Bill, I am in my seventy-second year and have spent my professional life serving the whims of political leadership or providing it the means to exercise military power. So do not assume anything about what I know or where and how I may have learned it.
I also have read quite a bit of Mearsheim's work. I thought his early efforts, particularly Conventional Deterrence, was a well thought out examination on the motivations for war, and hence how to deter it. I frankly think Clausewitz said essentially the same thing, but Mearsheim was more complete, or perhaps more readable. I believe he thoroughly lost his way in his critical examination of Lidell Hart. I forget the name of the book, though it is here in my library somewhere. It is a classic example of an academic stepping into the complex world of of operational and tactical warfare. The "indirect approach" to the operational art of war remains the gold standard of professional expertise. It is why we see exercised all too rarely. The Lee of Chancellorsville, Grant of Vicksburg, or Rommel of Gazala would have been amused by Mearsheim's thesis.
His notions of "offensive realism" which he seems to return to time and again, explain, but also excuse, the notion of regional hegemons and buffer zones. With respect to the Soviet Union and its rump successor, what I think he fails to take into account is the organization of the state itself. Where does the buffer zone begin of a "nation" composed of a polyglot of historical cultures and peoples. From my perspective, If anyone seems stuck in the past, in his case a bipolar world, it is Mearsheim.
For instance, this notion of his that any nation has the right to dictate the actions of its neighbors is built upon an inherent fallacy. That "right" only exists if that nation has the power to do so. When Russia had its jack boots on the collective neck of Eastern Europe, it had the power to exercise such a right. As the Ukrainian people, not the US or Western Europe or the CIA, stopped its brutal invasion of their country and rolled the Russian Army back from Kyiv, they demonstrated that Russia no longer had that power to exercise that right. The Finns and Swedes underscored exactly the same thing when they joined the Atlantic alliance.
I have said any number of times that this war will end in negotiations. Negotiations will end it because neither power is capable of dictating the terms of peace in either respective capital. But negotiated settlements come in all forms and can have the effect of victory or defeat or stalemate. Both sides, and from the West's perspective, particularly Russia must conclude that the prosecution of the war is no longer worth the expense of lives, treasure, and political capital. For the moment Ukraine believes it must continue to battle for its right of self-determination and Putin believes he can break the West's and Ukrainian will to brutally snuff out those aspirations.
Like you, I am beyond frustrated with this administration, but for different reasons. As I have also said here many times, the lack of will in the administration is appalling. We have a President who is a tottering figurehead and a weak and subservient SECDEF. This critical confrontation between the West and the dictator in the Kremlin is thus being managed by an election strategist.
Hopefully, the current plight of Ukraine after the cut-off of US materiel will awaken the administration to be far more aggressive and generous in those supplies.
Finally, I think you have it exactly backwards with respect to China. It was Xi who was attempting to form an alliance with Putin before Feb of 2022. It was Xi who saw the value of an economically weak but militarily strong and newly aggressive Russia on Western Europe's doorstep. Nothing could be more effective in dividing US focus, strategy, and military potential. Defeating Russia's new imperial ambitions is the surest way to counter that strategy.
Ukraine, not the US, has the right to determine the appropriate time to begin negotiations. If I had to hazard a guess, those negotiations will begin late this year or next. But whenever they are, the calendar will have nothing to do with it. Putin will await the effect and measure the success or failure of this renewed spring offensive. Ukraine will assess their capability to seize additional terrain and regain the initiative.
Several wild cards are also in play that could change the face of the conflict dramatically. First, is what I believe is the fundamental fragility of the Russian state. The impact of casualties, massive materiel losses, and growing damage to the economy could manifest itself at any moment. The parallels with 1917 are far from exact, but they are there. Likewise, war weariness could lead to the downfall of the Zelensky government. That too, would instantly change the trajectory of a negotiated peace.
But for the moment, the Ukrainian people continue their brave resistance against a brutal invader. Putin, not the US, initiated this war. Nothing proves that more surely than the undeniable fact that Putin is the only one who could end it tomorrow. I pray that we will finally provide Ukraine the means adequate to convince him it is time to do so.
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