged men (seeking recognition for their prowess) increasingly to younger men with little or no supervision.
24. Fragmentation into smaller settlements and impoverishment is the

- cultural context in which snaring has greatly increased. Unlike guns, snaring is difficult to control.
25. Given this social factionalism and the importance of secrecy to escape detection by the wildlife scouts, bushmeat, once obtained, is not widely shared.
 26. One consequence is that wild meat has shifted from a key element in reciprocity among relatives too, where the market is available, a commodity for strangers to purchase if cash is needed for other necessities.
 27. Both project conception and implementation were “top-down,” prescriptive, and focused more on wildlife than local people.
 28. ADMADE funds untimely delayed in reaching their targets and often misappropriated.
 29. Villagers were largely kept in the dark as to the amounts of funds generated through safari hunting and tourism on their lands.
 30. Communities through their wildlife committee were allowed to spend funds only in designated and appropriate categories of expenditures (a school, clinic, road building, etc.).
 31. A few key political players (notably the chiefs and members of their lineages) have monopolized both the allocation of these funds designated for GMA development and other important decision-making capacities.
 32. Chiefs gave preferential employment to members of their own lineages through the village scout program and retained control over the form and placements of community developments. As ADMADE was purposefully designed to work within existing authority structures, such practices had the effect of marginalizing the broader community, represented by other lineages, from active participation.
 33. Scouts have been used selectively against the project’s local detractors and other lineages.
 34. The wider community has experienced insidious inside policing and wildlife enforcement that has seriously impacted their access to wildlife protein and driven these practices underground.
 35. If ADMADE’s transfer payments to beneficiaries in the Munyamadzi

Corridor were meaningful at the local level, then we would expect a decrease in the number of arrests for wildlife violations over time. This reduction has not occurred.

36. Any reduction in the numbers of arrests appears as more a function of difficulties in implementing the program in an isolated GMA than in effectiveness or in changing behaviour.
37. Many imposed interventions have failed, such as gender and democratic representativeness, transparency, and equity issues.
38. ADMADE has provided neither leadership nor protection against elephants raiding fields—especially as residents remember elephant control as an important management feature under the colonial government.
39. There is no compensation to the owner of a raided field except if the raider is killed, and even then, scouts often claim the meat for themselves or the District.
40. And when cultivators try to protect themselves against a crop raider, they may find themselves being prosecuted.
41. ADMADE enforcement furthers social tensions among residents. Strong sentiments and expectations over wild meat motivate some individuals to become informers when they know of kills, and they have been left out of distribution networks.
42. Comparing the wildlife counts taken between 1966 and 1967 close to villages with those taken in the same location in 1988 and 1989 shows a 50 per cent reduction in numbers.
43. Snaring is a nonselective method that takes prey without reference to sex, age, or species. Thus conservationists intending to manage wildlife populations through these programs lose even more control over the very animals they sought to conserve.
44. Human communities neighbouring these protected areas continued to suffer resource constraints and damage to their crops or livestock by wild animals (Parry and Campbell 1992; Infield and Namara 2001). Further, rural communities had become legally dispossessed of their wildlife rights through the state's management practices of license controls, protection policies, and enforcement through its coercive

military culture (Peluso 1993; Hitchcock 2000). Conservationists were convinced that wildlife and protected areas would disappear unless local communities became more integrated with and benefitted from these areas.

45. The communities were expected to receive projects gratefully as passive recipients, to participate in proscribed “committees,” and to accept benefits in prescribed packages.

<unquote>

My Quote from ‘Plunderers of Eden’

It is the criminal human rights abuses visited upon villagers, coinciding with the arrival of ADMADE, which entirely consigns to the dustbin of history the rationale of outside intervention and force in the guise of government-directed community resource management. In Nabwalya central, the survey of households in 2006 showed that the percentage of arrests, 38% (174/460) among respondents, was even higher in some village clusters. In 2006, in a summing up of ADMADE, Marks declared that rather than rural residents benefitting from their natural resources, ADMADE had ushered in sustainable-use conservation but with legal access to wildlife only assured through wealth and privilege.

CBNRM in my experience in numerous African countries is a disaster: disempowering indigenous people; creating social divisions; introducing a military police presence (who themselves poach); imprisoning subsisting-hunting villagers and their families in prisons under conditions that defy belief and for periods - before and after sentencing - which run up to six years in Zambia; stimulating land and resource grabs - in particular, the wildlife on which they depend; using them as a rent-basket for siphoning off money from state game cropping schemes and

not sharing it equitably; driving subsistence 'poaching' underground through snaring; encouraging the use of poisons (so killing all the lion in Bangweulu); allowing hunting safari operator abuse of local villagers - as I experienced vividly in C.A.R., and as Marks records in his book, Life as a Hunt when writing of the life of a man who was once my safari tracker in Nabwalya in 1969. Marks' book, Life as a Hunt, makes absolutely clear what CBNRM is about.

Norwegian aid and sustainable development: Project case from Zambia (2003)

Sele, Anne Maiken

Final concluding remarks:

SLAMU is a good example which shows us that it is possible to combine development and environmental protection through sustainable use. It is, however, difficult to reach real decentralisation of management responsibility and financial gains, because of the difficult issue of power relations. Real decentralisation has not been fully and securely reached in SLAMU, although they have come a long way. It is therefore important to consider the circumstances when trying to reach decentralisation, and not forget what Crook and Sverrisson have highlighted; that decentralisation measures are not technically neutral devices which can be 'implemented' without constraint, as if there were no pre-existing social context (Crook & Sverrisson 2002: 2).

Evaluation of Norwegian Development Support to Zambia (1991 – 2005)

Oxford Policy Management (2007)

Executive summary

Introduction and Purpose

This case study report concerns the support given by the Norwegian government to the Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ) for its wildlife and natural resources sector during the study period of 1991-2005. This support was delivered primarily through the Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project (LIRDP) and its successor, the South Luangwa Area Management Unit (SLAMU). Related support was provided during 2000-2001 and 2004 to assist the transition from the government department responsible for wildlife management, the National Parks and Wildlife Service (NPWS), to the parastatal statutory body, Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA).

Background of LIRDP/ SLAMU and the Zambia wildlife sector

LIRDP/ SLAMU has been concerned primarily with the conservation of the Luangwa Valley in south-central Zambia, with a focus on the continued existence of the South Luangwa National Park (SLNP) and its wildlife in the Lupande Game Management Area (LGMA) immediately adjacent to the southwestern boundary of the SLNP. At the same time, it has aimed to utilize wildlife as a natural resource to improve livelihoods of the people in the LGMA, addressing rights, access to and ownership of natural resources, governance and political economics. Lessons learned in South Luangwa could be applied to other areas of Zambian wildlife

sector as a whole.

The origin of LIRDP was the Lupande Development Workshop of 1983, with a following study proposing a multi-sectoral project that received crucial initial support from the extant President, Kenneth Kaunda. The project has gone through several phases, with changing objectives, as well as changes in the external conditions in the Zambian government.

*The first implementation phase, **Phase II**, during 1987-1992, was an ambitious, multisectoral approach to improving the standard of living of the people in the project area by means of sustainable use of its natural resources, and a large component of infrastructure development. Although now viewed in retrospect as a top-down, unsustainable “minigovernment” that substituted for the work of the GRZ, this type of project was typical of ICDP-type donor interventions of the mid-1980s period, and Phase II did provide the initial basis for subsequent, more focussed developments.*

***Phase III** saw improved administrative management and a focus on creating a viable CBNRM programme, phasing out the non-wildlife sector components and making wildlife utilization the primary means of income-generation for park management and rural livelihoods. The CBNRM work also introduced a strong element of decentralized grassroots democracy, with elected Village Action Groups given the key decision-making role for managing the funds from hunting concessions.*

***Phase IV** coincided with the transition of NPWS to ZAWA, a process that ironically resulted in re-centralization of key activities, such as CBNRM. LIRDP became a ZAWA “area management unit”, SLAMU, arguably a positive step in the direction of institutional sustainability. However, it also, decentralized “ownership” of the wildlife resource in the GMAs and reduced the flexibility and level of funds received.*

Phase V extended the objectives of Phase IV, with even greater focus on financial and technical self-sufficiency of SLAMU for managing the SLNP and the LGMA. The expansion of the tourism sector, including creating ever-greater opportunities for private sector operators within the SLNP, and the development and maintenance of partnerships with NGOs in the GMA, have been key aspects of the move towards self-sufficiency.

The project objectives have clearly evolved over the two decades of support, with an accompanying trend towards greater financial, managerial and technical accountability and independence. In all phases, there has been a commitment to infrastructure development in the region, with a significant proportion of the budgets devoted to road building and maintenance.

ZAWA appears to have taken on ownership of the LIRDП through its creation of SLAMU, but central government still does not appear to be taking seriously the role of the wildlife sector in the national economy, in tourism and its multiplier effects, in general or in the Luangwa Valley in particular.

ZAWA abandoned the participatory approach developed by LIRDП/SLAMU under Phase III, forcing it to conform to the nation-wide ADMADE programme, operated through ZAWA's central headquarters, and retaining significant funds for itself and for the national treasury

Conclusions and recommendations

The main lesson from South Luangwa is that maximum impact on rural livelihoods, local democratic structures and active involvement in sustainable natural resource use and protection occurred under the conditions of Phase III, when all hunting funds were received directly by communities and decisions on their disbursement and spending were taken by village-level groups. This arrangement empowered the people

*most directly involved in wildlife utilisation and prevented much of the interference in their control over these resources by individuals and groups at higher levels, including powerful interests in government and the chiefdoms. The current system has interposed ZAWA between the source of revenue in hunting concessions and the rural people. The government now retains a significant proportion of financial return at a higher level, but more importantly it has re-taken much of the decision-making power over resource use out of the hands of the rural populace. **This approach is consistent with the view that, unless attention is focussed, powerful groups at higher levels in social hierarchies act to maintain their control over resources.***

We suggest that Norway and the development programme through its Embassy

- 1. should continue its support for investment in the capacity of ZAWA to develop its protected areas as income-generating enterprises, using the SLNP model and applying it to other parts of the country, .*

- 2. should continue dialogue with GRZ to reverse the policy of Treasury drawing funds from ZAWA, and instead for Treasury to recognize the importance of well-functioning wildlife PAs in the national tourism economy by providing ZAWA with funds sufficient for capitalization and investment to build PA capacity for income generation.*

- 3. focus attention on devolving financial resource capture and decision-making power to the lowest levels in community areas of Lupande GMA, and with that model, to other GMSs around the country. This may require changes to the Wildlife Act.*

USAID REPORT on CBNRM in Southern Africa (2011)

In October 2011, USAID, through its consultants, DAI, produced a draft review of CBNRM in Southern Africa, the final report produced in 2013.[xiv]

Part of this report was a 32-day ‘stocktaking assessment’ in 2017 by Vincent R. Nyirenda, a Zambia Wildlife Authority employee. His effort was a propaganda effusion for accepted ZAWA/CBNRM dogma rather than a report on the actual situation. His executive summary prepared us for what lay ahead: “As a result of conducive policy and legislation, as well as support from cooperating partners and local governance systems, CBNRM produced positive results.” [xv] I saw little evidence in Zambia to back up this statement.[xvi]

My Comments

Quote Page 20 (1).

In Zambia, the Act No. 12 of 1998 established the rights of local communities to use and manage natural resources in Game Management Areas (GMAs) and Open Area’s.

As in the 1998 Act,[xvii] DAI makes no mention of customary area. Under section 7 (2b), it does direct that a Community Resource Board (CRB) shall have the power to ‘manage the wildlife under its jurisdiction, within quotas specified by the Authority’ (ZAWA at the time). But, in reality, no such power has ever been conferred on CRBs. And although the CRBs do attend a quota meeting, they have absolutely no impact on it. They are directed principally by the income requirements set for the particular category of hunting concession by government. CRBs have not been given the right to use and manage natural resources, the main problem afflicting customary area. And as I

wrote in *Plunderers of Eden* regarding the new Wildlife Act of 2015. “The act is ominous, the inexorable heavy march of commodification, privatization, and the alienating state deafening.”

2. ‘These rights include developing management plans, in consultation with the Zambian Wildlife Authority (ZAWA), on the integrated use of natural resources – plans that are expected to reconcile different land uses within GMAs. To exercise NRM rights, communities must apply to ZAWA for registration as CRBs (Nyirenda, 2010). CRBs are then divided into smaller Village Action Groups (VAGs)’.

CRBs never write management plans; the few written are produced by government and imposed on the customary villagers. CRBs don’t apply to government for registration. It is the government that sets them up and removes them when they see fit. As for the VAGS, they disappeared a long time ago in the ADMADE era.

3. ‘In the fisheries sector, local communities have rights to 25% of fish levy revenues via zonal committee’s.

