

# God's Country

**Volume 1: Plunderers of Eden**



**I. P. A. Manning**

(Chosanganga)

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GOD'S COUNTRY - Vol I:  
Plunderers of Eden

*A history of Zambia and the battle for the wildlife and  
customary commons*

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*For Cathlin*

*who stood firm in the trenches with me and who added  
immeasurably to this book - with love, admiration, and life-long  
gratitude; and for our children: Hamish, Brendan and Bronwen,  
who were ever supportive.*

## Foreword

Volume I of *God's Country, Plunderers of Eden*, is a conservation history-cum-memoir of Zambia – and briefly, of other parts of Africa. I have always been motivated by a sense of adventure and a spiritual need for places wild and free, and filled with big game. Latterly, I became more focused on the indigenous people who live with wildlife: on Bantu villagers, fishermen and hunters; on the Bushmen, Pygmy, Maasai and Mbororo. The book also deals with my attempt from 2002 to implement my Landsafe framework for the customary and public commons – the chiefdoms and protected areas of Zambia.

Much of my time was shared with my wife Cathlin; who has been with me on the conservation track since we met in 1967, and then in 1972 as wife, best friend and partner. Since then we made 22 international moves, survived medical emergencies, civil war mortar fire, anti-poaching and rural protection campaigns, boat wreck, imprisonment, armed deportation, theft and treachery. But we had years that glow with the splendour of a life together amidst Nature's glory.

As an old returning Game Department hand to Zambia in the years 2003-2008, as an investor in wildlife conservation

and rural development, my focus was deflected by corruption unceasing. I was forced to take up the cudgels in order to wage a campaign against an elephant poaching gang operated by rogue elements within government, against the illegal alienation of customary area and protected areas, and by the proposed open-pit mining of a national park. I wrote many blogs and made many enemies. My campaign soon affected the family: I was abducted and driven away under armed guard, imprisoned briefly, and then driven through Botswana to the South African border; and my youngest son was deported via the airport. Then, shortly after, Cathlin and my aged mother were expelled. I had allowed the hubris of custodianship, of activism, to subsume their rights, their investment. For this, I am sorry, though I do not for a minute regret what I attempted.

Volume II: *Guardians of Eden* reveals my full plan for Zambia, its chiefdoms and its wildlife.

## Preface

The law locks up the man or woman  
Who steals the goose off the common  
But leaves the greater villain loose  
Who steals the common from the goose.

The law demands that we atone  
When we take things we do not own  
But leaves the lords and ladies fine  
Who takes things that are yours and mine.

The poor and wretched don't escape  
If they conspire the law to break;  
This must be so but they endure  
Those who conspire to make the law.

The law locks up the man or woman  
Who steals the goose from off the common  
And geese will still a common lack  
Till they go and steal it back.  
Unknown Author (seventeenth century)

*Landsafe...will enable a chieftom to operate securely as*

*a functioning customary commons in which the land is sacrosanct. Second, it will guarantee usufructs rights of both men and women. Third, it will support collective land-use agreements over common-access rights. Fourth, it will allow for exploitation of renewable natural resources and mineral mining only under co-management agreement land vested by the customary authority. Finally, it will place investors, foreign aid, and NGOs under the control of a land-use plan and a properly institutionalized customary commons.*

*I. P. A. Manning – [The Landsafe socio-ecological development model for the customary commons of Zambia: evolution and formalization](#) [i]*

*If all the world were Christian, it might not matter if all the world were uneducated. But, as it is, a cultural life will exist outside the Church whether it exists inside it or not. To be ignorant and simple now – not to be able to meet the enemies on their own ground – would be to throw down our weapons, and to betray our uneducated brethren who have, under God, no defense but us against the intellectual attacks of the heathen. Good philosophy must exist, if for no other reason, because bad philosophy needs to be answered. The cool intellect must work not only against cool intellect on the other side, but against the muddy heathen mysticisms which deny intellect altogether. Most of all, perhaps, we need intimate knowledge of the past. Not that the past has any magic about it, but because we cannot study the future, and yet need something to set against the present, to remind us that the basic*



*assumptions have been quite different in different periods and that much that seems certain to the uneducated is merely temporary fashion. A man who has lived in many places is not likely to be deceived by the local errors of his native village; the scholar who has lived in many times and is therefore in some degree immune from the great cataract of nonsense that pours from the press and microphone of his own age.*

C.S. Lewis - Learning in War-Time (The Weight of Glory, 1941)

\* \* \*

Beginning in the dying light of Empire, I had a fifty-year love affair with part of the increasingly blighted African Eden. I first ventured to the Protectorate of Northern Rhodesia in January 1962 as a schoolboy hitchhiker from South Africa where I was mesmerized by a dreamland of pristine forest and small, orderly colonial towns and traditional villages. I travelled with a school friend in the full loom of the rains to Abercorn near Lake Tanganyika where kindly British policemen at the European jail gave us one of the three cells to come and go as we pleased. Later we hitched a lift to Kasama, the rain unceasing.

On 13 January 1962, we stood nervously near the Kasama Golf Club as crowds of restive Africans of the Bemba tribe walked past on their way to a public meeting to be addressed by Kenneth Kaunda, president of the United National Indepen-

dence Party (UNIP). Seeing us, they raised clenched fists and shouted, “*Freedom! Kwacha!*” We were vaguely aware that four months before, the Northern Province had been in a state of civil unrest with UNIP militia burning down schools, mission stations and bridges. Three years later I returned for the last few months of Northern Rhodesia self-rule, staying on for the transition to political independence as a locum farm-assistant in the Mkushi farming block. I returned in 1966, embracing the Republic of Zambia fully as a professional ‘wildlifer’.

My Landsafe framework to protect the land held under customary law and tenure, the customary commons, evolved from my bush experiences: in late 1964 in Bechuanaland where I had volunteered briefly to mark part of the boundary for the Batawana people and Chief Letsholathebe II a Moremi on land they had set aside for their future Moremi Game Reserve; in the Zambia Game Department in south-east Bangweulu from 1973-1976 where I had set out to save the black lechwe antelope and conserve them to provide an annual harvest for customary commoners; as an investor back in Botswana in the years 1976-1979, carrying out the first game ranching scheme on private land – as well as cropping schemes on state land, and attempting to implement a cropping project empowering the Bushmen and Kgalagadi Bantu; and in the Republic of Congo in 1992-1993 where I was employed by the EU as *chef de composante* to empower the Bantu and Pygmy living in and around the Odzala National Park, but where I found that the hidden development script followed, inevitably, the plot of Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness*. I was also spurred on by the example set by my late friend, Errol Button, who in 1949 as District Commissioner Lundazi in Northern Rhodesia initiated the first embryonic Landsafe-type empowerment scheme for a

customary area.

During my final lurch in Zambia from 2002 – 2008, attempting to implement Landsafe, I was assailed by the destruction and plunder, the alienation of protected areas and the chiefdoms, the poaching of elephant, the attempted mining of a national park, and the spread of industrial agriculture and dam construction. Then there was the continuing disgrace of the justice system where innocent people, man, wife and child are imprisoned in buildings little different from a pigsty. And now the territory is a police-state dictatorship and bankrupt kleptocracy.

Zambia is embedded in the heart of south-central Africa, once home to a veritable cornucopia of wildlife; a country like many others, conceived in European commercial invasion and both nurtured and irrevocably altered by British colonial rule - in this case as a protectorate under an all-powerful British imperial government. In a matter of thirty years after its 'acquisition' in 1889 by the British South Africa Chartered Company under Cecil Rhodes, assisted by financiers such as Rothschild, the territory's framework of British institutions and infrastructure was in place, in thirty-five years the establishment of the Protectorate of Northern Rhodesia, in seventy-five years its political independence.

Britain, colonial master and protector, the parent it was hoped of developed egalitarian societies, has since 1200 seen the flowering of a large and highly educated class that in the years 1760 to 1860 produced the Industrial Revolution - though most people in the Great Britain of those times, with an on-going process of being removed from the commons ( the Enclosures) by the landowning elite, lived a life of unrelenting toil, squalor and ill-health.

When *njelesa*, the English, took over the territory as a

commercial concession having a royal charter in 1889, they discovered some 200,000 Bantu Africans already there who had invaded before them. While the English bribed the tribes and clans with their trade goods for mining concessions, they brought to an end the wanton killings and serfdom instituted by tribal despots. They snuffed out the Muslim Arab-African slave trade holocaust, ushered in Christianity and the Judeo-Christian ethic, a railway, modern medicine, written languages, the pit-latrine, the telegraph, roads, modern administrative systems, engineering, English common law, the Magna Carta conservation model, all of it transplanted holus-bolus onto a scattering of shifting people caught up in the beginnings of their neolithic revolution; they without the wheel, many of them long isolated, speaking some twenty languages and many dialects. Instantly they were enslaved by a predatory commercial culture looking for raw materials and markets for its goods.

Then, having created this shell of Britain in order to obtain the financial profits that had made the British Empire, its standard bearers in but a matter of 15 years had voluntarily and involuntarily departed the territory. As Marlow said in *Heart of Darkness*:<sup>[ii]</sup>

*The conquest of the earth, which mostly means the taking it away from those who have a different complexion or slightly flatter noses than ourselves, is not a pretty thing when you look into it much. What redeems it is the idea only. An idea at the back of it; not a sentimental pretence but an idea; and an unselfish belief in the idea – something you can set up, and bow down before, and offer a sacrifice to.*

Although the BSA Company brought peace and Western civilization to the territory, it was only after British rule of the Protectorate of Northern Rhodesia was declared in 1924 that a profit was made. The native collectors, magistrates, district commissioners and most other members of the British Provincial Administration (PA) of that time, were undoubted 'highly laudable emissaries of light' though masking – and powerless to control, the Anglo-Saxon muscular scourge of seeking profit at all costs.[iii]

The departure of the British ushered in the curse of the statist nation-state, inevitable when the new class 'politician', rather than the traditional leaders within the Native Authority – established under the dual mandate system of Indirect Rule, was handed control of the territory. To this were soon added the vagaries of economics, globalization and neoliberalism, the predatory neocolonial donors and the business lobby, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank – with the aid of a succession of autocratic leaders embracing the non-separation of powers of the executive and judiciary, maintaining Zambia in an arrested state of adolescence ever since. Its fall from grace was pitiful to behold, its continuing decline deeply troubling, knowing that this pleistocene eden of plenitude, of mountain, hill, plain and great river – which mistakenly assumes the existence of villagers feeding on an effulgence of natural resources – is now the great paradox, the great illusion of our time. For today the material consumption of most Zambians is below the pre-industrial norm with average longevity at birth having plummeted between 1977 and 1999 from 51 to 41 years, by 2012 supposedly increasing to 56 years – though this is undoubtedly biased towards the urban population.[iv] And rather than the customary residents embraced within wildlife

areas fattening on the abundant resources, they are subject to animal depredations and human rights abuses at the hands of agents of the state; for they and their compradors seek rents from the chiefdoms and their bountiful natural assets, a process inevitably, of '[accumulation by dispossession](#)'.

Assisting this lamentable process are those donor-aid projects that fail to support the growth of the customary commons through devolution and decentralization; instead aiding and promoting land alienation and the continued hegemony of a highly centralized and autocratic government presided over by yet another grasping, arrogant and ignorant big man politician - such as we have seen with Zambia's successive American-style presidents, ensuring the political economy of patronage and dysfunction. What we see is African patrimonialism at work, with rule by patronage, based upon relationships of loyalty and dependence with little separation of private and public interests. However, its actual historical roots are in denial of this, embedded as they are in the traditional African culture of kinships and interlocking clans girded by their animal totems whose members conform to an intricate set of give-and-take relationships and economic reciprocity forged over thousands of years. They have survival value; rigid ideology and laws do not, and moral relativism now holds sway. Now there is no notion of the world outside, no true notion of a nation-state, let alone ideology or law or honour, upon which modern states were founded and struggle to maintain.[v] And there are few principles outside the modern commercial 'clients' of the big man, as confirmed by the withering assessment of Chabal and Daloz: "The legitimacy of the African political elites, such as it is, derives from their ability to nourish the clientele on which their power rests. It is therefore imperative for them to exploit

governmental resources for patrimonial purposes'.[vi]

And yet, despite big man and his supine government and burgeoning civil-service feeders at the trough, the demarcated chiefdoms that are the basis of the customary commons are in place – even though bereft of much customary land taken as protected area, created by the British under their dual mandate policy of commerce and the preservation of the natives' interests and culture. Indirect Rule was the practical result, the territory administered by no more than 250 colonial civil servants working through the chiefs and their councillors, i.e. the Native Authority. These NAs should have made possible the continuance of the African religious ethic regarding the protection of Mother Earth for the 'living ancestors', and the flowering of the Guardians of Nature guilds; and such ownership and responsibility confirmed in 1964 at political independence, and the full adoption realized by what Aldo Leopold called the land ethic, one incorporating the surrounding ecology;[vii] and perhaps the flowering of what Basil Davidson referred to as the essentially native African model of community self-government.[viii] But yet, early in this 21st century, we stand witness to the great divergence between the elite and the disenfranchised people of the chiefdoms, and between the elite and the proletarian urban poor in their apartheid squatter compounds bereft of toilets, power and water. And the land is subject to open-access plunder for its natural goods, such that only the empowerment of the chiefdoms and a revival of African religion, melded with Christianity - provided the country is not overwhelmed by climate destruction and plunder by outside world - can reverse the process. For Zambia is a declared Christian nation.

In chiefdoms are women and children, but with few young

men, they still in the grip of worker migration. Here the villagers live by an ancient barter system, not the illusory dollar a day or more of income held out as the living benchmark of survival by the donor-aid industry; and there are few government services – if any, to alleviate their burden; and their traditional lands are fields of plunder where they are at times beaten, imprisoned or killed by the agents of the state for taking the ‘King’s deer’ on what is their land, their forests; or worse, where they conspire with the agents in its plunder. Yet, as members of the customary commons they are free – neither members of the urban proletariat nor peasants held in bondage by the state.

Zambia - even had they retained a significant number of Europeans with a political stake in the territory - must seek another way forward that is in tune with its own culture, rather than with the multi-party Westminster system which provides the shade-tree for the operating patrimonial kleptocracy. The West has no model of economic growth for Zambia as long as it deals with Western actors and their compradors, rather than real people operating under their long-evolved form of government – more ecological than economic. Clark, in *A Farewell to Alms*, observed that customary villagers are poor because they lack one or more of capital, land or efficiency.[ix] Of land in Zambia, there is no shortage, but much of its soils are some of the oldest and depleted in the world, requiring methods of conservation agriculture able to deal with an increasingly sedentary system of husbandry by rapidly increasing subsistence farmers. But since the early 1970s villagers have had to deal with the hybrid seed and chemical fertilizer induced microbial death, and the looming GMO attack that ties them into agribusinesses, corrupt middlemen and woeful state agricultural support systems – a



modern form of slavery. Obtaining capital is a difficulty, but the lack of efficiency and initiative, the high *time preference rates*,<sup>[x]</sup> exacerbated by the increasing open-access plunder of renewable and non-renewable natural resources in chiefdoms, is a significant impediment to progress. To this may be added the *tall poppy* syndrome with its built-in social constraints that stunt and nip innovation in the bud. Or is it something to overcome? If happiness in the West – supposedly correlated not only with wealth but with the disparity between the wealthy – is in short supply, being taken from someone else and not added to the common pool, then villagers have learnt that the *tall poppy* syndrome engenders harmony and happiness. There can be no place for jealousy within a group seeking equilibrium and survival in a world of ‘living ancestors’ and spirit mediums inseparable from the earth and its stewardship. But because they now have no control over their natural resources, this also ensures their continued ‘working poor’ enslavement by others not marching to the same drummer.

If Zambia is to attain true independence, then the great conspiracy of silence having to do with the constraints to progress must be revealed and discussed openly. To those mentioned one must add the stranglehold that sorcery exerts over the people, stifling logical thought and engendering suspicion and fear. As the administration of a country in the permanent grip of a semi-state of emergency falls further into disarray under successive autocracies, its own African moral framework for the stewardship of Nature sundered, we see the rise of rampant thievery and treachery for gain, the lack of principle, endemic begging and all the other social development constraints that have mushroomed since self-government and the loss of much of the territory’s cultural traditions, social

controls and all-encompassing religion. But so too is the continuing theft of the land and the natural resources by mainly foreign plunderers, aided by the government and the enriched elite.

For the aid worker the lessons of Conrad's *Heart of Darkness* are clear: the extremist benevolence of Kurtz that led to his total support for the cause of 'the Suppression of Savage Customs', may, under the daily assault of begging and conniving, of plunder and the lack of principle, turn to anger and then apathy, born as they are out of massive frustration. Such is the plight of the donor-aid industry being locked in pursuit of unattainable objectives and party to the plunder, of small investors harvested of their production and deported, of Zambians seeing their leaders grow 'big necks like pigs' while they thin.[xi] Yet foreign aid and profiteering will continue, in private recording its displeasure – as Conrad wrote, at the tearing out of 'treasure out of the bowel of the land', yet 'staying on their boat not daring even to speak the name elephant from which the ivory is taken', an apt description of those allowed to prey on Zambia in this the Anthropocene Epoch.

Socio-ecological developments must advance with vigour. But the gathering destruction of the Earth System and the Malthusian increase in population bodes ill for the country, that and capitalistic excess; and the failure to manage investment funds, the predatory nature of those seeking profit, the inability to curb open-access to the customary commons. It is all self-defeating, the law of diminishing returns and high time-preference hampering the responsible guardianship of the land under customary tenure. For those chiefdoms lucky enough to have them, a bounty of wildlife and other natural resources might be their saving grace. By concentrating on

the conservation of Nature and, where possible, the game and gamelands, and by making the necessary religious and socio-ecological linkages, development might find African expression and be made to march to a more timeless drummer where land remains under customary ownership and where the benefits of the natural resources it supports is shared with a small regulated government, one directly representing land held under customary tenure. It is the only way to ensure that the customary commons – along with the public commons of protected areas, and the territory as a whole, becomes socio-ecologically, spiritually and politically intact; a stable place for its people to live, one offering a platform for development that is egalitarian.

But to some, such a wish would be evidence of my Landsafe framework for the commons being yet another presumptuous Luddite attempt at ensuring Eden's survival, of freezing people into a primitive Arcadian state where small villages are filled with happy folk and the laughter of children as herds of impala graze nearby on the banks of fish-filled rivers. The great challenge remains. Zambia, as a nation-state, a nebulous idea at best, must somehow enjoin its many clan nations, speaking many tongues, into an African participatory democracy; but more importantly, into a recovered state of moral, cultural and religious legitimacy. I hope that my suggested *Zambian Guardians of Nature Manifesto* will be taken up vigorously.

Deported from Zambia in 2008 - my family shortly after, I sat down and wrote. Later, when I lifted my head and looked around, I realized that the rest of the world had also changed for the worse. Perhaps it was the Rolling Thunder bombings of North Vietnam in 1967 that announced the start of neoliberalism, a form of militaristic capitalism which has

grown increasingly fascist, and which now threatens all life on earth.

But now that I had started to think again, Antonio Gramsci's remark about the 'pessimism of the intellect and the optimism of the will' buoys me up for the all-consuming battle, encouraged by the refusal of Indigenous People to give up their belief in God and their duty to safeguard Mother Earth; powerful medicine indeed.

[i] Manning, I.P.A. "The Landsafe Socio-Ecological Development Model for the Customary Commons of Zambia: Evolution and Formalization." *52 Nat. Resources J.* 195. Natural Resources Journal, Law School, University of New Mexico, 1 Aug. 2012. Web. 6 Mar. 2017. <http://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol52/iss1/7/>

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[x] Clark, A Farewell to Alms, p.171.

[xi] Web 20 Jan. 2018. <http://www.zambianobserver.com/those-with-big-necks-like-pigs-should-stop-lying-about-founding-pf-kampyongo/>

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## Landsafe Wildlife Commons Project Zambia (2003-2010)

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## Working Definitions

1. **Alegal** - An unambiguously wrong, disruptive and often deliberately committed act for which there is not yet a specific law making that act expressly illegal.
2. **Agistment rights** - the rights under British common law of landowners to receive payments or profits from cattle grazed on their land
3. **Boma** – Colonial District Headquarters
4. **big man** – the head of a political patronage chain of clients
5. **Biodiversity conservation** - the care, protection or management of biodiversity (wildlife) aimed at a specific objective, e.g. to actively manage species and ecosystems for their long-term viability, to reduce the destruction of a key species' habitat, or to increase benefits from sustainable ecosystem management
6. **Biological diversity (biodiversity)** - Wildlife diversity is the variability among living organisms from all sources including, amongst other things, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, between species and ecosystems
7. **Chiefdom** - customary area under the control of a customary authority, i.e. a chief and headmen
8. **Chitemene** - swiddening, coppicing or slash-and-burn

cultivation

9. **Chola boy** – sycophantic bag-carrier
10. **Chosanganga** (*Nyanja*) – ‘the smeller-out of evil-doers’
11. **Clientelism** - exchange of political loyalty for the promise of material rewards
12. **Colony** - an area under the political control of another country
13. **Commons** – has four meanings: 1) being elements of the environment enjoyed and shared by all, 2) being land owned by someone but with commoners allowed to use it in specific ways, 3) the customary commons, being land used in perpetuity by a tribe or clan or community of people for the shared and equal benefit of its members, and 4) the public commons, i.e. state land.
14. Conservation area - A geographically defined area other than a Protected Area, which is governed and managed in ways that achieve positive and sustained long-term outcomes for the in situ conservation of biodiversity, with associated ecosystem functions and services and where applicable, cultural, spiritual, socio-economic, and other locally relevant values.
15. **Cornucopianism** - futurists who believe that continued progress and provision of material items for mankind can be met by similarly continued advances in technology.
16. **Customary area co-management** - the sharing of the responsibilities and benefits between government, civil society and customary people for the land and the natural resources which it supports, suggesting an evolutionary movement through decentralization and devolution towards semi-autonomous control and management of the customary commons

17. **Comprador** - a person or persons within a country who act as agents for foreign organizations engaged in investment, trade, and economic or political exploitation
18. **Conservancy** - people within a defined geographical area who jointly manage, conserve and use the wildlife and other natural resources
19. **Customary** – that relating to traditional custom
20. **Customary area** – Lands Act 1995 definition of land held under customary tenure
21. **Customary Authority** – Chiefs, headmen and councillors
22. **Customary commons** – all customary area, but in particular those natural resource elements outside of villages and village agricultural land - forests, atmosphere, rivers and lagoons, fisheries and wildlife that are shared – ideally used and enjoyed by all the people residing there under the authority of chiefs and headmen
23. **Customary residents** - the inhabitants and usufructuaries of a customary area owing allegiance to a chief and headmen
24. **Customary tenure** - land held through long tradition by village headmen under the chairmanship of a chief
25. **Ecosystem** - an ecosystem is the interaction of a natural community (biological life) with its physical and chemical environment and the resulting ecological processes of such interaction
26. **Ecosystem services** – A) the short and long term benefits people obtain from ecosystems: 1) provisioning goods and services, or the production of basic goods such as food, water, fish, fuels, timber, and fibre; 2) regulating services, such as flood protection, purification of air and

water, waste absorption, disease control, and climate regulation; 3) cultural services that provide spiritual, aesthetic, and recreational benefits, and; 4) supporting services necessary for the production of all other ecosystem services, such as soil formation, production of oxygen, crop pollination, carbon sequestration, photosynthesis, and nutrient cycling. But now the reality: 'On almost all continents, the land is being retooled to produce [saleable ecosystem services](#) as well as palm oil, GM soy or pulpwood. Entrepreneurs and landholders are being invited to manufacture biodiversity, wetlands quality or species-equivalent tokens that industrialists or developers can then buy to "neutralize" the destruction for which they are responsible'.[i]

27. **Forest** – [in medieval times in England](#) it denoted land used for hunting and as a source of venison; in Zambia, it is woodland - denoted forests, either protected or part of the customary commons. Zambia, therefore, covered as it is mainly by miombo woodland, relies on chitemene (swiddening) survival strategies by subsistence villagers of the customary commons.[ii]
28. **Game** - commonly hunted wildlife species
29. **Game Management Areas** – originally controlled hunting areas within customary area, then declared by the government as quasi protected areas where the state collects hunting revenue (sharing little of it with the chiefdoms), as well as income from tourist lodges - though not sharing with the chiefdoms. In 1971 they were converted to 32 game management areas (GMAs) by statutory instrument. In 1993 they were declared under the Game Management Declaration Order by statutory instrument No.67 of 1993

as areas for the sustainable utilization of wildlife.[iii]

30. **ICCA** - Indigenous and Community Conserved Areas
31. **Kakistocracy** – a system of government that is run by the worst, least qualified, or most unscrupulous of citizens
32. **Kleptocracy** - a country whose rulers use political power to steal the resources
33. **Landscape-scale conservation** - conservation and management going beyond biodiversity issues, in particular incorporating the social framework, and serving as a bridge between science and resources management by facilitating information flow among organizations vested in natural resource conservation. There are two forms: American Integrated Landscape Management – which merely integrates only those stakeholders with a financial stake, and the genuinely holistic European Convention on Landscapes.
34. **Landscape framework** - statutory trusts established on customary area, the trusts entering into co-management custodial and harvesting agreements with the state in respect of fisheries, forestry, water and wildlife, assuring customary residents secure access to land and lasting benefits from renewable natural resources, essential to biodiversity conservation and to the socio-ecological and cultural integrity of Zambia.
35. **Land alienation** – customary or protected land converted to a 14-year provisional title and then to 99-year leasehold (renewable)
36. **Land tenure** - the rights of individuals or groups over arable, grazing and residential land, how such rights are acquired, what they consist of, how they operate in the holding, transfer and inheritance of land, and how they

may be extinguished

37. **Liebig's Law** - the amount that a species or ecosystem can produce in a given place and time is limited by the resource in shortest supply
38. **Natural resources** - land and its biological resources: the soils, vegetation, water and fauna
39. **Neoliberalism** or neo-liberalism refers primarily to the 20th-century resurgence of 19th-century ideas associated with [laissez-faire economic liberalism](#). Those ideas include [economic liberalization](#) policies such as privatization, [austerity](#), [deregulation](#), [free trade](#) and reductions in [government spending](#) in order to increase the role of the [private sector](#) in the [economy](#) and [society](#). These market-based ideas and the policies they inspired constitute a [paradigm shift](#) away from the post-war [Keynesian](#) consensus which lasted from 1945 to 1980.
40. **Open Area** – that part of customary area not classified under the Laws of Zambia as Game Management Area (GMA), unfortunately signifying an area of open access
41. **Parastatal (Quango)** - an organization or industry having some political authority and serving the state indirectly – the former Zambia Wildlife Authority being an example
42. **Patrimonialism** – an acute degree of apparent disorder, as evidenced by a high level of governmental and administrative inefficiency, a lack of institutionalization, a general disregard for the rules of the formal political and economic sectors, and a universal resort to personal(ized) and vertical solutions to societal problems; the conditions necessary for the operation of big man patronage
43. **Peasant** - a poor farmer of low social status who owns or rents land for cultivation (as it is now a derogatory

- term it is used chiefly in a historical sense or concerning subsistence farming outside the customary commons)
44. **Plutonomy** – the small percentage of the world’s population that is gathering increasing wealth, i.e. the 1%
  45. **Precariat** – precarious proletariat
  46. **Proletariat** – working class people
  47. **Quango** - chiefly derogatory: a semi-public administrative body outside the civil service and financially supported - and senior appointments made - by the government, i.e. a parastatal
  48. **Shushushu** – state security agents of Zambia’s Office of the President (OP)
  49. **State land** - land not situated in a customary area (Lands Act, 1995)
  50. **Statist** – a political system in which the state has substantial centralized control over social and economic affairs
  51. **Sustainable growth** - an oxymoron
  52. **Tenure system** - legal and institutional framework that determines the way in which rights to natural resources (property rights) are defined and enforced
  53. **Tragedy of the commons** - an unproven economic problem in which every individual tries to reap the greatest benefit from a given resource. As the demand for the resource overwhelms the supply, every individual who consumes an additional unit directly harms others who can no longer enjoy the benefits
  54. **Ubuntu** - a quality that includes the essential human virtues of compassion and humanity
  55. **Usufruct** - the principle of customary tenure whereby any resident can have access to and the use of a piece of land but cannot claim any form of ownership of it.[iv] The



holder of a usufruct is known as a usufructuary

56. **Villagers** - Africans living in traditional communal villages
57. **Common acronyms**
58. **ADMADE** - Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas
59. **BINGO** – Big international NGO involved with wildlife conservation
60. **CBNRM** – Community-based natural resource management
61. **DNPW** – Department of National Parks and Wildlife
62. **EIA** - Environmental impact assessment
63. **EIS** – Environmental impact study
64. **EMP** – Environmental management plan
65. **GMA** – Game management area
66. **ICDP** – Integrated conservation and development project
67. **IUCN** – International Conservation Union
68. **LIRD** - Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project
69. **NPWS** – National Parks and Wildlife Service
70. **NRCF** – Natural Resources Consultative Forum
71. **PHAZA** – Professional Hunters’ Association of Zambia
72. **S.I.** – Statutory Instrument
73. **SLAMU** – South Luangwa Management Unit of ZAWA
74. **TCZ** – Tourism Council of Zambia
75. **WECSZ** – Wildlife and Environmental Conservation Society of Zambia
76. **WPAZ** – Wildlife Producers’ Association of Zambia
77. **WWF** – World Wildlife Fund
78. **ZAWA** – Zambia Wildlife Authority
79. **ZDA** – Zambia Development Agency

80. **ZEMA** – Zambia Environmental Management Agency  
81. **ZRL** – Zambezi Resources Limited

[i] Lohmann, Larry. Ecosystem Service Trading - draft entry for the forthcoming *Post-Development Dictionary* edited by Ashish Kothari and Alberto Acosta. 10 January 2017. Web 26 June 2017 <http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/resource/ecosystem-service-trading>

[ii] “No Trees in the Forest?” *World Wide Words*. Web. 16 Apr. 2017. <<http://www.worldwidewords.org/articles/forest.htm>>

[iii] Zambia Wildlife Act No. 12 (1998) Govt. Gazette (Acts), at Part V.26.1.

[iv] An Introduction to Legal Systems: African Law (J Duncan M Derret ed., 1968)

# I

## CENTRAL AFRICA

*A history of a central African territory inhabited by Bushmen and Pygmy, invaded by Bantu people from North-West Africa, then 'grabbed' by Britain: first as a commercial company holding a Royal British Charter, followed by the British Colonial Administration. Finally, the British withdrew, handing control over to the Bantu invaders; a country now called Zambia.*

## Before Times

*indigenous Twa Pygmy and Kxoe Bushmen - man's development in Africa - the first Bantu invaders - arrival of Portuguese for slaves and ivory - arrival of Bantu Ngoni from the south (1835) - formation of the Chikunda - arrival of Kololo in Barotseland - Bantu customs and culture - principles of Bantu life - the ecological state - man and nature separated - demarcation of customary commons - villager survival strategies – BSA Company and conservation – introduction of private property concept – BSA Company impacts on villagers - land for European settlers and Africans – the Passfield Memorandum - division of land - commercial farmers given preferential treatment - research and technical support - Protectorate of Northern Rhodesia (1924) - introduction of Indirect Rule (1929) - new tribes and chiefs created - Native Authority established - Melland calls for Indirect Rule reform - the Natural Resources Act of 1962 - Christianity and animism - restrictions on hunting and settlement - lifting of chitemene ban - witchcraft and sorcery - serfdom and slavery – Africa Lakes Corporation campaign - BSA Company anti-slavery campaign - early Europeans – missionaries - Mpeseni and the Ngoni – First World War – land alienations - native reserve - settlers*

*and mining – the hut tax - blackbirding for miners – European-style development - copper mining – the depression - Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1953-1962) - development funds*

*If Africa is to take her rightful place among the continents, we shall have to proceed on different lines and evolve a policy which will not force her institutions into an alien European mould, but which will preserve her unity with her own past, conserve what is precious in her past, and build her future progress and civilization on specifically African foundations.*

*J. C. Smuts - Africa And Some World Problems*

*Even an entire society, a nation, or all simultaneously existing societies taken together, are not owners of the earth, they are simply its possessors, its beneficiaries, and have to bequeath it in an improved state to succeeding generations, as boni patres familias (good heads of the household).*

*Karl Marx – Capital*

*How have we ravaged the garden instead of kept it, feeding our war-horses with its flowers, and splintering its trees into spear-shafts!*

*John Ruskin – The Earthly Paradise*

*I could not help wondering if sometime in the future ... the English would be remembered with gratitude for the work we had done when we were serving there. I dream of a day far in the future when a visitor from these Islands*

*will go to the rural parts of that country and be told of someone remembered by his African name in whose time there was peace and plenty in the land. He will be told of officials remembered for their honesty, their integrity, and their courage, who lived far from their own kind and worked for the advancement and progress of the Africans. We shall not have been forgotten.*

*Gervas Clay – Some reflections on the 70th anniversary of the founding of Northern Rhodesia, 1994.*

*“Ah, but before times it was good, Mr Manning!”*

*Bicycle Tembo - Chiundaponde, 1973.*

*A nation may either, following the example of Denmark or Switzerland, put brains into agriculture, develop a finely varied system of public education, general and technical, apply the ripest science to its special manufacturing industries, and so support in progressive comfort and character a considerable population upon a strictly limited area; or it may, like Great Britain, neglect its agriculture, allowing its lands to go out of cultivation and its population to grow up in towns, fall behind other nations in its methods of education and in the capacity of adapting to its uses the latest scientific knowledge, in order that it may squander its pecuniary and military resources in forcing bad markets and finding speculative fields of investment in distant corners of the earth, adding millions of square miles and of unassimilable population to the area of the Empire.*

*J.A. Hobson – Imperialism: A Study (1902)*

\* \* \*

Man lived in the territory - now called Zambia - long before the coming of the European and Bantu, the latter an African Niger-Congo linguistic group invading from the north of the Congo Basin moist-forest. Excavations at the Mumbwa and Natchikufa caves reveal two types of aborigines: bushmenoid of the Wilton culture and pygmoid of the Natchikufan culture.[i] They were killed or assimilated by the Bantu, except for a few bands of Kxoe Bushmen who lived in the region between the Mashi and Zambezi rivers in Barotseland - a remnant band found in 2010 south of Shingombo on the Angola border - a group for a long time interned in a refugee camp near Solwezi.[ii] In the Angola war, that all but destroyed their Bushmen, one band when surrounded by SWAPO, was rescued in 1975 by soldiers of my former unit, South Africa's 1st Parachute Battalion. Later, in October 1979, some bands were captured in Zambia near the Angola border by the South African army and removed from the country.

## BEFORE TIMES




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[illegible]

Len Vaughan (1902-1989) describing a Bushmen to me





*(Photo by Nigel Warr (N.R. Information Dept.)*

**Bushman—Seseche District**

**A typical Northern Bushman.** This man belongs to a group of Hukwe Bushmen still living in the Matemwa Forests between the Zambezi and the Mashai Rivers in the south-west corner of Barotseland. The pre-Bantu inhabitants of North-Western Rhodesia were of this physical type.

Excerpt from the Northern Rhodesia Journal

Twa Pygmy remnants exist in the Kafue, Lukanga and Bangweulu wetlands where they once lived in hiding from slavers until the 1920s in deep-water reed swamp in temporary shelters. In the southeast Bangweulu they were centred on the island of Mboyolubambe near the Chambeshi River - but in the midst of the swamps, now much intermarried with the Unga. One of their descendants, Hobito Munsha, in the years 1973-1976 worked for me in the Bangweulu, helping me capture lechwe

and sitatunga, a man similar to the Pygmy I employed twenty years later in the Odzala, Congo Republic.



What singles out the Twa are their geometric tradition of rock art and the now-defunct Butwa secret society.[iii] In the Luangwa Valley, the Twa aborigines were known as the Kafula, being skilled ironworkers and fearsome fighters. The Nsenga, who like the Twa had come from the Congo, knew them as the Katanga. They hunted elephant with spears, the last of them disappearing just before European colonization.[iv]

Recent genetic evidence using mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) and fossil evidence allows us to trace the movement of humans around the earth.[v] Africans have a much larger mtDNA sequence divergence than non-Africans, suggesting that they accumulated the most mtDNA mutations, and therefore the

greatest diversity, supporting the argument for an African origin of modern humans.[vi] Recent research in Israel by Ben-Dor provides the evidence that *Homo erectus* – who preceded *Homo sapiens*, disappeared from the Levant at the same time as the local elephant 400,000 years ago, *Homo erectus* being dependent on elephant fat for their survival.[vii] A report by Tel Aviv University revealed that:[viii]

*Scientists have connected evidence about diet with other cultural and anatomical clues to conclude that the disappearance of the elephants led to the emergence of Homo sapiens in the Middle East much earlier than first suspected. The findings set the stage for a new, revolutionary understanding of human history.*

## Bantu movements

By A.D. 500 a Bantu group who made stamped-ware pots had moved from the north of Lake Nyasa, down the Shire River, and then up the Zambezi Valley - a matriarchal people, these were the likely ancestors of the Tonga.[ix] During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the Maravi (Chewa) settled the Luangwa Valley and the eastern plateau, while the Kaonde moved into the northwest of the territory, displacing the Lenje. In the same century, more invaders arrived, the present people known as the Lozi entered the northern part of the Zambezi River and spread out onto the plains, usurping the land settled before by the Subiya, Mashi and Shanjo Bantu. Sometime in the

seventeenth century, the Luba in present-day Congo DRC, fueled by commerce from the West and the possession of many firearms, sought new lands to settle by moving into the present-day Northern Province. These migrations culminated in the arrival of the Bemba in about 1740, forcing the Bisa, Lungu and Mambwe to give way, the latter two, in particular, spending the next 170 years escaping their depredations until the arrival of British South Africa Chartered Company (BSA Company) officials who brought peace to the region.

In the early sixteenth century, the Portuguese gained ascendancy over Islam in the Western Indian Ocean. In the early fifteenth century, it captured the ports of Mombassa, Kilwa and Sofala. From here they made forays into the interior in search of gold and ivory. In the process, they introduced a wide array of new crops: pepper, wheat, tobacco, sweet potatoes, manioc (cassava), haricot beans, lentils, onions, guavas, pawpaws, small bananas, and later, maize.[x] Their first invasion into the interior - one leading to a settlement - was in the Zambezi Valley at Zumbo (the southern side of the confluence of the Luangwa and Zambezi rivers in present-day Mozambique), established by the Portuguese Goan, Perreira. Then an expedition under Lacerda journeyed in 1798 from Tete to Chief Kazembe's country near the Luapula River.


The first recorded crossing of Africa in these parts was by two Portuguese speaking Africans, Baptista and Jose, a journey that took them nine years as Chief Kazembe had held them captive on the Luapula. In 1827 the Portuguese established a small garrison to protect their Kazembe slave and ivory route in the Lundazi district of the Luangwa Valley, but by 1831 the last Portuguese expedition into the territory left Tete for the north under Monteiro and Gamitto.[xi]

The nineteenth century saw a reversal of the southward migration of Bantu by a northerly movement into the territory from the south known as the *Difaquane* – the scattering – following on from the *Mfecane* – the crushing, the latter describing the scorched earth depredations of Chaka's Zulu impis. In 1835 the patriarchal cattle-owning Ngoni crossed the Zambezi under Zwangendaba from present-day Swaziland, then split up into various groups, some of them under Mpeseni settling in the eastern part of the territory. In 1860 they displaced the Nyanja people and laid waste the area far and wide in their search for tribal converts and grain.[xii] To these immigrants were added a motley group of traders and escaped slaves from the Portuguese estates on the lower Zambezi who formed a 'tribe' called the Chikunda – based at Zumbo, and speaking Nyungwe, a mixture of Nyanja and Shona.[xiii] Their formative leaders were Kanyemba and Matakanya, the latter laying waste the Luangwa Valley for slaves and ivory so that by 1890 there were few people there.

To the west, a Sotho-speaking people, the Kololo, lead by Sebetuane, crossed the Zambezi with large herds of cattle in the same period as the Ngoni. An Nguni-speaking language group from present-day Kwazulu-Natal, they had settled in what is now the eastern part of the Orange Free State province of South Africa, a Sotho-speaking area. Known then as the Fokeng, the depredations of the Tlokwa sending them in 1823 on a trek through present-day Botswana, crossing the Zambezi near Kazungula, and moving onto the Batoka Plateau where they defeated the Tonga. Attacked by the Matabele under Mzilikazi, Sebetuane moved west into present-day Barotseland. On the death of Sebetuane in 1851, their fortunes declined and in 1864, brought low by malaria, Chief Sipopa of the Barotse

defeated them. The legacy of the Kololo is their language, Silozi (Sikololo).[xiv]

The Bantu invaders of the territory were predominantly hoe-agriculturists of a pre-industrial culture, with a few tribes such as the Tonga, Ila, Lozi and Ngoni being pastoralists, but also dependent on hunter-gathering and fishing in the well-watered territory. Canoes were dugouts, loin coverings bark cloth and antelope skin – with some spinning and weaving of kidney cloth - and they smelted hoe, spear and axe heads.[xv] The BSA Company recorded that when they established Mirongo and Ikawa in 1897 in present-day Northern Province, they found a thriving local industry: the Bemba making bark and cotton cloth; the Bisa cotton cloth - until overrun by the Angoni; the Senga producing good quality tobacco and spun cloth; the Awiwa smelting iron and making implements; and the Wanjamwezi and Swahili making mats and boxes. But by World War I, there were no industries, imports having destroyed all native manufacturing.[xvi]



Barring the Tonga, these invaders were noted for the rule of tyrants and extreme savagery; behaviour ameliorated later by contact with the British. From this time, reasonably well developed native African models of community self-government arose, particularly among the Barotse, the latter characterized by an elaborate central political authority from 1885 that has since self-rule come under some form of attack by successive Zambian governments. Although Bantu societies all have a rich set of kinships and clans, they vary considerably according to custom. The Tonga, when raided by the Matabele, had no chiefs and lived in small villages in groups related by maternal descent. There were then twelve matrilineal clans, some of them linked as 'joking partners', signifying a close and privileged relationship. The clan system was – and still is in rural areas – the *sine qua non* of Bantu life, as the early pioneer Stephenson observed:[xvii]

*But, of course, they would only help members of their clan or family, or surname – the last is, perhaps, the nearest equivalent according to our lights. In other words, these people would regard all Smiths in the world, all Browns, all Robinsons, as of the same descent: all Smiths are relations, all Browns are relations, but no Smith is any kind of relative to a Brown – certainly not! Natives of the same surname have, among themselves, particular rights and privileges: they will do for their “brothers” what they would do for themselves. But the strangers from another ‘surname’ is, as the scriptures say, “not with us,” and therefore “against us” – and is treated accordingly.*

## The three principles of Bantu life

Bantu clan and tribal life - showing a remarkable similarity over a wide area, was wrought in the fires of isolation and environmental hardship. Three principles have long governed their existence:[xviii]

*The idea of the intimate relation of the natural and supernatural worlds with the consequent interplay of religious and secular functions - the immanence of the supernatural; the conception of tribal and clan unity in both worlds, and the social and moral philosophy built on that foundation; the complicated and interlocking organization of economic reciprocity which regulates the*



*rights and duties of individuals in the various groups, often overlapping, some permanent, others temporary, to which they belong.*

What distinguishes the Bantu is their level of social organization known as the House, and the establishment of a big man. The House continuously competed for members with other Houses, comprising 10-40 people, i.e. an agricultural unit for coppicing, clearing, trapping and hunting. The House could become extremely large, depending on the fertility of the area:[xix]

*Membership included kinfolk of the big man, but also friends, clients, and various dependents as well. big man were usually polygamous and gave some of their wives as consorts to young clients to attract men to the House. The ideology of the House was based on the fiction that it was a family, that is, a bilateral group...The big man was the father of all the others and the term for his father was probably a term of address for the leader...there were no lineages, because the definition of lineage requires that the group's descent be 'unilineal', that is, counted through one gender only, consequently free men had a wide choice as to the establishment they cared to join. They could stay with their parents, move to their mother's brothers' House, or to the Houses of any of their grandparents. The village was an aggregate of Houses, led by the big man who founded it, assisted by the big men of the other Houses... the village defended a domain and defended it against outsiders... the village head also received a portion of the hunt. The village, therefore, was the very foundation of society.*

Therefore, the wealth of villagers is measured in the extent of social networks and not in the normal capitalist accretion model - 'rights-in-persons remain a respectable and rational way to invests and display wealth'.<sup>[xx]</sup> People in rural areas do not act as individuals seeking to advance their wealth beyond those with whom they live. Before colonization, in particular, Nature and man formed an inviolable relationship bound by religion. Elaborate rituals governed this relationship, something carried out – in addition to the 'living ancestors' - by appointed guardians having authority over particular waters where fish were plentiful, or by guilds who protected and held the rights to hunt elephant and certain other game species.

The Tonga organized themselves around a *sikatongo* (earth priest), and *basangu* (spirit mediums), existing as an ecological state rather than as a political entity. Using the *lwiindi* (rain-calling ritual), a *sikatongo* attracted followers, acting as the guardian of the land against raiding tribes and colonists. As described by Koma:<sup>[xxi]</sup>

*Leza' (God), is the Supreme Vital Force and the source of life who is concerned with community welfare. Of considerable importance are the malende sacred shrines, particular places at which the basangu make appeals during times of stress. In common with most Africans, certain animals are considered ancestral avenues through which ancestors visit their former communities and are often recognized by their descendants. If there is anything that the lwiindi illustrates, it is the belief that ancestors are resident with us on Earth and depend on the produce of Earth for their continual existence. To destroy Earth is*

*to destroy our life force. For an African, therefore, there is no after-life without Earth.*

With colonization, particularly under British Indirect Rule, the customary commons were fully demarcated, in some cases under new tribal creations with appointed chiefs and headmen who had previously not held such positions.[xxii] Gordon presciently remarked that "This led to the marginalization of an ecological ideology that had integrated discourses about society with those about nature. The new bureaucracy separated people and nature; nature becoming an object acted on by people, rather than an integral part of societal forces'."[xxiii]

While aboriginal people were hunter-gatherers having no impact on natural resources, the successive waves of Bantu invaders in some areas introduced mass game hunting techniques and twenty-one systems of land usage into the territory, the latter mostly of the type developed in dry to moist forest.[xxiv] Five staple crops were grown out of more than 100 varieties, of which four were cereals (maize, sorghum, millet and bulrush millet) and one root crop (cassava). Except for some examples of more permanent agriculture based on livestock, these were traditional systems. What these systems had in common is that they were adaptations and survival strategies of small groups of people, of low population density, to soils that were highly leached and acidic, in a region governed by an extended annual dry season of seven months. Notable were some shifting cultivation strategies of the chitemene type where trees are lopped, whole or in part, and then burnt, the crop seeds planted in the soil and ash for one or two seasons.

With the coming of the BSA Company in 1989, notions of forest conservation and the management of land were

introduced that had developed as a result of the long-settled history of people in the British Isles and written into the King's Law of Magna Carta in 1215. This affected traditional conservation systems, in particular, the fishing and hunting guilds, made considerably worse when the BSA Company introduced the alien concepts of leasehold and freehold land. After political independence, all land was vested in the President of Zambia, powers copied from the British Crown since 1066, still – only in theory – owning all Crown land in the four nations and in Canada, New Zealand and Australia.

For the people of the Great Central African plateau who required extensive areas of miombo woodland in which to carry out *chitemene* (pollarding), any population increase and a more sedentary existence had negative effects both on the environment and the people. Reports of the extremely wasteful deforestation that took place among the Bemba after their slaving had been brought under control points to this change, their young men taking great pride in cutting down trees, the area far exceeding that which was planted, particularly in the southern *chitemene* system where some twenty times the amount of land required annually for crops was swiddened.[xxv]

The agricultural methods of the Bantu invaders were highly developed adaptations to the environment. But the sudden imposition of the plough and other more modern methods caused difficulties, for the culture of people with long-honed survival strategies do not easily absorb sudden change. Moreover, where the movement of Bantu was restricted due to the imposition of native reserves, by concessions taken by chartered companies, and by European settlers – as occurred in present-day Eastern Province and along the railway – some ecological degeneration took place. And the imposition of mines drew men away from

their families and lead to village labour shortages and other adverse effects on the fabric of customary society.[xxvi]

## British South Africa Chartered Company


The acquisition of much of the territory by Cecil Rhodes's BSA Company under a royal charter in 1889 had taken place in the late Victorian era, a time of formal manners and a unifying Christian set of moral standards.[xxvii] This manifested itself in a non-relativist attitude when dealing with the African. The BSA Company had essentially gained land rights for what was known as North-West Rhodesia - except for Barotseland, where its rights were restricted to mining – though this restriction was later eased. It could, therefore, bring in European settlers and insist that Africans move that were living on land suitable for settlement. To compensate for this, the Northern Rhodesia Order in Council of 1911 declared that the Bantu would be assured sufficient land and water sources for their needs. In 1923 the Passfield Memorandum described the situation in more unambivalent terms, 'that the interests of the African natives must be paramount, and that if, and when, those interests and the interests of the immigrant races conflict, the former should prevail'. This led to the establishment of Native Reserves in 1928-1929.[xxviii] The Company, until 1924, never declared a dividend, and it was only later in protectorate days that huge royalties were produced.

By the mid-thirties, the land was divided into three categories: 42.5m ha of native reserve – 28.7m ha being Barotseland and

13.7m ha elsewhere, and the land alienated to two European companies totalling 2.2m ha, leaving another 1.2m ha of commercial farms. The balance of 42.5m ha was taken up by 4.5m ha of protected areas, with 38m ha being unallocated. The Pim Commission recommended these be converted into native trust land; this subsequently legislated for in 1947. Before attaining self-government, the territory comprised the following: Crown land (5.6 %) held by Europeans; native reserve (18.9 %); Barotseland (16 %); and native trust land (59.5 %). According to an Order in Council, the Governor of Northern Rhodesia administered native trust land for the sole benefit of Africans. Europeans could only have access to these areas if they were part of a township development or public utility.

## Chieftdoms as they were in the 1930s

### Native Reserves and Tribal Areas





Land divisions 1947+

The agricultural policy of Northern Rhodesia ensured that European farmers and the 'improved' Indigenous farmer, i.e. the demonstrably commercial farmer along the line of rail, had preferential treatment. But in so far as the production of the staple diet maize was concerned, this had no great effect on Africans due to expanding internal markets and changes in the control scheme. The Department of Agriculture, backed as it was by two fine research institutions - the Central Agricultural Research Station at Mount Makulu and the Veterinary Research Centre at Mazabuka, ensuring a full range of technical support. Also, two outstanding ecologists, C.G. Trapnell and W. Hall, fully revealed the ecology of African conservation agriculture, and the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute provided the socio-anthropological knowledge and understanding necessary.

The adoption in the territory of what was called Indirect



Rule – following on from its implementation in Nigeria and Tanganyika, established the customary commons under native authorities.[xxix] In 1929, the passing of the Native Authority Ordinance (repealed by the NA Ordinance No. 9 of 1936) and Native Courts Ordinance – followed by the establishment of native treasuries in 1936, saw Indirect Rule imposed everywhere except Barotseland. To form native authorities, this required that the Provincial Administration create additional ‘tribes’ (such as the Soli and the Chikunda), as well as appoint new chiefs by statutory appointment. Taking into account the jurisdiction of these authorities, the country was split into provinces and then into districts and staffed by District Commissioners (DCs), District Officers (DOs) and District Messengers (*kapasus*), headed by a Provincial Commissioner (PC) within the Provincial Administration (PA). Income for the Native Authority came from government grants, licences and other fees. District officials - following a set of development plans - therefore held meetings with the chiefs, the local officers responsible for agriculture and health, and with prominent local people. The operations of the Native Authority was therefore highly collaborative, with the officials visiting all the villages a few times a year to assess development and to advise on a host of issues. In 1965, the Local Government Act No. 69 finally replaced the Native Authority Ordinance.

F.H. Melland, who had served as a BSA Company magistrate, native collector and Native Commissioner from 1901-1924, wrote strongly from his experience of direct rule that the dual mandate system of Indirect Rule - whereby the administration of the country was carried out by the chiefs, required to be reformed so that Africans ‘could produce an autochthonous civilization that would provide a notable contribution to world

civilization'.[xxx] He was sternly critical of what had been done: '...it is necessary to repeat that the establishment of Indirect Rule was every whit as autocratic as our original assumption of direct rule. It is we who have decreed how the Africans shall be governed, just as we have decided what laws he shall obey, to what parts of his religion and customs he may adhere, what he shall or shall not learn'.[xxxi]



*Frank Melland*

As he pointed out, one of the principal criticisms of Indirect Rule was that it would not contain those educated Africans wishing to break free from what they now regarded as a primitive past. This immediately raised the revolutionary spectre of dual development: on the one hand, a materialist and self-centred one based on European consumerism and thought, the other, that of rule by the traditional authority where the

emphasis was on a culture of the clan rather than the individual. But Melland and Young suggested a third possibility, 'the rule of the aristocracy (in its original sense) which can be built on to the old tribal council, and yet admit into such councils plebeian educated natives who have demonstrated their worth'.[xxxii] In essence, this is what was eventually introduced in part in 1962 by the promulgation of the Natural Resources Act (the Native Authorities Act repealed in 1965), though ignored by the Kaunda autocracy and finally removed from the statute book in 1990.

Melland and Cullen declared that implicit in British Indirect Rule, be it as a Crown colony or protectorate, was the question of Christianity, which disregarded native religion and belief and required villagers to become Europeans in thought and deed, questioning the fact that while missionary effort was zealous in seeking to convert them, most of the Europeans farming, mining, administering or trading with them at the time were clearly not practicing Christians. But also, what was not realized, tragically, as Koma explains:[xxxiii]

*Africans will adequately relate to Jesus who assures them of abundant life within their life worlds. That most Africans depend on the land for their daily needs invites an ecological face of Jesus in Africa today. Among the Tonga of (Chief) Simamba, for example, Jesus should become the sikatongo, the charismatic rain caller, who intercedes with Leza (God) and the basangu spirit on behalf of God's people.*

Chiefs were not consulted on Indirect Rule. In the BSA

Company period from 1889 to 1924, they had become used to direct rule, had appreciated the impartiality of the British. But as Melland and Young observed, ‘They did not regain the right to rule in accordance with custom, but were forced to rule on lines laid down by their European overlords, to administer to justice and to punish on those lines’. But there were those like Sir Stewart Gore-Brown, who, seeing the damage wrought, called in his impressive maiden speech to the Legislative Council of Northern Rhodesia in November 1935 for the creation of a partnership with the African, a relationship of equals rather than an imposed will and imposed rule.[xxxiv]

The assumption of power by people with an advanced civilization in new territory caused some hardship and confusion. Early in the 1900s, the killing of big game was prohibited, though in 1905, the BSA Company reluctantly allowed duiker antelope to be hunted – considered by most to be small game. In 1907, at the end of the growing season, shifting chitemene agriculture and *mitanda* (seasonal dwellings built in the rains amidst the crops) were banned in some areas, as were the use of game pits.[xxxv]

This may have caused some hardship, although, given the few company officials, it is highly unlikely that it was enforced to any great degree. Also, all villages of less than twenty huts were instructed to amalgamate – *mitanda* now banned, and the new villages encouraged to move onto good soils. In the first year, harvests were good, and there were few breaches of the new chitemene regulations – doubtless the *ichima* communal workgroups comprising women hoeing or men cutting trees still functioned. However, in the Mpika district, a famine occurred due to a locust plague, the grass salt industry ceased production due to food shortages, and smallpox took a heavy

toll.

One benefit of the Provincial Administration was the fixing of all boundaries between the various chiefs, once a source of constant tension and squabbles. In 1908 three chiefs of the Mpika district travelled to Fort Jameson to complain to the administrator of the BSA Company concerning the abolition of chitemene. Three years later, after the chiefs' complaints could no longer be ignored, the ban was lifted. These early years after the great joy of the successes against the slave trade - even though they masked the foreign invasion intent of resource extraction - were difficult times for the villagers, chitemene requiring movement and the continual opening of new lands for cultivation.

One issue the PA had soon to come to grips with was witchcraft and sorcery.

## Witchcraft, serfdom and slavery

A witchdoctor (*ng'anga*) is a medium that protects Africans against sorcerers (*muloshi*). The latter cast a pall of terror over much of Africa, requiring individuals be they chiefs, politicians or ordinary people - to seek the protection of a witchdoctor against a sorcerer's malign powers. In 1956-1958 in Barotseland, 1212 people were prosecuted for sorcery, and nine sentenced to death and executed. These sorcerers had made use of *kaliloze* witch-guns (short-barreled muzzleloaders, the barrel made of a human tibia), killing people and often consuming their flesh. Since the wars of liberation, the *kaliloze*

is often the AK47 assault rifle, known as the *karavina*.<sup>[xxxvi]</sup>

Europeans believe that witchdoctors are the malign influence, confusing their role with that of the evil craft of sorcery. It is likely that the Witchcraft Suppression Ordinance of Northern Rhodesia, which stated that any person practising as a witchdoctor would be guilty of an offence, is much to blame for the confusion.<sup>[xxxvii]</sup> As it is unlikely that any Africans existed in those times who felt that they could not be bewitched, this ordinance - based on considerable ignorance and misunderstanding, would have had the effect of driving witchdoctors underground, making them subversive and secretive, an unhealthy development in the psyche of a people already under the yoke of a foreign culture and religion.

A witch or sorcerer in African society ceases to be a person and can, therefore, be killed without affecting society. Obviously, this belief is not accommodated by Western mores and customs. Bantu customary law is, like English common law, unwritten, evolving due to the pressures and adaptations of people to their environmental and cultural circumstances. African justice at its heart is based on offences against fellow clan members or members of closely related clans. The primary concern of any clan is to survive and multiply. Therefore discord and transgressions must be acted on and clan equilibrium re-instated. This notion is not possible under Western statutory law, where one of its main punishment options is imprisonment. Customary law became a compendium of tribal laws and customs enforceable in the native court that was established early in BSA Company times. Under customary tenure, for instance, there was no such thing as freehold or leasehold land, only usufruct (use of the land, not ownership), land disputes being settled by the headmen or chiefs. In Northern Rhodesia,

the English court could review a decision of the native court or hear an appeal from a native court. Customary law, which came into force in a dispute between a native and a foreigner, was generally enforceable.[xxxviii]

Endemic African serfdom was commercialized between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, first by the Portuguese who shipped slaves – known as the Atlantic Trade - to the 'New World' plantations. In 1807 Britain banned the trade, though perversely in her West Indian possessions, only in 1833.[xxxix] In the nineteenth century, the Indian Ocean trade was a place of horrendous plunder by Muslim Arabs and Africans. In the north, east and west of the territory, they operated from the East African Coast, collecting slaves from the Bemba, Lunda, Bisa, Yao and Chikunda, and taking them to Zanzibar, Pemba, Kilwa, and from there shipping them to Turkey, Persia and Arabia, the three East African Arab settlements being established in the tenth century.

In the last decade of the nineteenth century, the Matabele raids on the Batoka plateau laid waste the land; one such raid on a Tonga village in 1883, which yielded but a few young girls, resulted in the torture and slaughter of everyone.[xl]

In Barotseland, domestic serfdom and slavery were a feature of life. The Lozi raided the Ila and Tonga country and into present-day Angola. Slaves were also obtained from vassal tribes as tribute. From 1898 slavery was brought under control, aided by the Hut Tax's imposition in 1903 that discouraged citizen serfdom.[xli]

The tax had to be paid to the Provincial Administration by all able-bodied men, placing a burden on the Lozi, who considered labour demeaning.[xlii] To compensate Paramount Chief Lewanika of Barotseland for the loss of income from

slavery, the PA agreed in 1905 to pay 10% of all hut tax received to a Commission, with Lewanika receiving £1,200 annually.

Lewanika's proclamation of 1906 banning serfdom freed some 30,000 serfs on condition they paid £2 each in compensation to their owners. However, it took World War I to bring it to an end. In the rest of North-Western Rhodesia, the export trade continued, with the Mambari traders from Angola the most prominent - there being a lively trade in guns, cloth for slaves, ivory, and rubber until the latter was banned in 1905. This continued into the 1950s, Darling finding deserted villages after raiders had passed through from Angola.[xliv]

In the northeast of the territory, the slave trade had a firm grip on the area lying between the Luapula and Lake Nyasa and beyond it into the Katanga. In 1873 the Sultan of Zanzibar had banned the slave trade, but this made little difference. Since their invasion of the Mweru district in 1865 and their attacks on the Watawa people, the slavers had controlled the area. In 1883 the Afro-Arab slavers, Abdullah-bin-Suliman (who had helped Livingstone) and Tipu Tib, invaded the country in earnest, setting up a series of armed encampments (*tembes*). When the BSA Company's emissary, Alfred Sharpe, returned to Chief Nsama two years after a previous visit in 1890, he found that the slavers and their Bemba allies had murdered the chief the villagers enslaved. Sharpe later questioned any action in a region where financial returns would be difficult to achieve, suggesting it be left to the slavers and their harsh ways. However, he did conclude that as there were funds available to administer the area, they had a duty to do so.[xlv] But rather in contradiction, he closed the report with the following observations:



*Throughout the countries traversed on my journey, elephants were very scarce, but still, the supply of old ivory seems to be fairly plentiful. There are however many natural products which only await European energy and a firm administration to develop. Rubber especially is found everywhere throughout Nyasaland and the countries bordering the Tanganyika and Mwero. Wax is found in large quantities in the Mwero countries. Hitherto war, the African bugbear, has prevented any development in these regions.*

The area east of the territory was also in a completely undeveloped and barbaric state, the future Malawi ushered out of darkness by two remarkable Scots brothers, Fred and John Moir, who established the African Lakes Corporation, a trading, development and Christian support force which was to transform the region.[xlvi]

After a few years of trading ivory, in 1879, they began constructing the Stevenson Road from Karonga on Lake Nyasa to Kituta near the southern end of Lake Tanganyika, a wagon track intended to cut one of the main slave routes used by the slavers operating from the coast. Fred Moir describes being passed at his camp on the lakeshore by a slave caravan, 'We computed that the slaves in the caravan numbered three or four thousand', being marched to the coast by the slaver, Kabunda, leaving a trail of young children and the infirm and the weak behind, soon pounced on by hyena and human scavengers. The Moirs undertook the Karonga War, a two-year campaign against the slavers, at one time employing Frederick Lugard - later Lord Lugard of Dual Mandate fame - to head the action. A stalemate being reached by the corporation, in

1889, the Mozambique Consul H.H. Johnston sued for peace with the Afro-Arab Mlozi, 'the north-end natives allowed to return to their homes in peace, and they were not to be molested afterwards by the Arabs'. Fred and John Moir, Lugard, Alfred Sharpe, Crawshay and Consul Johnston, and L. Monteith Fotheringham – the latter who daily laid siege to the stockaded villages of the slavers, brought about the end of slavery. In 1895 Mlozi revolted and was attacked by a British military force, captured and executed.

Moir then negotiated with the chiefs to agree that Britain declares the territory the Protectorate of Nyasaland. Later, in return for important concessions, Cecil Rhodes, through his bankers, Rothschild, gave financial undertakings to the Imperial Government, allowing them in 1891 to establish the Nyasaland Protectorate:[xlvi]

*Most of the huge flows of money from Britain's vast stock of overseas investment flowed to a tiny elite of, at the most, a few hundred thousand people. At the apex of this elite was indeed the Rothschild Bank, whose combined capital in London, Paris and Vienna amounted to a staggering 41 million, making it by far the biggest financial institution in the world.*


The BSA Company then took over and assigned temporary responsibility for its territories north of the Zambezi to the commissioner of the protectorate. After 1895, the BSA Company began directly to administer the territory, dividing it in two in 1899 and naming the divisions North-Eastern Rhodesia and North-Western Rhodesia.

The death toll from slave raiding was enormous. It was estimated that one caravan of fifty-five captured women had involved the destruction of at least ten villages, each having a population of between one and two hundred people. The Plymouth Brethren missionary, F.S. Arnot, reported seeing forty men killed to abduct the same number of women and children.[xlvi] The slave trade was in part a domino effect and compensation for the lack of ivory, which in turn made villagers welcome the coming of the European as their protector. However, this was not the case with the Ngoni and the Bemba, firm action being required to bring them to heel.

With the defeat of Chief Mpeseni of the Ngoni in 1898, the slave trade ended in the east of the territory, though the Ngoni were still to send out many impis in search of tribal recruits until shortly before World War I, one impi entering the area around the present day Kasanka National Park.[xlvii] See chapter IV: [The Story of Rashid Bin Hassani of the Bisa tribe](#), Northern Rhodesia, in Margery Perham's 'Ten Africans'. pp. 81-118.

In the northeast of the territory, the Moir's African Lakes Corporation, set up at Abercorn in 1892, established trading stores to supply the officials and their troops. In 1895 the first expedition of the BSA Company's newly appointed head of the region, Major Forbes, began to attack the Muslim caravans and aggressively place administrative outposts with native collectors in command. From 1896 native collectors began a serious campaign against the slavers, one caravan intercepted, leaving Bemba country having 57 women and children and 1,500 pounds of ivory and rhino horn. Another caravan yielded 35 slaves and 1,000 pounds of ivory. The BSA Company focused on bringing the powerful Bemba chiefs, Mwamba and Mporokoso - the main agents of the trade in those parts -

to heel, putting the slavers out of business. The Company then took over the vacated land. A notable presence in the northeast was Native Commissioner 'Bobo' Young, responsible for putting down the slave trade in Bemba country and opening an early BSA Company station at Mirongo, in what is now Chinsali District. At the time, the local Bemba chief, Nkula, created two elephant sanctuaries in his country. The one near Chinsali on the Bwela Flats I re-stocked with 120 black lechwe in 1974-75.



*Ndake Elephant Reserve*

On 20 July 1914, Bobo Young wrote to Lt. Col. Stewart Gore-Brown describing his campaign against Ponde. His great friend was the elephant hunter, J.B. Yule, who had settled on a farm in the Chinsali area. Nearly 70-years old, in July 1914, Yule went hunting elephant in Kumwendo's country on the edge of what is now the South Luangwa National Park and was tusked by an elephant.



*J.B. Yule*

While lying there, mortally wounded, he wrote a note to his great friend, Bobo Young: 'Dear Bobo, I have got caught at last; going home this time. Tata. J.B. Yule'.[liv]



Young was extremely well-liked by the villagers, seeing out his time at Chinsali, returning to England in 1916, thence to Nyasaland for a few years as a labour recruiter – having earned a considerable reputation for his recruitment of carriers for World War I. While on leave from Chinsali, he had married an

artist performing with Harry Lauder and had taken her back to the wilds where she made a great impression on all who met her. [Young died in England](#) in the early 1920s while watching cricket.[lv]



There now was imposed upon villagers a steady stream of BSA Company officials and miners and European settlers - along the line of rail and on the Nyasaland border, direct rule now being imposed. With the slavers and their comprador chiefs defeated, dispossession was complete; and as in Asante on the Gold Coast, anywhere that wealth could be extracted by commercial means fell within the scope of European companies, mostly British.[lvi]

It has been suggested that the Bemba were forced by the poor land that they inhabited and the presence of tsetse-fly to raid other tribes for cattle and grain.[lvii] This may have been a contributory factor, but some tribes who practised chitemene in the leached soils of the Great Central African plateau did not pillage other tribes for slaves, grain and whatever else could

be plundered. The Bemba, like the Ngoni, sought to retain their ascendancy by obtaining recruits, many of which they sold; their methods were brutal – many villagers mutilated, their lips, noses and ears cut off. The general animosity of both these tribes towards the European may have been brought on by the fact that they foresaw that Christians would not long tolerate the slave trade and that the missionaries would not supply them with guns and gunpowder. With the defeat in 1895 of the Muslim Bantu under Mlozi - near Karonga, the power of the Muslim slave trade was broken.

## European arrivals

The first European to enter the northwest of the territory in 1849 was the Portuguese explorer extraordinaire Silva Porto. He spent the next sixty years travelling and trading for rubber, ivory and supplying slaves for the Atlantic trade. In 1884 he helped the missionary Arnot on his journey away from Lewanika. Arnot had been refused permission by Lewanika to travel to the tribes further up the Zambezi, stating that the people he intended visiting were the 'dogs of the Barotse', and missionaries would not be allowed to visit them. Arnot then walked to the Garanganze (Katanga) - whom 'God had told him to serve', being accepted by Mushidi, the tyrannical warlord of that region. There he persevered, treated with considerable disdain by Mushidi, living in abject conditions and making no converts.[lviii] Two of his early recruits, Dan Crawford and Dr Walter Fisher, who moved on to Lake Mweru and then the

Mwinilunga area respectively, left a more lasting impression, though, in a secular guise, the Fisher descendants are still active in the territory over a century later.

The trader, George Westbeeck, who had arrived in 1871 at Pandamatenga on the Zambezi, later became a highly trusted trader with strong links to Lewanika, obtaining permission for Arnot to carry out his missionary work. In 1882 Francois Coillard of the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society arrived from the Hlotse River area of Lesutu (then named Basutoland, now Lesotho), near its confluence with the Caledon - doubtless encouraged by the fact that the Kololo had previously introduced the Sotho language. Later he was invited by Lewanika to establish a mission station. However, the first attempt to travel to the north by the Basutoland mission was carried out by Arnot's colleague, Hermann Dieterlen, a friend of my great-grandfather, Hugh William Gordon, who farmed across the Caledon from the mission in the Orange River Colony.

The death of David Livingstone in 1873 near the Lulimala River in south-east Bangweulu evoked great sadness among those who followed his exploits; but the tale which then unfolded of the transport of his mummified remains by Susi and Chuma to the East African coast – the first stage of transport undertaken by Livingstone's donkey, soon to be eaten by lion near Mukuku on the Luapula River (the site of a game camp I had built 100 years later) - truly struck an emotional chord, lending impetus to missionary incursions, and inevitably, to commerce and European colonization.[lix]

The first missionaries to arrive in the north of the territory were from Livingstone's London Missionary Society. In 1891 the Catholic White Fathers arrived, in 1895 building Kayambi Mission in the Bemba country. In 1899 they opened Chilonga



Mission near Mpika, and in 1903, Chirui in Bangweulu. In 1904 they started work at Kamwiri in the Luangwa Valley. Their missionary work was closely bound up with the BSA Company.[lx] However, the pioneer missionaries in the eastern part of the territory was the Dutch Reformed Church of South Africa, which established a mission at Magwero in 1899 and at Madzimoyo in 1903.

In the same area near the Nyasaland Protectorate, two men, Harrison Clarke and Carl Wiese, worked without major financial institutions' backing and signed treaties and obtained concessions from chiefs and headmen.



Later known as the 'King of Northern Rhodesia', Harrison Clark was active from 1887 to the turn of the century, controlling much of the area north of the Zambezi to the mid-Luangwa and west to the Hook of the Kafue.[lxi] He maintained his

army of Nsenga tribesmen, keeping the Chikunda and Ngoni at bay. He was later made chief of the Ila.[lxii] Clarke built his headquarters in 1895 at the confluence of the Lunsemfwa and Lukusashi rivers (across the river from my 2005 safari-hunting camp), calling it Algoa after the Portuguese name for the South African town of Port Elizabeth. As famous a name as Livingstone, or as well known as Fort Jameson at that time, it was listed in The Times Atlas of 1922. Clark made numbers of treaties with chiefs that were as comprehensive as any signed by Rhodes's emissaries. They included mineral rights, establishing farms, collecting corn as tax, dealing with Muslim Afro-Arab ivory caravans as he saw fit, suppressing slavery, constructing railways, tramways, telegraphs and the building of towns and villages.[lxiii] One of the chiefdoms he signed up, Chief Mburuma of the Nsenga, is still in existence in the lower Luangwa Valley today, having in the years 1887 to 1890 fought a guerrilla war against the Portuguese and laid siege to Zumbo.

Another pathfinder who had a considerable impact was Carl Wiese, who established himself at the same time as Clark, but in Chief Mpeseni's country to the west of Clark's concessions, though he makes no mention of Clark in his book, *Expedicao Portuguesa a M'Pensene*. [lxiv] Wiese had first journeyed there in 1885 to buy ivory. In 1890 he began to acquire concessions. In May 1891, he met up with H.H. Johnston, who had arrived to take up the positions of Consul-General of the British Central African Protectorate and Administrator of the BSA Company. Johnston was dismayed to find that Wiese had already signed up many of the chiefs and headmen. In 1892 Wiese's concessions in the British sphere were placed in the Central African and Zoutpansberg Exploration Company (CAZEC), for which he

received shares.

The BSA Company wished to extend its domain to Lake Tanganyika and would not tolerate individuals signing treaties with chiefs. To resolve the dilemma, they gave Harrison Clark (*Changa Changa*) financial compensation for his concessions. Wiese agreed in 1895 to the re-organization of CAZEC - the company in which he had a major shareholding - as the North Charterland Exploration Company.[lxv] This new company was then recognized as the concession's legal owner, a 10,000 sq. mile area lying along the Mozambique border, including the land between the Luangwa River and Fort Jameson (Chipata). This included Mpeseni's country and the land of Luembe, Mwape and a few other chiefs. Here they received ordinary mineral rights and the land but no monopoly of trade. The rights of the natives were to be protected but not defined. In 1896 Wiese joined the NCE Company expedition to Mpeseni's Ngoni - in essence, an aggressive search for financial returns - later calling for British help in his reports that there was a threatened rising against the NCE Company. This was an unfortunate development as it led to the Ngoni war and settler incursions, and land alienations.[lxvi]

The BSA Company, which had fought Wiese's claims through Sir Harry Johnson, had artfully manipulated the process to deliver up the mining rights that Mpeseni had long refused to sign over to both the British and Portuguese, but which he had given to the man he trusted, Wiese. When these concessions suddenly appeared in the BSA Company's unwelcome form, it must have come as a great shock.

By 1897 Mpeseni was unwell and had lost control of the warring and raiding factions among his people. The Indunas (headmen), lead by his son, did as they pleased, taking slaves

and killing many people in their raids. The Ngoni wished to get rid of the European. Rumours abounded, worsening an already tense situation. One such rumour was that the Ngoni had killed two NCE Company officials. At that point, any reason would have been sufficient to advance upon them, for the Ngoni were viewed by the successive administrators of the Company - Johnston, Sharpe and Colonel William Manning - as standing in the way of the advancement of the Company's interest.[lxvii] When the NCE Company thoughtlessly established their Fort Young headquarters at Loangweni - six miles from Mpeseni's kraal (the Afrikaans word for a chief's village), the Ngoni bridled, smarting at the loss of land and the sudden influx of Europeans. An armed conflict was thus inevitable.[lxviii]

On 19 January 1898, the Ngoni were defeated in a brief battle by troops sent by Colonel Manning from Nyasaland (Wiese left the employ of the NCE Company at this time). Thousands of head of their cattle were confiscated, capping a series of shameful acts by the BSA Company, yet nothing like the Ngoni had done to the tribes they found on their arrival in the territory in 1835, for 63 years reducing the villagers over a wide area to a pitiful state. The Ngoni defeat was to change their way of life. Now they had to concentrate on cultivation and nurture their diminished herds. But many went to work in the mines. On 17 July 1902, the NCE Company manager wrote to the Administrator of North-East Rhodesia, confirming that the BSA Company had taken over the NCE Company.

In North-Eastern Rhodesia, development was slow, with only 129 Europeans living there in the year it was declared (1899), some of them itinerant hunters and traders. The Administrator Robert Codrington announced that the African living in that region was now free as he now paid no taxes and could,

therefore, move wheresoever they wished. In 1900 a High Court was created in Fort Jameson, and a district administrative system implemented. In a few years, Indian – mainly Hindu – traders ‘invaded’, soon to play an important part in opening trading stores in far-flung places.

## World War I

World War I saw the massive recruitment of village men as porters (*tenga tenga*) and as freelance scouts (*ruga ruga*). When the campaign intensified in southern Tanganyika against Von Lettow Vorbeck’s well-led German forces, the need for food was overwhelming. The presence of tsetse fly, which carried the cattle disease nagana and human sleeping sickness, made the use of animal transport impossible, and the Great North Road and the branch to Kasama could not yet take much-motorized transport (Model T Fords), and not at all in the annual rainy season.



The Luapula River route's development solved the supply problem with stores brought from the railhead at Ndola and across the Congo Pedicle to Kaunda on the Luapula. Here as many as 2,000 canoes organized by J.E. Hughes transported goods and tons of black lechwe meat and most of the puku - collected from native hunters working under David Ross (d.1934) and Mickey Norton (d.1949 Mwanza) - through the Bangweulu swamps and up the Chambeshi to the Lukulu River in Bemba country, thence up to within about twenty-five miles of Kasama. Hughes, a former BSA Company Native Collector (d.1935 Port Elizabeth),[lxix] author of the classic *Eighteen Years on Lake Bangweulu*, had left the Company to live in the vast wetland, guiding hunting-safaris and buying otter skins.[lxx] Years later, my wife Cathlin and I had the privilege of living in that glorious patch of God's Country.[lxxi]

The war caused a massive shortage of food, with many villagers resorting to the most basic food gathering. Such pri-

vation was understandable, knowing that 40,000 able-bodied men were away from their villages. In addition to these, many thousands were contracted to traders to carry their goods to all ends of the territory. Mortality among them was high. Where the Mpika to Kasempa road crosses the Chambeshi River, there is a World War I memorial commemorating the place where the German forces in East Africa surrendered on 25 November 1918, a plaque on the memorial recording the death of *tenga tenga*:

*To the memory of 1467 men of Northern Rhodesia who served in the British army as carriers in the Great War and were killed in action or died of wounds or sickness and in especial remembrance of 433 who fell in Northern Rhodesia.*



After the German surrender, the carriers returned to their villages in an emaciated state due to a lack of food, dysentery and typhoid. Of the 1,485 carriers sent from the Petauke sub-district, sixty-three deaths were reported. The Allied effort,

particularly in East Africa, was delivered with the help of the villagers but at great cost.[lxxii]

At the time that the Company was granted a royal charter in 1889, shortly after the creation of the Central African Protectorate in present-day Malawi, there were some 340,000 Africans in the territory.[lxxiii] The arrival of the European bearing documents that resulted in land given over under English contract law showed a lack of understanding of native African land tenure and was therefore completely amoral. On the other hand, some chiefs and headmen would do anything for trade goods and firearms – as evidenced by the slave trade, there being very little effort to safeguard the land of their kinsmen, the cultural system of clan support and equilibrium suddenly found wanting. But some chiefs firmly resisted their lands being taken over by settlers after World War I, as with the Tonga of the Batoka Plateau, particularly those clans under Chief Mwanachingwala.[lxxiv]

## Land alienations

The first recorded alienation of land to a European was by the Bisa mid-Luangwa chief, Mwase, who sold land for an ivory trading post to the Governor of Sena, Colonel Barbosa. This post was called Marambo - abandoned after two years. Under Company rule, the alienation of land under customary land tenure to European farmers after 1898 and the emergence of native reserves greatly affected African settlement and landuse along the line of rail and around Fort Jameson (Chipata). But



the BSA Company had the rights to sell land – in Barotseland with restrictions.

In North-Western Rhodesia - which included Barotseland, Administrator Robert Coryndon, with the permission of the Paramount Chief (the *Litunga*) in 1900 - and only in certain areas, gave out land on an ad hoc basis: the first in 1903 to [H.F. \(Hughie\) Walker](#) and his two sons, given 8,000 acres in the Kalomo district.[lxxv] By the late 1920s, about one-tenth of the Batoka plateau had been alienated to European settlement, a highly fertile tenth. As Melland and Young recorded in 1927: 'These natives are complaining that restrictions on the sale of their crops to Europeans, legislation for enforcing their continuance of big villages, and the like, are thwarting their natural aspirations and tending towards stagnation and repression'.[lxxvi]

In 1904 the East Luangwa Land Commission considered the impacts on Africans, the Mpeseni Native Reserve near Fort Jameson being demarcated and defined, and southwest of the Boma (district administrative headquarters) reserved for the sole use of Africans. In 1924 a Native Reserve Commission was appointed to investigate matters, and in 1928 nine reserves were set aside in perpetuity for the sole use of Africans by the Northern Rhodesian Crown Lands and Native Reserve Order in Council. This order reduced by a third the 10,000 sq. mile NCE Company estate, to which the Company objected in the courts. But the House of Lords ruled against the Company. The Provincial Administration and the Company then began moving Africans into the recovered area. By 1931 only a thousand or so people remained outside the reserve; large parts of the Petauke district became deserted, wildlife increased, and the tsetse fly. The impact of this re-distribution of people lead

ten years later to overcrowding and some land degradation, and inevitably to attempts once more to resettle people. In 1928 the tobacco industry around Fort Jameson was all but destroyed by the tobacco blight, the United Tobacco Company closing down.[lxxvii] In 1966, I accompanied Neil Johnson, a representative of the firm owning the last tobacco factory - for years out of use, its equipment still intact, to close it for good.

In North-Western Rhodesia, shortly before it joined with North-Eastern Rhodesia to become Northern Rhodesia in 1911, the Administrator, realizing that the Company could only be developed in a Western sense with an influx of European settlers, urged that grants of land be made, but on the condition that the interests of the African were protected. [lxxviii] He was encouraged by the Fort Jameson scheme where farmers could obtain land for three to five years, provided they took occupation, with the option of purchase after a certain period. In 1908 there were 68 farms in North-Western Rhodesia, but only 30 of them were genuine farmers growing maize, potatoes and finger millet.

After amalgamation, with about 1,000 settlers in the territory, they naturally began to voice their opinions and wished to have a say in the administration of the territory. Some favoured joining up with the new Union of South Africa, whose policies the government found abhorrent. This was to drive the process forward to self-government until the administration of the territory was handed over to the Colonial Office in 1924. Wallace was the first administrator and was paid by the BSA Company, his appointment approved by the Imperial British Government Secretary of State.

European farmers, alarmed at the prevalence of cattle disease and the lack of controls, called for firmer action. In 1918 an

advisory council drawn from the settlers was elected. It was vociferous on the issues of labour being diverted to Southern Rhodesia and of the way land was administered.

By 1921 there were 3,634 Europeans, 983,539 Bantu and an unknown number of Bushmen and Twa Pygmy in the country.[lxxix] In the place of the slave-trader had come the Blackbirder, recruiters of labour for the mines of the Witwatersrand, Southern Rhodesia, the Copperbelt and the Congo, village men recruited from the early 1900s. Recruitment for the mines in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia was only made possible by the imposition of a hut tax in 1901 in North-Eastern Rhodesia and in 1904 in North-Western Rhodesia, the territory as a whole being seen as an essential source of labour for the developing south.

In North-Western Rhodesia, many Tonga villagers refused to pay the hut tax because they had no money. A BSA Company official, Colin Harding, went to one troublesome area with eighty policemen and burned 970 huts.[lxxx] Deserving of great punishment, Harding was merely dismissed the Company service. In 1920 the hut tax was doubled, resulting in the Provincial Administration increasing their own wages. This was soon duplicated throughout the territory. Despite the negative impact, villagers had since before World War I been free to leave their stockaded villages and move about in search of work, something they had not been able to do with slavers and raiding tribes running rampant. However, the impact of all of this on village life with many of its men employed elsewhere would continue the state of dissolution of African social life – particularly on women, religion and culture, that the slave trade had begun.

After serving out their contracts, mineworkers returned

with trophies of the modern age, including venereal and other diseases. One of the main routes south (from the east of the territory) was through Feira on the Zambezi. In 1902, the count of men walking to and from Southern Rhodesia amounted to 6,981 going south and 4,308 going north; these were Africans of Nyasaland, North-Eastern Rhodesia and Portuguese territory.[lxxxi] In 1904, because of the high mortality rate of those walking, Nyasaland banned the recruitment of labour within its borders, and in 1907 North-Western Rhodesia brought in regulations controlling recruitment. In the same year, the Southern Rhodesia administration responsible for all recruitment north of the Zambezi recruited 4,743 men, and in 1908, 7,009.

The high death rate of miners was cause for great concern. In the years 1907 and 1908, the death rates from scurvy, dysentery and pneumonia were some 40 per 1,000. Added to this at the time were outbreaks of sleeping sickness, which brought about bans on recruitment from certain areas. The mining recruits were also frequently transported in trains without proper latrine facilities and worked without adequate rest, adding greatly to the abysmal mortality rate. After World War I, reform was introduced through the lobbying of the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society. But the effects of the mines through the invasion of hundreds of women from the villages working as prostitutes certainly added to the weakening of clan culture. But this was insignificant when compared to the effects of the slave trade.

During World War I, the mainstay of army recruitment was the Nilo-Hamitic Ila, who had attacked Europeans venturing into their country in the early days. After the war, they suffered from venereal diseases; the tribe saved from collapse by a

penicillin treatment campaign conducted by the Provincial Administration. With the extension of British interests over the whole territory in 1891, it took another thirty years for the basic infrastructure of railways, roads, towns, and the basic forms of Western technology and civilization to be introduced. By 1921 commercial mining had begun - the engine for the rapid growth that was to follow over the next 40 years, though the 3,634 Europeans, 56 Indians and approximately one million Africans (Bantu, Hukwe Bushmen and Twa Pygmy) in existence, stood together at the brink of development. At the time, 82% of the Europeans lived in Livingstone (the capital until 1934), Lusaka and Broken Hill (Kabwe). The rest - except the tobacco farmers in the Fort Jameson area (Chipata) - lived near the railway line that had reached Broken Hill (Kabwe) in 1906 and the Congo border in 1909. Of the Europeans, 1,000 farmed, with the great majority of Africans subsisting in the time-honoured fashion, while Indians traded. Only 133 Europeans worked in mining, mainly in the production of lead and zinc at Broken Hill.

The 1924 export value of metals was £161,000 - only £7,000 from copper (Bwana Mkubwa), with agriculture at £153,000 - constituting 70% of the total exports of £465,000.[lxxxii] But all of this was soon to change with a massive rise in the demand for copper, the mobilization of investment capital in London, and a recent advance in mining technology that allowed - through the flotation method - the mining of ores high in sulphides. However, the key was the decision of the Company - which still held the mining rights - to award vast mining concessions to well-capitalized mining ventures. By the end of the 1920s, copper was a major industry, the area - named the Copperbelt, experiencing a building boom. By 1930 seven major mines were in production. Allied with this development, advances in

the treatment of malaria allowed relatively large numbers of European miners to live in the area, the health of Africans also considerably improved.[lxxxiii]

## Mining depression

In 1931, with copper prices plummeting, the Bwana Mkubwa mine closed down. By 1932 with the onset of the Great Depression fully evident, copper production was cut by international agreement to 26.5% of world capacity. Between 1931-1933, the European population dropped from 13,846 to 11,278. Five difficult years followed, but by 1937 mining was once more in full swing, Northern Rhodesia now one of the most rapidly growing economies in the world. In 1949 the pound devalued, and the price of copper increased 44% overnight - and with it production, reaching 379,000 tonnes in 1954. In 1959 further significant growth took place, with minerals taking up 70% of GDP. From Federation days (1953-1963), these figures were no longer available, but no other industry challenged the copper supremacy in what had become a very lopsided dualistic economy.[lxxxiv]

In 1947 the government had inaugurated a ten-year plan, reporting to the Legislative Council:[lxxxv]

*To give, on a modest scale, the bare essentials of social and economic services which all sections of the community require; to encourage development of the natural and*

*potential assets of the territory but at the same time to prevent 'exploitation' (used in its worst sense) of these assets; and to assist the African population to develop itself under its Native Authority with all possible speed. This is urgent because a higher standard of living must be earned and cannot be awarded.*

Shortly after the start of the program, under pressure from the legislature, the goal of stimulating the rural non-monetary sector was diminished, with increased food production, roads and European and African housing taking their place. By 1953 the share devoted to African housing, education, and rural development fell from 31% to 17%, mirrored later by the government in 1980-2000.[lxxxvi]

Between 1945 and 1951, Britain extracted roughly 140 million sterling from their colonies, investing about 40 million under the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts; this under a Labour Government supposedly with the common man's interests at heart.

Despite strong African opposition, the British Parliament in 1953 passed an Act providing for a federal constitution for the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The Federal government controlled the main economic and military functions, but not the police. All matters affecting Africans – their education, agriculture and rural development - were parcelled off, a segregationist approach and the British Crown could disallow any law of the Federal Legislature, assented to by the Governor-General, within twelve months of it having been passed. The constitution was complicated, both Europeans and Africans vying for greater powers. One major development through an Order in Council was the recognition in 1953 of

the geographically internal Barotseland Protectorate, originally agreed to by the Lochner Concession of 1890 and substantiated in 1895.

By 1951 there were 37,000 Europeans in Northern Rhodesia, with their increasing political power matched by the rapid growth of the Africans' political consciousness and the growing realization that their powers were in the ascendant.[lxxxvii]

## Development funding

Development funds augmented those being supplied by the Northern Rhodesia government. Most of this was taken up by the modernization of the railway and the production of power at Kariba. Crucially, funding, which had been intended for the upliftment of the rural African, went to strengthen the urban monetary sector. And where some effort was made to improve African food production, this was based on Western agriculture methods. This was particularly applicable to the Kafue Flats pilot polder scheme to cover 11,000 hectares and modelled on the Gezira scheme in the Sudan, where 14,000 villagers grew crops. Begun in 1956, this was a massive and expensive failure and an augury of the Kafue Flats' destruction to come. It was handed over to the government at Independence and then taken over by the sugar barons, Tate & Lyle. Despite the negative aspects of capitalist European rule, particularly the malign influence of the Apartheid South, the lives of villagers had attained a state of development and safety never before, or since, reached.



As both the protectorate and federation days came to an end, it was claimed that the economic reality of the time was of an economy controlled by European interests where African farmers had been excluded from access to the land along the line of rail – essential to supplying the mines with food – with imposed produce marketing controls, seen as a deliberate policy to hinder their competitiveness with commercial farmers; and in industry, that the might of the European controlled unions blocked the attainment of any significant advances in labour skills by Africans.[lxxxviii] This conclusion did not take into account the massive social and cultural differences between Western Europeans and native Africans. And as Peter Bauer wrote, 'Poverty and prosperity are not usually matters of land. Poverty or riches and personal and social satisfaction depend on man, his culture, and his political arrangements. Understand that, and you understand the most important cause of wealth or deprivation.'[lxxxix]

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## Guardians of Nature

*The Victorian era gamefields (1837-1901) - veld herds of SA - elephant slaughter and slave trade - BSA Co (1889) - Westbeech and Lewanika - 47,000 elephant killed a year (1850-1890) - first hunting concession (1882) - affront to African conservation tradition - hunting guilds - the ground tusk - rinderpest (1892) - first protection and hunting controls (1896) - BSA Co-create Mweru Marsh Game Reserve (1900) - chiefs' protected areas: Lewanika and Nkula (1890's) - N.E. Rhodesia game laws issued (1900) - Lusangazi Game Reserve declared (1904) - impact of mines on villagers - NR Protectorate (1 April 1924) - game laws issued (1925) - first national park recommended (1929) - ordinance recognizes five game reserves (1931) - Pitman report (1934) - pre WWII elephant control officers appointed - Luangwa Valley Game Reserve declared (1938) - - Vaughan-Jones report (1938) - Dept. of Game & Tsetse Control established with V-J in charge (1942) - NAs to administer game reserves and CHAs (1945) - Native Authority control of hunting disastrous - PA and Game Department conflict - PC Errol Button establishes Chipera tourism scheme (1949) - Government Controlled Hunting Scheme in Nsefu chieftdom (1949) - severe checks on sport*

*hunting (1952) - scheme semi-privatized with Hankin in charge (1958) - Hankin and Carr take over privatized operation as Luangwa Safaris (1963) - Kidson and Rouse start Zambia Safaris (1964) - two safari companies amalgamate in 1970 - PHAZA formed (1965) - Barotse protection and game drives - Len Vaughan remembers Lochinvar and Kafue - Lochinvar purchased by state (1966) and falls into disrepair - the chila problem - Vaughan-Jones punts national parks (1949) - Kafue NP declared (1950) - opposition to 1957 game ordinance - game chilas banned (1957) - Carr succeeds Len Vaughan at Kafue (1957) - Game Department under attack (1958) - Natural Resources Act of 1962 not implemented - GRZ hunting scheme closed (1962) - pilot cropping (1962) - Luangwa cropping scheme (1964-1973) - Parker report on cropping (1970) - ele population - Rhodesia elephant massacre (1960-1988) - Johnny Uys killed (1973) - the end of cropping and death of Macleod (1977) - death of the Game Department (1942-1975) - political capture of natural resource laws (1964- ) - controlled hunting areas converted to game management areas (1971)*

*I believe in God; only I spell it Nature.*

*Frank Lloyd Wright*


*I dream of a day far in the future when a visitor from these Islands will go to the rural parts of that country and be told of someone remembered by his African name in whose time there was peace and plenty in the land. He will be told of officials remembered for their honesty, their integrity, and their courage, who lived far from their own kind and worked for the advancement and progress of the Africans. We shall not have been forgotten.*

*Gervas Clay (1907-2009)*

## Victorian-era game plunder

Much of the exploration and opening up of Africa's gamefields took place in the Victorian era (1837-1901). Not long before this, the forced scattering of the southern Bantu to the west and north known as the *Difaquane* - escaping the *Mfecane* depredations of Shaka and the Zulu - coincided with the Great Trek of the Cape-Dutch and Bushmen pastoralists (Khoi) from the Cape, as well as the movement of people from present-day Angola and the Congo Basin into the territory. In the 1850s, ivory hunters such as William Baldwin moved north of the Cape.

The vast herds of game in the southern African grasslands (the veld) were the object of commercial meat, hide-hunting and sport on an unprecedented scale by British, Dutch, and mounted Khoi and Bantu. Massive game drives became the order of the season, most notably in 1869 during the visit of Prince Alfred, second son of Queen Victoria, when 5,000 head of game were killed outside Bloemfontein in one day by the Rolong under Chief Moroka, a small number of antelope falling to the guns of the royal party.



Group of people and the horse-drawn carriage (Hendrickson, 1872)

In 1872 the Rolong received permission from the landowners encircling Bloemfontein to carry out another drive. This time 4,800 head were killed – but understandably, no mention made of the 10% or so wounded and lost.[i]

In central and eastern Africa, by the time of the Treaty of Berlin of 1885, elephant were considerably reduced, the treaty dividing Africa among the Western European nations formalizing the scramble for its natural resources and its later colonization, and allowing Victorians to wander at leisure in search of sport and trophies.

In her *Empire of Nature*, MacKenzie avers that ‘by the turn of the 20th-century commodity and subsistence hunting had been superseded by the ritualized ‘Hunt’ designed in large part to reinforce colonial power’.[ii] There is little evidence that the process had anything to do with reinforcing colonial power. It was simply made possible by colonial control of the hunting

grounds. The move towards a more organized hunt is a natural progression in the territory now firmly in the British sphere of influence.

The slave export trade, allied with the ivory trade, and paid for in firearms and calico, saw elephant numbers by 1870 reduced to such an extent in the Zambezi and Luangwa valleys that one of the Zambezi *muzungu* (*mixed race*) traders, Texeira de Sousa, who ran a stable of some three hundred or so elephant hunters north of the Zambezi, had great difficulty in finding bulls carrying heavy ivory. In 1885 it was reported that 'elephant populations had decreased surprisingly over the last two years in that triangle between the lower Chobe and the Western part of the central Zambezi'.[iii]

In the north-east of the territory inhabited by the Bemba and their vassal tribes, elephant were greatly reduced by 1879, Joseph Thomson reporting that there were few left between Lake Tanganyika and the East African coast.[iv] Alfred Sharpe, a former commercial ivory hunter and later Commissioner and Consul-General of the BSA Company responsible for Nyasaland – part of which was to become North-Eastern Rhodesia, only shot two elephant on his long journey back to Blantyre from Katanga in 1890, though Mushidi's country in Katanga – according to Arnot, was well populated with elephant.[v]

By the time of the takeover of the territory in 1889 by the BSA Company, elephant numbers had considerably dwindled. In Barotseland, this was in great contrast to the elephant drives that had taken place in the 1870s by Chief Sipopa, with elephant being driven by a few thousand men into the angle between the Zambezi and Chobe rivers - on one occasion, 90 elephant being slaughtered. Sipopa's later successor, Lewanika, continued

these annual drives on elephant and other game. The ivory trader George Westbeeche (d.1888) had formed a close personal and commercial relationship with Sipopa and Lewanika – as he had with Lobengula and Mzilikazi of the Matabele before, employing many elephant hunters in the region of the Machili Valley (Kwando River) and the Linyanti. In 1882 Lewanika gave Westbeeche his own exclusive hunting concession in the Machili.[vi] In 1871–1888, Westbeeche exported between 20,000 and 30,000 pounds of ivory.[vii]

Without Westbeeche, the Matabele would likely have destroyed Barotseland. Westbeeche also ushered in the missionaries Arnot and Coillard, laying the ground for the BSA Company and the emergence of a remarkable leader in Lewanika who introduced progressive education and conservation with the help of the British.[viii]

The slaughter of elephants in Africa - supplying only the London market - was estimated to be 47,000 head annually between the years 1850 to 1890.[ix] Including those wounded, this would mean 2.25 million elephant killed over the 40 year period.



Figure 1: The elephant hunt

As elephant populations recovered in the territory, they were again killed, but this time in defence of villagers. In the years 1917 to 1921 - native hunters armed by the BSA Company and supplied the necessary ammunition killed 3,992 elephant[x] This commercial exploitation of elephant by Africans, Europeans and Arabs – which reappeared a hundred years later - brushed aside native African laws of conservation, directly threatening their stability. For example, among the Bemba:[xi]

*Finding one bee's nest is good fortune, because honey is a blessing, finding two is better still, but persisting in your search for bees' nests that are never plentiful and finding three – that is the work of witchcraft: it is the influence of greed, for which the powers of Evil will find a way to punish you.*

## Hunting guilds

Before Company rule - apart from the activities of the commercial ivory hunters controlled by Europeans and Muslim Arabs - African animist religion assured that the hunting of elephant, eland, rhino and hippo was severely restricted to members of hunting guilds. Among the Bemba, the guild which controlled the hunting of elephant was held in great esteem, being known as *uwanga wa nsofu* with its secret nomenclature, initiation ceremony and body marks, its elders, the *chiwinda*. When they killed an elephant, the ground tusk (*chimbo*) was given to the chief, the tusk being a symbol of the customary territory's lordship. The tail was normally given to the hunter (*fundi*). As Marks has reported, among the Luangwa's Bisa, four groups of hunters were differentiated by the charms they used and how they had been legitimized.[xii] J.E. Hughes, the Company Native Collector stationed in 1902 at Kennelly in the mid-Luangwa Bisa country of Chief Nabwalya, reported on the use of members of this guild by the Arabs in their search for ivory.[xiii] Among the Chikunda of the Zambezi and Luangwa valleys, the supreme professional elephant hunters, the *nkombalume*, were held in high esteem.

Except for Barotseland, one of the Company's first acts when it assumed control - having had these rights signed over by some chiefs, but not all - was to claim the right to all ground tusks. This symbol of ownership and the right to rule was now accepted as being held by the Company. These guilds died with Indirect Rule and its creation of the Native Authority, the chief now being fully recognized in law, and chiefs appointed in the areas where there were none.



In 1892 the rinderpest epidemic reached the Horn of Africa territory, crossing the Zambezi in 1896. Buffalo were nearly exterminated, and kudu, eland and other cloven-hoofed species severely affected – yet, to a degree, also zebra. Barotseland was spared; the people brought new wealth from cattle (captured from the Ila) in the place of ivory. By 1896 regulations for the control of hunting and the establishment of game reserves were produced by the Nyasaland Protectorate, including much of North-Eastern Rhodesia. But some chiefs also created protected areas, Chief Nkula of the Bemba creating two elephant sanctuaries (1887).[xiv] [xv] In the Northern Rhodesia Journal of 1959 Vo. 4 No 2, in an article by the late E. Knowles Jordan, he claims to have “created a small unofficial game reserve near the boma and extending from the Luvu River...” This was, in fact, the sitting Chief Nkula’s own creation 20 years before.[xvi]

## Colonial and International Conservation

By 1899 Alfred Sharpe, alarmed at the desecration of the great herds of game between Lake Tanganyika and Mweru, declared the Mweru Marsh Game Reserve (gazetted in 1900) the first officially protected area in the territory and one of the earliest in Africa. In 1901 the North-Eastern Rhodesia Administrator reduced the reserve’s size by excluding the villages on the eastern boundary.[xvii]

In 1900 the North-Eastern Rhodesia Order in Council for the International Convention for the Preservation of Wild Animals, Birds and Fish in Africa was issued, and regulations for the

preservation of game provided. These were the Game Laws of North-Eastern Rhodesia, issued, printed and distributed in Fort Jameson and revised two years later. Killing animals with snares, traps and game-pits were banned, and other restrictions placed on the species allowed to be hunted. In 1902 an export duty was placed on ivory, and in 1909 the acting administrator stated that control was necessary as hippopotamus numbers were dwindling as they were being shot for their teeth. He also decried that in one week, an African hunter killed 30 rhino for their horns.[xviii] [xix]

In 1903 the restriction on the number of animals allowed to be hunted was withdrawn because of the increase in game stocks and the resultant damage to villagers' crops. In 1904, under Section 4 of the Game Regulations of 1902, the second game reserve was proclaimed, intended for the protection of Thorneycroft's giraffe; this was the Luangwa Game Reserve near Old Petauke - the Sasare Mine on its border, also known as the Lusangazi Game Reserve (de-gazetted in 1913).

In the early 1900s, a naturalist, S.A. Neave, spent four years in the Eastern Congo and Northern Rhodesian bush. His paper in *The Geographical Journal*, [\*A Naturalist's Travels on the Congo-Zambezi Watershed\*](#), provides a wonderful description of this wilderness at the time. Amazingly, this is how I found the Luangwa in 1966.

In the years 1912-1925, non-residents of the Luangwa were banned from hunting there because of sleeping sickness.

With the change brought about by the imposition of a hut tax and the demand for labour for the mines, villagers had a large proportion of their adult males drawn away. This necessitated a reorganization of the villagers' survival strategies. As Stuart Marks has vividly pointed out, the more elderly

lineage members now recruited younger males as hunters responsible for protecting crops and supplying meat. The younger males, in turn, grasped the opportunity as their control of meat supplies enabled them to compete for the position of the lineage head over their contemporaries who had gone off to the mines. The ownership of a firearm, therefore, became of considerable importance. The 'dangerous shades' of elephant, lion and eland required specialized guardian rituals to be observed, particularly if the hunter and his kin were not to descend into madness.[xx]

Soon after the Northern Rhodesia Protectorate formation on 1 April 1924, and managed by the Provincial Administration, the Northern Rhodesia Ordinance No. 19 of 1925 was promulgated, a game ordinance which consolidated the laws of the former North-Eastern and North-Western Rhodesia. Game licenses were issued allowing a villager to hunt in his traditional area, limits only being introduced in 1931. The bag was generous. The territory in 1926 was estimated to have 1,099 breech-loading rifles, 1,763 shotguns, and 25,619 muzzle-loaders among a population of about one million people, the impact on wildlife would have been considerable. However, this was balanced by the increasingly negative impact of wildlife in general on villages. In 1929 R.W.G. Hingston - the first wildlife consultant to work in the territory - was appointed by the Society for the Preservation of the Wild Fauna of the Empire. He recommended establishing what was to be called the South Central African National Park, a rejected suggestion but which would have incorporated much of the Luangwa and the present-day Kasungu National Park in Malawi. This was finally accomplished seventy-seven years later by forming the Malawi/Zambia Transfrontier Conservation Area linking the

Kasungu, Nyika and Lukusuzi National Parks.

The 1931 Ordinance amendment registered the Victoria Falls, Kafue Gorge, Mweru Marsh, Kafue and David Livingstone Memorial game reserves – with wardens provided by the Provincial Administration. However, Pitman in his report of 1934 did not mention Victoria Falls.[xxi] Pitman came to Northern Rhodesia in 1931. In his report of 1934, he laid the foundation for the future Game and Tsetse Control Department in 1942, or the Game Department as it became known.[xxii] His report remarked on the massive decrease of wildlife – except buffalo and elephant – due to hunting by villagers with muzzleloaders, and the inadequate game ordinance and state of the game reserves, some of which contained villages. He made some recommendations: 1) establishing organized elephant control operations to protect villagers; 2) establishing a Game Department; 3) obtaining the co-operation of the native authorities; 4) removing villages from game reserves; 5) making much of the Luangwa a game reserve (on 27 May 1938, Luangwa Valley Game Reserve southern section was gazetted); and, 6) that the present Kafue Game Reserve become a national park (accomplished in 1950).

## Elephant control

The Provincial Administration immediately began to contract experienced hunters to deal with marauding animals – in particular, elephant; these included E.C. Mills (a prominent professional white hunter and member of the East African Professional Hunters Association), Henry Rangeley, H.L. Hall

(who had farmed in the Petauke district ),[xxiii] Charlie Ross, D.G. Lancaster, and Captain R.W.M. Langham, MC.

Most of them were later appointed as civil-service elephant control Officers. In Charlie Ross's report in the rains of 1938, he mentions not being allowed by the Provincial Administration (PA) to follow elephant with his .404 rifle into *mateshi* thickets. He shot a single 104 pounder on one of his forays, the tusk measuring eight-foot and six inches long. An elephant later killed him on 29 May 1938 in Kamwendo's country, a section of the escarpment bordering part of the present South Luangwa National Park. He lies buried in the old Mpika Hunters' Graveyard, a place I cared for during my time in Bangweulu in 1973-1976; and briefly in 2003.[xxiv]



Mpika Hunters' Graveyard (the first up the path)



(From the 1938 report)

In 1935, to alleviate the suffering of villagers, control officers shot 4,600 elephant on control (plus 573 killed on licence) [xxiv]. Pitman urged that the Native Authority be given increased powers to effect the game's protection. The Secretary for Native Affairs had commented that the interests of Africans were the first consideration.

However, the shortage of money and World War II meant that his recommendations were much delayed. Out of this came two categories of wildlife land - game reserve and controlled hunting area, to be administered by the Native Authority, in return for which they would receive an income from hunting. Vaughan-Jones, the author of the 1938 report laying out the architecture of a future Game Department, warned of the corruption amongst chiefs but thought that the NA could in time manage wildlife and the

areas under them for the benefit of the villagers: 'The optimum scope of a Game Department, as has become apparent in the light of modern thought, is the whole relationship of wild life to human progress, not merely the preservation of game for sportsmen to hunt and the shooting of superfluous elephant'.[xxv]

## Department of Game and Tsetse Control (1942)

In 1941 Vaughan-Jones was appointed Officer-in-Charge of Game Affairs, a revised game ordinance proclaimed in the same year. After the formation in 1942 of the Department of Game and Tsetse Control within the Provincial Administration, any future proclamation of a game reserve – all of them being formed on native trust land – had to agree with the particular native authority. However, the NA's responsibility for controlling wildlife outside of the reserves, with them receiving substantial fees from non-resident hunters, was not a success, and wildlife populations continued to decrease – as they would under an open-access regime. This led to a conflict between the Game Department (pro-wildlife) and the Provincial Administration (pro-people). In 1945 the Kunda and Munyamadzi Controlled Hunting Areas (CHAs) were declared and responsible for protecting game given to the chiefs. In 1946 sportsmen were encouraged to hunt in these areas, with native treasuries (established in 1936) receiving income from licences and permits. In 1947 the Petauke Controlled Hunting Area was gazetted. At this time, Ian Grimwood (1912-1991) –

with whom I had once planned the emergency protection of the northern white rhino in Sudan (now extinct there), and who will be remembered for his 1962 Operation Oryx in Yemen – joined the Department as a biologist, ending up as Assistant Director, leaving in 1960 to become Chief Game Warden of Kenya.

In May 1949, District Commissioner Lundazi, Errol Button, suggested that it would be advantageous to nurture non-hunting tourism for villagers' benefit, adding that it would not interfere with local hunters' activities. This was accepted, and Vaughan-Jones instructed Game Ranger Norman Carr to hand over his Chipera Nsefu camp and convert it to tourist use, with all revenue accruing to the Nsefu Native Authority. The scheme's objective was 'to impress on the chief the game's economic transfer value in his area apart from its meat value'. Nsefu, a willing partner in these important developments, subsequently requested that his country be converted into a game reserve, a process held up by problems over access to the saltpans that were of great economic importance to his people.[xxvii]

In the Fort Jameson District Note Book Vol. III: was recorded the founding of the Nsefu Game Reserve:

*The Nsefu Game Reserve was created as part of a larger plan to preserve game throughout the Luangwa Valley. For many years it was known to the Game Department that for a variety of reasons, the concentration of a wide range of species built up in the area during the dry season; but the increasing depredation of hunters gave cause for*



concern.

*In 1949, after discussions with Government Officers Senior Chief Nsefu of the Kunda tribe agreed that this part of his chiefdom should be made in a Game Reserve. For the first two years the area, which was part of the Akunda controlled hunting area, was denied to hunting by the local African on the order of the chief. In return for his agreement to the protection concept, Government undertook to pay all fees accruing from visitors into the Kunda Native Treasury. It was only in 1951 that this 83 square miles of unique game country was legally constituted, with the agreement of the Native Authority, as a Game Reserve for a limited number of years. A very recent and welcome development has been that the Native Authority has agreed that the area becomes a Game Reserve in the fully accepted sense of the term.*

*In the first two years of the scheme, the Game Department equipped and built temporary camps on a site a few miles from the present campsite: the latter chosen for its safety from erosion, is the third that has been used and the present permanent buildings were erected in 1954.*

*Funds were provided for its construction by the Northern Rhodesia Government, the Eastern Province Provincial Native Treasury Fund and the Kunda Native Treasury. Furnishings were paid for mainly by the Kunda Native Treasury with some assistance from the government. The capital works have now been completed and the running expenses are entirely the responsibility of the Kunda Native Authority, who employ all the camp staff (excluding, of course, the Game Guards) and most all the routine costs of the camp.*



Figure 1: Chief Nsefu, a member of the traditional council, standing with other members.

This was at first refused. But Chief Nsefu had become an unwitting partner in alienating his customary area to game reserve – realized in 1954, the boundary laid out by my former colleague Barry Shenton. In 1955 Fip Parnell, Director of the Game and Tsetse Department, blocked moves to convert it to a national park because it would not serve the ‘native interests’. Inevitably, in 1972, it became a national park. Nsefu’s people still receive few benefits from this alienation, with the loss of a large and massively valuable piece of their wildlife customary commons – including the salt pans. In 2012 Chief Nsefu was arrested for shooting three impala.[xxviii]

## Development of safari-hunting after WWII (1949)

In 1949 the Government Controlled Hunting Scheme was also established by Button on the land lying under the Nsefu Native Authority, the scheme run by Bert Schultz. Barry Shenton helped with the hunting. and occasionally, Ron Kidson.



Barry Shenton and Bert Schultz (Shenton collecting)

In 1958 Peter Hankin took over the hunting from the government scheme as a contractor under his company, Central African Safaris. Five years later, the hunting was fully privatized and awarded to Hankin and Norman Carr - operating as Luangwa Safaris, their first apprentice being Bryan Smith, their PH, Angus MacLagan, and then later for a long time joined by Joe Joubert from Tanganyika, and briefly, by myself in 1969 and 1970.



1.10. 1968 (Smithsonian Institution, Department of Anthropology)

Smith eventually took over Hankin's shareholding, selling the shares in 1972. In 1964, Ron Kidson and Keith Rouse began hunting under their company, Zambia Safaris; Major Alan North recruited in Kenya as its first professional. At the end of the 1970 hunting season, Luangwa and Zambia safaris merged as Amalgamated Safaris, with a Belgian, Arnold Callens coming in as a major shareholder – shortly after that killed in a car accident in Lusaka.

Kidson was instrumental in forming the Professional Hunters' Association of Zambia (PHAZA) - first conceived at a meeting before the territory became Zambia, attended by Kidson, Keith Rouse, Carr, Hankin, and the Director of the Department of Game and Fisheries, Bill Steele. It was formally established in 1965; I joined as member No. 12. Its principal required role was to vet future applicants for professional hunter licenses and regulate PH affairs to maintain hunting and safari standards and ethics. For a period in the 1980s under

David Frost [xxix], it was able to further its objectives, but since then, given the government's dysfunctional administration, it has wielded little influence. In 2014 it had in the order of 75 full members; in [2018](#), 61.

By 1952 European hunters coming to hunt on their account could not hunt easily at all given that only 140 permits a year were issued, and then only valid for a fortnight in a particular area. But there was no check on African licenses or their hunting, and thus a massive trade existed in bushmeat - driven by the demand of the mines and by the burgeoning urban population.

## Liuwa Plain protected by the Litunga in 1900

The Liuwa Plain - adjoining the Barotse floodplains north of the Kalabo River and south of the Lungwebungu River - had long been the personal hunting grounds of the *Litunga*, the Paramount Chief of Barotseland, with people and their cattle still to this day living there amongst large herds of migratory wildebeest. This area was specifically protected in 1900 by Lewanika from any BSA Company activity. Once a year, the *Litunga* would organize a game drive. The last was held in May 1913, attended by labour recruiter J. Soane Campbell. The day before the drive, spearheads were dug into the ground and concealed in the grass. For three days, 7,000-10,000 men drove herds of wildebeest onto the spears, the kill accounting for 572 wildebeest and some zebra. In the Ila country of the lower Kafue River, the annual *chila* accounted for hundreds of Kafue lechwe, buffalo and other game. But seeing that

such carnage could not continue, in 1957, Gervas Clay, the Resident Commissioner for Barotseland – who represented His Majesty's Government directly (not through the intermediary of the Northern Rhodesia Government), banned the *chilas*. At the same time, tsetse fly eradication operations, allied with the disease control fences, accounted for large numbers of buffalo. In the Lukamezi River area of the cordon, Tsetse Control Officer Abraham Bothma killed 2,000 – half of the areas estimated population; the buffalo protected from native hunters but soon increasing back to the same level of 4,000. Fraser Darling, who visited the area, concluded that this was evidence that wildlife could be successfully cropped.[xxx] In the early 1970s, Liuwa Plain became a national park, though there was little Game Department activity.

## Lochinvar and Kafue conservation

Two national parks, Lochinvar and Blue Lagoon, were originally cattle ranches.



The former owner of Lochinvar, Len Vaughan (1900-1989) - [see letter to me of 6 November 1986](#) and one of [27 October 1986](#) - who had arrived on the Kafue in 1920 to go farming but had then become a White Hunter, the owner of what is now the Lochinvar National Park, and from 1942-1958 serving with the Department of Game Tsetse Control - described Lochinvar to me:

*This huge ranch, 120,000 acres and 28 miles from Monze and bounded on the north side by the Kafue River was originally taken up by a company known as the Rhodesia Cattle and Land Company (Bulawayo). The guiding light in the enterprise was one, Major Gordon, a pioneer I think*

of "The Column". The flotation started (I think) about 1912 or 1914. They built a most elaborate house (for those times) all with narrow board floors for dancing! All lit by an acetylene gas lighting system, hot water laid on to the house from the boiling mineral springs about a quarter of a mile from the house and every luxury you can imagine available in those times, the place was heavily stocked with cattle; an attempt was made to fence the whole area. Quite impractical, of course, because the game was in such quantities that I would say that before you had erected as much as a few hundred yards, it was all torn down again by herds of zebra or wildebeest. The directors had season tickets on the railway to and from Bulawayo (imagine the cost) and the ranch became a fashionable resort from Bulawayo and was, I was credibly informed, known as, "The Regent's Palace". However, it was all doomed to failure, the war came and I suspect bad management and other reasons judging by much of the paper I destroyed when I took over the ranch. The place was later purchased by a Belgian concern in Katanga who also only kept a caretaker there and everything fell into disrepair as I could see when I passed through on occasion. The masses of game remained in spite of the chila hunting by the Ba-Ila. These chila were as you know conducted by the encirclement of large masses of game by hundreds of Ba-Ila and walking inwards speared the game as bunches broke through the ring. This was, of course, the reason for the mpumpe head dress they wore which was topped by a long reed with a tuft to make it visible to other hunters when in long grass.

With the depression taking a firm grip on Northern Rhodesia,



Len decided in 1932 to travel to Nairobi in his Model T Ford and make a decision on moving to Kenya:

*While in Nairobi I happened to meet the Director of the Belgian company who owned Lochinvar, it was just a chance meeting, and speaking about Northern Rhodesia he asked if I knew the place and so it came about that he said to me, "Come now I sell you the ranch." I was completely taken aback as you can imagine, but it transpired that they actually did want to get rid of it. Well, the outcome of this meeting was that I purchased Lochinvar, did some repairs and so on and turned it into the most fantastic private game reserve you can possibly imagine with some 20 to 30,000 head of game.*

But with the depression and his failure to obtain support from the Provincial Administration to deal with the rising tide of poaching and the *chilas*, he sold it to two Johannesburg buyers. He then ran it for them until he joined the Game Department in 1942 as Game Ranger Southern Province. From then until 1966, it was used as a cattle-holding area by a consortium of cattle ranchers. Len and his wife left Zambia in 1958, moving to Rhodesia until the declaration of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in November 1965 sent them to South Africa.

When Len first arrived at Mazabuka in the Kafue aged 20 on Boxing Day 1920, he found a wildlife paradise. Here too lived the cattle owning Mashukulumbwe people - now called the Ila. Stark naked, except for the *mpumpe* headdress woven into their hair so that they could be seen by their fellows when hunting with their spears in long grass. Len, in his letter of October

1987, wrote:

*To have stood on an ant heap far out on the flats of an evening in those days literally surrounded by perhaps thirty thousand head of mixed game was just breathtaking, you would see a lion creep to the top of another ant heap, look around for a few moments, then down into the grass and appear again on another ant heap as he crept nearer and nearer to the animals. And one could learn all the secrets of the wild from the Mashukulumbwe friends over the camp fire at night, a wonderful life not granted to many! You will have heard of the Yesha buffalo hunt which used to be held about 20 miles up-river from Namwala each year in October, the grass was never burnt on the big flat till the time was ripe for the hunt by which time it was absolutely tinder dry of course and the bones having been duly thrown to find the suspicious day the hunt was on, there would have been perhaps two thousand buffalo in the flat or more and in the early hours of the morning the grass fired in a huge circle all round the flat so that it burnt inwards and trapped the buffalo. I attended many of these hunts, quite indescribable I can assure you as the fire burnt inwards, hundreds of ba-Ila, smoke and flame everywhere so that you could hardly breathe. Packs of buffalo running madly to and fro blinded and bewildered by it all pursued by the ba-Ila to get them into the deep lagoons which criss-crossed the area so that they could spear them in the water. I have seen buffalo actually being driven and beaten with sticks in the midst of it all. You cannot imagine it unless you saw it. I have seen as many as a hundred and fifty buffalo killed in*

*the morning by these remarkable people just with spear, sometimes five or ten ba-Ila killed as well! One had to have no fear of it all. It was often 'sauve qui peut' in truth. But what fun it all was when one was young.*



In 1957 Errol Button was appointed District Commissioner Mazabuka – his administration including Lochinvar. In 1975 my friend Button sent me a brief biography of our mutual friend Johnny Uys – in which he described the situation on the Kafue years later:[xxxix]

*In 1957, I took over Mazabuka at an hour's notice when the D. C. committed suicide. The political situation*

*was extremely delicate, but, Johnny still living in his small house near the office continued his unruffled way controlling vermin. Conservation was not yet a burning issue with him. However, 1957 was the year of the last lechwe chila at Lochinvar, and it proved a particularly bloody and sickening one. The P.A. had an extremely difficult and distasteful job under appalling conditions. Shortly after, Jervis, P.C. Southern Province, achieved, to his eternal credit, what everybody at that stage considered the impossible, the end of the chila.[xxxii] The feelings between the P.A. and officers of the Game Department ran very high, and the support and understanding we had a right to expect from the game people was replaced by emotional and irrational accusations, which resulted in Sir Arthur Benson's (the Governor) decimation of the Department, and very nearly its demise.*

Although Button left Mazabuka, he continued to intercede – along with Uys – in the fight to have Lochinvar declared a national park, the resumption of the *chilas* being a real possibility. For Uys – as Button remarked:

*His immediate objective then became the saving of Lochinvar and the lechwe. For the immediate future, the chilas were no threat, poaching there would always be, but until it became a national park, there would be the threat of a possible resumption of the chilas. Throughout the long interval between 1957 and the purchase of Lochinvar, Johnny never let me forget this.*

With the support of President Kaunda and the first Minister of

Natural Resources under self-rule, Munukayumbwa Sipalo, and later by the Minister of Lands, Solomon Kalulu – the latter Button's clerk when he was D.C. Lundazi, Lochinvar was purchased for £40,000 by the state and handed over on 17 October 1966 (with a grant of £2,000 from WWF), coinciding with the appointment of Button as Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources. In 1972 Lochinvar was declared a national park.

In August 2001, a tourism operator, Star of Africa, signed an MOU with the Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) to rehabilitate infrastructure and develop Lochinvar tourism. However, he later withdrew. The flood regime's mismanagement created a permanent lagoon and thicket encroachment (*Mimosa pigra*), displacing game from the floodplain and beyond the park's boundaries. A few years ago, the main house and lodge, the 'Regent's Palace' – Len Vaughan's former home, was derelict. There were no facilities for tourists, other than attempting to provide a visitors' centre and an imposing thatched entrance gate. Furthermore, a Chinese company, funded by the World Bank and seemingly oblivious to EIA guidance or supervision, had cut down trees to create wide roads to anticipate future tourist invasions.[xxxiii]

Len Vaughan described the present Kafue National Park area as once 'virtually uninhabited' except for the settlements under Chief Kaingu (Namwala) north of the Musa River. In 1949 he was instructed to prepare the area for national park status:

*I started off by doing an inspection of the whole area from Meshi Teshi southwards and after this had a look at it from the air and found it entirely uninhabited south of Meshi*

*Teshi, there was however a native settlement on the west bank of the Kafue about ten or twelve miles from Meshi Teshi which I hoped might be moved (Katinti). However, I was not successful in getting these people moved. However, I put in a report that I regarded the area as ideal for the formation of such a park as it is heavily tsetse fly infested and unlikely to be ever developed for any other purposes. Also, there was a good distribution of game, which would with protection increase rapidly, and in fact I was proved so right as the increase in game was simply dramatic. I was then instructed to go to Namwala, arrange for a house to be built for me there, take on staff and establish the Kafue National Park, so a dream came true. I was always extremely grateful to the Governor, Sir Gilbert Rennie for the support he gave me, due in no small part to the fact that every year in August when his children came out from England for their long summer holidays they would always spend a couple of weeks with me in the bush.*

On 24 February 1949, the Director of the founding Game Department, Vaughan-Jones, wrote a three-page memorandum entitled: 'Note on a proposal to establish a National Park':

*Government is committed by the 1933 London Convention for the Protection of Fauna and Flora, supplemented by several subsequent reminders by the Secretary of State, to consider the question of establishing "National Parks". Legal provisions for preliminary section exists in the Game Ordinance, Cap. 106, ss 3-10... the common assumption, based on observation of the development of the Kruger National Park, that a national park must be a*

*financially paying tourism proposition, is wrong.*

## Kafue National Park proclaimed (1950)

In April 1950, Governor Rennie, doubtless under the strong influence of Len Vaughan, proclaimed the Kafue National Park, is set aside within what was native trust land; the Order in Council defining trust land:[xxxiv]

*Land set apart for the sole use and benefit, direct or indirect, of the natives of Northern Rhodesia' and ...Out of the profits or rents accruing from any area of Native Trust Land set aside as a forest or Game Reserve there shall be paid first the expenditure necessarily incurred by the Government in connection with the said area, whether by maintenance, development or otherwise, and the balance shall be paid into the (native trust land) Fund, or into the treasury of the native authority concerned, as the Governor shall direct.*

The consultant, Fraser Darling, commented that being native trust land first and a national park second conflicted with national parks as outlined by the 1933 International Convention. Darling recommended that an amendment be tabled of the Order of Council altering the boundaries of trust land or invoking Section 5(1) (d) of the Order in Council, which empowered the governor to acquire trust land for public purposes.[xxxv]

In August 1957, Norman Carr (d.1997) was appointed Warden of the Kafue National Park and allowed to take Barry

Shenton (d.2007) and Johnny Uys (d.1973) with him to develop the area for tourism. He was given a year to do so or see much of it lose its status. In less than a year, they constructed 900 km of road, built Ngoma Lodge and two photo safari camps. At the end of 1959, the Kafue was opened for tourists. In 1964 Shenton became the warden, Uys moving to assume command of the Luangwa.

The Fauna Conservation Ordinance was approved in 1954 but only gazetted in 1957. Under the Ordinance, existing controlled hunting areas became First or Second Class hunting areas, and a category of private game area defined. As reported by my late friend Bill Astle, there was considerable opposition in the legislative assembly to the new game ordinance, with one member, Reuben Kidson (father of Ron Kidson, founding Chairman of the Professional Hunters' Association),[xxxvi] speaking out on behalf of the villagers who were suffering from wildlife impacts - demanding that the hunting areas be abandoned.[xxxvii] Some new African members requested that the Native Authority be allowed to shoot out their animals if they so wished. Vaughan-Jones reminded members that controlled hunting areas (CHAs) were created at the request of the Native Authority, the government agrees, hoping that they would manage their areas.

The Provincial Administration (PA) and the Native Authority were opposed to any tightening of preservationist regulations. And while the Game Department now had the necessary powers to control African hunting, they conceded that without the cooperation of the NA, no progress would be made in slowing down the pace of depletion. In 1958 Game Department staff were instructed to confine themselves to the Kafue National Park, the game reserves and the first and second class hunting



areas on Crown Land. In other areas, the NA would have full responsibility for game management. The retrenchment of many Game Department staff in 1958 – likely including Len Vaughan and Major Eustace Poles – came as a result of a fall in copper prices but was also fueled by the antipathy of Governor Sir Arthur Benson to the Game Department for their opposition to the PAs support for the Ila game drives (*chilas*) – although Provincial Commissioner Clay had banned the *chilas* in 1957. In the same year, the PA handed over control of most of the second class controlled hunting areas to the Native Authority.

*The Ministry of Native Affairs produced a Wildlife Policy for Northern Rhodesia* in 1961, and the following year the government-controlled hunting scheme abolished, the scheme privatized. In the same year, the Natural Resources Act Cap 315 of 1962 appeared on the statute books.

## The wildlife Chindits

Three prominent conservationists in Northern Rhodesia were Chindits in the Burma campaign of WWII in 1944-45, a brigade of British, Gurkha and Burmese guerrillas: Colonel Ronnie Critchley, MC., DSO., Major Eustace Poles, MC., and Captain Frank Ansell.

*Frank Ansell (1923-1996)*

Frank was a remarkable man, and as I have only now discovered, a very modest one. As Deputy Director of the National Parks and Wildlife Service, he hired me to take over the Bangweulu Command in 1973. [He visited us in Bangweulu that year](#) and then retired back to Cornwall. I only learned recently that he had earned a PhD in 1960 and before that had served as a [Captain in the Chindits in Burma](#) in 1945 (Force 136 SOE), where he had been mentioned in despatches. He never displayed his PhD or his captaincy. The other extraordinary finding was that Major Eustace Poles was his commanding officer. Both of them then joined the Department of Game & Tsetse Control in 1947.

*Captain William Frank Harding Ansell: Born in Devoran, Cornwall, on 3 June 1923, Captain Ansell's parent unit was 2 Burif. He was parachuted into Burma on 24 February 1945 as 2i/c to Major Poles on Operation Character, team Ferret. He left the field on 22 October 1945. After the war Dr Ansell (PhD 1960) was a zoologist who wrote several books and specialised in mammals of southern Africa. He was Provincial Game Officer in Northern Rhodesia from 1960, and has five creatures named after him. He was granted an emergency commission in August 1943.*

*Major Eustace Poles, MC. (1902-1990)*



Major William Eustace Poles, born on 19 June 1902 in Wentworth, Yorkshire, Major 'Pixie' Poles lived in Southern Rhodesia when war broke out. Poles was parachuted into Burma as officer commanding team Ferret - Operation Character. For his work in Burma, Poles was awarded the Military Cross.

After his [distinguished war service](#), Poles served as Game Ranger Mpika from 1947 with responsibility for wildlife over a wide area. But the area that received a great deal of his attention was the Munyamadzi Corridor, the area lying between the north and south Luangwa parks.

In 1958, after a six-month stint looking after Ronnie and Erica's ranch at Blue Lagoon, he retired back to Dulverton in England, probably at the first purge of personnel from the Game

Department. His friend Len Vaughan, as mentioned, moved to Rhodesia until its Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965, then went south to South Africa.

*Colonel Ronnie Critchley, MC., DSO. (1905-1999)*

Critchley was a professional British soldier from 1925 to 1947. Born in Edinburgh in 1905. Parachuted into Burma in 1945. Later awarded the MC.



Critchley first married in 1937. After the war, he married Erica,

daughter of the pioneer, Mopani Clark, and they lived on their cattle ranch on the Kafue, Blue Lagoon. From 1952-1972 he was the President of the Northern Rhodesia Game Preservation and Hunting Association, later renamed the Northern Rhodesia Wildlife Conservation Society. In 1973 he wrote to me to arrange Sir Peter Scott and Lord Aubrey Buxton's visit to Cathlin and myself in Bangweulu. We never did meet, and Erica died in 1976. Ronnie then left for Scotland for two years before moving to Australia in 1978, marrying Ethn  e Holmes    Court shortly after, the mother of my late friend, Simon, once the Game Ranger Ngamiland. Ronnie died in 1999.

They donated Blue Lagoon to the government - now a national park. [A report in 2013 tells of Blue Lagoon's deterioration and neglect.](#)

## Cropping schemes

In 1962 in the Luangwa - to provide funds for the Lundazi-Chewa Native Authority, a pilot cropping scheme was initiated by the Game Department, followed briefly by cropping in the West Lunga Game Reserve by Johnny Uys. Cropping then commenced in the Luambe Game Reserve in 1963, and in the Luangwa Game Reserve in 1964 where an abattoir was built on the Luangwa River near Chief Kakumbi's headquarters outside the reserve. The cropping of elephant, buffalo, hippo and some 'ration' impala in the reserve initiated.[xxxviii]

Chief Kakumbi was a character of note, dressed when on walkabout in a Henley (Oxfordshire) rowing blazer left to him by a departing District Commissioner.

The cropping was not for the benefit of his people, but rather for ecological reasons; a decision made on the basis that severe habitat damage by elephant was a threat to the floristic diversity, and therefore elephant numbers needed severe reduction.



*Derek (d.1977) in 1971 - Our last meeting.*

In 1966, Chief Game Officer Bill Bainbridge recruited Derek MacLeod (d.1977) and myself on contract from Rhodesia to do the cropping, joining Rolf Rowher (d.2008). In 1967 Rob Backus was recruited, having worked on the Uganda elephant and hippo cropping scheme initiated by Ian Parker's Wildlife Services Ltd., the latter formerly of the Kenya Game Department. The Kakumbi cropping station was managed by Jack Botha, a World War II veteran.[xxxix] The game rangers

working under Uys in the field at the time were Phil Nel (Mfuwe) and Kevin Lithgow (Lusangazi), Phil opening the roads for the cropping operations in record time after the rains.[xl]



*David frost & Phil Nel 1974*

Across the river was the Mfuwe Lagoon where stood Warden Johnny Uys's modest cottage, The Mushroom, and to the north, Phil's house and then the research staff houses followed further up by the newly constructed Mfuwe Lodge, which Norman Carr leased from government. MacLeod and I would stop in there after cropping for a drink, often meeting unusual celebrities. In July 1966, I was introduced to the diminutive colossus, Haile Selassie, where he greeted me alone and with great modesty in an empty dining room.

At first, we used dart guns and the drug Scolene to remove entire elephant family units - a hazardous [operation](#). Hippo and buffalo were at first shot at night on the tourist roads lying north and south of Mfuwe Lodge, the elephant removed by day on the cropping roads branching out from the O4 road heading north into the reserve. Later, buffalo - and occasionally hippo from lagoons - were shot by day on the O4. Whole animals were winched onto low bed trailers and taken to the abattoir where carcasses were deboned, the meat packed into steel cases and frozen, then sent for sale to the Copperbelt. A rudimentary leather processing facility was established and run by the ever amiable South African, Mr Ngelezi.

## Three Special People

### Baraman (1933-2004)

Baraman, I called him. He worked as my tracker in 1969 when I opened the Nabwalya chieftdom to hunting-safaris, a fabulous



game area awash with elephant, rhino, buffalo and lion lying between the North and South Luangwa game reserves. Stuart Marks, the anthropologist, wildlife biologist and authority on the chiefdom who first came to Nabwalya to study the people in 1966 when I was cropping elephant for government in the south game reserve, knew him by his tribal name, Hapi Luben. Stuart recounts this remarkable man's story in his superb book, *Life as a Hunt* (see ch. 8).


Born in 1933, Baraman never went to school, became a hunter, took four wives, and was bound on a course of becoming a big man (*Mukankala*). But he was troubled by sorcerers due to his popularity with clients and his fellows' jealousy and by his reporting of a white professional hunter for poaching a large lion. After the 1969 season with me, he fell ill, this repeating itself so that he was forced to leave safaris. Two of his nieces were killed by crocodile, and two of his daughters died from aids contracted from their husbands who had gone to work briefly in town. Eventually, He moved to Lusaka, leaving his wives and children behind and practised as a traditional healer, specializing in women's fertility. He died in 2004. I was in Lusaka at the time but never knew.



*Handwritten text, likely a name and date, is visible below the photograph.*

### Nelson Chilangwa (d. 1975)

Nelson – infinitely brave, friendly, uncomplaining – was, after the closure of the game cropping scheme operating in the south Luangwa Game Reserve, transferred to the isolated Kanele Game Camp (named for the first Native Collector, Kennelly, stationed there when it was a BSA Company station) on the Munyamadzi River in Chief Nabwalya's country, our departure, leaving him with the jealousy of his Zambian superiors for someone so highly regarded by former European officers – in particular, by Norman Carr, Derek Mcleod and myself. Like Baraman, sorcery was directed at him. I had trained him when cropping elephant was done with dart guns, a hazardous affair because of the drug having no antidote and the need to remove whole family groups.



*Nelson Mphahlele, "Big Game Hunter"*



*Nelson and carriers in 1968 (Pic Rob Backus)*

## Rice Time

Rice Time was my *fundi* while cropping in 1966-1967. A remarkable man and hunter. Later, he worked with me on my attempt to save the last black rhino, finding 13 of them in the hills behind the ADMADE headquarters. He and I were not allowed to capture and remove them to a sanctuary by the head ADMADE man from Wildlife Conservation International U.S. (WCI). But a year or two later, they were gone.



## The FAO/UNDP Project 1966-1973

Carrying on from his game ranch pioneering work in Rhodesia, Thane Riney (1918-2012) established the Luangwa Valley Conservation and Development Project as an adjunct to the cropping scheme begun by the Department of Game & Fisheries Department in 1964, its objectives to lay the ground for the multiple uses of the Luangwa: conservation, subsistence harvesting in wildlife management zones, agriculture and tourism. Here and elsewhere in Africa, he deployed dozens of exceptional biologists, pilots and administrative personnel to take conservation to a new level by giving wildlife value and encouraging government and the private sector of harvesting merits. His achievements were extraordinary. This was an essential first step to replace the failing protection measures due to the rapidly departing colonial expertise. Still, it would take the establishment of game ranching by landowners to improve matters. In the long run, it was increasingly clear that it is customary people who hold the key to conservation.

Riney served as an officer in the navy in WWII, revealing his field biology talents with notes of birds recorded on board.

An American, Riney, had started work in New Zealand in the early 1950s, becoming a world authority on deer. In 1955 he took a young Australian government hunter under his wing, Grahame Caughley (1937-1994), guiding him forward to university and employing him as an FAO consultant. Caughley came to work on the Luangwa FAO project on and off from 1969 to 1973.

In 1969 he carried out a short consultancy in the Luangwa, and then in mid-1971, he and his wife Judy came and lived in the park. Here she gave birth to a son.

Riney called in Caughley to take over from John Goddard, who had committed suicide – shooting himself on the Luangwa banks. He and Caughley had previously worked together in the Luangwa censusing elephant. Although Parker and Michael Norton-Griffiths greatly influenced Caughley when he worked in Kenya, Richard Bell opened his eyes to the importance of plant-animal interactions. In 1971 Bell and Jeremy Grimsdell began their research on the ecology of the black lechwe in the Bangweulu.

As [C.H. Tyndale-Biscoe later wrote](#) (see article for Caughley's 146 papers):

*The fruit of this interaction was Graeme's refinement of analyses of aerial surveys (44, 49, 52) and the development of his ideas on the long-term interactions between elephant and the trees that provide it with food and shelter (56). He suggested that 'the elephant problem' – elephants knocking down forest faster than the forest regenerates – does not reflect the notion, as previously believed, that an equilibrium between forests and elephants has been displaced. The evidence indicated that elephants increase while thinning the forest and then decline to a low density that allows the forest to recover. Elephants then begin to recover and the cycle repeats. This he defined as a 'stable limit cycle' which may be very long. He estimated the length of the cycle in the Luangwa Valley to be in the order of 200 years, from the size distribution of Mopane*

*trees, which showed a bimodal distribution suggesting an earlier period of low recruitment, and the age distribution of Baobab trees, which showed a unimodal peak at about 140 years. Since elephants browse young Baobabs the data suggested that a low density of elephants 140 years ago had allowed a cohort of Baobabs to become established and reach sufficient size to survive. The idea was put forward with characteristic verve and the paper aroused considerable interest in all African countries dealing with the elephant problem, and changed perspectives on management of the species.*

*Fourteen years later (130) Graeme examined this further by analysing the volume of ivory coming on to the world market since 1950, to determine the trend of the elephant populations from which it came. The data were consistent with a rapidly declining population. He deduced that few elephants would survive in East Africa outside high-security areas after 1995. The trend for Africa as a whole was similar but lagged about twenty years behind that of East Africa. This work was both clever and beautiful, but also written so tersely that it needed translation before it could be appreciated by all concerned.<sup>5</sup> It showed that the ivory trade rather than habitat loss has been the main cause of decline in elephant populations and it influenced the decision to ban international traffic in ivory so as to conserve the species.*

In October 1966, Professor Don Dodds of Acadia University, Nova Scotia,[xli] and D.R. Patton, arrived for a six-month

consultancy, launching the Luangwa Valley Conservation and Development Project. In 1968, Paul Dean was recruited.

In 1967, I resigned as senior cropping ranger to do a BSc at Don Dodds's Acadia University in Canada. MacLeod left soon after to go safari hunting and Backus, in 1968. The new hunters found cropping entire matriarchal herds with drugs and guns difficult, the decision to move over to rifles therefore inevitable. Rice Time, Nelson Chilangwa and Bob Langeveld, whom MacLeod and I had trained on dart-gun cropping, then carried on the work, though Rice and Nelson were never given the leadership of a cropping party as agreed with me.[xlii]

Nelson – infinitely brave, friendly, uncomplaining – was, after the closure of cropping, transferred to the isolated Kennelly Game Camp (named for the first Native Collector stationed there when it was a BSA Company station) on the Munyamadzi River, a transfer prompted by the jealousy of his Zambian superiors for someone so highly regarded by former European officers – in particular, by Norman Carr, myself and Derek Macleod.[xliii] In 1975, I met him by chance in Mpika and retired with him to a bar. A few weeks later, he was killed by a buffalo while out collecting honey.

In 1977 his cropping team leader and my great friend, Derek MacLeod, was killed in a car accident in Kenya. He had been on his way to the Sudan to capture bongo. He was 33.[xliv] Later, I was to write of Derek on an old typewriter in Cathlin's family cabin on the Bay of Fundy:





The two architects of the cropping scheme, Johnny Uys and Bill Bainbridge, produced a report that Bainbridge sent for comment to Ian Parker in Nairobi. Parker, the co-author of Dr. Richard Laws (d.2014) of *Elephants and their Habitats*, believed that the only way to solve Tsavo National Park's elephant overpopulation problem was to reduce numbers, a highly controversial conclusion.[xlv] On 23 November 1970, Parker replied to Bainbridge:

1. *The present criticism and confusion over the Luangwa cropping is the natural outcome of the absence of declared goals and policies for the reserve. With the lack of stated objectives, the decision as to whether trends were “desirable” or “undesirable” could only be subjective. That substantial public funds should have been spent on the project before a management objective was decided on is reprehensible. The foregoing notwithstanding, it is apparent that the Game Department did have a “generalised ambition” in the reserve. The apparent trends in decreasing floral diversity etc. were contrary to that “ambition”. If there was proof that animals were responsible, the action to reduce them would become justifiable when the Game Department’s “ambition” was projected as a clear nationally accepted goal.*

2. *From your information and my experience in East*

*Africa and elsewhere, I am certain that elephant are responsible for much of the Luangwa situation. If the decrease in floral diversity is to be halted and (possible) former diversity regained, you have no option but to manipulate the elephant toward this end. As in Uganda you will have to accelerate the eventual “crash”.*

*3. The reason for reducing hippo and buffalo are obscure. The hippo at 29.5 per mile of river (8,056 in 273 miles) is very low compared to say the Victoria Nile, which had c.250 per mile. The hippo grazing range you estimate at up to 5 miles from the river on both banks gives  $273 \times 10 = 2730$  square miles; just under 3 hippo to the square mile. You present virtually no case for the reduction of either buffalo or hippo.*

*4. Overall the report is too long and lacks factual data. When compared to some work done elsewhere on similar projects, the Luangwa results scientifically and economically seem very disappointing.*

*5. The goals you recommend make no reference or obvious consideration to Zambia’s individual requirements. Are there none?*

*6. You state clearly that there were no examples of large-scale cropping elsewhere to which you could turn to for advice. But preceding your work by some years was the Uganda National Parks hippo cropping in Queen Elizabeth National Park.*

Parker concluded by saying that the scheme was a massive failure.

In 1969 and 1970, while conducting some hunts in the Luangwa, I met up with [Stan Bleazard](#), Parker’s friend, a

pilot/administrator on the FAO project. In the Kenya Mau Mau campaign, a former Lieutenant became warden and deputy chief from 1960-1970 of the Kenya Game Department. In 1970 he came to the Luangwa, leaving on cropping's closure in 1973 to become deputy chief in the Malawi Game Department, staying until 1979. Here we met up again when Cathlin and I visited our friends the Zieglers on the Nyika, Anthony being the Warden there under another East African, Myles Turner, a former warden of the Serengeti. For five years, Stan worked as a freelance commercial pilot - having survived a crash in Luangwa brought on by his propeller coming adrift. In 1984 he moved to Australia with the old Uganda cropping hands - Ian Parker, Rob Backus and Alistair Graham living nearby. He and Parker then co-edited a book by 17 contributing game wardens entitled, *An Impossible Dream*.

The cropping program ceased in 1972 as a result, allegedly, of the lobbying of Kaunda by the conservationist Sir Peter Scott - a subject which I failed to question him on in 1975 when he and his wife Phillippa stayed with us in Bangweulu; she, like I, brought up in the Orange Free State of South Africa.



L-R: Peter Scott (d.1989) and wife Phillippa (d.2010), Aubry Buxton (d.2009), Chris Miller, Cathlin Manning, Chikuni, Bangweulu. 1975.

Over a seven-year period, 1,408 elephant, 1,643 hippo, 212 buffalo, and an unrecorded number of impala were cropped on the Luangwa scheme.[xlvi] By contrast, the cropping in Uganda carried out by Parker's Wildlife Services (Rob Backus et al.) accounted for 2,000 elephants in Murchison in 1965-1967 3,873 hippo between 1965 and March 1969.

At the time, Graeme Caughley of the FAO Luangwa Project estimated there were 350,000 elephant in Zambia. Then the poaching slaughter began; elephant reduced to 180,000 in 1981 and 25,000 in 2013.

In 1973, after conducting elephant aerial surveys with high confidence limits, attempts were made to continue the project; it is recommended that a two-step reduction of 5,000 elephants should occur. However, the cropping did not resume, and the project closed down; the reduction of elephant led to a massive onslaught of criminal poaching stimulated by the departure of European officers and the Zambianization of senior staff positions, the dramatic fall in the copper price, a simmering nationalist sense of resource entitlement, and ivory demand in the Far East. The cropping scheme had provided minimal benefit to local villagers. In November 1966, I learned that one five-ton load of ivory was 'hijacked' on its way to Lusaka.

Cropping to offset the ravages of the floristic diversity by elephant was therefore abandoned in Zambia. By contrast, in Rhodesia between 1960 and 1988, complete family units were culled as the answer to land degradation, 44,000 elephant being shot over the 18 years compared to the 1,408 over seven years in Zambia. Allan Savory, who recommended the culling in Rhodesia after transferring from the Northern Rhodesia Game Department to the equivalent in Southern Rhodesia, said it was a terrible blunder to cull elephant. However, [Brian Childe](#) [stated](#) in 2020 that:

*On threat of lawsuits from the Natural Resource Board for vegetation destruction, between 1960 and 1991 Zimbabwe culled or hunted some 46,775 elephants. The elephant population nonetheless expanded from 30,000 to 76,000. Even heavy culling of more than 4,000 a year, in the late 1980s, caused only a minor blip in elephant numbers and the accompanying habitat destruction.*

And he went on to present a convincing case for reducing elephant numbers.

Savory, applying himself later to the problem, put forward the notion that it was the great reduction in grazers and the misuse of fire that is the cause of desertification, requiring an increase in the number of grazers – coupled with a rotation of their grazing action - and not their reduction: this proposal he called holistic management, and later, the Savory system. At first, he punted it as a panacea to repair overgrazed areas, and later, as a tool to fight climate change. “The fundamental approach of this system is based on frequently rotating livestock herds to mimic native ungulates reacting to predators to break up biological material and trample plants and soils to promote restoration’.[xlvi]

This theory Carter et al. debunked, commenting that:

*Any claims of success due to HM are likely due to the management aspects of goal setting, monitoring and adapting to meet goals, not the ecological principles embodied in HM. Ecologically, the application of HM principles of trampling and intensive foraging are as detrimental to plants, soils and water storage, and plant productivity as are conventional grazing systems.[xlviii]*  
[xlix]

But in a letter to the Sierra Magazine, a vet and farmer, [Peter Ardington](#), after reading the many pro and con letters written in response to the article, ‘The Sacred Cow: Fighting Desertification’, in which [Christopher Ketcham criticizes Savory’s grazing system](#), observed that:

*Holistic management methodology with adequate recovery needs further research with recognition of historic observations before the scientific establishment rejects it. Currently the research is scanty and lacks recognition of such variables as periodicity, drought, wet conditions, and recovery in a broad holistic approach. We cannot expect to get all the right answers unless we ask all the right questions.*

*Can cows save the planet or not? This misses the point. Don't blame the cows. Blame the humans. How humans manage livestock can be destructive or constructive. Thus far in human history, overgrazing and ensuing horrors such as the great eroding American dust bowl of the 1930s have usually been the norm.*

## Johnny Uys

As boys, Johnny and his brother Jack were often found hunting the Kafue Flats, then teeming with game. They both then spent years in the Game Department: Johnny as a ranger, warden and chief wildlife warden; and Jack as the helicopter pilot.



By the 1960s, the Game Department was mortally wounded. In 1975 the Game Department, as we knew it came to an end, along with some of my greatest ever friends. In March 1969, Johnny Uys resigned from his post and joined Zambia Safaris as a professional hunter, guiding such as the baseball great Ted Williams[1] [li]





Johnny Uys and a lioness in 1970

In April 1970, Kaunda prevailed upon him to return to the department as Chief Wildlife Warden. This lasted a year. One day Johnny Uys wrote to me to say that he had married a girl whom he had met long ago in the Kafue National Park. He was happy; a son, the apple of his eye, came along. But times were changing, and despite President Kaunda's entreaties to stay, he left for Zimbabwe with his wife and child and took a job with a hotel group setting up game tours on the edge of the Wankie National Park. This was his dark hour. I thought back to his likely state of mind at the time of his resignation, of his despair and disappointment at the decline of Zambia. In 1973 we stayed with him at the Southern Sun Hotel's game concession near Dett in March and April, delayed from returning to Zambia by the landmines laid on roads leading to the border. Johnny gave us a delightful pole and dagga camp to live in for two months. I repaid his hospitality by assisting him with his plant collection.

I then decided to have done with safari-hunting and journey

to the Munyamadzi Corridor in the Luangwa, which I had opened for hunting safaris in 1969, to study buffalo. Cathlin and I had left Joburg in our 1957 Landrover Series I pulling a trailer loaded with three three-legged pots, a bag of mielie-meal and one of flour, cooking oil, bedding, and plastic sheeting. We were ready for the next adventure.

In August of 1973, while protecting some tourists, Johnny was killed by a cow elephant. Ron Kidson, Derek MacLeod and I flew down together for his funeral in Bulawayo, where we met up with his brother Jack, Phil Nel, and a former manager of Mfuwe Lodge, Stuart Campbell. On my return to my office in Chiundaponde, a letter from Johnny posted a few days before his death, 'Dear Yaningi and Cathie, don't forget to come, Xmas sounds a good time!!'. Thirty-five years later, in 2008, a letter appeared in the online 'Rhodiechat':[lii]

*I am seeking contact info for any children of Johnny Uys, who died saving the lives of my family, our friends, and two other members of our tour group in 1973. After many years, I sat down recently and wrote about that day. After writing it, and getting feedback from family and friends, it was brought to my attention that Johnny's family probably never heard the story from anyone who was there. If I remember correctly, Johnny had two kids... And I have no idea where they might have ended up. I do know Johnny had connections and family in Zambia. Possible they ended up there. Having lost my dad (who, after Johnny's death, got us out of there), it has become important to me to communicate that their dad was a very special fellow, and I have no doubt we would have died were it not for*

*his exemplary courage, and willingness to die saving us that day. Long winded, eh. - Member: AfricanHeart.*

I could never contact AfricanHeart to hear the full story or tell about Johnny's only son. Nor have I so far written the book on Johnny that I intended so many years ago, getting in touch with Errol Button as a result, as well as the last Governor-General of the Federation, Lord Dalhousie, for whom Johnny was a great favourite. Johnny's passing announced the end of a conservation era in Zambia and the Sixth Extinction beginnings. Elsewhere this had already begun.



*Johnny Uys memorial near Mfuwe*

And on the adjoining kopje near Mfuwe rests the ashes of my great friends, Derek MacLeod, and the memorial plaque for Phil and Janey Nel.



Just above me, a plaque commemorating the death of an unusual state of our friends, PhD in January 1983.



## The Killing Fields (1969 - )

In about 1969, the terrible plunder of wildlife had begun in East Africa, leading to the closure in 1973 of hunting-safaris in Tanzania and 1977, Kenya.[liii] The brief penumbra of colonial control was ended.

Four years after independence, President Kaunda had greatly centralized power over wildlife and protected areas in the 1968 wildlife bill presented to parliament. At the time, this was

little questioned given the existence of a highly competent Game Department with a vibrant research division based on a model copied by some other colonies, and funds were in plentiful supply given the high price of copper. In 1970 the Natural Resources Act of 1962 was repealed and replaced by the Natural Resources Act of 1970. Although it provided for a natural resources advisory board to oversee the management of natural resources, the provision of conservation plans and the appointment of fire authorities through provincial and district natural resources committees, it awarded total control of the various committees and their members to the Minister – a gross centralization of power. In the case of the Natural Resources Act of 1970, most of its provisions were in any case repealed by the Environmental Protection and Pollution Control Act of 1990, which only retained a few sections having to do with the conservation of natural resources and bush fires.[liv]

Kaunda and his central committee simply ignored not only two Acts of Parliament of immense importance to customary people and the conservation of natural resources, but all of their African religion and culture in which the care of the earth and their 'living ancestors' is paramount, a tragedy for the customary commons and the country as a whole.

The Wildlife Act No 65 of 1971 confirmed that the powers placed in the civil service head of the Game Department, the Director, were now under the sanction of the Minister. Penalties for poaching were increased as the hunting-safari industry expanded as part of the patronage system. The government passed a further eight statutory instruments outlining new regulations governing hunting licences, trophies, protected animals and legal methods of hunting. One of the prescriptions was that controlled hunting areas were

converted to 32 game management areas (GMAs), implemented by statutory instrument on 1 February 1971. This was a massive and surreptitious landgrab of customary area.

Hence, at the total behest of a politician, the two acts were the declaration of the one-party state in 1972 ensuring that these two Acts' eco-social provisions would be disregarded and commoner villagers in danger of being reduced to a state of peasanthood. In 1974, 32 years of a European run Game Department called the Game & Tsetse Control Department, the Department of Game & Fisheries, the Department of National Parks and Wildlife variously, and the National Parks and Wildlife Service (NPWS) came to an end. We were aggressively Zambianized; a veterinarian Geoffrey Zyambo appointed its first director in 1975, a plethora of mainly Indian-owned companies given hunting concessions, some of them to business people with no previous safari or wildlife conservation interest, attracted solely by the opportunity to obtain foreign exchange. Kaunda's Watershed Speech of 1975 declared that expatriate staff could not leave government service and enter other employment in the country. And, with the copper price plummeting, the game was over.

The construction of the Chinese Tanzam railway from Kapiri Mposhi to Dar es Salaam and the Chinese and Muslim Indian criminal dealership in rhino horn and ivory lead to the domino effect of safari-hunting closures for rhino (1979), elephant in 1983, and leopard and lion in 2013. In 2018, elephant and leopard remain on safari licence, along with 2,000 hippo to be cropped - from a population of 16,000 - because they are overpopulated.

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## Old Happy Africa

*Bandung and decolonization (1955) - 'Winds of Change' speech (1960) - Northern Rhodesia handed to class 'politician' – betrayal of white settlers - violent nationalism - Burton murder (1960) - Cha Cha Cha movement (1961) - killing of the Secretary General of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjöld (18 September 1961) - self-government granted (3 January 1964) - flawed constitution - Barotseland Agreement signed (18 May 1964) – Zambia Independence Bill in Commons ushers in American style constitution (7 July 1964) - Kaunda seduces British - political nationalism - self-rule - Kaunda makes promise on honouring of agreement (6 August 1964) – Kaunda applies Local Government Act to Barotseland (1965) - BNC abolished - Chiefs Act of 1965 enacted - Barotse native courts abolished (1966) - Kaunda engineers an amendment to the constitution (17 June 1969) - Kaunda removes Litunga's mineral rights (1969) - Kaunda renames Barotseland - Kaunda engineers a referendum coup and the Referendum Act (17 June 1969) - Western Province Act No. 47 removes Litunga's powers over land, wildlife and natural resources (1970) - forest administration centralized (1973) - MMD Party - Chiluba wins election (1991) - BRE legal*

*proceeding against GRZ using lawyer Chongwe - Chiluba declares state of emergency to deal with Barotse (1993) - KK arrested (1997) - Mwanawasa and toothless Mung'omba Commission (2001-2008) - under Banda situation deteriorates (2008-2012) - Mongu killings (14 Jan. 2011) - BNC tell Banda succession not being sought (Feb. 2011) - Sata recognizes Barotse Agreement (Sept. 2011) - Sata establishes Rodger Chongwe Commission on Mongu killings (Sept. 2011) - Sata and Kabimba refuse to release Commission findings - BNC support abrogation - complaint to Africa Commission by Ngambela (2012) - Barotse treason arrests (2013) - Canadian shame - BRE lay case against Litunga for stealing BRE funds received from African Parks (2017)*

*I should now like to turn to the Barotseland Agreement, which was reached in London in May, and I wish to give an assurance that it is the government's full intention that the Barotseland Agreement will be honoured fully after Independence. I believe that the agreement reached in London was an honourable agreement from the point of view of both the central government and Barotse government, I believe that the way to ensure that it is implemented to advantage us all is by means of a close personal relationship between the Litunga and the prime minister.*

*Prime Minister Kenneth Kaunda – speech to Litunga of Barotseland and Barotseland National Council on 6 August 1964*

*To know and not to know, to be conscious of complete truthfulness while telling carefully constructed lies, to hold simultaneously two opinions which cancelled out, knowing*

*them to be contradictory and believing in both of them, to use logic against logic, to repudiate morality while laying claim to it, to believe that democracy was impossible and that the Party was the guardian of democracy, to forget, whatever it was necessary to forget, then to draw it back into memory again at the moment when it was needed, and then promptly to forget it again, and above all, to apply the same process to the process itself – that was the ultimate subtlety; consciously to induce unconsciousness, and then, once again, to become unconscious of the act of hypnosis you had just performed. Even to understand the word ‘doublethink’ involved the use of doublethink.*

*George Orwell (Eric Arthur Blair) – Nineteen Eighty-Four*

*Facts do not cease to exist because they are ignored.*

*Aldous Huxley – Proper Studies*

\* \* \*

## Decolonization

As the historian Paul Johnson has recorded, the Afro-Asian Conference held at Bandung in Indonesia in April 1955, where four African and twenty-three Asian independent states gathered, lit the fuse of decolonization.[i] It also set in motion, slowly at first, in steam engine fashion, the mounting assault on the

customary commons of traditional people, on their ecosystem services, and on wildlife. Who could have foreseen then that by 2014 fully 59% of the world's tropical vertebrate species would be destroyed as a result of habitat loss and plunder?

The central belief of those optimistic Bandungites, filled as they were with the hubris of those times, was that they formed the nucleus of millions of the world's population and mobilised a third world of the free non-aligned. The Suez Crisis of 1956-1957 – explained by America's opposition to anything that would send the Arabs into the arms of the Soviets - confirmed that Britain had lost the will to rule their Empire.[ii] The blockade of the Suez Canal by Colonel Nasser and Britain's Eden government's dithering was in marked contrast to Israel's resolute action. But Nasser and the Bandung generation - with the support of UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, had won. Thus for the British Empire, weakened by World War II and Suez, and with world opinion supportive of the colonized, a radical change was not far off. But a British White Paper in 1948 had already recognized this, declaring that British colonial policy was to guide colonial territories to responsible self-government, clearly something that was impossible.

In the British general election of 1959, the final decision was taken to withdraw from Africa; the 'Winds of Change' speech made by Prime Minister Macmillan in Cape Town in 1960 merely making it public. Forgotten was the long-held and forlorn policy - as pointed out by the economist J.A. Hodson, that Britain 'saw the internationalization of colonial control as the best guarantee that colonial peoples and their resources would be managed for their own and the general good, rather than for the sake of profiteers'. What is curious all these years later is that while the colonized could mobilize



themselves, the colonizers never had any substantive meeting – other than that famous carve-up in Berlin – to chart a united path forward to decolonization. But then the whole process was engineered by men such as Cecil Rhodes, Hodson coining the term ‘imperialism’ to describe it.