This is the first I have heard of this. It is unlikely – as with the CRBs – that a fish levy has ever been paid. The administration of Zambia’s fishery is a fine example of an oxymoron.

4. There has also been some encouragement of a sense of forest ownership and the establishment of joint ventures with the private sector via the 1998 National Forest Policy. Legislation does guarantee the right to access and use NTFPs. Forestry legislation makes provision for Joint Forest Management Agreements between the government and communities, but has not been implemented except in a few pilot areas. The result is that communities cannot meaningfully engage in forest management and it is difficult for them to derive income from the sustainable use of forest products. Large timber harvesting concessions are provided to the private

sector without any provision for community benefit.

Yes, forestry is a disaster area. However, the Forestry Act of 2015 holds out considerable promise.

5. 'CRB rights include the negotiation of co-management agreements, in collaboration with ZAWA, with hunting companies and photographic tour operators. CRBs specify the benefits that should accrue to them in these agreements. CRBs also participate in setting wildlife quotas, including the quota that is retained for GMA residents; they have the right to manage the wildlife within these quotas. CRBs also have rights to a share of revenue generated by wildlife utilization: 45% of animal fees and 20% of concession fees are allocated to them as community funds.

CRBs are treated with disdain by the government. They have no power, being merely ghost-actors not paid according to the law by the rent-seeking government.

6. 'The allocation of the revenue to communities is often slow and not very transparent. According to official policy, the use of these funds must be divided between wildlife management activities (45%), community projects (35%), and CRB administration (20%). Some stakeholders maintain that the transfer of NRM governance and rights to local communities is still generally insufficient. Also, the Wildlife Act does not clearly define the use rights of CRBs and ZAWA mostly drives management activities and decision-making. Communities have realized that they play an important role in wildlife management and have started to demand a higher percentage of income.'

An understatement. CRBs have been defrauded, and many are complicit in poaching rings.

7. 'In Zambia, elephant have more than doubled in the Luangwa Valley since the 1980s from around 9 000 to about 18 600 and some other species in the valley such as impala and puku have also increased.'

There are only about 22,000 elephant left in Zambia, 14,000 in the Luangwa. No mention is made of the extinction of the black rhino when CBNRM - community-based schemes were at their most active.

Page 25.

8. 'In addition declines in wildlife numbers are attributed to the partial implementation of CBNRM where community rights are not well defined and benefits are not clear.'

True. But DAI makes no mention of the CBNRM context, i.e. customary area and its misuse by donor-aid CBNRM projects.

9. 'There are some indications that fish stocks have increased in traditionally protected fisheries in Zambia where community participation is robust (e.g., Barotse, Kariba). Also, local forests outside of the National Forest network have generally been conserved through traditional values and the participation of local communities. In the agricultural sector, widespread adoption of conservation farming techniques has resulted in impressive yield increases: 5,000 kg/ha for maize as opposed to 1,100 kg/ha using traditional practices. The Zambian approach to conservation farming appears to be a model that other CBNRM programs can learn from.'

Here there is an admission that villagers are in some areas conserving their fishery and forests. No mention is made that this is because of customary and traditional systems free of the CBNRM rent-seeking.

Page 30.

10. *'In Zambia 1,012 village scouts have been employed in wildlife management activities.'*

Mostly unpaid, unsupervised, and not employed under civil service conditions. They form the core of poaching rings. And prey on subsistence hunters.

Page 47.

'Conclusion

CBNRM can be a powerful tool for both conservation and rural development in Southern Africa. It has produced positive results where it has been implemented most closely in line with its underlying principles. It has not succeeded so well and in some cases has failed where devolution of rights has not gone far enough, where communities have been prevented from receiving the full benefits from resource management, and where insufficient attention has been given to developing resilient institutions and good governance processes. Decision-makers and policy makers in the region are in a position to build on the successes and take steps to avoid the failures of the past.'

No mention of the real issue – the empowerment of the customary commoners over land and its resources. CBNRM in Zambia has been an abject failure, working against the interest of customary people, the wildlife, the fishery, the forests, etc.

Perhaps the new Act, hidden away for the moment, will help remedy the donor-government CBNRM refrain (The Protection of Traditional Knowledge, Genetic Resources & Expressions of Folklore Act No. 16 of 2016).[xviii]

[xiv] Jones, Brian et al. Community-Based Natural Resource Management in Southern Africa. DAI/USAID. 2013. p.20. Web. 8 April 2017. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00JRSF.pdf

[xv] Nyirenda, V. Community based natural resource management: Stock-taking assessment. Zambia profile. USAID. Washington, D.C., 2011. Web. 10 July 2017.

[xvi] Manning, I.P.A. Critique of the report: CBNRM stocktaking report, Zambia profile, by Vincent Nyirenda. Web. 8 April 2017. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1QI2lOVCCYtDgybtjU_imDHVlmjHDoieZSP376BJ_1mo/edit?usp=sharing

[xvii] Wildlife Act of 1998. Web. 7 April 2017. http://theredddesk.org/sites/default/files/wildlife_act_12_1998_1.pdf

[xviii] Web. 7 April 2017. <http://www.parliament.gov.zm/node/5214>

Panos Institute Report on CBNRM in Zambia (2017)

<quote>

Conclusions:

1. It is evident that the limited or non-involvement of the traditional leadership and local communities in the ENRM and CBNRM issues directly impact the failure to attain sustainable forest and agricultural practices.
2. This has resulted in uncontrolled depletion of fish, land degradation and severe deforestation.
3. The limited knowledge, information and understanding of ENRM issues prevalent among the local communities have contributed to the failure

to manage natural resources effectively.

4. Also, the existing relevant laws and policies present several challenges as they do not provide detailed and transparent regulations and mechanisms for public participation in planning, decision-making and management of natural resources.
5. Moreover, some other policies and laws are still in a draft form, such as the Draft Land and Administration Policy and the Draft Fisheries Policy.
6. It is further noted that the Local Government Act does not adequately reflect the system of devolution espoused by the (amended) Republican Constitution of 2016.
7. There is also no provision for public participation or community involvement in developing several laws and policies or their preparation, as in the case of the National Environmental Protection Plan (EPP).
8. Despite numerous provisions mandating community consultation, there are no regulations governing the method, form, and precise process that community consultations should take.
9. Similarly, there is evidence suggesting widespread non-compliance and ineffective monitoring of CBNRM mandates in the fisheries and forestry sectors.

Recommendations:

1. The policies in draft form should be finalised and adopted.
2. Community consultation mandates should be accompanied by detailed procedural guidelines on the form, method, and process these consultations should take.
3. Community input should be solicited during the mining licence decision-making processes.
4. Law reform that integrates, harmonises and revises laws relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, and other sources (REDD+) should be undertaken.
5. The Local Government Act should be updated to reflect the system of devolution envisaged by the Republican Constitution.

6. Since prudent ENRM is most effective at its source, local community input and involvement is critical to the development of the National Environmental Protection Plan, and the Environmental Management Act must facilitate this engagement.
7. There is a need to ensure that there is statutory compliance with the Fisheries Act, which requires that all Fisheries Management Areas must have a Fisheries Management Plan.
8. The FMA plan must provide mechanisms to enable the public, women, in particular, to participate in managing water resources within a catchment.
9. An effective enforcement monitoring mechanism must be put in place to ensure that the CBNRM directives enshrined in laws and policies are complied with.
10. A precise process of community consultations should be included in the ENRM policies and laws.
11. There is a need to curtail discretionary elements in CBNRM implementation and to replace these with mandatory directives.
12. An outreach and awareness campaign should be mounted to inform the public of their public participation rights.
13. There is a need to conduct an ethnographic study on the enforcement and implementation of CBNRM directives and the effect of CBNRM laws and policies on local communities.
14. There should be a deliberate effort to translate basic key facts of the policies and laws into Zambian languages to facilitate understanding by the rural communities.
15. There should be continuous sensitisation and training programmes of different target groups of the rural communities to gain some knowledge and understanding of ENRM and CBNRM issues.
16. The media should consider designating a desk to specialise in ERN and CBNRM issues and regularly publish articles on these issues.

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Lessons from Luangwa

Barry Dalal-Clayton and Brian Child (2003)

APPENDIX 2

ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT DESIGN (ADMADE) FOR GAME MANAGEMENT AREAS

ADMADE is the official national CBNRM programme Zambia's National Parks and Wildlife Service (NPWS). Like LIRD, it had its origins in the Lupande Development Workshop held at Nyamaluma in 1983 (Dalal-Clayton and Lewis 1984) (see sections 2.1 and 2.2), but the two initiatives have followed different directions. NPWS (strongly prompted by Dale Lewis) believed that community-based resource protection and benefit-sharing should be enabled within existing administrative structures and remain firmly within and under the control of NPWS. This school initiated the ADMADE programme. The other school (planners and other government officers working with the Eastern Province authorities) followed through on the approach endorsed by the majority of workshop participants. It developed a proposal which led to LIRD - in its early phases, this was developed as an integrated project with a wide remit for resource management in the Luangwa catchment and sought to establish itself as a semi-autonomous body to overcome the inertia and poor performance in the Luangwa Valley of line departments. Since 1995, LIRD has had a tighter focus on CBNRM and managing the South Luangwa National Park. Since 1992, LIRD has been officially

under NPWS, but it has not been integrated with ADMADE and has been more-or-less ignored by NPWS and allowed to operate as a stand-alone project. The main donor support for ADMADE has come from USAID, which has provided US \$4.8m since 1989, but this funding is scheduled to end at 1999. The programme has operated through two phases: a development phase (1989-1994) and a strengthening phase (1995-1997/8). The development phase was based on the following objectives (Mwenya et al. 1990) - to

- Provide an effective network of buffer zones for national parks and self-supporting*

- wildlife management units;*

- Provide a self-sustained management programme for long-term protection of wildlife*

- resources in GMAs;*

- Develop an improved and sustainable basis for supporting local community projects; ·*

- Foster a closer and more cooperative relationship between the NPWS and local*

- communities on wildlife affairs;*

- Earn foreign exchange from the wildlife estate for the government central treasury;*

- Stimulate the development of entrepreneurship and skills among residents needed to*

- support the management of renewable wildlife resources.*

Thus, the main emphasis of ADMADE has been on wildlife management and conservation through law enforcement (anti-poaching).

The strengthening phase aimed to overcome many weaknesses identified in ADMADE by various evaluations (DeGeorges 1992, Hachileka 1992, USAID 1993, Billings 1994, Rosenthal et al. 1995) (see Table A2.1).

On paper, ADMADE covers over 30 GMAs in Zambia extending over more than 100,000 km² (about 20% of the country's entire landmass) but, in practice, to date, it has operated effectively only in the more 'viable'

GMA (i.e. those with reasonable remaining game populations) funded by USAID. These are in the Luangwa Valley (with the exception of Lupande GMA which is under LIRD/SLAMU), and more recently around Kafue National Park and in the lower Zambezi Valley (Figure A2.1). ADMADE is not yet operating in more than a third of Zambia's GMAs.

Table A2.1: Evolution of the ADMADE programme and claimed achievements

Source: Nyamuluma Training Institute, published in Moso (1998)

Pre-ADMADE Stage (1980-1988)	ADMADE Development (1989-1994)	ADMADE Strengthening (1995-1997)
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Poaching high 2. Community not a wildlife stakeholder in the wildlife industry 3. Community against conservation 4. No data collection for monitoring 5. No local NPWS administration 6. Too few camps and scouts 7. No arrangement for income to support areas 8. Resource ownership govt. controlled 9. No training institute for community skills 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sub-Authorities formed 2. Residents trained as village scouts 3. Extension officer (Unit Leader) deployed 4. USAID provided equipment support (incl. Vehicles) 5. WCRF (originally set up in 1986 to supplement govt. funding to national parks) used to return income benefits to communities 6. Information gathering system developed 7. Community skills introduced and Nyamuluma Institute created 8. Camp construction and improvements 9. Councils involved 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sub-Committees formed to balance powers of Chiefs 2. Sub-Authority members elected 3. Village Area Groups formed 4. Local bookkeepers trained 5. Capacity-building courses taught 6. Licensing computerised 7. Participatory skills extended to Unit Leaders 8. Quota-setting supported with indicators and local participation 9. Database made user-friendly & accessible to local management 10. Lease agreement tied to CBNRM commitment with capacity to monitor compliance 11. Nyamuluma Institute expands curriculum for local leaders & develops GIS applications for ADMADE
	Problems and weaknesses <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Abuse and interference of safari operators 2. Automatic leadership of Sub-Authority Chairmen 3. Misappropriation of WCRF funds 4. Dysfunctional Sub-Authorities 	

'viable' GMAs (i.e. those with reasonable remaining game populations) funded by USAID. These are in the Luangwa Valley (except for Lupande

GMA, which is under LIRD/SLAMU), and more recently around Kafue National Park and in the lower Zambezi Valley (Figure A2.1). ADMADE is not yet operating in more than a third of Zambia's GMAs. The ADMADE programme is administered directly by NPWS headquarters, with strong facilitation provided by the Nyamaluma Training Institute with one expatriate technical adviser (Dale Lewis). At the district level, Wildlife Management Authorities have been established, chaired by the District Governor with the area Wildlife Warden as the Secretary. Other members of the WMAs include local politicians (MPs and elected Councilors) and Directors of Commercial Companies with interests in wildlife in the area. But since the inception of ADMADE, however, WMAs have hardly functioned and have been irrelevant.