Since taking over from the BSA Company in 1924, the British Provincial Administration (PA) had fought against an increasingly vocal and powerful settler group and the siren call of the Apartheid South while continuing to rule through the chiefs as part and parcel of the native authorities created in 1929 under the Dual Mandate Policy, i.e. Indirect Rule. Now they were suddenly faced with the inevitability of withdrawal. The question, however, was to whom should they hand power. The native authorities – Barotseland apart – were still embryonic and required administrative and accounting expertise, particularly where clan and traditional leadership interests required an independent person or group to steer the ship through the muddy cultural waters. But the PA was not to make the decision; that was a matter for the Imperial Government who now looked around for the group normally in receipt of political power, professional politicians, candidates suitable for African nation-statist leadership, who despite their greatly inflated freedom-fighter credentials would, as Davison remarked, be the *interlocuteurs valables*, for they were the grand deceivers, making a show of accepting the primacy of civilized Western standards in order to take power. To them were handed the keys of The House – in Zambia, State House.[iii] As Johnson observed:[iv]

*The beneficiaries of decolonization were, therefore, the*

*vote-manipulators. Colonialism, of course, could not produce political equality; what it could, and at best did provide was equality before the law. But the process of transfer, by making the vote the yardstick of progress, left the law to take itself so that in the long run the vast majority of Africans ended up with nothing.*

Although this was a massive and callow act of expediency by the Imperial Government on the people whom their admirable PA - of no more than 250 men at any one time - had served so well for a mere 40 years as a protectorate within Pax Britannica, the decision to decolonize merely following what had been laid out in the 1948 White Paper, the PA therefore in a straight-jacket not of their tailoring. As great as was the betrayal of the native authorities by the Imperial Government, many of whom supported the new order called politician, so on the face of it was the betrayal of the European settlers who had been recruited to support Pax Britannica and the building of modern society. But the settlers refused to compromise on the sharing of power with Africans, rejecting British proposals under the 1962 constitution and forcing the hand of the Imperial Government.[v]

By then, Kenneth Kaunda had already formed the Zambian African National Congress in October 1958, having broken off from Harry Nkumbula's African National Congress. During this period, a member of the PA, [Jack Rose \(d.2009\)](#) - during World War II, a Wing-Commander and DFC - had been seconded to the Police Special Branch, telling me that in 1996 Kaunda had passed him inside information on Nkumbula's ANC.[vi]

The Northern Rhodesia Liberal Party under Sir John Smith

Moffat had fought hard for a future in which they hoped there would be a sharing of power. They wished to equalize the voting strengths of all citizens on a single common voter's role for the next election, an African elected majority in the legislative council. In this, they manifestly failed, with Sir John (d.1985) moving in despair to New Zealand. What was clearly lost in all the party politics and the attempts by Europeans and moderate Africans to stay the course was the opportunity to go to nationhood based on the African participatory model extolled by F.H. Melland, rather than the now-bankrupt neoliberal model with its army of 'other nations' representatives and the battalions of *compradors* and their deep pockets serving financialized capital.

In May 1960, was revealed the spectre of violent black nationalism in a cowardly attack by a United National Independence Party (UNIP) mob on Mrs Lillian Burton and her two young daughters. Petrol was poured over their car and set alight, the family dog burnt alive, Mrs Burton dying later in hospital – the children surviving. UNIP was responsible, though their spokesmen, Munu Sipalo and Sikota Wina, denied any responsibility. Following this came calls for Governor Sir Evelyn Hone's resignation, even though he had invoked the Public Security Ordinance on the Copperbelt, banning all UNIP activity.

The trial of those responsible took place in October 1960. As Judge Somerhough was passing sentence on the four Ngebe boys, he died on the bench, and shortly after that, the prosecutor, Paul Council, collapsed and was taken to hospital, where he later recovered. The case was retired and a new date set. Sir John Blagden was flown in and placed in a highly secure house, his food specially prepared and protected from poisoning. He

sentenced the Ngebe brothers to death; they appealed but were hung at Livingstone, some Lusaka streets rapidly renamed after them. Burton wrote an open letter to Kaunda in protest and then emigrated with his children.

## The killing of the Secretary-General

On 18 September 1961, an event took place at Ndola, which is still being investigated: the crash of a DC-6 carrying the [Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjöld](#).

*The purpose of the flight was to bring Secretary Hammarskjöld to a meeting with Moïse Tshombe, the president of the breakaway republic of Katanga, in which many western (British, French, Belgian and American) investors had large stakes in various mineral deposits. Those corporate interests had supported independence for Katanga after the Congolese leadership, notably Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, had advocated closer relations with the Communist bloc. (Lumumba, himself, was assassinated in January 1961, in what some researchers now believe was part of a Central Intelligence Agency plot to get rid of him.)*

[A map of warlike interventions](#) by the US since WWII neglected to include Zambia.

## UNIP violence in North-East (1961)

In August 1961, the north-east of the territory erupted into violence as card-carrying UNIP members lead by militants wearing coonskin caps conducted their *cha cha cha* campaign, burning schools and churches and blockading sections of the Great North Road. Governor Hone then assumed extra powers through provisions of the Public Security Ordinance, regulations already in force in the Northern and Western Provinces.[vii] The epicentre of this violence was in Chinsali District, home of UNIP's leader, Kenneth Kaunda.



Violence in Chinsali District September 1961

Even Sir Stewart Gore-Brown, an ardent Kaunda supporter, saw his Shiwa Ngandu farm school burnt down. But most of the destruction affected Africans and not Europeans, and many villages were temporarily deserted.

By July 1964, the UNIP campaign against Lumpa church members for refusing to join their movement caused an open rebellion against UNIP and set in motion the Lumpa's destruction between July and October 1964 by the police and the army.

## Self-rule and abrogation of the Barotseland Agreement

On 3 January 1964, Queen Elizabeth signed an Order in Council formally granting self-rule to Northern Rhodesia. On 23 January, Kenneth Kaunda was appointed Prime Minister. After 11 months of negotiations in Northern Rhodesia and London, the Barotseland Agreement 1964 laying out the conditions for the merger of two British protectorates in a unitary state, was signed on 18 May 1964 by Kaunda, the Prime Minister of the Protectorate of Northern Rhodesia Sir Mwanawina Lewanika III, the Paramount Chief (the *Litunga*) of the Protectorate of Barotseland, and Duncan Sandys, the Queen's Principal Secretary of State for the Commonwealth and the Colonies. This gave Kaunda, the master of cognitive dissonance, aka doublethink, the powers and confidence to embed the Kaunda dictatorship.



On 7 July 1964, at the second reading of the Zambia Independence Bill in the House of Commons, details of the constitution negotiated with the Northern Rhodesia Government were debated, leading to the Bill's approval. The [opening address by John Tilney](#), Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the Colonies, was a shameful Kaunda praise-singing affair, followed by a statement of what 'Zambia wishes', a sure guarantee of Kaunda's and Zambia's future dictatorial rule:[viii]

*Zambia wishes to have an executive President with wide powers, giving firm and effective leadership. But that does not mean dictatorship. There are many checks and*

*balances. Though the present Constitutional Council will disappear, its functions will be carried on by a judicial tribunal. The existing Bill of Rights is carried forward and entrenched with special arrangements for its enforcement. The judiciary will be independent. Public prosecutions should be effectively separated from politics. There will be a Public Service Commission for the Civil Service.*

Then Tilney informed the House of the Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill, Clause 8:

*This terminates the rights and obligations of the Crown and of the Northern Rhodesia Government arising under all existing agreements, undertakings or understandings with the Litunga of Barotseland. The Clause does not affect the Barotseland Agreement, 1964, which was an Agreement entered into between the Northern Rhodesia Government and the Litunga at the time of the Independence Conference regarding the position of Barotseland within independent Zambia; nor does it affect the rights and obligations between the Litunga and other parties under the agreements to which it refers.*

*The British Government have been conscious throughout the approach to independence of their special relationship with the Litunga, who visited London in 1963, for discussions with the then First Secretary. As a result of these talks, he agreed to open discussions with the Northern Rhodesia Government about the future relationship between Barotseland and Northern Rhodesia. After a long process of negotiations, Kaunda and the*



*Litunga, in the presence of the Secretary of State, signed a new agreement on 18th May which defined the position of Barotseland, which is to become an integral part of independent Zambia.*

Then Maurice Foley, the MP for West Bromwich, did away with the fawning:

*It was Her Majesty's Government who persuaded the Lewanika, in 1953, against his better judgment, to support the notion of federation. It was Her Majesty's Government who then knighted him as a reward and who referred to him as the Litunga. Since that day when we saw the inevitability of the end of federation, we tried to preserve this old feudal rule in Barotseland while, at the same time, dealing with the nationalist party of Dr Kaunda. The ignominy of it all was seen recently. This poor old man must be the most unhappy man in the whole of Central Africa. He is brought to London not to participate in the talks for independence, but at the end of these talks. He is brought in at ten o'clock at night to sign a document, which he does, which is reflected in this Constitution, whereby there is no Barotseland, whereby he has no power, whereby the Government of Zambia and the Nationalist Party have full control over Barotseland, as, indeed, they have over every part of Zambia.*

To this, R.H. Turton, MP for Thirsk and Malton replied:

*The hon. Member for West Bromwich was again inaccurate when he talked about the Litunga of Barotseland. He was not brought to Britain. He was most anxious to come to Britain because he felt that Britain owed him an explanation of why it proposed to part company with him. I hope that we shall not find in days to come that the Litunga is in the same position as the Asantehene, in Northern Ghana, who finds that a tyranny has deprived him of all his power and that his tribe is deeply unhappy.*

Foley understood the bogus nature of the Barotse Agreement and the fact that the Litunga's long-held expectations of independence à la Bechuanaland would not come to fruition. This is lent substance by the recent leaking of a 57-year old report by someone in the government at the time revealing Britain's 'dumping' of Barotseland.[ix] This was all the result of a remarkable act of seduction by Kaunda. He affects people: the smiling and gracious mien, the friendly man who beguiles us all. He had completely won over the senior Members of the House. How else was it possible to have Britain agree to a constitution more American than British, with a President standing aloof from parliament and having massive powers. The catalogue of supposed checks and balances supplied was pure illusion, as they are with the succession of generally woeful Presidents in America – including Franklin Roosevelt who declared a national state of emergency and then interred Japanese Americans for the duration of the war.

As with the Litunga on the Barotseland Agreement 1964, Kaunda had deceived the British, extracting promises of continued aid, but at the same time having the cheek to refuse the whites of Zambia the privilege of holding dual nationality.

Tilney's statement that 'Her Majesty also formally assumed obligations under agreements concluded between the British South Africa Company and the Litunga during the period that the company was responsible for the administration of the territory', referred to the Lochner Concession of 1890 when the *Litunga* had signed over the mining rights for all of Barotseland to the BSA Company in return for protection against the Matabele, the *Litunga* being misled by Lochner into believing that he was, in fact, dealing with the British Crown. Lewanika confirmed the Lochner Concession in 1895 and then signed the Lawley Concession in 1898 that allowed the BSA Company to sell land in the Toka and Ila country. However, these rights were not thought inconsistent with Barotseland's protectorate status as laid out in the Barotseland North-Western Rhodesia Order in Council of November 1899, the responsibility of the Secretary for the Colonies and his High Commissioner for the territory. As some referred to him, the *Litunga*, or King Lewanika - though not High Commissioner Milner, had handed over his country. He trusted the white man - the British, he and Milner having a very cordial relationship.

In the House of Commons on 10 July 1964, but three days after the second reading of the Bill, and less than two months after the signing of the Agreement, the MP Ronald Bell – who had missed the debate on 7 July, tried to placate the muttering backbenchers who believed that either the Barotse people had given away too much, or Kaunda was not to be trusted:[x]

*At the time Dr Kaunda gave a solemn promise on behalf of himself and his Government that after independence had come into force, after the passage of this measure, he, on*

*behalf of his Government, would solemnly and publicly reaffirm as an independent country their adherence to this agreement and their observance of its terms.*

Fenner Brockway, MP for Eton and Slough, then produced some nauseous sycophancy, “I know Prime Minister Kaunda very well, and am sure that he will carry out this Agreement in the letter and in the spirit.” The Bill, having been read for the third time, was passed.

Kaunda delivered the supreme act of deceit - a template for the unprincipled autocracies that were to follow, in a speech to the *Litunga* and the Barotseland National Council on 6 August 1964 - two months before independence: “...the Barotseland Agreement will be honoured fully after independence,” he announced.[xi] At the same time, miles away in Chinsali District, Lumpa Church members were being slaughtered in their villages simply because they refused to carry UNIP cards, to live with non-church members, or to dance to the tune of politicians. Kaunda banned the Lumpa Church on 3 August and arrested Alice Lenshina on 11 August. But the massacre continued. These events are to this day conveniently forgotten in the clamour of adulation for the supposed ‘freedom fighters’.

Thus the course of history was inevitable: where 70 years before in the territory there had been no written language and no politicians, the latter now took power in the name of ‘freedom’ – a legitimized coup mounted against customary people, supported by a constitution without the safeguards necessary to forestall dictatorship. Six months later, on 24 October 1964, the two protectorates – Barotseland, surrounded by Northern Rhodesia, merged as a condition for creating the Zambian unitary state. Under the agreement, the *Litunga* of

Barotseland – in consultation with his Barotseland National Council, was authorized to make laws for Barotseland (at the time comprising 16% of Zambia and which included parts of the present-day Copperbelt, Central, Western, Southern and North-Western Provinces) with full authority over local government, land, forests, fishing, hunting, game preservation and the control of bush fires. The agreement was very specific on the issue of land:[xii]

*In particular, the Litunga of Barotseland and his Council shall continue to have the powers hitherto enjoyed by them in respect of land matters under customary law and practice; the courts at present known as the Barotse Native Courts shall have original jurisdiction (to the exclusion of any other court in the Republic of Zambia) in respect of matters concerning rights or interest in land in Barotseland. Provided that nothing in this paragraph shall be construed as limiting the jurisdiction and powers of the High Court of the Republic of Zambia about writs or orders of the kind at present known as prerogative of writs or orders.*

Kaunda, of course, had no intention of honouring the agreement. He had witnessed first-hand the actions of the Imperial Government turning its back on the traditional leaders it had so carefully created and nurtured under Indirect Rule for 36 years, handing power to politicians instead - people like himself. His time he knew had come; after all, he was a graduate of Her Majesty's Prison Service, interned twice for subversive political activities - two months in 1955, and nine months in 1959 when

the Governor declared a state of emergency and banned his party - making him determined to continue to be as subversive as was necessary to take power. From the time of his violent *cha cha cha* campaign in Northern Province, Kaunda knew that power was in his grasp. The British had given up; their White Paper of 1948 made this clear. The UNIP-African National Congress coalition defeated the opposition in the October 1962 election, with Kaunda made Minister of Local Government and Social Welfare. As Gervas Clay, Resident Commissioner, friend and advisor to the *Litunga*, said in a letter to a Northern Rhodesia friend at the time:[xiii]

*Barotseland is much the same as usual, except for vicious attacks being made on the Paramount Chief by some of his enemies in the United National Independence Party. Anyone who saw the local gutter press would believe that Barotseland was on the verge of revolution, but this is all an attack from the outside, and within we are still very peaceful. The younger generation are unhappy about the demand for secession because they think that there would be no money for their pay and they would be under a rather reactionary Government forever, but I doubt rather if the Paramount Chief and his Indunas really believe they will get it. They are certainly frightened of U.N.I.P. and the way things seem to be going, and would prefer a "white" Government to "black" nationalism. They are always asking why Kaunda and Co. are given V.I.P. treatment by the British Government (they had been invited to Chequers) when everyone knows they live and get their support by thuggery and intimidation. It certainly seems*

*to pay to be naughty if you are African, and one wonders how much longer the Barotse Government will continue to be good and loyal when they see what happens to those who are the reverse. Mwanawina and his party will be going to England in March for talks in April. I wonder if they will be invited to Chequers??*

Clay, as Resident Commissioner, was in an invidious position: the Barotse wanted to retain their protectorate status at the very least, and the Colonial Office wished Barotseland to be incorporated with Northern Rhodesia in the new Zambia. As a result, truly a man of the nineteenth century, whose word was his bond, Clay received no plaudits, no knighthood, no OBE (Other Buggers Efforts) from Buck House.

From 1962 onwards, UNIP 'by thuggery and intimidation' had steamrolled the Barotse opposition, assisted by Lozi members of UNIP such as Nalumino Mundia, Kabaleke Konoso, Munukayumbwa Sipalo, Arthur Wina, and his brother, Sikota, whose father, Kalonga Wina, the *Litunga* had removed as his Prime Minister (*Ngambela*). Given the UNIP hegemony at the time, the Barotse were lucky that consideration was even given to an agreement. But the Barotseland Agreement 1964 was signed at a Chequers meeting, the Queen carrying the day.

The declaration in July 1964 by Governor Sir Evelyn Hone of a state of emergency to deal with the Lumpa Church in Northern Province and Lundazi District allowed Kaunda and succeeding state presidents to declare emergency regulations whenever they decided to issue an emergency proclamation, suspending clauses of the Bill of Rights in the process and restricting freedom of expression and association. When to this was added the State Security Act, the Preservation of

Public Security Act and the Public Order Act, sufficient for a person to be arrested and interned for waving a flag outdoors, we can understand why Zambia – under a permanent state of semi-emergency, is such a prize for big man presidents – all of it having its roots in a Zambian constitution agreed to by Britain, one providing few safeguards against excessive executive powers. On 24 October 1964, the territory became ‘independent’ of Britain. A month earlier, Kaunda announced his cabinet, which included members of the Barotse elite, the Wina brothers, Munu Sipalo, and Nalumino Mundia.

In 1965, Kaunda’s treachery became all too apparent.

Contrary to Clause (8) of the [Barotseland Agreement 1964](#) stating that ‘The Government of the Republic of Zambia shall take steps as may be necessary to ensure that the laws for the time being in force in the Republic are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement’, Kaunda and Sikota Wina (Minister of Local Government) abrogated the Agreement by enacting the Local Government Act No 69 of 1965. Section 113 stated, ‘The provision of this Act shall apply in Barotseland. The powers contained here may be exercised about Barotseland notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other written law as or in the Barotseland Agreement 1964’. As Nahayaluna wrote in *The Barotseland Walk to Freedom*, ‘Thus the beginning of an unlawful and spiteful orgy of legislating against his constitutional obligations under which Her Majesty’s Government had granted independence to Zambia’.

Then Sikota Wina produced a statutory instrument abolishing the Barotse National Council and provided in its place five district councils staffed by members he had appointed. The Barotse Native Treasury was closed down, the funds purloined. According to a report to parliament in 2013 by Vice-President



Guy Scott, the Minister of Local Government Arthur Wina had taken £411,000 from the Barotse Royal Treasury and supposedly 'distributed it among district councils across the country'. All the administrative staff under the Barotseland Royal Establishment (BRE) was relocated to government offices. Also enacted was the Chiefs Act 1965, which empowered the president to recognize or withdraw chiefs' recognition, including the *Litunga* and the chiefs serving under him. On 7 September 1965, Sikota Wina in parliament haughtily rationalized what he had done, "The Barotse, Mr Speaker, are no longer interested in being regarded as museum specimens, or to be regarded as pure preservation of old happy Africa as seen through the eyes of Stanley." In April 1966, the Local Courts Act was enacted, repealing the Barotse Native Courts Ordinance and abolishing the Barotse native courts; another outrageous action that shames Zambia to this day.

There came a plaintive call in December 1966 from that supposed repository of Judeo-Christian reason, the British House of Commons, the MP Biggs-Davison inquiring of the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs as to what exactly he had heard, given that the Barotseland National Council had just been dissolved without the *Litunga's* consent. MP Knox-Cunningham repeated the question. "None, Sir," replied Minister Hart. She went on to say that Zambia was now an independent country and ran its own affairs.

In this same year, the UNIP government banned all labour recruitment for the South African mines, turning the people of Barotseland against UNIP and causing considerable hardship because of the mines' importance in generating income for some 5,000 miners a year.

In 1966 a future Zambian Prime Minister, Nalumino Mundia,

formed the United Party as a catalyst for support to the Agreement and a promise to restore the power of Zambia's chiefs. On 30 May 1967, Kaunda recognized Biafra's secession from Nigeria, an action not lost on the Barotse. In the same year, President Nyerere announced the Arusha Declaration of collectivization and the Ujamaa tyranny. In March 1968, the year of a national election, Munu Sipalo, then Minister of Agriculture, made a startling attack on Kaunda, warning against the 'Divine Right of Presidents'. With support now strongly lodged with the United Party in Barotseland, Kaunda declared it illegal and imprisoned Mundia using his powerful arsenal of emergency powers, only releasing him in 1969. Later, Mundia was miraculously elevated to Zambia's ceremonial prime minister between 1981-1985, having obviously tired of being excluded from the big man trough.

On 26 January 1967, MP Bell inquired of the British Prime Minister whether Kaunda had communicated on the abrogation matter. The long-winded reply was that no communication had been received. On 2 December 1968, Sir Ronald Bell Q.C. (d.1982) called in disgust in the House of Commons for a motion condemning Kaunda's abrogation of the Agreement. Britain took no action against Kaunda and Zambia.

In the general election, UNIP lost eight out of 11 seats, three Lozi cabinet ministers, two of them being Arthur Wina and Sipalo. Kaunda now decided to destroy the Agreement utterly. On 17 June 1969, he arranged a constitutional referendum to amend the constitution and remove the requirement for future amendments of clauses protecting fundamental rights to go to a public referendum, requiring only a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly. The referendum was supposedly passed with an 85% 'yes' vote, turnout recorded reaching 69.5%.

Not to be outdone by Neil Armstrong's walk on the moon on 21 July, Kaunda, in a speech to UNIP on 11 August 1969 entitled, *Towards complete independence*, declared:

*I shall now deal with other types of mineral rights. The Litunga holds rights to determine conditions of prospecting licences, mining leases, etc. and to claim royalty on minerals in certain areas. I am afraid I have to terminate these rights completely and without compensation. The rights of the Litunga should not be different to those of our other traditional rulers. The rights of the Litunga are not different to those of the Nation, and I, and my Government are elected custodians of the interests of the Nation. The Litunga can rest assured, however, that we shall exercise these rights in the best interest of the Nation as a whole.*

The Mines and Minerals Act of 1969 made this law. In the same year, this *annus horribilis*, Kaunda announced that thenceforth Barotseland would be known as Western Province. The Referendum Act was then enacted, allowing parliament to amend the constitution without going to a national referendum. One of the Referendum Act's objectives resulting from the constitutional referendum was to allow Kaunda to confiscate land held by absentee landowners – duly carried out. Kaunda's despotic thunderclap, the *Zambian Constitution (Amendment No. 5) Act No. 33 of 1969* (the Referendum Act), utterly destroyed the Barotse Agreement. The carcass was picked clean by another legislative vulture, the *Western Province (Land and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act No 47 of 1970*, removed the

*Litunga's* powers over wildlife and natural resources and vested them in the President, all land in the Western Province being 'Hereby vested in the President as a Reserve within the meaning of and under the Zambia (State Lands and Reserve) Orders 1928 to 1964'. This was the willful destruction of the Barotse Guardians of Nature, for in a stroke was ignored, not only the Agreement but the fact that Barotseland was a model for future decentralization and the careful use of natural resources, where, from 1936, the Barotse Orders, Rules and Regulations saw the indigenous knowledge and management systems codified.

There were 26 Orders under Section 8 of the Ordinance of 1936, such as the Forest Orders dealing with the management of the teak forests. In 1968 the Barotse Forest Fund had £221,000 in its account, destroyed later by the Forestry Act of 1973, which centralized all forest administration in the Forestry Department (no mention being made of Barotseland).

In the mid-1980s, Kaunda co-opted *Litunga* Ilute Yeta of Barotseland and the paramount chiefs Chitimukulu (Bemba) and Kazembe (Lunda) to the UNIP Central Committee.

In 1991 the MMD Party broke Kaunda's stranglehold on the country. Under Frederick Chiluba, the MMD took power with an overwhelming mandate, a movement for multi-party democracy started by two Lozi's, Akashambatwa Mbikusita - son of *Litunga* Godwin Mbikusita (1968-1977), and Arthur Wina, Vernon Mwaanga, and Chiluba - the latter the trade union leader at the time, imprisoned by Kaunda in 1981 for three months on charges of plotting to overthrow the Government.

After the 1991 elections, Kaunda disappeared for a time into an ignoble 'Father of the Nation' role, garlanded by the great and the good and laden with a white man's burden of

honorary doctorates - to their shame - from the Universities of Belgrade, Fordham, Dublin, Wales, Windsor, Sussex, York, Chile, Humboldt State, California and Zambia. In 1996 Kaunda, out of power, decided on a political comeback and appointed Senior Chief Inyambo Yeta as UNIP Vice-President. In the same year, Yeta and seven other politicians were arrested and charged with treason and murder by the Chiluba regime after the 'Black Mamba' bombings in Lusaka. A *pro bono* group of lawyers had come to the latter's defence - Edward Shamwana, Sakwiba Sikota and Lucy Sichone. To President Chiluba's chagrin, Yeta and the others were released, it later being discovered that the security agents of the Office of the President (*shushushu*) were responsible for the bombings. But Yeta had aligned himself with Kaunda - as had his father, the *Litunga* Ilute Yeta, the latter allowing himself to be co-opted by Kaunda onto the UNIP Central Committee from 1983-2000, a cosy unprincipled alliance with the man responsible for the massive treachery of the Barotseland Agreement 1964 abrogation. On 23 August 1997, Kaunda and Rodger Chongwe - the latter having tired of the MMD - were shot at and wounded by police in Kabwe, Chongwe taking refuge in Australia, and Kaunda in 2000 opting for good works.

In the first two years of the Chiluba presidency (1991-2001), the Barotse Royal Establishment (BRE) began legal proceedings using the services of Chongwe but gave up after some neat shoe shuffles from Chiluba, a challenged man whose shoe collection rivalled that of Imelda Marcos.

There was no progress on the Barotse question during Chiluba's time. When in 1993, the *Litunga* had written to Chiluba requesting that he restore the Barotseland Agreement 1964, Chiluba threatened to arrest him and then introduced a

full state of emergency. The Law Association of Zambia was in no doubt that it was legally binding and had to be honoured if there was an agreement. Chiluba, aided by his poisonous *shushushu* State House security officers, imprisoned a war hero and three of his fellow serving soldiers, newly returned in 1997 from serving in Rwanda. Major Berrington Mkoma had saved the life of the journalist, Nick Gordon. The soldiers were held in hell in Lusaka for ten years, Mkoma developing cancer and receiving no treatment. Somehow he survived. The charges were without foundation.[xiv]

President Mwanawasa (2001-2008) was in no way tempted to correct a great wrong and engage with *Litunga* Lubosi II (2000- ), even though in 2005, the Mung'omba Constitutional Review Commission recommended that the government and the BRE should start negotiations on the Barotse Agreement. Nothing eventuated. Like the others before and after him, it was all about entrenching his big man position of power for two terms.

Under President Banda (2008-2012), the situation in Barotseland rapidly deteriorated. There was tribal friction, in particular involving the Mbunda tribe, some of them being members of the royal family but serving as *indunas* (headmen) and feeling discriminated against. In 2010 submissions by the BRE to the National Constitutional Conference (NCC), that farrago of Banda nonsense when his rule of patronage was at its apogee fell on barren ground, fueling the fires of Barotse discontent. The Constitutional Conference remains a very costly national disgrace, for which Banda and President Sata were responsible.

On 14 January 2011, three unregistered Barotse organizations held a peaceful rally in Mongu, calling for the Agreement's

restoration. Banda's forces attacked the demonstrators using live ammunition, allegedly killing nineteen people - another five going missing, and interning many on treason charges, one of them a 91-year old former *Ngambela* of Barotseland, Maxwell Mututwe. Some of those interned were abused and tortured.

On 11 February 2011, Senior Chief Inyambo Yeta, accompanied by 15 *indunas*, and representing the Litunga, presented the Barotse National Council's report to President Banda, making it absolutely clear that secession was not being sought, but rather a peaceful resolution to the issue of the Barotseland Agreement 1964, i.e. restoration, not secession.

Later, Michael Sata, the Patriotic Front leader campaigning in Barotseland for the September 2011 national election, told one gathering:[xv]

*How can you ignore an agreement that was signed, sealed and delivered almost 47 years ago? There is no honest person who can deny the existence and validity of the Barotse Agreement...and those with integrity honour valid agreements they have entered into whether they still like them or not.*

Michael Sata promised to restore the Agreement within 90 days of winning the election, even though, as an MMD Minister, he had opposed it. On becoming President, Sata released some activists but refused compensation to victims of his government's oppression. Incredibly, Kaunda was brought back into the picture doing envoy work here and there for Sata, although he kept quiet on the Barotse Question. Sata made no effort to restore the Agreement, merely instituting the Rodger

Chongwe Commission of Inquiry into the Mongu killings in September 2011, a Commission that he and Minister of Justice Kabimba then denigrated, then in 2013 imprisoning members of the Linyungandambo Association of Barotseland, charging them with treason.

To Sata's annoyance, the Rodger Chongwe Commission of Inquiry recommended that the Constitution Amendment of 1969 nullified the Barotseland Agreement's legitimacy and be repealed and that the government should consider restoring the Agreement. The Commission called for the former Inspector General of Police, Francis Kabonde, to conspire with the Rupiah Banda administration to clamp viciously down on dissent in Western Province, the commissioners describing the killings that occurred in Mongu on 14 January 2011 as cold-blooded murders. Banda's Minister of Home Affairs, Mkhondo Lungu (d.2016), was singled out for his instructions to the police to use brutal force. The Commission later said that Lungu, at the time Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly, was not a fit and proper person to occupy the National Assembly's second-highest office and should, therefore, be relieved of his duties by article 70 of the constitution. The Commission also found that Banda had exerted undue influence on the Police and Prisons Service. They also reported that the Red Cross was ineffective and the Human Rights Commission an abject failure; and recommended the prosecution of Vice-President George Kunda for lying to parliament on the issue of live ammunition use by the police. Sata rejected recommendations on restoring the Agreement, criticizing the Commission for going beyond its terms of reference to investigate the riots and killings' causes.

A voice that soon made itself heard was that of the secretary-general of the newly elected PF Party, Wynter Kabimba, ap-



pointed by Sata to head a commission of inquiry into oil and fuel imports. Kabimba, (made Minister of Justice), increasingly sounding like a minister-for-all-portfolios and president-in-waiting, in a television interview in February 2012 called the Chongwe Commission the “worst of all commissions,” even though as a fellow lawyer he had served under Chongwe doing *pro bono* work for the Mongu victims, and even though the report had not been published. He declared that the PF would take decentralized development to all parts of the country, including Barotseland - considered the least developed province - as articulated in the PF Party manifesto.

As one of the people who had made contributions to the manifesto and worked directly with Kabimba on a *pro bono* basis – doubtless because he was our company lawyer, I found the final version of the manifesto poorly enunciated and threadbare.[xvi] Ominously, Kabimba warned people that they should not challenge the PF government by stating that they would go ahead and secede ‘whether President Michael Sata likes it or not’, such statements being ‘treasonable’. Sata let it be known that the Barotseland Agreement 1964 would cause other chiefdoms in the country to rise and demand secession, a situation that he claimed would likely destabilize the country. But then he made the intriguing comment that he wondered why the Commission had not spelt out the benefits of restoring the Agreement. But, like all the other autocrats before him, he wanted nothing to do with devolution or decentralization, happy to consign villagers to an eternal state of peasantry. Sata and Kabimba refused to release the findings of the Chongwe Commission.

Between 26 - 27 March 2012, the Barotse National Council formed by the Litunga deliberated on the future of the Barotse

nation, concluding that:[xvii] [xviii]

*We now inform Zambia and the international community that we finally accept the unilateral nullification and the abrogation of the Barotseland Agreement 1964 by the Zambian government, which action has freed Barotseland from being part of Zambia. In line with the Postliminium Doctrine, we can no longer be obliged to honour an international agreement that the other part has nullified and abrogated, which has reverted us to our original status.*

Merriam-Webster describes Postliminium as ‘The right or rule of international law under which when persons or things taken by an enemy in war come again under the control of their own State they as a general rule regain the rights belonging or relating to them before capture’.

In April 2012, the Barotse Prime Minister (*Ngambela*) was warned and cautioned by the police for calling for Barotseland to secede. A hardening of resolve was taking place with news of a move towards armed insurrection.

On 3 December 2012, *Ngambela* Clement Wainye Sinyinda, supposedly on behalf of the Kuta of Barotseland, formally laid a complaint with the African Commission on Human and People Rights against the Zambian government on the matter of their violation of Article 20(1) of the African Charter, requesting that the African Commission make a declaration that:[xix]

*Their right to self-determination as peoples under Article*

*20(1) of the African Charter have been violated; that the Respondent State cease to administer Barotseland; and that the Respondent State immediately engage the Applicant with the sole purpose of working out the handover of the administration of Barotseland in the shortest possible time under the auspices of the United Nations.*

On 5 December 2012, President Sata, at a Southern African Development Community (SADC) military parade, had addressed recruits in his inimitable populist style:

*In Lukulu (Barotseland) people have formed a group called the Barotse Liberation Army. They are recruiting peoples as of today...and you army commander...when you go there just shoot when they say 'Fa', you fire when they say, 'Eni sha', just fire at them.*

On 11 December 2012, a scheduled meeting of the Litunga's Privy Council failed to take place, allegedly due to pressure from Sata. The Barotse Agreement, of course, provided the template for similar agreements to be entered into by the government with other chiefdoms – the last thing newly enthroned pan-Africanist politicians with relativist principles would consider.

Barotseland, with its 32 ethnic groups – including Bushmen, not just the majority Lozi, offered an opportunity for a leader of vision to assist the natural evolutionary process forward from the native authorities created under Indirect Rule towards a state built solidly upon African participatory traditions. But the British had handed the instruments of government to what Johnson called 'The scourge of the twentieth century',

politicians. In the case of the territory, these were those mission-spawned acolytes of the new proletariat who looked around and saw only witchbound chiefs and their primitive peasant subjects as competition for power – people of which they were frankly ashamed. Kaunda had grown up at the Lubwa Church of Scotland Mission in Chinsali District. He was a primary school teacher, a shadow Westerner of sorts, a new-age relativist who saw his opportunity in the British Empire's dying light. This failure of Britain to press forward with what they had set in place since the creation of the Protectorate of Northern Rhodesia produced the future statist kleptocracy, one based on the corrupt vote and not on justice.

The petition by the Barotse Royal Establishment on 7 November 2012 to the Africa Commission for Human and People's Rights that Zambia should cease to administer Barotseland was answered on 25 February 2013, the Commission declaring that it had 'decided to be seized of the complaint', and giving the complainants two months to lay their charges. This letter only surfaced in May 2013, it having been hidden away, allegedly by one of the Litunga's Indunas (headmen). In April 2015, the Zambian government made their case. But by October, the Litunga had entered President Lungu's camp, self-exiled to the Lusaka feeding trough.[xx]

On 26 October 2013, Sinyinda and 83 others, in detention since 14 August, appeared in the High Court charged with treason for attempting the secession of Barotseland from Zambia. Three MPs were barred from visiting the former *Ngambela* in prison, and the other accused were allowed no visitors. The son of *Litunga* Godwin Mbikusita (1968-1977), Akashambatwa Mbikusita, called for their release because their arrest was unconstitutional. As the Liuwa MP Dr Situmbeko

Musokotwane said in parliament in November 2013, “The people really believed that the Patriotic Front was a friend to the Linyungandambo and therefore gave their support during the elections because they expected to benefit from the relationship.” The principled leader of the Alliance for Democracy and Development (ADD), Charles Milupi, challenged Sata to explain why he had not kept his promise and re-instated the Barotseland Agreement 1964 within 90 days of forming the PF government.

In the same year, Kaunda, destroyer of the Agreement, was invited to address the Canadian Senate in Ottawa ‘where the session was temporally suspended to pay tribute to him for the role he played in ending apartheid and colonialism in Africa’, a shameful and ignorant action on the part of Canadian Senators.[xxi] This has been leant further shame by the revelations of the treatment over many years by the Canadian government of its Indigenous Peoples. This continues to this day in their conduct of ‘quiet apartheid’.

By 2017 Barotseland was in a worse crisis, the errant Litunga Edwin Lubosi Imwiko summoned to the High Court to answer charges laid by the Barotse chiefs, one of the charges (No. 9) being ‘that natural endowment and proceeds raised from Liuwa National Park invariably on lease have remained unaccounted for’.

The agreement on the privatization of the Liuwa National Park was officially between African Parks (Zambia) Limited, the Barotse Royal Establishment (BRE) and the Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA); African Parks holding 70% of the shares, BRE 30%, and ZAWA nil. [xxii] In 2008, the African Parks shareholding was taken over by the Stichting African Parks Foundation. Originally, African Parks agreed to spend not less

than \$2 million over the first five years and not less than \$25 million over the 20-year lease period. The Litunga was accused of having trousered all the money received by the BRE.[xxiii]

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## The Lumpa Massacre

*Kaunda, Barotse and the Lumpa - Alice Lenshina calling - registration of Lumpa Church (1957) - Cha Cha Cha UNIP campaign - UNIP the proletariat, Lumpa the peasants - UNIP membership card - Lumpa build new stockaded villages - Lumpa 90k in the 1950s - Chief Nkula becomes enemy - rules of the Lumpa Church - Paramount Chief Chitimukulu bans Lumpa - Prime Minister Kaunda orders Lumpa back to their villages - John Hannah DC Chinsali (1964) - DO Mick Bond arrives, soon joined by Peter Moss - 100 European policemen arrive at Chinsali - massacre of Lumpa - Stage 1 of Public Security Ordinance declared by governor 26 July (1964) - Kamutola (Sione) massacre of Lumpa by NRR with Moss and Hannah present - Bond forced to burn vacated Lumpa village - Lumpa attack Lundazi (1964) - Moss goes to Simwaule where NRR kill 81 (4 August) - Moss views villagers massacred by Lumpa - Lumpa attack Lundazi (3 August) - Chief Chikwa killed - Paishuko village attacked by UNIP and all killed - Lumpa banned 3 August - Lenshina arrested 11 August - NRR kill 60 Lumpa at Chikwa - Angus MacLagan memoir of Lumpa troubles - troublemaker Banda arrested and later released - plateau mayhem and carnage - in 4*

*months + 1,000 lumpa killed - Hannah leaves, replaced by Bond - John Hudson DC Isoka - NRR under Bird mutiny - Hudson negotiates peace - 20,000 Lumpa flee to Congo - inquiry report published 1965 - Lenshina under arrest on and off - Lenshina dies December 1978 - incorporation of 'peasants' into the state still to be solved*

*If we seriously consider the purity of the Christian religion, the sanctity of its moral precepts, and the innocence as well as austere lives of the greater number of those who during the first ages embraced the faith of the Gospel, we should naturally suppose that so benevolent a doctrine would have been received with due reverence even by the unbelieving world; that the learned and the polite, however they might deride the miracles, would have esteemed the virtues of the new sect; and that the magistrates, instead of persecuting, would have protected an order of men who yielded the most passive obedience to the laws, though they declined the active cares of war and government. If, on the other hand, we recollect the universal toleration of Polytheism, as it was invariably maintained by the faith of the people, the incredulity of philosophers, and the policy of the Roman senate and emperors, we are at a loss to discover what new offence the Christians had committed, what new provocation could exasperate the mild indifference of antiquity, and what new motives could urge the Roman princes, who beheld without concern a thousand forms of religion subsisting in peace under their gentle sway, to inflict a severe punishment on any part of their subjects who had chosen for themselves a singular but an inoffensive mode of faith and worship.*

*Edward Gibbon – Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*

*The Lumpa Church allowed Africans to enter the Kingdom of Heaven. After*

*Lenshina and her followers had built her Zion (or Sione) next to Kasomo*

*Village, Chinsali District, in 1958, and after her beautiful hymns were heard*

*across northern Zambia, heaven on earth was also a possibility. Only the*

*infringement of colonial regulations enforced by Chiefs disturbed the utopian*

*vision and reality: the need to pay tax, chiefs' control over land, and respect for*

*mission churches and schooling.*

*David M. Gordon - Rebellion or massacre? The UNIP-Lumpa conflict revisited[i]*

*When shall we be saved?*

*We who love the country of darkness!*

*We who love the country of slavery.*

*When shall we be saved?*

*Alice Lenshina – Hymn*

\* \* \*

In tandem with the Barotse treachery, [Kaunda's UNIP militia waged a murderous campaign against the Lumpa Christian Church](#), supported by the Colonial Provincial Administration

and the army.

In 1953, Alice Lenshina, a one-time parishioner with Kaunda at the United Church of Scotland Lubwa Mission near Chinsali, had visions of God commanding her to establish a Christian ministry dedicated to moral living, the exorcism of sorcery, and the control of witchcraft – both spiritual and medicinal.




*Alice Lenshina and her husband*

Her calling was announced by pastor Fergus MacPherson one Sunday in church at Lubwa when he urged her to follow the dictates of God's Command – but much to the concern of the mother church in Scotland.[ii] [iii] She then began gathering converts about her, registering the Lumpa Church in 1957 with Societies' Registrar. This coincided with the emergence of the UNIP party and its militant *cha cha cha* campaign in Northern

## Province.





UNIP represented the emerging nationalist urban proletariat, one now part of the capitalist world, while the Lumpa movement was intent, as van Binsbergen has commented: 'on reconstructing a whole, autonomous rural community' as a result of their rejection of proletarianism and UNIP attempts to force them into a state of peasanthood where they merely lived at the whim of the urban political class. The more UNIP, the Catholic Church, and the state attempted to have the Lumpa join the mainstream of more proletarian village life, one linked to increasing commoditization and development, the more their desire for ecological self-sufficiency and religious and cultural liberation expanded. In fact, the Catholic Church mobilized the state against the Lumpa. That the Lumpa were mainly Bemba tribespeople was a barrier to liberating themselves from the chief's authority and his control of customary land and government controls.

Alice had tried to buy land but was unsuccessful. Therefore, the only alternative was to take up vacant land, but without the

authority of the Bemba chiefs (some of them like Chitumukulu, Nkhwetu and Nkula responsible for the burning and death of some Lumpa). Similar treatment was meted out to the Watchtower Church, who had also refused to join UNIP.

The Lumpa rejection symbol was the UNIP membership card, which the Lumpa refused to carry or burnt when forced to carry them. As a result, UNIP began fomenting trouble, demanding that the Lumpa produce the cards when requested. Lumpa churches were put to the torch. This encouraged the Lumpa to vacate their villages, their crops and support systems, and build new villages in the bush on the Tanganyika Plateau around Chinsali, Kasama, Mpika, Isoka, and in the Lundazi District in the Luangwa Valley. There they built the stockaded villages of the slave days, but villages beautifully constructed in an orderly fashion, including pit-latrines – an unusual innovation, they being absent in most of Zambia, women and children forced to use the bush. They broke new ground for their crops – in some areas at a time when elephant numbers were at their peak, sending them by necessity to seek their food in the villages now controlled by UNIP. Lenshina had 90,000 followers in the 1950s, a fifth of the northeast population, dropping to some 20,000 in the 1960s. In the 1950s, people from as far afield as Malawi's Shire Valley walked for weeks to reach her through the bush with no protection from elephant, lion, hyena and other dangerous game, carrying their food and sleeping unprotected. After leaving behind charms and amulets, and a small fee to be exorcised of sorcery, they returned to their villages freed from the most terrible bondage.

To begin with, some chiefs had supported Lenshina's exorcism work; later, this support waned because of her popularity and uptake of customary area without their permission, leading



in 1959 to physical clashes between the police and the Lumpa. Lenshina's relative, Senior Chief Nkula, became a particular foe, peremptorily going to her headquarters and telling the assembled multitude to clean the place – symbolic of his guardianship of the land. The Paramount Chief of the Bemba, Chitimukulu, banned the Lumpa Church in his chiefdom.

A study of the rules of the Lumpa Church written in 1959 by Lenshina Mulenga is instructive:

*1. The Lumpa Church is a church in which God and His Son Jesus Christ are*

*to be praised. It is an organization that has no connection with Government.*

*2. In our congregation there is no citizen or foreigner, black or white, man or woman, but we are all of the same family; therefore we must love each other.*

*3. A Christian must take no part in: (a) Backbiting, (b) Cursing, (c) Lying, (d) Pride, (e) Selfishness, (f) False evidence, (g) Anger, (h) Harshness, (i) Hatred,*

*(j) Harmful words and actions, (k) Disobedience, (l) Cunning, (m) Stealing, etc. Therefore he must be truthful, kind, faithful, happy and obedient.*

*4. A Christian must avoid covetousness, witchcraft, stealing, adultery, witch-hunting, killing, drunkenness and bawdy songs, dancing and other pagan things.*

*5. Every Christian must be of good character, whether in private or public, when eating or going to sleep, waking from sleep or when starting or ending his work, while at play or in times of sorrow or trouble. When he is on a journey a Christian must pray to his Father.*

6. *There must be no beer or pagan dances during a Christian wedding. If they have these things, those who are being wed will be punished by the Commandment of Jesus. They must not be separated from each other until they die.*

7. *It is the duty of a Christian to go with others to prayers from time to time, and on every appointed day of worship.*

8. *A widow must not be punished by being prevented from re-marrying. She must only wear a string of white beads. If she wishes to re-marry she must be allowed to do so.*

9. *A Christian must not be a polygamist.*

10. *A Christian must not eat food prepared for the dead, and there must be no witch-hunting for the killer of the deceased person after the funeral.*

11. *At the time of worship no one should smoke cigarettes or a pipe or take snuff. They must not take any of these things into the church.*

12. *If anyone has taken some beer he must not come to worship in church, though he has taken only a little. Any person who disobeys these rules is the one whom the Lord Himself came to seek. That is why God the Father says "Give up all things leading to witchcraft, and live in my love." Anyone who is fond of bewitching, when his time comes to an end, will suffer because he will be troubled greatly.*

## Northern Rhodesia Self-Rule

On 22 January 1964, Northern Rhodesia was accorded self-rule. Kenneth Kaunda and the UNIP party were now in charge, although the Colonial Provincial Administration – apart from a name change, still functioned, but in an uneasy transitional role. National security remained a colonial responsibility until complete independence in October 1964.

The spark which fired Lumpa antagonism and their slaughter by UNIP, the army and the police is recounted in the condensed [District Commissioner Chinsali's report by John Hannah](#),[iv] - the longer copy I [received from John Hannah](#) - and by [John Hudson's \(d.2016\) book](#) - the former District Commissioner Isoka.[v] [vi].



John Hannah, Burford, Oxon. 1995. (d.2018)

Hudson described the act setting off the massacres:

*It happened on 25 June 1964. A boy from a north Chinsali Lumpa settlement, Kameko, was chastised by his UNIP uncle while passing through another village for failing to attend the local school because, being a Lumpa follower, he had been excluded from the dormitory and forced to sleep outside. The boy reported the assault on his return to Kameko.*

This triggered a tragic series of events that led to Governor Sir Evelyn Hone and Kaunda flying to Chinsali for meetings with Alice Lenshina, Provincial Commissioner Baker, and Hannah. Kaunda, on 13 July 1964, under the influence of his radical deputy, Simon Kapwepwe, ordered the Lumpa to return to their original villages, giving them a week to do so or have their new villages destroyed. This statement was published and distributed to local government authorities, the Preservation of Public Security Act being promulgated 14 days later.[vii] This fateful and arrogant decision led to the massacre of many Lumpa and the destruction of their villages by the British Provincial Administration and the colonial army led by white officers.

On the same day, the Mporokoso District Officer (DO) Mick Bond was transferred to Chinsali to help organize the Lumpa's return. There he met up with District Commissioner Hannah – only in the post from March but without a DO. Soon after, Peter Moss, later my colleague, friend and business partner – the DO Mkushi – was also told to report to Hannah and assist in the return process.[viii] He and Bond then teamed up.



Years before in 1961-1962, both he, Mick Bond, and others I knew, Valentine Musakanya, Jim Lavender and Jeremy Burnham, had attended a year-long course at Cambridge University – the Devonshire Overseas Development Course ‘A’, to train them as District Officers (DOs) in the Provincial Administration. The course included 22 men, some with degrees, some without. The course passed on valuable practical knowledge for doing an administrative job in the bush. However, it did not include the solemn advice of courses before the war: ‘to take quinine daily, always to wear a spine-pad and a solar topee, and never to fail at night to wear a knitted woollen tummy band firmly attached by a safety-pin to both jacket and trousers of the pyjamas’.

Valentine, I knew from the Lusaka Flying Club in the 70s, where I had taken flying lessons from former DC, Ian Breingan. I also knew Jim Lavender – later, unfortunately, being given the job by Kaunda to establish the odious Special Investigation

Team for Economy and Trade (SITET), and Jeremy Burnham (d. April 2017) - who was Moss's best man at his wedding, serving at Mumbwa for a time as DO.

On 15 July, about 60 soldiers went to Chilanga and attempted to persuade the villagers to return to their former villages. They refused. The same happened at the Lumpa HQ, Sione, followed by the killing of four UNIP militants. Elsewhere, villages were burnt.



Sione Cathedral in 1964, but destroyed by Kaunda in 1970



All that remains

After this, Inspector Smith led a patrol to Chilanga – also known as Chaupula, and knowing that the Lumpa were militant, foolishly entered the stockade, inviting an attack. He and Constable Chansa were immediately speared to death. With the news of the killing, DC Hannah set out with a Police Mobile Unit (PMU) and attempted to recover the bodies. But with his patrol too terrified to act, he returned to Chinsali. The following day, Hannah met with Provincial Commissioner (PC) Baker and Provincial Police Commissioner Bird, Baker instructing Hannah to visit Alice Lenshina at her Sione headquarters. The following day he drove to Sione. After some prevarication on the part of the Lumpa, he was told that she was ill in bed. Insisting on seeing her, he was lead to her bedroom, where she jumped out of bed fully clothed, muttering, “I knew it would come to this!” She then told Hannah that UNIP was the cause of the trouble and that she and her followers only wished to be

left alone.

The following day a force of 100 European policemen arrived at Chinsali by air. As Hannah later recorded:

*Baker agreed to fly over the village, at the same time as we arrived and fire a red Verey cartridge if he saw the villagers defending the stockade, or a green one if not. A simple plan, but his Verey pistol would not work, and so instead he threw out of the window, his handkerchief containing a message. Again a good idea, but unfortunately, it fell in a patch of cassava, and although we spent a while on our hands and knees trying to find it, we were unsuccessful.*

On 26 July 1964, Governor Sir Evelyn Hone (d. 1979) – a Rhodesian who held the position from 1959 to 1964 – met with the Central Security Council in Lusaka and with Kaunda, Hannah and the Assistant-Commissioner of Police, and then declared the application of stage one of the Preservation of Public Security Ordinance in Northern Province and Lundazi District. The following day a police mobile unit (PMU) was attacked near Mulanga Mission, and Inspector Jordan and five Lumpa killed. On 29 July, the 1st Battalion NR Regiment arrived and decided to attack the Lumpa headquarters at Sione.

The following day Hannah, accompanied by Peter Moss, approached the Lumpa gathered outside Kamutola Village near the Lumpa's Sione Cathedral. Hannah addressed the assembled crowd in Bemba. While engaged in this, some Lumpa ran forward en masse and attacked a section of the troops, who then fired on them. Lt. Col. Bird, the officer commanding, then ordered to enter the village, Hannah continuing to call for



the villagers to surrender. According to Hudson, when men, women and children attacked the troops with bow and arrow, spears and a few firearms, they were massacred: 59 Lumpa men and seven women killed and 110 wounded in the first attack, another hundred or so killed later; 436 women and their children surrendered. One soldier died of his wounds. Many Lumpa were shot in the church.



One massacre of the Lumpa

As Peter Moss told me years later:

*The army thought that Lenshina was hiding in a small building near the cathedral and fired upon it with bazookas, only to discover that it was, in fact, empty. I saw a long line of bodies laid out in the sun, one of who seemed to be alive. When I suggested to the police constable who was with me that something should be done about that, he replied that the man would soon die.*

This was the first time the NR Regiment had used automatic weapons, the .303 rifle replaced by the 7.62 NATO automatic and the hand-held rocket-firing Bazooka. The Lumpa were armed with primitive weapons.

On the same day as the Sione massacre, Bond accompanied the Second Battalion NRR to Chilanga and found it newly vacated, the army commander unwilling to surround the village. Bond then complied with his orders and burnt the village, the finest he had ever seen. The burning made him 'numb and angry'. There he took possession of a large traditional drum. Returning to Chinsali, he organized the incarceration of the survivors of Sione, mostly woman and children. Over the next week, he and Moss visited 13 villages and burnt them.

On 4 August, Moss went to a large, stockaded village near Simwaule with the 2NRR and PMUs. He addressed the Lumpa with a loud hailer, but the Lumpa fired their arrows and discharged ancient muzzle-loaders at them. Some just attacked with a spear or a club. As Moss lamented: [ix]

*I was dealing with a huge massively stockade settlement somewhere not far from Shimwaule. I was with 2NRR battalion and ten or twelve platoons of the Mobile Police. I*

*had only spoken a few words in ciBemba through the blue regulation loud hailer when the occupants opened fire with muzzle-loaders, bows and arrows, at which point I made the announcement that the Civil Authority had to hand over its responsibility to the military. All military hell broke loose! Many villagers old and young were killed and wounded. After Sione and this action, in which I thought the army and its new recruits had behaved badly, I recall having a long discussion with the DC in which I said that we did not seem to be approaching the problem in the humanitarian PA (Provincial Administration) way which we all understood. I felt by then we were probably going too far and had lost our way by carrying out this military coercion. He sent me to see my own PC in Broken Hill, who told me bluntly either to resign or to go back and follow orders...I followed orders and, working as far as I could within the system, managed to save some lives...I took a few days' break in Mkushi where I was DO at the time. Returning to Chinsali I was with the army again, and joined them in an operation against a Lumpa stockaded village on the Luangwa escarpment, which turned out to be deserted (all except for a scared cow elephant).*

Moss and Bond continued bringing in the Lumpa, being successful with about 4,000. But by then, the Lumpa had begun to attack the UNIP villages. Moss visited some of them. Later he was to repeat much of his earlier report:

*I visited with the army - on Hannah's orders, the villages*

*of Katuishi, Chipwata, Mabundo, Fineno and Nkonya located somewhere north-west of Chinsali boma, which had been attacked and burnt down by Lumpas a couple of weeks before. Only two people survived the slaughter that occurred in the middle of the night - there were awful bloated corpses of men, women and children everywhere... plus stench and vultures... It was a deeply traumatic experience for me. I had become a proficient Bemba/Lala speaker and like the rest of us was working at grassroots level – so much so that I believed strongly that we were getting it VERY wrong. I had gone to see the PC because I thought there should be a high-level change in approach to the problem. I was profoundly shocked by the whole thing, but I do not think the DC could have handled the situation any better than he did. Soon after these tiring events I returned disillusioned to Mkushi. After the Lumpa campaign I vowed never to have anything to do with public administration again, and thus began my move in 1965 to the Department of Game and Tsetse Control*

At the time, I was a farm assistant in Mkushi and had not yet met Moss, Hannah or Hudson, and was totally unaware of the Lumpa situation, the Tshombe secession in nearby Katanga taking up all the news – the same secession that a few of my old Parabat compatriots and I had thought of joining as mercenaries.

On 3 August 1964, across the Luangwa River to the east, a large group of Lumpa from their Chipoma Village redoubt - lying eight km north of Lundazi, attacked the town, captured

the police station and its armoury, and killed some Indian traders and their families. Retribution was swift. The following day two companies of the 1 NRR under Lt. Col Bird, supported by a mobile unit (PMU), formed a half-circle around the village, the DO Lundazi calling for the Lumpa to surrender. Some spearmen issued forth from the stockade and charged at them, the troops firing. Once the opposition had melted away, they advanced into the village using tear gas. In 40 minutes, there were 81 Lumpa dead, 43 wounded, and 11 captured.

Another Lumpa group on the same day attacked Chief Chikwa's village lying a little east of the Luangwa, killing the chief - a UNIP man, a District Messenger and nine villagers. South of there lay the un-stockaded Lumpa village of Paishuko (*the place of good fortune*), occupied by 46 villagers, 10 of them active men, the rest children and the elderly; these were people whom Hudson maintains had not been involved in the Chikwa murders. On 7 August 1964, UNIP militants massacred everyone there, inflicting terrible torture in the process, with grain mortar poles and sticks being forced into their body orifices. No attempt was made to bring the UNIP murderers to justice. Hudson recorded that the security forces' plan to remove the Paishuko villagers into protective custody on 6 August had mysteriously been cancelled. Moss told me that the Dakota aircraft was supposed to have deployed troops there but had developed engine trouble and failed to leave Chinsali. The UNIP militants had been given a clear field for their savagery. On 3 August, the government banned the Lumpa movement, arresting Alice on 11 August. In September of 1964, Hannah went on long leave, never to return to Chinsali, Mick Bond replacing him. On 10 October 1964, security forces attacked another village near Chikwa and killed 60 Lumpa, wounding

28.

In October 1970, while conducting a hunting-safari west of Chikwa, I stumbled on the site of an old Lumpa village, the surrounding forest shredded by automatic rifle fire. There is an ancient path linking Lundazi and Chinsali, passing near Chikwa and then crossing the Luangwa and following the Siduli River's course and Mwinechepeta Village thence to Chinsali. The Lumpa used this path in the 1950s until the start of the UNIP attacks.

### Angus MacLagan

The man who knew this area better than any European – having hunted it since 1955, was Angus MacLagan, whom I knew from our time together hunting for Zambia Safaris.[x] [xi] In his memoir, MacLagan reveals the UNIP campaign against the Lumpa Christians. Setting off on 24 April 1963 on a 150-kilometre walk from Mwinechepeta to Lundazi to buy an elephant licence, MacLagan reached the Luangwa on the morning of the fourth day. Here he encountered three UNIP officials dressed incongruously in suits. Crossing the river, he entered into 'the region where Lenshina's followers were being beaten up and their little churches burnt, there not having been any form of patrolling by police or district administrative officers since the previous September'. Before this, he had mentioned, 'Lenshina's teachings forbade the use of violence, her followers, by meekly taking the beatings and burnings of their churches, without attempting to defend themselves, allowed a horrible element of thuggery to run amok'.

Walking the following day across wild country with eight men without UNIP cards, they reached Chief Chikwa's village before noon. MacLagan knew Chikwa well and had helped him in 1955 after Chikwa had returned without food after a visit to Lenshina. Now Chief Chikwa was no longer friendly and pretended he did not know MacLagan. He had become a staunch UNIP supporter, motivating UNIP militia to force his people to buy UNIP cards. MacLagan carried on, arriving at the Luzi River where he found 200 or so men awaiting him on the opposite bank – obviously summoned by Chief Chikwa. Seeing him, they began the UNIP chant, "Kwaaaaa..cha...ngweeeeh!" MacLagan, utterly fearless, punched a man who had crossed the river to block his path, felling him, and walking down to the river, he nonchalantly took off his boots and crossed. With such brazen action and a little humour admixed, the UNIP crowd fell back.

The following day, after an eight-day march, they reached Lundazi. After buying his licence and receiving a lift from the DC, MacLagan returned to Mwinechepeta by another route. Having learned that the man responsible for much of the rabble-rousing in the area was a John Banda - who lived near Mwinechepeta, MacLagan drove to Chinsali and organized his capture and later conviction. In July 1964, the UNIP government issued an amnesty for prisoners, and Banda was released, causing considerable discontent among the Lumpa. This MacLagan suggests was the main cause of the extended civil war in the Luangwa. In August, the Lumpa killed Chief Chikwa and a few other people, one of them, Banda. Angus MacLagan concluded his sad tale:[xii]

## THE LUMPA MASSACRE

*Sometimes, thinking back on past hunts, I hear once again Lenshina's people singing in the evening by my camp on the Kalwangomo. The unconsciously attained perfection of their harmonizing the melodies they sang, so descriptive of the brilliant sunshine, the shimmering bush in the midday heat and the vast expanses disappearing over endless horizons. It always brings a lump to my throat and a sad feeling that those songs will, perhaps, never be heard again.*



*Angus MacLagan*

In about 1981, accompanied by my friend Roy Fryer of Empangeni, we drove up to Rhodesia from Zululand, where I was



commercial fishing. On our return, still some twenty km or so from MacLeod's and my old camp south of West Nicholson, I saw a familiar Landrover parked on the side of the road. I stopped, and out of the bush strode Angus MacLagan! He had just been dealing with some hyena cattle killers and worked for Liebig's ranch on predator control. Later he moved to Johannesburg, where he died not long after. In about 2010, Cathlin and I had lunch with his widow and two children.

Buried in this crime against a people holding peaceful beliefs was the fact that the Lumpa were in the process of uniting their traditional animist religion with that of the teachings of Christ, producing that made in heaven state of *Ubuntu*, of social and environmental harmony where sorcery and the excessive plunder of Mother Earth are expunged.

On 10 August 1964, security forces advanced with automatic weapons on the heavily stockaded village of Chaba near Mpika, killing 55 Lumpa and taking 145 of them prisoner. When the Lumpa arsenal made the inventory, it listed nine muzzle-loaders, ten bows, 150 arrows, and 50 spears. No attempt had been made in this or any other attack on stockaded villages to surround them and negotiate the Lumpa into submission. Although both Hudson and Moss believed that Kaunda did everything possible to bring peace, it was he who gave the order to use force should the Lumpa refuse to return to their old villages. At a meeting in Chinsali on 17 August, with the political firebrand Simon Kapwepwe calling for the heads of all Lumpa, Kaunda had ruled that the Lumpa 'be forgiven and accepted back into their villages'. However, he had already ruled otherwise. He and Governor Sir Evelyn Hone, the Commander-in-Chief, must bear responsibility for the massacres.

Between July and October 1964, considerably more than

1,000 Lumpa – men, women, and children – were killed against three soldiers and four policemen. And many more died later as 20,000 trekked to Congo and 2,000 Lumpa suddenly moved over the Muchinga Escarpment and into the Luangwa. Bond worked tirelessly to help them, but many must have died.

On 31 August, the 2nd Battalion NRR left Chinsali. In September, Bond continued searching for Lumpa survivors in the bush, and on 14 October 64 at the age of 27, he was made DC. His first act was to follow instructions and burn all documents marked secret before independence on 24 October. He found this repugnant. Is this why the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the former Lumpa Church in 1965 was a scant 36 pages long?

## John Hudson

John Hudson (d.2016), a gentle and kindly man, was the DC at nearby Isoka. Here the approach to the Lumpa was different. At Nsindano Village, one without fortifications, the troops stood at a distance, Hudson engaging with three delegates in the middle of the two opposing groups. Hudson noticed that they were being stalked through some long grass by three spearmen during the ongoing discussions. Quietly, as was his personality, he alerted the nearest group of soldiers, who then ran forward but did not fire. The Lumpa then disappeared into the bush. This operation was repeated with the Lumpa settlements at Chanama and Jombo.

Landing at Muyombe in a helicopter where the 1st Battalion of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment (NRR) was bivouacked

under Lt. Col. Bird – the same man who had directed the Sione massacre, Hudson sat down with the Colonel to plan the operation, noting the poor morale of the European and African officers. The following day they [mutinied](#),

*Hudson examines the reasons for this mutiny. The white officers knew they would be replaced by Africans within weeks and may not have been too concerned about the long term reputation of the regiment. They may not have wished to risk injury or death of themselves and their men for a cause in which they felt they were being used as tools of dubious politicians. The newly commissioned and inexperienced African officers simply followed their seniors' lead. Publicly spoiling the regiment's excellent reputation was only narrowly avoided.*

Army Chief of Staff Reid was summoned and addressed the officers, who then agreed to take up arms. On 19 August, they arrived at Chanama lying below the Makutu Mountains. Hudson then successfully negotiated a peaceful resolution, and the whole village was evacuated, the church and village burnt.

Jombo was a fortified village presenting all the dangers inherent in a very clearly marked Lumpa stronghold. However, Hudson and his Chief District Messenger, Musukwa, prevailed, the villagers loaded up and taken to Isoka, a simply massive achievement made possible no doubt by the fact that the Lumpa realized that they could no longer resist. As Hudson recorded, the Lumpa who died in those horrendous assaults by the police and army were Christian martyrs whose rule number one was, 'The Lumpa Church is a church in which God and His Son Jesus Christ are to be praised. It is not a political organization'.

When the church was banned, 20,000 Lumpa fled to Katanga in Congo. Unbelievably, Kaunda's mother and uncle were members of the Lumpa Church. Lenshina, jailed in Mumbwa without trial with her husband and some followers, called in September 1964 for a commission of inquiry. The inquiry was held, and the Commission of Inquiry's report into the former Lumpa church published in 1965 (36 pages). In the same year, 4,000 Lumpa were held in concentration camps – two in Northern Province and one near Petauke. Lenshina and her husband were moved to Kalabo in the same year, escaped, were recaptured, jailed for six months, and then 'restricted' in Mkushi. In 1970 she was placed in detention, the same year as the destruction of Sione Cathedral on Kaunda's orders - a dastardly act. In 1971, many of the Lumpa in Congo returned, being placed in internment camps. They were then divided into small groups and sent hither and thither around Zambia. The Lumpa Church now became the Jerusalem Church, then split into three. Lenshina was released in 1975 and then placed under house arrest in Lusaka, where she died in December 1978. She was a remarkable woman who for fourteen years was harried and hounded to her death.

Moss summed up the situation at a time when the territory still had a Governor-General and a Provincial Administration in place, one about to become a non-monarchist state, 'The PA had more or less lost the heart and means to carry out its administrative functions in the way it had always done through the chiefs and District Messengers, underpinned by mutual respect and trust'. On Kaunda, he added:

*Give him his due. KK wanted to defuse the situation*

*peacefully but was pushed into military and paramilitary action after the Jordan and Smith murders and by Kapwepwe's uncompromising attitude. Force seemed the only way out for both sides; the massacres committed by the Lumpa driven to it. At one time I thought that the government was being too hard on the Lumpas but after seeing what I saw in those villages I concluded together with the reporter from Drum Magazine who was there, that both sides were as bad as each other...but how many people died in the fields of Flanders for what reason...*

But as van Binsbergen commented: [xiii]

*For the élite the situation is uncomfortable indeed, for the extermination of Lumpa has by no means solved the much wider problem of the incorporation of peasants into the Zambian State. New peasant movements are likely to emerge which, like Lumpa, may employ a religious idiom in an attempt to regain local control and to challenge wider incorporation.*

### Postscript:

Significant though the Lumpa conflict is to our appreciation of Zambian historiography, the Zambian government has, however, imposed a curtain of silence over this dreadful event. The Lumpa sect and ideology are not taught in schools, nor are objective narratives of the war and Diaspora of Lumpa officially admitted as part of our social memories. The burnt churches and mass graves of the Lumpa are not recognized nor celebrated as memory sites. The whole episode of murder and destruction has been banished from the public domain as though nothing had happened.

[i] Gordon, David M. "Rebellion or massacre? The UNIP-Lumpa conflict revisited" (3) pp.45-76." In: *One Zambia, many histories Towards a history of post-colonial Zambia*. Ed. Jan-Bart Gewald, Marja Hinfelaar, Giacomo Macola. Brill, 2005. Web. 2 May 2017. <<http://saipar.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/One-Zambia.pdf>>.

[ii] " 'Alice' Movement Paralyzes Mission Work in Lubwa District (Northern News)." Chinsali District Notebook Vol III. p. 206a, 25 May 1956. Web. 26 March 2017.

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[iii] Lenshina, Alice. "Lumpa Church Chant." Chinsali DNB Vol IV p.206b, Northern News, 25 May 1956. Web. 26 March 2017.

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[iv] John Hannah article web. June 2018. <http://www.britishempire.co.uk/article/alicelenshinalumpa.htm>

[v] Obituary: John Hudson OBE. Web. 18 April 2017. [https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B0sCBiNNeEh\\_Y0ZmREx6N0tmN2F2YlZnZFdwQlBvbWlXUU9v/view?usp=sharing](https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B0sCBiNNeEh_Y0ZmREx6N0tmN2F2YlZnZFdwQlBvbWlXUU9v/view?usp=sharing)

[vi] Anonymous. John Hudson. Web. 18 April 2017.

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[vii] Gordon, the UNIP-Lumpa Conflict Revisited, p.60. Web. 2 May 2017. <http://saipar.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/One-Zambia.pdf>

[viii] Bond, M. *From Northern Rhodesia to Zambia: Recollections of a DO/DC 1962-73*. 2014. Gabsden Publishers, Zambia.

[ix] Bond. *From Northern Rhodesia to Zambia*. 2014.

[x] MacLagan, Angus. *A White Hunter's Life*. Clinton: Amwell,

1983.

[xi] "Angus MacLagan." Web. 26 March 2017. [https://docs.google.com/document/d/1eT4vZNNFCYEcqSsvin2DFfNBU-MtG6bF6QaKmqcTy\\_ZA/edit?usp=sharing](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1eT4vZNNFCYEcqSsvin2DFfNBU-MtG6bF6QaKmqcTy_ZA/edit?usp=sharing)

[xii] MacLagan, 1983.

[xiii] Van Binsbergen, W.M.J. 'Religious innovation and political conflict in Zambia: A contribution to the interpretation of the Lumpa rising', in: van Binsbergen & Buijtenhuijs, special issue, 1976:101-135.

## Building the Patrimonial State

*BSA Company receive miserly payout (1964) - INDECO/Sardanis/Kaunda seize businesses (1965) - Kaunda nationalizes the economy (1968) - Kaunda grabs 59% of the mines (1969) - ZIMCO (1971) - one party state (1972) - Kaunda buys out mines and severs contracts with British civil servants (1973/4) - rural situation - only vim on the shelves - the Watershed Speech disaster (1975) - nationalist harvesters - Kaunda and first black lechwe translocation (1974-1975) - the fall - ZIPRA - Commonwealth meeting Lusaka (1979) - Sardanis and his Meridien bank - Chilanga coup plotters (1980) - Bretton Woods and economic disaster (1983+) - David Ffinlo Quirk - lodge nationalizations and confiscations at Lake Tanganyika - SITET: special investigations team on economy and trade - SITET and King Georgi hotel - the South African ANC in Lusaka - white industrialists and the ANC - selling out the poor - farm murders - permanent semi-state of emergency - human rights situation (2012) - 'the horror' - a kleptocratic state - Africa's theft - deportations - corruption and the anti-corruption farce - Chiluba - parastatal mess - re-tread for Banda*



*One of the main consequences of foreign interventions has been to fragment the sovereignty of the state and to dilute its responsibility by dissociating those who apply economic policy from those who are formally held responsible to society as a whole.*

*Jean-Francois Bayart et al. (1999) - The criminalization of the state in Africa*

\* \* \*

## More Kaunda Plunder

### BSA Company miserly payout

Kaunda, with the help of two Britons, Oakeshott and Faber, at independence ensured that the BSA Company received the miserly sum of £4 million for most of the mineral rights it held to the territory instead of the expected £35 million.<sup>[i]</sup> The British government paid half the amount. But the BSA Company was not just about minerals. The ushering in of the [Dual Mandate](#) system of rule did attempt to reinforce customary authorities, despite the BSA Company's commercial role. And it was the Company that got rid of the Arab slave trade and brought an end to the Ngoni raids.

In 1965, at the behest of Kaunda, the Industrial Development Corporation (INDECO), headed by a Cypriot former café owner in Chingola, Andrew Sardanis - both CEO and Per-

manent Secretary of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, began nationalizing businesses owned by Europeans and Indians. He and Kaunda created two more parastatals in rapid succession: the Mining Development Corporation (MINDECO) and the Finance and Development Corporation (FINDECO).

In 1968 Kaunda - greatly influenced by President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania - used the Mulungushi Economic Reforms Conference to fully nationalize the economy. Large European-owned corporations were told to hand over 51% of their equity, to be paid for out of declared dividends, anticipating the future Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act of South Africa and its clone, the Citizens Economic Empowerment Act of Zambia, both part of the African affirmative action industry, a front for the African elite's self-enrichment through harvesting the fruits of endeavour of mainly European producers.[ii]

In September 1969, as his protégé, my friend David Gleason recounted that Gavin Relly, the head of Anglo American in Zambia, received a letter from Kaunda telling him that he had decided to take 59% of the mines.[iii] On 24 December, Relly signed the agreement to receive payment in the issue of bonds, Gleason being responsible for settlement negotiations. In 1971 the three parastatals were combined into the Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation (ZIMCO), with Sardanis as its CEO and Kaunda as chairman. Valentine Musakanya, the head of the civil service and Secretary to the Cabinet, was behind the appointment of Sardanis, his friend from their Chingola days.[iv] In 1972, Kaunda declared the one-party state, espousing his philosophy of humanism that called for a return to the African cultural roots of economic reciprocity and the 'low-poppy' society, but which in reality was a platform for state collectivization. The country now fell apart, the

legacy of Western Christian civilization and African culture squandered. In 2014 - advised by Kaunda, who spent hours seated in President Sata's office at State House - Sata reached back into darkness and declared the [re-birth of INDECO](#).<sup>[v]</sup>

In 1973 Kaunda abrogated the management contracts entered into with the mining houses, borrowed money from international banks, and bought out the mines. Anglo-American received their payout gratefully, funds which they used to establish themselves in the Bahamas. But the government had already begun an assault on British civil servants employed on British-aided service conditions and 'broke the contracts of numbers of long-serving officers while admitting their exemplary service'.<sup>[vi]</sup>

In October 1973, having taken over the new Bangweulu Command for the Game Department in May, I received a message from my friend, the Chief Wildlife Research Officer, Bill Astle, to meet him on the Great North Road. Bill had been the Luangwa Game Reserve research officer when I was Senior Cropping Ranger in 1966-1967. For the last five months, he had been working on a new three-year contract but was due to go on leave and meet his Brazilian wife, Mercedes, and daughter in Rome. But he was a realist: the government was getting rid of white civil servants on contract. He feared that while on leave, his contract would be broken and that he would be given three month's notice, losing his airfares and payment to repatriate his belongings. And this is what happened. Cathlin and I returned disconsolate to Chiundaponde, deciding to make a great effort to move to the floodplains and start work on the ecology of the sitatunga.



Our camp at Chiundaponde 1973

And so the pale faces denied dual citizenship by Kaunda in the negotiations leading up to independence, left so that by 1975 only Peter Moss and I remained of the Game Department old-timers. Moss was safe for the moment as he held a field position while I was serving on local conditions with barely enough salary to buy food.

Astle then took on a consultancy in Botswana, where we were soon to meet up again when I registered my company Wildlife Management Botswana there in late 1976.



*IM and Bill Astle*

## Zambianization

In 1974 the Zambianization program entered its penultimate phase. The Minister of State in the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources of the time, Sefelino Mulenga, travelled to the Game Department HQ at Chilanga to address the staff. He pointed at the European officers, declaring that the Zambians present would take their jobs and that they should denounce European racists. The Permanent Secretary, to his credit, later

apologized to the Director.

The economic downturn was rapid. In the village of Chiundaponde in eastern Bangweulu (Mpika District), I witnessed the closure of Zambian owned trading stores such as the store belonging to Bicycle Tembo - the Indians divested of them by Kaunda five years earlier and only allowed to run wholesale businesses. A Bisa patrician to the core, his store was starved of goods. Roads ceased to be graded; villagers instructed by Kaunda to live close to secondary and main roads under his village collectivization program found the hybrid seed and chemical fertilizer not delivered on time at the start of the planting season – every day of failure to plant adversely affecting the yield, and their maize harvest not collected and left to rot in sacks on the roadside. Many were never paid. In the provincial towns, there was no food; in Lusaka, the supermarkets on Cairo Road presented Leninist serried ranks of Vim detergent on their shelves and little else. I employed a man to roam the town in search of toilet paper, flour, cooking oil, salt, sugar and milk powder – fresh milk being an artifact of colonialism. A dairy-farmer friend, walking along a street in Kabwe, had suddenly heard a bellow from across the road, “Cream!” the man screeched. “Cream!!”

## Watershed Speech

In early July 1975, after a long stint at our paradisaical Chikuni Research Station on the Bangweulu floodplains, I bought a newspaper on reaching Lusaka. Taking up the front page was a shocking announcement: that of the now-infamous

Kaunda Watershed Speech.[vii] This was an address given to the National Council of UNIP at Mulungushi Hall, Lusaka. In a rush of despotic verbiage, Zambia was radically changed forever. With the economy already reeling from oil-price increases and low copper prices, Kaunda now unveiled a radical program of Zambianization and further pervasive state control, a cataclysmic event that effectively drained Zambia of its remaining critical mass of Western skills and consigned the country to an isolated and donor-supported one-party state, one serving only the elite. The Watershed Speech made Kaunda's revolutionary intentions clear to non-Zambians: he wished to place UNIP at the centre of Zambian life. 'Law can only be second to thought in importance in terms of revolutionary change', he had maundered.[viii] There were then 147 parastatals (quangos) in existence, 80% of them state-managed. The fact that Kaunda, despite being a self-appointed humanist, sought to harvest that which had been built by European technology and verve and invest it in Afro-European conglomerates that in no way redistributed ownership or benefits to his people is both instructive and ironic. But he did declare of parastatals:[ix]

*They were created to benefit the masses. But a lot of them because of the attitude of our Zambian workers have earned themselves such a bad reputation that the name Parastatal is now virtually a derogatory term. Some of them have made very heavy losses due to carelessness and outright robbery.*

Kaunda decreed that in future, all those in government ser-

vice would not be allowed to establish their own businesses once they had left government, naming in particular, doctors, lawyers, teachers and architects:[xii] “When they come,” he said, “they come to help us; they are fellow men to get over our problems of lack of professionals; after that they must either decide to continue serving the government or pack up, we shall thank them honestly and sincerely and let them go, but they should not add to our problems at all.”

In a stroke, he made it impossible for any expatriate in government service wishing to go into private enterprise to remain in the country, including my wife and me. As the government had already cancelled all our department heads in 1973, the Game Department was rapidly Zambianized. Then with the Watershed Speech in 1975, Kaunda made sure we would all leave the country. Investment in the territory dried up, and the emigration of Europeans and Hindu-Indian residents became a flood. Zambia, with Kaunda at the helm, ran upon the rocks.

In short order, private hospitals were closed, and the membership told to use state hospitals. My wife and I were members of a new private hospital near State House, the Zambia Medical Aid Hospital, where once she had been operated on for acute appendicitis. It was closed, the members given no compensation, the property simply taken over by the Kaunda regime.[x]



*Freehold land abolished*

Effective 1 July 1975, Kaunda abolished all freehold title to land, with all commercial farming land converted to leasehold for 100 years and idle farms converted to state land.[xi] In urban areas, land could no longer be sold, and all estate agents were closed.

Kaunda had taken particular exception to the steep rise in the cost of land in urban areas, singling out three properties belonging to George Louis Lipschild, who for years ran Lipschild's stationery on one of the plots in the central business district, Edwardian-style stationers opposite the council library, a magical place filled with items no longer available in the new world. The plots were sold to Solar Investments Limited, which then sold one of them to the Development Bank of Zambia. Kaunda decreed that Solar should give the money back to the bank. He then gave the bank the property and told Solar Investments to "get out" of Zambia. "We have declared war on exploitation, and we intend to fight it to the end!" he cried.

## Kaunda and the black lechwe translocation 1974-1975

In 1973 Kaunda issued instructions to the Chinsali Rural Council to make the necessary arrangements with the Game Department for the black lechwe antelope to be re-established in the Nashinga Swamps and Bwela Flats lying near his former home at Lubwa Presbyterian Mission, animals he had once hunted as a boy.[xiii] [xiv] The Game Department then made

contact with Richard Bell and Jeremy Grimsdell, at the time carrying out their ecological research on the black lechwe in the Bangweulu Command under my care.



The Bwela Flats/Nashing Swamps fed by the Lubwa River and lying west of Chinsali was once one of two elephant reserves created by Chief Nkula in the 1890s, and still protected by the chiefdom up until direct rule in the 1930s.[xv] [xvi] [xvii] [xviii]



On 30 October 1974, at short notice, members of the Wildlife Society of Zambia assisted me in handling the dozen or so animals I caught with the use of our airboat, Alwyn Williams transporting them in his twin-engined aircraft to Chinsali. On our last journey, we returned late, and with the airstrip in darkness, flew on to Kitwe and spent the night at Alwyn's home. There, at 0300 hrs, we watched Ali fight George Foreman for the world's heavyweight championship. This was the famous 'rumble in the jungle'. Defeating Foreman, Ali returned to America where a journalist inquired, "Champ, what did you think of Africa?" Ali replied, "Thank God my granddaddy got on that boat." A poignant remark at the time, given the Watershed Speech.

In 1975 I repeated the translocation exercise, but this time a Zambian Airforce Caribou ferried 120 animals to Chinsali. Ironically, the Black Lechwe Project, which had three phases:

research on the lechwe's ecology and distribution; its protection; followed by the issue of an annual cropping quota for those villagers resident in the lechwe's range, closed due to the Watershed Speech and my departure.[xix] And so, despite the main lechwe population having increased from 17,000 to 39,000 between 1971 and 1975, the project simply ceased. No follow-up was ever made of what happened to the lechwe released at the Nashinga Swamps and Bwela Flats, although in 2008, Chief Chibesakunda told me that they were again locally extinct, suggesting that the rural council took no interest in the matter, and neither did Kaunda.

The first African Director of the National Parks and Wildlife Service, Geoffrey Zyambo, was appointed in 1975 and - with the exception of one recently employed USA citizen, Peter Conant, who found himself stranded in Lochinvar National Park without transport, spending his time researching some captive chameleons, the last European wildlife officers were Peter Moss and me, and we departed Zambia in January 1976.[xx]

## The Fall

On 28 January 1975, Kaunda declared a full state of emergency, suspending constitutional guarantees, a modified state of emergency has been in effect since Rhodesian UDI in 1965. The presence in the country at the time of Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) created more incentives for Europeans and Hindu Indians to leave the country. Nkomo was the political leader of the Matabele, the latter

conquering southern Zimbabwe in the 1830s, instituting a reign of unspeakable terror far and wide, yet another Nguni language group that had journeyed north as part of the *Difaquane* and coming from the same area as the Ngoni and the Makololo to whom they are related. ZAPU organized the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) – supported by the Soviet Union and, amongst others, the Canadians. On 18 March 1975, Herbert Chitepo, the head of ZANU in Lusaka, was killed by a car bomb. In 1976 came the formation of the Patriotic Front by Joshua Nkomo and Mugabe – with Kaunda's help, with Nkomo moving to Lusaka in 1977 and from there directing ZIPRA insurgency operations into Rhodesia. On 3 September 1978, ZIPRA shot down Air Rhodesia Flight 825, arriving later and massacring the ten surviving European women and children. That evening on the BBC, Nkomo claimed responsibility for the aircraft's destruction, failing to mention the slaughter of the survivors. Ian Smith immediately suspended talks with him and declared martial law in the affected areas. On 19 October 1978, the Rhodesians bombed ZIPRA's Freedom Farm located in the commercial farming block of Chisamba. On 12 February 1979, ZIPRA shot down Air Rhodesia Flight 827.

At the time, some countries were complicit in raising funds for Nkomo's ZANU and ZIPRA operations. Noteworthy was the Canadian organization, CUSO, which sent volunteers to serve in undeveloped countries and supported by the Canadian International Development Agency. CUSO, acting on behalf of other NGO's as well, conducted widespread funding operations in Canada, with the United Church of Canada prominent – obviously without the knowledge of many of its parishioners. Since 2009 the Church's pension board has refused to divest from Goldcorp Inc, a Canadian mining outfit notorious for

its violent treatment of demonstrators in Guatemala.[xxi] On Good Friday 1979, Rhodesian forces attacked Nkomo's house at night, but he escaped, forewarned by British State Security.

In August 1979, the Commonwealth Heads of Government met in Lusaka, attended by the soon to be high priestess of free-market dogmatism and destroyer of organized labour, Margaret Thatcher (d. 2013), whom the Labour MP Tam Dalyell (d.2017) described as, 'a bounder, a liar, a deceiver, a cheat, and a crook'.[xxii] There too was the Prime Minister of Canada, Joe Clarke, and his Foreign Minister, Flora MacDonald – the latter visiting the ZAPU Victory camp - doubtless in the company of their Canadian advisor on African liberation movements, John Harker. The Lancaster House talks came soon after that, followed in February 1980 by an election in Rhodesia where Mugabe became the first Prime Minister of Zimbabwe – later deposed in November 2017.

In 1983 Mugabe set the North-Korean trained Shona Fifth Brigade upon the Matabele people, an operation named *Gukurahundi*, a mini-repeat of the holocaust. The Thatcher government stood by and watched.

## Sardanis

At about this time, Sardanis, 'Mr 50%', left government service and joined Tiny Rowland of Lonrho for a short time in London, later returning to Lusaka and buying Roberts Construction, Wilfred Watson (Caterpillar) and a pharmacy chain. He then established the Meridien Bank in the Bahamas - followed by commercial branches in six countries and an additional

international bank. Meridien was a criminal organization. Early on, it attracted 'a significant level of state deposits', amounting to a quarter of all deposits. With the ready money, it was able to corrupt bank and government officials, even the heads of state in countries where it worked:[xxiii]

*Meridien was the leading recipient of low-cost loans to the private sector by the African Development Bank and received from the Government of Zambia, for its restructuring, \$41 million in 1994. Meridien gave loans to, or acquired shares in public companies well known to be in difficulties had local branches of dubious reputation and offered to perform illegal transactions such as the conversion of CFA francs between the Central and West African CFA zones...*

Short of capital, his banking empire soon folded but not before he exported a massive sum in 1995 from Zambia. This is the same year that the government paid a hunting-safari operator a considerable sum, supposedly in compensation for some minor issue. Before this, Sardanis had established a game ranch in Chisamba near Lusaka, as well as a hunting-safari company run by my friend, David Ommanney.[xxiv]



David Gleason (left)

Later, David Gleason was to say of Sardanis in his unpublished memoir, *Threads* – a book I had published privately for him:

*He wasn't needed in Zambia then; he isn't needed now. His continued sojourn in the country is an affront – or should be – to every thinking Zambian who, reading an unexpurgated history of the role he played in permitting its dismemberment (Zambia's) should be, first, shocked, and then outraged.*

In August 2017, the Department of National Parks and Wildlife (DNPW) delivered some elephant calves to Sardanis at his Chisamba farm. These had been captured in the Lower Zambezi National Park assuredly with the knowledge of the NGO, Conservation Lower Zambezi. Word also filtered out



from the South Luangwa National Park that President Lungu had promised the King of Saudi Arabia a present of some lion cubs. These he duly obtained with the help of guards while out game viewing and later despatched to the Saudi king. One conservationist, a lone female voice in Zambia, on 23 August 2017 very bravely criticized the corruption in the Department of Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP) and revealed the continuing funk of so-called conservationists in the country:

*Has our Wildlife Department become an out-of-control, rogue agency? It happened in Zambia in the Lower Zambezi National Park two weeks ago (early Aug 2017). Following a report that a lone baby elephant had been spotted inside the Park, a Department of National Parks and Wildlife Service (DNPW) team appeared on the scene, consisting of a driver, two scouts and two vets, Drs Innocent and Musa, the former a DNPW vet, the latter a private vet from Lusaka. They had borrowed a translocation cage from Game Rangers International (GRI), the elephant-orphanage project and set out in their Parks-logo car from the Dept's headquarters in Chilanga to capture the elephant orphan, ostensibly to take it to the elephant orphanage at Lilayi in Lusaka.*

*It is understood however that they did not find the elephant orphan, and instead darted a mother (and possibly an aunty) and calf, and loaded the baby into the cage. Upon which the calf was either released, or broke the cage and jumped off the truck. Whether the calf managed to reunite*

*with its mother is unknown.*

*The team then left the scene to get the truck and cage repaired. News of their nefarious deeds had filtered out of the park, and the team had to stay uncomfortably at a nearby community campsite while the truck was repaired at a Chirundu garage. They'd found no offers of accommodation.*

*Over the coming days, the truck and team were back in the park and three more elephant mothers and calves were darted and the calves, estimated by eye-witnesses to be between 1 and 1 ½ years old, were transported out of the park. The team was under instruction and had written approval for the capture and translocation, signed by Mrs Liya Mutale, the PS of the Ministry of Tourism and Arts.*

*The elephant calves were taken to Chaminuka, a lodge and game-ranch near Lusaka, owned by businessman Andrew Sardanis (of mine-nationalisation and Meridien-Bank fame). He recently had lost 3 of his 4 draw-card elephants (Mphamvu due to cancer, a youngster – ranch-bred? – due to snake-bite, and an older male due to DNPW-shooting, as it'd become aggressive). He therefore wanted replacements, apparently offering some of his lion cubs in exchange.*

*Initial suspicion was that someone high up in the Ministry of Tourism & Arts (DNPW is a department within this ministry, its staff members are civil servants) had made a deal with someone external (China? Saudi Arabia?) to*

*export these calves. After all, Zimbabwe makes lots of money from such 'live exports'. Later it transpired that, some months ago, State House had promised the Saudis a few lion cubs as official present. There had been reports earlier this year of two cubs having been flown out of South Luangwa Nat Park, kept at Munda Wanga for some weeks, before being delivered to the King Saud of Saudi Arabia. The Zambian President in the very person, out on a game drive in the park, had 'rescued' them from an attacking male lion.*

*But more lions were needed. Chaminuka had some going spare but wanted elephants in turn, though not necessarily babies, and not necessarily wild-captured ones from inside a National Park. Rumour has it that, on arrival of the first one, there was concern at the Lodge, but not enough to stop the delivery of two more. How they are kept, who looks after them, and whether they are still alive has been impossible to establish. Frequent calls to Mr Sardanis remained unanswered.*

*Have we really reached such lows? Apparently yes. The capture team was well aware that what it was doing was wrong. They impressed on all eye-witnesses and park-radio listeners in threatening tones to "not get involved, not to question what they were doing, and to stop reporting it". Might may be right to the perpetrators, but the world needs to know that our Wildlife Department is out of control and gone rogue. The lodge needs to be named and shamed for being involved in such a trade.*

*Asked how he could stand by, watching such cruelty being committed without intervening, the Warden of LZNP, is reported to have said "I am a man in uniform; I just follow orders".*

*There are other considerations: elephant researchers have long established that an elephant family is a close-knit unit, a unit that gets very distressed when their youngsters are in danger. A distressed elephant herd whose babies have been stolen is certainly not something tourists on a walking safari would like to have near. Did DNPW think of that?*

*The Wildlife Act of 2015, in S. 65 (1) 'Prohibition of hunting young game animals or females with young' states:*

*... a person commits an offence who hunts*

*(a) the dependent young of a game animal or protected animal; or*

*(b) a female game animal or protected animal accompanied by her dependent young.*

*(2) For the purposes of this section, "dependent young" means a young animal relying upon its parent for sustenance and protection.*

*While S.80 'Cruelty to animals' states:*

*A person who, in any circumstances, causes unnecessary or undue suffering to a wild animal commits an offence.*

*But here we have the very people, employed and entrusted to ensure our wild animals' welfare, committing the offence. The Act does say "Except as may be authorised*

*under a capture permit”, which raises the question of legality. If a legal entity gives illegal orders, do the orders become legal and must be followed unquestioningly? The perpetrators, knowing they did wrong, could have refused, subverted or aborted the mission.*

*Also, there is the emotional angle. Anyone who has read Daphne Sheldrick’s graphic description in her autobiography of an elephant baby dying of grief will be haunted forever. And to think that there are not one but three of them most likely dying of grief at Mr Sardanis’ lodge, all small and not weaned, all torn from their mothers and their herds under incredibly cruel circumstances! I think Mr Sardanis should do the right thing and give the orphaned-by-department elephant infants to GRI’s elephant orphanage at Lilayi where they would have proper care and maybe a chance of survival, eventually even maybe a chance of rewilding?*

*Last but not least, there is the moral angle: should NGOs and operators continue to support a GRZ institution that openly and brazenly commits crimes against the nation’s wildlife? I personally think not, but they argue that, to continue the good work they are doing (and they undoubtedly DO good work), it is necessary to turn a blind eye to the many misdeeds of the Dept. After all, their licences, permits and livelihoods depend on the good graces of this Dept.*

*Aug 23, 2017*

*P.S. when asking around about the story-details I was struck by how terrified operators and NGOs are of the*

*Parks Dept in Chilanga. Nobody wanted to go on record, even though they finance, support, and do the Dept's work. Their fear is so extreme that email/phone/whatsapp surveillance is thought possible, or being PI-ed or closed down, while one person pointed to Tanzania and last week's murder of wildlife activist Wayne Lotta, implying it could happen here. This DNPW (ex-ZAWA) intimidation has been going on for many years in all nat parks and has to stop.*

## Chilanga coup attempt

On 17 October 1980, two prominent Lusaka lawyers, Edward Shamwana and Valentine Musakanya, and some Katangese army dissidents - on information allegedly supplied to Kaunda by Sardanis, were arrested at a Chilanga farm belonging to a fellow plotter. This was Pierce Annfield, a lawyer who had once acted on Peter Moss's and my behalf when Minister Mulenga illegally confiscated the tusks of our annual elephant; Moss's being a 92-pounder. Annfield managed to escape from Zambia. At their trial, one of the co-plotters, Lt. General of the airforce, Christopher Kabwe, turned state's evidence. Musakanya was acquitted in 1982, mainly on the grounds of his torture at the hands of the police. Shamwana was sentenced to death in 1983 but in 1985 found not guilty by the Supreme Court, having been tortured and poorly cared for, yet only pardoned by Kaunda in 1990. Musakanya was the first Zambian District Officer in the Provincial Administration at self-rule, serving briefly under John Hudson at Isoka during the Lumpa massacres, a quiet, self-effacing man to be seen in the company of friends

at the Lusaka Flying Club where the coup plot was hatched; a courageous man, he had become an outspoken critic of 'one-party participatory rule' and Kaunda, even while serving as head of the civil service and then Governor of the Bank of Zambia (1970-1972) - for which he paid a heavy price at the hands of an increasingly perverted 'white man's justice'.<sup>[xxv]</sup>

In 1983, its external debt by 1980 already amounting to \$3,244 million, Zambia entered into negotiations with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, leading to the imposition of a plunderous Structural Economic Adjustment Program. In 1986 the government cancelled the program and began its rescue package called Growth from Own Resources. The Fourth National Development Plan followed in 1988, as well as a resumption of its IMF relationship, so negating the Fourth Plan. From 1989 the government began the New Economic Recovery Program. Since 1989 there have been trotted out an endless litany of plans and programs.

## Arresting Invaders.

In those days, a shroud of suspicion hung over the land, leading to intemperate action. It was common for European visitors to the country to be flung in jail without charge because they were from Zimbabwe or South Africa and obviously 'plotting' against Zambia. The son of South African friends, accompanied by friends of mixed nationality, was on his way through Zambia to Tanzania when they were arrested at a roadblock and jailed in the Lusaka Remand Prison. The South African and British Embassies showed little interest in their nationals, in marked

contrast to the German Ambassador who personally took up the case of his with vigour, seeing to the German's release, yet continuing to offer encouragement and provisions to all those still jailed. Living in South Africa at the time, I knew a trusted lawyer in Lusaka and recommended him to our friends. The lawyer, David Ffinlo Quirk, was an elderly man of immense integrity and patience – a nineteenth-century man. He visited our friends' son daily, waiting outside the jail in the sun until allowed to enter. But the young man sickened, contracted hepatitis, and was taken to the hospital in a wheelbarrow. Finding it worse than jail, he insisted he is returned there. Eventually, after coming close to death, Quirk had him released.

## Circuit Holdings

In 1985, at the time that 4,634 miners were fired by Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) for striking over the Mukuba Pension Scheme – fired because the government wanted to rid themselves of labour due to the severe economic downturn, Kaunda appointed Circuit Holdings, a subsidiary of ZCCM, as the vehicle to convert Zambia into a major tourism destination and foreign exchange earner. Circuit Holdings was managed by Malcolm Freed. In 1979, in the company of a Zambian businessman - both of whom I had not met before, he had flown to see me in Gaborone, Botswana, as they wished to start a crocodile farming operation. I told them that I knew little about such farming but that I did know an alligator farmer in Louisiana. I soon found myself on a plane with them to the USA. Nothing came of it. Six years later,



Kaunda/Sardanis gave Circuit Holdings - with Freed at the helm, the nationalized Mfuwe, Chichele and Luamfwa lodges in the Luangwa, the 'Regent's Palace' in Lochinvar National Park, Rainbow Lodge in Livingstone, and Kasaba Bay and Nkamba Bay lodges on Lake Tanganyika – the latter two by June 1985 already refurbished and open for business. Freed also built a residence next to Kasaba Bay Lodge for Kaunda – and a 9-hole golf course used by him twice a year to host Samora Machel, Oliver Tambo and those of that ilk. To do so - as its manager at the time recalled, 'the Inangu Headland was degazetted from the national park (Sumbu)' and declared a game management area (GMA). In 1988 the army invaded the area overnight and confiscated all the businesses, and handed them over to Circuit Holdings. Included in these seizures was the crocodile, live tropical fish and commercial fishing operation at Chimba owned by Norman and Adrian Carr; Norman Carr – a man whom Kaunda admired. Also appropriated was Chris Blignaut's commercial fishing and tropical fish business at Cape Kachese and the commercial fishing business at Ntingila - lying between Ndole Bay Lodge and Cape Kachesa, belonging to Geoff Whittle and Barbara Hudson. Also, undeveloped land belonging to a Game Department biologist of the time, and the fishing operation belonging to Gerard Zytkov, were also nationalized. With the enforced departure of management, Carr's 4,000 crocodile, already suffering from a poxvirus, were left untended, starving to death. In 1991 Kaunda was voted out of power, and Freed departed Zambia to run the Kenneth Kaunda Foundation in South Africa. In 1994, a few years after Chiluba's MMD Party had taken power in 1991, they reversed the Kaunda nationalizations. Adrian Carr then obtained compensation for his dead crocodile – allegedly the only one to do so.

## SITET

The Special Investigations Team Economy and Trade, known to all and sundry as SITET, was, like the state security apparatus, the *shushushu*, created to cow any opposition to UNIP and Kaunda – an ex-judicial process favoured by American-style Presidents. SITET was notionally positioned in the Ministry of Home Affairs and run by seconded British security officials who reported directly to Kaunda. It was established by someone I knew, ‘Diamond’ Jim Lavender, a former District Officer, who quickly built an immensely powerful force for blackmail and extortion. Lavender arrived one day at the Anglo-American offices in Lusaka and questioned Gleason about the company, Everglo Electric (whose founder-owner, Des Sharp, I had known years before), which fell under the Anglo wing. He had proof, he claimed, that goods shipped through Rhodesia and bound for Zambia had partly been retained in Rhodesia; an illegal action under sanctions. As Gleason recounted in *Threads*:

*He had no alternative other than to order Everglo (Zambia) to cease trading immediately; today; now. On the other hand (so there was an alternative), a fine of 50 000 kwacha (in those years at parity with the South African rand), an admission of guilt, and an undertaking that Everglo (Zambia) would ensure these activities would not recur would enable the company to continue operating.*

Anglo-American paid, as did everyone else, such was the power of SITET. Lavender handed over control of SITET to Freddy Allen, a Northern Irishman and former Northern Rhodesia

policeman. He was aided by occasional visits from the UK by Lavender and the services of shadowy agents such as Len Norman and Frank McGovern. SITET could, under the legislation in force and the state of emergency, imprison people and hold them without trial in foul Dickensian prisons for long periods; arrests carried out often on mere rumour, with blackmail a powerful weapon.

## Amalgamated Safaris

In 1974 Amalgamated Safaris – the result of a merger between Norman Carr and Bryan Smith's Luangwa Safaris and Ron Kidson and Jukes Curtis's Zambia Safaris, was bought out by Oliver Irwin of Coopers Lybrand. The purchase price agreed was K1m and \$1m, the kwacha amount being paid to Irwin, and an agreement made to pay the \$1m outside the exchange control ring – an illegal action. Irwin immediately reported the matter to Freddie Allen, who then forced Kidson, Carr and Curtis to pay a K1m fine. During this affair, Kidson had visited Coopers Lybrand and interviewed Irwin's 'fixer', one Michael Sata – a future President of Zambia. After a heated exchange, Sata threatened Kidson, "Mr Kidson, I will fix you!"

## Bryan Smith

In 1989 my friend and former professional safari-hunter colleague, Bryan Smith (d.2014), was interned by Allen for three months in what was known in Northern Rhodesia days as the *King Georgi Hotel* - the Lusaka Remand prison.[xxvi] His crime: he had received US dollars from a Rhodesian con artist, Eric 'Farley' Winson, who had been travelling around all the commercial farms in the country buying up old machinery with dollars – clearly a sting operation. For Smith, there was no trial to establish his guilt, no option of a fine – a spiteful action. Inevitably, Allen had learnt of Smith's illegal use of dollars from Winson, and as Smith told me, from Oliver Irwin, his friend and former hunting client. A few of us delivered food to Smith, who was then only released once I had collected a cheque from his bankers and delivered it to Allen. Winson was the man who had persuaded Kaunda to give him title to a large piece of Chief Chiawa's customary area in the Zambezi Valley for a biofuel scheme – perhaps Winson's reward for being part of the SITET live-bait operation set to entice and trap commercial farmers.

Smith was placed in a small cell with sufficient room only for the 20 or so prisoners to lie down and served by a single slop-bucket in a low-walled cubicle. When he entered the cell for the first time, he was politely informed by the cell captain that he should observe certain rules when using the bucket. He gave Smith a place in the corner to sleep and told him that there were 'girls' for the men, "So the Bwana should not worry about being raped." Incredibly, 'in charge of the jail was an Afrikaner, Bezuidenhout, a truck driver arrested while drinking at the Lusaka Hotel and interned for two years without trial. He had

his own cell and was held in great affection by his jailers. "It's apartheid here, kaffirs!" he would announce once again to his jailers, sending them off into fits of laughter. Each morning the milk ration for the entire 'Hotel' was placed in his cell, warders and prisoners alike lining up in the hope that they were in favour. "Morning, Bwana Bez!" they would call out, holding out their pails, their right hand placed respectfully on their left elbow. There was order in the 'Hotel'. Bezuidenhout soon met Smith and had him share his cell.

A driver working for the parastatal, Contract Haulage, told Bezuidenhout that he had been caught smuggling rhino horn and ivory at the Kazungula border post (see 7: Rhino Requiem).

"Bwana Bez," he said, "I was always taking these ivories and horns to Joburg, and when I get to Joburg I phone my boss, and he comes to Joburg, and we go to this white man, always the same white man, who takes the ivories and gives us a Mercedes. We put the Mercedes in the container and bring it back to Zambia."

The King also looked after a young coloured man from Zimbabwe called Moffatt, a political prisoner. He was ill. "I will die here," he remarked to Bezuidenhout. "Don't be blabby stupid, man!" retorted Bezuidenhout, placing his arms on the man's shoulders and comforting him. But Moffatt was dying. His only relatives were in Zimbabwe, and they could do nothing to help him. Every few days, the police would take him away, sometimes to Lilayi Police Barracks. There, with his arms tied behind his back, he would be hung from the wrists and have his genitals subjected to electric shock treatment. On other occasions, his head would be pushed repeatedly underwater until he lost consciousness. He had kidney problems. When the 'King' awoke one day, Moffatt lay dead.

The 'King', I learnt on my visits, was in no hurry to leave the 'Hotel'. The South African authorities were looking for him. It was nothing serious, but in his isolation, he had blown it up into a major crime. He began to think of what would happen if he got sick. Prisoners were dying from resistant strains of malaria, Aids was rampant, as was hepatitis, cholera – anything could happen. Another inmate, a 92-year old political prisoner, would certainly die in the 'Hotel'.

One day, two men were caught stealing mielie-meal from the prison kitchen. The head warder had not seen them before. They had broken into the jail. Bezuidenhout was incensed, "What the blarry hell for you breaking into jail?" he shouted.

"We come for mielie-meal, Bwana! We are suffering from hunger, Bwana!"

This was too much for Bezuidenhout. It was time to go. Smith, now back on his farm, began negotiating his release. "Just give us a ticket to South Africa, and he can go," said his jailers. Bezuidenhout went home.

In the jail were some ANC members from South Africa imprisoned at the whim of their Lusaka-based leaders, such as Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma. There too came General Christon Tembo, summoned back to Zambia by Kaunda while serving as the Zambian Ambassador to West Germany and arrested for plotting a coup against the UNIP government. He was later pardoned by Kaunda in 1990 and graduated from jail to the vice presidency of the country.

## The ANC

The treatment of ex-African National Congress members who had resigned from the ANC – mostly on political grounds, was severe. The case of former *Umkhonto we Sizwe* members in prison with Smith was not revealed fully at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission hearings in 1996 presided over by Bishop Tutu in Cape Town, a Commission notoriously soft on the ANC. The ANC security department in Lusaka was a law unto itself, with the full co-operation of the Zambian judiciary, the *shushushu* and Kaunda – ably assisted by the arsenal of state emergency powers originally invoked to deal with the Lumpa Church. The ANC leadership resented the resignation of any of its members and had them kidnapped, tortured and imprisoned. This coincided with the first talks by the ANC with European South African business leaders led by Gavin Relly of Anglo-American (formerly head of Anglo in Zambia) and six other Europeans who met with Thabo Mbeki, Oliver Tambo, Chris Hani and others at Old Mfuwe - once Warden Johnny Uys's field HQ in the Luangwa, and subsequently taken over by Kaunda. The latter chaired the meeting. The next meeting was with the South African leader of the opposition, Frederik van Zyl Slabbert – who once promised much and then meekly withdrew from politics; and Bishop Tutu. From this time, delegations poured in to see Mbeki, Zuma, and whosoever else was available. There was hatched the shameful deal between South African European capital and the African prison-graduate oligarchy in which the African masses were sold down the river, the big man oligarchs being provided with that mechanism for enrichment, the Broad-Based Black

Economic Empowerment Act, in exchange for an undertaking not to nationalize the mines and big industry.[xxvii] [xxviii]

## Farm murders

The presence of the ANC in the Chisamba farming block north of Lusaka in the late 1980s led to armed robberies and the murder of European farmers. Brian Irwin – a neighbour of mine at the time, was shot through his bedroom window in 1989, a week after we had lunch together. John and Lorna Harvey, whom I had known for many years, were murdered by three ANC cadres in their lounge on 17 March 1991. Lorna was the daughter of Sir Stewart Gore-Brown, a former member of the Northern Rhodesia Legislature and a great champion of Zambia's people. He had acquired land on the Royal Lake of the Crocodiles (Ishiba Ngandu) in the Northern Province, the farm Shiwa Ngandu, now owned by one of his grandsons. John Harvey managed the estate for many years. Both sets of murders had all the signs of execution. Lorna's eldest sister married John Sutton, the professional safari-hunter who had guided Robert Ruark and who had made an invaluable contribution to that classic film directed by the great film producer Sydney Pollack, *Out of Africa*.

In 1961 there were 1,185 commercial European farmers; in 1966, 725; in 1970, 433; and in 1981, 300. There have been numerous murders of European farmers, despite a member of the Zambia National Farmers' Union Executive telling me that, 'There have been very few commercial farmers murdered in the last 40 years'. In December 1999, the former leader of Sir Roy



Welensky's United Federal Party in Northern Rhodesia, John Roberts - who had helped me, Kerry Curtis, Ron Kidson and Eric Balson in 1987 with a proposed tourism operation[xxix] - and his wife, Joyce, were tied up and killed on their Makeni farm. In August 2006, Sean Hayden, a 40-year veteran member of the Wildlife Society, who had, with other members of the Zambian Wildlife Society assisted me with the translocation of black lechwe in 1974, was murdered, along with his wife and their two adult children on their farm, Muna, near Kabwe; nothing was stolen. In 1997, in Chisamba, G.M.J. du Preez was murdered after 44 years on the farm. In 2018, his brother F.C.H. du Preez was running the farm, Frik, as he is known, South Africa's rugby player of the 20th Century

Near Kabwe c. 1998, Scrooby Senior and Junior, in two separate incidents, were murdered. Over the years, other farmers were murdered: Tom Puffet (Chilanga 2000), Eric Clayton (22 March 2003), Pieter Kleinschmidt (August 2004), Derek Tilanus - Clayton's friend, a Greek farmer in the mid-1970s on the Mkushi Club road, Tom Savory (Mazabuka 4 January 2008), Mark Jellis (Leopards Hill 2010), and Jesse John Walker (Choma December 2014). Given the small number of European farmers in the country, this bears a chilling resemblance to South Africa - though in Zambia, those murdered are not tortured first as they routinely are in South Africa. To this may be added the many attempted murders. Nine farmers I knew were attacked at their farm gate, workshop or house. Like the Lumpa massacres, this is kept from the public gaze. One of them, John Hudson, who played an important part after the initial Lumpa massacre in bringing peace to the Isoka District, was attacked at his house-gate in Lusaka. As someone told me whose parents were attacked four times in separate incidents

– one of them finally killed, “Life is cheap here. Whenever we go to funerals – not murder victims, just general funerals – I always find myself gathered outside with the relatives of the murdered. Strange how we unconsciously congregate.”

As the years pass, it is clear that there is no true rule of law in Zambia, constitutional procedures having been abandoned from the beginning. Chanda, in his paper, *The legal basis of emergency powers in Zambia*, notes acerbically, “The exercise of emergency powers in Zambia, particularly the power of preventative detention, derogates fundamentally from the rule of law’.[xxx] Between 1975 and October 1989, 684 people had been detained under this instrument, 72 for more than two years without going to trial. In 1997, after Captain Solo’s attempted coup, President Chiluba introduced more security legislation, interning prominent politicians Dean Mung’omba and Nakatindi Wina for a year without trial.

## USA Country Report 2012

The US Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2012 reveals the terrible damage done to citizens by the adoption of European law in dispensing criminal justice in a failed state. With more than 60% of the population living in urban areas, no longer does society seek justice through traditional mechanisms of social equilibrium and clan responsibility. In the first year of the new PF government, the US report summarized the situation:[xxxi]

*Serious human rights abuses occurred during the year. The most important were abuses by security forces, including unlawful killings, torture, and beatings; life-threatening prison conditions; and restrictions on freedom of speech, assembly and association. Other serious human rights problems included arbitrary arrest, prolonged pre-trial detention, arbitrary interference with privacy, government corruption, violence and discrimination against women, child abuse, trafficking in persons, discrimination against persons with disabilities and based on sexual orientation, restriction on labor rights, forced labor, and child labor. The government did not take steps to prosecute or punish officials who committed abuses, and impunity remained a problem.*

In April 2012, of 17,000 prisoners (with the same number of policeman in the country), 5,000 were pre-trial detainees (in the 2013 report, the figure was 6,000), 3% of which were women who could 'choose to have their infants and children under the age of four with them', 3% juvenile, held with convicted prisoners, all of them fed one meal a day of mielie-meal and beans. Potable water was in short supply, and outbreaks of disease common, death in prison a daily event, prisoners denied medical care – 25 clinical officers and one medical doctor caring for 19 prisons. On average, pretrial detainees spend three years in jail before going to trial; one man on a charge of murder was incarcerated for 11 years and then released without charge. One-third of the prison population had not been convicted of a crime. The 2013 report, apart from one extra prison coming on stream and an improvement in the plight of women, recorded a deteriorating situation. A modern Kurtz, in a Zambian jail,

dying, would utter the final terrible words, “The horror ... the horror...!”

And something not often mentioned is that Zambia only passes 2-3 bar exam applicants a year. The situation in Zambia, as for Africa as a whole, [is dire](#).

The PF government did nothing to improve what is a national calamity. Even world bodies have no means of bringing Zambia before an international court on charges of human rights abuses. The three releases of prisoners made by Sata, were with hindsight, recruitment efforts to the ranks of his panga wielding PF militia. And a report of 4 April 2015 makes clear that conditions in jail continue to deteriorate. As commentator Mungule had to say:[xxxii] [xxxiii]

*You can tell how a nation is civilized or uncivilized by the way it treats its most vulnerable members. What is happening in Mansa is disgraceful to all of us as a society. It is an indictment of our attitudes to those who have done wrongs to society and perhaps rightly need to be punished.*

Yet, the IMF is happy to hand out yet another massive loan.

## PF corruption

In May 2013 came news of massive increases in civil servant remuneration, now taking up 60 - 70% of government revenue. This was followed in October by a 27% increase in the pay of Sata and his snorter of Ministers. In September 2015, five

more ministries were created. The sheer scale of government dysfunction and immersion in grand patronage, now criminalized, may be gleaned from the reports of the Auditor-General and from the experience of investors and civil society. This far exceeds the rather benign state of African patrimonialism and clientelism where rule is by personal patronage rather than law, institutions or ideology, this now having subsumed the imperatives of culture, survival patterns, simple patronage and economic reciprocity. And this is a process assisted by the commoditization policies of the WB/IMF and the ravaging of natural resources by the amalgam of international investors and donor-aiders and by the urban elite and their *compradors*. For as can be seen in this section, there is no shortage of money or resources, but merely of principle and accountability to the country. Instead, as the Gini coefficient clearly shows, Zambia exceeds a 0.50 Gini score placing it with South Africa, Botswana, Namibia and a few others at the top of global rankings. This is a country beset by systemic poverty and inequality, where rural women are adversely affected by a hundred years or more of male migrant labour flows, and now still by culturally oppressive practices.

In Africa as a whole, the actual amount of illicit funds exported to Western financial institutions is a crime of colossal proportions. From 1970, over a 39-year period, Africa lost \$854 billion in cumulative capital flight – not including the trans-border smuggling by the informal sector. The illegal financial flows for Southern Africa – which includes Zambia – in the 1970s was \$5,894 million; 1980s - \$20,581 million; 1990s - \$31,447 million; 2000-2008 - \$116,828 million – a total of \$174,750 million. For Africa, in 2008, external debt was at around \$250 billion, leaving some \$600 billion

for poverty alleviation and economic growth.[xxxiv] Zambia accounted for between \$9,770 - \$5,880 million from 1970 to 2004, not including smuggled narcotics, ivory and gemstones. To this should be added the plunder of the ecosystem services – dwarfing the figures we have of illegal exports, a sustained loss yet to be quantified.

But it is the theft of public money, particularly within those ministries having responsibility for villagers and the natural resources which sustain them, that remains an abiding national disgrace. The amount of public money stolen since self-rule is simply unknown. That it is a massive sum, particularly since 1974 when civil service controls and expertise became severely impaired by the Zambianization policy, is beyond doubt. But it was in the age of neoliberalism, in the time of the MMD Party, that grand corruption became institutionalized. And that it is rural people, who have had to suffer most, cannot be contested, as recorded in the annual reports of the Auditor-General, reports analyzed by Transparency International Zambia for the period 1984-2004, where the equivalent of approximately one year of national income disappeared. Furthermore, in a country where some 80% of its people scrape a living, with an average life expectancy at birth of 33-48 years, the government spent only 16.3% of total national expenditure on education, health, agriculture, community development and social welfare – much of it stolen - with the environment in 2006 having an estimated budget allocation within the Transitional National Development Plan of less than 1%.[xxxv]

The Ministry of Home Affairs and its Department of Immigration remains one of the greatest obstacles to investment in Zambia, despite now having a customer service charter and an integrity officer in place – though they had not fulfilled

their pledges to produce quarterly reports (so too the Revenue Service and the Ministry of Lands). Home Affairs has little regard for the rights of investors.[xxxvi] It is also complicit in a scam whereby small to medium investors are deported for no reason, or imprisoned, leaving behind businesses and Zambian partners who benefit from their removal, a scandal that appears to have no end, something confirmed to me by an immigration official, a fellow supporter at the time of the PF Party.

## General corruption

The risk of 'clients' being held accountable for theft is virtually non-existent in Zambia, protecting the big man and his stable of trough feeders with such dubious excuses as being hampered by a 'statute of limitations'. Former President Chiluba, although found to be guilty of the theft of \$46 million by a judge of the British High Court, continued to live in retirement until his death in 2011 with all state privileges, being found not guilty in a magistrate's court of the theft of \$500,000, the state declining to appeal.[xxxvii] Corruption is, therefore, one of theft and abuse of state powers.

Towards the end of 2007, the Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee Chairman, Charles Milupi, told the House that his committee had discovered that 15 parastatals had not contributed to the national purse in 2005, i.e. the National Pension Scheme Authority (NAPSA), partly because they lacked management boards. Milupi said that the National Food and Nutrition Commission had not made financial returns for 11

years despite having received \$125,000, while the Engineering Services Corporation and the Village Industry Service – the latter an organization supposedly there to improve villager livelihoods, had also not prepared any financial statements.

The [Auditor-General's report of 2010 on 16 parastatals](#) revealed continuing massive theft and misappropriation. The Citizen's Economic Empowerment Commission report, amongst others, revealed a long list of dysfunction and theft.[xxxviii]

The National Heritage Conservation Commission was established in 1989 and mandated to conserve the natural and cultural heritage of Zambia. For the year ending 2010, of 260 staffing establishment posts, 132 were vacant. It was owed \$574,000 in rents for a building it had leased and had not remitted tax and pension payments for its staff to the amount of \$5.4 million. The Lundazi Castle Hotel, built by my late friend Errol Button when DC Lundazi, and acquired by the Commission and concessioned out for 25 years, had not made the necessary financial returns as per the contract.

The National Economic Advisory Council established to advise the Zambian president on the performance, and the future strategies of the economy was established in May 1993, but by December 2010, the Act empowering it had not been passed, rendering the operations of the council illegal. The council owed the government \$192,000 for its staff's NAPSA pension fund contributions, and the Executive Secretary had illegally signed his own employment contract from 2001 to 2013.

Successive governments have not prosecuted parastatals for failing to pay their employees NAPSA pension contributions. An October 2011 parliamentary report revealed that some \$81 million is owed by parastatals, \$33 million of this to the pension



fund. In late 2012 the PF government attempted to extract money owed to NAPSA by the MMD party using the Minister of Justice's one-man law firm, W. M. Kabimba & Company. In July 2012, the PF Minister of Finance Chikwanda, in the act of high farce, decreed that all parastatals should list on the Lusaka Stock Exchange (LuSE).

The endless litany of corruption and 'hands in the Zambian till' is supposed to be dealt with by such as the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), established in 1980 by an Act of Parliament as an independent body to promote transparency and minimize corruption, though it only began operating in 1982. It has since achieved very little, being highly centralized and under the personal control of the President. My reports and interviews with them regarding the illegal alienation of part of the West Mvuvye National Forest and the Musi-o-Tunya National Park did not result in any action. The ACC in late 2009 absorbed the Taskforce on Corruption – a force for corruption in itself.

President Mwanawasa established the Taskforce in 2002 by decree, with funding by some north European countries and the USA. He then immediately stripped Chiluba of his immunity, the same man who had handed him the presidency on a platter.[xxxix] This is a peculiarly African story: Mwanawasa becomes Chiluba's vice-president for three years, resigns on account of the corruption, and then is later handed the presidency. Obviously, Chiluba believed that the new big man would protect him from prosecution. When Chiluba was finally acquitted of charges of theft in 2009, the Taskforce Chief, Maxwell Nkole, launched an appeal against the acquittal and was then fired by President Banda. The Taskforce was disbanded after private prosecutors, who were being paid outrageous fees, appealed against the acquittal without the

approval of the Director of Prosecutions – as is required under the Act. The Taskforce, although unsuccessful with Chiluba, undertook 24 criminal cases and obtained 13 convictions. When Sata came on board, he sacked the AAC Director for incompetence. Since then, allegations of massive sums of money sitting in foreign bank accounts awaits investigation.

In 2010 President Banda was requested not to remove the offence of abuse of office; this he overruled as it could have seen him targeted in the future for unexplained riches. However, in March 2013, parliament removed his immunity from prosecution. In December 2012, Banda was awarded the Honorary Prize for African Democracy for ‘respecting the will of the people’, having just received the Crans Montana Prix de la Fondation award in Switzerland for some other noble achievement.

Another organization supposedly there to protect the public is the Commission for Investigations. This comical – though legally extremely powerful Dickensian Commission, operates in total obscurity from well-hidden offices off Cairo Road in Lusaka. My visits there to persuade them to investigate the illegal alienation of part of West Mvuvye National Forest (involving Chief Mwape, a ZAWA Board member) and the Musi-o-Tunya National Park, did not receive action of any kind.

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## Losing the Plot

*IUCN's World Conservation Strategy - Kaunda conservation dabbling - elephant and rhino killing fields - SRT: Save the Rhino Trust failure - hunting safaris and patronage - Lupande research project (1979-1984) - USAID's ADMADE programme (1987-1999) - Stuart Marks and the Nabwalya ADMADE project - Mario Kawayawaya (MK) and ADMADE Lower Zambezi - MK and commercial poaching in Zimbabwe assisted by Zambian paramilitary (1980s+) - torture of poachers by paramilitary as a control measure (1993-1994) - ADMADE Kafue failure - NORAD's LIRDP programme (1987-1991)*

*Man serves the interests of no creature but himself*

*George Orwell - Animal Farm*

*This is why torture is much more than a simple physical assault. Torture survivors will deal all their life with the consequences because somebody tried to destroy their personality. And we do often ignore the long-term consequences for our security, for an institutional culture*

*and ethics. As absolute power corrupts, so does torture. It corrupts our institutions and the rule of law. It changes who we are.*

*Gerald Staberock, Secretary General of the Geneva-based World Organization Against Torture - Truthout, March 16, 2018*

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## IUCN's World Conservation Strategy

The World Conservation Strategy of the World Conservation Union (IUCN 1980), was all about the integration of development with conservation objectives and the participation of rural people, its objectives to maintain essential ecological processes and life-support systems (i.e. atmosphere, soil and water cycles; to preserve genetic diversity - including prevent extinctions and preserve representative biotic communities) and to ensure the sustainable utilization of species and ecosystems. The usual bundle of words and high sounding phrases that conservationists use in the attempt to have man behave. But as Richard Bell commented in 1987:[i]

*Superficially, it appeared to provide an internationally acceptable framework for conservation and human development. However, in reality it merely presented as a gold*



*standard, a very narrow conservationists' view of what humans should aspire to, suggesting that society should transform and mould itself into a rigid conservationist society which has a strategy of limitation of resource use and human population increase to attain the World Conservation Strategy goals.*

In Zambia, the strategy goals proved impossible, although in the early 1970s a broad-based protected area system was in place and 19 national parks created from their game reserve predecessors. Only some of these protected areas were supported by the production of management plans and applied research. The new African hegemony under founding President Kaunda had for a few years continued with the Western conservation system it had inherited, despite the antipathy of the nationalists who believed that they had been denied access to hunting and bushmeat and other resources enjoyed before being colonized. By 1972, with the imposition of one-party rule by Kaunda, their smouldering feelings of entitlement burst forth into action.

## Kaunda conservation dabbling

Kaunda was avowedly pro-conservation early on, frequently visiting the South Luangwa Game Reserve Warden's own quarters on Mfuwe Lagoon, the Mushroom, spending days game-viewing in the company of men such as the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Lands, Errol Button, and Warden Johnny Uys, [ii] and the Chief Game Officer, Bill Bainbridge.



“Wrong rhino’, Johnny Uys 1965 (Pic by Errol Button)

Kaunda was also friendly with Norman Carr – who had opened Mfuwe Lodge on the same lagoon as the Mushroom. There too came David Shepherd to paint. In an article in *The Post* on 3 December 2006, Kaunda paid them homage:

*I was fortunate enough to have worked with committed wildlife conservationists from where some of us learnt a lot. People like Norman Carr taught us why the points I am making here are important. Norman Carr could literally not allow any disturbance of our wildlife. Then there has been the artist David Shepherd.*

But Kaunda forgets that his policies chased away the very people

with whom he was friendly.

## Rhino extermination and elephant massacre

Between 1973 and 1993, under a new and completely Zambianized administration, the entire population of black rhino of some 15,000 + were killed for their horns to supply Far Eastern peoples, and 94% of the 350,000 elephant population slaughtered. This mass killing has been put down to inadequate wildlife conservation policies inherited from the colonial era, but, in fact, there was little wrong with the policies of the time. Rather, it was the failure to implement the Natural Resources Act of 1962 and shore up the customary commons; the removal of the European administrators of a conservation system on the public commons developed by them; and the relentless march of a Zambian autocracy that led to the collapse of conservation governance and the imposition of open-access plunder.

That Kaunda, superficially at least, was trying to do something about the killing fields is not in doubt. But he embarked on a grandiose and tragically misguided indigenous social engineering plan, perversely doing exactly what the BSA Company had attempted early on - to order village regrouping - not for socio-ecological improvement as the Company had done briefly, but for political control. But crucially, despite his philosophy of humanism that sought to impose collectivization - where it already existed - rather than the egalitarian pre-colonial life of economic reciprocity, he refused to see that it was the empowerment of customary people, joined as they once were under the promising native authorities (NAs) and the

parish councils, where lay the way forward. But he had been Minister of Local Government in Northern Rhodesia when that remarkable piece of legislation, the Natural Resources Act of 1962 had been in force – legislation he had ignored and later had repealed. He believed in a highly centralized control mode with himself as dictator, serving his narrow constituency of his personally appointed central committee members and cabinet ministers, whereas the reverse was required. But this he had been lead to by his colonial masters, who having followed the development model of Indirect Rule through the NAs, when the time came to withdraw from Empire, looked for a few professional politicians to receive the cudgels of power, ignoring the NAs they had created.

Some NGOs attempted to stem the poaching tide. From 1979 Save the Rhino Trust made a concerted attempt, claiming some success in the early 1980s but being ultimately defeated by the poaching onslaught and the fact that National Parks and Wildlife Service (NPWS) staff were in collusion with the poachers. In return for concessionary benefits, Malcolm Freed's Circuit Holdings - a subsidiary of Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM), took on the NPWS powers for anti-poaching. In 1981 Kaunda temporarily deployed large numbers of the military into the Luangwa to stem the elephant and rhino poaching, but without success; and in 1982, the Minister put forward the required National Parks and Wildlife Amendment Bill of 1982, backbenchers opposing it, believing that the amendment impinged on the rights of their constituents. However, the front bench, reliant on Kaunda patronage, supported it. The bill was withdrawn, re-appeared a few months later with the prison sentences removed for poaching rhino and elephant.[iii] This omission coincided with the eye of the killing

field's tornado.

From 1983 the government allowed safari-hunting operators to retain 50% of their foreign exchange, so increasing the surge begun in 1970 for big man clientelism and businessmen with little interest in conservation to obtain hunting-safari concessions. At this time, Kaunda had lost the bedrock of wisdom and experience of those who had advised him in the 1960s and early 1970s, replaced by crackpots, opportunists and carpetbaggers. In the same year, with conservationists complaining about the dire poaching situation, two new major strategies emerged from the seminal Lupande Development Workshop, a last-gasp move of desperation to halt the slide into depletion anarchy.

## The Lupande Research Project (1979-1984)

This project - conducted in the Lupande Game Management Area (GMA) of the Luangwa Valley, gave birth to two major community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) interventions in Zambia. The first was the National Parks and Wildlife Service's (NPWS) Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas (ADMAGE), with its HQ at Nyamaluma in the Lupande area, which ran from 1987-1999, being established by Dale Lewis of Wildlife Conservation International (WCI), and the men who later became Directors of NPWS: Patrick Chipungu (1989-1991), Ackim Mwenya (1991-1998) and Gilson Kaweche (1998-1999). The latter were two of the first four Zambian wildlife management graduates (the others being Harry Chabwela and Lewis Saiwana). ADMAGE ran for the last twelve years of the NPWS (1987-1999), being

funded by USAID, WWF-US, and with further financial support and Lewis's technical assistance provided by the New York-based WCI. This was an ambitious program.

The second scheme was the Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project (LIRDP), operating in the Luangwa in the years 1987-2003, chaired by Kaunda and funded by the Norwegian Agency for International Development (NORAD). Ostensibly both programs had customary people as their main beneficiaries and the stemming of the elephant and rhino poaching as the main thrust – though neither of them did anything about the onslaught on rhino or elephant. LIRDP was to be an independent program having total development control in the South Luangwa National Park and Lupande GMA, essentially usurping the ADMADE mandate – despite ADMADE's HQ being at Nyamaluma in the Lupande GMA, part of LIRDP's fiefdom. ADMADE, with Lewis and the NPWS hierarchy as its champions, protested at LIRDP's concession, saying that what was required was not a mini-government, but a program within the NPWS.

## ADMADE

Lewis proposed an 'African model' for wildlife conservation, based on four hypotheses: 1) ADMADE employees would show greater dedication to conservation than NPWS employees operating outside of the ADMADE areas; 2) the costs of law enforcement would decline as local and more afro-centric institutions took over the management of wildlife, allowing for enhanced wildlife productivity; 3) the ADMADE wildlife

authorities would build trust and respect among rural residents, and 4) the restoration of 'traditional African wildlife values' would take place as wildlife recovered 'its place' within the lives of rural residents.[iv] Again it is revealing that ADMADE was a CBNRM program following a set of hypotheses which did not mention the security of land tenure and the ownership of natural resources as being the essential pre-requisites for the sustained development of wildlife land, the Achilles' heel of integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs).

CBNRM has been defined as 'for a community to manage its resource base sustainably it must receive direct benefits arising from its use. These benefits must exceed the perceived costs of managing the resource and must be secure over time'.[v] This definition excludes the essential element of providing benefits over time: secure customary ownership. Lyons conceded that ADMADE had many of the ingredients for a successful CBNRM project: 'that a strong wildlife legislation had been adopted by the government and that ...a legal framework which does not grant ownership yet empowers rural communities with access and management rights' was in place. However, such access and management rights have been almost totally absent in Zambia.[vi]

Avoiding the recruitment of powerful politicians, as LIRD had done with its recruitment of Kaunda as its chairman, ADMADE embarked on a program to increase revenues and staffing levels. For this, they would need a Trojan horse. Thus, they created their own hunting-safari concession which they leased out for a good return. Here they made use of the NPWS's Wildlife Revolving Fund, set up originally in January 1983 under Director Starr Yamba (1982-1986) as a mechanism to fund their operations.[vii]

There will forever be unanswered questions regarding the financial accounting and management of the revolving fund, with certain senior members at the time being involved in the theft of its funds. No full and satisfactory audit of the revolving fund was ever presented to the Ministry of Finance, most of the money being trousered.

Indicative of the corruption ADMADE set in motion, at the same time, in America - as reported to me by a friend and prominent member of the world hunting fraternity, Don Lindsay (d.2014), two very senior Zambian members of ADMADE/NPWS attended the Safari Club International hunting convention and attempted to extract a massive bribe from two Texans in return for a hunting and conservancy concession in the Luano Valley. As the Texans had been promised the area legitimately, they then cancelled their proposed investment.

NPWS, before the start of ADMADE, had begun a cropping program, making cheap meat available, claiming that they gave the local customary residents 50% of the income. They also gave villagers 40% of the hunting concession fee. The promise of this bought the necessary grassroots political support. ADMADE now established similar projects in other GMAs, creating a structure, not unlike that implemented by the colonial Provincial Administration's system of parishes, a system ADMADE imposed on the people of the GMAs. A Wildlife Management Authority (WMA) was established in each area, the district governor acting as chairman, the district secretary as vice-chairman, and members comprising the local MP, the local officer-in-charge of NPWS, the local chief and the ward chairman. This was not dissimilar to the native authorities of old which had all the government departments responsible for natural resources represented, and not just



those responsible for wildlife – as in ADMADE's case. The managing director of the local hunting-safari company also sat on the authority. In the GMA associated chiefdoms, sub-authorities were set up and chaired by the chiefs, with headmen, teachers and a representative of the district council in place. This structure was ingrained in the Wildlife Act of 1998 as community resource boards (CRBs), although no statutory instruments regulating their operations are yet in place, yet they assume powers over customary residents in GMAs through the imposition of a management plan to which they must conform, in direct opposition to the customary authority.[viii]

In practice, the hierarchy of the NPWS ran ADMADE as a private fiefdom, with the Authority and the sub-authorities having little power but with responsibility for game protection - rather as in the present situation, and with the same poor sharing and corrupt payment system. In time, ADMADE and NPWS metamorphosed in 1999 into the parastatal, the Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA).

In 1988 WWF had provided funding for six GMAs out of the thirty-two then in existence. The funding did nothing whatsoever for the assault on rhino and elephant. This was followed by a \$3 million grant from USAID. This money and support from other major donors began to encourage support from the government, although ADMADE was, in fact, the NPWS Trojan horse. The government agreed to absorb its hirelings into the civil service and to transfer 50% of the income from hunting-safaris to the revolving fund under the NPWS control. ADMADE now had nine GMAs under their control. Given that hunting-safaris were now the most important source of funds, USAID, doubtless mindful of the powerful American domestic hunting lobby received an undertaking that hunting-

safaris would continue into the foreseeable future.[ix] The concentration in the 1990s by ADMADE under WCI's Dale Lewis on data collection and arcane monitoring procedures, funded as it was by USAID, took on CIA like proportions – as revealed in a Master's thesis by Lyons. ADMADE was based at the pretentiously named assemblage of buildings in the Lupande GMA called the Nyamaluma Institute for CBNRM.

As pointed out by Gibson, the ADMADE Trojan horse ushered in by the NPWS, Lewis and USAID had easily captured something they would ordinarily not have been able to obtain: international protection, compliance with the mechanics of a new operating institution, and protection as a result of the government's reluctance to obstruct a large donor-aid partner. There was also the matter of the considerable patronage arsenal of special licences given to the Minister of Tourism. In 1999 under Director Lewis Saiwana, the Minister issued 233 animals from fifteen species in just three GMAs free-and-gratis to those whom he wished to favour, at a loss of \$141,400 to the three CRBs of those areas.[x]

However, an evaluation of ADMADE in 2000 by a former Director of the NPWS, John Clarke (1970-1974),[xi] in which he presented a précis of five evaluations of ADMADE carried out between 1992 and 1998 by consultants, was - apart from reservations about what had been done for women - fulsome in its praise.

Clarke concluded that the project had shown that CBNRM is a workable system for wildlife management in at least some GMAs and may apply to others and that hunting-safaris is a profitable use of wildlife. However, he admitted that our former colleague Bill Astle's criticism of community-based programs is valid: that they are nothing more than special pleading by

biologists on behalf of animals. Clarke also observed that ADMADE's strong assertion that anti-poaching is ineffective in conserving animals was contradicted by their massive effort and expense in the training and deployment of 600 CRB scouts.[xii] The fact that the Singapore ivory bust revealed that 19 container consignments of ivory had come out of the Luangwa in the eight years before 2002, coinciding with ADMADE and LIRDP, reveals the massive corruption of the system. Some of this ivory must have come from the NPWS HQ ivory room at Chilanga – a continuing scam (see 11: CITES confusion).

Some idea of the dysfunction and turmoil can be gauged by the fact that there were nine Directors of NPWS/ZAWA over those eight years, while in the 35-year Game Department period (1940–1975), there were six. Clarke also commented that the program started as a wildlife management exercise and ended up as one of food security. This is confirmed by Lewis's move from his HQ at Nyamaluma - after the demise of ADMADE and the NPWS – and the CONASA project, to Lundazi where he now runs COMACO, a food security/wildlife conservation *quid pro quo* project program, still supported by WCI. COMACO maintains that it establishes conservation trading centres that strive to provide stable prices and a guaranteed market for agricultural produce for farmers based on conservation farming techniques and a local landuse plan.[xiii]

Experience of the current state of GMAs and my efforts over nine years to invest in two GMA's and two Open Areas' does not support many of Clarke's overly optimistic conclusions. And the customary communities in some of the GMAs where ADMADE had spent eleven years working are rather bemused at ADMADE's disappearance and metamorphosis into CO-

MACO. As so often happens, villagers receive delegations of us foreigners, punting idealistic schemes, of which the government and the foreigners tire, and then depart (or are deported), only to repeat the exercise somewhere else under a different guise.

While ADMADE was consuming large amounts of money and time and raising once more the expectations of people living on their survival wits, without addressing the issue of customary rights to natural resources, a burgeoning game ranching industry operating on leasehold land was arising. This industry is based purely on individual ownership of leasehold land and the responsibility which comes with it, proving a far more potent force than the donor-government instigated projects that pretend to advance the cause of rural people, yet do not address the absolute fact that the reason why all the supposed CBNRM projects have failed is that they deal only with benefits from wildlife, but not its ownership; and that the benefits to villagers prior to 2002 – solely monetary – amounted to no more than 17.5% of total revenue in GMAs, the rest going to the government treasury, the NPWS, and the feed trough.[xiv] In the ZAWA period (1999-2015), the earnings by CRBs – let alone the villagers, was next to nothing.

At the end of ADMADE's life, they were reputed to be working in 29 GMAs, 21 of them being given out as hunting concessions, another eight being leased to hunting operators for rehabilitation over a 15 year period. But in fact, they supported 11 GMAs and 13 hunting blocks represented by nine CRBs.[xv] The 11 Wildlife Management Areas proved unworkable, the sub-units being viable but the chairmanship by chiefs creating dissatisfaction amongst its members. The answer they believed was money, it being agreed that the chiefs would be paid 5% of the income received by CRBs from the hunting concessions

in their areas. Some of the dissatisfaction and constructive criticism found expression in the Wildlife Act of 1998. In 1999 the CRBs were set up and 'elections' held. The NPWS was replaced by ZAWA, ADMADE re-inventing itself as COMACO, attempting now to prove the hypothesis that food security in rural areas will bring with it the conservation of wildlife, clearly signalling that the ADMADE emphasis on anti-poaching had failed.[xvi] [xvii] The recommendations of the final consultancy attained clarity by saying that in the future customary residents should have rights of ownership over wildlife managed by the CRBs, with ZAWA as the regulatory body being responsible for national parks and hunting-safaris, and making available highly professional technical services.[xviii]

If there was any doubt about what ADMADE has done in the name of conservation one need go no further than to examine Stuart Mark's Nabwalya Project operating since 1966 in Chief Nabwalya's country (the South Munyamadzi GMA of the Luangwa). Marks pointed out that ADMADE had assumed that villagers 'would readily trade their access (both as endowments and entitlements) to wildlife for community revenues from safari licences to foreigners'. He also revealed that wildlife numbers began to decline substantially in the Nabwalya chiefdom from 1993, the year ADMADE came to the area. This he ascribes to the toll taken from 1991 by NPWS game scouts from the operation of an official cropping operation and the killing of game for rations, and from assumed privilege of one sort or another. To this was added the low morale of NPWS staff and the failure of food crops due to drought and elephant depredations.[xix] He further pointed out that before ADMADE the chiefdom was not an open-access area and that few local men had the means and knowledge

necessary to hunt commercially. When ADMADE was ushered in emphasizing wildlife protection at the expense of community development, villagers subsisting on wildlife were criminalized, greatly impacting on them, particularly in times of drought and famine.



*Stuart Marks and Cathlin*

When I opened Nabwalya for hunting-safaris on behalf of Luangwa Safaris in the 1969 season it was a glory of Nature, with great herds of buffalo, large tuskers, black rhino, lion, leopard, herds of zebra and much other game, and then there was the magnificent Chifungwe Plain – where, in 1966, Warden Johnny Uys and I had counted 2,000 elephant.

Marks revealed later that for the NPWS/ZAWA in Nabwalya, wildlife became a commodity for generating revenues:[xx]

*Shifting the local patronage system from meat, protection and support to money and employment – a process requiring major transformations in social and cultural organization...other changes – a growing population, a shift from corporate (lineage) identities to endemic individualism, recurrent drought-induced famines and resource scarcities – are regional phenomena. How this symmetry of new changes and regional factors will alter valley life and livelihoods in the future remains open-ended.*

It is the criminal human rights abuses visited upon villagers, coinciding with the arrival of ADMADE, which entirely consigns to the dustbin of history the rationale of outside intervention and force in the guise of government-directed community resource management. In Nabwalya central, the survey of households in 2006 showed that the percentage of arrests, 38% (174/460) among respondents, was even higher in some village clusters. In 2006, in a summing up of ADMADE, Marks declared that there was little to support Lewis' earlier hypothesis. Indeed, rather than rural residents benefitting from their natural resources, ADMADE had ushered in sustainable-use conservation but with legal access to wildlife only assured through wealth and privilege.

## ADMADE in Chiawa Chiefdom

Mario Kawayawaya (d.2004) in his book [\*Captured Between Islands\*](#), tells of ADMADE's failure in the Chiawa customary area of the Lower Zambezi Valley of Zambia:[xxi]

*In early 1994, I was appointed Education Liaison Officer in Chiawa. My first official experience was at a community meeting in a village where two women had been killed by a lone elephant. People demanded compensation for the deaths and the loss of crops. Others went further, insisting that ADMADE, a scheme intended to involve local people in wildlife protection, had been imposed upon them without consultation. I could not help but feel sympathy for the villagers.*

*I knew conservation would be an uphill fight - at a general meeting of Conservation Lower Zambezi (CLZ), it became apparent that nothing would be paid to the villagers for their loss of life or crops. One flimsy excuse for not making the reparations was that the local bananas did not require much attention to grow! This angered the villagers, who had already experienced four years of ADMADE without receiving any benefits from the scheme. How was I to argue the point that wildlife could be a valuable asset? My task was made harder by some of the ADMADE personnel who created the impression that it was a national programme and therefore local resistance to it was unlawful. Soon I began to wonder if this was*



*deliberate misinformation – they did not want locals to know about the benefits that accrued from the scheme, for they would have to account for all the benefits not yet made to the people. Once before, I had lost my job on principle. Here I was again, with a good job, free food, free housing and other small incentives – was I to take the risk of disagreeing with the local ADMADE authority and the chief?*

*By 1994 no practical benefits had reached the community, even though ADMADE was busy establishing itself there. Donations appeared to vanish into the local ADMADE authority. There was no transparency at the top, no checks and balances of power, no democracy at all in fact. Concerned lodge owners also contributed funds to ADMADE, but none of it benefitted those who lived side-by-side with the animals. No wonder some people failed to regard wildlife as a 'communal asset' and game scouts had to be brought in to protect them. The idea that wildlife is a communal resource had failed to take hold in the Chiawa villages. The conservationists, environmentalists and advocates who assisted ADMADE were regarded with indignation as armchair specialists, or worse, as collaborators with an occupying force.*

*Throughout the 1990s poaching sky rocketed. ADMADE had broken its promises and failed to respond to some criticisms: 1) the GMA had been an imposition because local people had no say in it; 2) the chief was the only beneficiary of 'so-called' customary area assets, and 3) the customary area assets had no clear objectives. ADMADE*

*had established a Community Resource Board (CRB) and employed CRB scouts that were lowly paid, with no employment benefits or job security. Inevitably, many scouts poached, provided information, cover-ups, firearms, ammunition and in some cases even accompanying the poachers into the GMA. I met some of these scouts in dealer's homes waiting for the spoils. In the end, I stuck with the job for three years until the chief expelled me from Chiawa, one of the reasons being my complaint that the land she was selling to investors was not shared with the customary owners. The communities I represented withdrew their support for ADMADE. Without local involvement, the only way for the authorities to protect wildlife was through more police, more guns and repression. While I packed my bags, I could not help shedding tears, for in the eyes of many children and adults, I had brought hope.*

And of the Zambia Wildlife Authority, a parastatal which replaced the NPWS from 1999, he had this to say:

*ZAWA is yet to implement a philosophy of community participation that will resolve the conflict of interests between the general public and those charged with the protection and management of wildlife. Until this conflict is at least partly resolved, conservation will continue to rely heavily on law enforcement strategies. The costs of these strategies to the state are high, both in financial and political terms. The costs to the Zambian people, in terms of repression, suffering and loss of livelihood, are higher still.*

After serving for three years in Chiawa as the Education Liaison Officer, funded by the David Shepherd Foundation and working closely with the NGO Conservation Lower Zambezi (CLZ) – established by honorary ranger Alan Wardle (also founding chairman of CLZ) and the chief in 1992 – Mario Kawayawaya was fired by the chief because of his opposition to ADMADE. This was but more abuse visited upon this remarkable man. Brought up in the Chirundu area he had attended schools in the Catholic Diocese of Monze at a primary school in Chirundu and senior school in Monze. Later he worked for the Diocese's Zambezi Training Farm near Chirundu. For years he was sexually abused by the Dean of the Mission, Father Claudio. At 23, he escaped the clutches of this malodorous Catholic priest and, desperate to feed his family, because of 'illiteracy, poverty, hunger and cultural degeneration' went commercial poaching for four years across the river in Zimbabwe.

But it was the death stare of an elephant bull, a questioning stare like no other, that caused him to put down his Ak47. This was not to the liking of the Zambian paramilitary involved in the illegal ivory and rhino horn trade. They wanted him to continue doing business with them; hence ten months of torture and incarceration was delivered to him and numerous others. Few poachers ever went to trial, and many died or were maimed.



Mario Kawayawaya

In the Sichifulo and Mulobezi GMAs adjoining the Kafue National Park, villagers found poaching were, on the instructions of ADMADE, moved by the chiefs to areas with little wildlife. On the Kafue Flats where ADMADE was implemented for eleven years from 1986, it was clear that little had been achieved, despite the financial support of WWF and income from hunting-safaris.[xxii] Crucially, they did not initiate resource sharing initiatives over wildlife and fisheries, and as confirmed by a former Chief Wildlife Research Officer, Director (1986-1988) and Permanent Secretary, Harry Chabwela, no consultative process with local people was ever undertaken there by ADMADE.[xxiii]

In an e-mail to me in 2004, a former senior ZAWA officer, communicated his concerns regarding ADMADE and the fact that USAID had not compiled an appraisal report on them:

*One such project was the disastrous ADMADE. The*

*USAID put in a lot of money in this project in the GMA from 1983 through to 1993. Today most of these areas are depleted of the wildlife this very project was meant to conserve and use sustainably. This is just but many of what we in Zambia have undergone at the hands of "WELL INTENDED DONORS".*

## LIRDP

The Luangwa Integrated Rural Development Project (LIRDP), funded by NORAD was established by two consultants, Thor Larsen (NORAD) and Fidelius Lungu (NPWS) in 1986, and placed under the National Commission for Development Planning. The two consultants delivered the project by way of a private audience with Kaunda who enthusiastically agreed to become the project's chairman, particularly as his wife's people came from the general area, i.e. Jumbe in the heart of Kundaland, his one son involved there in politics with UNIP. Kaunda was approachable but malleable. An example of this was that at about the same time he had invited Dr M.A. Ranganathan to establish the David Universal Temple at State House, signalling a rift with Christians who increasingly criticized his autocratic ways. He also joined with the Maharishi Mahesh Yogi in a scheme to make Zambia 'Heaven on Earth'. Kaunda had become a pyramid salesman's delight, the early LIRDP management persuading him to afford them considerable powers.

Lungu became LIRDP's first co-director, joined by Richard Bell, the latter one of two scientists who carried out the Black Lechwe Project in the Bangweulu, a man I had got to know quite well as the result of a field trip with him and Cathlin to

Shiwa Ngandu, and numerous late-night discussions on every subject imaginable. We camped near where Livingstone had crossed the lake, his friend and pet dog Chitane drowning.

*We had to cross the Chimbwé at its eastern end, where it is fully a mile wide. The guide refused to show another and narrower ford up the stream, which emptied into it from the east; and I, being the first to cross, neglected to give orders about the poor little dog, Chitané. The water was waist deep, the bottom soft peaty stuff with deep holes in it, and the northern side infested by leeches. The boys were—like myself—all too much engaged with preserving their balance to think of the spirited little beast, and he must have swam till he sunk. He was so useful in keeping all the country curs off our huts; none dare to approach and steal, and he never stole himself. He shared the staring of the people with his master, then in the march he took charge of the whole party, running to the front, and again to the rear, to see that all was right. He was becoming yellowish-red in colour; and, poor thing, perished in what the boys all call Chitané's water.*

*David Livingstone - 15th January, 1867.*



Richard Bell & IM at Shiwa Ngandu (1973)

Bell and Lungu ran the project from 1987 to 1993, two years after Kaunda was defeated in the 1991 elections.

That National Parks (NPWS)/ADMADE and LIRDPA were at loggerheads was due to the removal by LIRDPA of control of the South Luangwa National Park and the Lupande GMA, the latter a source of foreign exchange from hunting-safaris. The ministry responsible followed Kaunda and his view that the NPWS was incapable of carrying out its mandate. Bell and Lungu attempted to create an independent enclave with total authority over wildlife in these two areas, encompassed by the newly created Mfuwe Command – the core of the South Luangwa tourism zone. They also created a revolving fund with a foreign bank account over which they had total control and into which they paid both revenue and grants from NORAD.

They did not submit reports to the Ministry of Finance as was required. In essence, they operated a mini-dictatorship within six chiefdoms and the South Luangwa National Park, attempting at one stage to have all government officers in the area fall under their control.

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*natural resource management: a case study of the ADMADE program in Zambia*. MSc Thesis, University of Florida. 2000.



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[https://docs.google.com/document/d/1uaUDvHd8CL16ARjZjEb5NpzrIgEQ9DK44\\_dwXVeiAI/edit?usp=sharing](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1uaUDvHd8CL16ARjZjEb5NpzrIgEQ9DK44_dwXVeiAI/edit?usp=sharing)

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## Rhino Requiem

*before the white man - BSA Company times - halting the carnage - colonial increase - the Chinese railway (1973) - the last rhino on licence (1979) - my appointment as o/c Bangwweulu Command - rhino taken for the trade - capture of poacher - leave Zambia due to Watershed Speech (1975) - meet Ian Grimwood re Northern white rhino - the Sudan and Zaire situation - plans for Garamba rhino thwarted - the ICCN and African Parks paralysis - first AERSG meeting (1983) - the Lawrence Anthony rhino rescue rebuff (2005) - IUCN impotence - corrupt triangular alliances – the third trident - time-preference - SRT failure and closure (1979-1987) - the Zambian directors - humpty dumpty - those responsible for rhino - Kaunda helps Mugabe not Zambia - rhino genetic problem - 120 rhino left (1986) - staff and money required to protect rhino - rhino strategy at Nyeri (May 1987) - start full-time on project rhino ( March 1988) - WWF pay my salary August (1988) - Wildlife Society Zambia agree to give funds - LIRD and NPWS & ADMADE mutual aversion - NPWS dysfunction and project sabotage - the Richard Bell factor - the John Hanks story - CITES and KAS - project rhino contradictions - Operation Lock gets to work - Paul Russell of*

*ACC suggests special unit (April 1988) - US funds establishment of Species Protection Department within ACC (May 1990) - ZEBRA paramilitary part in commercial elephant and rhino poaching in Zim and torture of villagers - Hanks, PB and KK to Zambezi (May 1988) - open ivory and rhino horn markets in Lusaka - Hanks sets up Zimbabwe project - Bell's threats - Lewis (WCI) intransigence - permission to go ahead but three rhino groups off-limits - rhino poaching out of control - my diary (March 1988 to October 1989) - press attacks Operation Lock - memories of Bill Bainbridge and times of integrity - Lewis hocus pocus (1989) - more exposure and controversy - NPWS hot air (1991) - SADC rhino reintroduction - 'deported' for second time - rhino chronology*

*Looking back over the poaching years, I had enemies who were conservationists. But even when working as a conservationist, I had enemies who were conservationists, for the majority of them were armchair conservationists who were not ready to meet the reality on the ground.*

*Mario Kawayawaya - Captured Between Islands*

*Humpty Dumpty sat on a wall,  
Humpty Dumpty had a great fall;  
All the king's horses and all the king's men  
Couldn't put Humpty together again.  
Lewis Carroll - Through the Looking Glass*

*The rhino is a homely beast,  
For human eyes he's not a feast.  
Farewell, farewell, you old rhinoceros,  
I'll stare at something less prepoceros.*

## Ogden Nash - The Rhinoceros

To paraphrase the late author EL Doctorow: “The historian will tell you what happened. The novelist will tell you what it felt like.” As a historian and professional ‘wildlifer’ I tell you what happened in the conservation trenches over the last 50 years—added to by another fifty years before that of the individual bush experience of a few friends – in all - a century of ‘how it felt’ in bush Africa. This chapter is a lament for the extinction of Zambia’s black rhino in January 1990- that being the month I was expelled from Zambia by those who did not wish the rhino protected, or who did not care less, there being no subsequent attempt to save them.

*Rhino Requiem* is a history of an African territory rescued from the elephant and slavery holocaust, and from inter-tribal immolation and savagery, by a few brave British employees of a man whose image ‘enlightened’ youth now wish to remove from our collective memory. I refer to Cecil Rhodes and his British South Africa Chartered Company. With its demise and that of the system of Indirect Rule through the chiefs implemented in British protectorate days, a multi-party Westminster parliamentary system and a constitution devoid of safeguards against excessive executive powers was handed by the stricken imperial power to the newly liberated inheritors called politician, in a land having been made ‘fit for purpose’. Inevitably there followed dysfunctional indigenous government, the extinction of the rhino, the elephant carnage, the invasion of market fundamentalism, the mining and the agribusiness landgrab, accompanied by the massive destruction of the rivers for power

hydro schemes, the land and people oppressed by additional plunder. The irony is that the UK itself requires a sea-change from a semi-feudal state, where 40 percent of the population is classified as the 'working poor', to a more collaborative and caring society, such – this being the irony supreme – as the state of religious and cultural equilibrium still miraculously preserved in the rural customary villages of Zambia. But in the UK any attempt to change the status quo is resisted by the land-enriched 'Norman' elite, as is the empowerment of customary area in Zambia by the rent-seeking state and the metronomic electoral curse of the 'big man'.

Threaded throughout this historical tapestry since before independence in 1964, are my experiences as a hunter-conservationist and professional 'wildlifer, twice being 'taken out of play' (three times if you count Kaunda's removal of civil service expatriates in June 1975 under the Watershed Speech) by vested political and commercial opposition, a ploy often used under the rules of game theory – particularly in Africa. As I now know only too well, game theory renders impossible whistleblower and advocacy efforts playing a zero-sum game (where the interests of the players conflict totally so that one person's gain always is another's loss); the gain being always made by players holding political patronage cards, while the 'grey' solidarity actions of the conservation activist support team – being moral and neoliberal relativists governed by self-interest, avoid confrontation, and are therefore stricken by divisive and damaging inaction, unable to suggest or support an obvious move to achieve success. And should they be 'grey-faced' conservation support players entrusted with the solemn duty of safeguarding Nature, they will always fail to support direct and resolute action – as they did when they obstructed

moves to save both the black rhino in 1988-89, the northern white rhino of Sudan and Congo DRC at the same time, and 19 years later, the plunder of Zambia's protected and customary area, and the obstruction of any successful implementation of my Landsafe framework for the customary commons and associated protected areas.




Black Rhino in Kafue (Pic: Shenton Family Collection)

Before the arrival in the territory of the BSA Company in 1889, anarchy reigned. Warring Bantu tribes and clans raided each other for tribal converts or slaves for barter. Muslim Arabs, white and black, were deployed by the Sultan of Zanzibar, trading firearms and gunpowder for ivory, rhino horn and

slaves – women, children and men - who carried the booty to the East African Coast. A few resolute British officials of the BSA Company and two Scots trader brothers put a stop to it. It was a remarkable achievement by some intrepid nineteenth-century men. But black rhino continued to be poached, though at a much lower rate. Although 20 or so years after the slavery war was won, one villager did kill 30 in a week.[i] [ii]

With the formation in 1942 of the Game & Tsetse Control Department in the British Protectorate of Northern Rhodesia, rhino numbers greatly increased, then stabilized. In 1968 Frank [Ansell produced a comprehensive report on their status.](#) [iii]



Frank Ansell's Black rhino distribution map of 1968



But the Chinese Tanzam railway built from Kapiri Mposhi to Dar es Salaam across the Great Tanganyika Plateau, its construction entering rhino country in 1972, provided a ready conduit along the old slave route, together with the horn-hub established by Muslim Indian traders in Lusaka for the dagger handle makers in North Yemen, the chippings used as medicine by the Chinese.

The same sort of anarchic forces that had operated during the slave trade set to work in the country as a result of the enforced departure from 1973 onwards of European government conservationists and their replacement by the first Bantu invaders of the country – a proletariat now bereft of their own Guardians of Nature guilds and religion which had once protected the land for the ‘living ancestors’. For them, their communal life had been largely replaced by a foreign mindset and culture, the rise of a nationalist sense of open-access entitlement, the rapid development of the kleptocratic state, and the presence of the Chinese and the Muslim cabal based in Lusaka dealing with South Africa, North Yemen and the Emirates. All it needed was for the expected administrative and economic collapse of a foreign system to occur.

As the newly appointed Officer-in-Charge and Biologist of the Bangweulu Command of the Department of Wildlife, National Parks and Fisheries in 1973 - incorporating the vast Bangweulu Swamps, three national parks, and numerous game management areas - I and a former colleague and friend in the Game Department from the mid-sixties, Phillip Nel, while hunting in Chief Kamwendo's country on the Luangwa Escarpment, discovered a newly slaughtered male rhino with its horn sawed off. Something quite evil was about.



Phil Nel in Kumwendo's country, November 1973.

The poaching scourge that had welled up in Kenya and Tanzania from about 1969 had spread south. In 1970 Eric Balson, a former Tanganyika senior game warden had in January 1970, at the request of President Nyerere, reported on the poaching being conducted by Game Department officers. In 1973, having left the country, he showed me a copy of the report in the form of a book manuscript, *Animal War*, a sickening tale of wildlife slaughter, a book his widow Viva located after his death (d.2014) and gave to me.

The plunder of the game in Zambia - elephant and rhino in particular - began in earnest then, one of my patrols under Chief Game Guard Daniel Walawala arresting the man who killed the last male rhino west of the Great North Road - on

the borders of the Lavusi Manda National Park – a female and calf surviving a little longer. The poacher was brought in to my nearby Chiundaponde office: a man of the village, small, of massive modesty. Later, the Mpika Magistrate fined him fifteen kwacha – a few dollars. He was the unwitting agent of the Chinese plunderers on their Tazara railway under construction only fifteen miles away from the kill. Using the same HF radio frequency as they, I would bait them with Peter Sellers renditions of China talk; and once when broken down near their camp, I ordered a Chinese worker to, “Take me to your leader.” Without hesitation, he replied, “Ah! But haf no leadah!”

“Then take me to the man who pays you.”

“Foddow me.” he replied.