GMAs are divided into administrative wildlife management Units. In most cases, a Unit covers a GMA, which also usually corresponds to a traditional chiefdom. In some cases, a Unit shares two chiefdoms. The Unit consists of a Unit leader and other staff. For every chiefdom, a Wildlife Management Sub-Authority has been established (chaired by the Chief). From 1997, WMA Sub-Committees were established to balance the powers of the Chiefs. In the period 1995-1997, Village Area Groups were introduced.

Table A2.2: ADMADE administrative levels

Administrative level	Responsibility
Headquarters	Centred at NPWS, Chilanga, and extending to regional (approximately provincial) level of the 12 Commands (Luangwa, Kafue, etc.). WCRF held at NPWS HQ.
Wildlife Management Unit	At GMA level or for chiefdoms within GMAs. Consists of a Unit Leader (an NPWS civil servant specially trained to implement community-based wildlife management), some NPWS scouts, 20-30 odd Village Scouts, and ancillary staff. Responsible for anti-poaching activities, data collection, community conservation education (through drama), health education. Unit offices keep files of field information and data summaries which is used for natural resource management plans. The division of the Unit from the Sub-Authority is something of an accounting convenience as the two are inextricably linked in terms of decision-making, administration and implementation.
Sub-Authority	An elected body (currently chaired by the Chief – they will become 'patrons' when ZAWA becomes operational). Members include village headmen, elected councilors, head teachers, a District Council representative and the Unit Leader acts as Secretary. It makes decisions on the allocation of funds to community projects. The Sub-Authorities were conceived as offering local residents a forum consistent with traditional customs to participate in the formulation of ideas on how to better manage and develop their wildlife resources and how to allocate wildlife revenues for community improvements. Recently, to increase democracy, Sub-Committees have been formed for finance, resource management and community development matters. Sub-Authorities are likely to become elected Community Resource Boards when the new Zambia Wildlife Authority become operational.
Village Area Group	Established to represent and express localised opinion. Each with a committee of representatives of "peer groups" (e.g. elders, fishermen, women's clubs) or other people who may be elected. Led by Senior Village Group Headmen. Members then among themselves elect representatives to sit on Sub-Authority Sub-Committees.
Nyamaluma Institute	Located within Lupande GMA, Eastern Province. Provides training courses for Village Scouts, Unit Leaders, Chiefs and other community leaders, bookkeepers and health workers (covering financial management, community development, resource management). Maintains comprehensive GIS database on ADMADE operations, e.g. hunting effort, success of safari operations. Used to: evaluate status of wildlife in GMAs; produce maps/illustrations for land use planning, resource management planning, zoning uses, siting fishing camps, lodges, safaris and planning hunting operations.

Revenues earned from wildlife in GMAs are channelled into the Wildlife Conservation Revolving Fund (WCRF) managed by NPWS HQ in Chilanga. Inflows include 100% of safari hunting concession fees and 50% of hunting license fees (the other 50% is taken into central government revenues). WCRF revenues are then expected to be used as follows: · 35% for community projects in the GMA; · 40% for wildlife management unit operations (i.e. village scouts); · 25% for administration

and other uses. As this distribution shows, about 35% of the WCRF funds are channelled to local communities for projects, but this process is cumbersome and slow. Given that half of hunting licence fees go to central revenues, this represents considerably less than 35% of total GMA wildlife revenues. By comparison, under LIRDP/SLAMU, 100% of all GMA wildlife revenues are returned to local communities to be used as they determine. There have been several formal reviews of ADMADE, and, as with LIRDP/SLAMU, there is considerable controversy surrounding the programme. For example, the issue of the role of chiefs has been closely scrutinised. The most recent review (Mano 1998) notes that: "ADMADE's key achievement over 10 years has been to persuade several Chiefs (together with their advisers) to exert their *de facto* authority for the preservation of wildlife – in exchange for their retention of a large portion of hunting (and some other minor) revenues in their area for "community development" in the form of schools, clinics, wells and other public goods. Much criticism has also been levelled at ADMADE for strengthening the authority of the "undemocratic" chiefs, particularly where the first tangible community asset has been a new house or palace for the chief himself, and where subsequent, more public, goods have tended to be located in his own village. But a short-lived attempt in 1995 to take the chiefs "out of the circuit" and to democratise in some fashion resulted in an explicit threat by all chiefs consulted to revert to the scorched earth policy." This review is generally positive and suggests that ADMADE has been a great success and argues that this is why it has spurned much controversy. But, in contrast, a report by Hachileka et al. (1998) concludes that ADMADE has not yet achieved success in the most important areas of the programme's ideals. Such opposed conclusions (also evident in reviews of LIRDP) have probably been influenced by the use of different criteria to judge success, the absence of performance indicators in project documents, and the personal biases or ideological orientation of the evaluators. Given the growing interest in CBNRM, an increasing number of academic and other studies are investigating progress with the ADMADE programme (e.g. Gibson 1995; Matenga

1999; Chundama and Hachileka 1999). Some are quite critical. For example, Matenga (1999) observes: "Contrary to its theoretical bases. ADMADE has operated as a top-down programme initiated, planned and implemented externally by the NPWS and facilitated locally by the all-powerful chiefs presiding over the Sub-Authorities. The ADMADE programme has since its inception been controlled by the NPWS, a state institution, in line with state priorities. As argued in one report, 'ADMADE is first and foremost a conservation initiative, for the simple reason that the remit of NPWS is to manage Zambia's wildlife estate...' Although the promotion of social and economic welfare is one of the expected outcomes from community-based conservation of wildlife, in ADMADE, this ideal has remained a far-fetched dream. The bulk of the wildlife-derived revenues in the GMAs are appropriated by the central government, NPWS and WCRF, leaving an insignificant revenue base for the enhancement of the economic and social well-being of local communities in the GMAs" "Most of the GMAs have experienced minimal economic returns from the programme. Very few community members have benefited in terms of employment as village scouts. Even for these few village scouts, most often they go without pay and other requirements the job demands for several months" "The Sub-Authority is composed of community representatives who are largely hand-picked by the all-powerful chiefs..... There is nothing in the structure that is representative of the broader community interests. The larger community is, therefore, simply told what has been decided by the Sub-Authority or the NPWS. This lack of voice in decision-making by the local community members has effectively disempowered them politically in voicing their concern on issues that affect their welfare." ADMADE has also conducted internal reviews, but the extent to which these have influenced ADMADE policy and implementation is unclear. ADMADE and LIRD/SLAMU are briefly compared in Table A2.3.

Table A2.3: ADMADE and LIRD/SLAMU compared

	ADMADE	LIRD/SLAMU
Main donor support	USAID: US \$4.8 (since 1989)	NORAD [insert figure] (since 1987)
GMA wildlife revenues returned to communities for their use	Revenue channeled to WCRF held at NPWS (100% of concession fees but only 50% of licence fees). Only 35% of WCRF returned to communities.	100% of all revenues returned to communities: 80% direct to Village Action Groups, 4% to ADCs, 6% to Chiefs, 10% to accumulation fund. Used as they determine
Use of community revenue	Use for projects (only) determined by Sub-Authorities. No household dividends	VAGs and ADCs determine use. Mix of projects and household dividends
Emphasis	Wildlife conservation and law enforcement in GMAs	1987-1995: multi-sectoral 1996-present: CBRNM in Lupande GMA and SLNP management
Status	National programme of NPWS	Stand-alone project, quasi-autonomous (officially under NPWS from 1992)
Geographical location	Officially in all GMAs, but effectively operational in fewer than half (mainly in Luangwa Valley, around Kafue NP and in Lower Zambezi Valley)	Confined to Lupande GMA and South Luangwa National Park
Changes	Two phases but little change of approach or emphasis. Failed to learn from lessons of LIRD/SLAMU	Innovative and evolved through 4 phases. Responded to criticism by changing objectives and focus

Current administrative structure	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Headquarters at NPWS 2. District Wildlife Management Authority (chaired by District Governor – hardly functional) 3. Wildlife Management Unit at GMA/chiefdom level (led by NPWS officer) 4. Elected Sub-Authorities for each chiefdom (chaired by chief), with sub-committees 5. Village Area Groups 6. Nyamaluma Institute (provides, training, facilitation and advice) 7. National coordinating office (at NPWS) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Authority (not functioning, Council of Chiefs to be introduced) 2. 6 elected Area Development Committees (one for each of six chiefdoms in Lupande GMA) – some chaired by chief, others with independent chair 3. 40 elected Village Action Groups 4. 6 indigenous indigenous Liaison Assistants (one per chiefdom) 5. LIRD/SLAMU administers and manages the project and provides logistical/technical support
Support for law enforcement	<p>< \$ 500,000/yr (from hunting revenues).</p> <p>< \$ 10-15/km²</p>	\$ 65/km ²
Training	Nyamaluma Training Institute runs regular courses for Village Scouts, Unit Leaders, Chiefs and community leaders, etc. Est. cost: c. US \$150,000/yr (c. 12% of WCRF)	Runs no courses
Data management and monitoring	Nyamaluma Training Institute maintains comprehensive GIS-based database on operations. Unit offices maintain data files for planning wildlife management	No database. Project oriented monitoring system (with indicators) introduced in 19**
Major equipment and infrastructural development	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Capital expenditure on vehicles once in 1990 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Periodic replacement of vehicle fleet 2. Road graders, tractors, lorries, etc 3. Maintenance of roads in SLNP and some in Lupande GMA 4. Feasibility study for rehabilitating and developing road network in SLNP for tourism development (separately funded) 5. New offices and housing at Mfuwe in 1999/2000 (separately-funded)
Presumed effect of ZAWA	Sub-Authorities will convert to elected Community Resource Boards. Chiefs will become patrons (not chairs)	ADCs will convert to elected CRBs with Chiefs as patrons

‘Life as a Hunt’ in Nabwalya Chieftdom

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Chapter Summaries

LIFE AS A HUNT: THRESHOLDS OF IDENTITIES AND ILLUSIONS ON AN AFRICAN LANDSCAPE

Stuart A. Marks
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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This cross-disciplinary study began in 1964 as some African territories were achieving their political independence after decades of European domination. Earlier foreign colonizers had exploited African environments through imposed and distributive regulations to benefit distant metropolitan agendas and subordinated its people within imperial developments. These continental

enterprises profoundly affected African events, processes, and values as well as affecting metropolitan boundaries and perspectives within Euro-American academic institutions and its media. For example, biologists, focusing exclusively upon wildlife and natural habitats, sought to extend their cultural scholarship as universal knowledge globally. Rather than acting as cultural brokers within enlarging fields of human relations with resources, biologists and botanists questioned African wisdom and classifications of life forms as well as the will of Africans, particularly in emerging politicians, to conserve wildlife and habitats. These scientists engaged in ecological and tropical studies of productivity as 'global resources' to enhance their claims for conservation-based in exclusive economic terms to strengthen existing game reserves as national parks. Other academic disciplines also disciplined their membership within designated non-overlapping frames to accommodate expanding global industrial, commercial and developmental vocations after World War II.

Begun metaphorically as youthful 'hunts' in the Belgian Congo hinterland during the 1950s, the author chronicles his earlier searches to preserve and contribute small wildlife to American and Belgian natural history museums and realize a Northern biological 'order' among his assemblies. Later, he pursued different orders of meaning and methods through his university education, additional engagements, and employments. As a professional zoologist/ecologist, his searches to expand his education through grants, affiliations, language training as well as sponsors, mentors, and colleagues became a similar serendipitous journey enabling this human story of life on a Zambian landscape. This book articulates an indigenous perspective of life on a wildlife frontier, one outside the normative views of most Euro-American scholars, media and tourists. His encounters and exposures through anthropological and ecological fieldwork were essential investments in placement, patience, and good fortune in learning to listen and iteratively 'to be there' in place to let local stories creatively emerge over time. During these participatory processes, routine visits over the decades became reciprocal exchanges rather than exclusive exports, individuals became mentors and friends rather than 'subjects', exchanging reciprocal

trust and sharing experiences over time. As the result, this book interprets the expanding/declining dynamics of human livelihoods and wildlife interactions through the lens of animal ecology, anthropology, development practices, and history covering six decades.