Forty-two years later, a woman who had been a translator on the railway construction in 1975, Yang Fen Glan, now the head of a massive ivory syndicate based in Dar es Salaam, was charged with smuggling 706 tusks to China. The newspaper report said she had been active for over 14 years – but this is more likely to be 42.[iv]

With the aggressive Zambianization program and the strictures of Kaunda’s Watershed Speech in June 1975, in which senior expatriate – mostly European - officers in government service were told that once their posts were Zambianized, or they left government service, they could not seek work in the private sector, the exodus from the country turned into a stampede, the fall in the copper price adding to the exodus. Peter Moss, David Lloyd and I had previously been granted endorsement by the Ministry of Lands Permanent Secretary for the establishment of two companies, Wildlife Management Services and Tabwa Mfuti Safaris. A little after the Watershed

Speech, I received a letter from the P.S. lamenting, "Sorry, but we have been overcome by recent events." With a rapidly crumbling NPWS, Moss and I left the country and joined David Lloyd for a while on his Welsh estate.

In October 1979 the last legal rhino shot on a hunting-safari licence in Zambia was by my friend and client from Los Angeles, Bill Faeth MD. Accompanied by his other half, Sandra Longvall, both of whom I had guided on a lion-tracking hunt in the Jao area of the Okavango in 1977, I accompanied them on this busman's holiday, the hunt conducted by Tony Moore. Bill wounded a rhino and in the follow-up, another was shot by mistake.



*Bill Faeth. M.D. 1977*

## The demise of the Game Department

By the end of the year, with mounting evidence of a killing field of rhino, they were taken off licence. The war was relentless, though everyone assumed that the enemy would easily be defeated. But the NPWS was no longer the power it had been up to 1973. In 1977 it reduced its labour force by 30% and its budget by 38%. In 1978 the Ministry of Finance reduced

it by a further 50% - a reduction in one year of 88%. Anti-poaching patrols could not be paid subsistence allowance, and the aircraft – five in number in the department with three full-time pilots when I ran Bangweulu until '76, reduced to one. Without expertise, without money, without experience and motivation, the NPWS went into total decline from which it and its successors, and the game - apart from the private game estate, has never recovered.[v]

In 1982 I met Major Ian Grimwood (d.1991) in Kenya. He was Northern Rhodesia's former Deputy-Director, and later, Chief Game Warden of Kenya. In the years 1965-1967, he documented the [destruction of Peru's wildlife](#), but did manage to establish a large national park. We discussed the plight of the northern white rhino in Sudan. Grimwood and I began to share some ideas on just how I could be involved. With nothing eventuating, I went to my old university in Nova Scotia, Acadia, to write up my research on the Bangweulu sitatunga. While there I received a letter from Grimwood in January 1983 making clear that the northern white was in a grave predicament; and that WWF/IUCN had dragged their heels for three years, doing nothing about them. Of the Shambe population that I wished to target in Sudan, there was no news, and the Garamba population in Zaire (Congo DRC) had in 1982 lost between 164 and 214 animals out of a maximum population of 250.[vi] Realizing that the Sudan population was likely extinct, I planned to research the Garamba population, and at the same time to assist in their protection. I gained a place at Cambridge University for a doctorate, but with difficulties over funding and Garamba's remote location, and with a very young family, I abandoned the idea. And as Grimwood had mentioned, IUCN had already sent others to protect the rhino.

In 1983 with the elephant and rhino onslaught mounting, the IUCN's Species Survival Commission (SSC) and the African Elephant and Rhino Specialist Group (AERSG) held their first meeting. David Western chaired the gathering – some other notable members being Grimwood, Richard Bell, Co-Vice-Chairman (then with the Department of National Parks in Malawi), and Phillip Berry (Save the Rhino Trust, Zambia, and former Chief Game Ranger in Zambia's Department of Game & Fisheries, in service since 1961).[vii] Kes Hillman presented a report on the northern white rhino, declaring that for Sudan there was little hope with about 15 rhino left in Garamba.[viii] The meeting recorded that 'AERSG are still concerned that there be guaranteed plans for captive breeding should in situ conservation efforts fail'.[ix] But, Robert Malpas, reporting on IUCN assistance to Zaire for the Garamba, concluded that, 'The question still remains: what specific action should be taken to ensure the survival of Garamba's rhinos, AERSG's first and priority recommendation?'

In 1973 hunting-safaris were banned in Tanzania, followed by Kenya in 1977 and Congo DRC in 1984. In all three countries, the elephant and rhino populations were decimated.

## Garamba project

In 1984 the IUCN Garamba Rehabilitation Project began under Charles Mackie, funded by WWF and the Frankfurt Zoological Society, Mackie reporting, 'At present, it would not be sensible to translocate the Garamba rhinos elsewhere'. He gave no reasons for this bizarre conclusion. At the time there were

thought to be 13 white rhino left in Garamba.[x]

In 1985 J.L. Tello from Mocambique joined AERSG as a member – he in 2005 in charge of the privatized Garamba under African Parks – President Mobutu having declared that the rhino would be protected there *in situ*. [xi]

Miraculously, about seven rhino survived in Garamba until the invasion of the park by the Lords Resistance Army (LRA), the park abandoned by the *Congolais Pour La Conservation de la Nature* (ICCN), a situation supposedly relieved in November 2005 by the takeover of the Garamba by African Parks. When a remarkable conservationist of both wildlife and customary land from Zululand, Lawrence Anthony (d.2012)[xii] - with an invitation from the Minister of Environment - journeyed up to Garamba with money and a helicopter to rescue the remaining rhino by translocating them out of the park, he met with a hostile reception from ICCN and African Parks. At one deplorable meeting with them, ICCN said that they had a partner in African Parks and did not require Anthony's help. Anthony wrote later that 'I knew then, with blinding clarity, that the fate of the northern white rhino had been sealed in stone that evening. That unless a miracle happened, the species would go extinct in the wild'. [xiii] And so it was within a few years, despite Anthony's audacious contact with the LRA who had given him a more sympathetic hearing than either ICCN or African Parks. This was yet another failure of corrupt and dysfunctional government wildlife departments and irresolute big international conservation NGOs (BINGOs), who, as they are often wont to do, make sure that others of a more resolute bent are sidelined. On 20 March 2018, the last male Northern rhino died in captivity, leaving two adult females.

The Conradian horror of the Congo was replicated in Zambia.



True, there was no armed anarchy as in the Congo, with 'rebels' like the Simba and the LRA and other countless plunderers, but what it had in common was that it signalled the end of any pretense that neoliberal conservation BINGOs could counter the plunder – merely masking the conservation effort, their employee bureaucrats with PhDs hunting the next conference, and without much field experience or zest for the essential decisions and action required. Yet in fairness, the ongoing dysfunction of African governments - a state attenuated by the donors and the operation of the criminal confederacy, did nullify their efforts – and continues to do so. As David Western wrote in 1984:[xiv]

*The easiest task for AERSG is monitoring and recommending projects, the hardest is getting action, particularly out of IUCN. The northern white rhino is a case in point. It took nearly five years to launch a conservation program, by which time the animals had dwindled from 700 to less than 30. IUCN claims they are too under-staffed to respond to any but the most urgent issues, yet recently, at the Madrid General Assembly, declared the northern white one of the world's dozen most endangered animals. If this isn't an emergency conservation issue, then what is? What is the solution for AERSG? I suggest the best remedy in future is for the group to take IUCN at its word, to accept that it is too under-staffed to respond to recommendations and to approach other international and national organizations directly on all urgent projects. Whichever organization takes the ball and runs is doing a service to the northern white rhinos of this world. And*

*it is, after all, the interest of elephants and rhinos, which our specialist group is trying to serve.*

The second great problem affecting the conservation of rhino and elephant, or for that matter any other accessible resource on open-access land, was revealed two years later by Chairman Dave Cumming of AERSG, 'Patronage of the corrupt businessman and the corrupt official by corrupt politicians can produce formidable triangular alliances which lead to illegal and devastating exploitation of natural resources'.[xv]

### Institutionalized plunder

This hints at but does not reveal, that it is not a trident but a devil's spear with a fourth spline: that of bogus conservationists, who, for reasons in addition to the operation of 'formidable triangular alliances', actively or by a subtle absence of action and contact, sabotage a conservation objective and its field implementation. Such was the case in Zambia during my attempt to save the rhino. This spline of the conservation spear involves a cultural factor that is often overlooked because of political correctness: the progression, from an equitable gardener/harvester approach to Nature, to one of plunder, i.e. increasing time-preference. Scattered pre-industrial cultures meeting up with neoliberal forces typically develop high time-preference rates (HTP), consuming natural resources now rather than later (think of the fruit tree), in particular in areas considered open-access such as the public commons - the government protected areas, and the weakly empowered

customary commons – customary land.[xvi] In the case of 'dangerous shade' protected species (eland etc.) and communal fisheries, this tendency was once controlled in pre-colonial times by culturally grounded Guardians of Nature sects.[xvii]

During the early days of colonialism under Indirect Rule, support was given to the Guardians, support disappearing with increasing colonial control. After World War II, populations of rhino and elephant increased considerably. Then as the colonial control disappeared, the time-preference rate soared without any cultural or controlled-access of the commons to restrain it. After 1974, the Zambian Game Department was converted to an HTP mindset, functionally corrupt, and, when added to by massive administrative dysfunction, a dead weight around the neck of any conservation initiative. In the case where Europeans or other industrial cultures were involved and failed to take action to protect a resource, to protect Nature, especially a critically endangered species, there were other serious factors at work, factors that rarely had anything to do with money or high time-preference, but usually were spiked on the territorial imperative, and on the sticky hubris of power, ego and self-interest. Time-preference, after all, is guided by the value and secure ownership of the resource. With no security of resource ownership for customary commoners, in what are open-access areas, the killing field is the result, i.e., the imperialism of the first-come-first-serve. Thus all the armies in the world cannot protect the rhino, the elephant and lion where they and the land are not owned, be it under leasehold or usufruct or controlled access under the management of a customary authority; hence the need for true customary control by way of a massive decentralization of the African states.

## Save the Rhino Trust (SRT)

The first campaign fought to counter the rhino-poaching offensive in Zambia was by SRT in 1980 – an expatriate-run and operated anti-poaching NGO. To bolster this effort, the National Parks and Wildlife (Amendment) Act, 1982 (Act 32 of 1982) was introduced in December of that year to cover: 1) any molestation of elephant or rhino, an offender receiving imprisonment without the option of a fine for a term not exceeding ten years; and 2) the possession of rhino and elephant trophies resulting in a heavy fine, followed, for a repeat offence, by imprisonment for not more than ten years.[xviii] However, the Act was amended at the behest of MPs connected with what was now an extremely lucrative rhino poaching operation in the country, the term of imprisonment withdrawn.[xix]

SRT was established by Norman Carr – who donated his Chinzombo Lodge to the Trust - and chaired by an ex-Northern Rhodesia army NCO and cinema owner in Lusaka, Mike Faddy. It deployed a few anti-poaching units in the Zambezi and Luangwa Valleys, supervised until 1985 by my ex-colleague and friend Phillip Berry.[xx]



Phil Berry & IM at Johnny Uys Memorial 1974

Funded by WWF and then by NORAD, it appeared to be a success, arresting many Zambian poachers. Berry was like other men of our culture in the old Game Department: resolute, taking little heed of politician and poacher; but SRT was a mere twig in the path of an elephant, masking the fact that rhino were being slaughtered in massively increasing numbers between

1984 and 1987. A rhino researcher in the Luangwa at the time, Nigel Leader-Williams, was under no illusions, advising SRT to take their few scouts and concentrate on smaller patches of bush with high rhino numbers, areas that their funding could cover at \$200 per km<sup>2</sup>. Although SRT made some adjustments, because of their limited finance and personnel they were unable to stem the tide of destruction. Unfortunately, they continued a pretence of war, allowing the deadly triad of politician, civil servant and criminal a free rein. The rhino never recovered.

Leader-Williams pointed out that by 1985 rhino had declined by 99% in some areas and by 22% in others - plummeting from 1650 to 110 at the rate of one rhino a day overall.[xxi] Though the AERSG - buoyed perhaps by the reports of their Zambian members, Berry, Lewis and Gilson Kaweche - in December 1984 wrote that 'Anti-poaching has greatly slowed losses in Luangwa', something patently not true, the numbers plummeting from 2,750 to 1,650 between 1980 and 1984.[xxii] The NPWS were happy with the situation, while the donors and their revolving door of experts thought the rhino problem was being solved.

In 1984 the AERSG's David Western had mentioned that there were about 13,000 black rhino left in Africa, but as many of them were isolated, they were extremely vulnerable. This left them likely, he wrote, to suffer inbreeding depression, a loss of genetic heterogeneity and therefore lower natality and higher mortality. Because of this, trying to save large populations was impossible, success more easily achieved on specific small populations such as the one in the Aberdares of Kenya. A three-way interchange of zoos, private and public lands, offered the best way forward, he said.[xxiii] In the same issue of *Pachyderm*, AERSG member Dale Lewis, resident

in the Luangwa, reported on the Lupande workshop chaired by Gilson Kaweche of the NPWS in September 1983. The workshop recommended that a Luangwa development project be established, something that did come to fruition in 1986 in the form of the NORAD funded Luangwa Integrated Rural Development Project (LIRDP), its head, Richard Bell. Lewis also declared that agricultural development resulting from foreign aid was having a detrimental effect on wildlife, something he later forgot as he implemented his COMACO agricultural scheme.[xxiv] The AERSG member, Richard Bell, reporting on law enforcement in Kasungu NP in nearby Malawi, never mentioned the few rhino there.[xxv]

By 1985 the black rhino in Africa numbered less than 9,000.[xxvi] In the same year, Zambia was encouraged to provide a national rhino conservation strategy.[xxvii] None was ever forthcoming – apart from my ad hoc plan in 1987/88. In 1986 there were an estimated 120 rhino left in the country, meaning that 2.2 rhino had been killed every day of the previous two years - while Lewis and Kaweche sat as members of AERSG - with priorities belatedly set at a meeting in the Luangwa in July 1986: 'Strong anti-poaching efforts combined with the involvement of local communities were identified as key requirements'.[xxviii] No mention, as with Garamba before, was made of 'getting them out'.

In October 1986 an African Rhino Workshop in Cincinnati affirmed the following strategy: 1) protection of the larger – more than 100 animals – population in the wild; 2) intensive *in-situ* management of smaller – less than 100 animals – populations in the wild; 3) *ex-situ* programs, scientifically captive propagation, to reinforce survival of wild populations. The workshop also recognized the existence of four conservation units of rhino,

and that at least 20 rhino needed to be dealt with as a unit, either *in situ* or *ex-situ*, ideally both. The Luangwa was placed 10 out of 30 on the priority for action.[xxix] The population estimate for Zambia in 1987 was 110. In December of that same year Pachyderm No. 7 repeated their statement of July 1986, 'strong anti-poaching efforts combined with the involvement of local communities were identified as key requirements; plus to develop a conservation plan'. The population estimate was given as 120.[xxx]

In May 1987 AERSG held a meeting at Nyeri, Kenya, to develop an action plan for the species as a whole. They revealed that there were about 106 rhino left in Zambia: 20 in Kafue, 5 in Mweru wa Ntipa NP, 76 in the Luangwa, and 5 in Lukusuzi NP. Of the 47 countries contacted in Africa for information before the workshop, only 14 responded. In the report was mentioned that Bell and the former Director of the NPWS, John Clarke, had recommended that to protect rhino, one guard was required for every 20 km<sup>2</sup> and, adopting Leader-Williams's recommendation, at a cost of \$200 per km<sup>2</sup>. At the time rhino horn sold for \$1,000 per kg. The report on Zambia was matter-of-fact: 'Zambia: Very heavy illegal killing of black rhinos in their main stronghold, the Luangwa Valley, has reduced their population numbers from several thousand in the mid-1970s to under 100 today. Rhino poaching is out of control in many parts of Zambia'.

The subsequent report on the Nyeri meeting – under action to be taken for Zambia, revealed the start of my Project Rhino rescue attempt, but gave no detail:[xxxi]

*Luangwa Valley, Zambia. The rhino population of the*



*Luangwa Valley has declined from several thousand to less than 100 within this decade. Support is required for the Zambian government proposal to establish a protected sanctuary within the South Luangwa National Park. There is also a requirement to strengthen anti-poaching efforts and to involve local communities further in conservation efforts.*

The source of this news was Director Harry Chabwela of the NPWS. The report gave a total estimate of 106 rhino for the country: Kafue 20, Mweru-Wantipa 5, Luangwa south 50, Chindeni Hills > 6 (\*My remarkable ex-cropping *fundi*, Rice Time, found 13 in mid-1988), Lukusuzi 5, Lumimba > 10, and Luano/West Petauke 10.

## Birth of my Rhino Project

I had urged my ex-colleague, Harry Chabwela, to take urgent action to save the rhino remaining. To his credit he responded positively, asking that I undertake the rescue mission. At first, I demurred, as I was working on a tourism project in the Bangweulu with Eric Balson, Ron Kidson and Kerry Curtis, but when Curtis withdrew the funding, I agreed. But Chabwela then only put my name forward for funding in a letter to WWF in March 1988 for the Anglo-American Marula Rhino Project as it was called, and, as well at a meeting on 7 April 1988 with Prince Bernhard (the founding president of WWF) and our former colleague John Hanks – since 1985 the Director of the Africa desk for WWF-I. Chabwela then applied to the Wildlife

Conservation Society of Zambia for additional funding, they signing up for K200,000 – sufficient to do the preliminary work on a sanctuary and some capture and translocation. I then formed a steering committee drawn mainly from the Society and worked on as a pro bono/part funder basis until September.

Years later, as mentioned in the previous chapter, contradictory statements were made about the poaching situation at the time: Jachmann and Billiouw declaring that 1,000 elephant and the last rhino were killed then – something not true in the case of the rhino.[xxxii] Dalal-Clayton and Child wrote that ‘LIRDП ushered in effective law enforcement in 1988, the poaching of elephant dropping dramatically, and some 2,500 elephants returning to the South Luangwa National Park’,[xxxiii] an assertion not corroborated by Gibson and Marks for the Munyamadzi Corridor and the Luangwa as a whole.[xxxiv] The latter found that over time poachers did not reduce their activities, merely moving from killing elephant, buffalo and the remaining rhino to smaller game. They also found that the drop in elephant poaching in 1990 and 1992 was due to the drought of the time; and although there was an increase in the number of arrests, this was because of additional scouts in the field; but for the Luangwa as a whole, the number of arrests stayed the same for years afterwards. And to add to this, the knowledge gleaned now from the Singapore ivory disaster where from 1994 to 2002, 19-container loads of ivory, equating to at least 14,000 elephant, were shipped out of the Luangwa – much of it from ivory buried during the LIRDП years, casts serious doubt on the Bell/Lewis optimism.[xxxv] Professor Sam Wasser who carried out the DNA assay of the ivory on one container load, sourcing it to Zambia, was quoted as saying that: “Our calculations show that between 3,000 and

6,500 elephants were poached for this single ivory shipment.” According to the same source, ‘Zambia’s official statistics cited the number of elephants killed illegally at only 135 in the previous ten years’.[xxxvi] Wasser though gets to the nub of the matter in his article.[xxxvii] In charge of the NPWS at the time were Ackim Mwenya and Gilson Kaweche.

After further delays, reflecting the inability of WWF and NPWS to move with alacrity, on 25 August 1988, four months after the initial official Zambian approach to WWF-I for funding, but fully a year since I had suggested the action to Chabwela, and eight months since AERSG knew of Zambia’s intention, I was officially appointed the project leader under NPWS control – to whom I was seconded.[xxxviii] [xxxix] In early September WWF-I agreed to pay me a monthly salary for one year; this was a year and at least some 60 dead rhino later since I had suggested the rescue.

At the time, Mark and Delia Owens uncovered a rhino poaching syndicate in the North Luangwa National Park being run by the NPWS warden in Mpika and masterminded by the head of the Office of the presidential security division (the *shushushu*).[xl] Clearly, any effort to save the rhino in Zambia would be resisted by the NPWS, but I did not realize this at the time. But the project had immediately to deal with the NPWS and LIRDOP mutual hostility, NORAD and its LIRDOP project having essentially taken over a massive part of the game estate normally under the NPWS. Obviously, Chabwela would have to lay down the law, although President Kaunda, as LIRDOP Chairman, had the final say. But Chabwela - an amiable man but without the necessary qualities of leadership, whom my friend Bill Astle had nurtured as a young village lad from Kantipa Village in Chief Kakumbi’s country, did nothing, despite the fact

that in 1988 he was made Permanent Secretary of the Ministry. This generally corrupt and shambolic administrative state of wildlife affairs was recognized by the former Chief Wildlife Research Officer - who had left the Game Department in 1973 - Bill Astle (d.2006), who in October 1987, while carrying out research in the Luangwa, realized that I would receive very little help, and wrote, warning me off: 'You would be extremely ill-advised to return here to work'.<sup>[xli]</sup> But I did so, my diary confirming what he said.



Bill Astle, Bronwen & Cathlin in Burford Oxon 1990

At first, it was hoped that LIRDp would turn the tide of

poaching; as recorded by Leader-Williams in 1989:[xlii]

*The Luangwa Integrated Resources Development Project, funded by NORAD, is now under way and it can only be hoped that appropriately directed schemes which allow local residents to participate in plans for their conservation areas, coupled with enhanced investment in infrastructure and policing, will permit the recovery of elephants and rhinos to the point where they can contribute more directly to the rural economy of the Luangwa Valley. After witnessing this particular Humpty Dumpty falling off the wall, I do hope that he can be put back together again.*

As Bell ran LIRD under the National Development Commission, reporting only to President Kaunda, with absolute control of the South Luangwa National Park and the east bank of the Luangwa, and with substantial funding, his powers were enormous, his full cooperation and enthusiasm vital in saving the rhino. I and my wife, Cathlin, knew him well from his time as co-director of the Black Lechwe Project that operated in my Bangweulu Command until its field closure in December 1973.[xliii] [xliv] For five months in transition, we had worked together, had captured lechwe with him and Jeremy Grimsdell for their ecological research, and had planned the translocation of a breeding nucleus of black lechwe to part of their former range in Chinsali District. President Kaunda, who had hunted lechwe there as a boy, and who had fond memories of his youth at Lubwa Mission near Chinsali, had in 1973 instructed the Chinsali Rural Council to build enclosures to temporarily hold the captured lechwe, and to liaise with the Game Department

and the Black Lechwe Project on their translocation there.



Bell now recruited my help for the proposed exercise. He, Cathlin and I went on a recce: first to Shiwa Ngandu, where I had briefly tried to deal with a lioness killing cattle, then on to Chinsali for meetings with the Chinsali Council and an inspection of the old lechwe grounds. We got on well on that journey, as ever talking endlessly, an *ulendo* of the old sort under canvas. But for some reason, the capture did not take place that year. In early October 1973, we had gone to the Black Lechwe Project's HQ on the Chimbwe floodplains to assist with an aerial census of the lechwe. Bell and Grimsdell were about to leave the research station in a week, the field work at an end. We were to take over the station. But Bell, standing athwart his

territory, arms akimbo, was not quite the easy-going fellow of our *ulendo*, he reneging on an agreement for our use of the guest house which Cathlin and I had refurbished, inserting instead, his driver; a trifling affair, but nevertheless one that was to be repeated years later in 1989 with very serious consequences for the black rhino. But in October of 1974, he wrote to us asking if he could visit over Christmas. We replied at once, welcoming him, but he never came. After fourteen years we met up again on matters Project Rhino.

## John Hanks

The recent publication of a book by a former biologist in the Game Department, and part funder through WWF-International of my rhino project, John Hanks, *Operation Lock and the war on rhino poaching*, is most revealing. On 9 April 1987, Hanks had met with Huxley and Berney of the CITES Secretariat in Switzerland who reported that Zambia's black rhino were being exterminated and that Zambians were doing the same to Zimbabwe's Zambezi Valley population. The CITES men said that as they were not an investigation agency their hands were tied, but that perhaps WWF could help. Hanks said he would look into it. This issue came up later at the Ridgeway Hotel in Lusaka in 1987 when Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands (founding President of WWF) told Hanks there was a real need for an organization that could investigate the rhino horn dealers. He then offered to fund it, but that it should be independent of WWF. In May 1987 at a meeting of the WWF board chaired by Prince Phillip of the UK, a WWF-I

trustee, Anton Rupert, repeated the suggestion - Hanks being instructed to provide the strategy. PB, as Bernhard was known, then discussed the issue with David Sterling, the World War II SAS leader, who arranged for KAS Enterprises under Colonel Ian Crooke to make contact with Hanks and PB. They then met on 22 October 1987; and, as Hanks records:[xlv]

*A few days after the KAS meeting WWF funded a project in Zambia to capture the remaining black rhinos and translocate them to safer sanctuaries in national parks such as the South Luangwa, Kafue and Lochinvar and on privately owned game ranches with tight 24-hour security by armed wildlife police officers. The project was eventually abandoned in 1989 owing to a lack of finances, and logistical problems. The decline continued, and by 1993 the species was extinct in Zambia.*

On 3 November 1987, he had convened a meeting of WWF delegates and wildlife officials from Kenya and Zambia in Lausanne to discuss his plan, *'The need for a continental strategy for the conservation of rhino in Africa'*. Prince S. Aga Khan, the Vice-President of WWF-I, reported that his recent tour of Africa had convinced him of the need for WWF to focus its efforts on strengthening 'smaller rhino-sanctuary networks'.[xlv] In his book Hanks recalled what he had told that meeting:[xlvii]

*I was less than enthusiastic about a request from the Zambian government to establish a sanctuary for rhinos within the South Luangwa National Park. I justified my position by highlighting the precipitous decline of the rhino*



*population of the Luangwa Valley which had been reduced by poaching in the previous 15 years from approximately 4,000 rhino to less than 100 at the time of the meeting. This was because the Department of National Parks in Zambia were seriously underfunded, and lacked dedicated, trained and adequately equipped staff for anti-poaching activities. Furthermore, the poaching – just before our meeting – of four of the six white rhino from Livingstone Game Park, so close to a major urban centre, was a loss that reinforced the perception of Zambia's inability to safeguard rhinos even when in highly conspicuous and supposedly secure areas. Against this background, I concluded that rhino capture and translocation programs within Zambia seemed to have a very limited chance of success and should not be supported by WWF until conditions improve.*

It was actually in September 1988, that WWF-I provided my salary for a year, while I covered all my living costs, transport and other field costs, later augmented with some of the funds promised by the Wildlife Conservation Society of Zambia, and a vehicle loan from Save the Rhino Trust (SRT). And Permanent Secretary Chabwela, and the NPWS, even though the project had been placed under them, did nothing but lie and carry out delaying tactics.

Hanks's concluding part of the statement – *the project was eventually abandoned in 1989 owing to a lack of finances, and logistical problems*, mirrored an unpublished 1992 report conjured up by the NPWS – later quoted in an article by its successor, the Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA).[xlvi] The project's abandonment was in fact due to the project's total obstruction by the NPWS, the LIRD and the Ministry – and a disinterested

steering committee, the coup de grâce administered by WWF-I and the Zambia Wildlife Society.

In January 1988, Operation Lock (KAS) – the investigation into the rhino horn trade, was established in Pretoria, reporting in March to Hanks and PB, the latter writing to Kaunda to request his support. Kaunda, as chairman of the LIRDP project, had total command of most of the last rhino in Zambia. In the same month, I investigated the offer of the Kasanka Trust to establish a breeding rhino pair in the Kasanka National Park, its conservation program started by myself, Peter Moss and David Lloyd in 1984.

In April 1988 WWF-I held a workshop in Lusaka to discuss WWF's elephant policy, a talk-fest chaired by the two Princes, PB and Aga Khan. The conclusion of the workshop was that the middlemen who drove the trade should be eliminated. After Hanks had addressed the meeting, the head of the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) in Zambia, Paul Russell, stood up and castigated WWF for funding a great failure, SRT, and suggested that a separate unit was required comprising the ACC, the NPWS and the honorary rangers (volunteer members of civil society given certain powers under the wildlife legislation – now called honorary Wildlife Police Officers).[xlxi] But what he failed to admit to was that the ACC had made no progress on eliminating the large and open ivory and rhino horn market operating at the time in Lusaka.

The result of Russell's intervention was that the US Information Service offered to work with him to establish an anti-poaching unit. WWF was requested to supply funds, to be matched by the US Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS). Funds were duly forthcoming, and the Species Protection Department (SPD) launched under the Anti-Corruption Commission (AAC)

in May 1990, a decade after the formation of SRT. According to Hanks, the SPD was highly successful until it got too close to the arch crook, President Chiluba – who came to power in 1991. However, it did little about the rhino and elephant. But it did help set in motion a campaign of torture and terror against villagers suspected of poaching.

### *Mario Kawayawaya*

Mario Kawayawaya confirmed this first hand in his book, *Captured Between Islands* - which I was able to publish for his wife and friends - where the SPD unit under the Anti Corruption Commission became linked with the Zambian Emergency Battalion and Riot Army (ZEBRA) established in 1991 by President Chiluba and based in Lusaka at Libala, and headed by a major player in the rhino and ivory trade, Assistant Superintendent Edwin Tembo. In the lower Zambezi, the unit was sited at the Pontoon Store cum police post established by an Indian trader, Dandika, close to Gwabi Lodge. Here the paramilitary unit made up of ZEBRA, police reservists, and game scouts of the NPWS, from 1992 to about 1995 carried out a campaign of torture and other criminal abuse of villagers whom they felt were involved in poaching. Prominent were two police reservists, a white, Derek Heath Gibb, and a coloured, Oscar Botha.



Rear: Honorary Police Officer Derek Gibb and NPWS personnel; seated are poachers with a pair of tusks and an AK47

Mario was imprisoned and tortured for almost a year after he stopped poaching in Zimbabwe, being moved between the ZEBRA base at Libala in Lusaka and the Pontoon by the paramilitary kingpin, Edwin Tembo. Gibb was very active in the torture at the Pontoon Store - imprisoning Mario and others repeatedly in a small room and filling it with tear gas. Mario reported numerous people being maimed for life or dying not long afterwards. Few suspected poachers were sent to trial

and little contraband recovered. Most of those affected only poached in Zimbabwe, their weapons and ammunition supplied by the army, the police and the paramilitary, who also provided transport for the rhino horn and ivory to the Lusaka dealers. In Mario's case, his torture and criminal treatment was part of the campaign by Tembo and other government officials 'on the take' to get him to return to commercial poaching.

Unbelievably, Gibb was the son-in-law of a prominent conservationist and honorary ranger in the Zambezi based at his Gwabi Lodge, Chirundu, Alan Wardle. Mario greatly respected Alan Wardle, being careful not to inform him of the part played by Gibb in his torture and of other villager suspects. He even assisted Gibb in anti-poaching work in the mid-1970s. Caroline Wardle married Derek Gibb in 1989 and divorced him in 1999. Gibb worked for Conservation Lower Zambezi (CLZ) in Chiawa from 1997-1999, then moved to England.

In 1997, shortly after Paul Russell retired and left the country, the SPD unit was disbanded. Awarded the Order of the British Empire (OBE), Russell had made a considerable contribution. However, whenever government highly militarized anti-poaching units are involved the oppression of villagers is inevitable. This I experienced when in charge of anti-poaching units in Bangweulu and the Congo Republic. SPD in Zambia could be no Zambia exception, though as far as I know no official evidence has ever been presented to prove this.

On 6 September 2021, I found out where Paul Russell had retired to and sent him copies of God's Country. Here follow some of his comments:

*On Page 252 you talk about ZEBRA and its creation in*

1991 by Chiluba. Chiluba took Office on 2nd November 1991 and I doubt he had much time to set this up as Kawayawaya says. The SPD had nothing to do with this Unit, if it existed. I am not saying that such a unit did not exist, but for all the time I was in charge of the ACC, and the SPD, there was no connection whatsoever. I think Kawayawaya is confused there.

Finally, you state that the “role of the SPD in the criminal torture of innocent villagers.....is yet to be fully exposed”. Since I was the Head of the ACC (from 1985) and thus Head of the SPD (created in 1988) what you say suggests that I condoned the torture of innocent people. This seriously impugns my character, and the character of the Zambian Officers who served with me. I performed my duties with honour and distinction and this was recognised by HM who awarded me with the OBE in 1995 for “services to development assistance in law enforcement in Zambia and to wildlife in Africa”. I am still in contact with my former colleagues in Zambia, and I’ll put this to them to see what they have to say.

I have learned today that, after I left Zambia for Malawi in 1997, the SPD, as a Department within the ACC, was closed down and the 2 NPWS Officers who had been seconded to the ACC returned to NPWS where apparently they formed the nucleus of what became the “Intelligence and Investigation Unit of the Wildlife Service”. The ACC Officers who were in SPD were reassigned to other departments within the ACC. For one year before I left Zambia, I acted as a mentor to a Zambian Officer designated to become ACC Director, so the transition was

*smooth. What that Unit did and how it behaved is not known to me as I had nothing to do with it after I left. There's a possibility that this Wildlife Unit might have been mistaken for the ACC SPD. I just don't know.*

*FYI, some time after I had arrived in Malawi, one of those NPWS Officers in the new Department IIU, came to me in Lilongwe, seeking my help in tracing a consignment of ivory that had gone, apparently, "walkabout" from Chilanga. With my help, and the help of Officers from the Malawi ACB, which I established, the consignment was found to have come from Lusaka to Lilongwe, and then moved through Moz to Singapore where it was seized. False shipping documents were of course used. You might have heard about it because it was internationally recognised. I kept my role invisible.*

## The Zambezi project in Zimbabwe

In May 1988 at a crucial time for Project Rhino in Zambia, Hanks, PB and KK went off on a helicopter squadron junket to the Lower Zambezi National Park where PB told Kaunda that WWF was supporting five major projects in the country. The only other WWF project of which I was aware was the Bangweulu and Kafue wetland project headed by Harry Chabwela, a project then about to close. I was working *pro bono* on the Luangwa rhino project at the time, Hanks still to decide whether to donate any WWF-I funds to the project. I was not invited to discuss Project Rhino. Nor, as far as I know, did Hanks or PB broach the subject with Kaunda. What they were intent on doing was to persuade Kaunda to endorse the

Zimbabwe project, being careful to avoid any mention of the shoot-to-kill policy of Zambian poachers by the Zimbabweans and the slaughter of numerous Zambian villagers who entered Zimbabwe to poach. Hanks later wrote that Kaunda ‘figured prominently in activities in and around Operation Lock’.[l]

Hanks’s remarks that of all the five presidents they had visited on their circuit that year, only Kaunda was genuinely interested in conservation is true, yet he was chairman of LIRDP and did nothing about the rhino in their area of jurisdiction – presumably being misled by Bell and Lungu that the rhino were safe, as with the 120 black lechwe I translocated to Chinsali on his instructions – they later being poached. But, in fairness, he had sent the army into the Luangwa in 1981 to attempt to nullify the poaching. Hanks says of Kaunda: ‘Unfortunately, in the months that followed conservation slipped further down Kaunda’s agenda as he fought for his political survival in the face of growing economic pressure to bring more democracy to Africa’.[li] What was introduced at the time by Kaunda was the nationalization and privatization of the economy, his electoral defeat in 1991 heralding a new wave of neoliberalism, ushered in by a thieving clothes-pony big man called Chiluba, all of it coinciding with the extermination of the black rhino and the decimation of the elephant.

Hanks singled out President Ian Khama of Botswana for his protection of the rhino, claiming that:[lii]

*He stands alone among the continents high ranking political figures as one who is not only genuinely interested and concerned about the rhino poaching crisis but also recognizes how it can negatively impact on the country’s international image and reputation, even undermining*



*development in the tourism sector.*

Ian Khama's scandalous and inhumane treatment of the Bushmen – a people inextricably linked with their environment - in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve and elsewhere - has prompted attempts at a tourism boycott of Botswana (see 14: Botswana - the tribe that lost its head).[liii] Khama retired in April 2018.

I was not aware at the time that Hanks was fully occupied with Zimbabwe. He had approached the Beit Trust in the UK for £1 million to translocate the 500 or so Zimbabwe/Zambezi rhino to safe areas. Sir Alfred Beit approved his application in December 1988 and appointed him project director, with Raoul du Toit as executive director. At the time the North Korean Embassy in Harare was a very active trading entity dealing with rhino horn, ivory and whatever contraband they could lay their hands on, and totally protected by Mugabe, for they had trained his troops responsible for the massacre in Matabeleland of the Ndebele people. But as Mario Kawayawaya fully revealed in his book, *[Captured Between Islands](#)*, it was the Muslim Lusaka ivory and rhino horn dealers who sponsored the poaching of the Zambezi by the villagers on the Zambian side of the river, as well as the rest of Zambia. And it was the corrupt NPWS, ZAWA, and the Zambian paramilitary, who made it all possible.

As Hanks tells us, the Zimbabwe government wanted the Beit money to go straight to them. A long battle ensued with the project only approved in February 1989 on the intervention of Beit himself, taking another year for it to begin in the field, with funding until 1998. The project was successful, du Toit later garlanded with awards – though by that time most of the rhino outside of the intensively protected areas were already

poached. Meanwhile, KAS concentrated on Mozambique and Namibia, assisted by Piet Lategan of South Africa's Endangered Species Unit – still in place in 1998 when I dealt with him when implementing CITES in South Africa. However, KAS's Ian Crookes, not surprisingly, 'received no support from selected senior conservation staff he met in Zambia'.[liv]

## The Muslim horn traders

Scores of ivory and rhino horn dealers, Muslim Senegalese middlemen and Muslim Indian Mafiosa held sway at the time in Lusaka at a building known as the Blue House, a market little different from traders selling openly from crowded stalls, the Zambia Police complicit, as Mario recorded:[lv]

*At Makeni filling station we caught a mini-bus to Kuomboka and disembarked near a blue building with lots of men milling around outside it. Obirt explained to me that this was a meeting place for illegal trophy dealers and yes, everyone called it the Blue House. Many expensive vehicles were parked nearby and most of the drivers were dressed in Islamic tunics. A brand new Skyline with a tinted windshield rolled up to the Blue House. Four men got out dressed in lavish robes. This galvanized the crowd. Obirt explained that the four men in the Skyline were the bosses of a large syndicate. They had come to brief the crowd on the buying and selling rate of black market commodities – especially precious stones, ivory*

*and rhino horn. I was astounded that the dealers would use such a public place as their office. Why were they not arrested, I asked Obirt? He pointed to a police registered vehicle among the parked cars and it was not long before a uniformed officer came out of the Blue House and hopped into it. Obirt sucked his teeth. "Mario these dealers are powerful. You will know much more in the future."*

With the all-clear given by the PS, Chabwela, to secure the rhino in the South Luangwa NP, Bell and his co-director in LIRD, Fidelius Lungu, came to Lusaka.

We went to dinner where Bell and I talked long and hard about the project. Seven months later, having seen Bell and Lungu on my trips down to the Valley, but with the NPWS still failing to arrange accommodation (Chabwela never kept his promise of 18 September 1988 to provide it), guard assistance, sanctuary sites and so on, clearly unwilling to still the simmering territorial discontent, the inevitable signal from the past was delivered. On 14 February 1989, I received an extraordinary threatening note from Bell saying that LIRD controlled all the staff housing and that I would have to build my own house, and that for my *"health and safety, I should understand it!"* This was followed a few days later by a phone call from Lungu saying that the project had first to be vetted by all four LIRD committees – one of them chaired by Kaunda, before we set to work, and that if I entered the park before the project was approved, they would arrest me. The park and the rhino, it was clear, were no longer under the NPWS, or under any form of cogent leadership.

## ADMADE/Lewis

In April 1989 Dale Lewis, the WCI employee running the ADMADE aid program for the NPWS, told me that he supported the project, but then refused his co-operation for the translocation of the Chindeni Hills rhino lying behind the NPWS/ADMADE headquarters, the grandly named Nyamaluma Institute for Community-Based Natural Resource Management. Although Lewis had no authority over the rhino, I let it go, knowing I had other rhino to deal with.

"They are," said Lewis memorably to me, "perfectly safe."

"Well, you are now responsible for them," I replied.

Finally, Director Chipungu of NPWS met with Bell and Lungu, saying that the project had been passed by the relevant committee, forgetting it was supposed to be agreed to by all four committees. They also declared that the Chindeni population and two others were off-limits. They never did name the other two, and there is no evidence that Bell or Lewis or NPWS made any professional effort to protect those three populations or any other. To these extraordinary actions by Bell and Lewis, was added an increasingly lacklustre steering committee, an NPWS disinterested in the project, and a Chabwela with the drawbridge beyond his moat fully raised. On 16 May 1989, I had gone in to see him at the Ministry, but he refused me an interview. In the waiting room at the time were gathered the confederacy of NPWS dystopia, Director Chipungu, Gilson Kaweche and Ackim Mwenya. On 26 May 1989, the Wildlife Society withdrew its funding for Project Rhino, due, they said, to the NPWS's failure to support their project.

## WWF-I financial support withdrawn

On 11 July 1989, Hanks arrived in Lusaka – informing Barclay of the Wildlife Society, followed by Chipungu of the NPWS, then myself, that WWF-I would no longer fund a project leader. Chipungu, the Director of the National Parks and Wildlife Service, made no suggestion for keeping the project alive. He and Barclay were in agreement: they did not want the rhino rescued, by me or anyone else. And that was that, writ now in history.

## Disgrace abounding

In August 1989 Operation Lock was closed down after it was exposed by Reuters Nairobi on 6 July in the UK's Evening Standard. As a result, Ian Crooke was left considerably out of pocket. The Lock affair was to reverberate in the press for some time. PB – a former member of the Nazi Party and later Allied war hero - went to ground, leaving Hanks to face the music, even though they had done nothing wrong. But what PB did do was to sully his reputation further, repeating his disgraceful conferral in 1974 of his Order of the Golden Ark award on President Kenyatta of Kenya, he whose one wife and daughter directed much of the rhino horn and ivory trade. Unbelievably, given his knowledge of Project Rhino, PB supposedly conferred the same honour on the one man I hold ultimately responsible for the extinction of Zambia's black rhino, Harry Chabwela. In my files, recently unearthed, is Chabwela's 2009 cv; under

AWARDS is written: *'A recipient of the Rider of the Golden Ark for the life time of service to conservation in Zambia, and for inspired leadership of innovative conservation program honoured by Prince Bernard of the Netherlands'*. Of course, there is no such award – the spelling and grammar mistakes apart; perhaps he had been dreaming of *Raiders of the Lost Ark*, of action-man Harrison Ford clad in brown Fedora, jodhpurs and boots, whip in hand. The award he claims can only be Prince Bernhard's, Order of the Golden Ark; but PB gives no date for the conferral – if indeed it is true (the web is unforthcoming).[lvi] Chabwela transferred in 1990 to be the permanent secretary (PS) in the Prime Minister's office. He had spent the previous 14 years as a senior administrator in a completely Zambianized NPWS cleared of *mazungu* experts in what is so far the darkest period in Zambia's conservation history, any award therefore during that period being a travesty.



Harry Chabwela

The refusal of an extension to my work permit by the Immigration Department in September 1989 was inevitable - obviously arranged by Chabwela, Chipunga, Kaweche and Mwenya. This made it impossible for me to help the rhino, let alone stay in the country. On 28 October 1989, de Haes of WWF asked for Hank's resignation. By 1993, with LIRD closing down - Kaunda having been voted out of power in

1991, the Zambian rhino was effectively extinct. My family and I moved to England.

Looking back all those years ago from 1983 until the extinction of the rhino by 1993, there had always been three or four members of the African Elephant and Rhino Specialist Group (AERSG) representing Zambia. Apart from Phil Berry of Save the Rhino Trust, who was a member for only a few years, the other three were members throughout the onslaught: Englishman, Richard Bell (the first AERSG Vice-Chairman and czar of the Luangwa Integrated Development Project from 1987-1993), the Zambian, Gilson Kaweche (Chief Research Officer of the NPWS, its Director in 1998), and the American, Dale Lewis, representing the New York Zoological Society's Wildlife Conservation International (WCI) since 1980, based first at Nyamaluma near the Chindeni Hills.

Tragically, Bell, Kaweche and Lewis not only failed to protect the rhino but obstructed me from doing so. They believed that they had set in place anti-poaching and villager protection systems ensuring the security of the elephant and rhino, and therefore resented the imposition on them of Project Rhino. The Zambians involved: Chabwela, Kaweche, and Chipungu, plus Ackim Mwenya, were in total opposition, despite Project Rhino being an NPWS project established by Chabwela. And Kaunda could have instructed Bell to get on with the rhino rescue, with or without my help.[lvii] After all, was it not he who had instructed Bell, then myself, to translocate black lechwe to Chinsali – something I had carried out in 1974 and 1975, he ordering the Zambian Airforce to assist me. In 1967 on the instruction of our Chief Game Officer Bill Bainbridge I had translocated the herd of eland he had built up at Chilanga to Mosi oa Tunya National Park. I can only assume that in



the case of the rhino and elephant, Chabwela did nothing and that Kaweche, a relative of Kaunda's, had assured him that all was well. And Bell, despite the evidence of SRT's anti-poaching failure – obviously told his chairman that the rhino and elephant were safe.

How different the new regime was from the old. The former Chief Game Officer, Bill Bainbridge and his wife, Sheila, had lived in a large house at Chilanga, the Game Department HQ. Nearby lay the large eland pens. In my first off-season from elephant cropping in November – June of 1966, Bill had instructed me to come and stay with him and Sheila. They were the complete and happy family I had never had. Bill loved to cook, and meals were happy affairs accompanied by much laughter. During the week I would carry out certain tasks under Bill's instruction. In the depths of the rains, this became an extended hunt for cattle-killing lion in the Chisamba farming block – some of it on David Frost's farm. And then, of course, there was the eland translocation. But Bill's other reason for plucking me temporarily from the Luangwa was that he needed someone to partner him at tennis. This happy family was the way it was then at Chilanga: all taking full part in the Game Department community, doing whatever was necessary for wildlife, being welcoming, friendly, and exuding massive integrity.

The other minor players in the *dramatis personae* of this one-act tragedy, *Project Rhino*, were the members of the project steering committee, all European and mostly drawn from the Wildlife Society of Zambia, who did very little to help the project along – a society of obstructive easing, awarding a grant of funding and then summarily withdrawing it.

## After Project Rhino

At the time Project Rhino was buried in 1989, Lewis (WCI) - self-appointed custodian of the Chindeni rhino - had presented some classic hocus-pocus entitled 'Zambia's pragmatic conservation program'.<sup>[lviii]</sup> First, he trotted out yet another rendition of the eternal Saturday matinee feature, 'The ADMADE Fable', where customary people suddenly want to protect their resources, even though they do not own or benefit from them; then launching into his self-congratulatory rhino-saving achievement:

*Considering the critical plight of black rhino conservation in all of Africa, the story of Lupande's black rhinos is even more spectacular. Specific details will be omitted from this paper for security reasons, but based on two separate surveys undertaken in 1984 (Chimbali, 1984 and 1988; Lewis and Chanda, 1988), as well as annual field patrol reports, it is clear that the rhinos in Lupande are breeding and their numbers are not decreasing. Furthermore, the rhino poaching rates have dropped abruptly during this period; from 1986 to 1988 there has been no reported rhino carcass throughout Lupande. Much of the credit for this trend must be given to the local Village Scouts who have demonstrated their abilities and concern for protecting their wildlife resources from illegal uses. The unseen or unknown variable is the extent of social resistance to poaching within the local communities where villagers might engage in poaching themselves or indirectly by*

*giving outside hunters lodging in exchange for meat. Indications from the attitude survey taken in Malama area show perceptions toward wildlife conservation are changing and that the people's recognition of the legal benefits from wildlife may be discouraging illegal uses.*

This premature and triumphalist effusion for what was a conservation disaster should be etched forever on the tomb of the Chindeni rhino. Lewis had obviously not read Leader-Williams's summary of the Luangwa rhino situation in the same issue of *Pachyderm*.<sup>[lix]</sup> This ADMADE-speak of Lewis's was all repeated in another paper he co-authored in 1990 with his friends Kaweche and Mwenya:<sup>[lx]</sup>

*This paper describes the results of an experimental project in Zambia that sought to halt the drastic loss of elephants and rhinos to poaching in and around protected areas in the Luangwa Valley....As a result, poaching dropped dramatically, local economies were improved and village attitudes toward wildlife management and conservation became more positive.*

### *WWF's reputation laid bare*

The prime achievement of this triumvirate of chums was the extinction of the rhino and the mass killing of elephant. Naturally, they made no mention of Project Rhino.

At that time, John Phillipson – with whom I was never in contact – produced an internal audit for WWF, a withering assessment of its failure to protect the rhino and other species;

[a report WWF suppressed.](#)[lxi] One of the points he made was that WWF took the credit for much rhino conservation that it should not have done. This was true in the case of Project Rhino: Hanks, without thinking I am sure, had told Faddy of SRT that ‘their Project Rhino was the only one of 150 to fail’; though the extent of WWF’s input – apart from its massive influence - was solely my modest wage for about half the time I was at work, my financial contribution being, for me, considerable.

In 1990 Kevin Dowling’s film *Tenpence in the Panda* excoriated WWF, the latter spending a reported £350,000 in damage limitation. And then in August of that same year, there was Central Television’s Cook Report attack on WWF, Cook having interviewed and filmed me in the Luangwa on the elephant situation. I never did see the film, but I phoned Cook after reading reviews of the program, remonstrating with him for attacking WWF, for whom I still had great regard. Cook, rightly, gave me short shrift. In that same year, Leader-Williams, Albon and Phillip Berry produced a paper on the patterns of the decline of rhino and elephant in the valley. They made no mention of Project Rhino.[lxii]

In 1992 the AERSG rhino chairman mentioned that someone called Mvima had reported that there were 407 rhino in the country; a piece of horror fiction.[lxiii]

In 1993, as reported in *Pachyderm* No. 16, Bell and Lewis were members of AERSG, Bell for the last time, Kaweche having already bowed out and concentrated on his mielie plot and his side investments.

But Bell left behind his calling card in the form of a co-authored article, ‘Illegal Activities and Law Enforcement in the Central Luangwa Valley, Zambia, from 1979 to 1992’:

*1. Data on illegal activity and law enforcement from the central Luangwa Valley, Zambia, are analyzed for two time periods, the first 1979-82, when the National Parks and Wildlife Service was supported by the Save the Rhino Trust (SRT), the second (1988-92), when it was supported by the Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project (LIRDP). Data on the intervening period are not currently available.*

*2. Before 1979, there was effectively no law enforcement in the area, which was subject to extremely heavy illegal offtake of elephant, rhino and other species. During the SRT period, there were up to 22 effective wildlife scouts engaged in law enforcement, with an operating budget estimated at US\$1 5/ km<sup>2</sup>/ year. This was sufficient to reduce but not halt the decline of elephant and rhino populations.*

*3. LIRDP was supported by major funding from the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) and used for an integrated rural development program. The wildlife management component was allocated about US\$65/km<sup>2</sup>/year; this led to the increase of scouts to 285 by 1991 and a comparable increase in law enforcement effort.*

*4. Between 1988-92, the illegal offtake of elephant was reduced by a factor of 88% to an acceptable level estimated at about 10% of the sustainable yield of the population. At the same time, indices of all other classes of illegal activity were reduced by between 75 and 90%.*

*5. Analysis of the relationships between indices of illegal activity and various law enforcement parameters demonstrates logarithmic relationships indicative of diminishing*

*returns on law enforcement effort and expenditure at low levels.*

*6. This result leads to the conclusion that, for most wildlife management purposes, including the conservation of elephant, acceptable levels of illegal offtake can be achieved for about US\$ 70/ km<sup>2</sup>/year, that is considerably less than the amount recommended by other authors. It is noted, however, that this result was achieved in the context of the LIRD community participation program. Moreover, it implies a significant increase in staff efficiency, requiring, in turn, a focus on staff quality at all levels.*

*7. The proposed scenario is probably not effective for rhino, which are both more attractive to illegal hunters and have lower sustainable yields than elephants.*

*8. The analysis provides no evidence that the 1990 CITES ban on ivory trading has influenced the rate of illegal offtake of elephants.*

Save the Rhino Trust operated up to Bell's takeover of LIRD in 1986, not just to 1982 – that being the end of the WWF-funded component, taken over after a hiatus of two years by NORAD, the same donor who funded SRT until at least 1996. Before 1979, the rhino poaching had not yet got into full swing, the last legal rhino shot in that year on licence by a client and friend, with me present. Bell said that LIRD had reduced elephant poaching by a factor of 88%. But we now know that 19 container loads of ivory of some six tonnes each were gathered in the Luangwa and sent to Singapore between 1994 and 2002 – an appreciable amount of it doubtless buried – as is traditionally the practice – during Bell's time. Bell did grudgingly concede, with massive understatement, that "The

proposed scenario is probably not effective for rhino, which are both more attractive to illegal hunters and have lower sustainable yields than elephants' but made no mention of rhino populations and anti-poaching efforts, nor of Project Rhino. The estimate given for rhino at the time in the Pachyderm newsletter, put out by AERSG, was 40. Given the current rate of attrition then, this is unlikely.[lxiv] In 1993 the guestimate was 33.[lxv] But by that time they were gone. There was no emergency action. Why?

In a 2011 report in Pachyderm, it stated that a new project to save the rhino was conjured up in 1991, and electric fencing purchased, 'But changes in policy shifted the project's focus. It was felt that an action plan should be formulated as a prerequisite to initiating the project'.[lxvi] In this report of 2011, ZAWA only gave basic details of Project Rhino, quoting from an NPWS report of 1992.[lxvii] Obviously, my reports were ignored or had disappeared, as they had at the WWF HQ in Switzerland. Between 1991 and 2002 the program was intermittent' - an eleven-year paralysis. *It was felt that an action plan should be formulated!* - yet another pithy epitaph for a rhino tombstone.

In 2000 Clark Gibson published an article on the NPWS record from 1975, my final year in the NPWS as the Bangweulu biologist. In 1991, two years after my attempt to save the rhino as a card-carrying NPWS member, he had interviewed some NPWS staff and others in the Luangwa and elsewhere, including Richard Bell, Kaweche and Mwenya. While he discussed the poaching of rhino, he made no mention of Project Rhino.[lxviii] He also made no mention of the cataclysmic effects of the Watershed Speech and the departure of conservation leaders in the NPWS, rather accentuating the massive fall in the price of

copper and the increase in oil prices. That the NPWS reduced its budget by 70% in the two years after Moss and I left the service presents too obvious a reason for the demise of the NPWS and the awful plunder of wildlife that then took place. The class had no teachers, no leaders, so mayhem ensued.

In 2001 Kevin Dunham produced a report entitled, *Reintroduction of black rhino in the Luangwa Valley, Zambia*, for the SADC Regional Program for Rhino Conservation. In it he produced evidence that rhino sightings had been made up until 1999 in the Chindeni Hills and Kapiri Kamfumu area, the latter lying west of Mfuwe in the South Luangwa National Park, the same area Rice and I had chosen for our first rhino sanctuary. In this report there is no acknowledgement of my and Rice's attempt to save Zambia's rhino, even though Dunham mentions he visited Phil Berry in the Luangwa.[lxix] In 1996 Bill Astle told me that while on a visit to WWF-I in Gland, he had had great difficulty in getting them to acknowledge that there had ever been such a project. In his book on the Luangwa, published in 1999, my late friend Bill Astle does not mention Project Rhino either, not even the fact that he had approached me in 1989 with the idea of him working as a volunteer for the project, his vegetation research in the Luangwa having come to an end.[lxx]

In 2003, George Kampamba, Director of Research and Planning in the NPWS, produced a report stating that Zambia's rhino, 'was poached to extinction in the 1970s'. He was only wrong by 20 years.[lxxi] [lxxii] And I was back in Zambia by then, trying to help the NPWS once again, meeting with Kampamba on several occasions *pro bono*, to help them establish CITES in the country. He never mentioned the report to me.

Here I think of conservationists of the top rank, men such as Frank Ansell, a kind and amusing man. Ansell was our Game



Department *fundi* of all things mammal, his quiz evenings with his wife a highlight of bonhomie and eccentricity. [Writing in Oryx Magazine](#) in 1969, he had this to say of the rhino at a time when the going was still good:[lxxiii]

*In Zambia's main wildlife areas, such as the Luangwa Valley and the Kafue National Park, the black rhinoceros populations are now stable and in some places even increasing – a striking reversal of the pre-war situation. Provided effective control can be maintained by the Department of Game and Fisheries, the author, who is a member of the Department, suggests that there is no reason why they should not continue to thrive.*



*Frank Ansell 1973*

I doubt that many of us who care will ever recover from the loss of Zambia's black rhino; the failure of nerve, admixed with self-interest and supreme disinterest, of criminality, of supposed conservationists who should have done their duty: in two decades, gone. And gone too is Cathlin's and my friend, Richard Bell. I see him now at the Mfuwe Airport as we left for the last time in '89. His eyes cast down, avoiding mine, and she, supremely forgiving and loving as always, at once over to him and saying that it 'was all right'.



Cathlin with wattled crane, and Richard Bell, 1973

He made no reply. A brilliant but afflicted soul, he committed suicide in Maun on 1 December 2001.

And so our enforced exit number two from Zambia duly took place. The African Wildlife Trust I had started with

Norman Carr, Dr James Cairns (a lifetime of service at St Francis Mission, Katete) and Panji Kaunda (a Deputy-Minister in the PF government, and Kaunda's eldest son) - with the latter's father as nominal Patron, I handed over to Bill Astle and Tagd Wixted. It never occurred to me to go to President Kaunda and have him intercede on my behalf with Immigration. He was chairman because of his friendship with Norman Carr, while I had not forgiven him the Watershed Speech and its destruction of the Game Department and all its foreseen consequences for the country, nor his failure as chairman of LIRDPA to act on the rhino's behalf. I and my family moved for a time to Oxfordshire - in African terms, close to Coventry.

### My Project Rhino Diary 1988-1989

The diary starts with Chabwela and me getting things going. But this followed my work a year before to persuade him of such a course of action. For in May 1987 the African Elephant and Rhino Specialist Group (AERSG) announced the results of their meeting at Nyeri:

Luangwa Valley, Zambia. The rhino population of the Luangwa Valley has declined from several thousand to less than 100 within this decade. Support is required for the Zambian government proposal to establish a protected sanctuary within the South Luangwa National Park. There is also a requirement to strengthen anti-poaching efforts and to involve local communities further in conservation efforts.

March 1988

*Had initial meetings in 1987 with Harry Chabwela, the Director of NPWS regarding the urgent need to save Zambia's black rhino. Discussed the possible translocation of rhino to Lochinvar National Park. I suggested we set up sanctuaries on private land, notably Anglo-American, Kalengwa and Chibote in the Chisamba area. He and I visited Marula Farm and Chibote. Negotiations with Anglo American farms proceeded well and little appeared to stand in the way. But Chabwela sent them a proposal that changed their attitude completely. Suddenly they were off the idea believing that the government wanted to take over the land. At the same time, Chabwela submitted the Marula Rhino Project proposal to John Hanks at WWF-International, at the time the WWF-I Program Director Africa. WWF-I, after delays due to infrequent Board meetings, agreed to pay for the project leader. Due to problems with Anglo, Chabwela and I decided to establish the first sanctuary in the South Luangwa National Park, and then only to consider moving the rhino onto private land.*

6 September

*Contract arrived based on the Marula Anglo-American proposal; new proposal on Luangwa already in post to them (WWF). I had dinner with Sir Harry Llewellyn the famous show jumper, a boyhood hero. He promised to give me a thousand pounds towards the rhino fence. A nice old boy with an attractive daughter. When I asked how Foxtrot was, she whinnied like a mare – of course, it was Foxhunter – a faux pax, I suppose.*

7 September

*Go off to the Kafue with Tony Pass to speak to a representative of Gallagher Fencing, a man called Scheepers. Return at midday and phone Chilanga to find that Chabwela is back from Nairobi. I require now to have WWF agree to the changed program and to call a baptismal meeting of the Steering Committee I appointed, made up mainly of members of WECSZ (Wildlife Society) and SRT (Save the Rhino Trust). I manage to recruit Bill Barclay, Adam Pope, Mark O'Donnell, Mike O'Riordon, Nancy Ashley, Thor Larsen, Mike Faddy (SRT), Peter Miller, Oliver Irwin and Chabwela. Saw Irwin who will be a great help. But there is evidence of antipathy between individuals. I will be at pains to unite their creative forces and hopefully negate the destruction. Have decided to sit tight in Lusaka until the project (and accommodation) is organized at Ministerial level, though once given transport, I intend gathering information on the rhino's status.*

*9 September*

*Saw Faddy who informed me of the result of the SRT meeting. "They agree to support the rhino project but first we want to see the project get going," he said. To this, he added, "I will start organizing the insurance for the vehicle, but I won't give the vehicle if it is to be used around town. If it is going down to the Valley (Luangwa), fine." I was somewhat taken aback at this fatuous nonsense and said I would see them at the meeting. After all my talks with him about the phoenix-like resuscitation of the rhino project, confirmed by Chabwela, this smacked of an unnecessary restriction.*

*12 September 1988*

*After much thought, I saw O’Riordon and explained the situation. He agreed with me that we must go ahead with a few dynamic members and not SRT and Faddy. They could assist when asked. Conservation politics again, with the rhino going...going...going! Clearly, their exact meaning was: ‘We will not help you get started and get set, and will not coalesce into the new project’ (SRT having been a massive failure).*

*13 September*

*Phoned Larsen (NORAD) regarding Chabwela’s agreement to move the Intelligence Unit away from Chilanga. He was pleased to hear this but hurriedly referred me to Richard Bell, newly returned from leave. I tried to phone the latter.*

*18 September*

*The run-up to today: Faddy/SRT position ludicrous. Barclay phoned me to say that WECSZ had decided to put up K200, 000 at once and that they would carry out fundraising; also said that Miller had said SRT was not 100% behind the project from the outset. Two stories speak of some confusion. Met with Chabwela on Wednesday and go over the ground for the first meeting of Project Rhino on Thursday. We agreed on an agenda. He told me of his trip to Luangwa with the Permanent Secretary who was highly enthused by the project. Someone had seen a rhino in the Chichele area. He agreed to sort out a Chinzombo house for me. Meeting on Thursday found him absent; his driver pitched up after an hour to say that he was delayed at Anti-Corruption. Not a good start - his absence unaccountable and very disappointing. Bill Barclay of WECSZ reiterated their position, taking a dig*

*at Faddy. He later read out a statement, " We will support the project when it gets started."*

*"What, " I asked, "Do you consider getting started?"*

*"When the Department sort you out a house, " replied Barclay.*

*The mind boggles. Everyone agreed to try for a meeting on Tuesday at Chilanga. Miller did not arrive as Faddy had failed to notify him.*

*30 September*

*Finally, at Chilanga for a meeting with Chabwela, Pope, Faddy, Miller, O'Riordon and Irwin. Faddy made no mention of 'getting started', perhaps because I had discussed the matter with Miller. Meeting very successful. Chabwela and I managed to lay out what was intended without any negative questioning, and with the acceptance of myself as project leader. He remarked to me later, "How long it all takes." Moved out to a house at Zam-Anglo (penyani onse) during the week. The relief was tremendous – a palpable flow of peace throughout. Children very happy. Next meeting of Steering Committee on 20 October.*

*1 October*

*Down to Kafue with Peter and Annette Miller to see Scheepers of Gallagher's. Must get the fence up before the rains. October had been spent trying to get away. Got the vehicle on the 25th, then K200, 000 from WECSZ. The Kafue still here: beautiful and timeless, though the despoiler, man, is everywhere at work. Nature is under assault. Chabwela has prompted President Kaunda to fire the Minister and promote himself to Permanent Secretary. Hope abounds.*

*8 November 1988*

*Left for Luangwa on 3 November. Slept at Lionel Potgieter's camp near Petauke. The following morning drove to Mfuwe the back way, arriving at midday.*

*11 November*

*Chuck B, the Information Officer at the US Embassy, was a guest of Chabwela's at Babbette dinner. A hearty rose-hued man: pipe-puffing, enormous bonhomie...hail-fellow. Seated next to this archetypal 'good Yankee fellow,' he turned to me and said earnestly, "Do you want a gun?" Some weird friend of diverse talents: judge, train-driver, pianist would like to donate a capture gun, dart and drugs to a rhino project – in exchange for an air-ticket from America. I am to meet him in Lusaka. The following day strolled around the country lying north of the Katete River. Little seen but looks promising.*

*22 January 1989*

*I return to Lusaka. Have lunch with the American. Attempt to get meetings going. Harry Chabwela now Permanent Secretary at the Ministry and great things expected. Donor document produced with help of Mike at Coopers the accountants. Committee did not like it. Adrian Carr has had his croc farm on Lake Tanganyika confiscated by the government. The explanation from Chabwela is unconvincing. This followed by the nationalization of all enterprises on Lake Tanganyika. They were given one week to remove their things. This is depressing, especially when added to the actions of the NPWS to go into the hunting-safari business together with the Zambia National Tourism Bureau, and that only two safari operators are left, their prime areas removed and replaced by marginal Open Area. In the midst of*



*this Norman Carr sent me a message to say that a scout had found seven rhino in a thicket near Msoro. I am now organizing initial staff and AK47s, tractor and trailer and darts and dart-gun. Will give Steering Committee jobs to do or we will not be successful.*

*12 February 1989*

*Finally am in the field. Flew down on Friday. Rice Time came over, bless his heart. He is quite thin now, greying, stick legs, but tough as leather with all that wonderful knowledge locked in his skull. How many miles has he walked after village-raiding elephant, how many has he shot - 29 in the 1966 rains with 29 rounds. Never met his equal as a tracker on hard ground. Out on a clear Sunday in search of rhino – up to the Mushilashi Bridge and saw seven elephant wading across. Drive into the bush a short way to park and hide our possessions – an unwelcome change from the past. Then off on foot with that old familiar figure in front, rifle on shoulder. I notice he is a little deaf now – had to point out a lone buffalo bull plodding through a patch of flooded bush – it is the rains. But perhaps he always has been a little deaf for I remember a night in '66 out after hippo, following one into a thicket on foot with a fading torch and having to turn him around and point him in the hippo's direction, our quarry eying us from 15 yards away. So long since I have been off into the Luangwa. One feels out of sorts, like a domestic porker away from his trough. It is hard to take anything in, just too many sights, smells and sounds. A large herd of buffalo took off some 50 yards in front of us, their passage like breakers smashing upon a shingle beach, the sharp metallic strike of their hooves and horns ringing in the air.*

*I stood rivetted, marvelling at it, remembering how Derek Macleod and I had one day cropped such a herd, running behind it and then in amongst it in a whirlpool of fierce bovine aroma, dust, insects and the grunts and metallic crackling. Had a good stroll seeing zebra, impala and elephant; but no rhino or their spoor. Drive on towards the Katete and walked inland. We found one track, an adult female from about December. Carried on and discovered the sad remains of a rhino calf.*

*13 Feb 1989*

*Across the river in the morning to the old Kakumbi cropping station on the east bank of the Luangwa. Called in to see Jimmy Joule, living in a temporary shack, but he is away. Found his sidekick, an Afro-Indian with a metal star up one nostril. Both I hear are on suspension. Over to 'cropping' – 13 years since it ceased - to find the bloated form of my ex-clerk, still employed, but now the local UNIP ward chairman. Looked over the cropping recovery trailers. Quite a few of the staff from the old days about with murmurs when they see me of "Chosanganga, Chosanganga!" – the smeller out of evil doers, or more literally, the witchdoctor who removes a sorcerer. As I made my way through pools of muddy water, came on a naked woman gazing bemusedly about her, obviously mentally impaired, nobody making any effort to usher her indoors. At Chinzombo met up with Saiagawa, the Japanese volunteer biologist, a pleasant fellow but in a permanent lather of sweat. Waited to see Chimballi the local ranger who is always uncooperative. Out with Rice to view the rhino boma site to be laid about a large pool on the edge of the Katete.*

14 Feb 1989

*With Rice up the 04 road, and through that familiar thicket we once traversed after elephant 23 years ago. Stopped the car at a flooded part of the dirt road and walked in a few miles. Came on a patrol coming toward us. Seeing us, they threw themselves to the ground. Then one guard stood up and challenged us. They reported seeing spoor. We walked on, describing a large circle back to the car. A little way on we found the fresh track of an adult rhino bull. Very little sign of elephant or anything else, except buffalo. Back to the house to find a message from Richard Bell, the LIRD Co-Director; a stiff and bristly note saying that LIRD controlled housing and that I would have to build my own house, and that for my 'health and safety, I should understand it'. Extraordinary note – particularly as I knew him well, having taken over the Black Lechwe Project from him and Jeremy Grimsdell when appointed the new Officer-in-Charge/Biologist of the Bangweulu Command in 1973. But the territorial imperative is strong in the conservation army; small territories are being carved out, outsiders frowned upon and kept out. Receive a message from Phiri that guards had arrived. Drove over to find four decrepit looking specimens, three of them drunk with no equipment or rifles. More, I was so informed, were waiting in Chipata. Dinner with James Schultz, coloured son of the late Bert Schultz whom I had known, married to a Dane. Geoff Howard was there who had once visited us at Chikuni in Bangweulu. He tells me he is leaving Zambia. A great shame.*

15 Feb 1989

*Over to Cropping with Rice to find ten guards now gathered. Addressed them and told them to return to their units to collect their kit. Left Rice in charge to deal with transport. Criticism percolating through from Chabwela, and other as yet unknown people, that I am spending too much time in Luangwa. Criticism can be expected from the NPWS who have taken five months to act. It is clear now that there will be no housing at all for the guards or me.*

*17 Feb 1989*

*My memos on file reveal the extent of LIRD (Bell's) intransigence and the Ministry (Chabwela) and NPWS's (Chipungu and Kaweche) neglect of the project. So much for 'the guardians' concern for the rhino. Agonised over report to WWF-I and finally got it posted. The performance of the Steering Committee is woeful. No fund raising, no attempt to ease the project through – except Bill Barclay who has made a great effort so far. Criticism of myself lurks in the committee shrubbery, but the minutes reflect it is the fault of the NPWS. Six and a half months down the road and nothing but opposition and obstruction.*

*18 Feb 1989*

*Back in Lusaka for a few days. Conversations on phone with Fidelius Lungu, Bell's LIRD Co-Director. Brings startling new information on the requirement that we be vetted by four LIRD Committees: Technical, Policy, Executive and Steering, the last chaired by President Kaunda, and that if I enter the park before the project is passed, I will be arrested. Patrick Chipungu (Acting Director NPWS) confirms the necessity for the vetting.*

*The question is: is this so? And if so, why has Chabwela allowed this? We are now left hanging. Have instructed guards to hang-fire. What do I tell WWF-I? The TRUTH! 23 March 1989*

*Numerous meetings with Barclay, one or two with Pope. The NPWS Director Chipungu is now apparently down in the Luangwa. I produced a paper, The way forward or, What way forward? I suggested we go to Kafue or somewhere else, including onto private land, but allowing the application to LIRDPA to take its slow way forward. Also attended a meeting of the game ranching committee at the invitation of Barclay. The chairman said that they knew of nobody in Zambia who had experience of capture and translocation! The mind boggles. Barclay pointed out my experience (who did they think would capture the rhino?). Came back home and wrote out my c.v. Barclay is printing and sending out. Envy abounds in the conservation game.*

*29 March 1989*

*Saw Chipungu who said the project was on. He had met with Bell and Lungu who informed him that the LIRDPA Technical Committee had approved the project. However, we are to keep our hands off the Chendeni rhino population and two other populations, as yet unnamed. Does not leave much for us to protect. Also, said Bell was not happy with our proposed sanctuary on the Katete. Volte-face, again. Saw Gilson Kaweche (Chief Wildlife Research Officer at NPWS) who had been a technical assistant when I was in charge of the cropping. We will meet on Friday to work out a strategy. Saw Barclay. Require letter of authority from Chipungu.*

5 April 1989

*Down to Luangwa with family. Saw Lungu and Bell briefly.*

6 April 1989

*Get family settled into my friend Bill Astle's house – our base while he is on leave.*

7 April 1989

*My man, Jones, phoned to say that he had been unable to obtain a letter from the Director giving the go-ahead; that he had been referred to Chilanga and told to collect the letter later. When he returned, they refused to give it to him.*

9 April 1989

*Rick Cleveland and Tom Fortune came to see me at Bill's house at Mfuwe Lagoon just as malaria set in. Gave them my forthright opinion: rhino being taken out with the approval of the people, that the poachers were respected villagers in the Munyamadzi Corridor, that the NPWS had failed to produce policy, that conservation politics did a great deal of damage ... and so on. Very ill...talk of medi-evac. Temperature eventually drops after miraculous intervention by Charl Beukes with the right drugs. Undoubtedly saved my life.*

10 April 1989

*Recovering. Jones further delayed. Most annoying. I need to get status information from the Ranger Mfuwe. If letter from the Chipungu has come then I can go ahead. Six elephant near Luangwa Wafwa killed by gang. Guards ran out of ammo. Vindicates my views on the idiocy of present situation. Chendeni rhino will go – just a matter of time.*

11 April 1989

*Recovering from malaria. Evans, the Game Ranger, and Godfrey (biologist for LIRDP) came to see me as a result of my phone call. He has not seen the minutes of the Technical Committee or any letter of recent vintage authorizing the project. He showed me a letter of 28 February copied to the executive committee, plus letter in reply from Chimbale saying I had no work plan. I was most forthright with Evans, stating in plain terms my disgust at the state of affairs. Suggested he get an all clear from Lungu.*

12 April 1989

*Collected Rick Cleveland and went to cropping at Kakumbi. Saw Evans who said he had seen Lungu and all was well regarding co-operation. However, guards and information could only be produced on Friday as LIRDP and NORAD hierarchy were down at Mfuwe. Further delays. It will not end. Dropped Bill Astle's chaps - Ria, Mannie, Dave, Rick - off for a recce on the Mushilashi, south of the road. Patrols are out to the north looking for poachers but with only a few rounds of ammo each. Jones arrived in evening from Lusaka with swollen face and missing front tooth, the result of being ambushed by three men with AK's the previous night near Katete. They stole my orange juice, bread and other groceries brought from Lusaka. He was saved by the arrival of a National Service lorry.*

13 April 1989

*UK TV presenter Roger Cook and soundman came round (The Cook Report) gathering material for a program on the ivory trade. I answered two questions live: one,*

*the basis of the elephant problem was sociological, not commercial; two, elephant continued to be killed despite what people were saying. Evans phoned to say the guards were ready. Saw him later in uniform and he saluted me (things may be looking up). Sent Jones off to buy mielie-meal and kapenta after briefing the patrol leader. Will have ten guards – including Rice, plus ten carriers, twenty in all. Are we now moving forward?*

*20 April 1989*

*Came back to Lusaka in one of two chartered Barons (funded by the Wildlife Revolving Fund) with only a couple of passengers in each. Saw Dale Lewis who supports capturing remnant rhino - other than the Chendeni population (he estimates 20 there). I warned him again that the Chendeni population's survival was his responsibility. Saw Chipungu who had little to say. A letter from Hanks (WWF-I) is very supportive. He and Prince Bernhard arrive on 19 May for meeting with the government and me. Project just might go ahead – meeting on 26 will confirm or deny this. My paper on game ranching read to the game ranching seminar.*

*26 April 1989*

*Project Rhino Committee meeting. Barclay hammered Director Chipungu on failure to deliver the letter I had requested. Chipungu said he had written two letters (on 1st and 4th April). Both were statements outlining NPWS's firm resolve to take action and control the situation.*

*27 April 1989*

*To Mazabuka with Bernard Bradley to persuade the Commonwealth Development Corporation to include wildlife as part of their investments. Also worked on Rory*



*MacDonald's plan. He is keen to have rhino as well. They wish me to come down for a field day. I suggested that I bring Kaweche and Jefferies.*

*28 April 1989*

*Out to Chilanga for meeting with Kaweche. He was in a meeting with Chipungu. Another Chilanga dead end.*

*2 May 1989*

*Worked out carrying capacity for CDC Mazabuka, a necessary exercise if rhino breeding units are to be put on private land. Provided letter to be sent to Jenkins and Dieter Rottcher in Nairobi on rhino. At work on status report (wrote Hanks a brief memo on subject).*

*4 May 1989*

*Meeting with Adam Pope on project plan outline. Had already prepared some materials. While it is necessary to have a plan to achieve reasonable levels of efficiency I seem to have been doing nothing else for 10 months and am heartily sick of it. He told me that he did not have time to put it into the form he considered best. Had the impression that his new grand position with a nationalized mining company has distanced him from what is required. Members of the Steering Committee, other than Barclay, do not do very much other than sit in meetings.*

*5 May 1989*

*Working on the project plan, I came on a proforma invoice for radios dated March 1988 which shows that long before the official project start I had been working towards saving the old chipembere (rhino) – at my own expense. Had sent vehicle to town on Friday to repair track rods and to set wheel alignment. Letters off to Palmer Capchur Equipment Company in the USA (I collected darts from*

*Faddy).*

*8 May 1989*

*Out to see Barclay. He was away. Over to Chilanga. Kaweche in Luangwa for meeting with President Kaunda. Saw Chipungu. Gave him my MOU draft. He said that drawing one up was very complicated and asked me if I had seen a government MOU. "No!" I replied, and should have added, "Why did you then not ask me to do it?" I inquired about the fencing pro forma. When I left, his secretary came out to tell me that I would have to come back on Wednesday, as he wanted to write a covering minute! God help us...so it goes on. Saw Mwale, the Chief Ranger, who came gleefully over to tell me that he and Nkonga had caught poachers newly arrived from Zimbabwe with rhino horn. They had confiscated three automatic weapons. A sop for the muzungu, I thought. Passed on information on confiscated carvings at Heathrow and on the lawyer in Zambia who had got the shipment legalized. Unless there is a substantial revolutionary change in the attitude of the government there will be no rhino or elephant left – perhaps only a few fleet-footed elephant.*

*10 May 1989*

*Had lunch with David Lloyd to discuss Kasanka National Park public-private partnership strategy. In afternoon at Pamodzi Hotel for discussion with gemstone dealer who gave general information on non-ivory middlemen. Mike Rowbottom arrived – once manager of Zambia Safaris - invited me to go down to Zim to see game department and ranchers.*

*13 May 1989*

*To Mazabuka with Richard Jefferies, Mike Faddy and Bernard Bradley*

*15 May 1989*

*To Chilanga to see Kaweche. Said he could not go to Mazabuka as it was necessary for him to farm on his off days?*

*16 May 1989*

*To Ministry of Tourism HQ. Chabwela would not see me, only wanted to see Lloyd. Also bumped into Chipungu whom David Lloyd and I have named 'The Clockwork Owl' for his curious shuffling manner and quizzical look. Kaweche and Ackim Mwenya not pleased to see me.*

*17 May 1989*

*Finally received Chipungu's letter, dated 6 April. Got up at 2.00 a.m. to pen three- page letter answering his charge that I was responsible for delays in the project. Sent it off with Jones. Later, Barclay said I should not have written it. My popularity is now clearly a myth. But am not prepared to accept accusations pulled out of a hat. They forget who motivated the project and funded the project start.*

*18 May 1989*

*Met Hanks off Prince Bernhard's plane. PB met by members of the Central Committee. Hanks climbed into PB's car in the front with the chauffeur, the MCC looking somewhat disconsolate in the back with PB.*

*19 May 1989*

*To reception at Dutch Embassy. Spoke to PB alone. He mentioned an incident while in Zimbabwe on the Zambezi when three AK47s armed poachers shook their weapons at him from the Zambian side. Also mentioned how sorry he*

*was that KK had to pay a fortune for electricity. NPWS people most unfriendly – I am now persona-non-grata. Made my opinions clear to Chabwela and the minister.*

*25 May 1989*

*Attended wildlife society annual executive meeting – was not invited to address them. Faddy took on role of 'the most qualified to do so' and spoke very little of Project Rhino. Clear from my reception at meeting that I am in poor standing with them. Bill Astle off by road to Luangwa.*

*26 May 1989*

*Saw Minister with David Lloyd. Minister started telling us about 'this rhino project' in the Luangwa. Ye Gods! Collected proforma for fencing after some difficulty. A total mess. A proforma from October 1988, requesting funds amounting to K455, 000, was now showing K180, 000. The Clockwork Owl showed no interest in speaking to me, or to Lloyd. We called on Kaweche who was with Mwenya at the time. The latter did not greet or look at me. Handed letter to Kaweche re need for NPWS to state what arrangements they were to make on security.*

*Called on Faddy to sign K25,000 cheque for payment of labourers (building bomas). He balked, saying that at a meeting of the Society strong protests were made about spending any more money on the project. Went to Barclay – he very flustered; said he was under fire from his members and that they had put a freeze on the money. I had previously pointed out to Faddy that the money was under the control of the steering committee and not the society. Barclay called for an urgent meeting. I told him that I had attempted to call one but Chipungu had said*

*he could only do this once the new MOU was drawn up. The Society/Barclay situation difficult to understand in light of PB's visit. Also, my not being invited to address them and their failure to communicate to me that they had frozen the project funding showed their unwillingness to do anything about the rhino. Very hard to understand. Barclay said they were very unhappy with the NPWS performance. Have cancelled my departure to Mfuwe on Friday.*

*27 May*

*Off to Chilanga. Kaweche and Chipungu not there. Left note regarding the necessity for a meeting. NPWS it is clear just do not have the leadership, vision or interest to address the problems of saving the rhino, or of wildlife conservation in general.*

*29 May*

*Called in on Barclay. He very agitated and would not let me get a word in. He said he had just spoken to Chipungu, had told him he did not agree with my letter, and that they (presumably the Project Rhino steering committee) supported NPWS. I said that I reserved the right to defend myself from unfair attack. I pointed out that the society had no right to cut off funds they had already committed. I added that it was impolite not to have informed me of such a unilateral action and that I already had people working in the field. We agreed at the end that at the steering committee meeting set for Tuesday sixth we should forget about the past and get on with the future problem – saving the rhino. Saw Faddy who had a message for me from Astle. The Warden Mfuwe, Chimbale, had informed him that I could not cut poles without the permission of*

*the director and that I should consult him regarding the sanctuary site, as he was unhappy with it. This despite Chipungu's letter, copied to him, in which I was instructed to make the final decision on the site. It is an endless disgraceful merry-go-round. Printed out status report and copies of report to WWF. Posted to WWF and gave others to Chabwela's secretary for onward transmission. Worked on report and the work plan with a lot of time being taken up by family health problems: children ill with malaria; Cathlin very ill with malaria and pneumonia. She came very close.*

*6 June 1989*

*Attended seventh steering committee meeting. Kaweche not there. No reason given. Miller and Irwin excused themselves after one and a half hours. Pope, O'Riordon not there. O'Donnell there for the first time (he is no longer MD of the Wildlife Trust so one wonders why he is there at all). A disgraceful meeting. Clearly, the guns were out for me, instead of the NPWS being taken to task for not coming up with the necessary support. There was no discussion of the lamentable Society and steering committee performance. This was especially deplorable, as both Barclay and Faddy had told me privately of the need to obtain concrete assurances from NPWS before the project could be given further financial support. This issue was sidestepped. Barclay denied having said that he was dissatisfied with the NPWS commitment. Faddy did not own up to his conversation with me regarding the need to have NPWS come up with guarantees on the scouts that had prompted my letter of 22 May. Faddy also attacked me for not having gone to the Luangwa to sort out pole*

*problems with the Warden. I will be penning him a letter laying out the reasons why. Suffice to say I have good reason and clearly Faddy could have asked me afterwards – instead, he saw an opening and went for the jugular. O'Donnell weighed in with the accusation that I had failed to provide regular accounting of funds. I pointed out that I had provided the accounts at the previous meeting and that much of the expenditure had come out of my own pocket. I said that Barclay, as a wildlife trust representative could have passed this on, and had he done so, I would have produced more information. He said they had cut off funds, as there was no progress. I replied this act was not only discourteous but ran counter to their decision to give the project the funds.*

*In response to my progress report, Chipungu and O'Donnell criticized it for the lack of Luangwa detail. I replied that we had no progress to report. That we had been blocked at every turn, as they well knew. I will have to provide an analysis of just why the project has made no progress, for the members clearly don't know or don't want to have it brought out. Meeting redolent of Kafka's, *The Trial*. Received no support from any quarter. Dishonest, cowardly, hypocritical behaviour of people with a vested interest in having good relations with the government - and at any price. I will have no more dealings with them on an official basis. Am seriously considering withdrawing. Chabwela keeps his head down beneath the trench parapet. Meeting decided to convene again on Tuesday next. All is totally unsatisfactory.*

*13 June*

*Nursing sick family and working on the project assess-*

*ment and discussing with Cathlin about 'going on' with the project. Meeting cancelled with steering committee. Chipungu and Kaweche did not pitch up. Barclay, Faddy, Miller, Pope there, Barclay now waxing strongly anti-NPWS once again. Faddy supported me in the view that the project leader should not have to try and get the committee established. All disgruntled.*

*14 June*

*Out to Chilanga. Chipungu made feeble excuse about some appointment and that he had sent a message cancelling meeting. Said Kaweche had probably not been notified. Pathetic. Set meeting for following day.*

*15 June*

*Meet Chipungu and Kaweche, present terms of reference. He drops a bombshell, announcing management changes. Welcome to the birth of the Project Advisor – me! Project leader to be appointed soon. That will usher in the man to 'push over the top' – very welcome. Barclay rapturous – somehow prevented himself from embracing the Clockwork Owl (my name for Chipungu) and Kaweche. Told The Owl and Kaweche that I would be going to SA for a few days while they sorted the project out.*

*26 June*

*Over to see Kaweche. Not there. His deputy Mwinyinyembe seems equally nonplussed at his continued absence and lack of interest, citing the fact that he still has not been given his terms of reference. Saw Chipungu. Informed me that he still had not chosen the project leader, giving as his excuse that he had been on standby at Mfuwe for Kaunda. And so it goes on. We agree to meet at 0900*



*hrs on Friday.*

*30 June 1989*

*Arrive at Chipungu's office for the appointment. I wait there until 1045 hrs. Entering, I ask him if he is ready for me. "Not really," he replies. He had no idea if Kaweche was in Chilanga, forgetting that the three of us had agreed to meet. I asked where the project leader was. No reply. I followed this with the following points: the cutting off of funds was unlawful; the Society (Barclay) had effectively hijacked the committee; the decision not to allow rhino to be caught until the fence was up was nonsense, and the Warden Mfuwe was uncooperative. The Owl came back with the following: he had applied to the Ministry for permission to appoint a project leader; I was still responsible for building etc. I was not to deal with LIRD direct – only through the Warden Mfuwe; and I should go down with Kaweche.*

*Met Kaweche and we agreed to go down to the Luangwa together in a week on a government flight. Flight did not materialize – Kaweche failed to organize it - and later in the week I left a message with Bill Astle in Chipata that I was unable to get a seat on the plane. The project Landrover is still in a workshop for replacement of timing belt and torsion bar repairs.*

*3 July*

*While awaiting confirmation of trip to Luangwa with Kaweche, David Lloyd and I saw the ADMARK consultant regarding investment for the Kasanka National Park. Meetings set up with USAID and the newly arrived consulting group.*

*4 July*

*Met with Alan de...of USAID. He gave us a long and pompous lecture. We pointed out the avenues they should take to support conservation.*

*5 July*

*Met with group of consultants contracted by USAID to assess regional possibilities. Dealt at length with issues. Kasanka explained. Good contact in one member, Otto, and an old acquaintance from Botswana days, Bob Hitchcock, an anthropologist.*

*6 July*

*Met with Chargés d' Affaires in the US Embassy and Alan de ... Had a forthright discussion. Out to Chilanga to see Kaweche on appointment. Not there, and no note left for me.*

*7 July*

*Phoned Bill Astle in Mfuwe who told me that Kaweche had been there earlier in the week and had asked him where I was? So it goes on, an endless dysfunctional charade. Down with malaria.*

*11 July*

*David Lloyd took a note out for me to Kaweche. Not there – surprise. Received message from Hanks to see him with Lloyd. Hanks read my progress report and commented that he appreciated its honesty and went on to say he had seen the Director, Chipungu, that morning and had told him that WWF-I was not happy with progress and was therefore withdrawing support. He was now informing me! He added that Barclay had been in at 0600 hrs and that he had told him of the WWF decision; that he had reports from Faddy and Barclay; that Bell had said I had not notified him of the project. I said that I*

*would provide a full report for WWF-I and would like some feedback as I was not prepared to be the scapegoat for the failure. Left with mixed feelings of relief and great sadness.*

*12 July 1989*

*Phoned Chipungu. Asked him if, as a result of the WWF-I decision, he would be calling a steering committee meeting. Long silence, the quizzical reply, "No! No! No! I don't think it's necessary!" Project closed. No mention of the rhino.*

*13 July*

*Saw Faddy who said Hanks had popped in briefly to say WWF-I was withdrawing but would provide 'capture expertise' when and if required. Also said that Hanks had mentioned that Project Rhino was the only one of their 150 projects to fail and that the Bangweulu Wetlands Project was doing very well – this not being my information, given that it is my old patch and I had returned there on a visit (the project ran from 1986-1988). Chabwela as Deputy Director NPWS was Project Leader Zambia Wetland Project, Conservation and Management of Bangweulu Basin and Kafue Flats, WWF/GRZ Program; Jefferies ran Bangweulu. To his credit Faddy said that the reason for this was that the wetlands project had been established and accepted, whereas Project Rhino had not. I inquired about payment (cheque) for Adri Motors for work on the Landrover. Said he had phoned Barclay who had replied that he would speak to Hanks about it. I said that I was still funding the project and could get Irwin to sign. Told him about the drugs ordered. Suggested I contact the NPWS. Will have to speak to Interchem.*

26 July

*Vehicle returns with katundu (personal effects) and mail. Send off to change money (old for new as the government is withdrawing the old currency – long queues in town. Imagine, the villagers far from town and their soon-to-be-useless money). Note from Astle gives impression that people in Luangwa are overjoyed at my being 'kicked off the bridge'. What really transpired at the meeting 'twix Hanks and Chipungu?*

October 1989

*Have not contacted anyone from the rhino committee since July. CITES Conference at Lausanne. Zambia stands with SADC countries against ban on ivory sales on basis that their elephant stocks are being looked after - cynicism at its worst. The Wildlife Revolving Fund of NPWS has just registered a hunting-safari company - clearly a scam. Professional Hunters' Association no longer supported by the NPWS and plays no part in the selection of professional hunters. No follow up to workshop. District Governor Copperbelt found in Mulobezi GMA with Swiss hunting clients, large ivory – hunting on his licence. A couple of years ago Chomba, ex-Chief Ranger, also found with clients. Common occurrence. Corruption of gun laws: people hunting on someone else's behalf. Elephant being shot all over: small ones, young, the repeat of the 1870 killing fields. Snares strung about every waterhole - a lioness with her lower jaw wired to her chest, trying to drink. Hyena snared. Meat-hunters everywhere.*



The ghost

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## II

# NEOLIBERAL INVASIONS

## The Resource Curse

*free-market dogma - NAFTA and the Zapatista rebellion - economic disconnect - the urban Malthusian trap - population increase - fifth national development plan - debt crisis and neoliberal disaster (1993+) - Chiluba state of emergency - mines privatization - proletariat to working poor - mining royalty debacle - Chiluba grand theft - Banda mining mismanagement - Glencore mafia - EITI: Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative limitations - 2008 financial bust - ten-year \$8.8 billion loss - ZDA: Zambia Development Act assessment - blog: overview of Zambia's investment climate - a small business nightmare in Zambia - rating of doing business - Zambia for the Zambians - MIGA: Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency - BAA: Business Action for Africa farce - CEEA: Citizens' Economic Empowerment Act - blog: notes of a foreign investor - dysfunction and dishonesty - investors on their own - Article 296*

*This I know, I had rather have God for my banker than all the Rothschilds.*

*Charles H. Spurgeon* – Morning and Evening

*Perpetual growth is the creed of the cancer cell.*

*Paul Ehrlich*

\* \* \*

Since Adam Smith's time in the eighteenth century, most economists have overwhelmingly held to a very rigid free-market position. But there is now a clamour of dissenting voices. Major opposition to neoliberal free-market policies first took place in Mexico in 1994 due to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on the native Chiapas people, rising against their government in what became known as the Zapatista Rebellion. The basis of much of this was the Mexican government's repeal of the rights customary residents had long held to their commons, the *ejido*, to allow agribusinesses to be established on their land.[i] In 2018, this threat remains, NAFTA giving corporations the power to challenge the laws and regulations of sovereign governments.

The Zapatistas reveal two inescapable facts: 1) power is not something to be concentrated at government level, merely changing hands between political elites at every election, but something to be devolved to the community level, and 2) that it is foolish to trust government to hand down power of its own volition, requiring people of the customary commons to rise united and empower themselves.[ii] However, it was at the first meeting of the World Trade Organization in Seattle in November 1999 that the phenomenon of anti-globalization emerged, followed in 2000 by the demonstrations at the World



Economic Forum meeting in Davos, a movement protesting that the rich were getting richer and the poor, poorer.

The evidence suggests that the past thirty years and more of IMF and World Bank interventions have exacerbated rather than ameliorated Zambia's debt crisis. Ironically, in return for debt relief, Zambia is required to continue borrowing. Two financial commentators observed that 'It is not acceptable that these institutions effectively control policy-making in countries like Zambia. Policies need to be developed which are genuinely homegrown alternatives that put the Zambian people, especially the poor.[iii]

In 2006 problems of fuel supplies, the exchange rate mechanism - the dollar losing 30% of its value - the inflation rate and the vagaries of the budget (not least the fact that oil reached and surpassed \$100 a barrel), meant continued difficulties for the tourism industry and agriculture in particular. In 2008, without consultation with the tourism industry, the government increased tourism visa fees by 100%. It sought to have hunting-safari operators pay in advance for 100% of the game quota (non-refundable), even though the quota offtake since 2001 had not exceeded 45%.

While there is a continued agitation for investment in agriculture, the reality is that for a long time, the powerful lobby for hybrid maize seed, nitrogenous fertilizers (more than 50% running off the land) and herbicides are extremely damaging to the environment and create a continual state of crisis and dependency among villagers regarding seed and fertilizer availability, maize collection, marketing and credit - the country paying lip service to conservation agriculture, and neglecting the use of age-old techniques using non-hybrid seeds, a major factor in the continuing impoverishment of both the land and

the villagers. The 2008-2009 season saw the most dramatic rise in prices in the country's history, with compound fertilizer prices increasing from K3.3 million per tonne to K8.8 million per tonne, and diesel prices almost doubling from K4,860 per litre the previous year to K8,500 at the time of ploughing and planting the maize crop. To this has been now added the GMO and glyphosate assault. In the 2016/17 season, 3.6 metric tons of maize was harvested, a quarter securely stored, the rest left to rot.

The World Bank has acknowledged that for every percentage point increase in a country's extractive-resource dependency, the potential GDP declines by 9% (as against the real GDP recorded).[iv] Significantly, Zambia in 2010 had the second-highest combined resource dependence and the lowest capital accumulation in all countries in Africa.[v] A major assessment of the state of the environment and existing policy, legislation and conventions carried out by the Policy Development Secretariat confirmed that 'It has become widely recognized that Zambia's wealth of natural and cultural resources are in danger of further widespread depletion and degradation, sometimes irreversibly as in the case of misuse of some soils'.[vi]

In Mexico, as a follow-on to the Zapatista rebellion in 1994, the Permanent Peoples' Tribunal (PPT) met, concluding that:[vii]

*The imposition of an intensive agroindustrial model – which includes transgenics as one of its most extreme elements – not only constitutes an attack against a culture, but also a veritable war against subsistence, spearheaded via the confection of laws to prevent the defence of peasant*

*agriculture and independent food production.*

A fact not often mentioned in Zambia is that the depletion and degradation of the environment are due to Zambia falling increasingly into the Malthusian Trap in urban areas. While people in the slums, in defiance of Malthus, actually benefit from the critical mass market found there, they also represent a massive market for plundered rural natural resources. In the last hundred years, Zambia's population has increased to 18 million (10 million in 2000), with perhaps half of the population now urbanized and rural populations expected to supply food, charcoal, bushmeat and timber for the town consumers. One report gives Zambia's population increasing at a rate of 3%, with projections of 44.5 million by 2050 – three times the present number in a mere 35 years. The overall life expectancy is somewhere between 33 and 48 years. The world population, presently 7 billion, will, if nothing is done to help women, increase to 24 billion by 2150.

Although Zambia introduced a national population policy in 1989, it was only in 2005, after considerable vetting, that it was made official. Population issues were not fed into the poverty reduction strategy paper of 2002-2004, nor into the Transitional National Development Plan of 2002-2005. The Fifth and Sixth National Development Plans made weak attempts to deal with the issue. Zambia's population density since self-government has gone from about 5/km<sup>2</sup> to 13.5/km<sup>2</sup> with considerable variation across the country. The available labour force in 2010 was in the order of seven million, indicating a rise of 15% over five years. By 2015 it is projected that there will be more than a million Aids orphans.

The Fifth National Development Plan revealed that the gov-

ernment's vision in population and development was 'improved quality of life through the achievement of population trends that are commensurate with Zambia's socio-economic development'. It then listed the objectives as being: the reduction of high levels of procreation, particularly amongst adolescents; the expansion and maintenance of the nation's population database; the promotion of an even spatial distribution - especially between urban and rural areas; and the improvement of the sexual and reproductive health status of the population. But the strategies they gave for achieving these vague goals were derisory. The Sixth National Development Plan is equally threadbare.

In 1993 the debt crisis led to the creation of the much-vaunted Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) that imposed stringent conditions by the IMF on Zambia, resulting in the privatization of public utilities, removal of subsidies, deregulation of its markets and general trade liberalization, investment deregulation, retrenchment of civil servants, public sector wage cuts and freezes, and reduced state intervention in the agricultural sector. By any measure, these policies were a massive failure: the textile manufacturing industry declining from 140 manufacturing firms in 1991 to eight by 2002; and the agricultural industry regressed - in part due to the removal of subsidies; many companies collapsed, jobs were lost, and welfare programs originally performed through a parastatal were not continued by private companies; spending on the rural poor dried up; the trade deficit increased, and employment before the mining surge was still at the same level as it was under protectorate rule before 1964. The core IMF and WB policies agreed to by Zambia - trade liberalization, agricultural liberalization and privatization - are some of the major causes

of its woeful economic and social performance.

Embedded liberalism, that political-economic organization of the vibrant post-war period, was dead, replaced by the neoliberalism that had swept through much of the world. As Harvey remarked in 2005:[viii]

*The capitalist world stumbled towards neoliberalisation as the answer through a series of gyrations and chaotic experiments that only converged as the new orthodoxy with the articulation of what became known as the 'Washington Consensus' in the 1990s.*

After the implementation of neoliberal policies in the late 1970s, as revealed by Bakija et al.: [ix]

*The percentage of all pre-tax income (excluding capital gains) in the United States that was received by the top 1% of income earners rose strikingly from 2.2% to 8.0% between 1981 and 2006'; and the impoverishment of the developed world's working class.*

By 2030 the 1% will hold 64% of the world's wealth.

The same process is ongoing in Zambia, with politicians and their patronage clients growing ever richer at the general population's expense.

## Privatization of mines

In Zambia's history, there occurred a dreadful congruence: the imposition of the free-market and trade liberalization and the privatization of the copper mines presided over by the MMD government and President Frederick Chiluba, the man who was to become a major criminal clothes-pony. Chiluba had in 1993 declared a state of emergency to deal with what he thought was a UNIP coup plot, arresting two of Kaunda's sons, Panji and Wezi, and a future president, Rupiah Banda, and taking away the UNIP leader's (Kebby Musokotwane) passport. Some of those detained were tortured. On May 25, Chiluba lifted the state of emergency, having dismissed potential MMD leaders, including Emmanuel Kasonde, the architect of his economic reforms, and his Minister of Education Arthur Wina, and demoting Roger Chongwe from Legal Affairs to Local Government.

The privatization of the copper mines between 1997 and 2000, ZCCM being broken down into smaller companies and sold to private investors, had grave negative effects, which, under secret development agreements that are immune from any future legislation for the period it takes to remove all the copper, allowed the shredded companies to be exempt from any responsibility for ZCCM's liabilities (pensions, taxes, environmental pollution etc.); removed state control over companies (advised by WB/IMF); allowed companies to ignore or circumvent health safety, labour, immigration and environmental regulations; allowed the massive casualization and conversion of the workers to a 'working poor' category – the workers unable to replace what ZCCM had provided and what the state could not provide (medical care, education,

electricity); removed secure housing; stopped local purchases; negated the necessity for any industrial or mining policy, and totally neglected the existing infrastructure. Little was left of the state's resources went to the WB/IMF as loan and debt service payments. As consultants brought in by Christian Aid, Fraser & Lungu explained:[x]

*Despite the Mines and Minerals Act specifying that mineral royalties should be set at 3% for those holding large-scale mining licences, the rate negotiated by most mining companies is 6% of the gross revenue of minerals produced in the mining areas. The agreements also allow companies to avoid paying a good deal of corporate tax by carrying forward losses for periods of between 15 and 20 years on a 'first-in, first-out' basis, meaning that losses made in year 1 of operations could be subtracted in subsequent years from taxable profits. The companies were also granted deductions of 100% of capital expenditure in the year in which it is incurred and were exempted from paying customs and excise duties or any other duty or import tax levied on machinery and equipment. This exemption was extended to other contracting firms importing machinery for mines development. The government undertook not to amend any of these tax regimes after the agreement was struck, for as much as 20 years.*

In 2007 the High Court in London found that Chiluba – under the Zamtrot conspiracy, organized the transfer of \$25 million to a London account, \$1.2 million then transferred to a

Swiss clothing shop, half of it spent on clothes, the remainder unaccounted for. Also, Chiluba transferred \$21 million for a supposed arms deal to Swiss and Belgian accounts.[xi]

In 2007 the Auditor-General's report on the Ministry of Finance and National Planning dealt with a severe financial scam affecting mining pollution. In April 2008, with copper prices at an all-time high, President Mwanawasa made a public show of increasing Zambia's revenue from mining, introducing a 25% windfall tax, a 3% mineral royalty and 30% corporate tax. This was never implemented. The commodity and financial crisis of 2008 that resulted in the closure of numerous mines elicited a predatory response from district councils and the government in seizing miners' plant, vehicles and equipment, as well as a call to cancel mining contracts and nationalize the mines. In an unpublished letter to the UK's *The Economist* on 27 August 2008, I commented:

*Sir – your piece on Zambia's recently departed President Mwanawasa is flat-earth news. Chiluba ushered him in as his successor in exchange for a go-slow on any future prosecutions, Chiluba yet to exchange his 500 shirts for a dicky-bird suit required for a sojourn in a horrendously overcrowded jail unfit for animals, let alone people. Zambia is a criminalized state, the anti-corruption drive a farce, the courts heavily politicized. The big mining investors came back to Zambia because commodity prices allow them to plunder Zambia's natural resources at peppercorn royalties, assuring the future pollution of national parks and rivers while a dysfunctional government looks the other way and trots out the fiction of a 6% GDP. The*



*last election was won for Mwanawasa and his MMD Party by the Chinese who bought the rural vote with truckloads of blankets, bicycles and trade goods (in Mumbwa organized by his wife, Maureen Mwanawasa), the MMD Party destroying ballot papers where necessary, and as a quid pro quo, being given open-access to the nation's natural resources. And what of benefits to the poor? Rural Zambia now shares the same average longevity rate at birth as Zimbabwe of 33-37 years, the second highest cervical cancer rate in the world, and there are no teachers or medicines for many villagers still witchbound and bereft of any support such as they once enjoyed under Indirect Rule. A reading of the Auditor-General's reports and Transparency International Zambia's booklet, Show me the money reveals how little has been done for the rural people, and how much the ruling MMD Party and civil servants plundered.*

The big man MMD government under the hapless Rupiah Banda (hand-picked by Mwanawasa as his successor-protector from Kaunda's dying United National Independence Party (UNIP)), lost \$2-3 billion dollars a year of income that should have been tax and shared earnings from mining, with a derisory royalty process and with no capacity to deal with mining's massively damaging environmental and social impacts. Banda also ignored mining operations' requirement to undergo an EIA pre-qualification by instructing that the Chinese could start mining at Ichimpe without one. And it is now known that most mines – assisted by corrupt officials - do not comply with the legal, environmental requirements for mining licences.[xii]

[xiii]

Glencore, known originally as Marc Rich & Co AG, was formed in 1974 on the back of credit default swaps – the toxic ‘derivative’ instruments that in 2008 brought our financial system to its knees. The founder was the fraudster Marc Rich, pardoned by the disgraced US President Bill Clinton as his last unethical act in office.

In May 2011, Glencore had its loans abruptly severed by the European Investment Bank for its Mopani Mines operation in Zambia because leaked audits found that a reported increase in operating costs could not be explained, that it had carried losses forward for 10 years and had not paid corporate tax, that there were serious inconsistencies in the production volumes declared, and that it was selling copper and cobalt at a lower price than the London Metal Exchange rate to its related company Glencore in Switzerland. All of this caused 50 EU MEPs to demand a moratorium on public financing for mining projects. The bank subsequently banned all loans to Glencore and its subsidiaries. Glencore International AG is headed by a South African, Ivan Glassenberg, the commodity trader whom French President Nicolas Sarkozy had in mind when addressing the G20 on 14 June 2011, referring to commodity speculators as the Mafia, saying they were responsible for spiralling food and energy prices, and all but naming Glencore by saying that a leading commodities trading concern had set a record for its initial public offering on the London Stock Exchange of \$60 billion. It is questionable whether Glencore has settled the tax question with the Zambian government. In October 2014, a crisis over VAT refunds emerged.

With such lamentable big man governance,[xiv] civil society now places its hopes for future reform in the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), perhaps mistakenly. Zambia

published its EITI report for 2008 that found unresolved discrepancies of \$66 million between what Zambia said mining companies had paid them and what they had received. Moreover, the pricing structure for Swiss copper - remarkably similar to Zambia's exported copper - was six times higher than the funds Zambia received, facilitating a potential loss of some \$11.4 billion. This is especially interesting when considering that Zambia's entire GDP for 2008 was \$14.3 billion. Thus, corking revenue leakage through EITI - off the mark by billions - is impossible because it does not focus on what multinationals ought to have paid, only what they have paid. It never investigates the means through which corporations were able to circumvent taxation.[xv] Ironically, much of the above occurred under the malign influence of a former trade-unionist, Frederick Chiluba, supposedly there to serve workers and the national interest but who reversed allegiance, imposing extremely unpopular structural adjustment programs on Zambia. Where structural adjustment was not agreed to, Zambia had to give the IMF 'policy undertakings', under the threat of losing international creditworthiness, inevitable without the IMF's stamp of approval.

In August 2017, CIVICUS - the global alliance of civil society organizations, reported on the violation of people's rights to 'organize, speak out and take action are being violated by 38 of the 51 members of EITI. Zambia and another 23 countries fall into the 'obstructed' category, 'where serious restrictions - including illegal surveillance, excessive force during protests and physical attacks on journalists - mean that citizens cannot effectively exercise civic freedoms to hold those in power to account.'[xvi]

The surge in mining brought about by high commodity

prices once more allowed Zambia to misplace its development priorities and fall deeper into the 'resource curse' trap, leading to considerable natural resource exploitation with very poor environmental safeguards in place and with a corrupt royalty negotiation process that has lost it a great deal of revenue. This renewed focus on mining has only enriched the elite who benefit from mining royalties and other pay-offs, with many rural people not only excluded from the kleptocratic patronage system but dispossessed of their land or poisoned by mining waste. Inevitably, given recessionary fears as a result of the US government's deregulatory support to financial speculators, global commodity prices plummeted in September 2008, leading to mine closures, massive retrenchment and the loss of government income, events redolent of the precipitous collapse initiated by the formation of a one-party state in December 1972 in what had been one of the fastest-growing economies in the world between 1920 and 1960, with a growth rate of 4% per annum until 1974.

In a report on illicit financial flows, the US-based group, Global Financial Integrity, revealed that between 2000 and 2010, Zambia lost \$8.8-billion in revenue, \$4.9-billion from trade mis-invoicing – most of it from operations, equivalent to half of Zambia's GDP. In 2011, 'Zambia's GDP was \$19.3-billion; its per capita GDP, \$1,413. The government collected a total of \$4.3-billion revenue'.<sup>[xvii]</sup> In April 2012, a video laid bare the copper mining plunder and environmental destruction.<sup>[xviii]</sup>

## Doing business in Zambia.

On 19 July 2007, [I addressed the Zambia Business Forum Conference in Lusaka](#) – one Zambian speaker from the Ministry of Tourism sitting with his back to me at the high table – my talk entitled, *An overview of the Zambian investment climate for tourism, conservation and rural development*:<sup>[xix]</sup>

*My experience of investing in the hunting-safari industry to support our overall objectives of biodiversity conservation and villager upliftment has been deeply unpleasant. Dealing as a partner in a Hunting Concession Agreement with the Zambia Wildlife Authority, the statutory body who hand out hunting and tourism concessions and who are mandated to conserve our wildlife and wild places, particularly the regime of the present Director-General's predecessor, has been one of the more unpleasant experiences of my life: a trail of corruption, deceit, incompetence, administrative bungling and neglect, endless and pernicious litigation, the failure to negotiate in good faith, the use of blackmail, a shocking disregard for the principles of wildlife management, and a complete neglect of the Community Resource Boards and the customary residents whom they should be serving. My past criticisms have now been vindicated and laid hideously bare by the Auditor-General's report on ZAWA published a few days ago. This brings me no great pleasure. Quite clearly, the Act requires some mechanism to protect an investor who has entered into such agreements with dysfunctional and*

*poorly managed parastatals.*

A married couple involved in tourism in Livingstone wrote to me after my talk to pass on their observations of being small investors in Zambia, 'We were investors in Zambia and, after hearing the then Minister of Home Affairs, Shikapwasha, and the District Administrator of Livingstone say (on separate occasions) in public meetings that they could 'kick out investors any time', we decided to cut our ties and leave the country. There were other reasons, e.g. the incessant changing of government rules and fees and the incompetent and often discriminatory implementation of them. In a nutshell, investing in Zambia just wasn't worth it'. Another European tourist operator described how his wife was jailed overnight in a crowded cell of woman and children in Livingstone for a minor infraction of her immigration status. In August 2007, Sven, a Danish citizen whose knowledge of the Zambezi below the Victoria Falls is legendary, a man appointed by the Livingstone 'river rats industry to be its safety officer with the job of marshalling the many rafts and canoes making the run down one of the finest stretches of white-water in the world, received notice from the Immigration Department informing him that his self-employed permit had not been renewed because *'his business is not viable.'* Sven left for Uganda, where other Livingstone river rats before him had gone. They welcome the Livingstone river *fundis* with open arms in Uganda, issuing them immediately with five-year renewable work permits.

A rating of doing business in 2015 in Zambia by the World Bank compared Zambia with 189 economies, giving it an overall ranking of 111/189, with registering property an abysmal 152/189.[xx] While the investor protection index of 82

out of 185 countries suggests that there is fair protection when compared with the Sub-Saharan Africa average of 115 out of 185, they did not take into account that once the political and executive establishment have decided to rid themselves of an investor, there is little that can be done about it, national and international protective measures offering scant protection for those without large financial resources. Moreover, the blurred boundaries between the executive and the judiciary result in decisions not favouring the alleged transgressor, with long delays being the order of the day. Justice, therefore, is denied. The judiciary also constrains the alleged transgressor from making public comments for fear of prejudicing the judicial proceedings; silence, therefore, is enforced.

Zambia in 2010 was positioned at 135 out of 181 countries for worker employment. The Minimum Wages and Conditions of Services Act ensure that students are not employed. Investors avoid employing older workers as terminal benefits for workers reaching 55 years of age ensure they must be paid three months wages for every year of service - provided they have worked for ten years – an unaffordable cost for most businesses, saved only by the low life expectancy of the average Zambian. In the case of our firm, Mbeza Safaris Limited, in respect of a worker who had been employed for two years, a benefit of a year's wages had to be paid to the widow on his HIV/Aids-related death – much of this claimed by predatory relatives under the traditional system. However, the law also impacts the worker who moves to another employer, who goes into business, whose employer goes out of business, for they may lose the entitlement. An additional impediment to progress is redundancy pay, set at two months pay for every year of service – this compared to, for instance, the South African standard

of one week for every completed year of service. In July 2012, the PF government issued SI No. 46, increasing the minimum wage by 67%, which immediately had the opposite effect on job creation. A commercial farmer whose family I had known for decades – a family farming enterprise since World War II-was mechanized and paid off 240 workers within a few months.

Alarming, the view of the business stakeholder group, The Zambia Business Forum, is that 'Zambia is for the Zambians' - as expressed by its Chairman Sherry Thole at a meeting, I attended in 2008; and that the pre-eminent legislation guiding their work is the Citizens' Economic Empowerment Act. Replying to her address, I pointed out that all growing countries required skilled and qualified immigrants and that what she was recommending was the 'kiss of death for Zambia.'[xxi] I found support for my comments from the venerable liberation activist, Simon Zukas, no relativist.



Zambia signed up for the Multilateral Investment Guarantee



Agency (MIGA) in 1988. MIGA, a member of the World Bank Group, supposedly provides guarantees against political risks regarding currency inconvertibility and transfer restriction, expropriation, war, terrorism and civil disturbance and non-honouring of financial obligations. It applies a comprehensive set of social and environmental performance standards, guidance on this being forthcoming from its sister organization, the International Finance Corporation. These address the following: social and environmental assessment and management; labour and working conditions; pollution prevention and abatement; community, health, safety and security land acquisition and involuntary resettlement; biodiversity conservation and sustainable natural resources management; indigenous peoples; and cultural heritage. For instance, Performance Standard 6 recognizes that protecting and conserving biodiversity is fundamental to sustainable development. Where a proposed project is located within a legally protected area, the client must, in theory alone, meet some requirements. Performance Standard 7 recognizes that indigenous peoples are often among the most marginalized and vulnerable population segments. They may play a role in sustainable development by promoting and managing activities and enterprises as partners. MIGA insures investments, but the performance standards are ignored.

However, the reality is that investors - most of them small to medium - do not rely on such august conventions for their protection. The multinational corporations also rely on a close relationship with their political elite and a battery of international lawyers using highly placed *compradors* or become corporate members of such organizations as the supposedly influential Commission for Africa's, Business Action for Africa,

an organization represented in Zambia for a time solely by our Mbeza Safaris – Business Action claiming falsely in a report to the G8 meeting in Germany that it was fighting corruption in Zambia.[xxii] And they did nothing whatsoever to come to Mbeza Safaris' aid when it was targeted by the government, even though Mbeza were carrying out the Commission's charter on anti-corruption. Furthermore, the Zambia International Business Advisory Council – affiliated with the Commonwealth Business Council – and in turn to Business Action, with its function to advise the presidency on investment, did not address complaints concerning the membership on the Business Advisory Council of the Chairman of the CEE Commission, the Commission being patently anti-investment. When, at its meeting in Livingstone in 2005, the Business Council Chairman criticized the Commission's lack of progress since its previous meeting, President Mwanawasa upbraided Commission Chairman Lord Simon Cairns for his temerity in levelling criticism. Since then, Cairns adopted a timid and conciliatory tone, saying that Zambia had 'great potential' and implemented many of the recommendations made during the previous meeting two years previously.

And to underline the problem that foreigners who invest in Zambia and commit any criminal act (except minor traffic offences) might face, under Section 33 of the Penal Code Cap 87 of the Laws of Zambia, they can be compulsory deported upon conviction. President Mwanawasa in September 2007 was assuring potential investors of conducive policies and protection for their investment while upholding the interests of local people. But Amnesty International reported that since his election, there was 'widespread harassment and intimidation of people perceived to be critical of the government', something

entirely glossed over in the praise for Mwanawasa for going after Chiluba.[xxiii] Mwanawasa single-handedly created the stealthy monster, the Citizen's Economic Empowerment Commission, brought into being by the CEE Act of 2006, an Act that has as its central tenet:[xxiv]

*To promote the economic empowerment of citizens, in particular, targeted citizens – defined as someone who is or has been marginalized or disadvantaged and whose access to economic resources and development capacity has been constrained due to various factors including race, sex, educational background, status and disability... and to give instructions to any state institution or a company, and is empowered to take whatever actions necessary to ensure broad-based economic empowerment of targeted citizens, citizen empowered companies, citizen influenced companies, citizen owned companies...the President has total control of the Commission whom he will appoint.*

Guided by what Edmund Burke had said long ago that 'Bad laws are the worst sort of tyranny', on 25 September 2007, I wrote the blog, *Notes of a foreign investor in Zambia*:[xxv]

*The recent appointment by the President of Zambia (Mwanawasa) of the members of a Commission which is answerable only to himself and whose mandate is*

*to promote by 'whatever actions are necessary' the economic empowerment of 'targeted citizens', i.e. black and indigenous Zambians, is both ominous and unsettling, particularly for us investors who can now look forward to some intensive predator-prey interactions as the Citizens Economic Empowerment Act No 9 of 2006 starts to have its merry way with us. The CEE Act makes no bones about the powers given to the President (appointing the members, directing it what to do) and to the Commission: giving instructions or directions to any state institution or a company, taking 'whatever actions necessary to ensure broad-based economic empowerment of targeted citizens, citizen empowered companies, citizen influenced companies and citizen-owned companies', making it abundantly clear just how an investor is viewed by the government on 24 September 2006.*

*As a foreign investor in rural development who is also a member of Business Action for Africa, what might be my objections to such legislation? Well, for a start, as a paid-up member of the Western Liberal Democratic Club – presumably the same one the government belongs to, this legislation closely resembles Lenin's decree for the establishment of the People's Commissariat of State Control in 1919, with Stalin as its first Commissar. This is legislation imported from the only country in Africa still with a communist party, South Africa. The go-between for the transfer of this racially based legislation is J.J. Sikazwe, a member of the Zambia International Advisory Council, senior policy advisor to BP, Chairman of the Tourism Council of Zambia, and coincidentally, Chairman*

*of the first black targeted citizen empowerment company in Zambia, Legacy Holdings Zambia, recently given a 75-year tourism lease by the Zambia Wildlife Authority to build two large hotels, an 18 hole golf course and 400 or so chalets in the tiny Musi-o-Tunya National Park at the Victoria Falls – a World Heritage Site. And despite the Vice-President laying a foundation stone, accompanied by an extraordinary and virulent attack on foreign tourism investors, no environmental impact assessment has yet been accepted by the authorities.*

Yet, in Mwanawasa's efforts to usher in such harmful legislation as a tool of patronage – the evidence being his appointment of Sikazwe as the first Commissioner and his tacit approval of Sikazwe's takeover of most of the Musi-o-Tunya National Park, the government cannot even provide legislation that will encourage 'targeted citizens' to enter the tourism business. The Tourism and Hospitality Bill when it was before the National Assembly, which, in the form I had studied and commented on would have ensured that villagers could not join the tourism industry easily, a raft of long-overdue statutory instruments about to appear on the Government Gazette editor's desk, ensuring this.[xxvi] These were regulations on prescribed fees, GMAs, hunting, national parks and game ranching, which their respective stakeholders never signed off. One of these stakeholders wrote to me as follows:

*"The alarming part of this is that we have been asking for a copy of this draft for over ten months. Many letters*

*have been written to ZAWA and phone calls made yet it has been impossible to get anything. It is clear that there are things in the SI that ZAWA does not want to be known until it is too late. I have established that the fees for “residents” to enter national parks are slated to go up substantially and it also looks like the reason the resident hunting quota for wetlands has not been sold is that these fees have gone up substantially also. What else is in it; who knows.”*

Mwanawasa resented my blog because the CEE Commission greatly added to his already considerable big man patronage powers. Nine months later, he had me strong-armed out of the country.

Mwanawasa did all he could to buttress his presidential powers, already considerable in that Zambian Presidents decide when parliament is called and just when they wish to address it: they can appoint eight MPs above the normal number and have the sole power to appoint and fire ministers; they have control of all financial legislation, they can release large numbers of criminals from jails on a whim, and they cannot be impeached without parliament first lifting their immunity from prosecution. With Chiluba, it all came to nothing, as it did with Banda; his immunity lifted in March 2013. Mwanawasa rejected the formation of a special constituent assembly to decide on the Constitutional Review Commission’s findings. In March 2003, he refused parliament’s request for state funding of political parties. And Sata shelved all matters constitutional. And it is too much to hope that the next government in 2016 will abolish Article 296, which vests all customary areas in the president.

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[ii] Kingsnorth, One No...p.20. 2004.

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[vii] "Structural Reforms, Free Trade Agreements and the War on Subsistence." *Grain.org*, 10 Feb. 2015. Web. 7 Mar. 2017. <<http://www.grain.org/article/entries/5130-structural-reforms-free-trade-agreements-and-the-war-on-subsistence>>.

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[ix] Bakija, Jon. "Jobs and Income Growth of Top Earners and the Causes of Changing Income Inequality: Evidence from U.S. Tax Return Data." *Web.williams.edu*. 17 Mar. 2009. Web. 11 Mar. 2017. <<http://Web.williams.edu/Economics/bakija/BakijaHeimJobsIncomeGrowthTopEarners.pdf>>.

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## Donors and BINGO's

*Kaunda loses election (1991) - LIRD fires Bell/Lungu (1993) - LIRD absorbed into NPWS (1995) - SLAMU absorbs LIRD (1995) - National Parks & Wildlife policy ignored (1998) - NPWS becomes ZAWA (1999) - NORAD continues with aid - SLAMU corruption gathers force - hippo cropping money stolen (2006) - my report on ZAWA to Veep - Chiluba hunting safari ban (2001-2002) - donors refuse funding for ZAWA - scouts unpaid - massive poaching and destruction - ZAWA oversee destruction of records (2003 - ) - WSSD failure (2002) - I showcase ICDP projects for investment at Nedbank invitation - Steiner of IUCN and Nedbank renege on agreements - I begin my Landsafe scheme for rural empowerment (2003-2010) - Zambia's constitution: Article 50 - no curbs on executive power - the corruption of the statutory instrument - contradictions of the Lands Act 1995 and the Wildlife Act 1998 - Mulonda points out the problem for Zambia - Neoliberal donor funded ICDP projects begin from 2000 - CONASA (2001-2004): Community-Based Natural Resource Management - sustainable agriculture - Sichifulo and Bilili.*

*Neither we, nor our bailiffs, shall take other men's timber for castles or other works of ours, without the agreement of the owner.*

*Magna Carta 1215: clause 31*

*Because Magna Carta attempted to set limits to political power without grounding these limits in the sovereignty of the people, it demonstrated a problem with which philosophers have grappled for even longer than 800 years. From where do the principles that constrain rulers come, if from neither the rulers nor their subjects?*

*Peter Singer – Magna Carta at 800 [i]*

\* \* \*

## LIRDP

With Kaunda removed from power in 1991, the Luangwa Integrated Development Project (LIRDP) began in 1986 with autonomous control of the South Luangwa National Park and the adjoining Lupande GMA, had its triumvirate of imperious rulers removed by 1993. During this period, LIRDP claimed that its law enforcement efforts were excellent. However, as I was to discover while there on the ground, this was a figment of their imagination, given knowledge now of the massive elephant poaching under the Singapore connection at the time, the extinction of the black rhino, and subsequent research

showing that poaching did not diminish.

In 1995 LIRDp was absorbed into the National Parks and Wildlife Service (NPWS) with Flywell Munyenymbe, its nominal Director until 2002. But the NPWS did little for LIRDp, dragging their feet on the hippo-culling plan (not on scientific grounds) and claiming park licence fees and lodge lease payments, and crucially, hunting-safari income. Brian Child was hired as a technical assistant and de facto head of the program from 1996 to 2003, establishing the community-based natural resource management program (CBNRM) and restructuring LIRDp into SLAMU in 1999, the latter relegated to being a Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) 'area management unit.' Residents were empowered to a degree by forming village action groups and area development committees. Still, the various line ministries grasped back the power they had lost, and CBNRM withered on the vine.

The NPWS under Director Ackim Mwenya (1992-1998) and Gilson Kaweche – his deputy until he became Director in 1999 – with Dale Lewis of Wildlife Conservation International (WCI) advisor, made SLAMU bow to the nation-wide ADMADE program, its hands securely on the money. While the NPWS was changing over to ZAWA in 1999, the same took place with the LIRDp to SLAMU transition, with minds concentrated by the knowledge that donor money was to cease in 2003. This resulted in plans to increase tourism, reduce staff and improve management systems, immediately running into resistance from the NPWS. From 1999-2002, NORAD agreed to continue with a grant donation of an average of half a million dollars a year – about the same income SLAMU received from tourism.

The conversion from NPWS to ZAWA was initially funded by the European Development Fund (EDF), and then by Nor-

way and Denmark, a succession of consultants brought in. The NPWS hierarchy was resentful of this decision, Director Mwenya informing one Danish consulting company representative who wished to employ me as project leader that candidate project leaders should be 'fresh', i.e. they should know little of the dysfunction and corruption of NPWS, and certainly should therefore not be former European employees of NPWS or its previous equivalent. The experienced consultants from Zimbabwe and Botswana were not made welcome, and the master development plan provided, ignored.

The formation of ZAWA, a statutory body and parastatal, was confirmed by the Wildlife Act No. 12 of 1998 Part II: 4. (1), subsuming the former NPWS that had been empowered under the Wildlife Act No.10 of 1991. This Act mandated that ZAWA and its Board, with the assistance of its proxy community resource boards (CRBs), enter into partnerships with villagers and 'share responsibilities of management in GMAs.' In Zambia, the Policy for National Parks and Wildlife, adopted in 1998, had recognized that customary people are the best custodians of natural resources. However, it is a policy, like much other legislation and policy, to which little attention is paid, all power being retained at the centre. An ex-ZAWA warden gave me his opinion of his former employer and its relationship with donors:

*For the time ZAWA remained a parastatal institution feeding from the cooking pots of the community, it remained a liability to conservation efforts in the country and beyond, rather than a prime mover of objective and sustainable natural resources management practices and innovations. It is a very shameful situation that the*

*donor agents continued to go to bed with ZAWA while deliberately failing to put enough conditions and ask for tangible and projected results of the use of their money.*

From 1998–2001 Deloitte and Touche were retained to establish ZAWA, but as there was no ZAWA Board in place, their work was delayed until 1999. In 2002, the South Luangwa Management Unit (SLAMU) applied to NORAD for funding to develop a further phase of the project, which would allow them to gain greater autonomy. Not surprisingly, ZAWA resisted this.

In January 1999, ZAWA had signed an agreement with NORAD to allow SLAMU to retain all revenues from tourism in the South Luangwa National Park and hunting-safaris in the Lupande GMA. SLAMU suffered major management problems, exposed in the Auditor General report on parastatals in 2005. In July 2004, it agreed - without any scientific justification - with L and L Properties for cropping 600 hippo over a period of three years in its area of jurisdiction. From this, ZAWA received K498 million in 2005, but as of December 2006, only K82 million had been remitted to SLAMU, leaving a balance of K415 million still owed. Also, both SLAMU and ZAWA Head office had been invoicing Chichele Lodge in the park. The lodge invoicing ZAWA HQ instead of SLAMU - as a result, records at SLAMU indicated that Chichele owed them a sum of K523 million (\$67,202). In contrast, the lodge's statement showed that they owed \$19,764 as of August 2006. As one seasoned Zambian commented in a letter to me:

*At the other extreme is the NORAD/LIRD/SLAMU*

*where millions of dollars have been thrown into the park and had created an overall negative impact on local culture, ownership and created more problems in the long term than they have solved. There are still no effective patrols in the park other than the private sector organized ones, no alternative income interventions in the poaching communities on the west bank (not that much in the east either if you take away the tourism industry) and critically, no local ownership nor partnership structures. In fact, there is more hostility between locals and their tour operators, and ZAWA, than anywhere else in Zambia.*

## Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA)

With the South African CITES Implementation Project that I headed coming to an end in 2001, I had flown *pro bono* to Zambia to see if I could help with their CITES implementation. Later I returned to the country again, and while there, the Vice-President of Zambia at the time, Enoch Kavindele, whom I had known from a period in 1984-5 when I had helped Peter Moss with the management of his lodges in the Luangwa, asked if I would report to him on the state of ZAWA. I then met with him a few times – on one occasion accompanied by John Hanks, the former WWF-I employee who had been an unenthusiastic player for a short time in efforts to save the Zambian black rhino from extinction, then working for the BINGO, Conservation International, his particular interest being to present to Kavindele the proposal for the Okavango/



Upper Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area (TFCA).  
My key recommendations to the Vice-President were:

*The immediate formation of a Zambian biodiversity alliance - representing the biodiversity community, the wildlife and tourism industry, customary area commoners, NGOs, researchers and other interested parties – dedicated to facilitating the following:*

- 1. The immediate establishment of a competent ZAWA.*
- 2. The provision of suitable management structures and monitoring.*
- 3. The facilitation of aid flows and feedback to donors.*
- 4. The provision of emergency funding to pay salary arrears.*
- 5. The provision of equipment and suitable transport.*
- 6. The immediate reinstatement of the hunting-safari industry, based on a set of responsibilities and obligations in return for security of tenure.*
- 7. Immediate scientific support in the provision of offtake quotas.*
- 8. The facilitation and monitoring of returns to customary area commoners and local authorities from sustained use of the biodiversity.*
- 9. The encouragement of protected area support groups through dedicated NGOs.*

The suspension by President Chiluba of hunting-safari leases and the subsequent loss of much of the ZAWA income (\$2 million in 2001; \$2.7 million in 2002) was a disaster for the country; the donors at the time refusing to provide funding because there

was no ZAWA Board and that the ZAWA leadership was corrupt – taking particular exception to the presence of Director Lewis Saiwana. Inevitably foreign exchange earnings, tax income, employment and associated benefits for ZAWA workers, and income for community resource boards responsible for appointing CRB scouts under the Wildlife Act of 1998 were adversely affected. This encouraged the onslaught on wildlife by opportunistic criminal bushmeat and ivory poaching gangs, aided by striking ZAWA and Community Resource Board (CRB) scouts. At Ngoma, headquarters of the Kafue National Park, staff vandalized buildings and stole the Ngoma lodge roofing sheets. As for ZAWA's scientific capacity, that had already been severely impaired, with most of the management plans, scientific reports and relevant files produced in the previous years stolen, not returned by borrowers, or thrown away. This I confirmed in 2003 when I inspected the government archives, revealing that few files had been deposited there after 1974, with the ZAWA library stripped, old files considered 'redundant' – as an officer informed me – and thrown out (in 1975 I discovered that the Mpika office had discarded their old files, and rescued some of them). Moreover, where valuable research information was available, such as at Ngoma, researchers decades later were in total ignorance of it.

Peter Moss sent me a note recording some of his experiences:

*The main incident I recall was actually at Chilanga, I suspect c.1991, when I saw one of the offices, perhaps in the second line of buildings behind the main offices, that house the "ecologists", which had a mound of files and other paperwork, piled as high as the window ledge*

*covering most of the floor. When I asked what was going on was told that they were being "cleared out". The other two incidents that come to mind was a visit to Mpika c. 1989 when I went to the Warden's office and asked him if he could direct me to the old Boma where I had worked 1957-1960. He looked embarrassed but finally agreed to show me the place where the building had stood since 1908? and had been removed from the face of the earth c. 1985; it had gone and even the foundation bricks had been removed. I asked him what had happened and he said the building was "too old" and the bricks were "needed for new constructions".*

*The other was at Ngoma quite recently, probably 2010, when I found that the Warden's office (the same one that Barry Shenton used), which was more or less at the back of the Warden's garden, between that and the Biologist's office now extended as the Ngoma Area Management Unit HQ, had been demolished. This again had been done because it was "too old" and there was SEED/WB money available to knock it down as part of the refurbishment of the Ngoma office and housing infrastructure! The old office used to have filing cabinets full of the old files and those I was told had been "transferred" to the newer building.*

## World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD)

On the closure of the CITES project, I became involved with the World Summit on Sustainable Development. WSSD was held in Johannesburg over 10 days in August and September 2002, carrying on from the Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit in 1992, and before that, from the World Commission on Environment and Development (the Brundtland Commission) in 1987, calling for us to 'fulfil the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.' This was in the hope of placating the rich consumptive north with its fears of the damaging survival strategies of southern subsistence peoples and their corrupt and undemocratic leadership, and to mobilize the 'haves,' the North, into doing something about their own pollution and the growing disparity between themselves and the poor south. The main theme of the WSSD was to foster sustainable development through the triumvirate supports of economic growth, social development and environmental protection.

A call for the alleviation of poverty had been made by various African government ministers at a Nairobi meeting held in October 2001 (African Preparatory Conference for the World Summit on Sustainable Development), saying that they would not dwell on the failure to implement Agenda 21, nor wish to renegotiate the outcomes, but that the WSSD 'should result in a concrete program of action with time-bound measures and well-specified sources of funding to implement them.' It affirmed that it was the New African Initiative that should be the framework for sustainable development in Africa and that the eradication of poverty meant the eradication of Northern

import restrictions, debt reduction and cancellation and a review of the conditionalities of the Bretton Woods institutions; plus the usual wish list involving sustainable development.

Under the heading human development, the acknowledgment was given to the fact that Africa was currently straining under the burden of communicable diseases that were disabling their economies, ascribing the reasons to poor environmental conditions, or in the case of HIV/AIDS, to a need to incorporate the disease in poverty reduction, sustainable development and economic growth strategies.

Taking the cue from the African Ministers' exhortation to provide a concrete program of action with time-bound measures and well-specified sources of funding to implement them, I embarked on a program of forming a coalition of African - mainly Southern African - environmental and biodiversity interests, tasked to provide programs which could contribute to sustainable development. In particular, I saw it as an opportunity to deliver conservation investment to Zambia. A menu of these projects, developed in a growing partnership with business, rural people and donors, and my associates, presented at the WSSD.

As highlighted by Bond, the summation of the WSSD - together with the hopes raised in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, was a massive failure to carry through with global environmental reform, Johannesburg merely signalling a defeat and a long campaign ahead against neoliberalism and an unsustainable future.[iii] The actions of the host nation, South Africa, which had only just thrown off the yoke of apartheid, and to whom the poor and marginalized looked for relief, sided with the Washington Consensus, privatizing its water, much of the Kruger National Park, and doing little for the plight of the

poor majority.[iv] With the US refusing to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and the Convention on Biodiversity – the two main Conventions emanating from Rio - and embarking on a war against the terrorism which had struck on 11 September 2001, it was clear that environmentalism was very low on the priority list, something the global south – due to neoliberal globalization – was caught in a worsening economic crisis over which they had no control.[v]

As part of this failure were my attempts to showcase integrated conservation and development projects (ICDP) from around Africa. This attempt resulted from the offer by Dr. Ivan May (d.2010) of Nedbank, who had sat on my CITES implementation committee, to have the free use of their new conference facilities in Sandton, Johannesburg, whatever conservation program I thought would add to WSSD. I then held a meeting with some organizations in Cape Town (including Nedbank's 'green' partner, WWF-SA) and received their support for holding a conservation investment facility.

After accepting May's offer, funds were then procured from the Nedbank Foundation. At this stage, I had only briefly been introduced through my black rhino project to the machinations of some big international NGOs of the greenwash sort (BIN-GOs); after all, I was a lone wildlifer always tilting at windmills. I soon realized that I had entered a world populated by a cast of men supposedly carrying the flag of conservation, but in reality, empire builders of scant integrity. Having agreed with me on how the funds were to be managed, Nedbank placed them under the control of WWF-SA and its director, Tony Frost, smarting that Nedbank had given us the conference facilities and not himself.

## Achim Steiner and IUCN

IUCN, who had decided not to participate in WSSD, suddenly had a change of mind. Their CEO, Achim Steiner, invited me to Geneva to discuss their possible support for the Conservation Investment Fair. In Geneva, it became clear that Steiner wanted some of the conference space for IUCN, showing no interest in participating in our little sideshow. Notwithstanding this, I then made two-thirds of the large facility available to IUCN at a very modest fee. Steiner agreed and was most grateful. But as I learnt later, he immediately instructed his similarly unprincipled South African representative, Saliem Fakir (later joining WWF-SA), to negotiate behind my back with Nedbank for the free use of the facilities. These negotiations were carried out with the Nedcor General Manager, Kevin Dunn, to take back control of the facilities and not to pay us the paltry \$20,000 fee Steiner and I had originally agreed to, even though the sum had been approved by our supervisory committee, the IUCN-SA EXCO Members Committee.

It was no surprise, therefore, years later when the Financial Times revealed in April 2006 that Achim Steiner, the incoming head of the United Nations Environment Program, was given his new job three months after he served on a jury that awarded a \$500,000 prize to Kofi Annan (d.2018), UN Secretary-General. Questions were asked of just how Steiner, a Brazilian-German, had been awarded the job, given that he replaced Klaus Toepfer – a German who had also sat on the prize jury. On principle, neither the incompetent Annan nor Steiner should have accepted their prize.

And to the investment fair, there came another BINGO,

Conservation International, introduced by John Hanks, with hints of assistance for us; but when its founder and Chief Executive, Peter Seligman, came to see me was as though Caesar had encountered a beggar. With a lift of his toga, head up, he carried on down his august path.

When I resisted the Steiner coup, WWF-SA/Nedbank (Frost and Dunn) withheld most of our funding. My friend, David Gleason - who knew the CEO of Nedbank at the time, Liebenberg, interceded on our behalf and managed to obtain a small part payment. Years later, Gleason took up the debt with the new Nedbank Chief Executive, Tom Boardman. Over lunch in his palatial office, Boardman promised to pay my associates and me what was owed. "Let's make a level playing field," he announced. This promise Boardman did not keep. When he retired, he joined the board of WWF-SA. And Frost, after departing WWF in 2007, now carries out 'ethics monitor surveys'.

## Moving back to Zambia

Returning to Zambia at the end of 2002, I began work on my Landsafe framework for the customary area, designed to shore up the customary and public commons. The lessons of the rhino burnt deep into my soul. I was encouraged by a significant observation put out in a Luangwa Integrated Rural Development Project (LIRDP) report by Dalal Clayton and Child on the first stage of shoring up the customary commons, one ignored to this day:[vi]



*Government should now take the bold but essential step of allocating the rights to use and benefit from wildlife in a given area outside National Parks to these people with established usufruct in the area. These people should then be viewed as shareholders of the resource and, as with any shareholders, should be entitled to the dividends from the proper management of their shared assets. This necessitates a second major policy decision – the decision to pay people in cash for their wildlife in the same way that they would be paid for in any other produce.*

## The Legal Tyranny of the Zambian Executive

Over six years, I developed a working hypothesis for Zambia, guided by the legal and policy framework's realities.

As Mulonda reminds us, with a wave of new donor projects in the wings and about to move onto the stage, the Constitution of Zambia is the guide to policy and legislation: Article 50 awarding responsibility for policy formulation to cabinet; Article 44 (3)(b) allowing the president to put forward laws for consideration to parliament; and Article 62 vesting legislative power in parliament, i.e. the president and the national assembly. Part IX, Article 112(i) deals with natural resources: "The state shall promote sustenance, development and public awareness of the need to manage the land, air and water resources in a balanced and suitable manner for the present and future generations.[vii]

In the mid-2000s, the Ministry of Tourism shared responsibility for natural resources with eleven ministries, backed by thirty-three sets of legislation and the notional twenty-one

international conventions to which it was a signatory. Under the Patriotic Front government, the number of ministries obscenely increased, with still wholly inadequate legislation and implementation mechanisms for customary area development. Moreover, the state remains essentially hostile to private sector investment in environmental and natural resource management, particularly if it deals - as it must - with questions of resource ownership on customary areas, the inequitable distribution of benefits, and state rent-seeking. The prospects, therefore for the improvement of livelihoods and sustainable development, will remain illusory in the absence of a fundamental change in how power is devolved.

The Executive retains near-total control of the policy and legislative process, ensuring that citizens have little say in the laws and policy that govern them. In March 2007, in my contribution to the Tourism Council of Zambia's brief to the National Assembly's Committee on Economic Affairs and Labour headed, *The adequacy of Zambia's legal and policy framework on investment*, I wrote that:[viii]

*In general, Zambia has had an adequate investment legislative framework. However, it is in the area of legislation delegated by parliament that is of considerable concern, something long overdue for revision. The compilation and drafting of statutory instruments and regulations - supposedly checked by the Ministry of Justice - which are peremptorily signed into law by Ministers without sight - or of the participation of civil society, create a tyranny of the law. This process is not helped by the fact that the Ministry of Justice does not even have in stock the*

*full list of SI's, nor are they available at the Government Printer, and many Bills remain unpublished. The law, therefore, remains a distant and intangible artifact to the common man, to the poor who are always with us. English common law and its equivalent, customary law, remains the law of daily use. Zambian statutory law remains therefore distant from those it is meant to serve.*

*The expression of the law is to provide the necessary framework for investors, both local and foreign, which may join together with the populace to attain at the very least, the Millennium Development Goals. The MDG should be inculcated into the legal fabric. Draft regulations have inflated ZAWA's powers at the expense of customary residents. Noteworthy were the powers by way of proposed regulations – backed by draconian punishments – assumed by ZAWA in that part of the customary area demarcated as game management area (GMA); in particular, in the matter of bush fires, further highlighting the contradictions of the Lands Act of 1995 and the Wildlife Act of 1998. The proposed regulations also withheld full ownership of wildlife on registered game ranches, requiring that game ranchers pay hunting licence fees for hunting their animals; and again in the GMA regulations, ZAWA – in the person of the Director General of the time, Hapenga Kabeta, being under the mistaken impression that GMAs were state land. The legal consultants to ZAWA took full notes during the workshop, yet subsequently, no workshop reports were issued, nor a workshop held to sign the regulations off.*

Mulonda has pointed out the stages in formulating policy, a horrifying indictment of the executive using the law to do what it wishes:[ix]

*Article 50 of the Constitution empowers Cabinet to advise the President, to formulate policy and to assign responsibility for policy to the executive, a highly centralised process; policy procedures are the function of an internal executive act, with no requirement for consultation with non-government stakeholders or civil society; those who formulate and evaluate policy are all state operatives. This process ensures that policy, which is not in the public interest, can be gerrymandered, resulting in both flawed legal instruments and legislation, and legislation biased against the disenfranchised, the poor and illiterate; there is virtually no information exchange between government and the governed, the procedures in place to arrive at statutory instruments, bills and the passage of legislation are screened from public view, and may rapidly pass into law unless newspapers happen to take an interest; once an issue or instrument has passed to cabinet, it is regarded as top secret, and no public debate or scrutiny is possible, unless authorized. Also, consultation is restricted to line ministries and scrutiny to the legal committee of cabinet. Article 44 (3) (b) of the Constitution gives the executive, through the president, power to initiate laws for consideration by the National Assembly. Legislation formulation is, therefore, an executive act.*

In the mid-2000s, some integrated conservation and develop-

ment (ICDP/CBNRM) projects under the ZAWA umbrella were mounted with a frankly neoliberal agenda, a far cry from the development script envisaged shortly before self-rule in 1962 under the provisions of the Natural Resources Act – a logical extension into a new era from that of Indirect Rule and the Native Authority Ordinance No. 9 of 1936.

## CONASA

CONASA (Community Based Natural Resources and Sustainable Agriculture) was the first project of note coinciding with the emergence of ZAWA. A USAID-funded project was mounted between 2001-2004 in the Bilili/Nkala, Sichifulo and Mulobezi GMAs in Southern Province. This was an \$8.5 million program intended to support rural livelihoods through agricultural production, small business development, policy and advocacy, and tourism-based natural resource management. Implemented by CARE International, the African Wildlife Foundation and the Wildlife Conservation Society of New York (WCS) - ADMADE funder, the mid-term review reported that two months after it began operating, CONASA was informed by USAID that its total budget had been reduced by \$2 million, the project from five to four years, and with one less GMA. However, the results framework and performance targets were not adjusted. Consequently, what was already an ambitious and possibly unrealistic set of goals for five years was compressed into four. The review also cast doubt on commercial hunting-safaris's ability to generate the revenue levels of the 1990s. Lyons commented that CONASA 'came to

an end when its donor decided to take a different approach to rural development, and the three NGOs that made up CONASA could not adapt to the new course nor find alternative funding.’ He claims the project itself was successful, with no money troused. However, the project came to an end and left the ever-present vacuum of unempowered villagers.[x]

Today there is little to see of CONASA’s efforts, other than a human rights problem. In Sichifulo, GMA residents were forcibly moved from the area by ZAWA and then allowed to return, but not with the blessing of Senior Chief Nyawa. The Bilili Springs GMA is now the most heavily populated in the country due to agricultural settlement schemes, with wildlife severely depleted. And the ADMADE/Lewis program within CONASA departed to Lundazi in Eastern Province under the COMACO banner. Also conceived by CONASA was the Natural Resources Consultative Forum (NRCF), now lapsed into a government-sanctioned consultancy group rather than an advocacy group as was intended – hence my resignation from its management committee and my removal of my *pro bono* assistance.[xi] It may, therefore, be classed as a USAID/ZAWA failure and let-down for GMA residents.

## COMACO

COMACO (Community Markets for Conservation) was founded by its Chief Executive Officer Dale Lewis (Wildlife Conservation International), to some extent a continuation of a notable program failure, ADMADE – in part directly responsible for the demise of the rhino within its care –

in particular for the Chendeni population for which Lewis had personally taken responsibility. The COMACO website explains that it parlays agricultural input loans, guaranteed prices and market access as incentives to poachers - and villagers in general - to enter into organic farming; and is a partnership between the CRBs, district councils and WCI. This is just what Lewis said in 1984 would be a threat to wildlife development.[xii] Another worrisome trend that will weaken the development potential of Luangwa's wildlife is the bias in international development aid toward agriculture, which is introducing more industrial farming. Undoubtedly, such methods will increase the rate of land clearing, soil depletion, insecticide use and hybrid and GMO seeds.

The COMACO model requires high finance with no guarantees of sustainability once the project drivers have moved on. COMACO works in some chiefdoms merely as a servicer and marketer of products. In June 2009, Norway (NORAD) agreed to give COMACO \$8 million for five years, accepting that further support for the program would be required for many years after that. And like ADMADE before, it does not protect the customary commons.

At a meeting with Lewis set up by Rolf Shenton in 2003 - I being exceedingly reluctant after Lewis's part in the final extinction of the black rhino - I explained why I felt the Landsafe framework for the empowerment of the customary commons was essential for Zambia's future. Lewis pretended to be won over. We then attended a development meeting together with government and other notables where I was allowed to introduce my framework. When I had finished, Lewis then went on the attack against Landsafe.

Critics of COMACO draw attention to the fact that Lewis

profits from a camp for visitors. The increase in villager income had led to an increase in the bushmeat trade, the many snares available for sale to COMACO indicative of this – apart from a percentage obviously manufactured for sale. However, one appraisal was positive in its findings.[xiii] COMACO, ever in tow with the WCI and the Co-operating Partners of Zambia (the main Zambian aid-donors), plan to promote cotton-growing the Mumbwa and Namwala areas next to the Kafue National Park. In 2010 this scheme was rejected by ZAWA on the basis that it would encourage more encroachment in game areas and that the accompanying charcoal production and game meat trade would increase the decline of GMAs and the park.

COMACO then engaged in the REDD+ scam:

*In 2015 we began working with The World Bank on Zambia's first large-scale Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) carbon project. Under a pilot initiative with nine chiefdoms, we set in place a monitoring system that determines how much CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are saved by avoided deforestation as a result of our Community Conservation Areas. Through a carbon offset scheme, communities are then paid for their conservation efforts. In the first monitoring period, 228,000 tonnes of CO<sub>2</sub> emission reductions were recorded, which paid out \$490,000 to the participating chiefdoms. The carbon revenue has been invested in community development projects, such as the drilling of new wells in regions with limited access to clean water, or the launch of additional incomes sources like community poultry farming and bee keeping.*

*We are currently working with 28 additional chiefdoms*



*to expand the carbon project to serve communities across the Luangwa Valley. Many of the target areas for the project expansion are important wildlife corridors that will connect fragmented forests and greatly aid in the effort to rebuild the Luangwa Valley's elephant population*

## SEED

The Support for Economic Expansion and Diversification (SEED) program (2004-2011) was a \$23 million, World Bank-funded, four-component project covering: tourism, protected areas, agribusiness and gemstones sector development and project management. [\[xiv\]](#)

The protected area sub-component covered biodiversity restoration in Musi-o-Tunya and Kafue national parks and capacity building for ZAWA, a NORAD/World Bank-financed component. From August 2002, the Kafue was financed by Norway through the Emergency Resource Protection Project, its purpose of assisting ZAWA to regain management of the park and reverse the high levels of poaching. In 2004 Norway and the World Bank agreed to join forces to support ZAWA and the Kafue park through the present project under SEED. In 2006 the SEED project underwent a 'refocusing,' and the Musi-o-Tunya project was dropped – this at a time when the park was under threat from the ZAWA/Legacy landgrab - the funds and focused shifting to the Kafue. The project's goal was to see that critical habitat and species were secured in the park and surrounding GMAs through improved management,

infrastructure, and tourism development.

The review of the performance of the 2002–2007 strategic plan concluded that the project did not have a clearly defined leader and was therefore not able to achieve its objectives; the research was of a poor standard; ZAWA's performance unsatisfactory; large sums of money stolen; and the lack of motivation at different levels a major concern. Furthermore, they found that in the CBNRM component, only two of the three objectives were addressed: the objective, "To develop co-management agreements with traditional fisherfolk in the park and its surrounding GMAs" ignored – the Twa fishermen obviously considered to be of little importance. In all, nine GMAs were dealt with, and the CRBs trained in basic GMA management skills. Also, landuse planning initiated in selected GMAs was later discontinued due to a budget change. The project considered introducing hunting-safaris in the park, but this did not find favour. The consultants, Booth et al., provided a withering assessment.[xv]

In August 2006, I wrote a blog entitled, *Gone to seed*. [xvi]

*The World Bank SEED program had in 2001 reported that "The government is committed to the growth of tourism and is now ready to make the resources necessary for that to happen - funding to underpin a strong approach to tourism would confirm the government's credibility and the private sector appears ready to do its part. The government has identified Livingstone and the Victoria Falls (the Musi-o-Tunya or "the Smoke that Thunders") as a priority for economic expansion and diversification, based on tourism. The Victoria Falls is a World Heritage*

*Site. It is a strong magnet that has long attracted tourists to the falls themselves as well as to its surrounding wildlife and extraordinary cultural heritage'.*

*In November 2005, with SEED about to collapse and no visible sign of anything accomplished, the steering committee of the Natural Resources Consultative Forum of Zambia – of which I was a committee member at the time, anxious to see that this did not happen, approached the World Bank official responsible for SEED, Marie Sheppard, of the Africa Private Sector Group, suggesting that the NRCF was the forum through which the rescue plan could be brokered. And that is the last that anyone from NRCF heard from the World Bank, until last week that is, when a rather jazzy report on tourism in Livingstone pitched up on e-mail: no consultations, no stakeholder meetings, no NRCF hosted cross-sectoral workshops, no strategic environmental assessments or project documents giving some idea of what the Bank envisaged doing in Musi-o-Tunya, no, only "The key players know the situation". But something had kick-started ZAWA in 2006, the agency responsible for carrying out the SEED work in Livingstone and Kafue National Park, for suddenly the newspapers carried adverts calling for consultants to train ZAWA teams to look after the Musi-o-Tunya white rhino, to sort out the mangled, in-bred wildlife aberration within the park, the communities outside... although all three expatriate game wardens employed on the SEED program in Mosi and Kafue had packed their katundu (possessions) after being without transport for a year - though rumour has it that one still survives, cycling earnestly around on his njinga (bike).*

*So, how much responsibility must the World Bank bear for the SEED mess, for allowing a tourism lease for such a proposed massive perturbation of part of the Victoria Falls Transboundary World Heritage Site to be issued, for funding consultancies that do not involve civil society, the National Heritage Commission, the Livingstone Town Council, the NRCF, the indigenous and indigent communities, that all of this endeavour is supposed to benefit. And what of the strategic review of ZAWA that they and NORAD are funding, a four-month consultancy given to a local company, supposed to be in touch with the NRCF and other stakeholders. Not a word from them either. And does Chief Mukuni of Livingstone know - he so very keen to see Legacy install a bit of Florida on his chiefly midriff, that the World Bank funded consultancy for the Ministry of Lands has recommended that all customary area should in future fall under the said ministry, with chiefs relegated to the role of land administrators? And so is it the intention of the World Bank to ensure that the people of Livingstone gather daily at the electrified curtain cutting off their town from the Zambezi, to watch the Hawaiian-shirted, cigar-chompin' denizens of Legacy swing at little white mabolo (balls) upon their now treeless, jumboless ancestral turf; the chiefly custodian of the smoke that pisses, resting nearby under his talkin' tree, sans kapasu (Chief's Messenger), and with no land to administer?*

## REMNPAS

The Reclassification and Effective Management of the National Protected Areas System Project (2006-2011) was a \$7.3 million project executed by the Ministry of Tourism through the ministry's division of environment and natural resource management and ZAWA. The Global Environmental Fund (EF), United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the government jointly funded the project. The project had three main areas of intervention: providing the regulatory, legal and institutional framework for public-private partnerships, strengthening the institutions responsible for protected area management, and implementing new protected area categories within these partnerships.

The original UNDP/GEF, 'Classification of Protected Areas' project, had its origin in 2000 when UNDP and the ministry decided that Zambia's protected areas required reclassification. The justification for this was presented in September 2000 to GEF as a concept proposal for a PDF Block "B" grant, stating that 'Zambia has demonstrated its commitment in conserving and managing the country's biodiversity through various legal instruments and policy frameworks and the establishment of institutions at national and local levels' - a statement made at a time when such commitment was little in evidence, a quango, ZAWA, has replaced the NPWS.[xvii] The concept note declared that:

*Since the 1960s, when the present boundaries of the protected area system were designed and implemented, there*

*has been substantial habitat conversion, encroachment and unsustainable use of resources within the protected areas. These impacts have changed the nature of the protected areas, and in some cases, boundaries no longer coincide with biodiversity hot spots and distribution. Furthermore, there is increasing demand from local communities for access to the resources. It is, therefore, an urgent necessity, as recognized in the NBSAP, to re-inventory, reclassify, and redefine the protected areas system, and at the same time develop incentives for community involvement in the management and conservation of biodiversity, to ensure the long-term sustainability of the new classification and system.*

Apart from the date being wrong by between twenty or seventy years, no empirical evidence was put forward to justify the project depending on the particular protected area. GEF, the WB and the Nordic Development Fund were sent the concept note with a request for £410K to write a full project proposal. This was accepted. The plan recommended nine implementing partners for the project: the Ministry of Tourism, ZAWA, WWF, UNDP, Ministry of Finance and Planning, NRCF, a 'relevant ministries steering committee', a technical advisory group, a project consultation group (consultants) and private sector partners for two demonstration sites. There was no mention of the customary authority and its people.

The government strategy at the onset of REMNPAS was for ZAWA to concentrate on the national parks with high tourism potential so that they could become conservation hub income generators. This would involve the following: a protected area re-classification exercise; the government to pass new

legislation supporting the protected area estate; a range of public-private partnerships (PPPs) to be developed; and core systems and institutional level capacity strengthened; and two new categories of protected area advanced, 1) community conservation areas which would maximize incentives for conservation for communities by giving nearly full control over resources and the revenue derived from these resources while preventing conversion to agriculture or other landuses, and 2) allowing portions of national parks to be zoned as hunting-safari areas, converting them from cost centres to profit centres for ZAWA - requiring a change in their legal status. Although REMNPAS removed the ZAWA hunting-safari scheme from the project, it (given the MMD minister's pronouncements at the time, Namugala) allowed ZAWA to operate as a mercantile quango – confirmed by the PF government instruction that all parastatals list with the Lusaka Stock Exchange.

One forthright conservationist wrote to me, saying that:

*The UNDP reclassification project exhibits all the classic mistakes of an aid program supporting an institution that does not follow its own agenda of partnership building, 1) has made no effort to decentralise or manage its finances - see Auditor-General's report of 2005 on parastatals, and 2) uses foreign consultants (Future Search), who appear to have no experience in rural Africa when there are at least three community ownership projects run by locals, two of them supported by a sister institution, WWF (Mpumba and Mazabuka), and 3) dreams up a big plan without extensive involvement of the local stakeholders and with no reference to relevant past studies or paying heed to*

*existing conventions. Bound to fail at a cost to future generations.*

On 17 November 2007, I penned the polemic *Alien Invasions of Zambia*.<sup>[xviii]</sup>

*... an invasive force (is) arguably far more threatening to a nation than being colonized by the pre-eminent culture of the time; an invader that reduces a nation's GDP, watches as the average life expectancy decreases over the last 20 years from 57 to 37, removes development incentives, underwrites corruption, parasitizes civil servants time and then poaches their services, ignores traditional systems – the magma of future life, and forcibly injects a debilitating cocktail of untested foreign ideas, policies and development drugs into the national buttock - in contempt of the law of unintended consequence and the demands of the precautionary principle. Such an invasive force is foreign donor aid – exemplified by its visible battalions, aid programs.*

[i] Singer, Peter. "Magna Carta at 800." Project-Syndicate, 4 June 2015. Web. 29 March 2017.

<https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/magna-car-ta-anniversary-by-peter-singer-2015-06>

[iii] Bond, P. *Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neoliberalism*



*in South Africa*. Pluto, 2000.

[iv] Bond. *Elite Transition*. p.294

[v] Foster, J.B. *The Ecological Revolution*. Monthly Review Press, New York, 2009.p.130

[vi] Dalal-Clayton, B. & Child, B. Lessons from Luangwa: the story of the Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project. International Institute for Environment and Development. Wildlife and Development series NO. 13. 2003. p.81

[vii] HURID. "Policy and Legislation Review of the Fisheries, Forestry, Wildlife and Water Sectors Vis-a-vis Community Based Natural Resource Management." *Natural Resources Management & Development Portal*. USAID, 1 Jan. 2002.

[viii] "Report of the Committee on Economic Affairs and Labour 2007." *National Assembly of Zambia - Downloads*. 27 Feb. 2008.

[ix] Mulonda, Palan. *Legal Framework, Policy and Legislative Processes*. In: *Report on the Forum on Natural Resource Management Policies and Legislation*. Lusaka: CONASA/USAID, 2003.

[x] Lyons, A. "The Rise and Fall of a Second-generation CB-NRM Project in Zambia: Insights from a Project Perspective." *National Centre for Biotechnology Information*. U.S. National Library of Medicine, 22 Dec. 2012. Web.

[xi] Manning, I.P.A. "Zambia Natural Resources Consultative Forum Funding Proposal Phase 2: Royal Danish Embassy, Lusaka." 5 Dec. 2006.

[xii] Pachyderm. No 3 June 3, 1984, p14. <http://www.poachingfacts.com/docs/Pachyderm/pachy03.pdf>

[xiii] Nshimbi, Muleba, and Royd Vinya. "Impacts of Public-Private Partnerships on Local Livelihoods and Natural Resource Dynamics: Perceptions from Eastern Zambia." *Resources*. 13 June 2014.