INTRODUCTION

On poaching an elephant: calling the shots and following the ricochets

We compare the written assertions of an itinerant game ranger, as he investigates a 'poached' elephant carcass in Zambia's Luangwa Valley, with the diaries of local villagers, who inscribed their different and more compelling narratives. Residents repeatedly paid the high costs for this ranger's alleged assumptions as officials iteratively accused them of this criminal act. Those responsible were never identified, yet vulnerable local scapegoats suffered intermittent accusations torture. When another elephant was killed two years later to feed regional mourners at the wake of a local patron, similar accusations toward local actors covered those responsible, ended in the same indeterminate resolution. These stories introduce the intertwined welfare and environmental issues of land, people and wild animals discussed in this book.

PART I: On becoming and staying Bisa

CHAPTER ONE

History and circumstance: on becoming and being Bisa

'An important stranger may become your mother.' [Bisa proverb (1989)]

Bisa myths and idioms do not translate readily or easily into our historic stories, yet their pasts and of heroes remain etched within their historic homeland. Fragments of past encounters occur in the writings of foreign visitors, who became local patrons, captors or just passers-through. For British colonials, the Luangwa Valley became a 'wilderness,' which they re-constructed into expansive wildlife sanctuaries bearing their colonial, marketable and cultural values. For residents, their landscape remains 'thickets' of diverse spiritual, ecological as well as physical memories. Each villager and respective generation porously shift and blend their cultural memories as individuals reconstruct their lives through daily struggles of eking livelihoods from this often unpredictable landscape.

CHAPTER TWO

Creating and sustaining a good life within a difficult environment

Valley Bisa song celebrating ascendancy of a new chief and a warning. [Bisa song (1989)]

Outsiders' static images and pejorative ideas about Valley Bisa society never convey the vitality in residents' lives and connectedness within their environment. Villagers live in different worlds of language, temperament, geography and time from transients working in more urban landscapes. To gain access to how they, as gendered and generational persons, sustain their identities through conversations and work, we follow the activities of eight individuals, each recorded for one day a week during the 1988-89 agricultural season. Excerpts of these timed, observational sequences are glimpses into how each perceived, pondered, and gathered 'goods' from fields and bush, then redistributed and prepared its products at home. Their routines during this agricultural rainy season differed from the hot, tepid dry season. During the latter when most are mostly subject to outside observations, local residents appear less energetic, prefer to socialize over beer rather than work, are absent

visiting relatives and friends elsewhere, or attending essential preparations for the subsequent rainy season. Valley Bisa society is not without its endemic dilemmas; aging, gender differences, tropical diseases, wildlife threats and historic inequalities as well as beliefs in witchcraft and suspected suspicions of others' activities take their respective toils and tolls.

CHAPTER THREE

Never an isolated place suspended in a-historic space

Valley Bisa song about surveyors finishing animals and leaving. [(1988)]

Those living within the central Luangwa Valley were always connected to and intertwined with the destinies of their neighbors as well as the cresting turmoils of global commerce and politics. That this society was ever isolated or archaic is an illusion perpetuated by foreigners and tourists to convey their difficulties in getting here; and upon arrival, describe what they observe in its meagre circumstances as 'poverty' even 'degeneracy.' Wildlife also remains foreigners' and visitors' main draw to this valley today; earlier quests were for ivory, slaves or just to get beyond. Wildlife persists as an important 'good' for residents as they remain conscious of its dangers and still depend upon it as an asset. Both humans and other lives live within this ecosystem along with the tsetse fly, which transmits a lethal disease to livestock (absent here) which sometimes morphs to afflict humans, as well as by mosquitos and other hosts of tropical diseases. In the recent past, local people managed the land by protecting themselves from dangerous wildlife and subsisted on a mixture of cultivated and wild products. As a British protectorate and especially since Zambian independence, the state has progressively rescinded local wildlife uses through its global market-driven visions of 'wilderness landscapes' and more recently by 'donor' driven projects and programs combining wildlife management with 'community developments'. As hoe cultivators, hunters-gatherers, and labor migrants, most Valley Bisa have become mostly 'transitional figures' subordinated within their truncated

homeland. A few residents may gain seasonally through employments within state programs of touristic extractions and exchanges. Yet, most continually struggle, face daily hazards living in close associations with large, dangerous, wild mammals and reptiles. Occasional devastations by colonizing swarms of birds and locusts also affect their welfare.

PART II: On the Quest for Local Sustainability

The following six chapters constitute an ethnography of three consecutive generations of local hunters. Their life histories are distillations from conversations with each during all my residences, from accompanying each on bush forays and, during the 1988-89 year, as we developed a methodology to record bush pursuits and the distributions of its produce within villages. As this book is published (2017), most have become guardian and spiritual mentors within the lives of some subsequent and persistent pursuers of local gain.

Chapter Four introduces local ideas, boundaries and categories of land, animals and persons with their connectivities expressed in beliefs and values as well as observed behaviors and activities through which Valley Bisa hunters and others make sense of their personal and environmental relations. These distillations of discussions and observations with hunter practitioners over decades are gender and generationally specific, not common knowledge. The following two chapters examine the life histories and accomplishments of local hunters and we tag along as a hunter reminisces and searches for desirable prey during the dry and wet seasons of 1988-89. Buffalo were the major objectives for these hunters aspiring to become lineage patrons. The next chapters detail how a common property wildlife regime, Lineage Husbandry given its technologies, nurtured and protected local needs, operated in the bush to kill wild animals and whose products were distributed among kin and clients. Within the 1980s, national inflation, commercialism, foreign cash and donor interventions to conserve African

wildlife progressively eroded the spaces, normative structures, and concerns of this regime. During this inflationary and uncertain decade, government employees in local residence and from the plateau used their links with local residents to augment their own wealth to cash in on bushmeat deliveries while local hunters camouflaged their deprecatory risks and local concealments by shifting technologies from reverberating gun blasts to the silence of snares. A sectional masculine ideal, “Buffalo Mystique” chronicles how lineage hunters grappled competitively and realigned their strategies around the chieftainship during five decades.

CHAPTER FOUR

A cultural grid: making sense of the (natural) world

‘The bush rewards those going there.’ [Bisa proverb (1978)]

Indigenous environmental knowledge and practices express how local people relate to their worlds and to their places within it. The main passion for some Valley Bisa men, hunting is a meaningful representation for their fastenings with wildlife afield as well as their ambitions among kin and associates. Their prey shares many attributes with humans; individuals might act in their own right, become an antagonistic opponent, or an accomplice of witches. Yet, no cultural repertoire remains the same for long, as any depository of awareness and meaning shifts in sync with its members’ experiences, contentions and needs.

This chapter begins with an incident on a full moon night in 1973 as the author and four Valley Bisa hunters prepare their sleeping site during a bush hunting (*malala*) expedition. As the sun set, our elderly headman leaves us to gather prescriptions (*umuti*) from the surrounding bush. Returning, he places assorted branches and leaves on the fire before distributing the smoking ashes strategically around our site. When asked, he tells us that his actions will ward against trespassers of all sizes. We were awakened after midnight by the

accomplished middle-aged hunter struggling to discern meaning from his puzzling dream. This nightmare was that a porcupine, having invaded our 'protected space,' had stomped on his back to awaken him. In his mind, his nightmare bristles with reverberating interpretations. Arising abruptly from sleep, the rest of us had no answers beyond acknowledging that porcupines belonged to an anomalous group of mammals, based on stripes and mixed colors (Bisa informal taxonomy), and that some people avoided eating the flesh of these marked animals. After hearing our indifferent references, our elder headman declares the dream 'ominous' and veiled (his term '*chibanda*'), meaning obscure, likely an ancestral forecast of our current predicament or reflective of an unexpected event back at the village. For the rest of that night, we remain conscious of our vulnerabilities, alert, awake, yet muffled and huddled, attentive to suspicious dark movements and the rising barks of nearby hyenas. Further afield, the deep coughs of lions alternate with the splashes and sneezes of nearby elephants visiting the waterhole at the bottom of the small hill upon which we encamped; our anxieties increase.

Confidence somewhat returns with the rising sun prompted by the headman's suggestion that we return promptly to the village, where we might distill our enigma. While walking single file back to the village, we crest a small hill and immediately stumble upon a pride of three lionesses with four cubs disembowelling their 'just killed' zebra. Both the lions and our group momentarily froze for an interminable moment of indecision. Finally, with an axe held high, the lead hunter breaks the silence by loudly commanding (in pejorative Afrikaans slang) that the lions immediately 'leave'; forthwith, the pride disappear and abandon the zebra carcass to us. Given this confrontational outcome, our elderly headman instantly reverses his earlier dream diagnosis by announcing its categorical opposite interpretation. What we had just witnessed was ('*mipashi*'), which translates in most languages as a spiritual blessing. As we walked over to the carcass, the headman elaborates upon this rendition by contrasting the dichotomies of difference in events (the night's dream with the present encounter) and our respective states of being (fear earlier, followed by belief now). Then he tackled the ambiguities of any arrangement/order acknowledging the similarities and connections

between seemingly separate species (porcupine and zebra).

The elder's oral testimony resonated from a personal lifetime of accumulating cultural wisdom of place as he pronounces that the key evidence resolving our evening's enigma lay immediately before us in a complete zebra carcass. This omen's ultimate meaning lay in the dramatic way in which the ancestral spirits delivered their 'gift', by accommodating 'spiritual lions'! [Local Bisa group lions according to their observable behaviors as belonging to one of three groups: as guardian/spiritual presences (normally chief's surrogates), as sorcerer's apprentices (tragedies in times of social uncertainties), or as normal bush predators.] Such gifts of protective forbearance were meant for sharing among kith and kin as well as reminders of unseen links to ultimate powers. Beyond his theatrics in protecting us, his perceptive interpretations of our unintended encounter with lions and our restored sense of masculine mastery and survival within an uncertain, dangerous world, our elder delivered a dramatic cultural epitome affirming the efficacy of his presence and the genius of his generational worldview.

In fieldwork, the challenge is always to acquire the time and exposures enabling one to appropriately understand and translate another society's cultural nuggets and threads of wisdom. Through such shared experiences with accommodating hosts, outsiders sometimes serendipitously grasp the otherwise invisible sense of another society's culture— its symbols and beliefs motivating membership behaviors. On this journey, meaning was embedded in significant events, attributed to ancestral spirits and lions as actors, translated through the distinguished, authoritative renderings of an accompanying elder rather than the mumbo-jumbo and distancing interviews with random/uninitiated others. Such wisdom is a product of time invested as well as chance, good fortune as well as reliable company. This chapter concludes with a desperate, elder widow's search for a place to settle upon her displacement from her late husband's community. Elephants had destroyed her late husband's community's fields and she was accused and dismissed by former in-laws as an ancillary scapegoat for these losses. Her story illustrates how dissimilar portrayals and categories may motivate lineage groups to differentially act toward 'others' during disparate stages in their relationships.

CHAPTER FIVE

Caused to hunt: life histories of three generations (1903-2000)

'Hunters perish by their prey as farmers succumb to their labors', [Bisa proverb (1967)]

We explore the life histories and representative memories of three generations of local hunters living in the central Luangwa Valley during the latter half of the 20th Century. For these men, their quest began with a dream, acquiring a patron as spiritual sponsor, and having a vision. Given successful hunting and professional prowess, each cultivated their social capital as they judiciously provisioned kin with protection from depredations, apportioned subsistence bushmeat, and assisted appropriately with local task. Each achieved identities as they absorbed, tested, improvised and expanded their reputations in the bush as well as among dependents. In their lives, hunters became legends or were overwhelmed by the changing assets and maneuvers of other male competitors, often kin. Those with legacies as lineage sponsors or spiritual patrons remained as exemplars for subsequent generations to emulate. When their roles became criminalized as 'poaching,' state prosecutions challenged the culture of their craft, their husbandry of wildlife, their livelihoods and identities. Courts convicted many practitioners for 'illegal hunting,' yet few legendary hunters served jail time. All those documented lives have become history, their haunting spirits remain resurrected as needed by their descendants pursuing shards of their past heritage within the changing shadows of their presence.

CHAPTER SIX

Gameful pursuits in the bush: coping with process and uncertainty

'Seek ye the spirits of those that killed....and move in the evening.'[Bisa verse
(1966)]

The excitements of learning about wildlife, local histories, knowing the terrain and sharing stories occur as we accompany an articulate hunter on hunts during the 1988-89 dry and wet seasons. During the first foray, our tutor anchors history and stories spatially as we traverse the landscape, applying his tracking skills and signs for the presence of recent buffalo. Prior to leaving the village for the second foray, he mentions an auspicious earlier dream, wonders about its plausibility for this day, given that a reinforced wildlife scout unit was known to be nearby. Walking back towards the village under the hot afternoon sun, we sight as he stalks and kills a grysbok, the smallest antelope. We learn how 'spirits' communicate through dreams and operate in the bush by situating prey to camouflage the hunters presence from wildlife scouts and to immobilize prey. Additionally, such small prey may afflict the gun should the hunter neglect normalized conventions.

Every hunt acquires new knowledge as hunters hone their skills at every stage, beginning with initial preparations before entering the bush, concluding in sharing its products or experiences with others. Each foray is an open process of evolving strategies as opportunities appear, tactics dictated by game, cover, wind as well as by other events and adverse circumstances. We learn about the significance of buffalo as prey, about locals' knowledge of buffalo ecology and movements, about using this knowledge to develop a means to estimate this community's off-takes of buffalo, about buffalo as cultural creatures and why this species became a significant marker among men.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Lineage provisioning through hunting: changes in scope and scale

'I consume as lightening, lions must drag down their prey.' [Bisa hunting
boast(1967)]

In 1933, the colonial administration appointed Kabuswe Mbuluma, a young, returning resident with experience as a migrant laborer in the Congo and Rhodesia, as the chief of an amalgamated Valley Bisa chiefdom in the Luangwa Valley. Given the chiefdom's small population with much of its territory designated as a prohibited 'sleeping sickness zone' and under discussion to alienate some of their homeland to several game reserves, situated as a slender corridor at the eastern edge of the colony's largest district, accessible to infrequent official surveillance by difficult foot caravans lasting weeks, this valley chiefdom developed a 'relative autonomy' which few other local authorities were to achieve under Indirect Rule. Given his official directives and aware of the above realities, this vigorous chief and advisors re-constructed a 'lineage husbandry wildlife regime' (*Nkombalume*). This local wildlife commons' included elements of colonial prerogatives (labor, taxation, faunal protection) as well as local histories, hunting and masculine traditions (hunting rituals, local protection of properties, persons, provision of protein as well as the subjection of women) that effected the distribution of local manpower for decades.

Under this chief's hegemony, wildlife populations in the Luangwa Valley rebounded enhanced by numbers from the surrounding game reserves. For three generations, most Bisa men spent their labor and life time as migrant laborers throughout southern Africa. They posted cash and goods as remittances to their home lineages, returned infrequently to their villages, where many eventually hoped to retire. After briefly serving as external laborers, a few men, selected for hunting aptitude, remained in their villages developing these customary roles while provisioning bushmeat, protecting lineage properties and for furnishing supplemental supports to women and children in subsistence chores. This local regime persisted for five decades until its practices were impacted iteratively by an inflating Zambian economy in late-1970s (when most migrant laborers returned to their villages, unable

to find employment elsewhere), and the declining health and deaths of its chief architects and contributors. The rampant slaughter of the valley's wildlife mainly by outsiders (with some inside participation) led to foreign donor demands for new wildlife laws and the enhancement of a national wildlife institution, more intrusive wildlife protective programs, including the militarization of anti-poaching units.

In colonial days, buffalo were the largest game permitted on ordinary licenses, of ample size to supply the rounds of lineage stomach demands and, unlike other species, had no local or widespread taboos against consuming its flesh. Hunters refined their allocative tactics for smaller species as overlooked kin might complain, even gossip, or turn into informers for wildlife scouts. Yet through their optimization of buffalo production and consumer satisfactions and as residents, local huntsmen had time to spend in beer drinking, engaging in marital chores and in honing their relative standing in lineage politics with their more transient male competitors.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Muzzle-loading guns and snares; weapons within their cultural context

'My gun is my future, it kills every time it speaks.'[Bisa hunting boast (1973)]

Although not an indigenous product, muzzle-loading guns became intricately woven within the cultural fabric of Valley Bisa hunting lore. Guns assumed metonymic significance in lineage identities and in lineage welfare. As an exceptional 'good,' bushmeat became a spiritual indicator of ancestral approval and land productivity; muzzle-loaders were strongholds of masculine power, privilege, authority as well as expressions of manly vulnerabilities (venery). These weapons spoke with a loud voice and generated a powerful hearing for those dependent upon hunters' hands, crafts, for protection

and for game. A local history of a muzzle-loader tells of its purchase by a headman in 1948, its iconic name, its successive deployment by a younger cousin and others until it exploded in the hands of a nephew. The nephew explains his devastation and chagrin over the loss of the beloved heirloom, in which he and his matrilineal relatives had invested much of their health, prosperity, and ambitions. A village blacksmith re-constructed another weapon by incorporating the former's salvaged trigger assembly with a longer barrel, embedding both within a new wooden stock. The new gun looked nothing like its previous form, yet its reputation remains uncertain as its possession becomes problematic.

Years later as a headman of a larger village, this nephew faces a new dilemma. As lineage liabilities and poverty increased under the new state wildlife program, villagers were using more (re)sil(i)ent, customary and improved technologies (snares, camouflage) to place bushmeat inconspicuously within home cooking pots. As a legal item and as lineage 'property', the replaced gun is considered beyond 'selling'; consequently, the headman realized that the gun's real costs to him as its custodian, could become excessive beyond its tax and annual game licenses. He could face the additional legal court fees and as well as the high social costs of imprisonment should a younger client be apprehended using this weapon.

CHAPTER NINE

Buffalo mystique: protein, privilege, power and politics (1950-2000)

'In killing a buffalo, the game guard likens it to his mother.' [Bisa verse (1989)]

"Buffalo Mystique," is a chronicle of circumstances, misadventures, and successes culled from the life histories of three representative generations of local hunters, who centered their lives mainly around the Chief's compound at Nabwalya. These individuals, among others, created, contributed to or

sought to epitomize the target values at the core of *Lineage Husbandry*, a local form of wildlife management (re)-established during the 1930s. Our story begins in the 1950s with his introduction to a group of young and older hunters then gathered around the chief's palace in 1966-67. This account's narrative arch traces the lives of individuals of the original cohort and the two subsequent generations in their struggles to sustain status within their homeland under the darkening shadows of distant, obscure Zambian political-economic events. We follow these hunters' successes and misfortunes until the 1991 Zambian elections rapidly transformed the national government and facilitated the implementation of neoliberal economic resource management, local developments, and structural adjustments. These agendas interrupted the waning local 'respectability' of the commons formerly dominated by local patrons and their clients. The previous decades of national inflation produced uncertain urban labor markets and forced many Valley Bisa men back to their rural homeland, where they struggled with subsistence work. The exploitations of wildlife and other natural resources by these returnees and their connections with prominent individuals elsewhere enabled them to capitalize as entrepreneurial hunters, solicitors, and carriers of valley bushmeat to plateau markets for wealth. Their tangible commercial successes contributed to the destabilization of local normative resource uses and values as well as adversely impacting environmental resources upon human welfare depended.

The global responses to this African wildlife hecatomb were American and European financial, material, and training supports to enhance African states' capabilities ('modernization') in their national resource regulatory bureaucracies. Within Africa, these donor initiatives were euphemistically named 'community-based' wildlife management in professional and global reports. Within Zambia, the program was known by its chimerical acronym, ADMADE (ADministrativeMAnagementDEvelopment), designating its origins and directives as a program to capitalize wildlife 'resources' beyond its local worth. Its agenda was to generate state revenues and distributions from wildlife 'spectacles' within international tourism circuits and from 'trophies' within sport hunting markets. Besides state coffers, these investments bene-

fitted foreigners' interests in wildlife and environments through employment and training of many Zambian nationals as regulators, as administrators, scientists and enabled commercial tourist and safari enterprises. Some of this wealth trickled down to create physical developments (schools, clinics, roads, material goods) and to support the welfare of a few within rural communities. Both the quantities and qualities of local deliverables were never certain nor sufficient, promises made rarely achieved expectations on the ground. As a consequence, most residents were left to struggle 'in limbo' as dependents and transients as their welfare declined and their environments deteriorated. The local moral economy of clients and dependents still mattered, yet basic needs were subordinated if only sacrificed to meet a weak state's demands for revenues and imposed assessments. Under the 'protective gaze' of wildlife scouts, elephant and buffalo numbers increased noticeably becoming destructive 'problem animals' (PAs in scout speak) around villages and fields. Most smaller game populations noticeably cycled under predictable droughts of climate change and the 'caught' of snares.

As a new century approached, prolonged negotiations between donors and Zambian officials over the latter's alleged fraudulent practices resulted in 'fresh' wildlife legislation creating a 'modern' wildlife authority (ZAWA). We leave this story of externally funded global/national plans and of militarized wildlife conservation with uncertain flows to 'local communities' exhibiting marginal successes and growing doubts about sustainabilities in terms of human welfare and environmental resources. Progressive climate changes within the central Luangwa Valley forecasts bleaker chances for human economic welfare and wildlife survival despite the multi-millions of US dollars generated worth through state-mandated management and protection of this homeland's wildlife and natural assets over the past five decades. The concluding dismal scenarios may seem demeaningly inhuman, even disturbing for well-intended readers, visitors, even for the narrator of these studies spanning seven decades. This valley's story repeats and reflects the human, cultural, political-economic and global relational problems effecting marginal groups elsewhere. Yet changes are inevitable in human and environmental relations, whether through evolutionary or, more abruptly,

through revolutionary causes. For hopes and limitations gather strength and arise to imaged heights and despairs of the spiritual phoenix of human aspirations within the darkening shadows during the waxing and waning of empires.

PART III:

The Challenges of Decreasing Entitlements

The remaining chapters narrate the Zambian state's two wildlife programs and developmental attempts during the 1980s to define its land boundaries in the Luangwa Valley and to impose its controls for managing wildlife. The name of these initiatives, auspiciously camouflaged and discursively presented respectively under a 'community-based' and 'integrated resource' branding were initiated through foreign interests, directed by outside expertise and finance. Subsequent events of intermittent outbursts in local anger and silence show that local communities became progressively distrustful of distant promises, of unresolved boundaries as well as restricted access to wildlife. The final 'readings' section contains concepts and brief histories of how wealth and power often provoke poverty and injustices in remote places.

CHAPTER TEN

On coping within a cornucopia of constant changes

Recording during a survey about local expectation from my studies (1989)

A review of national documents and political decisions to initiate Zambia's

'community-based' wildlife program reveals that improvements in general village welfare and the restoration of local entitlements to wildlife were never the primary concern. Instead, the program's priorities were to expand the wildlife department's national agenda, importing donors' wealth to shield its staff from political meddling and to control the lucrative wildlife traffic through alliances between the public and certain private sectors. The recurrence and interpretation of two events witnessed in 2006, an altercation over land boundaries and the stomping of a prominent village elder by an elephant, display the continuing depth of residential distrust of state officials and some likely risks of living with dangerous wild mammals. These episodes also expose the despondency/dependency and poverty felt by residents marginalized within a weak state. Both issues need recognition, reconciliation and negotiation before meaningful and sustainable futures are contemplated.

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North Luangwa

North Luangwa Conservation Programme

As I wrote in *Plunderers of Eden*:

In November 1987 – because the park had been abandoned to poachers, I made a PPP proposal to the African Wildlife Leadership Foundation to join a consortium of Zambian businesses and the NPWS under Director Harry Chabwela for the park’s management. In this, I had received the support of the Chairman of AWLF (AWF), John Heminway, and David Frost, the Chairman at the time of the Professional Hunters’ Association of Zambia. However, the AWLF executive declined the opportunity.

A research couple, Mark and Delia Owens, then began the North Luangwa Conservation Project having had the US Embassy in Lusaka

obtain the necessary permits and permissions for them from the NPWS. This project involved anti-poaching in the park and a variety of villager projects in the Mukungule GMA to the west of the park.

At the same time in 1988 that I had begun the Black Rhino Project, the Owens uncovered a wildlife crime syndicate run by the Mpika warden of the NPWS - with links to headquarter staff - controlled in turn by the chief security officer in the Office of the President (OP). This syndicate ran a gang of elephant and rhino poachers in the park. Some elements in the NPWS did not want a project trying to save the very rhino they were intent on killing. In 1994, with the rhino obliterated and the elephant greatly reduced, this OP official visited the Owens in their Luangwa camp. Later they were warned by one of their employees that their lives were in danger.[v] At about the same time, the North Luangwa Conservation Project, along with other in-country NGOs, were asked to renegotiate the status of their projects. At issue was the NPWS demand that the project turn over its fixed and moveable assets to them, and that it agreed to pass its operating funds through a government account so that they could be taxed at the rate of 33%. This issue was never resolved.[vi] The Director of NPWS at the time was Harry Chabwela.