[xiv] "VICTORIA FALLS HERITAGE PROTECTION." *World Bank SEED Project PID 2001*. I.P.A. Manning, 13 Aug. 2006. Web. 29 March 2017. <<http://victoriafallsheritage.blogspot.com/2006/08/world-bank-seed-project-pid-2001.html>>.

[xv] Booth, Vernon et al. "Mid-term review of the program of the development of Kafue National Park as a model of sustainable economic use and biodiversity conservation in a management extensive environment: Kafue National Park project." *Norad*. 1 July 2008. Web. 29 March 2017. <https://www.norad.no/globalassets/import-2162015-80434-am/www.norad.no-ny/filarkiv/vedlegg-til-publikasjoner/mid-term-review-of-the-kafue-national-park-project.pdf>

[xvi] Manning, I.P.A. "Gone to SEED??" VICTORIA FALLS HERITAGE PROTECTION. 26 Aug. 2006. Web. 29 March 2017. <<http://victoriafallsheritage.blogspot.com/2006/08/gone-to-seed.html>>.

[xvii] Manning, I.P.A. ALIEN INVASIONS OF ZAMBIA, [zambiaconservation.blogspot.com](http://zambiaconservation.blogspot.com). 17 Nov. 2007. Web. 29 March 2017. <http://zambiaconservation.blogspot.com/2007/11/alien-invasions-of-zambia.html>.

[xviii] Ibid

## National Parks Privatization

*IUCN categorization - the public land commons - photo and ecotourism – privatization - Blue Lagoon - Luambe – North Luangwa – Kasanka - West Lunga – transfrontier conservation areas - Malawi-Zambia TFCA - KAZA TFCA - Kazangula and Zambezi Heartlands programme - Liuwa Plain - Kafue*

*So the financialization of nature risks locking us into an extractivist and privatizing pattern despite the limits imposed on us by ecological and social crises. And as in the case of carbon markets, financialisation is instrumental in pushing us towards the continued extraction of fossil fuels instead of keeping them in the ground to tackle the climate change challenge.*

*Antonio Tricarico – The financial enclosure of the commons (2012)*

*Many conflicts accompanying a privatization process*

*develop because the new arrivants and the legal authorities do not recognize the symbolic value attached to the resource by the former users.*

*Balland & Platteau - Should common property resources be privatized (1994).[i]*

\* \* \*



National Parks of Zambia (numerous game management areas  
- part of the chiefdoms - surround most national parks)

The IUCN World Commission on Protected Areas classifies the national parks of Zambia as Category II protected areas:

*Large natural or near natural areas set aside to protect large-scale ecological processes, along with the complement of species and ecosystems characteristic of the area, which also provide a foundation for environmentally and culturally compatible spiritual, scientific, educational, recreational and visitor opportunities.*

Category II areas are typically large and conserve a functioning “ecosystem”. To achieve this, the protected area may need to be complemented by sympathetic management in surrounding areas.

Protected area and surrounding areas – the classification goes on to say, are ‘needing to be complemented by sympathetic management in surrounding areas’, i.e. the game management areas (GMAs), a planning framework within customary area and not a separate category of public land, despite what government thinks. This definition did not consider the issues of bio-cultural rights as laid out in the Biodiversity Convention. The degree of protection afforded these areas range from the highest to the lowest – in descending order: national park, national forest, local forest, GMA and Open Area – the latter that part of customary area other than GMA.

However, in 1994, IUCN introduced protected area management Category 1b (Wilderness Areas). In 2008, the IUCN World Commission on Protected Areas 2008 Guidelines on Protected Area Categories were approved at the World Conservation Congress in Barcelona. In these revised guidelines, both Category 1b and the term wilderness were retained.

*The primary management objective of Category 1b is nature conservation: management that will protect the long-term ecological integrity of natural areas that are undisturbed by significant human activity, have no modern infrastructure, and are characterized by freely occurring and reasonably intact natural processes. An important aspect of this objective is the emphasis on biological health and intactness.*

*Where the biological integrity of a wilderness protected area can be secured and the primary objective of nature conservation is met, the management focus of the wilderness area may include other objectives such as recreation or other human uses, but only if the primary objective is maintained securely. Traditional ways of life and cultural and spiritual uses are commonly considered compatible with wilderness management and, as noted throughout these Guidelines, rights-based approaches should be fully implemented at all times.*

*Category 1b exists to enable Indigenous Peoples, Tribes, and local communities to maintain their traditional wilderness based ways of life and customs, living at low density and using the available resources in ways compatible with conservation objectives... promotes the protection of relevant nonmaterial benefits, such as solitude, respect for sacred sites, and respect for ancestors.*

Botswana, Congo DRC, Tanzania, Equatorial Guinea, and Zimbabwe have introduced legislation to recognize Wilderness Areas. Zambia did not agree to introduce the category Wilderness Area suggests that they wish to retain control of the game management areas, a major source of income generation.

Out of the Category 1b wilderness areas has come the category of [Indigenous and Community Conserved Areas \(ICCA\)](#), some years after my Landsafe attempts for the GMAs.

## Photo and ecotourism

In colonial days non-hunting tourism took the form of government self-catering camps in protected areas, many of which fell into disuse from 1975, now replaced by private sector lodges. Tourism ventures are now concentrated around Livingstone (Victoria Falls), Mfuwe in the Luangwa, the Kafue park, and the Zambezi portion of the Chiawa GMA, and Lower Zambezi park, government making every attempt to privatize the protected area estate along the lines of the Kruger park model adopted by the organization, African Parks. In the game management areas (GMAs) situated in customary area (successor to the controlled hunting areas run originally by the Native Authority), apart from hunting concessions leased out by government, there is little non-consumptive tourism development and therefore little benefit to the people of the chiefdoms.

The industry today is served by the private sector run Tourism Council of Zambia, the parastatal, the Zambia National Tourism Board, and the Department of National Parks and Wildlife (DNPW), formerly the Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA), the latter a parastatal profit-centre failure. Essentially, tourism is operated in the field – as it always has been – mainly by whites, who carry out their own marketing, ill-served by government.

Donors and the government have concentrated their efforts

in developing eco-tourism in two national parks - in addition to Musi-o-Tunya: the South Luangwa, which the Norwegians have funded for close on three decades, and the Kafue, where a privatization exercise has largely failed, and where tourism concession management is a misnomer.

Zambia's tourism is mainly wildlife based – apart from the Victoria Falls – and thus it must compete in the region with Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia and South Africa. Other than being a peaceful country and friendly, it is expensive and corrupt, placing it overall well behind Namibia and Botswana in its facilities for tourists – though in Botswana's case, given the appalling treatment of Bushmen, that country rapidly squanders its advantages as a former British protectorate with enlightened leadership.

The Livingstone area, extended to Musi-o-Tunya, has benefitted most from tourism growth. Yet, the town and the park are neglected, increasingly crime-ridden, polluted by trucking and with serious water and power shortages. In nature-based tourism, the Livingstone area represents 39% of all beds and 45% of all bed nights, with high occupancy levels. Zambia's tourism strategy is a serious challenge because 60% of tourists spend less than four days in Zambia, usually taken up with visits to the Victoria Falls. During the early SEED project period (2004-2011), at a meeting in Livingstone attended by over 100 government officers and members of the tourism industry, a long catalogue of dysfunction was fed into the proceedings. The Zambia Police spoke of their need for cash donations to give tourists security, something already supplied by private operators in the form of a police station with accommodation. Yet, the police declared that they had not taken occupation because they required bedding and kitchenware. Mention was



also made of the Zambian borders and the money extracted from tourists for carbon taxes, toll fees, car insurance, ferry charges, district council levies, each tax having its own office with two to three staff members per office. In Botswana, one tax office collects all revenue.

Common constraints in developing tourism in Zambia remains an unskilled labour force and a control-minded labour administration and legislation, poor infrastructural supports, burdensome licensing bureaucracy, short land leases, an unrealistic high minimum wage, contempt for concession agreements by the government, the highest tax rates in the region, a Zambia Development Agency and Department of Immigration who prey on investors, a judicial system largely under political control, and Zambianization policies. However, one of the major constraints has nothing to do with man: the extended rainy season and soils that make access and movement well nigh impossible over much of the game country for half the year. The other major issue is the failure thus far of government to devolve powers over natural resources to customary area and to knit customary residents into the fabric of protected area development and appropriate exploitation.

As a country known for its wildlife, Zambia, it was clear by 2013, attracts few tourists compared to South Africa, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Kenya, and Mozambique. The majority of the parks do not support a tourism industry. In 2012 in the 36 GMAs, only 10 have any photo-tourism – and no payment is required to be paid by them to the Community Resource Boards. Hunting-safaris at the time operated in 51% of the GMAs.

## Privatization

One insidious development affecting these areas is privatization, particularly that of national parks and customary areas. The movement to privatize national parks has gathered momentum in Zambia since the Zambianization of the National Parks and Wildlife Service (NPWS) in 1975 and its lamentable capacity and lack of finance to manage the parks and GMAs. Early efforts of mine, as well of the Norman Carr Foundation and the African Wildlife Trust – formed for just that purpose, was to assist NPWS with the management of Kasanka, Lavusi Manda, Isangano and North Luangwa national parks, and not as their complete privatization with NPWS as a distant partner in their management. Hence, I had worked with the NPWS to provide a basic public-private partnership (PPP) agreement that supported their management, which incorporated its former customary owners in its management and flow of responsibilities and benefits.

The privatization of the public commons is a process headed in the wrong direction, whether driven by the commodification of nature or by philanthropy, as it further removes the public commons from the implicit bio-cultural rights held by its former occupants now living on its borders – or in the case of Liuwa NP, both in and outside its borders, as well from taxpayers who expect government to care for the public commons. It is one thing for government to privatize national parks so that their management is still a government responsibility, tendering out tourism services to the private sector; another for government to simply hand over a national park to a big international NGO (BINGO), a limited liability

company, a trust company, or divide it up into tourism block concessions – as in the Kruger NP model – with varying degrees of management control and responsibility for the management of wildlife and the ecosystem. Privatization is more of the Harvian examples of accumulation by dispossession and not the re-entry of customary people back into the ownership of their old lands through the negotiation of new protocols for co-management. Privatization, as it is presently envisaged, is [a neoliberal model posing great dangers to customary people](#). As Tricarico commented: ‘So challenging and reversing the financialization of nature inevitably means questioning the role of both markets and states and *putting forward a comprehensive alternative political project centred on reclaiming the commons*.’[ii]

The United States, which provided our model for national parks, has embarked on an alarming privatization program as a basic result of ‘declining budgets in the national parks.’[iii] Thomas More advances five alternative management models for parks and protected areas in the US: 1) A fully public model; 2) to operate as a public utility; 3) outsourcing; 4) private ownership by non-profits; 5) fully private in which land is bought and operated for profit.[iv] Zambia has tended towards the fourth model: private ownership by non-profit organizations. The ownership of the land does not change, but the park is ‘taken over’ and operated under specific MOUs. ‘Some critics have suggested that large U.S. conservation organizations have become as corporate as industry itself and can be reluctant to take strong positions on conservation issues for fear of offending potential donors.’ In the case of Zambia, offending government, or if a powerful chiefdom is involved, offending such as the Litunga of Barotseland, or if not, offend the customary commoners of Barotse, or civil society at large.

Given that Zambia has to move away from financialized capitalism to survive, it will be tempted to privatize the public commons. However, this would oppose the increasingly urgent need to reclaim the commons for the commoners. What happened to the black rhino is indicative of what went wrong.

## Blue Lagoon National Park

Blue Lagoon was once a cattle ranch owned by Ronnie and Erica Critchley (daughter of the pioneer, Mopani Clarke), later donated to the state and declared a national park in 1973. Since that time – except for recent interventions, it has been neglected, either being used by the Zambian army or subject to failed public-private partnership arrangements. From 2000, Real Africa Safaris agreed with ZAWA to manage the park. In December 2001, a further agreement was signed to uphold the principles of ‘sustainable tourism.’ By October 2007, Nyanja Safaris were negotiating with ZAWA for its takeover. However, nothing eventuated - barring reports in October 2008 of a killing field of game carcasses. In March 2010, David Bland established the Blue Lagoon Trust, ‘To carry out effective and long-term projects within the local area to benefit both the community and the conservation of the wetland habitat.’

## Luambe National Park

The park was taken over under a public-private partnership MOU between ZAWA and an international NGO, Luangwa Wilderness e.V., in December 2003 – the name later changed in 2008 to Communities for Conservation Society of Cologne. Some society members were also shareholders in a lodge that served the park. No formal arrangements had been entered into with the adjoining Chitungulu chiefdom, charitable gestures extended to the community on an ad hoc basis. Along with Nsefu, this was one of the first areas under customary tenure appropriated by the Provincial Administration as a game reserve, agreed to by the customary residents on the condition that they would benefit from its protected status. This agreement continues to be ignored.

## North Luangwa National Park

In November 1987 – because the park had been abandoned to poachers, I made a PPP proposal to the African Wildlife Leadership Foundation to join a consortium of Zambian businesses and the NPWS under Director Harry Chabwela for the park's management. In this, I had received the support of the Chairman of AWLF (AWF), John Heminway, and David Frost, the Chairman at the Professional Hunters' Association of Zambia. However, the AWLF executive declined the opportunity.

A research couple, Mark and Delia Owens, then began the

North Luangwa Conservation Project. The US Embassy in Lusaka obtain the necessary permits and permissions for them from the NPWS. This project involved anti-poaching in the park and various villager projects in the Mukungule GMA to the west of the park.

At the same time in 1988 that I had begun the Black Rhino Project, the Owens uncovered a wildlife crime syndicate run by the Mpika warden of the NPWS - with links to headquarter staff - controlled in turn by the chief security officer in the Office of the President (OP). This syndicate ran a gang of elephant and rhino poachers in the park. Some elements in the NPWS did not want a project trying to save the very rhino they were intent on killing. In 1994, with the rhino obliterated and the elephant greatly reduced, this OP official visited the Owens in their Luangwa camp. Later they were warned by one of their employees that their lives were in danger.[v] At about the same time, the North Luangwa Conservation Project and other in-country NGOs were asked to renegotiate their projects' status. At issue was the NPWS demand that the project turns over its fixed and moveable assets to them and that it agrees to pass its operating funds through a government account so that they could be taxed at the rate of 33%. This issue was never resolved.[vi] Harry Chabwela, who bears the ultimate responsibility for the Zambian black rhino's extinction, was the Director of NPWS at the time.

In 1997 Ackim Mwenya was Director NPWS and had the assets of the Owen's seized while they were away on leave in the USA, their staff placed under house arrest. The staff were later freed on the USA and British Embassy personnel intervention, but the field projects and staff left permanently to their own devices.[vii] For although the Owens were not

deported, they did not return to the country, handing over the park to the Frankfurt Zoological Society, who in 1998 signed an agreement with the NPWS agreeing to conserve the wildlife resources and to develop the park. The reason the Owens had not returned was that they had exposed the poaching ring. However, the Zambia Police wished to question Mark Owens and his son in connection with an investigation prompted by the summary execution of a poacher by his scouts, the corpse captured on an ABC television documentary.[viii] This film lent considerable substance to the stories of the killing of poachers by the scouts whom Owens commanded and of other numerous human rights abuses against villagers, highlighting the dangers of privatization and imperial foreign aid.[ix] [x]

In 2003, under the SADC Regional Rhino Program, five black rhino were translocated into the North Luangwa from the Kruger National Park and placed in a fenced sanctuary. In 2006, a further ten were introduced.

## Kasanka National Park

Kasanka first came into being as the Kasanka Game Reserve when by government notice 111, the Livingstone Memorial Game Reserve (gazetted in 1931) lying to the north of it was abolished and two small reserves created in its place: 1) to the west, the Lavusi Manda Game Reserve and 2) to the south, Kasanka.

On 22 December 1937, the District Commissioner Serenje, J.S. Moffat, had written to the later founder of the Game Department, Vaughan-Jones, suggesting that the creation of

the reserve would merely benefit the people of the Congo (*Bulumatari*), advising that the Congolese create a reserve and join it with the Kasanka – perhaps the first suggestion of its kind for a transfrontier conservation area. This initiative I and Rolf Shenton followed up with a [Central African Transfrontier Conservation Area](#) (CATCA). The proposal fell on deaf ZAWA ears.[xi] [xii]

Vaughan-Jones had commented that the reserve would result in numerous villages being relocated, suggesting that the controlled hunting area (CHA), which allowed Europeans to hunt, be made into a 'native game area' for the use of the local people, and that the emphasis should rather be on the legitimate meat requirements of the villagers. The acting Provincial Commissioner, E.H. Cooke, wrote to the Chief Secretary and advised strongly against any CHA extension, urging that the people's traditional hunting grounds be preserved for their exclusive use. On 11 January 1941, the D.C. Serenje, now M.D. Thomas held discussions with Chief Kafinda, his headmen and 148 men of the seven villages in the Kasanka, reaching an agreement on creating the reserve. However, this was at odds with some Game Department officers and members of the Provincial Administration who felt that creating such a reserve would mean that elephant numbers would increase and with it predation on village crops.

The Kasanka Game Reserve status was supposedly underlined in 1952 when the Game Ranger Serenje, Robertson-Bullock, carried out a game census. In 1955 a brief census corroborated the 1952 estimate, but the Provincial Game Officer Gerald Taylor concluding that the low game numbers and the presence of tsetse fly made tourism development impossible, but that the reserve should continue to afford



protection to the sitatunga.[xiii]

For much of the 1960s, little was done for the Kasanka or the villagers living on its borders. In 1972 it was declared a national park. The following year the Deputy-Director of the Game Department, Frank Ansell (d.1996), instructed me to establish the Bangweulu Command, with responsibility for three newly created national parks converted from their former game reserve status, the Kasanka, Lavusi Manda and Isangano, and some GMAs in and around the Bangweulu Swamps.[xiv] In 1991, the Convention on Wetlands (RAMSAR) came into force in Zambia, with Bangweulu designated as one of the sites.[xv] [xvi]

In 1974 after I had moved over to run the Black Lechwe Project on the floodplains, the whole Bangweulu Command was taken over by the NPWS Northern Command and languished once again. In the late 1970s, my friends and former District Officers in the Provincial Administration, David Lloyd (d.2011) and Peter Moss (d.April 2017) – the latter once a colleague in the Game Department, visited the park, commenting on its abandonment. Then, and later in 1984, I suggested to Lloyd that he take on its management, to which he showed great interest. I then negotiated a preliminary public-private partnership (PPP) MOU agreement for the park's management between Lloyd and the Director of Conservation in the NPWS, Lewis Saiwana. At the time, I was unaware that I helped usher in privatization, whereas I saw it more as a mentoring partnership.

In early 1976, Moss and I had moved to Wales and with Lloyd had taken up residence on his Coedmore estate on the Teifi River.



Cotswold Wildlife Park, 1971

Moss and I took over two tenancies and began an assessment of the estate, as well as the first Ecosafaris Ltd tours to Bangweulu and Luangwa. With my work not done in Africa, I returned to one of my former haunts, Botswana. Moss carried on, and together with David Lloyd, Jeremy Burnham (d. April 2017), and with the inputs of Ian Swingland – for a short time, a biologist in the Kafue, developed the Cotswold Wildlife Park.



*David Lloyd and Peter Moss, Coedmore 1976*

The original concept, elaboration, strategy, approach and technical evaluations for a PPP regarding the Kasanka was developed after this by Moss, with inputs from myself, Lloyd, Chief Kafinda – the latter now metamorphosed into Chief Chitambo.



Peter Moss in 1984

Lloyd took up residence in the park in 1984. At the time, I was busy assisting Moss with a tourism contract in the Luangwa entered into with Vice-President Kavindele. Moss began applying for funding for Kasanka - obtaining an EU grant, while Gary Williams - a Mkushi farmer – invested considerable time and effort into its operations.

In 1987, while living in Kloof, South Africa, I decided to return to the Chimbwe floodplain in southeast Bangweulu to continue with a similar tourism enterprise (Ecosafaris UK Ltd.) Peter Moss and I had pioneered in 1976. This time it would be with a new entity, Safariland, its funder being Kerry Curtis – former shareholder of the hunting company, Amalgamated Safaris. The others involved were my friend

Ron Kidson who had started Zambia Safaris, and Eric Balson - former Senior Game Warden of Tanzania and Director of the International Game Park, now known as the Lower Zambezi National Park, and myself. Eric Balson and I went up to my old Game Department headquarters at Chiundaponde where I saw my friend of 1973-1976, Chief Chiundaponde (d.2013), asking and receiving the usufruct rights to Lake Waka Waka lying between Chiundaponde and the Kasanka National Park, as well as an island lying on the edge of the plain next to the Lukulu River, the center of my old sitatunga and shoebill stork study area.[xvii] Waka Waka was seen as a transit camp, with Shoebill island the permanent working camp. There Balson and I built a *chitenje* and a kitchen and storeroom. I then returned to Kloof in Natal to pack up our house and move back to Bangweulu.



OLIVER KIDSON, BARRY CLARKE, ERIC BALSON & BOB DE WILDER (left)

Years later, when our mutual friend Chief Chiundaponde died, Moss wrote to me describing his early days in the chiefdom as a district assistant:

*The end of an era indeed and sad passing of a good friend, Chief Chiundaponde or "Mwansabamba", who I first met in 1958. I last saw him in 2010. He was very unwell then and remembered little of the early days...I toured his area village-by-village with the court assessors and tax registers twice maybe three times 1958-1960 (once with John Hannah) and got to know Mwansabamba and his area very well...hunting, fishing (fabulous both inland on the upper Lukulu and in the swamps - Fisheries Department active then with scales etc at Muwele), Kalela dancing (we set up a Kalela dancing competition at the Mpika annual district shows with Mwansabamba's help), road building (the Chiundaponde road from Great North Road and the Muwele road with first embankment supervised by District Messengers), local customary law - chief well-respected, livelihood (Bicycle Tembo shop and truck), sociology (Simon and Agnes Vibeti) - it all went on peacefully and amicably...a few pictures of those days attached.*



*Chief Chiundaponde 1958*

But, back to '87. At the time, a former colleague Harry Chabwela was the Director of the NPWS. I saw him occasionally, communicating my concerns over the state of the black rhino in the country. He was enthused, asking me to head up a project to save the 200 or so left. But I declined due to my tourism commitment but promised to recruit David Lloyd's assistance in translocating some rhino to the Kasanka. Not long after, my funder, Kerry Curtis, withdrew from the tourism venture. I then gave the free use of my two usufruct properties to David Lloyd to be used by the Kasanka Trust for a tourism operation and the Safariland Company I had registered for the purpose. Twenty-nine years later, African Parks, who had taken over

the [Chikuni Community Partnership Park](#), its core being my old home Chikuni and the nearby Shoebill Island, notified the Kasanka Trust in April 2016 that their lease of Shoebill and the rights to operate tourism there would cease at the end of July, but that they would honour any bookings already made.[xviii] In creating the Chikuni CPP, villagers' usufruct rights had not been affected, though not in my and the Kasanka Trust's case. But the fact that I held the usufruct rights to the properties had been long forgotten, the NPWS cheekily charging the trust tourism fees for the use of the island. The trust still has a camp at Lake Waka Waka, but their Shoebill camp has been moved to the nearby Lavusi Manda National Park.

On 18 July 1990, after a protracted period of negotiations by Lloyd, guided by Moss, and assisted by Tony Mitchley, Ali Hamir, Harry Chabwela, John Wright and Jackie Shisholeka - Deputy Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Tourism, there took place the signing of the Kasanka Management Agreement between the Kasanka Trust Limited (E.D.M. Lloyd) and the NPWS - witnessed by Moss - the trust agreeing to finance and manage the park in partnership with the NPWS. But Shoebill island received little attention from management for some time. A causeway constructed to it affected the annual flooding regime on the Chimbwi plain, encouraged immigration into the area by fishermen and a change in vegetation in parts. And one disastrous decision was the release of Kafue zebra onto the floodplains – a foreign strain in conflict with the native species. Such being the dangers of privatization landgrabs.

Moss between 1985 and 1993 provided the foundation for Kasanka's future. In 1992, with Robert Monro of the British Council and Jimmy Skinner, he prepared an EC funding proposal. This was approved. He was subsequently retained by



the council as the consultant to 'assist the Kasanka Trust and IUCN in preparation of plans for the sustainable development of Kasanka National Park.' In 1993 the trust retained him to prepare a project work plan and other guidelines for future operations. In this, he liaised with Lloyd and David Frost. Moss, with the assistance of a professional fund-raiser, John Wright, identified funding from the Holly Hill Trust. He then coordinated the GIS mapping of the park and buffer zone with Ian Swingland of the University of Kent (Durrell Institute), the mapping carried out by Kent Cassells, assisted with a health survey, prepared and verified asset inventories, and helped prepare annual reports and the development of tourism with Gary Williams and Nick van Gruisen. Moss then negotiated to introduce an Earthwatch Program and Ecology Research Program under Ian Swingland, attending some high-level meetings with Earthwatch in London, and developing the Kasanka Development Program Guidelines.[xix] But, as Moss told me, "Jealousy took over, and we got sidelined. And the program failed.

In 1995 minutes of a meeting of the Kasanka Trust (London) on 26 September reported my appointment as honorary scientific advisor to the Trust, and Nick Ashton-Jones as the coordinator of a team with a mandate to produce the Kasanka management plan - with funding from the EU. This work was carried out in 1995-1996, producing a management plan 'involving a consideration of environmental impact, community development, land-use planning, (future) participation of local people, and staff training needs; and working closely with the Kasanka steering committee and the training of locally-based consultants in the fields of economics and landuse trends - especially developing management planning skills in the

staff of the national parks department.' The plan was never implemented.

From 1995 until 1998, when I left for South Africa to implement the CITES Convention there, I continued to advise Lloyd and convert our garage in Burford, Oxfordshire, into a flat for him. He was ill, stricken with HIV/Aids, doing all possible to have the disease brought under control. When we left Burford in 1998, he went to live with his cousin, then returned once again to Kasanka. In about 2000, extremely ill, he was flown from Zambia to Johannesburg. There I found him in hospital, his usual cheerful self. As I walked into the ward, he sat up and called, "It's snuffsville for me, Manning!" Shortly after that, he moved to stay with us in Johannesburg until well enough to travel.

In 2002 he was awarded the Order of the British Empire (OBE) for services to conservation. Rightly, he was embarrassed, though he did not refuse it. At the time, we were in Zambia on holiday with our friend David Gleason. David's life-long friend, Peter Moss should have received the OBE – after all, the award is accurately described as 'Other Bugger's Efforts'.

On 28 May 2002, an MOU was signed between the trust and ZAWA and automatically renewed in 2007. The MOU's substance made it clear that the trust's park manager should report to the ZAWA Warden and submit quarterly reports. The trust agreed to pay ZAWA and the Kafinda Community Resource Board 10% and 5% respectively of its gross income from tourism within the Kasanka. Funds given to the CRB were to be maintained in a bank account to which two members of the CRB, the park manager and the ZAWA Ranger, were signatories, with the use of the funds following the Zambia Wildlife Act. All accounts were to be made available to ZAWA

every quarter. The MOU also laid out the composition of the Kasanka Management Committee consisting of the DG of ZAWA (Chairman), the ZAWA Director of Conservation, the park manager (Secretary), the Area Warden and Ranger, the Serenje District Council Secretary, the Serenje MP, Chief Chitambo, one ward chairman, the CRB Chairman and two Kasanka Trust officials. The Committee was to meet bi-annually and to approve plans and programs for future activities. The Trust was also given the mandate to 'assist the local communities living within the surrounding Kafinda GMA to embark on community development'. In 2005 Kasanka registered as a trust under the Companies Act (limited by guarantee), i.e. a non-profit organization.

Funding for management and other activities had come from the EU, Conservation Foundation (Zambia), Darwin Initiative, Beit Trust, Kasanka Trust (UK), Tusk Trust, Finnish Embassy, Holly Hill Trust, German Development Service (DED), Save the Rhino Trust (SRT) – though there were no rhino there - and from tourism. As with Coedmore, Moss eventually withdrew, still owed money for work done in a professional capacity.

Until early 2009 no working management plan existed. Consultants reported lamentable financial accounting and unprofessional management, and negligent oversight by the Kasanka Trustees in Lusaka (although one consultant reported that the PPP arrangement was working and should continue to receive investment). The manager, Edmund Farmer, recruited in the UK, whom I had met in London when the trustees agreed to hire him, established his own air-charter company, leaving much of the day-to-day management of the park to his wife. Lloyd, resident in the park for 26 years but in increasingly poor health, was even less involved with managerial control,

conservation management, or pursuing programs that offered more than the notional community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) projects.[xx] Ad hoc management decisions were made without accompanying impact assessments, such as the decision to translocate Kafue zebra onto Chimbwi Plain in the southeast Bangweulu and build drainage canals in the Kasanka park. [Serious consideration was given to importing black lechwe](#) until I told him that there was no record of them ever having occurred there.[xxi] I also wrote to the DG of ZAWA, Lewis Saiwana, in 2007:

Dr Lewis Saiswa  
Director General  
Zambia Wildlife Authority

Dear Lewis,

The bush telegraph has informed me of the intentions of the Kasanka Trust and ZAWA to translocate Black lechwe into the Kasanka National Park. As the former warden and biologist of the Bangweulu, its GMA's and National Parks, and as a former scientific advisor of the the Kasanka Trust in London, I most strongly object to any such plans.

1. Any actions by the Kasanka Trust to translocate animals into or out of Kasanka, in the absence of a park management plan and a specific EIA, I consider ecologically indefensible and therefore highly objectionable.
2. Black lechwe have never occurred in the Kasanka i.e. as a breeding population, as long as we have had records - and I have copies or access to most of them. Migrant males will always pitch up here and there in the August to October period, and so the occasional male coming up the river from the Luapula is not unusual. This also happens in the lechwe grounds with puku, a female arriving one day at Chikuni (Lukulu area) and mingling with the lechwe. However this is not the norm. The offspring of any union are infertile and will simply die off; but in the Kasanka they should be removed at once, and the lechwe males as well.

I never did receive a reply. I had also met with David Lloyd and the new Chairman of the Trust, John Hudson, to discuss their plans for Kasanka as I had heard that John Hanks, my former colleague in the Game Department, had been asked to provide a report on Kasanka. When I wrote to Hanks, he was most apologetic about not having contacted me.

Lloyd had become concerned about burning; the country set ablaze every year in the late dry season. In Kasanka, he carried on punting the damaging colonial tradition of early burning, writing a letter to the Secretary-General of Zambia's Environmental Council in 2004 requesting that he

do something about it. As Peter Moss wrote concerning fire management in the Kafue National Park: 'After many years of research and practical endeavour, the Kafue National Park's objective was set as follows: *To protect as much of the park as possible from fire and to delay fire incursions as long as possible.*

Kasanka still carries out this early-burning policy to this day.

Apart from some limited CBNRM work in the Kafinda Open Area and GMA under Chief Chitambo, the traditional owners remain alienated from the park and relations between the trust and the people – according to J. Kapijimpanga, a former cabinet minister and relative of Paramount Chief Kopa of the Bisa were deplorable. Chief Chitambo confirmed this when he stayed with me in England in 1997.



David died on 19 December 2010. In the [\*Daily Telegraph\*](#) obituary, Peter is mentioned only as helping David establish the Coedmore Wildlife Park – a massive job in itself. Still, there

is no mention of his role with Kasanka. There is much else in David's Telegraph obituary that is not true – such as partaking in the Lumpa campaign and his being a professional safari-hunter and his supposed discovery of Kasanka in the first place. Sadly, if one knows something about a particular subject, the papers usually get it wrong, a searing example of post-truth. But what is true is that he was a wonderfully generous man.[xxii]

Peter, having moved back to England from France with Jill, died on 22 April 2017. *Kaole*, as the Bemba had named him many years ago, was certainly 'someone easy to get on with'. I think now and then of his visit with his first wife Jill and son Julian – whom I named *Chongo* – to our isolated house on the Bangweulu floodplains in 1975. He and I went fishing for a few hours, and when we returned, we found the house surrounded by angry villagers brandishing *pangas*. The warden had employed them to cut the grass on the airstrip, and he had failed to pay them.[xxiii] [xxiv] And the new Zambian DG of the National Parks & Wildlife Service, who happened to land on the airstrip when all this was going on, soon took to the air, leaving our womenfolk to fend for themselves

[Peter's obituaries in the Daily Telegraph](#) and [Wikipedia](#) were also riddled with errors. Here follows what I wrote of him:

*Peter de Vere Moss (Kaole) (2 August 1938 – 22 April 2017)*

*Sixty years ago or so Peter went to the Protectorate of Northern Rhodesia as an assistant district officer in the colonial service. Once there, as is their custom, the villagers sized him up and gave him his Bemba name,*

*Kaole (meaning: 'someone very easy to deal with'). He was ever thus.*

*In 1961, with 21 other future district officers, he attended the Overseas Development Course 'A' at Cambridge. After the year was up, he was posted back to the Northern Province of Zambia. In 1964, as District Officer Mkushi, with independence set for 24 October, he was sent up to Chinsali to help District Commissioner John Hannah, there joining his Cambridge compatriot and fellow DO, Mick Bond. Their job was to persuade members of the Lumpa Church to follow the instructions of Prime Minister Kenneth Kaunda to abandon their new villages and return to their former homes.*

*At one village, the police foolishly entered the village stockade without invitation, their officer killed. Despite this, Bond and Peter, both fluent in Bemba, took it in turn to visit other remote Lumpa villages - accompanied only by their unarmed District Messenger – where they were received with respect and a complete lack of hostility.*

*On 29 July the 1st Battalion of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment (1NRR), accompanied by the DC and Peter, went to the Lumpa cathedral at Sione (Zion). Despite their efforts, the army, using automatic weapons for the first time, killed many men, women and children. There were no army casualties. A few days later Peter went to a large stockaded village with the 2NRR and a dozen Mobile Police Units where he witnessed yet another slaughter.*

*Peter's recollection of that time is recorded in Bond's autobiography, *From the Cam to the Zambezi*: "I was profoundly shocked by the whole thing. Soon after these tiring events I returned disillusioned to Mkushi. After*



*the Lumpa campaign I vowed never to have anything to do with public administration again, and thus began my move in 1965 to the Department of Game and Tsetse Control."*

*In the Kafue National Park, Peter found his true calling, first as a park ranger, then after his return in 1972 from Guelph University in Canada, as a biologist. In Kafue he wrote the first management plan for the park, and recently, the definitive tourism guide. And for the last few years he had been at work on a guide to the antelope of Zambia.*

*I first met Peter on his return from Canada. I too was in the Game Department. We became great friends. In the Kafue, I helped him move puku from a soon to be flooded area to safe ground; we then carried out an aerial census of the park and the Liuwa National Park. Although it was a time of destructive political change, we always saw the funny side of things*

*Peter was the last colonial serving member of a Game Department established in 1942. In 1976 he and I resigned and departed for our friend David Lloyd's Welsh estate. Here Peter established a wildlife park and we formed Ecosafaris Ltd., a safari company. Later we set up the Kasanka National Park project together, Peter carrying it on for a number of years, laying the groundwork for the areas conservation. His was a magnificent achievement.*

*We continued over the years to work occasionally together: in the Congo Republic making a film, in the Luangwa managing a cluster of lodges, in the Philippines assessing a wildlife park. He was a cherisher of friendship, a man brave and true.*

*Kaole was his name.*

There are now threats to the park from [the Nansanga](#) and Luombwa Block farming schemes and other agri-development landgrabs (Senior Chief Muchinda). The Nansanga is placed upstream of the main river feeding the park, an alienation that should never have been allowed. It was only after the scheme was approved that an EIS was provided. The Kasanka will suffer impacts to its elephant population, to its bat havens, and the sitatunga and puku wetlands will be poisoned.

Recently, the trust took on the management of Lavusi Manda National Park, where, in 1973, the park in my charge, I had tried to save the last black rhino there and failed. And, finally, the Chinese, who were responsible for their demise, have now banned the ivory

Then in March 2020, the publication of a paper by Vera Rduch and Thalia Jentke revealed that the privatization exercise in Kasanka is a massive failure with an 84% decline in the puku population, a reduction of other species and [“clear signs of poaching.”](#) They also report that a fenced game ranch has been established on the south-western boundary with the park, and impala, kudu and eland introduced to the area - the former not native. Impala have now invaded the park. In 2017, African Parks translocated 150 puku from Kasanka to the Bangweulu wetlands. Waterbuck, roan and eland were not observed, and fires are rampant.

**Abstract**

Knowledge about antelope populations and their status is a key for conservation. In November 2019, we used distance sampling to perform a re-survey of the bovid species in Kasanka National Park, Zambia, with a focus on the puku (*Kobus vardonii*). Data collection and subsequent analyses were of the same design as in a previous survey in 2009–2010. This allowed for the direct comparison between survey periods, especially for the data collected in November 2010 and 2019. The estimated puku population size decreased from 5,038 (range 3,268–7,238) animals in 2009–2010 to 819 (range 250–2,708) animals in 2019, representing an 84% decline. Smaller group sizes were observed. Changes in population structure (decline in male abundance, fewer male groups) and spatial distribution (decline in population density, especially along the park boundaries) of puku showed signs of increased poaching activities in Kasanka National Park. Also, puku became more vigilant and demonstrated significantly longer flight distances in 2019 in comparison with 2010. A strong decline in puku in combination with clear signs of poaching, as well as the reduced species richness and sightings of other bovids, should become an agenda for long-term conservation of Kasanka National Park.

<https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2022/feb/07/injunction-halts-deforestation-threat-to-zambia-park-vital-for-fruit-bats-aoc>

## West Lunga National Park

West Lunga also achieved national park status in 1972. For thirty years it languished until in 2003, the West Lunga Trust was established by Charles Rea of Mwinilunga in association with the Kesho Trust (a registered society in British Columbia, also registered as an NGO in Tanzania), to ensure the con-

servation of the park and the surrounding Chibwika and Ntambu chiefdoms – both GMAs. The Chibwika Development Foundation, a wholly grassroots organization, emerged from the process. In early 2009, with Lewis Saiwana in his final year as DG ZAWA, there came the surprising news that the privatization organization, African Parks, had taken over. But on 11 September 2009, the CEO of this business organization, Peter Fearnhead – the former Commercial Manager of South African National Parks - and whose privatization model had been adopted by their AP program funder, Vlisserman - announced on African Park's website that the West Lunga Project had formally been terminated by Minister of Tourism Namugala, African Parks suspending its activities in February 2009, having signed a management agreement in 2008, with a loss of \$250,000. This was all part of a UNDP/German-aid climate change project. The Minister said 'that she would like the Zambia Wildlife Act to be amended and a policy to be developed on public-private-partnerships before any further agreements with ZAWA are concluded...that ZAWA made mistakes'. This announcement came five years after the first illegal signing of a privatization agreement – and for the same reason, between African Parks, ZAWA and the Barotseland Royal Establishment for Liuwa Plain and Sioma Ngwezi national parks.

It was alleged that a dispute between the DG ZAWA and the Muslim-Indian hunting-safaris cabal, who had attempted to obtain the hunting rights in the two contiguous GMAs, had led the cabal to place pressure on the minister for the cancellation of the African Parks agreement. In October 2009, the REMNPAS aid project on protected areas had taken West Lunga under its wing. It had Chiawa and Chikuni in Bangweulu – the latter in

partnership with African Parks, funded by the United Nations Program for Development (UNDP). In late 2012 a potential Australian investor in the West Lunga told me that he had found the park besieged by poachers - with no sign of ZAWA guards and a great quantity of plant and equipment and new buildings supplied by UNDP. He also mentioned that UNDP had bought a new aircraft for the park and that the roads in the park had three to four-year-old trees growing in them.

## Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCAs)

### Malawi-Zambia TFCA.

On 13 August 2004, the Zambian and Malawian governments signed an MOU agreeing to establishing the Malawi- Zambia TFCA and an international coordinator's appointment to manage the TFCA's development. The Global Environmental Facility approved a project preparation grant of \$328,000, which the two governments requested the Peace Parks Foundation to manage and oversee to an implementation phase. The legal agreement between the World Bank and Peace Parks has since been signed, as has the letter of agreement initiating the process to establish an endowment fund for the project that will receive a capital injection of \$5.9 million once established. In the first component, management and tourism plans have been drafted, and a joint law-enforcement project combats commercial poaching in the Nyika and Vwaza/Lundazi compo-

nent of the TFCA. A wildlife-restocking program for Lundazi Local Forest and Vwaza Marsh Wildlife Reserve commenced in 2007. In May 2008, the ministerial committee approved the investment framework and logo for the Malawi-Zambia TFCA and the Nyika TFCA joint management, integrated tourism development and restocking plans, and the Kasungu-Lukusuzi project plan. In 2013 it had been agreed that the North Luangwa National Park would form part of the TFCA.

In 2014 a Zambia Auditor-General report revealed that seven gemstone mines were operating in the Lukusuzi National Park.[xxv]

The African Wildlife Foundation and the Wildlife Conservation Society (USA) – aka Dale Lewis - support the implementation of Community Markets for Conservation (COMACO) in the area between Kasungu and Lukusuzi.

## KAZA TFCA

Kaza includes Zambia, Angola, Botswana, Namibia, and Zimbabwean territory that make up the 278,000 km<sup>2</sup> in the Okavango and Zambezi River regions. The MOU was signed at Victoria Falls on 7 December 2006. KAZA TFCA includes the Okavango Delta and Chobe, Makgadikgadi, Kafue, Sioma Ngwezi, Musi-o-Tunya, Hwange, Chizarire, Bwabwata, Moremi and Luiana. AWF Kazungula Heartlands is part of the project, along with Conservation International, Integrated Rural Development and Nature Conservation, Peace Parks Foundation, Roots of Peace and WWF. It has the CBNRM objectives of support to local villagers by developing income-

generating opportunities such as community-run tourism enterprises, cultural and ecotourism villages, and basketry projects within ecological corridors linking protected areas.

In 2016, the Botswana government complained that Zimbabwe and Zambia failed to pay their subscription or provide water, forcing elephant to move into Botswana.

### Sioma Ngwezi National Park

When African Parks had declined to take it on under a PPP arrangement, ZAWA embarked on establishing a partnership between the Royal Barotse Establishment itself and the customary residents of the area. The original proposal was to develop a large tourist lodge, the institutional framework for signing a co-management agreement between ZAWA and the residents of two villages. In 2010 SADC initiated a tourism marketing effort called Boundless Southern Africa, coordinated by the Department of Environment and Tourism Affairs in South Africa, and assisted by many consultants who were given the contract for tourism marketing in the Peace Parks TFCAs. In Sioma National Park, they issued some concessions: Kwando, Kalolo, Ibaale, Ngezi, Katuli and Mufulani, and Ngonye Falls Lodge. No mention was made of any customary area resident participation or ownership. However, being part of the KAZA TFCA, the park was allocated €3.3 million by Peace Parks donors, part of it to implement the Community Centred Conservation and Development Program involving agricultural activities. Also included was the fenced Ngonye Falls Community Partnership Park and the construction of

the Sioma Ngwezi park headquarters. Peace Parks approved an early burning program so that 'there are fewer late-season veld fires and thus less destruction...', not the wisest course of action.

Peter Moss, the authority on the Kafue park and the surrounding GMAs, clarifies that early burning is unnatural, described by Fraser Darling as a '*tool of despair*', eliminating fire-sensitive plants and converting the vegetation into a monotonous woodland. Moss wrote:[xxvi]

The Lozi people, cattle keepers of the Barotse Floodplains and the Ila of the Kafue Flats, were ecologically attuned to the carrying capacity of the habitats they lived in. They and their cattle moved as fresh grass grew and as the seasons changed. Early administrators recorded the fact that both tribes never burned the grass on their floodplains until the annuals had seeded. The perennials had completed a year's growth, so that in places where there was standing dry grass at the end of the dry season, fires would be started to clear the dead or dying growth and to encourage the new flush, the rest having been grazed to a low incombustible state. This form of controlled burning, in fact, coincided with the lightning storms of the early rains, thus emulating natural fire that allowed natural succession to take place and a broad mosaic of vegetation types and stages in succession to prevail. This was well known to the Administration and was a well-respected policy for edaphic grassland management practiced by traditional rulers. After many years of research and practical endeavour, the Kafue National Park objective was set as follows: '*To protect as much of the park as possible from fire and to delay fire incursions as long as possible*'.



## The Kazungula and Zambezi Heartlands program

Most of the former Heartlands is now part of KAZA. It was funded by USAID and directed by the African Wildlife Foundation and its partners: Peace Parks Foundation, the Southern African Trust, The Nature Conservancy, USAID/Regional Centre for Southern Africa, the Wildlife and Environment Conservation Society of Zambia, the Botswana Department of National Parks and Wildlife, the Elephant Pepper Development Trust, Integrated Rural Development and Nature Conservation of Namibia, and the Japan Fund for Global Environment.

In Zambia, it supposedly included the Rufunsa GMA, the Lower Zambezi National Park, and the Chiawa cultural village's development within the Chiawa GMA, where it had shared interests with the proposed Chiawa community partnership park – the latter unable to attract funding or the necessary support. AWF's principal interest is elephant conservation, yet they have done nothing to oppose plans for large lodge developments, nor the alienation of 39,000 hectares of the Rufunsa GMA bordering the park, nor the proposed mining of the Lower Zambezi National Park, the Chiawa GMA and the building of the trans-national park highway.

On their website, they state that the elephant population in the Zambezi Heartland is on the rise - with an 8% increase overall since 2002 and a dramatic 137% rise in Zambia, claiming that 'landscape-wide management techniques' and poaching prevention efforts are working. This flies in the face of the information presented at the CITES CoP15 meeting in Doha, which revealed the area to be one of the most heavily poached

in Zambia, confirmed by my experience of the poaching in the adjoining West Petauke GMA. This was re-confirmed in 2016 by the Africa-wide elephant census.

## The Liuwa Plain National Park

This park has long been the Paramount Chief of Barotseland's personal fiefdom, the Litunga, with little being done there by the government until the first aerial census of its wildlife was made in 1975 by Peter Moss and myself.[xxvii] In 2003, when I assisted ZAWA in producing guidelines on public-private partnerships (PPPs), it was made clear to me by the Director of Conservation, Lewis Saiwana, that no PPPs would be entered into by ZAWA until national policy on PPPs was provided, and that an application made by me to establish a PPP for the Lavusi Manda and Isangano national parks would have to await this event.[xxviii] Despite this, in 2003, African Parks was granted a concession over Sioma and Liuwa national parks. In Johannesburg in 2001 or thereabouts, I had been asked by a friend, John Ledger, to meet with a board member of African Parks who wished to seek my advice on the Barotseland parks. I had heard of AF and their wealthy founder, Paul van Vliissingen, who had persuaded Nelson Mandela in 1998 that the customary villagers resident in and around protected areas would benefit from conservation and protection activities. But this was neoliberal privatization with commercial interests. Van Vliissingen, an economist, was beguiled by the Kruger National Park privatization model, perpetuating an enclosure of the public and customary commons.[xxix]

With Sioma Ngwezi soon dropped by African Parks (its elephant now massacred), the Liuwa agreement was cemented by the formation of African Parks (Zambia) Limited, with African Parks holding 70% of the shares the Barotse Royal Establishment (BRE) 30%, and ZAWA nil.[xxx] The agreement stipulated that both the BRE and ZAWA could not interfere in the park management and that African Parks was empowered to have complete rights over the wildlife, rights little different from that of a game ranch owner. However, the people living in the park with their cattle had their customary rights respected. They were allowed to fish in designated ponds, collect vegetative materials, grow crops in agricultural areas, and live in the park. They were not allowed to hunt, and no mention was made of their traditional use of fire to enhance grazing under the direction of the *Litunga*, nor income sharing.

African Parks agreed to spend not less than \$2 million over the first five years and not less than \$25 million over the 20-year lease period. Any 'surplus' of income over expenditure, it was stipulated in the agreement, should be divided among the three shareholders: 40, 30, and 30% respectively to the African Parks, ZAWA and the '*local community*' – this taken to mean the 20,000 villagers living in the park.

In 2003 the United Party for National Development MP for Livingstone, Sakwiba Sikota, [accused the government of corruption](#), complaining that the people of Liuwa and Barotseland had not been consulted and that their heritage had been taken from them. He called for a parliamentary inquiry, a request ignored.[xxxi]

In 2004 headmen (*n'dunas*) from the area came to Lusaka to voice their discontent at the 'alienation' of their park to African Parks. They sought a meeting with me at which I advised that

they form Community Resource Boards under the Wildlife Act of 1998 to obtain rights to wildlife, followed by trusts along the lines of my Landsafe framework, and then seek investors for the appropriate development of the land bordering the park, an area which I suggested should soon have increasing numbers of wildebeest and other wildlife as result of the activities of African Parks.[xxxii] so that they were able to discuss the larger political issues, I organized a meeting for them with the upper hierarchy of the Patriotic Front Party, Michael Sata, Guy Scott and Wynter Kabimba, along with Rolf Shenton, a former MMD MP and son of the former Game Department Warden of the Kafue NP, Barry Shenton. At the time, I was woefully ignorant of the Barotse Agreement 1964, and at the meeting, Sata never mentioned it. It was clear that ZAWA and the Minister of Tourism (Kalifungwa) – supported by the *Litunga* of Barotseland - had effectively alienated the park to the limited liability company African Parks without the clear agreement of the residents and those outside with access rights.

In 2006 the public accounts committee on the Auditor-Generals' report of 2005 revealed the illegal acceptance by ZAWA of a donation, which was listed as having been given by People and Parks to ZAWA:[xxxiii]

*The Zambia Wildlife Authority Act, which stipulate, among other things, that the Authority may accept moneys by way of grants or donations from any source in Zambia and subject to the approval of the Minister from any source outside Zambia, ZAWA received a donation of K207 million in 2005 from People and Parks, an organization based outside Zambia, without the approval of the Minister.*

The ZAWA Controlling officer replied that:

*It was regretted that there was an omission with regard to ZAWA's seemingly failure to obtain approval for the K207 million donations from an organization called "People and Parks" based in South Africa. Although there were indications that the former Director-General had obtained authority from the Minister, no letter to this effect was traced.*

The Officer listed the donation's use: the rehabilitation of the DG's office, work on the library and the procurement office. When I questioned the accounts office at Chilanga, he told me that the DG Saiwana had spent some of the money on himself in the form of sidearms, hubs for his car and so on. The donation had been a bribe. At the time, the only 'People and Parks' I could find were based in Australia. I wrote to them but never had a reply. However, the Department of Environmental Affairs in South Africa has a People and Parks Program, but no such organization. When working with Saiwana on PPPs, he said that no PPPs would be considered until there was national policy. African Parks is in total control of the area. And this is the land of the Barotseland abrogation of 1964. In its final comment on the donation issue, the committee requested that 'the controlling officer establish whether the donation carried any conditions that subsequent ZAWA administrations may have to deal with'. This was likely never done.

While Liuwa Plains is still a concession of African Parks, it also forms part of the Liuwa Plains-Mussumu TFCA orchestrated by the Peace Parks Foundation to conserve the full range

of the wildebeest migration in Barotseland and Angola. In 2017 the BRE brought a case to the High Court charging the *Litunga* with having 'trouserred' the BRE share of income. But in February, four n'duna's had taken him to court for neglecting his duties since 2,000, requiring that he step down. Nothing so far has come of it.

While one must oppose neoliberal privatization, there is little doubt that African Parks has increased the [wildlife stocks of Liuwa](#), Lindsey et al. 2014 reporting that 'By contrast, in Liuwa Plains (co-managed by African Parks/ZAWA since 2003), wildlife populations have recovered, and large mammal biomass (excluding hippos and species of bushbuck size and smaller) increased from 966 kg/km<sup>2</sup> in 2003 to 1,921 kg/km<sup>2</sup> in 2013. Apart from game ranches, this is not the case elsewhere.[xxxiv]

## The Kafue National Park

The SEED Project prepared the first national park in Zambia for attempted privatization and the landgrab of nine surrounding GMAs. In 2010 ZAWA adopted the Kruger National Park privatization model and tried to tender new commercial tourism concessions and large co-management concessions for the park. Under this scheme, commercial tourism concessions (TCs) were divided into recreational TCs, consisting of high-value investments such as hotels and lodges with a capacity of more than 40 beds each, and nature-based TCs of various negotiable size. The commercial concessions were to be operated through a tourism concession agreement (TCA) between the concessionaire and ZAWA.

Recreational tourism concessions were awarded for an initial term and in consideration of a fixed charge and a variable payment per bed night per person. The minimum variable charge was based on the bed occupancy in the first two years of operation, 15% in the third year, 20% in the fourth and subsequent years. Certain rebates were considered for occupancies above 55%. The concessionaire also had to commit to capital investment in fixed assets outlined in a business plan. In the case of permanent structures, the concessionaire agreed to turn over to ZAWA - at the end of the initial term or the agreement's termination, all the structures erected by them. ZAWA asked for large payments in both operating and capital investment for its leases, unrelated to investment returns. Smaller operators, having signed leases at reasonable levels, suddenly found their lease amounts doubling.

However, the focus had developed into joint management concessions (JMCs) covering large areas of the park (between 1,823 km<sup>2</sup> and 6,778 km<sup>2</sup>) and awarded as JMC agreements between 'ZAWA, local communities and concessionaires'. ZAWA declared that concessionaires would consist of partnerships that might include the private sector, NGOs and 'community-based organizations' (CBOs). The critical issue was the lease period, a 75- years lease being a little different from leasehold alienation.

The mention of CBOs is unconvincing as the original owners of the native trust land, from which Kafue was demarcated, and the basis for its establishment should have been the founding partners in the PPPs. These would have been the residents of the Namwala area.

Under the original recommendation in a 2007 consultancy report to ZAWA on the feasibility of establishing block tourism

concessions in the park, the investor would enter into a 75:25 shareholding with ZAWA and pay them an annual concession fee. This proposed agreement was a PPP concept that was built on later following acceptance of the park's business plan of 2008, the first phase implementation in 2009 and the revised general management plan of 2010, at a time when the principle of the joint management concession agreement - with a variable tenure period and negotiable set of responsibilities, was introduced.

In August of 2011, in the turbulence of an imminent national election, the whole tourism concession system for which ZAWA had recruited the services of a brokerage company under Tony Pass, one funded by the World Bank, was suddenly replaced on Banda's orders by the Greater Kafue National Park Economic Development Project (GKNP) under that neo-conservative free-trade army, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), established in 2004 by President George Bush. An MCC account (MCA) was established in Zambia in the Ministry of Finance and National Planning with funding of \$120 million - reduced from \$164 million. JMC's were, therefore, to be put aside in favour of a single 'management partner' for ZAWA. This partner would have responsibility for managing the entire park and surrounding GMAs, nullifying the ongoing brokering of JMCs and TCs.[xxxv] The role of ZAWA itself, the villagers, and the legal legitimacy of this plan remained obscure.

What had occurred was that in the final weeks before the national election, President Banda had issued instructions to ZAWA, through his chief economics advisor at State House, to cancel the multiple JMC process and to engage fully any recommendations put forward by the MCC, thereby unilaterally disregarding the existing brokerage contract as well as all the



recommendations made in the business plan and associated general management plan reports. This order was issued when parliament had been dissolved, when no minister was in office, and without the approval of the ZAWA Board. Allegedly, on 30 August, the MCC signed a letter of commitment with ZAWA, though the latter, to their credit, were not in favour of the executive order. Apparently, business-orientated consultants to the MCC had recommended that African Parks be the single management partner of ZAWA within the park and that COMACO, the program dependent on NORAD and other donors for its sustenance, take over the nine GMAs, i.e. the customary area covered by the GMAs.

Chemonics International Inc and its consultants - lead by J. Barnes, and retained by MCC as the consultants on human livelihoods, produced a report and recommendations that reiterated much of the disastrous ADMADE program, out of which COMACO was developed. Their stated aim for the Kafue program was "To promote sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction in the greater KNP area through increased nature-based tourism, improved park and wildlife management capacity, and greater participation in tourism and diversified livelihood activities by the rural communities in the surrounding Game Management Areas (GMAs)".[xxxvi]

In abject ignorance of Zambia's history and of African land tenure, they recommended that the *alienation of land to leasehold* be allowed in the GMAs so that they 'would be able to maximize consumptive and non-consumptive tourism', citing the fact that private sector companies had already done so. And instead of an independent and decentralized customary statutory structure being formed, they recommended that the community resource boards (CRBs) – a ZAWA proxy - be registered as a trust or

commercial company and carry out the development with a single NGO partner. These recommendations to the MCC raised considerable concerns about the total alienation of customary area by MCC, acting in consort with a single outside agency. The recommendation for the full strengthening of the CRBs and conversion to trust status to deliver CBNRM – rather than statutory organizations being established within the communities themselves, showed no understanding of the need to protect customary area. What it represented was yet another landgrab and low point of donor aid recommendations and actions.

The MCC had suggested the following financial inputs: the Zambian government (\$3,670,217), ZAWA (\$271,478), World Bank and Global Environment Fund (\$4,885,779), Millennium Challenge Account (\$164,248,587), Norway (\$1,836,590), the partner GMA organization (\$3,704,000), the partner Joint Management Concession for the national park (\$6,250,000), with a total project cost of \$201,317,908. CBRM expenditure was projected at \$19,382,046 – a mere 10%, with business development adding another \$14,084,046. Of considerable concern was that some 70% of the money for the GKNP project was set aside for road construction in the KNP itself, at unnecessarily advanced standards and expense - with a considerable amount of fee money reserved for U.S. road consultants.

In early November 2011, the MCC had dropped its Kafue project and now invest in the Lusaka water sector. This decision was probably due to the PF government's expected future investigations into Rupiah Banda and his MMD administration (begun in March 2013 with the lifting of Banda's immunity from prosecution). Added to this, the World Bank and Norway

at the time were due to discontinue their funding of the park. But as the Kafue project faded from view, another took its place, the Greater Lusaka Water Project, soon mired in corruption. The sequel to all the aid jockeying was a short paragraph in the [2014 Auditor-General's report on the 'Management of Wildlife'](#): [xxxvii]

*Out of a total of thirty (30) tour operators in the Kafue National Park, fifteen (15) operators with valid concession agreements signed between 2003 and 2008 were not operating and had not honoured their obligation to pay fixed charges. However, as of 31st December 2013, ZAWA had not taken any action against the operators.*

*Tourism Minister applauds partnership with African Parks (September, 2021)*

<[LINK](#)>

*Tourism and Arts Minister Rodney Sikumba has said his office will work with African Parks (AP) and all partners who share the government's vision.*

*Speaking this morning when he received the handover of the painted Kwacha House building and a ZMK7,470,255 cheque meant for the Kafue National Park, the Minister said the Government must shine through to the far reaches of this country and add value to the way of doing business in the management of national parks, game management areas and other wildlife protected areas...And African Parks Country Director James Milanzi said AP model*

*has achieved its goal of making a parks secure from illegal activities and create a tourism product of local and international reputation. in liuwa plain national park, after 18 years, ap has spent us\$30m and the fruits of that are seen.*

And so it continues.

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## CITES Confusion

*CITES implemented in Zambia (1991) - Zambia burns 15.5 tonnes of ivory (1991 - 1992) - Zambia applies to sell 17 tonnes of ivory at CoP12 (2002) - no control of stockpile - Singapore ivory smuggling of 19 container loads (1994-2002) – Luangwa is source of ivory - confiscated 2002 consignment taken to Kenya – poacher mastermind Benson Nkunika pardoned by Banda - Luangwa Warden Nkhoma implicated - six tonnes of ivory from Lusaka captured in Manila – ZAWA does not comply with CoP14 action plan (2007) - CITES inspection panel visit (2010) – panel accepts ZAWA tale of payments to CRBs - ZAWA applies for elephant downlisting at CoP15 (2009) to sell 22 tonnes of ivory - application rejected - Zambia wants to sell ivory stockpile at CoP16 but changes mind (March 2012) - ZAWA reports theft of the ivory (June 2012) – LATF: Lusaka Taskforce – elephant sport hunting and ZAWA perfidy - Minister Pande ignorance - SCI's Jackson's ludicrous claim - - hallmarks of science missing from North American wildlife management - after two year ban 20 elephant and 24 lion (and 2,000 hippo) on safari license (2016) - CITES allows tusks of 80 elephant to be exported (2017) - CITES won't allow Zambia to sell its 52-tonne*

*ivory stockpile*

*Science ... commits suicide when it adopts a creed*

T. H. Huxley – The Darwin Memorial (1885)

*Thus further time passed. Then gradually I began to intellectually reject some of the delusionally influenced lines of thinking, which had been characteristic of my orientation. This began, most recognizably, with the rejection of politically oriented thinking as essentially a hopeless waste of intellectual effort.*

John Nash – A Brilliant Madness[i]

*The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) seeks to conserve plant and animal species through the regulation of international trade. CITES has traditionally encouraged its members to enforce its trade restrictions through the adoption of strict legislation and the nationalization of lands for use as protected areas. This “classical” approach to conservation, however, is ineffective in many developing countries, since they often lack the resources or political will necessary to enforce these measures. Additionally, by removing local communities’ ability to use, and therefore benefit from, the protected species, the classical approach can actually incentivise the communities to undermine the developing countries’ conservation efforts.*

Stefan Carpenter - The Devolution of Conservation: Why CITES Must Embrace Community-Based Resource Management (26 September 2011)[ii]

*Science should be a corrective to politics, challenging assumptions, asking uncomfortable questions, projecting longer time horizons. If it is to formulate utopias these must be real utopias, rooted in lived experience, and we have to be extra vigilant in examining their conditions of existence, their internal contradictions, and their possible dissemination. In all cases science loses its raison d'être when it loses its autonomy, its critical pessimism. If it takes a bit of combat to jolt widely held preconceptions, then so be it.*

*Michael Burawoy*

\* \* \*

For Zambia to pursue income generation from wildlife, it has to engage with the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES), a convention concluded on 3 March 1973 and entered into force after ratification by ten countries on 1 July 1975. The new strategic vision of the Conference of the Parties (CoP) to CITES outlined the convention's direction in the new millennium. It took into account, within the context of its mandate, issues such as contributing to the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) relevant to CITES and contributing to the World Summit on Sustainable Development's (WSSD) target of significantly reducing the rate of biodiversity loss by 2010, as well as ensuring that international trade in wild fauna and flora is conducted at sustainable levels. In this, it has failed.

In 1991 the Zambian Parliament was told that "The Forest Act No. 7 of 1999 provides for the implementation of the

convention,[iii] the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance - especially of waterfowl habitat, the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Convention to Combat Desertification and the Lusaka Agreement on Co-operative Enforcement directed at illegal trade in wild fauna and flora'. In 1991 the National Parks and Wildlife Services (NPWS) had nine tonnes of ivory in its store. In 1992, funded by Elefriends, they burnt 6.5 tonnes.

CITES is a contentious convention, running up against differing theories of economics and the impacts of trade restrictions on the illegal harvesting of wildlife species, in particular – now that native Zambian black rhino are extinct – elephant and hippo (ivory, hippo teeth and bushmeat), and lion and leopard (bones and teeth).[iv] At the 12th meeting in Santiago, held 3-15 November 2002, Zambia made an application for its elephant to be downlisted from Appendix I to Appendix II to sell its stockpile of 17 tons of ivory.

Before CoP12, a CITES panel of experts visited Zambia in late 2002, reporting that Zambia was failing to report seizures of ivory as required under the convention. They also reported that Zambia had not communicated any information on ivory seizures to the secretariat or The Wildlife Trade Monitoring Network (TRAFFIC) - although TRAFFIC had sought information from Zambia - and consequently was not implementing the recommendation in Resolution Conf. 10.10 that parties should provide information on seizures within 90 days of their occurrence. Also, an audit conducted by Price Waterhouse in 1998, which the panel expected would contain details of ivory stocks, was not made available to them for inspection. As was reported in the document, when alluding to the 17-tonne ivory stockpile:[v]

*This equates to approximately 1.4 tonnes a year (N = 10 years). The average weight of ivory (N = 1,700) being 4.23 kg per tusk, it can be assumed that ivory from about 200 elephants were being harvested each year. This equates to about .9% of the overall population (22,000), which is within the expected rate of increase of elephant populations in the region (assumed to be 3 - 5% per annum).*

The panel concluded that the elephant population was not increasing, indicating an illegal offtake of approximately 800 animals a year. But Zambia reported that from 1988-1992 poaching in the Kafue National Park increased threefold. They claimed it was reduced by more than 90% by ADMADE and LIRD anti-poaching operations in the Luangwa Valley parks. This conclusion is improbable given the extinction of rhino at that time and in light of the revelations brought about by the Singapore ivory bust.[vi] In the document, CoP. 12, Doc. 66, Annex 4 – p. 6, CITES posed the following question:[vii]

*Would the acceptance of the proposal be likely to have a positive or negative impact on the conservation status of the elephant population and its environment in the affected range state? The responses to most of the questions posed by the Conference of the Parties are negative. Nonetheless, if the proposal were accepted, and if the stock of raw ivory in Zambia were sold, the funds could be used to ensure a positive impact on the status of the species in Zambia. The Conference of the Parties will be able to judge this when it is clear exactly how the funds would be*

*spent.*

The CITES report CoP.12, Com. 1 Rep (Rev.) – p.3 made clear that members were not easily duped. The U.S. delegation, supported by Denmark and on behalf of the EU and Kenya member states, declared that they could not support the amended proposal because the Zambian population failed to meet the requirements for transfer from Appendix I to II. They expressed concern that the elephant population was declining in Zambia and that the Zambian government did not have the capacity to monitor elephant populations or control illegal hunting adequately. On behalf of the EU, Denmark proposed that Zambia improve their control of illegal hunting and stockpiles and consider resubmitting the proposal to CoP13. Israel requested clarification on a report by the David Shepherd Foundation that funds raised from the 1992 burning of 9.5 tonnes – of the 17 tonnes - had been mismanaged. Zambia declared that it had offered to meet with the foundation to discuss the issue. They then requested funds for conservation, concluding with a request for a vote by secret ballot. The proposal was narrowly rejected.

## Singapore ivory

But CoP12 was not aware that a raid in March 2002 on supposedly legitimate ivory carving business in Lilongwe had discovered large amounts of ivory. This led to a 5.9-tonne consignment of ivory being intercepted in Singapore. In

April 2005, I attended an International Ivory Enforcement Training Workshop in Lusaka held by the Environmental Investigation Agency (UK) and funded by DFID, where a presentation on the Singapore ivory seizure was made, which included details of the DNA investigations of the ivory and soil isotope analysis, suggesting that the elephant came from two savannah populations, one of them perhaps being the Luangwa. However, they needed to be matched with samples from there and elsewhere. At this same presentation, Samuel Ngosi of the Malawi Anti-Corruption Bureau revealed, possibly for the first time, that 19 shipments had been made between 1994 and 2002 by the same criminals in Lilongwe, using the same methods and freight carriers, and sent to the same destination – a possible total of 123.5 tonnes of ivory being shipped. The value of this at the time was \$185 million.

As reported in a National Geographic newsletter, Sam Wasser and his team at the University of Washington sequenced DNA recovered from nearly 500 samples of dung collected from elephant in 23 African countries and then matched it with DNA from the seized ivory.[viii] When Wasser's team compared 75 samples from the illegal shipment to their genetic map, they found that all the ivory came from Zambia. Moreover, as the bulk of Zambia's remaining elephant are to be found in the Luangwa, this does name the ivory's source.[ix] Extrapolating from the 2002 CITES report on Zambia found that the average ivory in the strong room was 4.23 kg; this would mean the tusks of 14,598 elephant might have been in those 19 containers.

The Lusaka Task Force took the confiscated 2002 consignment to Kenya for assay.[x] Benson Nkunya – the man involved in procuring ivory for the Singapore syndicate, who was convicted and then released on the understanding that he would

turn state witness, subsequently re-offended (poaching in the Luangwa Valley again), was re-convicted and imprisoned, and then pardoned by the big man of Eastern Province at the time, President Rupiah Banda. As a US investigator [revealed in a 2007 report](#) submitted to the US National Institute of Justice: [xi]

*Nkunika was arrested for poaching in Mfuwe in 2001 and subsequently revealed the extent of the network he was supplying with ivory. His testimony not only indicated extensive corruption within the regional ZAWA staff but also that he had been hired by Rodgers Nkhoma, the warden of Luangwa National Park to kill as many as 100 elephants. The killing of elephants near the ZAWA base at the park supported Nkunika's claim that ZAWA was involved. Interviews with ZAWA investigators by the researcher supported these claims of extensive internal corruption. As far back as 1992, as reported by Britain's Environmental Protection Agency (EIA), Zambia admitted to official involvement in elephant and rhino poaching involving the police and military. Poachers tend to operate in small groups of 4-5 individuals and store their weapons with local villagers. They also hide ivory by burying it. Weapons are bought or borrowed from local police or military in exchange for money. Chipata was the base for the trafficking group headed by Sindikani Banda.*

On 28 October 2005, a six-tonne consignment of ivory and



precious stones was discovered in a container in Manila's port, the container originating in Lusaka. The ivory was later stolen from the warehouse.

In May 2009, the Ministry of Tourism wrote to the Lusaka Task Force requesting the return of the intercepted ivory of 2002, the same newspaper reporting, 'well-placed sources have revealed that elephants might become extinct in Zambia just like rhino if the government does not prosecute the syndicate involved in ivory scams at Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) and other government agencies'; the same source at the Ministry suggested that some of the Singapore ivory had come from the theft of ZAWA's ivory cache.[xii]

At the 54th Standing Committee meeting of CITES in Geneva in October of 2006, it was decided that Japan would be the designated buyer – pending certain conditions - of the proposed one-off sale of ivory stocks from Botswana, Namibia and South Africa. A decision on designating China as well was put off to a later date. Thus, despite Japan being a major buyer of illegal ivory, it was allowed to import ivory.

At the CoP14 meeting at The Hague between 3-15 June 2007, the Action Plan's implementation for the Control of Trade in African Elephant Ivory agreed to at CoP13 was mandated and adopted. Zambia reported that it was following the plan and had established an office at the Lusaka International Airport. However, this office lay unmanned, and the action plan was not implemented. Document CoP14 Inf. 61 was then presented on behalf of Africa by Chad and Zambia. The new annotation authorized the trade-in hunting-safaris trophies and allowed South Africa, Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe to sell their ivory stockpile, no further sale of ivory being allowed for nine years. This left Zambia and Tanzania free at future CoPs to

apply for downlisting, and therefore able to sell their ivory stockpile.

In 2009 Zambia again proposed the CITES Secretariat for its elephant population to be downlisted from Appendix I to Appendix II (CoP15 Prop. 5) to allow it to trade in registered raw ivory, with a single sale of 22 tonnes only to trading partners designated by the standing committee (this to be allowed once the secretariat had verified the registered government-owned stocks). The conditions applicable were that the trade proceeds must be used exclusively for elephant conservation and community development programs within or adjacent to the elephant range in Zambia; and, on a proposal from the Secretariat, the standing committee could cause this trade to cease in the event of non-compliance.[xiii]

In March 2009, 72 tusks and five rhino horns were intercepted from Kafue to Lusaka. They were transported in three vehicles, with two police officers present. No prosecutions resulted. A report by the Environmental Investigation Agency concluded that. 'There are serious allegations that Zambia has reorganized its stockpile data to affect the inventory of ivory favourably'.[xiv]

Between 31 January and 5 February 2010, a four-person panel of experts selected by the standing committee of CITES travelled to Zambia to assess its application for downlisting at CoP15.[xv] The panel members consisted of the chairman – also the head of the CITES management authority and conference support, an intelligence officer of the Nairobi-based Lusaka Task Force, and two consultants from Dar es Salaam and Harare, respectively. The panel reviewed the ZAWA proposal and the previous review of the application for downlisting made by Zambia in 2002 and submitted it to the 12th

CoP. Two conservation NGOs – both regionally-based - were invited to offer their views, the South Luangwa Conservation Society and Conservation Lower Zambezi. A further two Zambian organizations consulted were the Professional Hunters' Association of Zambia and Zambia's Tourism Council. The international NGOs, WWF, the Wildlife Conservation International (US), the Environmental Investigation Agency (UK) and TRAFFIC provided further information. Also, a host of government officials were interviewed. Only one chief, Chiawa (a former ZAWA Board member), and her CRB were interviewed. No knowledgeable independent experts were consulted – particularly on the science of the aerial population estimate and on the historical record; and the Natural Resources Consultative Forum (NRCF), expressly established by the Ministry of Tourism to deal with such issues in an open-handed manner, was also not consulted. This is likely because the NRCF, in its advisory note to the Minister of Tourism, opposed the issue in 2005 of 20 elephant for sport hunting – its members are drawn from civil society, including the Professional Hunters' Association and the Safari Operators' Association. At the same time, on behalf of the NRCF, I had written a proposal to DANIDA requesting funding for three years for the implementation of the National Policy on Environment, a proposal which Peter Moss had written.[xvi]

The panel accepted the 2008 ZAWA estimate of the elephant population of 26,000 elephant (not including West Lunga), with 18,000 in the Luangwa and approximately 2,000 in the Lower Zambezi. The panel concluded from this that the population was stable if not increasing. ZAWA provided all the information for the panel. In the case of elephant shot on problem animal control, they reported that 122 elephant were shot between

2005 – 2008, an average of 31 a year. However, when the panel inspected the ivory management database, it revealed 525 tusks, equivalent to 66 animals a year. From 2005-2009 hunting-safari operators shot 60 elephant. The figures that ZAWA produced on poached elephant were 59 elephant a year between 1995-1998. In 2008 they claimed that 70 elephant were poached, giving a total offtake for the year, legal and illegal, of 208 elephant – 8% of the 2008 population estimate. The panel then concluded that:[xvii]

*Even if this value were substantially increased, to allow for undetected natural mortalities and poached elephants, it would still fall within the expected rate of increase of the elephant population, in the range 3-5% per annum. Thus, the panel believes that overall elephant offtake can be considered as sustainable at the national level, especially when interpreted with the stable and possibly increasing overall elephant population since 2002.*

The panel also accepted the information given to them by ZAWA on the benefits to customary area villagers, clearly not taking into account reports of the Auditor-General or of the parliamentary public accounts committee, nor numerous reports critical of the delivery of benefits to customary area commoners and the efficacy of resource management in Zambia. It also did not consult with the House of Chiefs or organizations such as the Land Alliance or the Wildlife Producers' Association of Zambia. And it made no mention of the failure of ZAWA to pay the CRBs, further accepting ZAWA's version:

*27. From ZAWA records, the Panel learned that over the years 2005 to 2009, a total of USD 6,171,126 had been disbursed to 56 Community Resource Boards (CRBs) in 35 GMAs. This figure is 40% of total hunting revenue (USD 15,429,920) earned over the same period from foreign clients hunting in GMAs and accrued to ZAWA for subsequent disbursement to communities. On average, this equates to an annual dividend of USD 21,653 to each CRB.*

Apart from all the official and unofficial information to the contrary, ZAWA's minutes resulting from a pre-2011 meeting between themselves and hunting-safari operators concluded that 'ZAWA has failed to pay its staff countrywide because it does not have the funds'. It then revealed its balance sheet: income \$3,634,140, loss \$1,352,400 – and an accumulated loss of \$12,270, 060. And it admitted to owing CRBs more than \$1.3 million. The CITES panel also assumed that ZAWA was following the policy agreed to for the use of CRB income:

*28. The disbursement mechanism is specified in the Wildlife Act and Regulations and stipulates that the hunting revenues (made up of concession and hunting fees) should be divided equally between ZAWA and the community concerned. Fees for elephant hunts are subject to a separate Statutory Instrument, which stipulates payment of USD 10,000 per elephant. All fees due to CRBs are clearly documented by ZAWA, and hunting revenues are disbursed quarterly upon receipt of reports by CRBs on expenditure for the previous quarter and*

*budgets for the forthcoming quarter. Traditional leaders (chiefs) receive 5% of the 50% CRB disbursement directly.*

*30. The CRB allocates 20% of its share (45%) of the hunting revenue to administration, 35% to community projects, and 45% to wildlife management (salaries for 24 trained Village Scouts, patrol equipment and clothing, and patrol rations).*

From my experience working with two CRBs, ZAWA never adhered to the disbursement mechanism. At the same time, the Environmental Investigation Agency (UK) confirmed once more that Zambia has a thriving domestic ivory market with criminal syndicates freely at work, with many of the ZAWA officials implicated in poaching and those involved in poaching now occupying even more senior positions, and that large quantities of ivory are easily obtained. The CITES Panel claimed in CoP15 Doc. 68 Annex 6b – p. 10 that:

*According to ETIS, from 1989 to 2009 there were 229 ivory seizures in the country and 92 outside the country that implicated Zambia. Zambia has been involved in just three large ivory seizures in the period 1989 to 2009: 1,201 kg from Angola, seized in Zambia itself in 1994; 7,146 kg recorded as originating in Zambia, and passing through Malawi before being seized in Singapore in 2002; and 3,720 kg, also recorded as originating in Zambia, and as passing through the United Republic of Tanzania before being seized in the Philippines in 2005.*

In March 2010, the CITES Secretariat endorsed its panel's

report, saying that the proposal demonstrated that the elephant population did not meet the biological criteria for retention in Appendix I and that appropriate and effective enforcement controls are in place in Zambia. While the Secretariat recommended that the proposal be adopted, it also sounded a note of warning:[xviii]

*The adoption of the proposed annotation would mean that no trade in specimens of elephant would be possible under the provisions relating to Appendix II except for hunting trophies; the specified stock of raw ivory owned by the Government and derived from natural mortality and from problem animal control; live elephants of Zambian origin to 'appropriate and acceptable destinations' and 'raw hides'.*

In effect, Zambia was making an application to down-list to make \$3.5 million from the sale of part of the current ivory stockpile at the time when it is unlikely that it would ever trade in raw hides or export many live elephant. Furthermore, hunting-safaris did not need to down-list to receive an increased elephant hunting quota and the necessary permission from CITES to export the trophies – and only 60% of the 20 bull quota was shot, casting doubts on the population estimate. However, Zambia did cite a reason for making the application that it saw the primary risk to elephants in Zambia as elephant conflict with humans and not international trade issues. They would not tolerate humans rising against elephant as a result. However, as revealed in their proposal, much of the motivation for their actions is their resentment of outside interference in

their affairs.

Two elephant experts – Iain Douglas-Hamilton and Joyce Poole, disagreed with the recommendation of the Secretariat that the proposal should be adopted and that elephant in Zambia should be moved to Appendix II. They reminded CITES that the elephant estimate in 1972 was 350,000; in 1981, 160,000. In 2019, there are about 30 000 elephant in Zambia.

In the 1930s, Pitman had reported that there were considerably more than 12,000 elephant.[xix] This was borne out in 1935 as 4,600 were shot on crop protection and 573 killed on licence.[xx] This figure of 5,173 is the number killed; probably the same number again were wounded, at least half dying of their wounds. Moreover, a figure of some 8,000 elephant died from legal control operations. When this is added to the number poached and the number of cows - given the skewed offtake since 1917, Pitman's figure is a considerable underestimate.