In 1997 Ackim Mwenya was Director NPWS. The Owens' assets were seized while they were away on leave in the USA, their staff placed under house arrest. The staff were later freed on the intervention of the USA and British Embassy personnel, but the field projects and staff left permanently to their own devices.[vii] For although the Owens were not deported, they did not return to the country, handing over the park to the Frankfurt Zoological Society who in 1998 signed an agreement with the NPWS agreeing to conserve the wildlife resources and to develop the park. The reason the Owens had not returned, was that they had exposed the poaching ring. However, the Zambia Police wished to question Mark Owens and his son, Christopher in connection with an investigation prompted by the summary execution of a poacher by his son, the corpse captured on an ABC television documentary.[viii]

This film lent considerable substance to the stories of the killing of poachers by the scouts whom Owens commanded, and of other numerous human rights abuses against villagers, highlighting the dangers of privatization and imperial foreign aid.[ix] [x]

The New Yorker article had this to say (viii):

Fouche handed me a letter that he said Owens had faxed him in 1994. It was written in part as a plea to Fouche to help raise funds for the Owens' project, and it listed some of Mark Owens's antipoaching accomplishments. "To date I have flown eight airborne antipoaching operations over your area, including four in which I inserted scouts on ambush," Owens wrote. "Two poachers have been killed and one wounded that I know of thus far, and we are just getting warmed up."

[v] Owens, M. & Owens, D. *Secrets of the Savanna: Twenty-Three Years in the African Wilderness Unraveling the Mysteries of Elephants and People*, Houghton Mifflin Company. 2006, p.162.

[vi] M Dykes 2009, personal communication

[vii] Owens. *Secrets of the Savanna*. p.178.

[viii] Davidson, Amy. "A Shooting in Zambia." *The New Yorker*, 4 Apr. 2010.

[ix] "The Owens and the North Luangwa National Park, Zambia." Google Docs. *The Southern Africa Trumpet*, No.2, June, 1997, the Southern Africa Forum for Communities and NGOs (SAFCAN), 1 June 1997. Web. 30 March 2017. <http://www.maninnature.com/Management/Conservation/WConservationId.html>

[x] Goldberg, Jeffrey. "The Hunted - Did American Conservationists in Africa Go Too Far?" *The New Yorker*, 5 Apr. 2010. Web. 30 March 2017. <<http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/04/05/the-hunted>>.

Mukungule GMA

Mukungule, lying to the west of the North Luangwa NP is one of the few GMAs with a [management plan](#) (2004). It was part-funded by the Frankfurt Zoological Society. Involved there is Hammer Simwinga, winner of the prestigious Goldman Prize in 2007. He now runs The [*Foundation for Wildlife & Habitat Conservation*](#) in Mpika. *Marc and Delia Owens pioneered the North Luangwa Project from 1985- 1997 - see [Owens Foundation for Wildlife Conservation](#)*. Hammer and I have for many years attempted to conserve the old Hunters' Graveyard in Mpika.

LIRDP (1986-2009)

Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project

In 2009 the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) produced the report *Creating and Protecting Zambia's Wealth:*

3.7 Wildlife – major programmes in the Luangwa Valley producing real benefits for wildlife and people

LIRDP was one of southern Africa's pioneering community-based wildlife management initiatives. Now called the South Luangwa Area Management Unit (SLAMU), LIRDP was one of the main outcomes of the seminal Lupande Development Workshop held at Nyamaluma in the Luangwa Valley in 1983. Workshop participants included stakeholders from Government, NGOs, donors and traditional authorities. They agreed a strong case for community participation in wildlife management as a deliberate strategy for resource management. Funded mainly by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), LIRDP

was arguably the first operational, and remains the longest running (now 23 years), official, donor-funded community wildlife management project in the world. Along with the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe, LIRD has been a pioneering initiative that has laid the ground and provided a stimulus for many subsequent community wildlife management projects elsewhere in Africa. The project, of necessity, has been experimental in nature and has evolved significantly over the past two decades through several phases (see Box 10). LIRD articulated a participatory ecosystem approach that was ahead of its time, and advocated an integrated multi-sector economic model. In its initial stages, LIRD focused on the South Luangwa National Park and adjacent Lupande Game Management Area. Two particular issues emerged which excited much policy debate. The first was the official admission that the high level of commercial poaching during the late 1970s to the mid 1980s (which had severely depleted the elephant population in the Luangwa Valley and led to the local extinction of Black Rhinos) could not be addressed without local community support. The second issue was that such community involvement in resource management would need to deliver tangible incentives to local communities for it to succeed. The philosophies of both LIRD, as well as the Administrative Management Design for Game Management (ADMAGE),¹⁵ were premised on the beneficial involvement of local communities as key stakeholders. Based on the experiences of LIRD and ADMAGE, the Wildlife Act (1998) created ZAWA as a semi-autonomous institution. This Act and new National Parks and Wildlife Policy (also 1998) formally recognised communities in wildlife areas as co-managers and made provisions for co-management.

LIRD Phases

1986-1987 - Establishment

1987-1982 - a 5-year agreement between NORAD and Zambia

1993-1994 - Bridging phase

1995-1998 - focus on wildlife management, NORAD reduces funding to US\$1 million annually

1999-2000 - LIRDP becomes SLAMU within the NPWS

2006-2009 - final NORAD support concentrating on infrastructure and tourism development. \$15 million.

The **‘major programmes in the Luangwa Valley producing real benefits for wildlife and people’** is a neoliberal illusion. Another study found that [“LIRDP has generally failed](#) to achieve its conservation and development objectives and that the program has achieved few community benefits.”

I had returned to the Luangwa in 1986 to attempt to save the last black rhino with the help of my former *fundi* on the elephant cropping scheme in 1966/67, Rice Time. I found LIRDP fully ensconced, donor-funded, with complete control of the South Luangwa National Park and the adjoining Lupande GMA. Its Chairman was President Kaunda, which allowed its director an imperial management style. The director, whom I knew well, was initially cooperative but then refused to assist me with accommodation or provide an area in the park into which I could translate rhino and care for them. I was forced to leave the Luangwa (see *Plunderers of Eden*), the project folding. To add to this, the CEO of the ADMADE project would not allow us to capture and translocate the dozen or so rhino in the hills behind their HQ. They were all poached shortly after.

During this period, LIRDP claimed that its law enforcement efforts were excellent. However, as I was to discover, this was a figment of their imagination, given knowledge now of the massive elephant poaching under the Singapore connection at the time, the extinction of the black rhino, and subsequent research showing that poaching did not diminish. They and the ADMADE project - who operated in the same area but were at loggerheads - also opposed my efforts at the rhino's preservation.

In 1993, the National Parks and Wildlife (Elephant and Rhinoceros) Regulations were issued in about the year the Zambian rhino became extinct. Unbeknownst to the government, the last rhino had been shot on license in 1969 by a client of mine with me present.

In 1999 LIRDP was absorbed into the National Parks and Wildlife Service (NPWS). But the NPWS did little for LIRDP, claiming park licence fees and lodge lease payments, and crucially, hunting-safari income. A technical assistant and de facto head of the program was appointed from 1996 to 2003, establishing the community-based natural resource management program (CBNRM) and restructuring LIRDP into the South Luangwa Management Unit (SLAMU) in 1999. My Luangwa Landsafe project in the Luembe and Nyalugwe chiefdoms between 2003-2010 fell within the SLAMU jurisdiction. I soon found that they operated a commercial poaching scheme in the Nyimba district and elsewhere.

[Lessons from Luangwa](#): The Story of LIRDP Zambia by Clayton and Child (2003)

Table 6.6: Summary of Law enforcement statistics (1988-1999)

	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999 to June
Amount of poaching												
Number of poachers	227	189	146	359	389	279	271	175	174	219	241	128
Poison down	11482	15601	21703	26643	18929	30823	27937	18314	9514	15633	20150	15663
Placement days	29138	3520	3436	4436	8543	5508	5125	5168	1815	2864	4266	2162
Effective days	8544	12972	18296	22443	14388	24823	22806	13146	7976	12793	15882	10203
Investigations												
Staff	3	5	3	2	2	2	2	4				
Days	331	1354	230	2768	3119	661	1152	177	1812	880		
Personnel												
Scouts	133	172	222	286	285	240	232	208	208	200	160	154
Carriers	7	7	6.2	134	134	87	87	34				
Rangers	1	1	2	4	4	4	4	6	10	10		5
Vehicles	1	2	2	2	2	4	4	4	4	5	5	2
Frequency of offences												
Serious offences	340	236	240	217	84	140	278	137	492	678	685	538
Elephants killed	340	16	27	4	7	4	12	17	14	12	15	10
Other animals killed	67	90	37	33	17	23	11	118	46	120	96	43
Permitted/forfeited	110	237	245	213	441	76	76	233	415	211	38	11
Crushnets used	174	156	148	161	161	72	98	143	388	225	218	157
Armed groups seen	63	24	8	17	8	5	8	10	28	40	35	14
All minor offences	449	821	425	728	233	262	1007	1018	873	1570	1023	518
Results												
Arrests (provisional)	130	116	271	223	121	99	19	87	291	147	48	
Arrests (patrols)	100	82	79	188	49	238	82	61	78	87	75	24
Total arrests	230	298	341	411	171	334	71	148	369	234	123	24
Arrests (provisional)		125	62	79	11	13	13	20	16	3	5	1
Indices (level per thousand effective patrol days)												
Serious offences C/E	39.8	23.7	12.1	6.7	6.9	6.1	12.2	21.9	32.6	33.8	43.1	32.8
Elephants killed C/E	4.2	1.3	1.5	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.5	1.1	1.8	0.9	0.9	1.0
Other animals killed C/E	7.8	7.5	2.9	1.3	1.2	1.4	4.0	7.8	0.1	8.8	6.9	4.1
Crushnets used C/E	26.4	12.9	9.2	9.2	11.2	2.9	4.3	4.6	22.0	17.4	13.6	13.3
Armed groups seen C/E	1.4	2.0	0.5	0.8	0.8	0.1	0.4	2.9	3.8	3.1	2.2	1.4
Patrol arrests C/E	11.7	6.8	5.8	8.4	4.2	9.6	2.3	4.0	9.7	6.8	4.7	2.3
Expenditure												
Total Cost					326,901	500,288	412,619	248,304	586,102	431,262	529,025	
Cost per day					36.77	20.48	14.09	24.36	76.22	32.94	33.36	-
Patrol	9.2	7.6	8.1	7.8	9.5	11.4	10.0	7.3	3.9	6.5	10.3	18.9
Day cost/month					1,350	2,088	1,794	1,774	2,021	2,036	2,611	-

Total Arrests

3,461 poachers arrested impacting on an average about 10 family/clan members each resulting in major impacts from [prison/abuse](#) for 34,000 or so people directly affected.

The report says that prisoners frequently spend years in prison awaiting resolution of their case. Over a third of inmates in Zambia are not serving time following a conviction but are in prison on remand, awaiting trial

or other legal action. They frequently have no access to a lawyer or to bail and may wait months even for an initial appearance before a judge. Immigration detainees often linger in prison with no due process...Sexual abuse is common, and children are particularly vulnerable to rape by adult inmates in their cells.

Problem animals

(Note: This is a long-standing issue which pre-dates LIRDP)

"The response to our complaints about problem animals is too slow – the procedures need clarifying, they are too prolonged and sometimes they don't come."

(Chief)

"It takes too much time to respond to complaints about problem animals. We need clear rules on how much damage should be caused before an animal is shot. We need a transparent process. In most cases, they [NPWS officers] kill the wrong animal anyway. We don't get any benefit from elephants which cause the most damage – they give nothing to the community. All we get from problem animals is meat."

(Community Liaison Assistant)

"When these problem animals graze and damage our fields, it is we owners of the fields that really suffer. A lot of fields get destroyed and tyolefa is too little to compensate us. We need a problem animal control system."

(Member Luangwa VAG, Kakambi chiefdom)

ADMADE (1987-1999)

Many of the “traditional” protective types of prescriptions (magic or umuti) against dangerous wild mammals in the bush are now used to address the threat of detection and assaults by wildlife scouts.

Stuart Marks

ZAWA abandoned the participatory approach developed by LIRD/SLAMU under Phase III, forcing it to conform to the nation-wide ADMADE programme, operated through ZAWA’s central headquarters, and retaining significant funds for itself and for the national treasury.

*Evaluation of Norwegian Development Support to Zambia (1991 – 2005) - *Oxford Policy Management (2007)**

* * *

Introduction

The first community-based wildlife management program began in 1949 when the newly formed Game Department of Northern Rhodesia entered into an agreement with Chief Nsefu whereby he and his people received income from the tourist use of a Game Department tourism camp. When in the early fifties, the Chief's area was proclaimed a game reserve, earnings ceased. The Game Department in 1949 also initiated the Government Controlled Hunting Scheme, which conducted safari hunting operations in the Eastern Province with 50% of the income accruing to the Native Authority. The scheme ran well until in 1962 it was privatized, with the local authorities receiving no further direct income until the late 1980s. The next significant scheme was in 1973 with the establishment of the Black Lechwe Project, where phase three was intended to allow the local people to utilize black lechwe, something never achieved as the Government abandoned the scheme in 1976. In the 1980s, the ADMADE project was established, which sought to derive direct benefits from villagers' wildlife, this aspect being a woeful failure. Later the LIRD project was mooted, attempting on a far grander scale what ADMADE had attempted. It, too, proved unsuccessful. [Gibson and Marks in 1995](#) wrote that:

Using game theory and a case study from Zambia, we find that these programs misunderstand some of the economic, political and social benefits of local hunting. As a result, community-based wildlife management schemes succeed in protecting some of the larger mammals only by virtue of their increased enforcement levels, not their ability to distribute socioeconomic benefits. Rather than support conservation, local hunters continue to kill game at a rate comparable to the days before the programs, although they have shifted their tactics and prey selection.

The Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas

(ADMAGE) was a massively damaging CBNRM scheme. It was established and managed by the big international NGO (BINGO), Wildlife Conservation International (WCI), and funded by USAID, WWF-US, and WCI. It was based in the South Luangwa at the Nyamaluma Institute for Community-Based Natural Resource Management.

Chiawa Chiefdom GMA, Lower Zambezi

ADMAGE (1987-1999) expanded from the Luangwa into the Chiawa chiefdom on the Zambezi River. An ex-elephant poacher turned conservationist, Mario Kuwayawaya, with Allan Wardle's support - co-founder with Chief Chiyabe (Chiawa) of the NGO Conservation Lower Zambezi (CLZ) was hired from 1994 to 1997 as the Education Liaison Officer by the David Shepherd Conservation Foundation. As he wrote later in his book that I published, *Captured Between Islands*:

Chiawa is a customary area in the Lower Zambezi Valley. The government made part of it a game management area (GMA) in 1990 to prove to the local community that wildlife was a valuable resource, which would benefit everyone if managed sustainably. To this end, a USAID/WCI sponsored initiative called Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas (ADMAGE) within the National Parks and Wildlife Service became involved in several GMAs (1987-1999) in Zambia. This gave considerable control over ADMAGE to the existing chiefs, their defects being that villagers must show too much deference to them and are therefore treated with contempt.

In early 1994, I was appointed Education Liaison Officer in Chiawa. My first official experience was at a community meeting in a village where a lone elephant had killed two women. People demanded compensation for the deaths and the loss of crops. Others went further,

insisting that ADMADE, a scheme intended to involve local people in wildlife protection, had been imposed upon them without consultation. I could not help but feel sympathy for the villagers. It occurred to me that most people knew me only as a notorious poacher, and now I was in their midst associating with conservationists and police officers. Would they think I was here to convince them to accept policies that had not worked for them so far? Many young villagers had been shot in Zimbabwe while poaching, so that when I introduced myself, people shrugged and gazed at me, shocked, as if to say, 'Well, God changes things.'

I knew conservation would be an uphill fight - at a general meeting of the NGO Conservation Lower Zambezi (CLZ), it became apparent that nothing would be paid to the villagers for their loss of life or crops. One flimsy excuse for not making the reparations was that the local bananas did not require much attention to grow! This angered the villagers, who had already experienced four years of ADMADE without receiving any benefits from the scheme. How was I to argue the point that wildlife could be a valuable asset?

At first, people did not want to lend me an ear. The novelty of conservation had waned, and I was seen as repeating the same old story. With much effort, I eventually got people to accept the possibility that wildlife could be a tangible value to the community. My task was made harder by some of the ADMADE personnel who created the impression that it was a national programme, and therefore, local resistance to it was unlawful. I soon wondered if this was deliberate misinformation - they did not want locals to know about the benefits that accrued from the scheme, for they would have to account for all the benefits not yet made to the people.

Once before, I had lost my job on principle. Here I was again, with a good job, free food, free housing and other small incentives - was I to take the risk of disagreeing with the local ADMADE authority and the chief?

The Lower Zambezi National Park was exhausted in 1990, having only become a national park in 1983. The rhino had been swept from the picture, and even the elephant population would soon vanish in a

blink. By 1994 no practical benefits had reached the community, even though ADMADE was busy establishing itself there. Donations appeared to vanish into the local ADMADE authority. There was no transparency at the top, no checks and balances of power, no democracy at all, in fact.

Concerned lodge owners also contributed funds to ADMADE, but none benefitted those who lived side-by-side with the animals. No wonder some people failed to regard wildlife as a 'communal asset,' and game scouts had to be brought in to protect them.

The idea that wildlife is a communal resource had failed to take hold in the Chiawa villages. The conservationists, environmentalists and advocates who assisted ADMADE were regarded with indignation as armchair specialists, or worse, as collaborators with an occupying force.

Throughout the 1990s, poaching skyrocketed. ADMADE had broken its promises and failed to respond to some criticisms: 1) the GMA had been an imposition because local people had no say in it, 2) the chief was the only beneficiary of 'so-called' customary area assets, and 3) the customary area assets had no clear objectives.

ADMADE had established a Community Resource Board (CRB) and employed CRB scouts that were lowly paid, with no employment benefits or job security. Inevitably, many scouts poached, provided information, cover-ups, firearms, ammunition, and even accompanied the poachers into the GMA. I met some of these scouts in dealer's homes waiting for the spoils.

In the end, I stuck with the job for three years until the chief expelled me from Chiawa, one of the reasons being my complaint that the land she was selling to investors was not shared with the customary owners. Chief Chiyaba had accepted my criticisms, but she had nobody to share them with, other than myself again – and this put her in a tough position. She needed courageous advice, which many were not willing to give.

The communities I represented withdrew their support for ADMADE. Without local involvement, the authorities' only way to protect wildlife was through more police, guns, and repression. While I packed my bags, I could not help shedding tears, for, in the eyes of many children and adults,

I had brought hope. I had stocked the education centre with equipment – books, desks, a TV and video donated due to extended calls to interested parties.

SLAMU (1999-2015)

In 2003 - donor money ran out

* * *

South Luangwa Management Unit

SLAMU replaced LIRDP - the Luangwa Integrated Development Project -when the NPWS was closed and replaced by the parastatal profit-maker, the Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA).

I operated within the SLAMU area of jurisdiction in the south Luangwa, i.e.,

Luembe and Nyalugwe chiefdoms. In 2005, I revealed the SLAMU staff's ivory and meat poaching operations with my arrest of one of the ring leaders with game meat in a poaching camp. The police and Senior Chief Luembe were all complicit. I reported this to the man in charge of SLAMU, who did nothing about it. Likely, they were similarly involved in all of the SLAMU area of jurisdiction.

The SLAMU local headquarters in the nearby town of Nyimba was totally involved in the commercial meat and ivory trade, organized by officer i/c Collins Chibeka. When I reported all this to the ZAWA HQ at Chilanga, the criminal guards were transferred.



Poached impala



The poacher: wildlife scout Joseph Mbo



The poacher (2nd from right) - before being caught - at a meeting I held with Senior Chief Luembe (left) - 2004

From 1994 to 2002, a criminal gang had smuggled 19 container loads of ivory out of the Luangwa to the Far East.

In April 2005, I attended an International Ivory Enforcement Training Workshop in Lusaka held by the Environmental Investigation Agency (UK) and funded by DFID, where a presentation on the Singapore ivory seizure was made, which included details of the DNA investigations of the ivory and soil isotope analysis, suggesting that the elephant came from two savannah populations, one of them perhaps being the Luangwa. However, they needed to be matched with samples from there and elsewhere. At this same presentation, Samuel Ngosi of the Malawi Anti-Corruption Bureau revealed, possibly for the first time, that 19 shipments had been made between 1994 and 2002 by the same criminals in Lilongwe, using the same methods and freight carriers, and sent to the same destination – a possible total of 123.5 tonnes of ivory being shipped. The value of this at the time was \$185 million.

As reported in a National Geographic newsletter, Sam Wasser and his team at the University of Washington sequenced DNA recovered from nearly 500 samples of dung collected from elephant in 23 African countries and then matched it with DNA from the seized ivory.²⁶ When Wasser's team compared 75 samples from the illegal shipment to their genetic map, they found that all the ivory came from Zambia. Moreover, as the bulk of Zambia's remaining elephant are to be found in the Luangwa, this does name the ivory's source.²⁷ Extrapolating from the 2002 CITES report on Zambia found that the average ivory in the strong room was 4.23 kg; this would mean the tusks of 14,598 elephants might have been in those 19 containers.

The Lusaka Task Force took the confiscated 2002 consignment to Kenya for assay.²⁸ Benson Nkunika – the man involved in procuring ivory for the Singapore syndicate, who was convicted and then released on the understanding that he would turn state witness, subsequently re-offended (poaching in the Luangwa Valley again), was re-convicted and imprisoned, and then pardoned by the big man of Eastern Province at the time, President Rupiah Banda. As a US investigator revealed in a 2007 report submitted to the US National Institute of Justice:²⁹

Nkunika was arrested for poaching in Mfuwe in 2001 and subsequently revealed the extent of the network he was supplying with ivory. His testimony not only indicated extensive corruption within the regional

²⁶ Marris, Emma. "The Tusk Detective." *Nature.Com*. Nature International Weekly Journal of Science, 5 July 2007. Web. 30 March 2017. <http://www.nature.com/news/2007/070702/full/news070702-12.html>

²⁷ Brown, Susan. "Record Ivory Cache Traced to Zambia Elephants, DNA Shows." *National Geographic*. National Geographic Society, 18 Aug. 2006. Web. 30 March 2017. <http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2006/08/060817-ivory-dna.html>

²⁸ Silwamba, C et al. Finance ministry reports ZAWA management to ACC. The Post, 9 June 2009.

²⁹ Warchol, Greg L. An Exploratory Study of the Illicit Commercial Wildlife Trade in East and Southern Africa with Implications for the United States. Marquette: Northern Michigan U Submitted to the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice. 2006. p. 30.

ZAWA staff but also that he had been hired by Rodgers Nkhoma, the warden of Luangwa National Park to kill as many as 100 elephants. The killing of elephants near the ZAWA base at the park supported Nkunika's claim that ZAWA was involved. Interviews with ZAWA investigators by the researcher supported these claims of extensive internal corruption. As far back as 1992, as reported by Britain's Environmental Protection Agency (EIA), Zambia admitted to official involvement in elephant and rhino poaching involving the police and military. Poachers tend to operate in small groups of 4-5 individuals and store their weapons with local villagers. They also hide ivory by burying it. Weapons are bought or borrowed from local police or military in exchange for money. Chipata was the base for the trafficking group headed by Sindikani Banda.

On 28 October 2005, a six-tonne consignment of ivory and precious stones was discovered in a container in Manila's port; the container originated in Lusaka. The ivory later disappeared from the warehouse.

I was in the bush in 2005-2006 and then working on the project in Lusaka until my and my family's deportation in 2008. I still tried to help Chief Nyalugwe with development for two years until my investor withdrew funding support.

The Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) set off a human-rights disaster with the mass imprisonment of villagers in any way connected with game meat and poaching. Because of this, [ZAWA was eventually dissolved](#) by President Michael Sata.

Another view: Lessons from Luangwa

SLAMU (2012) Walking Tall. A Wildlife Conservation Success Story; Dalal-Clayton, B. and B. Child (2003). Lessons from Luangwa. The story of the Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project, Zambia. London, International Institute for Environment and Development. <https://pubs.iied>.

org/9079IIED/

Comments on the hippo culling by SLAMU.

Hippo culling

"Hippo culling has been done disgracefully, with carcasses in the tourist viewing areas and lorries of smelly meat driven through the park."

(Representative of Luangwa Safaris Association)

"We didn't agree to this system of SLAMU selling hippo meat themselves. How do we know how much has been earned? They should discuss such decisions with the Chiefs and ADCs."

(Member of Mochanya ADC)

"We want this hippo meat available locally for sale at a low price. They didn't consult us before changing the system. They are making up 10 kg sacks. There is no transparency."

(Chief)

"Local people want to get some of the hippo meat at a modest price."

(Member of Luangwa VAG, Kakambi chiefdom)

SLAMU/ZAWA and Gamefields Ltd

Once Begun.

*The union between God and Nature in the person of Christ admits no
divorce.*

C.S. Lewis - Miracles

* * *



Luembe women dressed up for a meeting.