On 22 March 2010, at the 12th session of committee I, Zambia addressed the committee, thanked NORAD for their assistance for wildlife conservation over 20 years, but emphasized that their application was motivated by their wish to reduce their dependence on donors. They also highlighted increasing elephant-human conflicts and the fact that the paramilitary had been brought in on anti-poaching exercises. Chief Chiawa addressed the committee, saying that elephants were seriously affecting villagers' livelihoods. Chiefs in Zambia were committed to wildlife conservation, having allocated considerable tracts of land to wildlife (forgetting that they were not consulted on the creation of game management areas). Then, noting the comments from the panel of experts, other parties and the secretariat, Zambia suggested amending the proposal following



rule 22.2 of the rules of procedure, so that, after ‘for the exclusive purposes of allowing’, it would read:

*a) Trade in hunting trophies for non-commercial purposes;  
b) Trade in live animals to appropriate and acceptable destinations, as defined in Resolution Conf. 11.20; c) Trade in raw hides. All other specimens shall be deemed to be specimens of species included in Appendix I and the trade in them shall be regulated accordingly.*

Having made this amendment to their proposal, Zambia admonished those circulating rumours that revenue from ivory sales would be used for political purposes. Apart from the expected support of South Africa and Zimbabwe, Norway and the United States expressed the bizarre view that Zambia had sufficient law enforcement and management capacity to regulate any trade that would be allowed by the adoption of their proposal and considered that the biological criteria for Appendix II listing had been met. Norway also considered Zambia’s proposal to be in line with precedent to transfer elephant populations to Appendix II. Uganda noted that the moratorium on proposals to allow ivory trade agreed at CoP14 did not apply to Zambia’s elephant population. They believed that Zambia was faced with the challenge of balancing increasing numbers of elephant with consequent environmental degradation, which had possible implications for climate change. On behalf of the EU, Spain accepted that Zambia’s elephant met the criteria for downlisting and that national management and conservation measures were adequate. Ghana, Kenya, Mali and Rwanda, as members of the 23-member African Elephant Coalition, were against

the proposal, Kenya and Rwanda reminding the meeting that the moratorium had been instituted to allow implementation of the African Elephant Action Plan and monitoring of the effect of the one-off sales and that Zambia had not consulted African elephant range states before submitting their proposal. Ghana was skeptical about whether benefits from the elephant trade would indeed accrue to people living alongside elephant. Zambia then requested a secret ballot. The result of the vote was 55 in favour, 36 against, with 40 abstentions. Accordingly, the amended proposal was rejected (CoP15 Com. I Rec.12).

On 25 March 2010, in plenary, Zambia moved to vote by secret ballot to re-open the amended proposal debate. The debate was re-opened, with Uganda, Malawi, Japan and Zimbabwe supporting the amended proposal; Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone opposed. The CoP rejected the amended proposal, with 59 in favour, 47 against and 38 abstentions.

In August 2010, the Minister of Tourism Namugala declared that Zambia would re-submit its proposals to CoP16 in Bangkok in March 2013 to enable it to sell its ivory stockpile and would, therefore, increase law enforcement in the Lower Zambezi National Park to reduce 'the high level of illegal offtakes'. However, it made no such application to downlist and sell its stockpile; Tanzania was the only country to so apply, an application later withdrawn at CoP16. Sitting on such a fortune, locked in for years to come, and with a looming national election, the outcome was entirely predictable.

## The ivory 'theft' from Chilanga

In June 2012 - nine months after the PF had won the main election and shortly before by-elections - ZAWA reported the theft of three tonnes of ivory from its Chilanga ivory room – worth in the order of \$5 – \$6 million. This ivory room was described in Zambia's 2009 application to downlist its elephant to Appendix II (to allow it to sell its 24-tonne stockpile of ivory) as 'a newly constructed and modern strong room with a computerized ivory database fully installed and functional, and the premises is under 24 hours armed surveillance'. Two ZAWA scouts (the equivalent of a police constable) were arrested by Zambia Police, beaten, and the Muvi TV cameraman filming the incident arrested and later released, sans his equipment. The Lusaka Police Commissioner revealed that 25 tonnes of 'Government Trophies' were missing from the store. These government trophies could only be ivory, worth in the order of \$40-\$50 million, a tonnage by coincidence corresponding to the ivory ZAWA had applied to CITES to sell. But in early November came news that one of the ZAWA accused was acquitted; the other still faced a charge of being found with a piece of ivory in his house. On 3 April 2014, after lawyers for Muvi Tv had forced the police to release the movie camera – with the film found to be erased, two reporters, one from Muvi TV, the other from the Times of Zambia, were arrested for investigating the ivory theft. The PF government made no further comment.[xxi]

What CITES 15CoP revealed is that the elephant problem is a microcosm of the conservation and people problem - the

CITES, aid-donor, nation-state, NGO consensus problem on the necessity for benefits to flow from wildlife to customary villagers. Given that in customary area with significant wildlife populations, residents are 30% poorer than people living elsewhere, the tepid resolution presented at the Doha meeting by the standing committee working group on CITES and livelihoods, a document entitled: *Strategic Matters: CITES and Livelihoods* on the importance of resource tenure rights for customary residents, is indicative of the problem.

Given the horrendous assault on elephant in Africa as a whole and parts of Zambia such as Sioma Ngwezi National Park and the failure to curb the bushmeat and ivory trade, the only panacea is the building of the customary commons and the enfranchisement of customary residents. However, as long as fortress conservation is pursued by the great and the good, the elephant problem and the elephant impoverished will remain.

## The bushmeat trade

As regards the bushmeat trade, Decision 11.166, adopted by CoP11 relating to the establishment of the CITES bushmeat working group, recognized that poaching and illicit trade in bushmeat constitutes the greatest threat to the survival of wildlife species in Africa, especially in central Africa; and that the illicit trade in bushmeat creates poverty and the food deficit among villagers who use bushmeat as their main source of animal protein. The CoP advised all relevant parties to clarify

or establish property rights regarding CITES-listed species harvested, traded and consumed as bushmeat and involve villagers in monitoring the harvest, trade, and consumption. At CoP15 Doha on 22 March 2010, in Committee II, the Secretariat presented a document on the 'Report of the Central Africa Bushmeat Working Group (CoP15 Doc.61)', announcing that no report had been received from the working group and that decisions 14.73 and 14.74 had been carried over.

An organization established to support the workings of CITES is LATF - the Lusaka Agreement Task Force. The LATF Secretariat grew out of the meeting in 1992 of some African wildlife personnel in Lusaka hosted by the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the Zambian government. In 2000, an MOU was signed between LATF and the CITES. There were six members: Congo, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Lesotho, with South Africa, Ethiopia and Swaziland as signatories. One officer from each state was seconded to LATF. In November 2008, LATF arrested 57 suspected dealers and confiscated about 1,000 kg. of powdered, carved and raw ivory products. Among those arrested were four Chinese nationals attempting to smuggle ivory curios out of Kenya. This highly publicized event merely revealed the scant success of LATF. In October 2008, it held its governing council meeting in Uganda. LATF has had a negligible impact on poaching or the illegal ivory trade in Zambia. To add to this sorry tale of ZAWA and CITES is the saga of elephant sport hunting.

## Elephant sport hunting

In April 2004, ZAWA announced that they were applying to CITES to downgrade elephant from Appendix I to Appendix II to 'control 20 animals' considered to be crop raiders. In May 2005, ZAWA applied for a voluntary elephant quota of 40 tusks at a CITES standing committee meeting. It then issued elephant sport-hunting licences for the 2005 hunting season in the Chiawa, Rufunsa and Lower Lupande hunting concessions. Ten elephants were reserved for those areas' concessionaires, the remaining ten to be auctioned to other safari operators – the proceeds to be deposited in an elephant conservation fund and shared with affected villagers. The reason ZAWA gave for the issue of elephant hunting licences was that villagers had complained of elephant damage to crops and loss of life. The DG of ZAWA, Kabeta, woefully ignorant of wildlife matters, announced that 20 problem bull elephant had been identified by his officers (sic). These would be shot, and that measures would be taken to assist villagers in improving their capacity to defend themselves against raiders. Kabeta, unfortunately, did not give the necessary guidance on just how these 20 unmarked anonymous garden-raiders would be found again. The Tourism Council of Zambia, the Safari Hunting Operators' Association of Zambia, the South Luangwa Conservation Society – which produced an analysis of the issue (in particular a response to ZAWA's Draft Guidelines for Elephant Sport Hunting), and Conservation Lower Zambezi, opposed the hunting of elephant because elephant was poached, that populations had not yet recovered from the hunting ban of 1982, and that the few

bull elephant in these areas were of considerable value to the ecotourism industry. Numerous international elephant conservation organizations also opposed the move. CITES agreed to the hunting. The US Fish & Wildlife Service made two findings: one, under CITES, would determine that the trophy import was for a 'purpose' that was not 'detrimental'; and two, under the US Endangered Species Act, that the underlying hunting benefitted elephant conservation.

On 10 January 2006, the Natural Resources Consultative Forum (NRCF) met to discuss the elephant sport hunting issue to provide an advisory note for the permanent secretary and the minister for their attendance at the Safari Club Convention in Reno, Nevada on 18 January 2006. At the convention, Zambia's safari operators would sell the 2006 elephant quota. The acting DG ZAWA declined to attend the NRCF meeting or to send a competent officer. The meeting overwhelmingly agreed that given the absence of the necessary baseline data from ZAWA, clear advice might be tendered to the permanent secretary. The precautionary principle should be invoked and elephant hunting banned for 2006 until ZAWA provided the essential inputs.[xxii] On 11 April 2006, at the ZAWA HQ, an auction for ten elephant for hunting-safaris was held, and most of the licences were purchased by one bidder, Rashid Randera.

In January 2007, at a meeting with the ZAWA DG Saiwana and my fellow steering committee member of the NRCF, Rolf Shenton, Saiwana assured us that no decision on elephant hunting would be made until he returned from attending the SCI Convention. The next day the ZAWA licensing officer phoned me with an invitation to attend an auction of elephant licences held a few days later. On 19 January 2007, in a repeat of the auction of 2006, and witnessed

by a safari hunting operator's representative, ten elephant for hunting were put up for auction at a reserve price of \$10,000 each, two elephant permits being purchased by Doug Reynolds of Royal Zambezi Safaris for the Chiawa concession, an area adjoining an ecotourism hotspot (Chief Chiyaba is a shareholder). Rashid Randera – a gun and ammunition dealer in Lusaka and Baobab Safaris owner and Nyampala Safaris, who in 2006 had purchased eight elephant permits, attended, did not take part in the public bid but met with the auctioneers before the auction. No other operators, Reynolds and Randera apart - as in 2006, attended. An opportunity was given to acting DG Isaac Longwe to comment on the auction. He did not do so.

On 27 January 2007, Minister Pande, now lobbying in the US – issued an article in the government propaganda mouthpiece, the *Zambia Daily Mail*, entitled, *Zambia Minister lobbies for elephant hunting with US Fish and Wildlife Service*, pronouncing that:

*Zambia has launched a campaign to lobby the United States Government to recognize elephant trophy hunting as key to the conservation of the earth's largest mammal. The American Government does not allow its citizens to participate in elephant hunting-safaris in Zambia and advances the Convention on Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) banning, dealing in ivory among others, as the reason for its position.*

Speaking when he met the Director of the USFW at the Reno Convention Centre, Pande suggested the impossible, i.e. that



in the future, animals shot on control by ZAWA staff should rather be shot by foreign trophy hunters and so earn large sums of money for villagers. He was quoted as saying, "Between 2001 and 2005, 115 elephants were killed on control programs, resulting in a loss of US\$1.1 million in licence fees. If the same animals were hunted for trophies, communities would have realized US\$575,000 for investment in various socio-economic areas to reduce poverty." It is hard to think of an example that so clearly reveals some Zambian Ministers' massive ignorance. A former senior member of ZAWA then wrote to me saying:

*A promise made in public having been abrogated to create some friendship with individuals and give ZAWA a breath to pay some credit is the most terrible betrayal of trust among parties, collaborators and sympathizers. ZAWA will never commit itself to any truth as long as they are dripping with the desire to make money for their senior staff and settle what they owe people. It is a very shamefully situation that the donor agents have continued to go to bed with ZAWA while deliberately failing to put enough conditions and ask for tangible and projected results of the use of their money. Professional judgment and management of wildlife is no longer the main focus, but the commercial benefits gained in such a program.*

On 23 February 2007, at a meeting between ZAWA and safari hunting operators, ZAWA announced that they wished to make changes to the Statutory Instrument No. 40 of 2005 (The Zambian Wildlife (Elephant) (Sport Hunting) Regulations, 2005) so that parts of elephant - other than their tusks, could

be exported. I pointed out that the NRCF - supported at the time by the hunting industry, had advised that elephant should not be hunted in Zambia for a variety of reasons and that this advice had been ignored in 2005 (9 killed) and in 2006 (15 killed), and that in 2007 it was expected that much of the quota of 20 animals would be killed. The Director-General, who had previously given me his word that no elephant-hunting permits would be issued without stakeholder consultations, said that more than 20 elephant a year needed to be killed to provide income for villagers and that the 100 or so animals shot to protect crops should be sport hunted to provide additional benefits. However, for this to be done, it would require that the statutory instrument be altered, i.e. section (2) (a) 'The hunting of elephants for sport shall not include the hunting of elephant for purposes of controlling problem elephants'.

On 15 March 2007, the Tourism Council of Zambia upheld its previous resolution that all elephant hunting-safaris be banned in Zambia, one of its members, the Professional Hunters' Association, giving full support to the Council's position.

According to the regulations, elephant may only be hunted for sport providing the tusks have a minimum weight of 15 kg per tusk and a minimum length of 150 cm per tusk. The CITES Panel's analysis of ZAWA trophy quality records from elephant hunted in 2005-2009 showed that 13 out of 118 tusks were less than 15 kg, while 22 out of 118 tusks were less than 150 cm.

In 2008, ZAWA placed elephant back on licence.[xxiii]

On 31 December 2012, the Minister of Tourism, Sylvia Masebo, announced that no elephant would be hunted from 2013 onwards. In 2016, after a two-year hunting ban, 20 elephant were once more back on quota, as were 24 lion in 2016 and 2,000 hippo over four years in the mid-Luangwa, a

RAMSAR site for wetlands of international importance. CITES, however, allow Zambia to export the ivory of 80 elephant, but will not allow it to export its 52-tonne ivory stockpile.

### *Safari Club International*

In the *Hunting Report* of November 2011, John Jackson III, Conservation-Force Chairman and President, in an article entitled: *District Court Denies Relief in Zambia and Mozambique Elephant Import Suits*, recorded that on 30 August, a US Judge rendered judgment in the suit over the import of elephant hunting trophies from Zambia for the 2005 and 2006 seasons, saying that 'Most relief was denied or mooted while the cases were processing because of the USF & WS finally processing the permits in response to the two suits'. When writing of Zambia, Jackson claimed that:

*The hunting was not for itself, but part of a well-conceived conservation plan. Zambia reopened its elephant hunting in 2005 as part of its formally planned conservation strategy with the advice and support of the foremost experts in the world. It was strictly limited to three select communal areas expressly to reduce elephant-human conflict and provide benefits to those who had to tolerate the elephant.*

Here is revealed the problem Safari Club International (SCI) and Conservation-Force (CF) have in dealing with Africa's hunting issues. Their worthy objective is to expand hunting in Zambia ignoring the lack of supporting scientific evidence

- and in this case, the opinion of the professional hunting community of Zambia who was not in support. But SCI also has problems in justifying much of sport hunting in the USA and Canada. Astoundingly, given the history of wildlife management in North America, [an article in March 2018 by Artelle](#) et al., entitled, 'Hallmarks of science missing from North American wildlife management' reveals a similar situation to that of Zambia and other safari-hunting countries:[xxiv]

*Resource management agencies commonly defend controversial policy by claiming adherence to science-based approaches. For example, proponents and practitioners of the "North American Model of Wildlife Conservation," which guides hunting policy across much of the United States and Canada, assert that science plays a central role in shaping policy. However, what that means is rarely defined. We propose a framework that identifies four fundamental hallmarks of science relevant to natural resource management (measurable objectives, evidence, transparency, and independent review) and test for their presence in hunt management plans created by 62 U.S. state and Canadian provincial and territorial agencies across 667 management systems (species-jurisdictions). We found that most (60%) systems contained fewer than half of the indicator criteria assessed, with more criteria detected in systems that were peer-reviewed, that pertained to "big game," and in jurisdictions at increasing latitudes. These results raise doubt about the purported scientific basis of hunt management across the United States and Canada. Our framework provides guidance for adopting*

*a science-based approach to safeguard not only wildlife but also agencies from potential social, legal, and political conflict.*

### *Conservation Force and leopard*

In May 2017, Conservation-Force (CF) produced a report laying out [50 reasons](#) why the leopard is not endangered in the countries listed as threatened. Here is dealt with the SADC countries, crucial to the future of wildlife, of which safari-hunting is an essential part. Once again, a scientific framework is lacking, i.e. *measurable objectives, evidence, transparency, and independent review*. Under reason 46, they had the following to say:

*46. In Zambia, operators lease concessions from communities in Game Management Areas. They make concession lease payments as well as share 50%+ of animal fees. They provide additional support for infrastructure projects as well. A small sample of four operators invested over \$100,000 in community projects in 2015 and contributed an estimated \$75,000+ in game meat to villages. During the twoyear moratorium on leopard and lion hunting, Zambia's wildlife authority received "lots of complaints from local communities" and human-wildlife conflicts increased, because communities did not receive the tolerance-inducing benefits from sport hunting.*

The paragraph provides two references, one being [a 2015 article in the New York Times](#), which could have done with an independent review before it was published - a good example of

how the media and organizations spread damaging post-truth with a message they want to the public to believe. I commented on the 46th reason:

1. Zambian safari companies do not lease concessions from communities in game management areas but rather from the central government. And the use of the term 'community' is redundant when dealing with a homogenous group of customary residents having legal and traditional use of territory having an allegiance to a chief and headmen and a common culture.
2. The hunting concessionaires do pay concession and animal licence fees to the government, which is supposed to be shared with the 'community'. In a separate [report of September 2018](#), CF give the amount supposedly paid to 'the community' as (in ZMW): 2010: 5,192,444 2011: 10,660,206 2012: 4,658,671 2013: 5,246,777 2014: 5,203,554 2015: 3,368,391 2017: 7,275,717. Yet, as I reveal later in the book, the customary authority and its residents have not received what they are owed under the Hunting Concession Agreement (HCA), the government trousering the money. This is one of the most important issues for a customary authority and its villagers, who desperately require cash benefits from wildlife. However, their cultural and religious beliefs oppose the destruction of the land and wildlife, outside players - including the government - that slaver after their land and resources.
3. Safari operators (having been one myself) do pour a considerable amount of capital and energy - going well beyond the requirements of the HCA - into the concession, including supplying game meat to villagers, infrastructure,

training, medical health, crop protection, providing community trusts, and anti-poaching support, etc.

4. To say that for the two years when hunting of lion and leopard was halted that *human-wildlife conflicts increased* is not true. To support their statement, CF provides no evidence.

The report concluded by saying:

*The correlation is empirically proven: in the SADC countries, wildlife populations (including leopard) are generally stable or increasing, habitat is secure, poaching is controlled, and conflicts are manageable and mitigated.*

CF supply no evidence: in Zambia, there has been a catastrophic reduction in wildlife since 1972, coupled with an invasion of game management areas, parts of them even alienated. [Lindsey et al. confirmed this in 2014](#), giving as the reason:

*a) rapidly expanding human populations, poverty and open-access systems in Game Management Areas (GMAs) resulting in widespread bushmeat poaching and habitat encroachment; b) underfunding of the Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) resulting in inadequate law enforcement; c) reliance of ZAWA on extracting revenues from GMAs to cover operational costs which has prevented proper devolution of user-rights over wildlife to communities; d) on-going marginalization of communities from legal benefits from wildlife; e) under-development of the photo-tourism industry with the effect that earnings are limited to a fraction of the PA network; f) unfavourable*

*terms and corruption which discourage good practice and adequate investment by hunting operators in GMAs; g) blurred responsibilities regarding anti-poaching in GMAs resulting in under-investment by all stakeholders. The combined effect of these challenges has been a major reduction in wildlife densities in most PAs and the loss of habitat in GMAs.*

And the present parlous result:

*The biomass of large wild ungulates is lower in GMAs (mean  $212 \pm 59$  kg/km<sup>2</sup>) and national parks ( $791 \pm 240$  kg/km<sup>2</sup>) than in extensive game ranches ( $2,424 \pm 305$  kg/km<sup>2</sup>) (which are devoid of human settlement and rely primarily on trophy hunting for income) ([Figure S1a](#)) [19]. The diversity of wild ungulates is also lower in GMAs ( $4.7 \pm 0.58$  species) and national parks ( $7.2 \pm 0.9$  species) than on extensive unfenced game ranches ( $11.1 \pm 0.86$  species) ([Figure S1b](#)) [19]. The higher biomass and diversity on private ranches is likely to be primarily due to the availability of greater resources for anti-poaching than in state protected areas. These findings reinforce the suggestion that trophy hunting need not have a negative impact on wildlife populations given appropriate land tenure arrangements.*



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### III

## AFRICA AT LARGE

*Bechuanaland/Botswana - Rhodesia/Zimbabwe -  
Namibia - Malawi - South Africa - Congo Republic -  
Tanzania - Central African Republic*

## Botswana: The Tribe that Lost its Head

*The indigenous people - the Bantu invaders - the cattle hegemony - veterinary cordon fences - Game Department formed (1956) - boundaries set for Moremi Game Reserve (1965) - Simon Holmes á Court - lion, wildog, leopard, hyena classified as vermin - beef exports - an evening with Seretse Khama - Khama elected president of Bechuanaland Protectorate (March 1965) - DNPW formed (1967) - national development plan and wildlife management areas (1975) - Ronnie Landless invites me to start Talana cropping scheme (1976) - tribal land grazing policy destroys customary area (1975) - Bushmen problem - proposed Makgadikgadi cropping scheme turned down - Makalamabedi and Phuduhudu schemes begin - cattle interests and the lion - Bushman fenced out - the rights of Bushman - Bushman evicted from CKGR (1997) - mining in CKGR (1999) - Bushman boreholes destroyed (2002) - High Court decision to allow Bushman to return to CKGR ignored (2010) - fracking proposed in CKGR - reasons for Bushman oppression - Gaborone Declaration (2012) - Botswana boycott (2013) - Conservation International trustee Ian*

*Khama - British Royalty support to Ian Khama - Carlos and anti hunting - 81 game ranches (2015) - game ranches fence off Bushman and allowed to hunt - Ranyane Bushman attempted eviction (2013) - Khama the autocrat - Moremi landgrab - Khama shareholder Linyanti Investments - Bennett on the negative impacts of wildlife law enforcement - Conservation International in bed with WB - safari hunting banned on state land (2013) - funding drought for anti-poaching and villager compensation - poaching in Okavango - US report on human rights violations of Bushmen - 50th Independence celebration and my blog*

*The future should see the establishment of further utilization schemes, directed principally towards the involvement of the rural poor within a series of wildlife management areas. This could be the start of a major conservation revolution.*

*Ian Manning - "[Wildlife Utilization on a Botswana Ranch: A Pilot Project.](#)" Botswana Notes and Records Vol 9, 1977 [i]*

*While hunting formed a critical part of the local economy, conservation of wild animals and vegetation were included in customary rules that regulated access, control and utilization*

*Glorious Gumbo - Economic and social change in the communities of the wetlands of Chobe and Ngamiland, with special reference to the period since 1960 (2010) [ii]*

*Capitalism must be regarded as an economy of unpaid costs, 'unpaid' in so far as a substantial proportion of*

*the actual costs of production remain unaccounted for in entrepreneurial outlays; instead they are shifted to, and ultimately borne by, third persons or by the community as a whole.*

*K.William Kapp – The Social Costs of Private enterprise (1971)*

*Neoliberalism needs to be understood both as a political-economic regime within which capitalism has expanded and diversified, and as a framework for public life within which capital has re-imagined and represented itself, and within which environmentalism has been reformulated, and arguably co-opted.*

*William M. Adams - Sleeping with the enemy? Biodiversity conservation, corporations and the green economy (2017)[iii]*

*Because rights to hunt and gather are not recognized under customary or statutory law, the indigenous San people continue to be displaced by fenced ranches and relocated in settlements. The Tribal Land Act entrenched a fairly uniform system of Tswana land tenure. It did not accommodate other forms deviating from the Tswana patterns of land holding and use. The San are not the only minority marginalized in this way.*

*Martin Adams - Land tenure policy and practice in Botswana; Governance lessons for southern Africa. 2003.[iv]*

*By 'genocide' we mean the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group. This new word, coined by the author to denote an old practice in its modern development, is*

*made from the ancient Greek word genos (race, tribe) and the Latin cide (killing).... Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except when accomplished by mass killings of all members of a nation. It is intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. Genocide is directed against the national group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of the national group.*

*Raphael Lemkin - Genocide*

*In Botswana, Tribal Land is the main class of landholding by area and number of persons affected and acknowledged by the Tribal Land Act, 1968. However, rights to allocate lands have since been centralized into largely unelected boards reporting to the national government. Opportunities for villages to formalize their traditional rights to specific rangelands have also been undermined by legal provision for individuals to access these lands under common law leases. Legal provision does not exist for either Indigenous Peoples (San hunter-gatherers) or settled agro-pastoral communities to obtain collective certificates over shared lands, without forming commercial ranching syndicates.*

*Liz Alden Wily 29 May 2018*



Botswana is a country dominated by a Bantu cattle-owning elite – now expanding into tourism, mining and other businesses through the patronage system, they but part of a very much larger Sotho-speaking group in South Africa. Some three hundred years ago they moved into the eastern part of the territory, making contact with the first Bantu invaders of the southeast, the Kgalagadi, and the people living there from time immemorial, the Bushmen (Basarwa). Fifty years after the rinderpest disaster of 1896 that killed many ungulates - wild and domestic, the country was once more a wildlife paradise, much of it a dry acacia savanna, its jewel in the forehead the Okavango Delta and Chobe River area in the north. Brought to nation status as a British Protectorate in 1885, it was first administered from a small Afrikaner town in the Western Transvaal, Mafeking, with most of its people settled along the eastern line of rail. It immediately became a source of beef and labour for the Witwatersrand mines.

In the 1920s a cold storage facility was built at Lobatse and some beef exported to Europe, but in the 1930s Europe placed an embargo on beef imports due to an outbreak of Foot and Mouth disease (FMD). From 1954 the country embarked on a program of veterinary cordon fence and quarantine ranch construction to control cattle movements from north to south, the first being the 125 miles Dibete fence, followed by Central Ngwato and Ngamiland in 1955, Kuke in 1958, Shorobe-Chobe in 1968, and another 12 fences erected up to 2000.[v]

In Botswana, as with the Bantu elsewhere, customary land is administered by chiefs, with powers of allocation to villagers (usufructuaries) for agriculture and huts, with grazing areas shared by those in the chieftdom owning cattle. As time went on and boreholes were sunk, the sharing fell away with borehole

owners assuming control of what are called cattle posts.

Given the general antipathy to wildlife by the cattle-owning elite, it was only on 1 December 1956 that Major Pat Bromfield was appointed the first Chief Game Warden of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, he later appointing Pat Hepburn in 1960 as the Chobe Game Reserve Warden, and Simon Holmes á Court as Game Ranger Ngamiland, with Daryl Dandridge, appointed Game Control Officer. In September 1964 Rob Backus arrived as a VSO from England, working briefly under the District Commissioner Francistown, Phil Steenkamp, then recruited by the Game Department as a game ranger under Pat Hepburn, joining Mike Sloegrove who had been seconded from Zambia's Department of Game and Fisheries. I met Major Pat Bromfield in 1964 (replaced in 1965 by Lawrence Tennant, assisted by Alec Campbell) in Francistown, and then journeyed to Maun where I briefly carried out some work for Jack Ramsden on the boundary of the future Moremi Game Reserve – set aside originally for the Batawana people by their beloved regent, Pulane, and later, their chief, Letsholathebe II. However, the customary residents of the land, the Bushmen, had been removed beforehand. It was Simon Holmes á Court who found me attempting to recce the boundary of the Moremi, but without the necessary data to do so. He took me off - along with his friend Alan Hill, and we toured Ngamiland, visiting the legendary professional safari-hunters Eric Rundgren and Peter Becker at their camps in the Chobe, returning later to Simon's camp.[vi]



Simon at his Okavango camp in 1964 (pic: IM)

Simon was a quiet man, and greatly respected. He always wore Chapplies, sandals once used by Indians on the Northwest Frontier, and later by the British in the desert war of WWII. I always remember his kindness, reminded of this occasionally when I strapped on my Chapplies in later years. In 1977 he had fallen in love with a girl in Maun. But something went awry, and he simply packed a bag and drove away, never to be seen again. His car was later found parked in the Tsitsikamma Forest in South Africa; and after much time, his skeleton. Years after I received this information:

*Apparently Simon went missing in May 1977 – and about a month later his Datsun pick-up van was found abandoned in the Tsitsikamma Forest with the number*

*plate removed and the engine number scratched off. Ethnee (Simon's mother) was convinced he wasn't the type to commit suicide and no motive for murder was uncovered. Many years later, there was some talk that a man fitting Simon's description had been seen working as a game warden in one of the South African reserves and it caused her to wonder whether he had had some sort of accident and lost his memory, but was still alive. She was unable to verify however.*

And then Richard Bell, the brilliant biologist whom my wife and I had known well in Bangweulu, Zambia, in 2014, - also in Maun and a case of unrequited love, committed suicide.

The assault on wildlife to protect cattle was a feature of life in those times: large predators were classified as vermin, parties of hunters venturing out to shoot lion, hyena and wild dog for a government bounty; in the south-east of the Okavango Delta, the campaign to control the spread of the tsetse fly, carrier of the cattle disease, nagana, resulted in the mass killing of game. This all received the tacit support of the Paramount Chief of the Bamangwato - and later President of Botswana, Seretse Khama, who as a cattle owner saw wildlife as a threat to the cattle business – in particular from Foot and Mouth Disease which prevented the territory entering the beef export market to Europe. To correct this, he dispatched his Director of Veterinary Services, the 'King of Bechuanaland', Jack Falconer, to Europe to negotiate the lifting of the beef embargo. In 1977 an outbreak of FMD closed beef exports for five years. This resulted in the country being traversed by veterinary cordon fences and leasehold ranches in the Kalahari such as the Ncojane ranches. At the request of the Wildlife Department I wrote

a report on the potential for wildlife utilization[vii]. Ncojane killed many migratory wildebeest and hartebeest, and impacted negatively on the Bushmen, many of them serfs to the cattle elite. In 1959, 130 new ranches were added to the Ghanzi Block in the west of the country, all the farms then converted from leasehold to freehold, signalling a final and total removal of ancient Bushmen customary rights there. In 1980 many thousands of wildebeest died along the Kuke fence and around Lake Ngami.

In 1965 Seretse Khama, head of the Bechuanaland Democratic Party declared that when elected he would not allow any form of discrimination against minority racial groups. A highly approachable man, I had sat for much of one evening at the time with him in Maun – and with Chief Letsholathebi with whom I had become friendly, and discussed history and the way forward for his country. Seretse's uncle, Tshekedi, for a time regent of the Bamangwato, had banned the purchase of Bushmen children, and had appointed headmen in certain areas to assist them, and had also travelled to London in 1930 to request that the British government cancel the mining rights that his father had signed over to the British South Africa Chartered Company. In March 1965, Seretse was elected Prime Minister of the Bechuanaland Protectorate.

On attaining self-rule on 30 September 1966, a sense of entitlement gathered pace, the elite cattle owners, some 12% of the population and owning 60% of the cattle, urged that the borehole sinking program be accelerated into the Kalahari sand areas, land of the Bushmen. As each borehole came into production, the mounted Motswana elite drawn from the dominant Bangwato and Kalanga tribes, using the services of the Kgalagadi tribe, moved in their cattle, claiming the

water and causing local desertification and negative impacts on wildlife and the Bushmen, and extending the long-existing system of serfdom.

In 1967 the Department of National Parks and Wildlife (DNPW) was formed, with its headquarters in Gaborone. In 1975 under the enlightened leadership of Director 'Chucks' Matenge, and British seconded officers of long experience such as my friend Anthony Ziegler. The National Development Plan of 1976-1981 created wildlife management areas in which wildlife utilization was to take precedence over cattle, and where human settlement was restricted.



*Anthony Ziegler (pic: IM)*

I arrived back in the territory at this time as a result of the invitation of the farming consultant to the Botswana Development Corporation (BDC), Ronnie Landless, to begin

utilizing the game stocks on their Tuli Block ranch, Talana, managed by Wouter and Betty Fourie from Zambia.[viii] I registered Wildlife Management Botswana (Pty) Limited and began cropping impala and kudu– the first scheme of its kind in the country. However, the imposition of an export levy on the meat put paid to the scheme.



Wouter and Betty Fourie examining a kudu.

The Tribal Land Act of 1968 gave usufruct title to its customary residents, but not to non-Motswana people such as the Bushmen, the land still to be governed under customary law, but the chiefs and headmen replaced by elected land boards, who then were, with the consent of the minister, allowed to issue common law leases. This then led to the fencing and enclosure of the commons, the 1975 Tribal Land Grazing Policy

empowering the land boards to cede communal grazing lands to cattle ranchers, extending the enclosures and leading to land degradation and increasing poverty.

In 1974 the Ministry of Local Government and Lands appointed an officer to deal with the 'Basarwa problem'. This was Liz Wiley, who served from 1974-1978 as head of the Basarwa Development Program (BDP), its objective being for Bushmen to obtain ownership rights to boreholes and to settle there and to safely carry out foraging. But government wished to see the Bushmen 'civilized', while the BDP saw it as a means to gain rights to the territory for the Bushmen. However, financial constraints saw few boreholes established. In 2015, Liz produced the following map and customary land calculation for [Landmark.org](http://Landmark.org).







In 1970 Land Boards were established under the Tribal Land Act (Cap. 32:02), the boards vested with powers to distribute and allocate land to the Motswana Bantu. Only 12 tribal territories were created by the Act. The Bushmen and other groups were excluded, eking out a precarious living on territories marked out by ecological necessity. The Act was later amended by the Tribal Land (Amendment) Act 1993, which replaced 'tribesman' with the words 'citizens of Botswana'.<sup>[ix]</sup>

The Land Board was also empowered to go beyond issuing a right under usufruct with an actual grant of land rights under common law (Part iv (1) 'A land board may lease to any person

an area of land, not exceeding five acres in extent, together with ancillary rights on such terms and conditions as it may determine or which may be prescribed.'[x] At the same time, the government started drilling boreholes in the waterless Western gamelands, soon snapped up by the cattle elite, 218 fenced, borehole centred, leasehold ranches allocated by 1984 under the Tribal Grazing Land Policy (TGLP).

While cropping at Talana Farm on the Motloutse River in 1976/77 - employing Tudor Howard-Davies to carry it out,[xi] I applied to Director Matenge for permission to initiate the harvesting of wildebeest and zebra on the Makgadikgadi salt pans in partnership with the Bakgalagadi and the Bushmen. This idea of mine was prompted by my memory of the time I had passed over the salt pans on the back of a Joubert's Transport lorry in the Bechuanaland of 1964, recounted in my hunting memoir, *With a Gun in Good Country*: [xii] [xiii]

*In the middle of the night, the sky shimmered with embedded stars. We stopped to take on more passengers. A leg of wildebeest was smacked down beside me and followed by a Bushmen. He smiled and sat perfectly still. As the lorry bumped, lurched and growled its way across the sand plain, white maggots rolled down upon me, I moved beyond the carcass and went to sleep again. When I awoke, the Bushmen had gone and we had passed Makalamabedi and were entering Maun – 18 hours after leaving Francistown.*

After meetings with the Game Department and one of their advisors, Alistair Graham – an ecologist from Kenya and

author of the classic *Eyelids of Morning*, the Ministry refused the communal harvesting scheme. “We are before our time!” muttered Director Chucks Matenge to me. Instead, I came to an arrangement with the Botswana Livestock Development Corporation for the cropping of wildebeest on their Makalamabedi quarantine cattle area near Maun – the meat being made into biltong. Later on, I expanded onto the Phuduhudu quarantine block on the Lobatse – Ghanzi road in the Kalahari, cropping hartebeest and then conducting hunting-safaris and employing some Naro Bushmen.[xiv] [xv] [xvi] [xvii]

## Lion killing fields

It was at this time that the Game Department (DNPW) entered into near-total legal confusion on the issue of game licences and the empowerment of cattle owners. Section 46 (1) of the Act permitted ‘the owner or occupier of land or any agent of such owner or occupier to kill any animal which caused, is causing or threatens to cause damage to any livestock, crops, water installation or fence on such land’. This immediately allowed for the destruction of lion, their skins sold to hide dealers from Johannesburg and elsewhere. Not wishing to be part of the lion killing fields, I sold my business and departed the country. One dealer told me years later that he used to fly into a pan and there be met by his buyer with a load of lion skins. Briefly, sanity prevailed between 2001 and 2005 when lion were not allowed to be killed (cheetah saved by the issue of SI No.26 of 2005), but then, following the revocation of the SI No. 70 of 2000, lion were once again allowed to be killed by a cattle owner or his

agent, provided it was reported to the Botswana Police within seven days.

Before I left, I undertook one memorable journey with the late Mark Murray of the Game Department into the southern end of the 52,800 km<sup>2</sup> Central Kalahari Game Reserve – a reserve proclaimed in 1961 for the Bushmen through the efforts of George Silberbauer (d.1982)[xviii] who had in 1958 been appointed as the Bushmen Survey Officer.



George Silberbauer at 81 (d.2013)

We departed Naro country and entered the land of the !Kung Bushmen - whom Barnard had found to be unrelated to the Naro linguistically and having far superior Bushmen medicine

and knowledge than all the other bands. We left a band of Naro and after a long drive on a compass heading came on a Bushmen newly returned from the Witwatersrand mines and on his way to being reunited with his people.[xix] I see him still, a speck on the horizon standing as though carved from stone beneath a massive camelthorn, motionless, while we slowly approached, moving only when I addressed him in the lingua franca of the mines at the time, *Fanagalo*, the Bushmen language attempts of Murray being unintelligible to him.

In 1975 Sir Seretse Khama announced to the nation that the traditional tenure rights where local grazing rights were the property of the tribes, was now radically altered by the Tribal Land Grazing Policy (TGLP). He announced three zonings: 1) commercial area, where individuals or groups would be accorded exclusive grazing rights in exchange for rents paid to the local authority; 2) communal area, being the current traditional lands; 3) reserve area, where large swatches of grazing land was set aside for future use by the poor. Land reserved for wildlife, freehold land and 25% of the land deemed 'undecided', was not demarcated. Apart from the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR), established for the survival of the hunting bands of Bushmen, land was soon classified under the three categories; but no land was awarded them. As a consultant to government, Bob Hitchcock discovered that the aggressive sinking of boreholes by the cattle-owning elite continued into the Bushmen lands, his recommendation that land be set-aside for the Bushmen ignored. And no land was placed in the reserved area category.

## The rights of Bushmen

The Motswana hegemony, through its legal instruments, has excluded the non-Motswana ethnic groups, vast areas of Bushmen land fenced off, barring them from access to what is their customary area. The instrument used is the supposedly definitive Attorney-General effusion on *common law leases* that on [page 84 of an FAO article](#), succinctly lays out the infamy: [xx]

- 1) *Bushmen only have rights to hunting*
- 2) *Only land rights granted in terms of certificates of customary grant are protected from enclosure by commercial leases*
- 3) *The land boards have apportioned smaller areas of land to Bushmen applicants than is given to Motswana because they are unable to cultivate Motswana-sized patches*
- 4) *The customary land rights of Bushmen are rights in or over property and should not have been extinguished without due process, as required by the constitution*
- 5) *Unless a grant of customary land certificate has been made, customary title is meaningless*
- 6) *In the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR) the Bushmen were removed;*
- 7) *The provision of vital human services such as water, food rations and healthcare in the area removed;*
- 8) *"Special game licences" that had exempted them from the legal prohibition to hunt in the reserve removed;*

- 9) *Prevented from entering the reserve without a permit;*
- 10) *Compensation for the loss of their homes and resources never qualified or provided, despite explicit provisions for compensation in the event of compulsory land acquisition in the Tribal Land Act (ch. 33);*
- 11) *Rights of way not provided for;*
- 12) *The definition of customary rights still only refers to the Motswana*

By 2006 Botswana had no formal integrated conservation and development program (ICDP), and it was only in 1990 that the USAID-funded Natural Resource Management Project (NRMP) within the Department of National Parks and Wildlife (DNPW) was initiated, and the first community-based organization (CBO) - the Chobe Enclave Community Trust, registered in 1993 to obtain income from hunting and other tourism.[xxi] In 2000 a National CBNRM Forum was formed. However, many CBOs had suffered through the theft of their funds, now all but moribund since the ban of all hunting on state land in January 2014. However, this may assist the customary leadership to claw back some of the authority assumed by the CBOs.

Cattle lands have not attracted any form of integrated projects due to their high traditional value among the Motswana elite. Not surprisingly, the cattle rangelands are being privatized due to the neoliberal agenda mounted by the elite, cynically putting forward claims of supposed overgrazing by villagers' cattle, and therefore the need to introduce a modern system that will not degrade the land - a familiar criticism of the way the cattle industry has been managed for years. The decision by the government to ban hunting-safaris on state land from the 2014 season may be all part of the same process. However, the

creation of wildlife management areas (WMAs) has tended to restrict cattle expansion. Under the regulations governing these WMA's, residents are encouraged to turn subsistence hunting to profit. Here they were to be assisted to do so and allowed to trade in 1200 kilograms of game meat a year. But while government handed over utilization rights to the Bushmen, they did not hand over the land.

## Destruction of the Bushmen

The continuing anti-Bushmen stance of the Botswana government is an abiding human rights disgrace, but more accurately, genocide. The government, led by Seretse's eldest son, Ian, (until 31 March 2018) continued with the campaign against the Bushmen of the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR), the rights of Bushmen in general at self-rule in 1966 being guaranteed under Section 14.3.c of the Constitution. These rights were shamelessly dismantled in the case of the 'owners' of the CKGR.

Tragically, in the early 1980s, diamonds were discovered in the reserve. On 12 October 1986, the President Quett Masire (1980-1998) announced that his government would relocate the Bushmen from the reserve. Hitchcock suggested this was due to 'an expansion in the utilization of horses and donkeys as hunting aids'.<sup>[xxii]</sup> But it was the Bakgalagadi - a Bantu people - who are the horsemen, but we rarely mention them or clamour for their rights.

In another paper, Hitchcock reminds us that it was two



researchers Mark and Delia Owens 'who had worked in the reserve (and) argued that Bushmen were 'not living traditionally' and that they were having 'negative impacts' on the area, a position that was never substantiated with hard data (and as he confirmed to me recently, 'an important paper since it was the one that the government used to justify the removal of the San and Bakgalagadi from the Central Kalahari').[xxiii] And as Hitchcock also mentions, from 1986 to 1987, Masire and his civil servants began a programme of unconscionable neglect of the Bushmen:[xxiv]

*When the borehole at Xade, the largest community in the reserve, broke down, it took months before it was fixed. Buildings and roads were not maintained in the reserve except for those going to Department of Wildlife and National Parks camps and mining exploration camps such as those around Gope (Ghagoo) in the southeastern portion of the reserve. Drought relief feeding programs were implemented more slowly and less effectively in the Central Kalahari than elsewhere in Botswana, a situation that threatened the well-being of people in several parts of the reserve.*

The Owens were later deported from Botswana in 1985 by the Masire administration for having drawn attention to the death of hundreds of wildebeest in the new veterinary fences erected to protect the beef industry.

In 1997, in the last year of Masire's rule (he was knighted by Britain in 1991), the first forced evictions of Bushmen took place, followed by the transport into the area of mining

equipment by Anglo American Corporation and its subsidiary de Beers. In 1999, with Festus Mogae (d.2017) now president (1998-2008), more mining camps were established in the reserve. In the CKGR at the time there were some 650 Bushmen and Bakgalagadi, an NGO, First People of the Kalahari, negotiating on their behalf. They persuaded the Department of Wildlife and National Parks to put forward a scheme to government whereby the indigenous people could stay in the CKGR, and benefit from tourism. In March 2000 regulations were issued (Government Gazette No 28 of 2000) outlining the implementation process. At the same time Survival International emerged as a powerful voice speaking on behalf of the Bushmen. However, an anthropologist, James Suzman, a former consultant to de Beers, criticized Survival, saying that they, 'opposed the plan as it did not grant the Bushmen exclusive ownership of the Central Kalahari in accordance with the International Labour Organization's 1989 convention'... and were, 'unaware that granting Bushmen full ownership of the Central Kalahari would establish a precedent that would lead to the collapse of Botswana's communal land tenure system'.<sup>[xxv]</sup> He also stated that de Beers had been greatly concerned by the evictions, obviously because people would infer that they were due to the mining; and that in his report to de Beers, he had also criticized the evictions. "I, along with the Negotiating Team, diplomatic observers, San CBOs and NGOs among others, am satisfied that diamonds are not the cause of the evictions."<sup>[xxvi]</sup> However, the rights of the Bushmen to the CKGR were confirmed in the constitution at Independence.

## Forced evictions

In 2002 the forced eviction of Bushmen clans intensified with government destroying boreholes and banning Bushmen from hunting. Active were companies such as BHP Billiton, with financing from the World Bank's International Finance Corporation, the latter ignoring its environmental and human rights responsibilities under its World Bank Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). In 2006 Mogae ignored the High Court decision that the Bushmen had been illegally removed and should now be allowed to return. Although some did return, they were denied water. In 2008 Mogae was awarded the Ibrahim Prize for 'exceptional African leadership'.

In 2010 the Bushmen and Bakgalagadi living in the reserve took the government to court over their human right to water. Specifically, they sought to re-commission a borehole that had been closed in 2002. The High Court judge denied their request. All this was revealed by Bob Hitchcock, for 40 years still monitoring the tracks of the 'San'. In a 2011 article, he goes carefully over the ground, revealing the determination of the government to place what they regard as primitive people in settlements, the full horror of which will be revealed in time.[xxvii] [xxviii]

However, there has been an improvement in so far as their residence is concerned - as [Hitchcock reported](#) in 2020:

*In recent years, the San have achieved some success in organizing themselves, both locally and internationally.*

*Notably, they have filed successful legal cases aimed at regaining their land and resource rights in Botswana, Namibia and South Africa. As a result, San have gained a degree of control over the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park, in South Africa, along with the rights to park gate receipts. In the Central Kalahari Game Reserve, in Botswana, San (and Bakgalagadi) who were removed in 1997, 2002 and 2005 have obtained the right to return to the reserve. The people also were able to secure the rights to water in the Central Kalahari, which set an international legal precedent. In Namibia, !Kung, !Xun and Khwe San have successfully challenged illegal cattle-owning immigrants who had entered the Nǀa Jaqna Conservancy in what used to be defined as West Bushmanland.*

But, they are still prohibited from hunting:

*A critical issue for the San has been the government policies that led to criminalization of their hunting. In the colonial era, laws were passed in many Southern African countries that made subsistence hunting illegal. The only contemporary exception to this is the [Nyae Nyae Conservancy](#) of northeastern Namibia, where Ju/'hoansi San have the right to harvest a limited array of wild animals with traditional weapons (bows and arrows, spears, clubs). San in other regions are arrested, jailed and fined if they are caught hunting. One of the only ways that these San have been able to obtain game meat is through the operations of safari hunting companies in their areas, which donate meat.*

## Mining and fracking

GEM Diamonds, who started extracting diamonds at its Ghaghoo mine in the CKGR agreed with the government not to supply water to the Bushmen. The diamond fields are massive, the richest in the world.

When I alerted my friend, David Gleason - a Business Day columnist in Johannesburg, publisher, and former senior executive at Anglo-American in Zambia - of what was taking place; he did some investigating, and then on 13 November 2013 penned the column, *Fracking adds to Bushmen's woes*:<sup>[xxix]</sup>

*Companies have flooded into Botswana in recent years. One of these companies, the Australian-based Tamboran Resources, is drilling in the Gemsbok Basin near the Kgalagadi district. According to Tamboran's website, which inconveniently leaves blank any information about the project's status, a drilling program undertaken by US consultants estimates a 196-trillion cubic feet gas-in-place resource. Exxaro Coal, wholly owned by JSE-listed Exxaro Resources, is involved in a joint venture with a subsidiary (Sekaname) of Kalahari Energy, which is in turn supported by a US government agency, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), to develop a coal-bed methane exploration program in the Kalahari Karoo Basin.*

On 18 November 2013, *The Guardian* weighed in with the following:[xxx]

*The Kalahari's ecosystem is at particular risk because it contains coal bed methane, which requires water to be pumped out of the ground. This increases the danger of pollution and lowering the water table, potentially by hundreds of feet, which could cost a community its access to water – already a scarce resource in Botswana.*

In 2012, 122 prospecting licences for petroleum and methane gas had been issued;[xxxi] but by 2013, 88 had been cancelled or relinquished, most of those being in the CKGR, the government insisting that hydraulic fracking is not allowed in the exploratory phase.[xxxii]

Petroleum licence EL001-2012, covering the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park (former Gemsbok National Park) in the south-west of the country, appears to have been issued in 2012; to this has now been added petroleum licence EL162-2015, which includes the southern half of the CKGR; and coal and coal-bed methane (CBM) licences PL159 and 160 covering 1500 km<sup>2</sup> in the mid-eastern part of the CKGM.[xxxiii] [xxxiv] Government seem unaware of the risk of extreme environmental damage during exploration, let alone during the inevitable extraction:[xxxv]



Fracking concessions

*Coal seam gas (CSG) mining is an invasive form of unconventional gas mining. It usually involves tens of thousands of gas wells, with roads, pipelines, compressor stations, wastewater dams, and other infrastructure. A CSG project can spread across hundreds of thousands of hectares of land.*

A seminal report by the German government lays out the impossible task of ensuring there is no grave environmental damage, even from the first phase when the fracturing fluids are injected - usually hazardous, and their reaction with the earth and groundwater receiving them extremely difficult to predict. A formidable number of German scientists take the issue further:[xxxvi]

*The flowback redrawn after the pressure release contains fracturing fluids, formation water, and possibly reaction products. Since the formation water can also exhibit serious hazard potentials, environmentally responsible techniques for the treatment and disposal of the flowback is of primary importance. In summary, we conclude that basic knowledge and data are currently missing preventing a profound assessment of the risks and their technical controllability (e.g., the properties of the deep geosystem, the behaviour and effects of the deployed chemical additives, etc.).*

If this is the conclusion for shale gas exploration and extraction in Germany, how is possible for Botswana to even contemplate allowing exploration for these gasses. The greed and irresponsibility now match what is taking place in the northern hemisphere. But then this has all the hallmarks of a classic Ponzi scheme.[xxxvii]

And the American government's Overseas Investment Corporation (OPIC) is aggressively making it all possible. In July 2016, OPIC leant the government \$125 million to develop its diamond industry in a 'sustainable manner', an oxymoron of



note. The OPIC's PR machine choir singing out with gusto, "All OPIC projects adhere to high environmental and social standards and respect human rights, including worker's rights!" Under President Trump, OPIC will become a frightening force for funding some of the climate catastrophes.

The reason for the government's position on the Bushmen is 1) racist -believing the Bushmen to be an affront to the Motswana's now modernized lifestyle, 2) that they require 'mainstreaming' - a determination by the elite to claim the area for their cattle; and 3) to mine the area without the threat of the Bushmen disturbing their plunder. Gordon Bennett won the right for them to return to their ancestral home in 2006, and in 2011, the right for Bushmen to drill their own boreholes – though this had supposedly been done back in 1975. Even the Bogosi Act of 2008, which was intended to fully establish a House of Chiefs, awarded the eight Motswana hereditary tribes an automatic seat in the House, but not the Bushmen, the Wayeyi and the Mambukushu – in fact not even recognizing them as tribes.[xxxviii]

As mentioned by Gleason, the Botswana government prevented Bennett from attending a High Court action on 29 July 2013 where he was due to contest the government's refusal to give evicted Bushmen full access to their reserve. This shameful forced eviction against a defenceless people traversing the area since time immemorial, long before the coming of the Bantu, reveals the doublethink hypocrisy of the Gaborone Declaration of May 2012 that resulted from the World Summit for Sustainable Development.

## The Gaborone Declaration 2012

The declaration was organized by the American BINGO (large international NGO), Conservation International, with the support of one of their board members, President Ian Khama himself, and signed by 10 African nations – though not Zambia, in which they agreed that in future any form of development should fully account and pay for ecosystem services.

The declaration, a milestone supposedly for integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs) and indigenous people, announced that:[xxxix]

*The historical pattern of natural resource exploitation has failed to promote sustained growth, environmental integrity and improved social capital. Economic growth and human well-being in Africa will be threatened if we do not undertake concerted action to halt and reverse the degradation and loss of healthy ecosystems and biodiversity, and to enhance society's ability to adapt to climate change and environmental risks and scarcities.*

The declaration recognized that ecosystem services are Africa's 'natural capital', and that this outflow should be recorded (in particular for mining), its contribution to GDP clearly identified and its long-term debt to natural resources quantified. In their final communiqué on natural capital accounting, they recognized the severe limitations of GDP to measure social and environmental well-being, advocating the importance of

natural capital accounting, 'as a tool for mainstreaming natural capital into informed economic decision making'. But the actions of Khama, his brother (one of the twins) the Minister of Environment Tshekedi Khama, Conservation International, and mining and tourism interests against the Bushmen, against the 'ownership' of ecosystem services in the fullest sense of the term, is an affront to humanity and should be condemned. In April 2015 CI advertised for a coordinator for the Gaborone Declaration, to be based in Gaborone.

In October 2013 Survival International began a campaign for tourists to boycott Botswana. I and some 8,000 potential tourists signed a petition never to enter the country again until the Bushmen are allowed to return to the Kalahari Reserve with full rights. To their shame, and his, Khama remains a Distinguished Fellow of Conservation International since his departure for the presidency on 31 March 2018, but now also take on the role of chief salesman Africa for them; an organization which proudly declares:

*We're working to ensure a healthy, productive planet for everyone... because people need nature to thrive. But nature's ability to provide for us is being stretched to its limit...and... Africa's resources are being depleted far too quickly. And if we don't protect them, we're putting the continent and the more than 2 billion people who will call it home by 2050, at grave risk.*

On glassdoor.com, a former senior manager at Conservation International commented that CI was noted for 'high level prostitution for green washing'. CI is also one of the members of

the Climate, Community and Conservation Alliance. Founded in 2003, it has five BINGO members: CARE, CI, The Nature Conservancy, Rainforest Alliance and Wildlife Conservation International. Its mission is *'to stimulate and promote land management activities that credibly mitigate global climate change, improve the well-being and reduce the poverty of local communities, and conserve biodiversity'*. Since 1997 it has adopted a closet relationship with the mining industry, a greenwash PR operation.[xl] This Faustian bargain negotiated with the corporates by the BINGOs is fully explored in an article by Adams.[xli]

Representatives of the archaic British royalty, Prince Charles and Prince William, welcomed Ian Khama as an honoured guest at their United for Wildlife anti-poaching jamboree in London in April 2014, where the talk was all of archaic fortress conservation. Predictably, Conservation International is a member, as is Fauna & Flora, IUCN, The Nature Conservancy, Wildlife Conservation International (WCI), WWF, and the Zoological Society of London. Following the conference, the British government established the Illegal Wildlife Trade Challenge Fund, some projects began, with others in the pipeline.[xlii] On 25 March 2015, UFW held a conference at Kasane in Botswana.

While Survival International has taken WWF to task for funding projects where people are being removed from tiger reserves in India, and for allowing Pygmy to continue to be brutalized by WWF and eco-guards on their funded project in Cameroon, they have yet to target Conservation International. Unfortunately, Survival International's director Stephen Corry declared that 'Kings can hunt elephants, which we're told are threatened, but Bushmen can't hunt to eat, not a single one of the plentiful antelope they've lived off sustainably since time

immemorial.[xliii] Here he was alluding to King Carlos of Spain who had shot an elephant in Botswana – at no cost to the Spanish taxpayer - on state land in 2012.

The King had shot an elephant on licence, the basis at the time of a thriving industry greatly benefitting residents of the hunting areas. The Zimbabwean ecologist Vernon Booth was quoted on the matter of hunting-safaris and of the benefits to residents of the wildlife commons:[xliv]

*Lions were now protected mainly because of the high value attached to them as trophies. Locals only tolerated lions because of the trophy hunt fees that trickle down to them, and without that, they would increasingly poison them because of the threat they pose to people and livestock. "If there is a complete ban on lion hunting, the tolerance levels for lions would just plummet," Booth said. "And in wild areas outside of the protected areas, lions would be exterminated, and very quickly." He added that "Even though hunting may seem unpalatable to a lot of people around the world, it is actually very, very necessary."*

This is what happened in the Bangweulu swamps of Zambia when I was in charge of the area for the Game Department – my arrival greeted by the extermination of the Bangweulu black rhino population in 1973. There I discovered that lion were poisoned by villagers, having run into conflict as a result of rising waters, increased human population, declining herds of lechwe, an absence of any income from hunting-safaris, and our Game Department failure to implement lechwe offtake quotas for customary people. Although the objective of our Black

Lechwe project was to allow residents to make full use of the game stocks, the rampant Zambianization of the Department and a massive fall in government income from copper, buried the project.

## Game ranches

The 81 registered Botswana game ranches in 2015 are the result of the Game Ranching Policy approved by parliament in 2002. The policy clarifies that farming of some species will be the responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture, while game ranching will remain the remit of the Department of National Parks and Wildlife (DNPW); 41 of those registered are members of the Botswana Wildlife Producers Association – and presumably are all leasehold land, and allowed to carry on hunting after the ban imposed on state land hunting on 1 January 2014, provided they are 20 miles away from a national park.[xliv] It appears that this did not include game reserves, for there are registered game ranches conducting hunting and cropping on the Kalahari Reserve boundary. As The Hunting Report recorded in April 2013:[xlvi]

*Bokamoso is located three hours out of Maun adjacent to the Kalahari Game Reserve. It encompasses 60,000 hectares (about 148,263 acres) behind a high fence, featuring flat to rolling country covered in thorny bush. Tholo Camp is about 2½ hours west of Maun and has 104,000 hectares (about 256,989 acres), also behind wire. This*

*property features salt pans, big limestone formations and large trees in some areas; thick brush in others and in the north is open savannah. The two ranches are home to a range of popular plains game, including blesbok, blue wildebeest, duiker, eland, gemsbok, hartebeest, impala, jackal, kudu, ostrich, springbok, steenbok, warthog and zebra, plus guinea fowl and francolin. Tholo offers bow hunting from ground blinds near water and over salt licks. Eaton also conducts spot-and-stalk hunts for both rifle and bow hunters. He uses Bushmen trackers and can arrange for San cultural dancing for guests at the lodge.*

So while the Bushmen have had their land and subsistence hunting rights removed by the government, on the borders is a massive area of land alienated to leasehold where the owners may hunt what they wish. The continuing reprehensible actions of the BINGOs: CI, WWF, AWF, WCI, who won't stand up to Khama and his ilk everywhere, will eventually lead to their demise – clones of the neoliberal corporates that they are; but the damage they continue to do as 'corporate clones' is immense.

To add to the shame of CI and Khama, attempts were made in March 2013 to evict the Ranyane Bushmen living in the wildlife corridor linking the Kalahari Reserve with the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park, the scheme sponsored, predictably, by Conservation International.[xlvi] Fortunately, for the moment, the government in the form of Ghanzi's Land Board, Council and District Commissioner, on 18 June 2013 at the High Court in Lobatse were told to 'back off', the Bushmen's lawyer, Gordon Bennett, able to have some restrictions placed on government action. However, the Khama sword hangs over the Bushmen.

## Ian Khama

With the election on 24 October 2014 won by Khama with a reduced majority, Botswana is deeply troubled, his action and that of the Botswana Democratic Party underlining Botswana's considerable social divisions reflected in its third place on the Ibrahim Index of African Governance. Khama was an autocrat, obsessed with security and secrecy, using his military powers to suborn the opposition. He was born in England in 1953 of an English mother; she widely respected and liked in Botswana, a woman of immense courage, given the racial issues of the time. After being sequestered at home for some years, Khama was sent to school in Rhodesia, and then from 1966-1970 to Waterford School in Swaziland. This was the school founded by my ex-headmaster at St Martin's School in Rosettenville, Johannesburg, Michael Stern. In 1958, I had gone to the future Waterford site with some fellow pupils and had constructed the first classroom. This was not far from St Marks School where I had been a pupil from 1955-1957. In 1972 Khama spent a year at Sandhurst Military College, followed by attending various courses elsewhere in the dark military arts. He then joined the Botswana Police Mobile Unit, and then the Botswana Defence Force, created in 1977. The following year he became Deputy-Commander of the BDF and took charge of the northeast region. I remember this period well as I was active at the time in the Tuli Block, Francistown, Makalamabedi and Jao area adjoining Moremi, his road blocks responsible for numerous heavy-handed incidents, his troops arrogant and brutish.

To add to the calamity of the Bushmen is the landgrab of



the Moremi Game Reserve lying north of Maun, the jewel in the Crown for tourism and potential benefits to the Batawana people and their chief. In 1962, at a time when there were a mere 500,000 people in the country, the Ngamiland Fauna Preservation Society was formed with the assistance of June and Robert Kay to create the Moremi Game Reserve, a scheme to which the DC Maun, Eustace Clark, was opposed, he withholding government financial support.

In 1963 the Batawana Tribal Council established the reserve, urged on by the regent, Pulane, and later by Chief Letsholathebe II a Moremi, a man educated in England. As the reserve began to attract tourism, Ivan Glass, Clark's replacement, introduced a scheme whereby the government could receive revenue. In 1979 at a *kgotla* (meeting) called by Letsholathebe, it was decided, because of their difficulty in funding the reserve, that they ask government take over its management. But they did not give the reserve to the state. In April 2014 the Ngami Times reported that the Batawana were determined to take back the Moremi and the Maun Educational Park. In October 2014 the Maun West MP, Kgosi Tawana Moremi of the Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC), son of Chief Letsholathebe II, attempted to engage government and the president on the issue. At a rally in Maun, the UDC announced that they were preparing a case against the government and that 'there was a ruthless land grab in Ngamiland perpetuated by President Ian Khama and his commercial cronies with interests in the booming tourism sector'. And that while land was being grabbed, the people were being propelled into poverty; an assertion backed by the Bushmen leader, Roy Sesana. The M.P. Tawana Moremi criticized Khama for issuing a recent directive to alienate the Moremi Game Reserve from tribal to state land.

Khama, it is now revealed, in 2002 purchased 5% of Linyanti Investments, a subsidiary of JSE-listed Wilderness Holdings, which operates in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve, Linyanti, being the holder of the Linyanti Concession that covers 1250 km<sup>2</sup> of the northern Kalahari where Wilderness Safaris operates their Kalahari Plains camp.[xlvi] On their website, they offer up some malodorous tourist-speak: 'Immerse yourself in the culture of the San Bushmen people with an interpretive Bushmen walk'.

In the Washington Post of 20 October 2016, Amy Poteete re-iterated the fact that there is a significant gap between Botswana's reputation and reality. The death of an opposition leader under unclear circumstances, and the actions of Khama signals that all is not well in the country. This at a time when the economy is regressing, water and power shortages are a daily problem, and the enrichment of the elite a reality.

## Gordon Bennett reports

In February 2015 IUCN convened a symposium on wildlife crime in South Africa, a preamble to the Kasane meeting of the BINGO membership of the British Royal family sponsored United for Wildlife. Gordon Bennett, the barrister acting for the Bushmen, presented a short talk: *Negative impacts of wildlife law enforcement in Botswana, Cameroon and India*, where he made the following points on Botswana and the Bushmen:[xlix]

1. *In Botswana, the law allows those who are “principally dependent” on hunting and gathering to apply for “special game licences”. Regulations explicitly refer to “persons who can rightly lay claim to hunting rights in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (“the CKGR”).”*

2. *But no “special game licences” have been issued for the CKGR since 2002, and since 2014 hunting has been banned almost everywhere in Botswana. The ban was renewed for another year only last month. It pays no heed at all to the rights or needs of the Bushmen of the CKGR.*

3. *The Minister of Wildlife drew up and signed the ban at his desk, in the exercise of his statutory powers. He did not have to explain his decision to the National Assembly or anyone else. There were no consultations. The Minister acted entirely off his own bat, in the untested belief that “illegal off take” was or might be to blame for a decline in wildlife numbers.*

4. *Responsibility for the enforcement of the ban rests with a paramilitary force called the Special Support Group. Its members are heavily armed, and in the CKGR have camped close to Bushmen communities. The Bushmen have been made to feel that they are under constant surveillance. They report that they and their homes are searched at random and that on occasion they have been beaten or threatened.*

5. *Hunting has become more difficult but persists, because the only alternative is starvation. The Bushmen no longer eat during the day, to reduce the risk of detection, and have had to abandon hunt related customs.*

6. *Many Bushmen who have a legal right to live in the*

*reserve are afraid to do so. They worry that if they hunt and are caught, they will be imprisoned or assaulted or both.*

*7. They are stranded in resettlement camps outside the reserve, where alcoholism and HIV/Aids are widespread and there is little or no work. Their previous, largely self-sufficient existence has given way to a dependence on government handouts, and an inevitable decline in their sense of identity and self-worth.*

*8. There is no evidence that the Bushmen of the CKGR hunt in any systematic way for sale, or use guns or vehicles, or hunt endangered species, or that their hunting is unsustainable. In the name of conservation, they have had to pay a price out of all proportion to any threat that their subsistence hunting might pose.*

On 6 April 2015 Conservation International announced that:[1]

*Conservation International is honoured to be named as the global executing agency for the first World Bank fund to be managed by indigenous peoples," said Johnson Cerda, Indigenous Advisor for Conservation International's Indigenous & Traditional Peoples Program. It is a testament to our ability to work with local communities and indigenous peoples groups.*

## The impact of the hunting ban on state land

And with hunting banned on state land in 2014 and still in place two years later, a seminal report on hunting-safaris had this to say about Botswana after the hunting ban in 2014:[li]

*Since trophy hunting was banned in Botswana in 2014, there has been a minimal uptake of hunting blocks for photographic tourism (Winterbach pers. comm.). Winterbach et al. (2015) conclude that only 22% (17,142 km<sup>2</sup>) of the Northern Conservation Zone has intermediate to high potential for photo-tourism, while 78% has low photo-tourism potential (61,769 km<sup>2</sup>). Ten concessions (out of 32) in the Northern Conservation Zone did not include high potential photo-tourism areas, and only one of those ten was conducting photographic safaris (although the economic viability of this concession was reliant on access to the nearby Moremi Game Reserve). Although these ten concessions have been offered to public tender four times since the hunting ban in 2014, as of June 2016 still only one was operating photo-tourism, the other nine being without concessionaires or not operational. Regarding habitat connectivity between protected areas, those ten concessions are critical for ecosystem health and form a vital link between Moremi Game Reserve, Nxai/Makgadigadi Pans National Park, Chobe National Park in Botswana and Hwange National Park in Zimbabwe and surrounding concessions. While*

*hosting what is possibly the geographically largest intact lion population in Africa, this is also a key wet season range for buffalo and elephant and hosts two long-range migration routes of zebra. Some blocks that are part of the Western corridor in southern Botswana have already been changed to agricultural use (livestock farming), disrupting the link between the Central Kalahari Game Reserve and the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park and probably fragmenting the lion population of the Southern Conservation Zone. Although the Government of Botswana has a good conservation track record and there is no immediate threat to these areas, pressure from Botswana's livestock industry for access to areas with limited tourism potential is only likely to increase (Winterbach et al. 2015). Initial reports from some communities in Botswana suggest significantly reduced conservation incentives (including meat, jobs and pensions) and hardening negative attitudes toward wildlife since the ban was implemented (Naidoo et al. 2016b).*

In Botswana, the arbitrary ban on hunting-safaris on state land in August 2013 by President Khama and his brother left villagers without an income earned previously from foreign hunting clients. The Minister of the Environment Tshekedi Khama admitted he could not replace the income needed to conduct anti-poaching or pay villager compensation claims.[lii] Naturally, they have done the inevitable. Poach. A recent article concludes that the annual illegal offtake in the Okavango Delta, conducted by 1,800 poachers, is 620,000 kg of medium-large herbivore biomass – equivalent to 15,500 impala. This explains the [reports of a decline in ungulate populations](#).[liii]

## Alienation of Bushmen land and hunting rights

The Botswana government stopped the Bushmen subsistence hunting on the Central Kalahari Game Reserve, a vast area set aside for them in 1961, but yet he allows private ranches on its borders – taken from the Bushmen - to continue hunting-safaris – they allowed by an obtuse government to be alienated from customary control. And though lion hunting-safaris were finally stopped in 2000 due to a population crash resulting from a government edict of 1979 declaring that any lion seen near cattle could be killed by the cattle owner or his staff – the reason I sold my game management business and safari company there, the cattle obsessed government continue to kill many lion every year to supposedly protect the cattle herds, a number very far in excess of what hunting-safaris killed, a process assisted by the fact that cattle are often not kraaled at night, yet the cattle owners still receive compensation for cattle killed. That is until recently when government budget cuts impacted on this and the DWNP anti-poaching operations. And cattle, as I mistakenly believed at the time, produce more climate change from one kg of beef than a flight from London to New York, and outstrip the global transport sector as a whole.[liv]

I am reminded of my attempt 52 years ago to empower the Bushmen and Bakgadigadi of the Makgadikgadi pans through a sustained game utilization scheme, turned down by the Ministry, but enthusiastically supported by the Director of National Parks and Wildlife at the time, Chucks Matenge. Now the Kalahari reserve is invaded, the Bushmen's rights sundered. In Nata, the hub near the salt pans, where it could have been

all so different, the Bushmen complain of their destitution.[lv] There could have been, should have been, numerous reserves set aside solely for them. Instead, the population of 50,000 of this ancient hunter-gatherer people in Botswana inhabit the margins of life as the wildlife recedes, their land is grabbed and fenced off, their water polluted by the mining, and exploited as the Botswana economy falters. And they have been allowed to wander into the terrible arms of HIV/Aids: "I am convinced that [the aim of the resettlement of Basarwa is to exterminate them](#). It is as if a grave is dug and people are thrown in and carefully covered with sand." [lvi]

## US report of 2015 on human rights

The US report on human rights practices in Botswana for 2015, revealed the following abuses of the Bushmen:[lvii]

1. *Principal human rights abuses included violence, particularly sexual violence against women and children; discrimination against the Basarwa (or San) people; and child labour in cattle herding, agriculture, and other work.*
2. *The government's continued narrow interpretation of a 2006 High Court ruling resulted in a few hundred indigenous Basarwa people (also called the San) being prohibited from living or hunting in their tribal homeland, the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR). Government officials maintained the resettlement program was*



*voluntary and necessary to facilitate the delivery of public services, provide socioeconomic development opportunities to the Basarwa, and minimize human impact on wildlife. In 2012 the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues approved a set of nine draft recommendations addressing the impact of land seizures and disenfranchisement of indigenous people. In 2013 attorneys for the Basarwa filed a High Court case in which the original complainants from the 2006 CKGR case appealed to the government for unrestricted access to the CKGR for their children and relatives (i.e., without permits). The case continued at year's end (see section 6, Indigenous People).*

*3. An estimated 50,000 to 60,000 persons belong to one of the many scattered, diverse tribal groups known collectively as Basarwa or San. The Basarwa constitute approximately 3 percent of the population and are culturally and linguistically distinct from most other residents. The law prohibits discrimination against the Basarwa with respect to employment, housing, health services, and cultural practices; however, the Basarwa remained marginalized economically and politically and generally did not have access to their traditional land. The Basarwa continued to be geographically isolated, had limited access to education, lacked adequate political representation, and some members were not fully aware of their civil rights. NGOs have previously reported forced labour of Basarwa—including adults and children—on private farms and cattle posts.*

*4. While the government respected the 2006 High Court ruling on a suit filed by 189 Basarwa regarding their forced relocation, it continued to interpret the ruling*

*narrowly, allowing only the 189 actual applicants and their spouses and minor children to return to the CKGR. The court ruled the applicants were entitled to return to the CKGR without entry permits and to receive permits to hunt in designated wildlife management areas, which are not located in the CKGR. The government did not permit adult children and other family members of the original applicants to return to the CKGR without entry permits. Many of the Basarwa and their supporters continued to object to the government's interpretation of the court's ruling. Negotiations between Basarwa representatives and the government regarding residency and hunting rights stalled after a separate court ruling provided the right to access water through boreholes.*

*5. A UK citizen affiliated with Survival International who serves as an attorney for some Basarwa groups is currently on a list of individuals from visa waiver countries who must apply for a visa to enter the country, impeding the group's ability to respond to legal and advocacy matters involving the Basarwa.*

*6. Government relocations ceased in the Western settlement of Ranyane after a 2013 restraining order issued by the High Court prohibited the government from relocating further residents.*

*7. There were no government programs directly addressing discrimination against the Basarwa. With the exception of the 2006 court ruling, there were no demarcated cultural lands.*

*8. Some NGOs made efforts to promote the rights of the Basarwa or to help provide economic opportunities, but such programs had limited impact. The NGO Survival*

*International, along with other independent organizations, continued to criticize the government decision to allow mining exploration in the CKGR as mining operations in the area expanded during the year. The NGOs argued diamond exploration in the CKGR would have a significant negative impact on the life and environment of the Basarwa.*

*9. The government previously charged Basarwa with unlawful possession of hunted carcasses. In August 2014 five Basarwa filed a lawsuit against the Minister of Environment, Wildlife, and Tourism over the hunting ban in the CKGR; the case was pending at year's end.*

As Charlie Marlow said in *Heart of Darkness*, "The conquest of the earth, which mostly means the taking it away from those who have a different complexion or slightly flatter noses than ourselves, is not a pretty thing when you look into it much." In June 2017 comes a ruling which may change things for the Bushmen and Bakgalagadi: the ruling by the African Court on Human and People's Rights in favour of the Ogiek of Kenya. They are now allowed to live in their ancestral home.[lviii] Yet the Sengwer have been attacked by forest guards and forcibly evicted. In January 2018 the EU finally reacted and cancelled their conservation project in the area.

50th Year of Independence (30 September 2016)



Naro woman making an ostrich egg necklace for IM in 1977  
(pic: IM)

### **The tribe that lost its head**

*On 30 September 2016, a country dominated by a few cattle-owning clans and tribes celebrated its 50th year of independence from its former colonial protector of 81 years. Shortly before this celebration its President had two titles conferred on him: one, an honorary doctorate from the local university; two, the title of Racist of the Year, awarded him by a British NGO, Survival International.*

*An imperial-style company of ill-schooled dragoons mounted on white horses, replete with lances and pith*

*helmets, opened the ceremony at the football stadium in the capital. This gaggle ushered in the President standing in a military Landrover, carrying what looked like an inflated banana. The army rather ran the show. This was not lost on the sole indigenous people taking part, its young men officially choreographed and attired in cloth wrapped around their vitals, sun-dried silver-backed jackal skins hanging down their backs, bows in one hand, doubtless bussed in from one of the government squatter camps. What no one mentioned was that this was also the 50th anniversary of their first nation rights, confirmed at self-rule in 1966, and guaranteed under Section 14.3(c) of the Constitution.*

*Following on behind the manure spattering eructations of the dragoons, came an aged black Bentley - not a deluxe model mind, its rear window rolled down enough to allow a gloved female hand to twitch spasmodically at the assembled citizenry. This was the Queen of England's representative, her daughter, Anne, better known as a Scots rugby supporter.*

*The country where this took place is some 600,000 km<sup>2</sup> of mainly arid lands, populated by two million people having a Gini coefficient of income inequality placing it in the top 10 of nations, its fellow select elite feeders at the trough being Lesotho, South Africa, Namibia and Zambia.*

*And what country is this? Botswana, of course.*

*Ah, the Bushmen, I hear you mutter.*

*A government official, George Silberbauer (d.1982), in 1961 created the Central Kalahari Game Reserve for the Bushmen, a 52,800 km<sup>2</sup> patch of dry paradise with giant*

*Acacia's in places that make one stop and wonder. The Bushmen had of course occupied these lands for many sunsets prior to the arrival of Bantu peoples. But in 2002 the Bushmen were evicted from the reserve and banned from hunting, the government destroying their boreholes. A High Court ruling in 2006 allowing them back to their land, was ignored. Since then they have been placed in encampments where alcoholism, HIV/Aids, malnutrition and depression assail them. The few who have been allowed to return, though not to hunt, bear the brunt of security force brutality and enforced water austerity. Why? Because the government support mining of the reserve - first for its diamonds, and now for methane and natural gas prospecting; as well as supporting its enclosure by game ranches and tourism within.*

*So what about Ian Khama? He is also an international trustee of the corporate conservation NGO, Conservation International, who aid and abet Khama in his crimes: in March 2013 sponsoring attempts to evict the Ranyane Bushmen living in the wildlife corridor linking the Kala-hari Reserve with the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park.*

*But in fairness, Khama did not start the Bushmen pogrom, he merely followed the lead of former Presidents Quett Masire (1980-1998) and Festus Mogae (1998-2008). Masire it was who announced on 12 October 1986 that they would relocate the Bushmen from the reserve, diamonds having been discovered there a few years before, though the first evictions only took place in 1997, Anglo American then moving in their mining equipment. Despite this, or because of it, Masire was knighted by Britain.*

*In 2002, Mogae evicted all the Bushmen, then ignored the 2006 High Court decision. In 2008 he was awarded the Ibrahim Prize for 'exceptional African leadership'.*

*Ian's father, Seretse, the former paramount chief of the Bamangwato tribe, with whom I had spent a memorable evening at Riley's bar in Maun in 1964 while he was campaigning to become the Prime Minister of Bechuanaland, certainly held no animosity for Bushmen, Boer or Brit. And his uncle, the regent of the Bamangwato for a time, Tshekedi, had after all banned Bushmen children being taken from their parents as slaves and concubines, and had appointed headmen in certain areas to assist them. And, in light of the present mining infamy, and the game and cattle ranching and tourism invasion of Bushmen lands, it is interesting to note that Tshekedi had travelled to London in 1930 to request that the British Government cancel the mining rights that his father had signed over to the British South Africa Chartered Company. The fact is that Seretse Khama (d.1980) was unable to advance the security of land interests of the Bushmen due to serious ill health.*

*But still, in 1970 the Tribal Land Act only recognized 12 tribal territories, the Bushmen and some other tribes excluded. In 1975 the Tribal Land Grazing Policy was introduced which allowed the elite to aggressively sink boreholes and then acquire part of the Bushmen commons. And in 1977, my scheme, supported by the Department of Wildlife, to allow the cropping of the herds of zebra and wildebeest on the Makgadikgadi salt pans for the benefit*

*of the Bushmen, was turned down by the Ministry. 'We are before our time,' muttered Director Chucks Matenge to me.*

*By 1984, 218 ranches, fenced and with boreholes, were alienated to private ownership, and snapped up by the cattle elite.*

*But Ian Khama is not a racist. After all, his mother was white and his people carry Bushmen genes. He is just uncomfortable with the fact that the egalitarian chiefless Bushmen eschew Western Godless ways. And the diamond fields are exceedingly rich, and the tourist operation in the reserve in which he has shares is clearly doing well.*

*The International Court at the Hague, newly emboldened by its decision to enlarge its remit to matters of the destruction of the environment, must bring charges against the Botswana Government. But change must come, and will, but from within.*

The plight of the Bushmen is an enduring national disgrace. Once wild and free, guided by God, they are now increasingly confined to shacks; degraded, hungry, ill, disease-ridden, and ecological grief victims, their lives changed forever.