Following the formation of the Norman Carr Foundation, both as the vehicle to assist ZAWA/SLAMU and to pursue the aims and objectives of what I eventually called the [Landsafe](#) Socio-ecological Model for the Customary Commons, I opened a Zambian branch of Gamefields Limited, the company my Middle-Eastern partner in London had registered in Gibraltar. On 12 June 2003, I signed an MOU for the implementation of Landsafe with Senior Chief Luembe, 153 of his headmen, the Luembe CRB and the Nyimba District Council. I then set out to establish a chieftdom-owned game ranch.

On 31 July 2003, I signed another MOU with the parties to transfer all landuser rights for all of the Luembe land classified as GMA to the future [Luembe Conservancy Trust](#). On 4 June 2003, the trust was registered under the Companies Act (limited by guarantee) to safeguard customary area, followed by implementing a holistic development program. On 3 September

2003, the chief, with the Nyimba Council's agreement and the Luembe CRB, ceded the landuser rights for all of the Luembe lying to the Luangwa River's east to the Luembe Trust for 60 years.

In September 2004, the trust invited the West Petauke GMA concessionaire, Mbeza Safaris Limited, to join us and further the trust's objectives. When they declined to join the trust, we bought Mbeza from them. On 5 March 2005, in the name of Mbeza Safaris, and as shareholders, an application was made by my family of five to the Zambia Investment Centre for the issue of investment certificates under the Zambia Development Agency Act. These were issued [ii]

We then sent a preliminary Landsafe manual to the House of Chiefs. We also began hunting-safaris in the GMA sections of Nyalugwe and Luembe. We encouraged the trust to block the alienation to a 99-year leasehold of more land in both chiefdoms, particularly in the West Mvuvye National Forest. I then wrote a business proposal for the GMA lease as 'Primary Nature' to an investor. And to offset free-rider immigration into the area and assist in establishing secure landuse rights for villagers, I planned to open a chiefdom land registration book in which all residents and their agricultural usufruct plots could be GPS registered.

On [28 November 2005](#), our peace and optimism were shattered. With our first hunting season completed, I wrote a letter to *The Post* Newspaper taking the DG of ZAWA to task for his threat in a newspaper article to lay criminal charges against seven hunting-safari operators for allegedly overshooting their hunting quota in the 2004 season. Our company, Mbeza Safaris, was one of those accused, but at the time, we were not the owners.[\[iii\]](#) This article was written by a statehouse security member – masquerading as a journalist on *The Post*, a ploy to move in and grab safari concessions, a campaign carried on by NAMAC (The National Movement Against Corruption). This marked the start of my campaign [against government corruption](#) in conservation.³⁰

³⁰ I had formerly served in the Game Department in 1966-1967 (senior Cropping Ranger); 1973-1976 (o/c and Biologist, Bangweulu Command; and 1987-1989 (Rhino project creator and director).

Immediately to the north of the Nyalugwe Chiefdom, in the Nyimba Open Area of Senior Chief Luembe, land (Mbizi Ranch) was obtained by a Muslim-Indian Zambian and an American businessman in 1995 under a 99-year leasehold. The property was later sold to an investor.

A controversial alienation within Luembe had been that of the area on the M'nyamadzi and Luangwa rivers, obtained originally on a 14-year provisional lease. Later the property was transferred to Munyamadzi Game Ranch Limited. The property is 10,500 hectares in extent (property No. f/10005; certificate of title No. L9879), extended illegally to a 25-year provisional lease and registered on 9 March 2001. It was obtained from the chief in 1998 without any benefit or consultations with his people. In a letter written on 9 November 2004 by the Luembe CRB and Senior Chief Luembe and addressed to ZAWA, they complained:

The M'nyamadzi section of Luembe was given to a foreigner by Senior Chief Luembe, with the agreement of the Nyimba District Council, and the obtaining of an investment licence from the Zambia Investment Centre for a provisional lease of 14 years. 'A Provisional Certificate of Title is a certificate that a District Council issues in accordance with the Lands and Deeds Registry Act No. 38 (1994) GOVT. GAZETTE (Acts) Part I.2.a'. [xxxiii] The agreement with the ZIC required the owner to fence the property and develop certain infrastructure. This has not been done and we have discovered that the lease has been illegally extended to 25 years on the original document held by the Commissioner of Lands. And more, without consulting us as required by the wildlife act, a hunting quota was issued to the company to conduct hunting-safaris without our involvement and without the knowledge of local ZAWA officers. And we understand that certain species have been shot without ZAWA officers being present, some of these species (such as lions) which are very scarce in our Open Area, and for which we have received no income. As well, we have discovered that workers employed by M'nyamadzi have been poaching animals. The Luembe CRB therefore urgently request the following: that no quota be issued in the future to M'nyamadzi; that a

copy of the quota and the species shot be given to us; that all money from licence and concession fees be given to the CRB, as well as compensation for our having to come to Lusaka and to hire lawyers to represent us; that M'nyamadzi report on how the meat from the animals was given to the community; that the M'nyamadzi do what they have agreed to do under their investment permit, meaning they must fence the property in such a way that it is with our agreement, and within the next six months; that they must then buy the species inside the fence and pay the full price to the Luembe CRB/ZAWA; that any other species within the Luembe hunting block and Open Area which they may wish to buy to be agreed to only with our permission and with certain conditions given by us, and that the price be negotiated by us and ZAWA; and that ZAWA supports us and our patron and his headmen in obtaining direct benefits from our wildlife for our community.

No reply was ever received to this letter, nor an application by Luembe - as allowed for under the Wildlife Act of 1998 - for harvesting rights to wildlife in the remaining part of the Nyimba Open Area within the Luembe chiefdom. The Luembe Conservancy Trust then took the matter further, inquiring of ZAWA as to the actual boundary between the game ranch - lying on the Luangwa River's west bank - and the GMA east bank. ZAWA confirmed that the entire river was included in the GMA. The Surveyor-General in the Ministry of Lands declared that private land might not encroach closer than 60 metres to the Luangwa River, although hippo and crocodile are annually issued on quota by ZAWA to the ranch for hunting-safaris; ZAWA, therefore, issuing licences for animals to be shot outside of unfenced private land, and on customary area, or by their definition, on GMA. No EIA of the fence construction was carried out, nor any consultations with customary residents, the GMA concessionaire, or the Forestry Department, as is required by the Fencing Ordinance of the Agricultural Lands Act. The chief also failed to keep his promise to the Luembe Trust to place a caveat against the inevitable alienation to a 99-year leasehold of the Munyamadzi Game Ranch Company's land.

At the time, the chief was co-director and trustee with me of the Luembe Conservancy Trust and had given his blessing for part of the West Mvuvye National Forest to be taken over by the trust's Joint Forest Management Agreement (JFMA) with the Department of Forestry.

The lower terrace of that part of the Nyimba Open Area lying between M'nyamadzi and Mbizi ranch, the land called Kazumba, that had been vested under customary law in the trust in 2003 for use as a community game ranch, had a large part excised and sold in 2005 by the chief to a Petauke trader. When this was taking place, the trader, as reported to the Commissioner of Lands on 10 March 2009, paid a Nyimba district councillor to backdate the lease's application to February 2008. A villager from Luembe wrote to me and commented:

It is only the hippo which can show a clear picture of how the crocodile lives in the water. I have gotten to the bottom of this and have discovered that some many government officers took part in the sharing of Ridwan's money including the District Commissioner. This is in addition to the meat that the D.C. was collecting from the Chief, Mr Francis Kalunga Njobvu in the night. The D.C. thought he was clever but posterity has judged him wrong and good heavens my writing to relevant offices has made him leave this sweet Nyimba prematurely. I hope he remembers me in his dreams in Lundazi. So far about four of the Indunas have died in Luembe in very unclear circumstances. The story is that some Indunas were in magical aircraft travelling to Nyimba to come and bewitch us but due to our belief in Christ, the pilot missed his malocation and crashed. Another one, Mbega Besa from Chitumbi has developed itching disease that has forced him to abandon us. The revolution is unstoppable, and as soon as the new D.C. is put in place, we will demand the last part to be done. Thanks for the external pressure you are exerting on Francis which is giving us more zeal to extinguish the fire of witchcraft that Francis has set blazing in Luembe. I wish you well and continued co-operation with us.

As a result of my threats of legal action, the trader temporarily ceased building. My relations with Chief Luembe were already sundered, and the trust unable to function. And in 2007, despite being registered investors, ZAWA/SLAMU illegally cancelled the safari lease we had purchased two years before and then had my family. I deported in 2008 - all due to my advocacy against government corruption.

In early 2009 while living in Johannesburg, I agreed to continue working for the villagers' benefit, and I resumed payment of the chief's monetary allowance as trust co-director. In February 2009, the chief's advisor reported to the trust that Luembe had again applied to the Nyimba District Council for their approval to sell the land to the trader. The council refused this application. In June 2009, with the removal of the chief imminent, the trader and Chief Luembe made a last effort to complete the sale, with the trader donating a vehicle to the council and bicycles to the councillors, who then agreed to the sale. A writ of summons was issued in July 2009 by our attorney on behalf of the Luembe Conservancy Trust, and injunctions placed against the trader and the Nyimba District Council, the former later cited for contempt of court as he had continued with his building activities. Investigations into the matter were conducted by the local chairman of the MMD Party, also head of a Catholic Task Force, and by the Land Alliance.[xxxiv] In August 2009, the task force investigated the sale of the 4,500 hectares by the chief to the trader, discovering that only 50 of 219 headmen had approved the sale of the land, that the land encroached on village farming lands, that the residents were not widely consulted, and that headmen were given \$10 each in local currency to append their signatures. On the withdrawal of my partner from our Zambia investment in 2010, I was forced to let matters on the cases against Immigration and ZAWA. My requests to the attorney to carry on our cases on contingency were met with silence.

Francis Kalunga Njobvu, Acting Senior Chief Luembe, ex-Zambia Army radio operator, died in May 2013. He was succeeded by Lazarus Mulowa, a graduate of the Military Technical Training School and a self-trained computer specialist. Although he is a board member of the Zambia CBNRM

Forum and Chairman of the House of Chiefs, he has done nothing to rectify and re-instate our agreements and the trusts and associations we had established. Our expenditure over the 7 years of the project amounted to \$2.5m.

The State of the Luembe and Nyalugwe Chiefdoms in 2003-2010



GMA made up by the Luembe and Nyalugwe chiefdoms



Nyalugwe chieftom section of the West Petauke GMA



Luembe Chiefdom pillaged by SLAMU

1 I had reports from the chiefdom of the “fire of witchcraft (sorcery) that Senior Chief Francis Kalunga Njobvu has set blazing in Luembe”, suggesting a chiefdom that was severely stricken. Rumours of twisted sorcery had also included Luembe’s sister, Chief Mwape, in the adjacent chiefdom (a ZAWA Board member on occasion), who was allegedly set upon by villagers and beaten for failing to protect them from elephant that had killed ten people - thirteen villagers arrested as a result. In the adjoining Soli chiefdom in the Luano Valley, two successive chiefs (women) were likely poisoned for attempting to combat a poaching ring with some investors’ help. On the sudden death of a remarkable chief in 2018, her successor, Paxina Sakala (42) was installed in March 2019 and [died in April 2020](#).

2 From year to year conditions remain much the same - the villagers dealing with floods or droughts, severe animal depredations, very poor and restricted education and health facilities, a lack of motorable tracks and transport, the lack of markets for crops and honey (the people of Nyambweka have a bee project but cannot sell their produce), a people caught in a time warp where the government is to them largely irrelevant.

3 Women bear the brunt of the continuance of sexual cleansing. A widow is compelled to have sex with her late husband's relatives, being pestered by men even during their husbands' funerals, and possessions are plundered on their husbands' death by his relatives. There are many more women than adult men in the villages, with the men working elsewhere as migrant labour, an unhealthy situation. And apart from the strain of bringing up several children without a father, they are often infected with HIV.

4 The spectre of major perturbations in the Luangwa system is at hand. The Luano Valley Uranium-Coal Project - in the Lunsemfwa Rift - comprises two licence areas, Lunsemfwa and Bulonga, and is part of an exploration agreement with Albidon Limited. The two areas cover two Albidon prospecting licences and have a combined 6,970 km² covering Karoo sediments. Were these to be developed, particularly for uranium, with the impossibility of curbing its pollution, this area of primary Nature would be destroyed. Then there is the sword of Damocles of hydropower dams, inevitable at the Lunsemfwa and Luangwa gorges.

5 On the far Western side of Luembe are the isolated villages of Mbilisao on the Lukusashi River. I found about 1,500 people living there under four headmen. As there was no store, people had to walk 12 km to buy salt and soap. There was no health centre. The education scenario was equally grim: the school consisting of 120 children taught in two classrooms, with four teachers grappling with seven grades, the teachers paid by our company Mbeza Safaris until our removal three years later. There were no government teachers, no pit latrines, no windows and no desks, paper, pens or seats, and